TEAM CODE – TC_050

KISAN LAW COLLEGE

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH

IrolCOURT OFLtd.
Com. Pvt. MANTE
(PETITIONER) V
Union of India & Ors. (RESPONDENT)

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MAN

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER - Irol Pvt. Ltd. Com.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................4-5
CASES..............................................................................................................................4
RULES & STATUTES....................................................................................................5

BOOKS............................................................................................................................5

REPORTS........................................................................................................................5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................6

STATEMENT OF FACTS.....................................................................................................7-8

STATEMENT OF ISSUES......................................................................................................9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................10

ARGUMENT ADVANCED.................................................................................................11-31

I. THE WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 IS MAINTAINABLE...................11-23

1. The Petitioner Has Locus Standi, An Enforceable Legal Right…............................11-12

2. Alternative Remedy Is No Bar to Writ Jurisdiction....................................................12-13

3. High Court Has Jurisdiction to Hear the Present Case...................................................13

4. Violation Of Fundamental Right.................................................................................13-23

II. SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION MAKES THE CONTRACT VALID....................23

1. Presence of fresh Agreement......................................................................................23-24

2. New Arrangement in the terms of the contract..............................................................24

3. Presence of fresh consideration..................................................................................24-25

III. DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION/FORCE MAJEURE CAN’T BE INVOKED.25-28

1. Existence of commercial hardship.........................................................................25-27

1
 2. Temporarily illness can’t affect the performance....................................................27-28

3. Government Interference Can’t Be Pleaded..............................................................28

IV. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED FOR ANY COMPENSATION......................28-30

1. Firm Has Already Began More Processing Work for The App............................28

2. Investment Of Money on Similar Advertisements..............................................29

3. Meetings Cancelled with Investors..................................................................29-30

PRAYER….............................................................................................................................31

2
 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

Abbreviations Full Form

¶ Para
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Bom Bombay
Cal Calcutta
Cr. L.J. Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
H.C. High Court
Kar. Karnataka
Ltd. Limited
CPC The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
No. Number
Ors. Others
p. Page
Para. Paragraph
PC Privy Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Report
Supp. Supplementary
v. Verses
Vol. Volume
Contract Act The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Constitution The Constitution of India
Evidence Act The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITY
CASE LAWS
1. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 588
2. A.V. Venkateshwara v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1954 SC 403
3. Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1955 SC 661
4. Bhagwandas v. Shri Dial 1913 Punj Rec. No. 92, p. 325
5. Bhudra Chand v. Betts (1915) 22 Cal LJ 566:33 IC 347
6. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 1455
7. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1369
8. Himmat Lal v. State of U.P AIR 1954 SC 403
9. Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 851
10. Maa Vaishno Enterprises and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors. W.P. No. 7373 of 2020
11. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal. 539
12. Nazir Ahmad v. Jiwan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 159
13. Real Estate Agencies v. Government of Goa, AIR 2012 SC 3848
14. Raman and Raman Ltd. vs. The State of Madras and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 694.
15. State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1269
16. Sachidanada Patnaik v. G.P. & Co, AIR 1964 Ori 269
17. Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44
18. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1369
19. State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalia and Ors., AIR 1956 Bom 1
20. Suraj Narai v Sukhu Ahir, AIR 1924 All 730
21. State of Haryana v. RamKumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 321
22. T. C. Basappa v. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440
23. T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3032
24. Travancore Devaswom Board v. Thanath International, (2004) 13 SCC 44
25. Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd v. CG Power and Industrial
Solutions Limited LL 2021 SC 255
26. Vishakha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011

4
 RULES AND STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India
2. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
3. The Indian Contract Act, 1872
4. The Specific Relief Act, 1963
5. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
6. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
7. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
8. Delhi High Court Act, 1966
9. The Punjab High Court Act, 1918

BOOKS
1. AVTAR SINGH, CONTRACT & SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 12TH EDITION
2. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (13TH ED. 2001)
3. J.N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (55th ED. 2020)
4. MULLA’S THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (19th ED. 2017)
5. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8TH ED. 2019)
6. R.C. SRIVASTAVA, THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF CONTRACT (1st ED. 2018)
7. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (27TH ED. 2019)

REPORTS
1. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia's Working Paper No. 2,
2. The Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform's Report on Minors Contracts.
3. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia's Report on Minors' Contracts.
4. The “Latey Committee” Reports on the Committee on the Age of Majority
5. Law Commission Working Paper No. 81, Minors' Contracts
JOURNAL
1. Saloni Khanderia, Commercial Impracticability under the Indian Law of Contract:
The UNIDROIT Principles as the Way Forward? (2018)

2. Shivprasad, Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Isolating
the Problem 1 (2021), Statute Law Review

5
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner humbly submits this memorandum for the petition filed before this
Honourable Court. The petition invokes its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It sets forth the facts and the laws on which the claims are based.

6
 STATEMENTS OF FACTS

S.NO. FACT TITLE INSTANCES

1. Invitation to Offer Ishika (Respondent), a 17-year-old girl, a computer
science wizard, came across advertisement of freelance
software creation for ‘irol’ company and subsequently
apply for the interview
2. Contract with Minor Oral Contract with Minor
(December 15, 2020) In interview she impressed the Vice- President of
company, subsequently awarded contract on December
15, 2020.
3. Breach of Policy 1. The interview and subsequent contact with Ishika
held as per “company policy”.
2. The “firm” has a policy of not doing business with
minors. (Breach of Policy)
4. Signing of Contract 1. Ishika (Respondent) is mailed a contract by the
(January 16, 2021) Petitioner Company for her signature.
2. she “signs the contract” and updates it on the
company's website, where it is “duly obtained”.

5. Considerations 1. Consideration for Company (Petitioner)

Ishika is told by the company to send a prototype of
the app by April 21, 2021.
2. Consideration for Ishika (Respondent)
She was told that she will be paid Rs. 1,00,000 for
making and sending the prototype to the Company.

6. Covid-19 and delay in 1. For the development of the prototype Ishika

performance) ordered few hardware pieces from China.
(End of February 2021) 2. There was a spike in cases of Covid-19 in India in
the month end of February 2021. There was a
“delay in the delivery” of the hardware ordered by
Ishika,

7
 which made it difficult for her to complete her
prototype.
3. Since the same hardware wasn’t available locally,
Ishika had to put her work on hold for some time.
7. Minor turns Major Ishika turned to eighteen on March 23, 2021.
(March 23, 2021)

8. New Agreement Recognizing that she will not be able to deliver the
(May 5, 2021) prototype by the deadline, she requests a two-week
extension, since she was down with covid, on April 20,
2021, and agrees to submit it by May 5, 2021.

9. New Request for Money No response for Request for Rs. 40,000
In order to finish her prototype, she requests an
additional Rs. 40,000/-. However, by that time, the
firm had already begun more processing work for the
app and had invested a significant amount of
money on
similar advertising efforts.
10. Losses to Company The company had “to cancel few meetings with major
investors” for this app because of the absence of
prototype. In that situation corporation can't afford to
send Ishika “any more time” when it's still losing
money.
11. Filing of suit for breach Plaintiff “Irol” Company files a claim in the Mante
(September 14, 2021) High Court for damages and recovery of Rs.2,50,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakhs Only), accusing Ishika of breach
of contract.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I – WHETHER WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 IS

MAINTAINABLE?

ISSUE II - WHETHER SUBSEQUENT ALTERATION IN AGREEMENT, WHEN

RESPONDENT BECOMES MAJOR, CAN BE AFFECTED BY PREVIOUS VOID
AGREEMENT?

ISSUE III - WHETHER DELAY IN DELIVERY CAN BE TREATED AS

COMMERCIAL HARDSHIP?

ISSUE- IV WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED FOR ANY REMEDY?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I - WHETHER WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 IS

MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that present writ petition is maintainable
against Union of India and also against Government of Delhi since, it is a state under Article
12 of the Constitution. It is further submitted that since there has been gross violation of
Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution, the writ petition is maintainable, and on account of the
same relief is sought.

ISSUE II - WHETHER SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION MAKES THE PREVIOUS

AGREEMENT VALID?

In order to make the agreement of minor valid after minor has turned major then requirement
of law is that there must be a fresh agreement which must be supported with the fresh
consideration then such agreement may become valid one and in this case there is presence of
fresh agreement supported by fresh consideration so the agreement was a valid contact, thus,
previous agreement has no effect on later agreement made on 20th April 2021.

ISSUE III - WHETHER DELAY IN DELIVERY CAN BE TREATED AS

COMMERCIAL HARDSHIP?

This is humbly submitted that the respondent Ishika can’t take excuse of either doctrine of
Frustration under Section 56 or force majeure under Section 32 as her performance of
contract in no case has become impossible to perform as per the need of section 56 and her
contract was not contingent on any uncertain event as required under Section 32 of the
Contract Act, thus, it was merely a commercial hardship.

ISSUE IV- WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED FOR ANY COMPENSATION?

The petitioner is entitled for compensation as it has suffered losses because the breach has
been committed by the Respondent, in due course, the natural consequence of which the
petitioner has to cancel few meetings and has to find similar freelancer prototype developers,
thus, has to spent some amount of money on advertisements which gave him total estimate
losses up to the value of Rs. 2,50,000.

10
11
 [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]

I. THE WRIT PETITION FILED IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT

It is humbly submitted that the Writ Petition No. XX of 2021 filed by Irol Pvt. Company Ltd.
on behalf of all Business community involved is maintainable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It is contended that the petitioner has the locus standi [1.], alternative
remedy not a bar to maintainability [2.], High Court has the jurisdiction to hear the present
case [3.], there is violation of fundamental right [4.].

1. THE PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI, AN ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHT

1.1 Conversion Of Suit into Writ Petition
1.1.1 This is humbly submitted that High Court has extraordinary power to convert matter
before it, involving infringement of fundamental right and legal right, into the writ
Jurisdiction1. Further, in order to have the Locus Standi, the person of body
approaching must have enforceable fundamental rights.2 The petitioner fundamental
right has also been violated under Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution effects of
which is that petitioner has a locus standi to claim writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the
Constitution in this court.
1.2 Company can claim fundamental rights
1.2.1 This is well-settled law that the company can’t claim fundamental rights under Article
19(1)(g)3. In this case it is not only the company who is claiming fundamental rights but
also it is representing all those business community whose rights are at stake. In this
case though petitioner is a private limited company but all the shareholders are citizens
and this fact is not disputed. Therefore, every one of these shareholders, if he was
carrying on business, would be protected by Article 19(1)(g).4
1.3 Intention of Framers of the Constitution
1.3.1 In Reserve Bank of India v. Palai Central Bank Limited,5 the Kerala High Court said
that the intent of the framers of constitution was not to exclude corporate bodies from
exercising all fundamental rights. The fact that “Article 19 (1) (c)6 they gave all citizens

1
Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 1455; S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1369
(India).
2
State of Haryana v. RamKumar Mann, (1997) 3 SCC 32(India).
3
The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1955 SC 661(India)
4
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalia and Ors., AIR 1956 Bom 1(India).
5
AIR 1961 Ker 268(India)
6
Constitution of India(India)

12
 the right to form associations and unions, and it could not have been their intention that
the corporate bodies so established by citizens, should be denied the rights guaranteed
to the individual citizens, in particular that the Corporate sector through which a
substantial portion of their business is conducted by the citizens of this country and a
considerable portion of their property held, should not have the protection of Clauses
(f) and (g).”

2. ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS NO BAR TO WRIT JURISDICTION

2.1 Alternative Remedy is Not a Rule of Law
2.1.1 The rule that court may refuse to grant any writ where alternative remedy is available is
only a rule of direction and not a rule of law 7. It is well-settled and which is cleared by
the Honorable Supreme Court that “alternative remedy is not a bar in an unprecedented
situation where rights of public interested is vested, which is also a case arises in the
given situation.”8and in the present case before it there is involvement of public interest
existed, as interest of business community which is the basis of the Indian Economy, its
right is on the stake.
2.2 Alternative Remedy Is No Bar
2.2.1 Where there is case of infringement of fundamental right, the alternative remedy is no
bar to claim the jurisdiction of the High Court as this position was cleared by the
Supreme Court in Himmat Lal V. State of U.P.9
2.2.2 The Honorable Supreme Court of India in May 2021 10 held that the availability of an
alternative remedy does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining a writ petition in
an appropriate case. As the High Court may entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding
the availability of an alternative remedy and for the application of this judgment this
writ petition is seeking for the enforcement of fundamental right and petitioner has
challenged the Section 11 of the Contract Act., further court has provided following,
inter-alia, grounds to invoke writ jurisdiction even there is availability of alternative
remedy, Firstly, Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right;
Secondly, the vires of an Act is under challenge"11

7
A. V. Venkateshwara v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1954 SC 403 (India).
8
T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3032 (India).
9
AIR 1954 SC 403 (India).
10
Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd v. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Limited LL 2021
SC 255 (India).
11
Id.

13
14
2.2.3 Thus, position of law is clear that the suit can be converted into the writ petition and the
alternative remedy is no bar in a writ jurisdiction where there is involvement of
infringement of fundamental rights and in this case Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) has been
violated.

3. HIGH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE PRESENT CASE

3.1 High Court Laid with Great Responsibility
3.1.1 The jurisdiction of the High Court enshrined under Article 226 is an important and
integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, as it provides effective remedy
for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights if they are violated. The High Court is
laid with the responsibility to protect and guarantee the Fundamental and other legal
rights and therefore, it cannot refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against
infringement of such rights.12
3.2 Scope of High Court Powers Under Article 226
3.2.1 Further, speaking on the wide powers of High Court, the Supreme Court in T. C. Basappa
v. Nagappa13 has held that Art. 226 is couched with comprehensive phraseology and it
confers a wide power on the High Court to remedy the injustice wherever it is found.
3.2.2 Thus, the honorable High Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present case
under Article 226 of the Constitution as it is empowered to hear the case which
involves infringement of fundamental rights or other legal rights of the petitioner.

4. VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

4.1 The violation of a Fundamental Right is the sine qua non for enforcement of that right by
the Supreme Court or the High Court. Thus, this, inter-alia, aspect is violating the
fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) discussed below. The
petitioner rights are violated under the following heads: -
A. Arbitrary Action of State by Not Providing Any Safeguards under Article 14.
B. Unreasonable Classification of Major & Minor Turned Major under Article 14.
C. Unreasonable Classification of Civil and Criminal Wrong under Article 14.
D. Infringement of Right to Carry on Business under Article 19(1)(g).

12
T. C. Basappa v. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 (India).
13
Id.

15
 4.2 BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 14
A. Arbitrary Action of State by Not Providing Any Safeguards
4.2.1 It is well-settled in civil law that minors could not be keep in prejudicial state in civil
cases relates to matters of breach of contract14 or in case of fraud committed by the
minor and who continues it even after attaining majority. 15 As in the absence of
safeguards in Section 11 of the Contract Act which is violating the Fundamental Rights
of the Petitioner by making unfair treatment as in case of breach of contract or in case
of active concealment of fact by the minor, there is no law which can protect the
petitioner to provide any sort of remedy or which cause justice to both parties.
a. Section 11 of the Act is empty formality & silent on providing safeguards
4.2.2 As the law has no position to deal with the situations where minor commits breach of
contract or cheating or fraud against party who is competent to contract as the silence of
law on this aspect is making unreasonable trouble and hardship to the competent parties
to deal with this situation as there is no proper law which can touch the minor to
provide him reformation where he intentionally commits cheating or fraud as in case of
criminal law there is mechanism to put the minor in observatory home till 21 years of
age, after that he will be sent to jail.
4.2.3 Gowda J in Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary 16 applying Mohori Bibee17 observed that
enforcement of such arrangements by courts was ‘an erroneous application of law”
keeping in mind the decision of the Privy Council in Mohori Bibee’ The case was to
exert an enormous influence on subsequent case law, to the extent that it came to be
treated as an unquestionable axiom of Indian contract law. 18 The rule that minors’
contracts are void ab initio has left Indian contract law with a serious anomaly19
b. Violation of Principle of Justice Equity and Good Conscience
4.2.4 In this case where minor has committed fraud by not revealing her age of minority or in
other cases where due to the act of minor, competent parties have to suffer and this
injustice is being caused, which is against the principle of equity, justice and good
conscience. In case of minor, not revealing her age of minority, the respondent could

14
Mohori Bibee V Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal. 539 (India).
15
Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 851(India).
16
[2015] 5 SCC 634, 635 (India).
17
Id. at 15
18
Shivprasad, et at., Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Isolating the Problem 1
(2021), Statute Law Review, Volume 42, Issue 1, February, Pages 101–115, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy034
19
Id. (2)

16
 have been booked under Section 420 of IPC20, but in civil breach there is no any
liability to which minor can be liable as there is no role of Law nor of state’s duty to
protect the individuals who in good faith entered into contract and faces the anti-role of
law against them as instead of providing any relief it remains silence. The wrongdoer
must not be pardoned and it is against public policy to not provide any treatment to
minor who commits fraud in civil matters.

B. Unreasonable Classification of Minor Turned Major & Major

a. Contract Act omits spelling out the consequences of contracting with a minor
4.2.5 The State has made laws more in favor of majority age group of persons who entered
into agreement at their age of minority, later turned major and ratifies the contract then
law from judicial side treats their valid contract as void ab initio as what was not valid
since inception as how can it later be made as valid. The Indian contract act is silent on
this aspect except there is few judicial interpretations21 which makes the present law in
a conundrum state as law of contract is silent on this aspect. Section 11 provides that
minors are not competent to contract. While the Act goes on to specifically set out the
consequences of vitiated ‘consent’ in Sections 19, 19A, and 2022, it omits spelling out
the consequences of contracting with a minor.23
b. Judicial Pronouncements & Creation of Conundrum Situation
4.2.6 When law remains silent then judiciary through its necessary or implied implications
draw the correct inferences which proves helpful but in interpretation of Section 11 the
privy council and further judicial pronouncement had creates a conundrum situation as
Section 11 speaks of minor is incompetent to contract but it doesn’t speak of a case
where minor commits fraud or cheating or other breach of contract which is in his
favor, subsequently, ratified by him on attaining age of majority even then they
declared as void ab initio despite the fact that minor has turned major and ratified it at
the time of majority.24
c. Guaranteed Rights Comes with Other Rights

20
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
21
Suraj Narai v Sukhu Ahir, AIR 1924 All 730 (India).
22
Indian Contract Act, 1872 (India)
23
Shivprasad, et at., Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Isolating the Problem 1
(2021), Statute Law Review, Volume 42, Issue 1, February, Pages 101–115, https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy034
24
Id.

17
4.2.7 Right to carry on business includes the right to ask for enforcement and also for
compensation. In one case there are stakeholders which can ask for damages against the
majority age group of contracting parties in case of breach of contract or in case of
fraud under Section 73 and 17 respectively. But, in another case there are persons, who
enters into contract with minors, who later ratified the contract on becoming major, can
neither ask for enforcement nor can claim for compensation in case of breach of
contract, so this unreasonable classification which is violating not only the Petitioner’s
fundamental right but also all those contracting parties who are willing to make a
contract with the minor who ratify the contract but they got discouraged.

d. Judicial Dicta & No Reason in “Law or Equity” That Amended Contracts at

the age of Majority Are Unlawful
4.2.8 It was many times observed in judicial dicta’s 25 by the honorable Judges that if a minor,
when of full age, takes it upon himself to pay a previous debt, there is no reason either
in law or equity why his agreement shall be deemed to be "unlawful." 26 Of course, there
is no question of unlawfulness, but one of want of consideration. This also was a case
of a further advance after majority and further change in terms of contract with respect
to new time and fresh consideration. This current situation of conundrum through
which the business community is suffering from must be dealt with serious note as
gross injustice is being caused to the minor. Thus, this situation warrants the need of
guidelines or safeguards or amendments in the laws relating to Contract Act as well as
other civil laws.
C. Unreasonable Classification of Civil &Criminal Wrong
a. Law is outdated & against the interest of business community
4.2.9 Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act27 provides the age of majority shall be eighteen
and which means that the persons who are below the age of eighteen are incompetent to
contract.28 This position of law is inconsistent with the contemporary globalized time
and has become outdated and present needs of society does not warrant this as this is
violating the right of the petitioner as well as other business community to carry on
business.

25
Suraj Narai v Sukhu Ahir, AIR 1924 All 730 (India).
26
Id.
27
Every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of majority on his completing the age of eighteen years
and not before.
18
28
Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

19
4.2.10 The above view is unconstitutional for the reason of it (1.), being very old and not
made as per the present needs (2.), of the contemporary time and more so violating
the rights of large Section of business community as it is completely against them (3.),
who has been constantly denied the right to ask for compensation as well as for the
enforcement of their fundamental rights in case the breach of contract is committed by
the minor turned major.
b. Section 68 of Contract Act & 33(2)(b) of Specific Relief Act is not adequate safeguards
4.2.11 Except in few cases that deals with quasi-contracts under Section 68 of the Contract
Act, where the contract is for necessities or in cases where the matter falls under
Section 33(2)(b) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 as in both the laws protects the interest
of business community but still silent on the aspect where minor commits fraud and
unjustly exhausted the amount and the amount found not in his traceable limits in that
case law is silent and there are no safeguards.
4.2.12 Though there is law under Article 19A that reasonable diligence is needed but in
many cases including this case of respondent where the company has taken due
diligence despite this it could not be possible. This is submitted that state has violated
the petitioners right to equality under Article 14 and of the Indian Constitution by
unreasonably classifying the civil liability and criminal liability of minor turned
major, as in case of former there is no civil liability where minor turned major, who
ratified the contract, commits a breach of contract and in case of later the Juvenile Act
keep a separate class of juveniles between the age of 16 and 18 and in case they
commits the offence they were held liable for their actions as per the gravity of the
offence.
4.2.13 So, this unreasonable differentia creates a conundrum in present time as the person
who is minor turned major ratified the contract on attaining majority whose contract is
void by reading Sections 11 and 25 with Mohori bibee case and in later case also, he
even not major can be held liable for offences under criminal law such as cheating and
he can sentenced up to imprisonment for life which in case warranted or permissible
as there is report of law commission of England and Wales which suggested that there
is a need of reform in this trend.
c. Need Of Criminal Amendment So as Need of Civil Amendments

20
21
4.2.14 This is humbly summitted that as before 2015 Act29 there was a position that minor
who commits the offence can’t be put behind bars but when the need felt after
Nirbhaya case30 then state has modified law relating to minor 31 and treat the juvenile
offender who commits heinous offences32 under the category of an adult and they can
be punished with imprisonment up to life which was not a position of law before
Nirbhaya case to treat the juveniles of age from 16 up to 18 as in a different category
4.2.15 There is a juxtaposition which is against the economic policy of the country to treat
the minor turned major in a different category by not providing any civil liability in
case of commission of breach of contract by the minor turned major, who ratifies the
contract, there comes no liability on them to pay, except under Section 68 of the
Contract Act or under Section 33(2)(b) Specific Relief Act 1963.
d. Principle of Intelligible Differentia

4.2.16 Thus, this position of law is not correct as it is violation of the principle of right to
equality as this is not based on intelligible differentia which is set out by the Supreme
Court in K. Thimappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SBI33, and this
unreasonable classification is not complying the principles laid down in this case
which states that for a classification to be reasonable it must fulfil the following two
conditions: -
1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others, left out of the group: -
4.2.17 In this case also the classifying these two categories in case of civil breach there is no
civil liability and, in another case, there is far much liability then civil breach which is
against the economic policy of the country as it is prohibiting the business industry to
do businesses with only certain age group individual.
2) Differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
Act
4.2.18 This above classification is inconsistent with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act as the object of the Contract Act was to ensure that the rights and obligations
arising out of a contract are honored and that legal remedies are made available to
those who

29
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
30
Section 2(33) of juvenile justice (care and protection of children) act, 2015
31
Id.
32
Id. at 27
33
AIR 2001 SC 467 (India).
22
23
 are affected. The third Law Commission, presided over by Lord Romilly, 34 who made
a report on Contract Bill, submitted the report on 1866, “recommended the revision of
the enacted law at Intervals of only a few years"35 and the provision of "such new
rules of law as might be required by the rise of new interests and new circumstances
in the progress of society".36 Thus, it is clear that the law relating to minor needs
reforms and the age of minor needs a revisit with respect to the civil law
e. Law Commission on Reduction of Age or the ratifications by Minor

4.2.14 These were the various law commissions reports which are in favour of age reduction
of minor up to 16. Further, some are in favour that ratification done by the minor on
attaining age of majority must be binding on him.

S. No. LAW COMMISSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Latey Committee (1969) 1. The law should contain no provision
preventing persons from ratifying contracts
they made during their minority.
2. It is quite clear that while protection against
contractual liability is needed by persons under
the age of majority there is no justification for
protecting adults against the consequences of
fresh contracts or of ratification.”37

England (working paper) All contracts of whatever nature would be fully

binding on minors aged 16 years and over;38 a
(1982)
minor below the age of 16 would have no liability
under or by reason of any contract.39
2. Australia (Western Australia) A minor on reaching full age should be bound by a
(1978) contract which he or she then ratifies “in writing,

34
Drafted the Indian Contract Act, 1872
35
K C Sen, The Law Commission Report 917 (THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY July 1959)
https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1959_11/28-29-30/the_law_commission_report.pdf 36
Id.
37
Report on the Committee on the Age of Majority (the “Latey Committee”) (Cmnd. 3342, 1967), analysed by
Evans, The Need for Reform of the Law of Infants' Contracts – Some Comments on the Latey Report, Auckland
U. L. Rev. 65 (1969).
38
Law Commission Working Paper No. 81, Minors' Contracts, paras. 12.1–1218 (1982)
https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rMinorsContracts.htm
39
Id.

24
 words or otherwise and whether communicated to
the enforcer or not”40.
3. Canada, Alberta's Institute 1. After a minor reached full age, he or she should
of Law Research and be able to affirm a contract made during
Reform (1975) minority, even though that contract was
unenforceable against him or her during
minority.41

4. British Columbia (1976) 1. It seems to us to be a logical extension of this

judgment that if an adult decides that it is to
his advantage to consider himself bound by a
contract made during his minority, he is
capable of taking responsibility for that
decision.42
2. “Reasonable that once a minor has reached
adulthood the law should not go out of its way
to extend a privilege and protection that is
attributable to minority. The parties may deal
with each other as adults, and we can perceive
no reason why one party should not be entitled
to ask the other to declare himself on whether
he intends to affirm or repudiate the contract.”

D. Infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g)

This is humbly submitted that the law that minor is incompetent to contract is violating the
Petitioners: -
1) Right to carry on business;
2) Right to seek compensation.

a. Object Of the Contract Act

40
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia's Working Paper No. 2, Project No. 25: Legal Capacity of
Minors, para. 3.14 (1978)
41
The Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform's Report on Minors' Contracts, p. 34 (1975)
42
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia's Report on Minors' Contracts, pp. 55–56 (1976).

25
4.2.19 The major object of the contract was to ensure that the rights and obligations arising
out of a contract are honored and that legal remedies are made available to those who
are affected. Further, this provision was made so that no one can commit fraud on the
minor. the present needs of the society warrants that the minor of between 16 to 18
ages must be held liable for their actions like they are held liable under Juvenile Act43
as per the gravity of their offence, but in this case so as this being a case belonging to
the civil breach there is no such safeguard has been provided by the government. The
object of the around 200 years old Act is not compatible with the present needs44

b. Legitimate expectation to provide safeguards

4.2.20 There are two essentials to invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation;
1) There must be a government element who has promised something
2) There must be a breach of duty or promise

1) There Must Be a Government Element Who Has Promised Something -

4.2.21 In this case the State element existed as the breach has been committed by the
Government concerned i.e., Government of Mante and the Government of India.
2) There must be a breach of duty or promise -
4.2.22 When article 19(1)(g) was enshrined under the Indian constitution, the business
community could legitimately expect that the state had promised them the right to
carry on business which includes the right to ask for enforcement and also for
compensation. So, this was expected that the Government concerned would provide
them enough safeguard to protect their right to carry on business, but the present
situation of law is that there is no such safeguard has been provided by the union or
the respective state governments although the matter has been mentioned under the
concurrent-list entry seven45 read with clause 2 of Article 24646 and there is no such
safeguard that can save the parties in case of civil-breach is made by the minor or the
minor turned major respondent, as the case may be.

43
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
44
Law Commission Working Paper No. 81, Minors' Contracts, paras. 12.1–1218 (1982)
45
Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not
including contracts relating to agricultural land.
46
Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State
also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule
(in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).

26
4.2.23 The Constitution empowered the State as well as the Central-Government to make
safeguards regarding breach of contract with minor or minor turned major but the
respective governments have not fulfilled their promises regarding it. The contract in
the nature of private contract is also covered by the expression “other special forms of
contracts”.
4.2.24 Thus, it is submitted to the honorable Mante High Court that the State has violated the
right to carry on business of the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution.
so, the respective state must be held liable for the breach of such promise. This court
is a constitutional court that can provide guidelines to protect the interest of the
petitioner till there is absence of such law.
c. Quasi-Contracts are Not Enough Safeguards
4.2.25 The provisions of quasi contract which are mentioned under Contract Act deals with
situations of necessity and not with other subject matters and the present need of the
developing society warrants the need of provision which can further provide
explanation to Section 11 of the Contract Act as this is in the economic and public
interest of the Indian Society as well as in the interest of the petitioner to provide
safeguards in cases where minor commits breach or intentionally hide his or her age.
4.2.26 This case does not fit into the parameter of the quasi-contract as the case does not
belong to the necessity as making a prototype for the company does not fall in the
ambit of Section 68 of the Contract Act,47 although money has been provided to the
respondent but that was not for the necessities.
d. Specific Relief Act Not Provide Enough Safeguards
4.2.27 Section 33(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 saves the parties where they, in good
faith, transmit anything of value to the minor. but this Section is silent on the aspect
where minor commits cheating as per Section 420 of the IPC and another party
suffered losses. there must be some relief which is to be provided to the party who has
suffered losses. as there are some interdependent contracts which are based upon a
separate contract. In this case also the other contracts with the petitioner also
depended upon the present contract as the petitioner had to cancel many meetings
with the other parties which had caused him huge losses.

47
If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied
by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is
entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person.

27
4.2.28 Further, in this case a minor can be liable for cheating under Section 420 but she
can’t be liable for breach of contract in a situation of juxtaposition. On one side she
can be imprisoned in case of a breach on the other side no civil liability, though not
personally, but like from her state as a minor becomes liable under Section 68 of the
Contract Act. Further, this Section benefits the party against whom breach committed
only when the goods or amount of money is in the traceable limit of minor. but it is
silent on the aspect where the amount transferred is not within the traceable limit of
the minor or minor turned major.
4.2.29 Thus, this case also warrants the need of amendment or modification in the present
law and the petitioner humbly emphasized the point of providing safeguards or
guidelines till the Government makes law in that aspect. The court can take recourse
to the Vishakha’s Case48

II. SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION MAKES THE CONTRACT VALID

This is humbly submitted that the in-writ jurisdiction the petitioner can argue for question of
law as well as facts 49. It is well settled that the whether a disputed question of fact should be
resolved in a writ filed under Article 226, is really one of discretion and convenience, and not
of jurisdiction.50 In the present case the subsequent amendment in the contract which is made
after the respondent has turned major was valid as there was presence of fresh agreement [1].,
and fresh consideration [2]., so these terms are evident that there was a ratification in the
terms of the contract [3].
1. Presence of fresh agreement
1.1 Settled Principle of Law
1.1.1 This is submitted that it is the requirements of settled principle of law that in order to
make the minor agreement valid, there must be presence of fresh agreement and fresh
consideration at the time when minor had come of age 51 and in this case, there is
presence of fresh agreement as the facts provides that respondent has come of age on
23 March 202152 and first performance of the contract to be made on April 21.

48
Vishakha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (India).
49
Real Estate Agencies v. Government of Goa, AIR 2012 SC 3848 (India).
50
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1269 (India).
51
Nazir Ahmad v. Jiwan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 159 (India).
52
Factsheet ¶ 4

28
1.1.2 The fact that respondent was down with covid on an uncertain date 53 so when she had
recovered from the covid, she requested the petitioner to arrange for some extension of
date of performance of the contract to which company has agreed upon 54 and accepted
her request of extension of time for a fresh time of 5th of May.55
2. Presence of fresh consideration
2.1 Respondent asked for fresh consideration
2.1.1 The presence of fresh agreement and fresh contract makes the new contract as it can be
implied from the amendments that there was a ratification in the contract when the
respondent has turned major. As the respondent has asked for the extension of time but
respondent has also asked for the fresh consideration of Rs. 40,000.
2.2 Presumption regarding acceptance of the offer of Rs. 40,000
2.2.1 In this case Petitioner has remain silent about the consideration and denied the more
extension of time apart from 5th of May. The request of Rs. 40,000 was made with the
same time of extension of the time up to two-weeks and where the proposal was not
absolute or unqualified the proposer may become bound, if, by his subsequent conduct,
he indicates that he has accepted the qualifications set up" Bhagwandas v Shri Dial 56. In
this case as well the petitioner has not denied the request of the respondent for fresh
consideration.
2.3 Presumption regarding contract was made for the benefit of Respondent
2.3.1 In this case it is not the respondent who has cause any prejudice to the respondent as the
petitioner was very liberal while dealing with respondent as extension of time of
contract and accepting the fresh consideration upon the ratified terms of the contract.
This shows it is not the petitioner who has asked for any condition as it is the
respondent always who has requested and the bona fide respondent has accepted that.
3. New Arrangement in the terms of the contract
3.1 Presumption Regarding Ratification in Terms of The Contract
3.1.1 The additional request for money was made because of the implied fact that the terms
of the contract was ratified by the Respondent so as the terms was ratified which makes
the contract as valid one and the burden of proof to deny this fact lies on the respondent
that there was absence of ratification.

53
Factsheet ¶ 3
54
Factsheet ¶ 4
55
Id.
56
1913 Punj Rec. No. 92, p. 325 (India).

29
3.1.2 Petitioner has not denied the request of the respondent requesting for fresh
consideration of Rs. 40,000 as it is evident from the facts 57 as petitioner merely denied
for the more extension of time rather to deny the fresh consideration of second ratified
contract.58 This makes the position of law aptly clear that there was presence of fresh
contract as the term of the contract was ratified on respondent being attaining the age of
majority. As per the Contract Act59 acceptance can be implied.60

III. DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION OR FORCE MAJEURE CAN’T BE INVOKED

This is humbly submitted that argument that doctrine of frustration can be invoked can be
countered by the presence of the following requisites, the presence of which can prove to be a
legal constraint for the application of Section 56 of the Contract Act, namely; existence of
commercial hardship [1.],61 temporarily illness can’t affect the performance [2.],62
Government interference can't be pleaded [3.]63

1. EXISTENCE OF COMMERCIAL HARDSHIP

1.1 Force majure or doctrine of frustration
1.1.1 This is humbly submitted that the respondents can’t take justification of either doctrine
of Frustration under Section 56 or force majeure under Section 32 as her performance
of contract in no case has become impossible to perform as per the need of Section 56
and her contract was not contingent on any uncertain event as required under Section
32 of the Contract Act, thus, it was merely a commercial hardship.
1.2 Delay In Delivery Is Merely a Commercial Hardship

1.2.1 As per the facts the prevailing circumstances were that there was covid in the month
end of February 202164 which causes delay in delivery but that does not make the
delivery impossible as she could still perform her contract as she has time of more than
one month to perform her contract. Thus, the argument of hardship due to the presence
of Covid-19 was liable to be ignored.

57
Factsheet ¶ 4.
58
Id.
59
Section 9 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
60
Supra at 49.
61
Avtar Singh, Contract & Specific Relief, Commercial Hardship 394 (12th ed. 2017).
62
Id. at 403
63
Id.
64
Factsheet ¶ 2.

30
1.2.2 A situation like this which causes delay can be described as one of commercial
hardship, which may make the performance unprofitable or more expensive or
dilatory65, but this does make it sufficient to excuse the performance, for it does not
bring about a fundamentally different situation such as to frustrate the venture66 Further,
it was held in Standard Chemicals Co (P) Ltd. V Palakol Cooperative Sugars Co. Ltd67
“A person who contracts to supply has to assure his stock. His inability to replenish his
stock is his problem and not that of other party”.
1.3 Judicial dicta over commercia hardship
1.3.1 The Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not contain any specific provision on hardship.
Instead, support for hardship is confined to judicial dicta, which indicate that the
paradigms of the subject shall be assessed within the parameters of the principles of
discharge by the frustration of contract.68
1.3.2 In Megan v Updike Grain Corporation69, it was held that the doctrine of frustration or
impossibility does not apply to a situation so as to excuse the performance and where
the performance is not practically cut off, but merely rendered the contract more
difficult or costly. Such cases do not fall within the domain of Section 56.
1.3.3 Further, the Supreme Court in Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd v Union of India70 disregarded
the appellant’s plea to invoke the doctrine of frustration of contract when, due to the
changed circumstances caused by the Second World War, the agreement became more
burdensome to perform due to an abnormal increase in the prices of ghee, which was
initially supposed to be supplied at a fixed rate. 71 In Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram
Bangur & Co.72 Mukherjea J opined that the courts could additionally employ Section
56 to regulate instances of commercial impracticability.73
1.3.4 Thus, in the present case like this where there was no prior agreement to supply to her
necessary particulars and any necessary items which she needs to perform had to be
arranged by her as she has not asked it before entering into the Contract that it is to be

65
Avtar Singh, Contract & Specific Relief 394 (EBC 12th ed. 2017).
66
Travancore Devaswom Board v. Thanath International, (2004) 13 SCC 44 (India).
67
(1988) 25 Rep 60
68
Saloni Khanderia, Commercial Impracticability under the Indian Law of Contract: The UNIDROIT Principles
as the Way Forward? (2018)
69
94 F 2d 551 (1938) (India).
70
AIR 1960 SC 588 (India).
71
Id.
72
AIR 1954 SC 44 (India).
73
Id.

31
 arranged by the Petitioner Company so in this case it is the respondent who is solely
responsible and this is case of commercial hardship which in no case can excuse the
respondent from pleading frustration. This is settled principle that commercial hardship
does not excuse the parties to plead frustration74

2. TEMPORARILY ILLNESS CAN’T AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE.

2.1 Minor was not ill on the date of new contract
2.1.1 This is humbly submitted that the respondent was down with covid on 20 th April 202175
on this date when she has become major, asked for further extension of two weeks 76
which subsequently shifted the date of contract on 5th of May 2021 which shows that
she could claim so-called doctrine of frustration under Section 5677 till 21st of April
2021 but when she has requested to perform her contract on a later date and on that date
she was not minor and not ill, could have performed her contract on 5th of May 2021,
but she has not willingly performed on that date.
2.2 Presumption Regarding Mild Fever
2.2.1 This is submitted that the respondent Ishika was having only mild fever as she has
contacted the petitioner company for extension of date up to 5 th of May 2021 which
shows respondent was in a state of sound health, could easily understand the pros and
cons of her non-performance which makes position clear regarding the fact that she was
only having mild fever which could be cured within a few spans of time and not more
than hardly 14 days as it is evident from the reports.78
2.2.2 Hence, once it is proved that she was having only mild fever. It can be conclusively
presumed by the court that she was able to perform her work on the date of
performance. Thus, it is proved that she was having temporary illness, not permanent
and the doctrine of frustration can’t be claimed to make the valid contract invalid one.
2.3 No Justification in Not Complying with The Terms of Contract
2.3.1 It was merely an occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in
performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract, thus, it can provide no

74
Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44 (India).
75
Factsheet ¶ 3
76
Factsheet ¶ 4
77
Indian Contract Act, 1872
78
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) on 16-24 February 2020
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf

32
 justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted
with open eyes.79 As her down with covid,80 can’t be an excuse as she was permitted to
submit it on 5th of May 2021 instead of 21st May 2021. More so she was having only
mild fever as she was able to communicate easily and has asked for extension of time
which shows she was of sound mind as per the need of Section 10 of the Contract Act.

3. GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE CAN’T BE PLEADED

3.1 This is submitted that the Government of Delhi has imposed the lockdown on 19 th April
202181 which in no case prevent the respondent Ishika to perform her work by online mode
as she was not needed to submit her work through physical delivery. There were so many
ways available for respondent to submit it either on Petitioner website or through Google
drive mode or through Telegram. So, the excuse that Government intervention was made,
could not be taken by the respondent. Thus, it can be said that doctrine of Frustration
within the ambit of Section 56 is not attracted in the given case.

IV. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED FOR ANY COMPENSATION

This is humbly submitted that the petitioner is entitled for the compensation of Rs. 2,50,000,
under the principle of “Quantum Meruit”, 82 as it is established that the there was a valid
contract,83 then nothing in law stops the petitioner to claim the compensation as it can be
claimed with respect to the losses suffered by the Petitioner having due regards to the fact
that firm had already begun more processing work for the app [1.], had invested a significant
amount of money on similar advertising efforts [2.], had to cancel few meetings with major
investors because of the absence of prototype [3.], The corporation can't afford to send Ishika
any more time when it's still losing money [4.]84

1. FIRM HAS ALREADY BEGAN MORE PROCESSING WORK FOR THE APP

79
Maa Vaishno Enterprises and Ors. vs. State of M.P. and Ors. writ petition no. 7373 of 2020 (India).
80
Factsheet ¶ 3
81
Order regarding curfew on movement of individuals (except for exemption given below in this order) in the
territory of NCT of Delhi with effect from 10:00 pm on 19-04-2021 to 5:00 am on 26-04-2021 (Monday). No.
F.2/07/2020/PT FILE-III/382 ORDER 19/04/2021.
82
Section 73 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872
83
Supra.
84
Factsheet ¶ 4

33
1.1 The petitioner had begun more processing work on the app as soon as it comes to know
the fact of respondent has not performed her contract on time i.e., 5 th of May 2021. This
resulted because of non-performance of work on time, thus, the respondent is liable for
the expenditure which the petitioner had spent on the processing work of the app.

2. INVESTMENT OF MONEY ON SIMILAR ADVERTISEMNTS

2.1 Losses suffered within the meaning of Section 73 of the Act
2.1.1 In order to prove the losses suffered by the petitioner, need to prove that the petitioner
has suffered losses results from the breach of the contract. Section 73 of the Contract
Act provides that85 the compensation for any losses suffered, which naturally arose in
the usual course of things from such breach to be likely to result from such breach and
the losses which had been suffered by the petitioner were results from the natural
course of the breach of the contract as the Ishika won’t be able to perform her work on
time.
2.1.2 The reason respondent won’t be able to perform her contract on time, the petitioner
had to spent significant amount of money on the similar advertisements which was
earlier advertised by the petitioner86 before entering into the contract with Respondent.
Thus, petitioner, the value of the amount which he had spent, entitled for the recovery
of them as this was also in the cognizance of the Ishika that petitioner may suffer
losses.
3. MEETINGS CANCELLED WITH INVESTORS & ABSENCE OF PROTOTYPE
3.1 Time Was the Essence of Contract
3.1.1 when the petitioner has agreed to extend the date of performance up to 5th of May87 it
can be presumed that time was the essence of the contract as petitioner agreed only for
the two-week extension of time88 and not more than that time. 89 Therefore, it can be
presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the time was the essence of the
contract as transaction was made in the course of private business. Further, if time were
not of the essence of the contract, then Ishika need not had to asked for the extension.90

85
When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party
who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose
in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be
likely to result from the breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or
damage sustained by reason of the breach.
86
Factsheet ¶ 1
87
Factsheet ¶ 3
88
Factsheet ¶ 4
89
Bhudra Chand v. Betts (1915) 22 Cal LJ 566:33 IC 347 (India).
34
90
Id.

35
 3.2 Intention of the Parties
3.2.1 Moreover, the real intention of the parties can be gathered from the fact that any specific
date is mentioned for the completion of the contract then one has not to look at the
letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain the real intention of the
parties.91 In this case it is fact that only two weeks extension and no more extension
after the two weeks proves the intention of parties to perform it on time.
3.3 Burdon of Proof
3.3.1 The supposition that time was the essence, petitioner has successfully established under
para 3 of the Section 55 of the Contract Act92 as the respondent has implied notice of
the intention of the petitioner agreement, thus, the burden of proof under Section 102 of
the Evidence Act93 lies on the respondent as the case of respondent would fail if not
able to disprove the petitioner supposition.
3.4 Cancellation of Meetings as absence of prototype
3.4.1 Once it is established that the time was the essence of the contract and which was in the
knowledge of the respondent then breach of which naturally goes to the default of the
respondent. The facts are the evident that the petitioner has to cancel the meetings with
the major investors because of the fact that there was absence of prototype on the
requisite time as respondent has not fulfilled her obligation which was warranted under
Section 37 of the Contract Act, thus, respondent hold liable for the losses of
cancellation of meetings with the major investors.
4. THE PETITONER CAN'T AFFORD MORE TIME, WHEN IT'S LOSING MONEY
4.1 it is evident from the fact that the Petitioner Company can't afford to send Respondent
any more time when it's still losing money, 94 this shows the petitioner had lost some
amount of money in the processing work for the app, making expenditure in similar
advertisements as made prior thereto and had to cancel meetings with major investors.
These all facts tilt the scale of justice in favor of the petitioner.
4.2 Thus, the petitioner is entitled for the compensation of Rs. 2,50,000 which he has to lost
or spent because of the respondent failure to perform work on time.

91
Sachidanada Patnaik v G.P. & Co, AIR 1964 Ori 269 (India).
92
Indian Contract Act, 1872
93
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
94
Factsheet ¶ 4

36
 PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the issued raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:

In Writ Petition No. XX of 2021

1. That in the absence of any safeguards provided in Contract Act, to issue any order in the
form of direction or any guidelines which would be binding till the respective
Governments make the law in that aspect;
2. That the subsequent ratification contains fresh consideration and fresh agreement which
makes the agreement as a valid contract;
3. That the respondent seeking for the frustration is not the case here;
4. That the Petitioner is entitled for the damages & recovery of Rs. 2,50,000

AND/OR
Pass any other order or relief it may deem fit and proper, in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

S/d

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

37