TEAM CODE – TC_050

KISAN LAW COLLEGE

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE COURT OF MANTE

Irol Pvt. Ltd. (PETITIONER) V

Union of India & Ors. (RESPONDENT)

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF M

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT – Union of Inida & Ors.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................4
CASES............................................................................................................................4
RULES & STATUTES...................................................................................................5

BOOKS...........................................................................................................................5

REPORTS.......................................................................................................................5

CIRCULARS..................................................................................................................5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION10.................................................................................6

STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................................7-8

STATEMENT OF ISSUES....................................................................................................9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..........................................................................................10

ARGUMENT ADVANCED...............................................................................................11-29

I. THE WRIT PETITION UNDER ART. 226 IS NOT MAINTAINABLE..................11

1. No locus standi...........................................................................................................11

2. Suitable remedy is a bar on maintainability..........................................................11-16

3. Petitioner has not exhausted alternative remedies...............................................16-17

II. THE SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION MAKES THE CONTRACT VALID.......17

1. First agreement with minor was void ab inito.........................................................18

2. Ratification does not make the contract valid one..................................................18

III. THE PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED FOR ANY RELIEF...............................20

1. Agreement made with minor was void ab initio.....................................................20

2. Principle of restitution not applicable.......................................................................20

3. Petitioner has suffered losses on his own account...............................................20-21

1
 4. Time was not the essence of contract.................................................................21-23
.
5. Principle of quantum meruit” is not applicable.................................................23-24

6. Agreement become impossible to perform due to pandem................................24-25

IV. THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED FOR RELIEF...........................................25-29

1. Mental agony.............................................................................................................25

2. Undue Influence......................................................................................................26-29

3. Respondent has suffered losses................................................................................29

PRAYER…...........................................................................................................................30

2
 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

Abbreviations Full Form

¶ Para
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Bom Bombay
Cal Calcutta
Cr. L.J. Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
H.C. High Court
Kar. Karnataka
Ltd. Limited
IPC The Indian Penal Code, 1860
CPC The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Ors. Others
p. Page
Para. Paragraph
PC Privy Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Report
Supp. Supplementary
v. Verses
Vol. Volume
Constitution The Constitution of India
The Contract Act The Indian Contract Act, 1872

The Evidence Act The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITY

CASE LAWS
1. Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 659.
2. K.C. Gajapati Narayana Deo and Ors. v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1953 Ori185
3. veerayya v. Sobhanandri, AIR 1956 SC 166
4. Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 659.
5. Shalini Shyam Shetty and Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 15 (2010) 8 SCC 329.
6. Daryao and Ors., v. The State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1961 15 SC 1457
7. Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114
8. Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary [2015] 5 SCC 622
9. [2015] 5 SCC 622
10. Mohan Pande v. Usha Rani (1992) 4 SCC 61
11. Arjun Singh v. Mohinder Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993
12. Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527
13. Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449
14. Ashok Kumar Mittal vs. Ram Kumar Gupta & Anr. 2009 (2) SCC 656.
15. Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd v. CG Power and Industrial
Solutions Limited LL 2021 SC 255.
16. Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114
17. Tukaram Ramji Shendre v. Mahhorao Manji Bhange, AIR 1948 Nag 293.
18. Nazir Ahmad v Jiwan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 159
19. Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114
20. Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill (1914) 3 K.B.60
21. Jogan ram Marwari v. Mahadeo Prasad Sahu, (1909) 36 Cal 768,776

4
JOURNAL
Shivprasad, et at., Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Isolating
the Problem 2 (2021)

STATUTES AND RULES

1. The Constitution of India
2. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
3. The Indian Contract Act, 1872
4. The Specific Relief Act, 1963
5. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
6. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
7. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
8. Delhi High Court Act, 1966
9. The Punjab High Court Act, 1918

BOOKS
1. AVTAR SINGH, CONTRACT & SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 12TH EDITION
2. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (13TH ED. 2001)
3. J.N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (55th ED. 2018)
4. C.K. Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (Edition: 9th, 2021)
5. POLLOCK & MULLA ON INDIAN CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC RELIEF ACTS
6. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8TH ED. 2019)
7. R.K. BANGIA, CONTRACTS – 1V (6TH ED, 2018)
8. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL , THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (27TH ED. 2019)
9. M N Rao, et al., N.S. BINDRA'S, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (10TH ED. 2007).

REPORT

Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on 16-24
February 2020

CIRCULARS
1. Notification dated 21.7.2003 under powers conferred by Section 26 of the Punjab Courts
Act, 1918. [No. 382/Gaz./F. Judl. 1(a) Powers 21st July, 2003
2. Official Gazette, Notification No. F.5/26/2020/Est./Coop/Misc/Covid-19 duty/Part File

5
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondent humbly submits this memorandum in response to the suit filed before this
Honourable Court. The Petitioner has come to this Court to ask for the damages and recovery
of Rs. 2,50,000 for the breach of the contract under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872. It sets forth the facts and the laws on which the claims are based.

6
 STATEMENTS OF FACTS

S.NO. Fact title INSTANCES

1. Invitation to Offer Ishika (Respondent), a 17-year-old girl, a computer
science wizard, came across advertisement of
freelance software creation for ‘irol’ company and
subsequently apply for the interview
2. Contract with Minor Oral Contract with Minor
(December 15, 2020) In interview she impressed the Vice- President of
company, subsequently awarded contract on
December 15, 2020.
3. Breach of Policy 1. The interview and subsequent contact with
Ishika held as per “company policy”.
2. The “firm” has a policy of not doing business
with minors. (Breach of Policy)
4. Signing of Contract 1. Ishika is mailed a contract by the organisation
(January 16, 2021) for her signature.
2. she “signs the contract” and updates it on the
company's website, where it is “duly obtained”.

5. Considerations 1. Consideration for Company

Ishika is told by the company to send a
prototype of the app by April 21, 2021.
2. Consideration for Ishika
She was also told that she will be paid Rs.
1,00,000 for making and sending the prototype
to the Company.

6. Covid-19 & Delay 1. For the development of the prototype Ishika

(End of February 2021) ordered few hardware pieces from China.
2. There was a spike in cases of Covid-19 in India
in the month end of February 2021. There was
a “delay in the delivery” of the hardware
ordered by Ishika, which made it difficult for
her to
complete her prototype.

7
 3. Since the same hardware wasn’t available
locally, Ishika had to put her work on hold for
some time.
7. Respondent turns Major Ishika turned to eighteen on March 23, 2021.
(March 23, 2021)

8. Alteration in Agreement Recognizing that she will not be able to deliver the
(April 20, 2021) prototype by the deadline, she requests a two-week
extension, since she was down with covid, on April
20, 2021, and agrees to submit it by May 5, 2021.

9. New Demand for Money No response for Request for Rs. 40,000
In order to finish her prototype, she requests an
additional Rs. 40,000/-. However, by that time, the
firm had already begun more processing work for
the app and had invested a significant amount of
money on similar advertising efforts.
10. Losses to Company The company had “to cancel few meetings with
major investors” for this app because of the
absence of prototype. In that situation corporation
can't afford to send Ishika “any more time” when
it's still
losing money.
11. Suit for Breach of Contract Petitioner “Irol” Company files a claim in the
(September 14, 2021) Mante High Court for damages and recovery of
Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Only), accusing
Ishika of breach of contract.

8
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I - WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF MANTE HAS JURISDICTION TO

ENTERTAIN THE WRIT PETITTION?

ISSUE II - WHETHER SUBSEQUENT ALTERATION IN AGREEMENT, CAN BE

AFFECTED BY PREVIOUS VOID AGREEMENT?

ISSUE III - WHETHER PETITIONER ENTITLED FOR ANY COMPENSATION?

ISSUE IV – WHETHER RESPONDENT ENTITLED FOR ANY RELIEF?

9
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I - WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF MANTE HAS JURISDICTION TO

ENTERTAIN THE WRIT PETITTION OR SUIT?
The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain either the suit, or writ petition as the former is
barred by the alternative remedy is available and Section 26 of Delhi High Court Act, 1966
sets the Pecuniary Jurisdiction of this Court is Rs. Two crores and the valuation of suit is
merely Rs. 2,50,000 and later jurisdiction is barred as petitioner fundamental or legal right is
not violated.
ISSUE II - WHETHER SUBSEQUENT ALTERATION IN AGREEMENT, WHEN
RESPONDENT BECOMES MAJOR, CAN BE AFFECTED BY PREVIOUS VOID
AGREEMENT?
The first agreement was void ab initio then amendment or ratification of the void agreement
can’t possible, the effect of which is that there is no fresh agreement concluded, thus, the
subsequent agreement is not a contract as it has effect of previous agreement with
Respondent.

ISSUE III - WHETHER PETITIONER ENTITLED FOR ANY COMPENSATION?

Petitioner is not entitled for any damages as it is well-settled rule that from minor no damages
can be recovered except when there is unjust enrichment or in case contract was in favour of
minor but in this case, there is no such case neither any valuable item or money has been
delivered to the Respondent nor any necessity of goods supplied to the Respondent, thus, the
Petitioner is not liable for the compensation.

ISSUE IV – WHETHER RESPONDENT ENTITLED FOR ANY RELIEF?

Respondent is entitled for relief as she has to suffer mental agony and torture of proceeding
despite the fact that Respondent has not cured from the Covid fully, further petitioner has to
lost her valuable time in making prototype and she has to invest her own money so she is
entitled for the compensation to all the losses which has been incurred by her.

10
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THE WRIT PETITION FILED IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HIGH

COURT It is humbly submitted before this honourable High Court that the writ petition filed
by the “Irol Pvt. Com.” is not maintainable on ground that Petitioner has no locus standi to
argue the case [1.], Suitable Remedy Is a Bar On Maintainability [2.], Petitioner has not
exhausted the alternate available remedies [3.]
1. NO LOCUS STANDI
1.1 Suit can’t be converted into writ
1.1.1 The Petitioner has filed a suit before this Court which in no case can be converted into
writ petition, if Petitioner is alleging for the violation of the Fundamental Rights, then
in no case the Respondent is an interested party in this case as the writ petition can only
be filed against the “State” and not against the “Private Party”.1
1.2 Suit Can’t Be Clubbed into Writ
1.2.1 It is well-settled law that writs can be clubbed where there is involvement of common
question law, but in no case a suit can be clubbed with the Writ Petition. The Petitioner
can’t take the help of “Colourable Legislation”2 and trying to committing a mischief of
law by clubbing the suit indirectly converting the suit into the Writ Petition.
1.3 Company Can’t Claim Fundamental Rights Under Article 19(1)(g)
1.3.1 The Company, though a separate legal entity, can’t be treated as a natural person and it
is well-established proposition that company can’t claim fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution3. However, the stakeholder of the company can claim
fundamental rights but as this is a matter pertaining to the right of the private
individuals and there is no such involvement of the interest of the large business
community as all the laws are in compliance with the public policy of the state and in
case the situation of violation of fundamental rights arises.
2. SUITABLE REMEDY IS A BAR ON MAINTAINABILITY
2.1 Lack of Pecuniary Jurisdiction
2.1.1 This is submitted before this Honourable Court that the general principle which govern
the suit relating to place of suing is Section 15 of the CPC 4 which provides that "every
suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it" effect of
which

1
Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 659.
2
K.C. Gajapati Narayana Deo and Ors. v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1953 Ori185
3
All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.

11
4
Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it.

12
 is that this suit has to be instituted in the Court of lowest grade competent to try It and
the Petitioner has to exhaust the other remedies first.
A. Principle of Implied Powers
2.1.2 This suit is not filed as per Section 6 of the CPC5 which deals with Pecuniary
jurisdiction. It states that no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain over the suits the
amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any)
of its ordinary jurisdiction. Though, in this case amount is less than two crores, is not
exceedingly above two crores’ limits but as per the principle of implied powers6 laws
which are necessary and proper for the execution of power are incidental to such
powers are called implied powers and this Section is impliedly restricting the
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the suit.7
B. Suitable Remedy Is a Bar On Maintainability
2.1.3 The minimum pecuniary original jurisdiction of the Mante High Court has been
prescribed under Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act 1966 8, which provides that
the High Court of Mante shall have jurisdiction on the subject matters, the value of
which exceeds Rs. two crores. As per principle of literal rule of interpretation which
states the word "shall" has been used in Section 5(2) of the said Act the effect of
which is that this High Court can't entertain suits the pecuniary jurisdiction of which
is less than two crores.
C. Punjab High Court Act Empowered the Mante High Court to Limit Pecuniary
Jurisdiction
2.1.4 Further, Punjab High Courts Act, 1918 empowered the High Court of Mante to
specify pecuniary jurisdiction for subordinate Judges. Section 1 of the Punjab Courts
Act9, 1918 provides that this Act extends to the Union Territory of Mante and Section
26 of this Act10 empowered the Mante High Court to specify the pecuniary limits of
the jurisdiction of subordinate Judges.

5
Save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court
jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of
its ordinary jurisdiction.
6
M N Rao, et al., N.S. Bindra's, Interpretation of Statutes 832-835 (Lexis Nexis 10th ed. 1 January 2007).
7
Id.
8
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the High Court of Mante shall also
have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds
rupees two crore.
9
It extends to the Union Territory of Delhi.
10
Subject to the limit specified in Section 25, the jurisdiction to be exercised in original civil suits as regards the
value by any person appointed to be a Subordinate Judge, shall be determined by the High Court either by
including him in a class or otherwise as it thinks fit.

13
2.1.5 By exercising this power under Section 26, this High Court had declared 11 on 21.7.
2003 that the pecuniary jurisdiction of all the subordinate Judges to try Original Civil
Suits the jurisdictional value of which does not exceed Rs. 3,00,000/- and in the
present case the value of the subject matter of the suit is Rs. 2,50,000.
2.1.6 Thus, as per the above-mentioned law which makes the position of law aptly clear that
the jurisdiction of the present suit is vested in the Court of Civil Judge of Junior
Division as the valuation of subject matter of the suit is Rs. 2,50,000/- only.

2.2 WRIT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

A. No infringement of fundamental or legal rights
2.2.1 The Petitioner has contended that there is violation of Article 14 of the constitution
which in no case warrant the application of these rights as for the former there must be
the existence arbitrary exercise of the powers which in no case the “State” 12 has
exercised, and further the State is empowered under Article 15 to make laws for the
protection of children and presence of provision like Section 11 of the Contract Act is
constitutionally valid as it derive their validity from Article 15 which in no case make
it unconstitutional.
2.2.2 Argument that the Respondent state has violated the Petitioner right under Article
19(1)(g) of Constitution13 is not sustainable as prima facie company is not a citizen so
can’t claim protection of that Article14 as this Art. is exclusively for the citizens.
Further, Petitioner has argued that the it in qua stakeholders or other business
community can claim protection is also not sustainable as the presence of Section 11
of the Act15 is in no way against the public policy and providing no safeguards by the
State is in no way violated the rights of the Petitioner as it can’t challenge any law
which is in compliance with the public policy16 or made as per the mandate of the
Constitution17
B. Pure Question of Facts Can’t Be Answered in Writ Jurisdiction

11
Notification dated 21.7.2003 under powers conferred by Section 26 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. [No.
382/Gaz./F. Judl. 1(a) Powers 21st July, 2003
12
Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.
13
Supra at 3.
14
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India.
15
Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is
subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
16
Veerayya v. Sobhanandri, AIR 1956 SC 166 (India)
17
Article 15 of the Constitution.
14
2.2.3 It is cleared from the above proposition that there is no violation of fundamental or
legal rights no such writ can be maintainable then the questions raised by the
Petitioner were pure questions of fact18 and which could be answered in one way or
the other only by the Civil Court in a properly constituted civil suit and on the basis of
the evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ filed under the Art. 226 of the
Constitution by the HC.19
C. Inconsistent Remedies & admission of facts
2.2.4 The learned counsel of the Petitioner has argued for the invocation of the writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution which by necessary implication
means admission of the fact that Respondent is protected by the current laws and
asking for the remedy means which this Court all can do is to provide safeguards
which would be applicable prospectively. As the guidelines could not be applied
retrospectively as they would work as the substantive law.
2.2.5 On one side the Petitioner is invoking a Writ and on other side Petitioner is arguing
for regular remedy which in no case permissible. 20 Even if the High Court gives
direction and to more extent declare any law unconstitutional it will have prospective
effect as it will not bind the parties by this judgment as decisions can have prospective
effect.
D. Private parties can’t be added in writ jurisdiction
2.2.6 Further, in no case it warrants the addition of the Ishika as a Respondent in this case
as when there is infringement of fundamental rights then on what grounds Petitioner is
seeking for Respondent as a party in a writ petition. It is well settled 21 law that “the
Respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties and the private parties acting
in collusion with State can be Respondents in a writ petition. In the present case the
Respondent is not in collusion with the any respective Government, thus, can’t be
made as a party in this case.”22 Therefore, Respondent is not a necessary party in this
case.
E. Principle of Res judicata
2.2.7 This is a well-established principle of law that “res judicata” is applied on writ
petitions23 either under Article 32 or 226.24 The question of law which the Petitioner is

18
J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, Question of Fact Art. 226, 626 (55th Ed. 2018)
19
Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 659 (India)
20
Id.
21
Shalini Shyam Shetty and Ors. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 15 (2010) 8 SCC 329 (India)
22
Id.

15
23
Daryao and Ors., v. The State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1961 15 SC 1457 (India)
24
C.K. Takwani, The Civil Procedure Code with Limitation Act, 1963, Res Judicata & Rule of Law 71 (8th Ed.
2017)

16
 arguing for, has already been discussed and decided by the Supreme Court in many
case laws that contract with minor is void ab initio.
2.2.8 Many times, the decision of Mohiri Bibi case 25 upheld by the Supreme Court26 which
meant that not only could neither party enforce the agreement made with minor, but
also that no restitution is possible to the pre-contractual position. The case was to
exert an enormous influence on subsequent case law, to the extent that it came to be
treated as an unquestionable axiom of Indian contract law, it is also confirmed
recently by the Supreme Court of India in Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary27 The rule
that minors’ contracts are void ab initio has left Indian contract law in a serious
anomaly.28
2.2.9 Thus, the question of laws which has already been discussed need not be reviewed. By
citing the situation as unprecedented the Petitioner is trying to commit mischief of law
as it will be a review of situation which the only Supreme Court is empowered and not
the High Court as Article 226(4) of the Constitution 29 states that high Court can’t act
in contravention of the Supreme Court.
F. When writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 can be invoked
2.2.10 Honourable High Court can’t be allowed to invoke its constitutional jurisdiction to be
used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or
criminal, are available. The Apex-Court has made it clear that 30 it is not intended to
replace ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an
aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special
and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the
litigant.31

2.3 INHERENT POWER OF HIGH COURT UNDER SECTION 151

2.3.1 Argument that Petitioner can claim jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC is also not
sustainable, though it is true that High Court’s inherent power under Section 151 is very
wide and residuary in nature32 but they come with certain limitations and can’t be
exercised in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the code or against the

25
Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114 (India)
26
Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary [2015] 5 SCC 622 (India)
27
[2015] 5 SCC 622 (India)
28
Shivprasad, et at., Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Isolating the Problem 2
(2021), Statute Law Review, Volume 42, Issue 1, February, Pages 101–115, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy034
29
The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.
17
30
Roshina T. v. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 659 (India)
31
Mohan Pande v. Usha Rani (1992) 4 SCC 61(India)
32
Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitutional of India 56 (13th Ed. 2001)

18
 intention of the Legislature.33 As procedure provided by the code dictated by the
interest of the justice which can’t be overlooked.34 Thus, in the exercise of inherent
power a Court can’t invest itself with the jurisdiction which is not vested in it by law.35
2.4 IN WRITS RULES OF CPC DOES NOT APPLIES
2.4.1 It is pertinent to mention that when a High Court is working under the CPC regime, it
cannot take aid of Article 226 of the Constitution. In a similar manner when High Court
is working under the Writs it can’t apply the rules of CPC at the same time. 36 So, as
power under Section 151 can’t be used.
3. PETITIONER HAS NOT EXHAUSTED ALTERNATIVIVE REMEDIES
3.1 Grounds On Which Petitioner Can Approach High Court
This is humbly submitted that the Petitioner can approach this Court on following ground:
Grounds To Approach the High Court Ground of rejection/Dismissal
S. No. Provision Dealt with
1. Section 151 of the Inherent power of High This provision can’t surpass, what
CPC Court has dictated by the Code37
2. Order VI Rule 17 Amendment Can’t be claimed as damages not
of CPC application for Plaint claimed more than two crores.38
3. Sections 96 of First Appeal No decree has delivered which
CPC39 required in a suit to apply for appeal.
4. Section 113 Reference40 For this there must be a case
pending in lower Court, which is not
the case
here.
5. Section 114 Review No decree has been made, thus,
review can’t be filed.
6. Section 115 Revision No error or illegality is made before
any Court so it can’t be claimed

33
Arjun Singh v. Mohinder Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 (India).
34
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 (India).
35
Raja Soap Factory v. S.P. Shantharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1449 (India).
36
Ashok Kumar Mittal vs. Ram Kumar Gupta & Anr. 2009 (2) SCC 656. (India).
37
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 (India).
38
Section 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966
39
an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court
authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court.
40
Court may state a case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make
such order thereon as it thinks fit

19
 7. Article 226 of Writ Jurisdiction Can’t be claimed as no
the Constitution of High Court infringement of Fundamental or
Legal Rights.41

3.2 Civil Courts to Try All Civil Suits Unless Barred

3.2.1 Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, (hereinafter referred to as C.P.C.) grants
power to civil Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. It provides that the Courts shall
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance
is either expressly or impliedly barred and Section 26 of Punjab Court Act, 1918
impliedly barred the jurisdiction of this High Court to try this suit as this High Court
has already prescribed42 the limit of pecuniary jurisdiction of Subordinate Judges.
3.2.2 Thus, the High Court can’t entertain the matter of the Petitioner as in no case the
Petitioner’s grounds has satisfied this Court to invoke any of the above provision.
3.3 Transfer of Suit to Proper Court
3.3.1 As per order VII Rule 10 of CPC43 which empowered this Court to return the suit to be
presented to the appropriate forum and this Honourable Court may direct to transfer this
suit to the Civil Judge of Junior Division, who has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, in
accordance with the Section 644, Section 945 and Section 2046 of the Civil Procedural
Code and that Court has the jurisdiction to decide all the matters referred to it for
decision, save as provided by the Punjab Court Act, 1918 and Delhi High Court Act,
1966.

II. SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION MAKES THE CONTRACT VALID

This is humbly submitted that in order to prove the voidness of subsequent agreement, prima
facie, there is need to prove that first agreement with minor was void [1.], and subsequently
when previous agreement was void thus, subsequent agreement which ratified the void ab
initio agreement is itself not valid, thus, ratification does not make that valid one [2.]

41
Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd v. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Limited LL 2021 SC
255 (India).
42
Ibid
43
The plaint shall at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have
been instituted.
44
Nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the
subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction
45
The Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is
either expressly or impliedly barred.
46
Other suits to be instituted where Respondents reside or cause of action arises

17
1. FIRST AGREEMENT WITH MINOR WAS VOID AB INITO
(January 16, 2021)
1.1 This is submitted before this Court that as per Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act,
187247 which declares that minor is incompetent to contract effect of which is that
agreement with minor is void ab initio as the Respondent was minor 48 when written
agreement made between parties on January 16, 202149
1.2 A person who by reason of infancy incompetent to contract can’t make contract within
the meaning of this Act and further the question whether a contract is void or voidable
presupposes the existence of contract is not arise is cases where minor is a party 50as their
agreements are void from the very beginning51

2. RATIFICATION DOES NOT MAKE THE CONTRACT VALID ONE

2.1 Subsequent Alteration During Age of Majority
2.1.1 This is humbly contended by the Respondent that subsequent alteration in agreement
during age of majority of Respondent makes the contract valid is not acceptable
because when prima facie agreement was void how can such void agreement, which
has no meaning in the eye of law, can become a contract 52 and it was held in Nazir
Ahmad v. Jiwan Das53 that “a person can’t on attaining majority ratify an agreement
made by him during minority”.
2.2 Valid Contract Needs Fresh Consideration & Fresh Agreement
A. Absence of Fresh Agreement
2.2.1 The presence of fresh agreement demands complete rectification in the terms of the
Contract but the Respondent has not rectified the agreement, but had merely ratified it
as former comes with correction or improving the terms of the agreement as when,
through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties a contract or other instrument in
writing does not express their real intention then any parties with the help of Court
can rectified the agreement,54 but later comes with giving formal approval of
something and in this

47
Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject.
48
Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary [2015] 5 SCC 622 (India).
49
Factsheet ¶ 2
50
Indian Contract Act, 1872
51
Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114 (India).
52
Tukaram Ramji Shendre v. Mahhorao Manji Bhange, AIR 1948 Nag 293 (India).
53
AIR 1938 Lah 159 (India).
18
54
Section 26 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963.

19
 case Respondent merely ratified the time of previous void ab intio agreement result of
which the argument of the Petitioner regarding ratification does not sustain.55
B. Absence of Fresh Consideration
2.2.2 In order to sustain a void agreement which was made during the age of minority there
is need of ‘fresh contract’ which necessitates the “fresh consideration” as per the
facts56 Ishika has altered the agreement on attaining majority as she agrees to submit
the prototype on May 5, 2021 as when she entered into agreement and asked for two
weeks extension that was a modification in the agreement which is separate from the
further demand of Rs. 40, 000.
2.2.3 Another fact which places a question mark on the intention of the Petitioner as the
company had ignored the demand of Rs 40,000 and did not act on the request, instead
continuing in their processing work. Further, Section 25 states agreement without
consideration is void. Thus, this subsequent agreement lacks fresh consideration so
this is void.
2.2.4 As facts are evident that the when demand for Rs. 40,000 was made then Petitioner
has, before the demand made, already started similar advertisement for new
contractors for the development of prototype for the app. Moreover, this is supported
by the case Nazir Ahmad v Jiwan Das57 where it was held that “the consideration
which passed under the earlier contract can’t be implied into the contract into which
the minor enters on attaining majority”. Thus, there was no concluded contract at the
age of majority.
C. Absence of Novation
2.2.5 Argument that there was novation of contract also not sustainable as for the
application of Section 62 of the Contract Act there is need of previous valid contract
as there was no previous valid contract, thus, it can be said that the provision of
novation is not attracted in this case.

III. PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED FOR ANY RELIEF

This is humbly submitted that the Petitioner company is not entitled for the any relief on the
following grounds as the agreement with minor was void ab initio [1.], the principle of
restitution is not applicable [2.], Petitioner has suffered losses on his own account [3.], time

55
Id. at 50
56
Factsheet ¶ 4

20
57
AIR 1938 Lah 159 (India).

21
 was not the essence of the Contract [4.], the “principle of quantum meruit” does not applicable
[5.] the doctrine of frustration applies.
1. AGREEMENT MADE WITH MINOR WAS VOID AB INITIO
1.1 First Agreement Was Void Ab Initio
1.1.1 Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act 187558 deals with the age of the majority of
persons domiciled in India. It provides that the age of majority is eighteen years. The
Respondent was minor at the time of first agreement as her age was 17-year-old so she
was not competent to make the contract, as per Section 11 states that the person who
makes the contract must be of age of majority according to the law to which he is
subject and in this she was not competent. Agreement with minors is void ab initio as
this proposition becomes clear in Mohiri Bibi case59 law as well as subsequent judicial
pronouncement.60
1.2 Second agreement was the modification of previous void agreement
1.2.1 In second agreement there was fresh agreement but no fresh consideration, so which
makes the contract void in void contract no compensation is available except in few
circumstances but in case of minor where there was no existence of contract in that
situation damages for recovery of losses suffered can’t be claimed as Sections 37
(obligation to perform promise), 55 (Time is essence of contract), 56 (Doctrine of
Frustration) applies only in cases where there was a valid contract but these provision
does not comes within the ambit of minor case as Section 11 of the Contract Act is a
bar which does not allow the other provision to prevail over.

2. PRINCIPLE OF RESTITUTION NOT APPLICABLE

2.1 No amount or earnest money received by Respondent
2.1.1 In this case the Respondent has not received any amount as for the application of
principle of restitution either under Section 64 or 65 of the Contract Act there is need of
transferring of goods or any valuable items which in this case was not delivered.
2.1.2 It is evident from the facts 61 that Petitioner has agreed to provide money on the prior
condition of making and delivering of the prototype, which was not performed at any
due date, thus, when no money was delivered no restitution is possible.

58
Every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of majority on his completing the age of eighteen years
and not before.
59
Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose, (1903) 30 Cal 539=30 IA 114 (India).
60
Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary [2015] 5 SCC 622 (India).

22
61
Factsheet ¶ 2

23
2.1.3 The demand of Rs. 40,000 was also ignored by the Petitioner and even if it was
accepted then no such money had received by the Respondent, as this proposition
cleared from the facts of the case.62
2.1.4 Thus, in such a situation, Section 33(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is of no use
as it applies when the money is in traceable limit of the minor63 but as there is no such
case, the principle of restitution does not apply.
2.2 Contract Was Not Made for The Benefit of The Minor
2.2.1 In order to attract Section 68 of the Contract Act, 64 the contract must be made for the
benefit of minor and moreover there must be transfer of something for the necessities of
minor65 and in this case both of these elements are silent so the argument for this point
is liable to be rejected.

3. PETITIONER HAS SUFFERED LOSSES ON HIS OWN ACCOUNT

3.1 Petitioner not intended to assigned contract to Ishika
3.1.1 The Petitioner argument regarding compensation is completely baseless and has
suffered losses on his own account as when Respondent has requested the further sum
of Rs. 40,00066 by that time and before the second agreement was made it has already
started working on the app and invested some amount of money on similar
advertisements which shows his intention was not to assign contract to Respondent.
3.2 Loss suffered by Company before the agreed date (5th May 2021)
3.2.1 The combined reading of para 3 and 4 of the Fact Sheet proves that the losses which
had been suffered by the Petitioner Company were before the 5 th of May 2021. The
express interpretation of these words can be made as follows to show losses suffered
before the agreed date.
S. No. Factsheet Express meaning

62
Factsheet ¶ 4
63
Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill (1914) 3 K.B.60
64
If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied
by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is
entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person.
65
Jogan ram Marwari v. Mahadeo Prasad Sahu, (1909) 36 Cal 768,776 (India).
66
Factsheet ¶ 4

24
 1. “In order to finish her prototype, she Ishika has asked this amount before
requests an additional Rs. 40,000/-.”67 15th May 2021 so that she can submit
the prototype on time.

2. “by that time, the firm had already The company had also had to cancel a
begun more processing work for the few meetings with major investors for
app and had invested a significant this app because the prototype was not
amount of money on similar available before the agreed date.
advertising efforts.”68 Further, investment made before the
agreed date shows the company is
dependent also on other investors.

3. “The corporation can't afford to send The word “still losing money” is
Ishika any more time when it's still evident to the fact that Petitioner
losing money.”69 Company started suffering loss before
the agreement date and still company
was suffering loss means, it has started
suffering it prior to the agreement date.

3.3 Ready And Willing to Perform the Essential Terms of the contract
3.3.1 Respondent was promised to pay money on 21ST March 2021 upon the completion of
the prototype, but she failed to submit it due to the delay in delivery 70 of hardware
which was ordered. For the development of the prototype Respondent ordered few
hardware pieces from China71 and there was a spike in cases of Covid-19 in India in the
month end of February 2021.
3.4 Bona fide intention of Respondent
3.4.1 As above para shows her bona fide intention to perform the contract as she subsequent
to the promise, although minor, acted upon and ordered hardware for the completion of
prototype from China which could not be delivered on the agreed time because of delay

67
Id.
68
Id.
69
ibid
70
Factsheet ¶ 3
71
Factsheet ¶ 3

25
 in delivery due to covid-19. Subsequent to this Government of Delhi 72 has imposed
lockdown on the 19th of April as well as she was down with covid due these two
reasons it could not become possible in any case to complete the work on 5th May 2021.
3.5 Respondent dispensed with performance of Contract
3.5.1 Section 67 of Contract Act73 deals with “Effect of neglect of promisee to afford
promisor reasonable facilities for performance” it which required the promisee
company to afford reasonable facilities to the promisor but in this case no such
reasonable requirements were provided by the Petitioner company to the Respondent
and the result of which as this Section states the promisor is excused by such neglect
or refusal as to any non-performance caused thereby.

4. TIME WAS NOT THE ESSENCE OF CONTRACT

4.1 This is humbly submitted that the time was not the essence of the contract as Petitioner
has flexibly enhanced the date of performance and was already looking for another
contractor for the similar work which shows that the Petitioner was having more time to
deal with new contractors, thus, it shows time was not the essence. If we suppose time
was the essence even then Petitioner can’t ask for the compensation under para third of
Section 55 of Contract Act.
4.2 Absence of Notice of intention
4.2.1 Para third of Section 55 of the Contract Act deals with “effect of acceptance of
performance at time other than that agreed upon”. The present case is fit to fall within
the domain of this Section as in order to attract this Section, there is need of certain
essentials to be complied with which are as follows:
4.2.24.2.2
Essential of Para 3 Of Section 55 Relation Of Law with Facts
1. As on agreed time the contract was not In this case also the Respondent has not
performed performed the contract on agreed time74
which was 21st April 2021.

72
Official Gazette, Notification No. F.5/26/2020/Est./Coop/Misc/Covid-19 duty/Part File
http://it.delhigovt.nic.in/writereaddata/Cir20217149.34.45.pdf
73
If any promisee neglects or refuses to afford the promisor reasonable facilities for the performance of his
promise, the promisor is excused by such neglect or refusal as to any non-performance caused thereby.
74
Factsheet ¶ 4

26
 2. Promisee accept the performance at any other The Promisee Company agreed to
time than agreed upon perform the promise on 5th May 2021
(other time than agreed upon)
3. Notice of intention; There was no notice of intention was
given to Respondent. Thus, it can be
said that the Petitioner company was not
entitled to compensation.
5. PRINCIPLE OF QUANTUM MERUIT” IS NOT APPLICABLE

5.1 Section 37 of Contract Act75 obligates the parties to perform their respective promises,
unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act
and Section 11 which demands the competency of parties and in this case where prior
agreement was made with minor and subsequent contract was vitiated by lack of fresh
consideration which is requirement of Section 25 makes the subsequent altered contract
void.
5.2 No advanced money given & contingent contract
5.2.1 The facts76 provide that Petitioner company will pay Rs 1,00,000 to the Respondent and
for this Respondent was told by that it could be possible only when she must send the
prototype and there was no prototype made by Respondent and such payment was
contingent upon the fulfilment of the prior condition to make the prototype for the
Petitioner company.
5.3 Application of Force majure principle
5.3.1 Section 32 of the Contract Act 77 deals with enforcement of contracts contingent on an
event happening. This case also deals with the same situation as para third of the facts
sheet specifically provides - “Ishika is told by the company that she must send a
prototype of the app by April 21, 2021, and that she will be paid Rs. 1,00,000 for doing
so…”78So, here the contingency is that first send the prototype and Petitioner Company
will provide you with money. But, when the performance of the act become impossible
because of the two following reasons, namely, the which makes the altered contract
void: -
(i) Due to pandemic, there was a delay in delivery,

75
The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective promises, unless such
performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law
76
Factsheet ¶ 2
77
Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens cannot be enforced by
law unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void
27
78
Factsheet ¶ 2

28
 (ii) Respondent was down with Covid.
5.3.2 Further, the event of performing contract becomes impossible to perform so this
Section79 makes such agreements void if the event becomes impossible.
5.4 “He who seeks equity must do equity”
5.4.1 The subsequent order of hardware from China and asking of extra Rs. 40,000 makes it
clear that Respondent has spent more than 40,000 rupees to purchase hardware from
China and which can vary up to 1,00,000 which Respondent is to be provided by the
Petitioner company as Principle of Equity comes into play which states that “he who
seeks equity must do equity” to receive equitable relief, the Petitioner party has to
complete all its own obligations as well. The Petitioner to a Court of equity is just as
much subject to the power of that Court as the Respondent.
5.4.2 Doctrine of restitution read with Section 67 of the Contract Act80 which states that if
promisee (Petitioner) neglects or fails to provide reasonable facilities to the promisor
(Respondent) then promisor is excused by such non-performance caused thereby,thus,
One who comes to Court must come with clean hand.
5.4.3 Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity as in the case of a minor it is aptly needed
and, in this case, it is the Petitioner who has to compensate the Petitioner as upon his
request the Respondent has acted upon and in good faith did her best for the benefit of
Petitioner Company so this Court shall take notice of this fact.

6. AGREEMENT BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO PERFORM DUE TO PANDEMIC

6.1 Delay in delivery attracts Doctrine of Frustration
6.1.1 As Section 56 of Contract Act deals with contract to do act afterwards becoming
impossible81 and in this case also the performance of contract become impossible either
it is to be performed on 21st of April 2021 or on 5th may because in former date the
performance of contract was delayed due to the unprecedented pandemic, the effect of
which is that there was delay in the delivery of hardware as it is evident from the
facts.82
6.1.2 In later date, performance of work on 5th may is not possible as the Respondent was
down with covid which makes it impossible to finish the work on the agreed date and
Section

79
Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
80
Ibid.
81
A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event
29
which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
82
Factsheet ¶ 3

30
 1683 deals with Personal bars to relief. It provides Specific performance of a contract
cannot be enforced in favour of a person who has become incapable of performing the
contract.
6.2 Presumption regarding illness time
6.2.1 It is evident from the medical reports that using available preliminary data 84, “the
average time from onset to clinical recovery for mild cases is approximately 2 weeks
and is 3-6 weeks for patients with severe or critical disease. Preliminary data suggests
that the time period from onset to the development of severe disease, including
hypoxia, is 1 week. Among patients who have died, the time from symptom onset to
outcome ranges from 2-8 weeks”85 so, this data probes that even if a patient was
suffering from mild covid she needs at least 15 days to recover which may take up to
6 weeks i.e., 42 days. This shows that the Respondent could not be able to complete
the work on time as her suffering from covid makes the performance of the prototype
impossible.

IV. THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED FOR RELIEF

This is humbly submitted that the Respondent has suffered a lot due to the act of the
Petitioner so she is entitled for the Counter-Claim upon the grounds of Mental agony [1.],
Undue influence was employed by the Petitioner on her [2.], Respondent has to spent her
own money and time [3.]
1. MENTAL AGONY
1.1 Petitioner putted the life of Petitioner at the risk
1.1.1 When Respondent teenager was burdened with covid and unreasonable pressure and
other factors lead her life to the unreasonable pressure and great hardship at the time
when she was suffering from Covid-19, the pandemic which has killed millions and this
fear of death and other torture made by the company and the filing of suit which is not
even maintainable proves that Petitioner Company was putting the life of Petitioner at
the risk.
1.1.2 So, this Court may provide Respondent a reasonable compensation and the company
was trying to make similar advertisement in order to harass Respondent teenager more
and

83
Specific Relief Act, 1963
84
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on 16-24 February 2020
31
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf
85
Ibid

32
 more and Respondent who was already harassed when listened the news of similar
advertisement gets mental trauma as it is very reasonable for a common person who is
very excited to opt for this opportunity, suddenly, faces a blow of new advertisements
this also implies Petitioner was not willing to provide this contract to Respondent.

2 PETITIONER HAS EMPLOYED UNDUE INFLUENCE

This is humbly submitted that Section 16 of the Contract Act 86 deals with undue influence
which provides that a contract is said to be induced by ‘undue influence’ when relations
subsisting between the parties are such that -
1) one of the parties is in a “position to dominate the will of the other” and;
2) uses that position to “obtain an unfair advantage” over the other87
2.1 Petitioner has dominated the will of Respondent
2.1.1 As Petitioner was very well-versed with the fact that the Respondent was a minor as it
is evident from the fact that before agreement was made, the prior requirement was
interview on phone call,88 which shows that “Petitioner company has the cognizance of
the Respondent's minority.”
2.1.2 Further, through this interview the Petitioner company knows that the Respondent is
“very interested in the making of the prototype” as the Respondent has shown his
keenness which makes the Petitioner company realise that she is very interested in the
opportunity of making a prototype and she can go to any end to make this.
2.2 Unfair Advantage” Over the Respondent & Mischief of Law
2.2.1 The Petitioner company has cognizance of the Covid-19 and also that the Respondent
was suffering from covid-19. Despite all this Petitioner company allow the Respondent
to submit the prototype by 5th day of May 2021, this shows that by having cognizance
of the health condition of the Respondent that she is suffering from covid-19 they made
a new contract in order to commit mischief of law as the previous agreement was not
valid and was against the policies of the company89

86
A contract is said to be induced by “undue influence” where the relations subsisting between the parties are
such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an
unfair advantage over the other.
87
Id.
88
Factsheet ¶ 2
89
Factsheet ¶ 2

33
2.2.2 Despite that still they ratified the contract in order to avoid the consequences of law and
if anyone suffers from corona it takes at least two weeks’ time90 to recover an average
person despite this allows the Respondent to continue with the work.
2.2.3 Most important fact is that the market price of the same prototype in india was 10 times
the actual price which was agreed upon and this is a clear case of undue influence as the
Respondent was a teenager who was interested in such activities so the Petitioner
Company has tried to obtain undue advantage over the innocent Respondent to make
the prototype at a very lesser price than actual. As the Respondent soon realised that she
still needed more money to make the prototype which she couldn’t make with merely 1
lakh Rupees.
2.3 Mental Capacity is Temporarily Affected by Illness
2.3.1 This inhuman tendency of the Petitioner company and having knowledge of illness
falls within the ambit of Section 16(2)(b)91 which provides that “a person is deemed to
be in a position to dominate the will of another where he makes a contract with a
person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of
illness, or mental or bodily distress and during this time the Respondent health was
affected by permanent illness because despite her efforts she could not be able to
submit in proper time which also shows her health condition was not normal.
2.3.2 Thus, as per all the above facts the essentials to attract Section 16 of Indian Contract
Act, 187292 is complied with which makes the position of law is aptly clear that the
company has employed undue influence over the will of the innocent Respondent
teenager.
2.4 Burden of proof
2.4.1 In order to shift the burden of proof on the other party there is need of following
condition of which the Court must satisfy as these conditions are mentioned under
Section 16(3) of Indian Contract Act, 1872, namely;
1) A person must be in a position to dominate the will of another

90
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on 16-24 February 2020
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf
91
Indian Contract Act, 1872
92
A person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another where he makes a contract with a
person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or
bodily distress.

34
2.4.2 In this case also the Petitioner company was in a position to dominate the will of the
Respondent teenager as when subsequent agreement was made out at that time
Petitioner was suffering from illness which has already been proved above in para
third. Thus, this condition of dominant position is satisfied henceforth.
2) Transaction Appears to be Unconscionable.
2.4.3 The next essential states that when such a person, who is in position to dominate the
will of the other, enters into a contract with the Respondent minor, and the transaction
appears, [1]. on the face of it, or [2] on the evidence adduced to be unconscionable. In
this case as well the transaction with minor clearly on the face on record is
unconscionable because as per the facts 93 the agreement was made with inadequate
consideration as market price of the same prototype is very expensive.
2.4.4 Further, it is evident that this transaction is unconscionable as Section 111 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 187294 deals with such type of burden and it deals with “proof of
good faith in transactions where one party is in relation of active confidence” and in
this case as well the it is the Petitioner Company who is in position of active
confidence.
2.4.5 Thus, as per above facts the burden is shifted on the Petitioner to prove there was no
undue influence employed either at the very beginning of the agreement, or at the
subsequent transaction. Moreover, proviso to Section 16(3) 95 makes it clear that there
is no necessity to prove above essentials as when any question arises which law is to
be applied then Section 111 would prevail over Section 16(3) of Contract Act.
2.4.6. Respondent has to spent her own money and time in the making of this Prototype as it
is evident from the fact that she has ordered some hardware from Foreign country,
thus, she is entitled for the recovery of her money.

93
Factsheet ¶ 2
94
Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the
other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party
who is in a position of active confidence.
95
Nothing in this subSection shall affect the provisions of Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of
35
1872).

36
 PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the issued raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:

In Writ Petition No. XX of 2021

1. That Petitioner claim for writ jurisdiction is liable to be rejected;
2. That the laws can’t be challenged as they are necessary for the public interest;
3. That the subsequent contract was never rectified by the Respondent;
4. That the Agreement be rescinded;
5. That the Impose the Petitioner is liable for exemplary cost;
6. That the Respondent is entitled for compensation

AND/OR

Pass any other order or relief it may deem fit and proper, in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

37