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Putting Properties First

Putting Properties First

A Platonic Metaphysics for
Natural Modality
M AT T H EW T U G B Y
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

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© Matthew Tugby 2022
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First Edition published in 2022
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For Priya and Jayan

Contents
Acknowledgementsxi
1. The Scope and Aims of This Book: Properties,
Laws, and Dispositions 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 4
1.2.1 Properties and Predicates 4
1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions 7
1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization 10
1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding 12
1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship 13
1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction 14
1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity 16
1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence 16
1.2.9 The Methodology of Ground Theorizing 18
1.3 The Rival Approaches to Natural Modality 20
1.3.1 The Mosaic View 21
1.3.2 The Law-Driven Account 22
1.3.3 Property-Driven Approaches to Natural Modality 24
1.4 Modal Platonism in More Detail 27
1.4.1 Defending Platonism 28
1.4.2 The Grounding Theory of Natural Modality 30
1.5 The Big Picture 34
PA RT I . T H E C O R E T H E O RY: M O DA L P L AT O N I SM
2. The Platonic Theory of Dispositional Directedness 41
2.1 Introduction 41
2.2 Two Metaphysical Principles about Dispositions 42
2.3 Properties as Tropes or Universals? 45
2.4 The Aristotelian versus Platonic View of Universals 54
2.5 Alternative Accounts of Dispositional Directedness 59
2.5.1 Manifestations as Parts: The Conjunctive Property Proposal 59
2.5.2 Manifestations as Structural Constituents: The Diachronic
Property Proposal 61
2.5.3 Directedness as a Higher-Order Monadic Property 62
2.6 Conclusions 65
viii Contents
3. Against Dispositional Essentialism: A Grounding Theory

of Natural Modality 67
3.1 Introduction 67
3.2 Two Kinds of Internal Relation 68
3.3 Against the Bradlean Conception of Dispositional Directedness 73
3.4 Jaag’s Formulation of the Problem Facing
Dispositional Essentialism 78
3.5 The Leibnizian Approach: Universals as Qualities
Which Ground Natural Modality 81
3.6 The Logical Form of Dispositional Predication 86
3.7 Comparison with Other Theories of Dispositions 91
3.8 Conclusions 95
4. Solving the Entailment and Governance Problems 96
4.1 Introduction 96
4.2 The Entailment Problem 96
4.3 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Not Entail 97
4.4 What Second-Order Law Statements Do Entail 101
4.5 Does the Reverse Entailment Hold? 103
4.6 The Question of Governance 104
4.7 Why Leibnizian Relations of Directedness Do Not Govern 105
5. Dissolving the Problem of Latent Dispositions 107
5.1 Introduction: The Problem of Latent Dispositions 107
5.2 Mumford’s and Bird’s Dispositionalist Accounts of Latent
Dispositions110
5.3 Identity Theory to the Rescue? 115
5.4 Psillos’s Regress Problem 117
5.5 Marmodoro’s Pure Powers Response 118
5.6 Bauer’s Pure Powers Response 120
5.7 Conclusions 127
6. Objections and Replies 128
6.1 Introduction 128
6.2 Really Realist? 128
6.3 Multiple Realization? 131
6.4 Act of Faith? 135
6.5 Humean? 137
6.6 Can Qualities Explain Dispositions? 142
6.7 Meta-Grounding? 145
6.8 Exclusion Problem? 151
6.9 Qualities Collapse into Powers? 154
6.10 Why Not Tropes? 156
6.11 What Is Directedness? 157
6.12 Not Naturalistic? 159
6.13 Un-Eleatic? 161
Contents ix
PA RT I I . P U T T I N G P L AT O N I SM T O WO R K
7. Instantiation and Repeatability: A Platonic Approach 165
7.1 Introduction 165
7.2 The Explanatory Instability of Aristotelianism 167
7.3 The Explanatory Role of Platonic Universals: A Traditional
View of Instantiation 170
7.4 Is There a Simpler Explanation? 178
7.5 Armstrong’s Aristotelian Account of Instantiation
and One over Many 180
7.6 Conclusions 183
8. Probabilistic Laws 184
8.1 Introduction: Laws and Probabilistic Strength 184
8.2 Armstrong on Irreducible Probabilistic Laws 185
8.3 Resisting Probabilistic Causation 187
8.4 Armstrong’s Preferred Account 190
8.5 The Problem of Probabilistic Failures 191
8.6 The Merits of Modal Platonism 194
8.7 Further Considerations: Van Fraassen’s Criticisms
of Armstrong’s Probabilistic Laws 197
8.8 Conclusions 200
9. Determinable Laws 201
9.1 Introduction: The Challenge of Accounting for Functional Laws 201
9.2 The Problem of Functional Laws in More Detail 204
9.3 Determinable Laws 205
9.4 The Overdetermination Problem 210
9.5 Solving the Overdetermination Problem 213
9.6 Conclusions 217
10. Extending Modal Platonism 218
10.1 Introduction: Modality in General 218
10.2 Non-Natural Modality 218
10.3 Possibility and Necessity: Platonism versus the Dominant
Possible-Worlds Approach 219
10.4 The Richness of Modal Platonism 223
10.5 Platonic Modal Relations 225
10.6 Modal Platonism and the Argument from Unrealized Possibility 230
10.7 Alien Possibility and Natural Science 239
10.8 Further Work 241
10.9 Conclusions 244
11. Summary 245
Appendix I: Logical Proofs of Chapter 4 253
References 255
Index of Names 269
Index of Concepts 271
Acknowledgements
Welcome! Come take a walk with me through the Platonic realm, where
solace is to be found. Before we get down to business, I must acknowledge all
the help that I have received in bringing this book to fruition. I have been
very lucky. Over the years I have received lots of support in a variety of ways
from brilliant friends and family, teachers and colleagues. There are too many
people to list individually, but they know who they are. My wife Sapna and
parents, Gillian and Gay, deserve a special mention for all their encouragement
over the years, as do various teachers at Ashfield School, the University of
York, and the University of Nottingham.
During my career I have been lucky to work with many of the thinkers
whose work first got me interested in metaphysics. My first stroke of luck was
to work under the PhD supervision of Stephen Mumford and the late
D. M. Armstrong as part of the AHRC Metaphysics of Science Project. I am
particularly grateful to Stephen Mumford for taking me on as a PhD student,
and for being an excellent mentor and friend ever since. As a lecturer at
Durham University, I have also been fortunate to work with colleagues such
as Nancy Cartwright, John Heil, and the late E. J. Lowe, all of whom have
been a great source of intellectual inspiration. Indeed, perhaps what I have
done in this book is to take what I like from the work of these five thinkers,
before adding a generous helping of Platonism.
Much of the research for this book was undertaken during a six-month
Mind Association Research Fellowship (2015–16). I am very grateful to the
Mind Association for supporting this book project through that award. I have
also received support and guidance from several academic mentors and friends,
including Stephen Barker, Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Lisa Bortolotti, Sophie
Gibb, Robin Hendry, Wendy Parker, and Markus Schrenk. I would like to thank
the many students, discussants, and referees who have provided helpful feedback
on my work over the years. Again, there are too many people to list here, but
many of them are named in the acknowledgements sections of my journal
articles and referenced in this book. Special thanks go to three anonymous refer-
ees, Giacomo Giannini, and Samuel Kimpton-Nye for invaluable feedback on the
book manuscript. I am grateful to Giacomo Giannini and Ben Young for their
proofreading work, to Giacomo for help with the index, and to José Tomás
xii Acknowledgements
Alvarado for in-depth discussions about the contents of this book. Over
many years, I have also benefitted from philosophical discussions with my
Nottingham friends Ben Curtis, Greg Mason, and Ben Smart. Finally, I thank
Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press and the production team:
Daniel Gill, Jenny King, the project manager Saranya Ravi, Emma Varley, and
the copy editor Kim Richardson.
There is some truth in my quip above about seeking solace in philosophy.
This book was delayed by a critical illness in 2019 and 2020, and working on
the book has provided some much-needed respite from health worries. I would
like to thank Mr Prakash Johnson and his surgical team at Sunderland Royal
Hospital, and I thank Dr Andrea Clarke for sending me their way. Sapna was
my rock during this difficult time. I am truly grateful. I also thank Richard
Stopford, Alice Wilson, and other colleagues at Durham University for their
unwavering support during that time.
Parts of this book contain material that was published previously in the
journals, and I thank the journal editors and publishers for their permission:
Chapter 2 contains material from M. Tugby, ‘Platonic Dispositionalism’,
Mind, volume 122, issue 486 (2013), pp. 451–80, by permission of Oxford
University Press.
Chapters 3 and 6 contain a small amount of material from the following
article: M. Tugby, ‘Grounding Theories of Powers’, Synthese, volume 198 (2021),
pp. 11187–216. This is an open access article and is reproduced under a Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License: http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Chapters 3 and 7 contain extracts reprinted by permission from Springer
Nature Customer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, of M. Tugby,
‘Universals, Laws, and Governance’, Philosophical Studies, volume 173 (2016),
pp. 1147–63.
Chapter 10 contains material from M. Tugby, ‘The Alien Paradox’, Analysis,
volume 75, issue 1 (2015), pp. 28–37, by permission of Oxford University Press.
This book is dedicated to my daughter and son, Priya and Jayan, who
arrived and lit up my life while I was writing it.
1
The Scope and Aims of This Book
Properties, Laws, and Dispositions
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this book is to develop and defend Modal Platonism, a new
non-reductive theory of natural modality which is based upon a certain realist
view of properties. I call this a ‘properties-first’ or ‘property-driven’ theory,
because it takes properties to be fundamental and views them as the metaphys
ical source of natural modality. By ‘natural modality’ we mean those possibilities
(and necessities) arising from the laws of nature and the behavioural disposi-
tions of physical entities, such as the fact that masses are disposed to attract
each other (in a certain way) or the fact that particles with similar charges are
disposed to repel each other (in a certain way). It is natural modality that ren-
ders our world ordered and hence susceptible to scientific investigation. At
the heart of scientific enquiry is the search for explanations and predictions
concerning natural behaviour: if the world had not contained laws and
entities with stable behavioural dispositions, it is difficult to see how predic-
tions and explanations could have been formulated. Thus, in searching for a
theory of natural modality, we are searching for an account of the metaphys
ical preconditions of all scientific enquiry.1
One of the core assumptions of this book is that we should take a broadly
realist attitude towards science and metaphysics. The main idea behind this
assumption is that there is a mind-independent world which has a nature
independently of how we think or talk about it. The commitment to meta
physical realism can be cashed out in a number of ways, but a common theme
in contemporary metaphysics is that realism involves the adoption of some
sort of truthmaker principle. The core idea behind such a principle is that, in
1 In this book I shall be less concerned with the more exotic cases of possibility that philosophers
sometimes discuss, such as the possibility that there could have been nothing in existence at all.
However, in Chapter 10 I will show how my theory of natural modality can be extended to various
cases of non-natural modality.
Putting Properties First: A Platonic Metaphysics for Natural Modality. Matthew Tugby, Oxford University Press.
© Matthew Tugby 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198855101.003.0001
2 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions
Armstrong’s words, ‘[t]here is something that exists in reality, independent of

the proposition in question, which makes the truth true’ (Armstrong 2004, 5).
Putting our current project in these terms, the domain of truths in question
are the truths of natural modality, and our aim is to find truthmakers for
those truths. The fundamental truthmakers I offer for these truths are Platonic
universals (properties), like the property of having mass or the property of
being spherical. A property qua universal is an entity which can be instanti-
ated by more than one object at the same time. This means, for example, that
a red letterbox and a red bus literally have something in common: the univer-
sal of redness. According to the Platonic conception of universals, some uni-
versals are instantiated in the world, and some remain uninstantiated. The
uninstantiated universals exist just as much as the instantiated ones: all uni-
versals are actual, necessary existents.
Platonism has not been a very popular position in modern metaphysics,
especially in twentieth-century Western philosophy. Once Platonic universals
are in play, however, they can be used to provide a powerful explanation of
the laws of nature and the dispositions of physical things (or so I shall argue).
I call this book Putting Properties First because it offers a metaphysics which
takes properties (universals) as its foundations, and then shows how modality
flows from there. However, if Platonic properties are to play this foundational
theoretical role, it is crucial that they be understood in the right way. Other
recent theorists who claim to take a properties-first approach to modality
favour a ‘dispositionalist’ conception of properties: they view properties as
being identical with dispositions (the ‘powerful-qualities’ identity theory) or
as having a dispositional essence (dispositional essentialism).2 I argue that
these views are mistaken. Instead, we must view properties as being qualita-
tive rather than dispositional. According to Modal Platonism, properties are
qualitative universals which metaphysically ground dispositions and laws.
There are general reasons for thinking that if x metaphysically grounds y, then
x cannot be identical with y or have y as part of its essence. I thus reject the
identity theory and dispositional essentialism. In short, Modal Platonism is
novel in at least two respects: it resurrects an unpopular form of realism about
properties (Platonism), and resists the dispositionalist conception of properties
which is popular among other ‘properties-first’ theorists.
2 I thus understand dispositional essentialism to be a theory about the natures of properties, such as
charge and mass. However, the term ‘dispositional essentialism’ is also sometimes used to express a
thesis about the essences of natural kinds, like being an electron (see e.g. Ellis 2001 and Dumsday
2013b). To be clear, I am not using the term ‘dispositional essentialism’ in this latter way.
Introduction 3
Metaphysical questions about the nature of properties have been neglected

in much of the work on natural modality—yet it is these questions that pro-
vide the key to formulating an adequate metaphysics for modality.3 One of my
principal aims in the early parts of this book is to show why a newcomer to
realist metaphysics ought to be attracted to the property-driven account of
natural modality. The rival ‘mosaic’ and ‘law-driven’ accounts of natural
modality, as I will call them, have already received wide critical discussion in
the philosophical literature, particularly in relation to neo-Humean regularity
theories of laws and the nomic realism of Dretske, Armstrong, and Tooley
(more on this later). Rather than adding to this mass of literature, it will be
more fruitful to present the core aspects of my own theory, starting in
Chapter 2, and then as the book proceeds to indicate the advantages that it
brings.4 In doing so I shall be arguing for my view on the basis of the theoret
ical virtues that it can claim, such as comprehensiveness, explanatory power,
and the ability to solve various long-standing puzzles. Knock-down argu-
ments are rare in metaphysics, but by displaying the advantages of my new
property-driven account I hope to show it deserves to be considered a strong
contender for a theory of natural modality.
The book has two parts. The first part, spanning Chapters 2 to 6, develops
the core theory. Chapter 2 argues that the Platonic theory of universals is the
only theory which can shed light on the directedness of dispositions.
Chapter 3 rejects dispositional or nomic essentialist conceptions of universals
in favour of a qualitative conception. Chapter 4 discusses the relations
between laws and their instances. Chapter 5 shows how my qualitative con-
ception of properties solves puzzles regarding dispositions that remain in a
latent state. Chapter 6 presents objections and replies to the core theory. The
second part of the book puts Modal Platonism to work and reveals some of its
theoretical benefits. Chapter 7 shows how Modal Platonism can explain the
repeatability of laws. Chapter 8 shows how Modal Platonism can solve puz-
zles surrounding probabilistic laws. Chapter 9 shows how Modal Platonism
can solve puzzles surrounding functional laws like Newton’s law of universal
gravitation. Chapter 10 shows how Modal Platonism can be extended to deal
with various kinds of non-natural modality, and identifies future work.
3 For example, much work on dispositions has focused on the connection (or lack thereof) between
disposition ascriptions and counterfactual conditionals. However, this debate is of little help when it
comes to understanding the metaphysical source of natural modality. I say more about this later in
this chapter.
4 This methodology has similarities to that employed by Williams in his recent book on powers
(2019). Following Bigelow (1999) and Ellis (2001), Williams calls it an ‘argument-by-display’.
This section has offered a very brief introduction to the book, and I could
stop here and proceed to the next chapter. To prepare uninitiated readers for
what is to come, however, it may be helpful for me to introduce the core meta
physical concepts and assumptions employed in the book, and to situate my
Modal Platonist approach within the broad landscape of positions on natural
modality. I address these tasks in section 1.2 and section 1.3, respectively. This
introductory work will take some time, however, and readers familiar with
the contemporary debates on natural modality may wish to skip one or both
of the following two sections. In the final two sections of the chapter I provide
a more detailed introduction to Modal Platonism, which will help readers to
see more clearly what is novel (and controversial) about it.
1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism
In this section I introduce the main metaphysical concepts and assumptions

on which Modal Platonism relies. This, I hope, will help to eliminate potential
confusions that could arise later on, since terms like ‘properties’, ‘qualities’,
‘dispositions’, ‘existence’, ‘grounding’, ‘reduction’, and ‘essence’ can mean differ-
ent things, even within academic philosophy. Let us begin by saying more
about properties.
1.2.1 Properties and Predicates
All realists about properties must face the question of which predicates cor-
respond to genuine properties—the latter, on my theory, being Platonic uni-
versals. It is far from obvious that for each predicate that truly applies to a
thing, there is a corresponding universal. For example, realists about univer-
sals are pretty sure that the properties figuring in the laws of physics are genu-
ine, but it is implausible to think that gerrymandered predicates, such as
Goodman’s infamous ‘grue’, correspond to genuine universals, even though a
statement like ‘this emerald is grue’ can be true.5 Some people are happy to
say that grueness is a property in some sense, but it is not one that has the
same ontological standing as a universal. This distinction is sometimes drawn
5 Goodman’s property of being grue (1955) is disjunctive and is defined as follows: an object is grue
if and only if it is examined before time t and is green, or is not so examined and is blue.
The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 5
by saying that grueness is a property in the abundant sense, while the genuine
properties are ‘sparse’ or ‘natural’.
The problem, though, is that it is often far from clear whether a predicate
corresponds to a genuine sparse property. One way of drawing the line is to
allow science to guide us. Hence, Armstrong (1978) adopts a naturalistic
approach he calls ‘a posteriori realism’, which says that all and only the prop-
erties referred to in the true, fundamental scientific theory are genuine uni-
versals. I cannot accept Armstrong’s specific theory of universals, because as
we shall see it rules out the existence of uninstantiated or ‘alien’ properties;
according to Modal Platonism, it is important to accept the existence of unin-
stantiated properties, since they can do much important theoretical work
where unrealized possibilities are concerned. Nonetheless, a Platonist could
agree with Armstrong’s general idea that we should accept all and only the
universals that are sufficient to ground the truths of science (which for me
include scientific truths about alien possibilities). This would make Modal
Platonism a naturalistic theory in an important sense.
What about dispositions, such as the disposition of salt to dissolve in water?
Should we regard dispositions as properties, and if so are they sparse or abun-
dant? These are complex questions. Dispositions are often spoken of as if they
are properties of things, and for dispositional essentialists like Bird (2007),
Ellis (2001), and Mumford (2004) many dispositions are indeed fundamental,
sparse universals. However, according to the view put forward in this book,
all universals are fundamentally qualitative rather than dispositional.
Dispositions certainly depend on universals, but the universals are in them-
selves qualitative. As we shall see, on my view, for something to have a dispos
ition is for it to instantiate some qualitative property that stands in a
relationship of dispositional directedness. In section 3.6 we shall see that, on
this theory, disposition ascriptions are disguised expressions of existential
facts. So, dispositions are not themselves properties in a straightforward
sense. I shall tentatively settle on the view that dispositions are derivative
‘second-order’ properties of their possessors. But to make matters more com-
plicated, dispositions like ‘being disposed to dissolve’ do seem to ‘carve nature
at its joints’ better than many other derivative properties like ‘grue’, and so to
say that dispositional properties are merely abundant is to do them a disser-
vice. An obvious compromise is to accept that not all sparse properties are
fundamental universals. Since I take fundamental entities to be ungrounded
ones, this would mean accepting that some grounded properties (including
second-order dispositional properties) are sparse. In this spirit, it has been
argued by some that because the properties invoked in the special sciences
(like chemistry and biology) carve out similarities that are important for the
purpose of scientific prediction, we should accept that there are sparse prop-
erties at non-fundamental levels (see e.g. Schaffer 2004 for discussion). For
current purposes, then, we shall remain open to the possibility that some
(second-order) dispositional properties are sparse.
I have made it clear that all fundamental universals are qualitative, but I
shall remain neutral as to which predicates pick out the universals and which
do not, and I remain open-minded about whether, for example, there are sim-
ple monadic universals, first-order relational universals, conjunctive univer-
sals, structural universals, haecceity universals, or natural-kind universals.6
We shall also remain open-minded about what are the bearers of properties.
For example, we shall not assume that it is only simple entities or medium-
sized particulars that are the bearers of properties. Science may suggest that
there are properties instantiated by whole physical systems, or at least proper-
ties which are collectively instantiated by various parts of a system. Indeed, it
has been argued by some that these sorts of system-level properties are
needed to account for certain high-level nomic principles such as symmetry
principles and the laws of conservation, which apply to systems as a whole
rather than individuals (see e.g. Chakravartty 2019 and Godfrey 2020, ch. 4).7
There is no reason why Modal Platonism cannot accommodate such univer-
sals if they are needed.
To be clear, though, it is certainly not assumed in this work that predicates
which do not pick out genuine universals are in poor standing. For example,
few would deny that sentences involving non-fundamental predicates can be
just as true as sentences involving fundamental ones. The difference is just
that the truthmaking story for the former is more complicated than we might
have expected, perhaps involving very many universals. Fortunately, we can let
natural science take the lead on the question of what the specific truthmaking
6 Grossmann (1983) thinks that all genuine properties are simple. Ontic structural realists (e.g.
Ladyman and Ross 2007) argue that the fundamental properties in physics are relational. Armstrong
(1986) thinks that conjunctive and structural universals are genuine and uses the property of being
methane as an example of a structural universal. Note that if the world is ‘gunky’ and no level of nature
is absolutely fundamental (Schaffer 2003), it may turn out that all universals are structural. Regarding
natural kinds, I have in previous work rejected the need for sui generis natural kind universals such as
‘being an electron’ (Alvarado and Tugby 2021) but most of the arguments in this book are neutral on
this issue. One possibility is that natural kinds are complex universals that have simpler universals as
constituents (for further discussion see Hawley and Bird 2011 and section 10.4).
7 This strategy has structural similarities to one proposed by Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse (1992),
which explains global principles via the essential properties of the world-kind. However, this world-
kind strategy arguably requires a robust commitment to natural-kind essentialism, which some modal
theorists (including myself) would like to avoid.
stories look like. Modal Platonism is sufficiently abstract that it should be

compatible with the various possible developments in science.
With the foregoing points in mind, I shall often speak as though macro-
properties (such as being spherical) and the properties found in the special
sciences (such as types of chemical structure) correspond to single universals.
Not only will this retain the spirit of open-mindedness about what the univer-
sals are, but it will also allow us the convenience of using examples which are
more tangible than those in, say, theoretical physics. If such examples do not
ultimately involve single, fundamental universals, then they can be con
sidered as placeholders for more fundamental examples.
Let us now say more about the differences between qualitative properties
and dispositions.
1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions
According to Modal Platonism, universals have a qualitative rather than dis

positional essence. Nonetheless, qualitative properties are the metaphysical
source of dispositions. On my view, a thing’s qualities are occurrent proper-
ties that are numerically distinct from its dispositions. This puts me at odds
with many rival property-driven theorists, who fail to see a clear distinction
between occurrent properties and dispositions. For example, dispositional
essentialists such as Bird and Mumford often insist that dispositions are
occurrent properties (see Taylor 2018 for discussion), while powerful-
qualities theorists often describe their position as the view that qualities and
dispositions are identical. In later chapters (see especially sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.7,
and 5.3) I argue against each of these theories, but for the time being I shall
say a few words about what I take to be the main features of qualities and dis
positions. This should help readers to see why I take qualitative properties
and dispositions to be non-identical.
Let us start with the notion of a quality. The notion of a quality is perhaps
most familiar in discussions about perception, as when we say someone’s per-
ceptual experience has the quality of redness or hotness. However, the notion
of a qualitative property is not intended here to be restricted to phenomenal
properties. Fundamental physical properties such as mass or charge could
equally be described as qualities, as would structural properties such as being
H2O or being rectangular. Such properties are wholly present in their
instances and concern how their possessors occurrently are. In the case of
structural properties, they typically determine the geometrical features of
their possessors. Since qualitative universals are the primitive elements of my

ontology, unsurprisingly I take them to be self-individuating. This is to say that
fundamental qualitative properties (including relations) have a self-contained
nature, or an intrinsic ‘suchness’, and cannot be defined in terms of anything else.
This in itself is not problematic, however: many people, such as Lowe (2007,
522), have argued convincingly that some entities have to be self-individuating
or else a problematic metaphysical regress of individuation arises.
It is sometimes argued by dispositional essentialists that scientific theory
favours a dispositional rather than qualitative understanding of fundamental
properties because scientists typically describe properties (like mass) in terms
of the dispositions they confer (such as gravitational dispositions). However,
I side with Neil Williams in thinking that science is more ontologically inno-
cent than it appears. The fact that scientists describe properties in dispos
itional terms is a reflection of the methodology of science rather than its
ontology (see Williams 2011 for details). And even if scientific theory could
help us to settle metaphysical debates about properties, it is far from clear that
the dispositional conception of fundamental properties would win the day
(see Livanios 2017, ch. 3).
Given that qualitative properties are primitive and self-individuating, one
might be tempted to think of them as so-called ‘quiddities’. I prefer to avoid
the terminology of quiddities, however, because the term is slippery. For
example, in his later work Armstrong sometimes refers to his categorical
properties as quiddities, but on Armstrong’s view if two quiddities are monadic
and simple, the only thing that distinguishes them is the fact that they are
numerically different (2010, 34). Hence, it looks as though Armstrong’s funda-
mental quiddities merely have a bare identity rather than an intrinsic qualita-
tive nature. Lewis (2009) is also typically regarded as holding a similar
quidditistic view (see Black 2000); Locke (2012, 351) has called this version of
quidditism ‘austere quidditism’, while Hildebrand (2016, 519) calls it ‘bare
quidditism’. Thanks to the work of Armstrong and Lewis, bare quidditism
appears to have been the dominant form of quidditism in recent decades.
However, this theory is surely a non-starter for a property-driven theorist
about modality like me, for if universals were nothing more than bare quid
dities, it would seem inexplicable as to why different properties ground differ-
ent laws and dispositions. A similar point has been made by Smith (2016, 249)
and I think Smith is right. In my view, the reason why different properties
ground different laws is that they have different intrinsic qualitative natures.
Given the close association with quidditism and the categoricalist theories of
Armstrong and Lewis, which I reject, I prefer to drop the quiddities termin
ology altogether and simply refer to properties as qualitative universals.
What exactly, then, are dispositions? To say that something has a disposition
is to say, minimally, that a certain behavioural manifestation is naturally
possible for it (see Vetter 2015 for a similar characterization). Earlier I gave a
concrete example: masses are disposed to attract each other (in a certain way).
What this means, minimally, is that certain kinds of gravitational behaviour
are naturally possible for those masses. Dispositions, then, have a modal
essence while occurrent qualities do not. To use a slogan, qualities determine
how things occurrently are, while dispositions concern what things can do. To
illustrate with a common macroscopic example, I would say that the spheri-
cality of a ball is qualitative because it determines the occurrent geometrical
form of the ball, while its disposition to roll is modal and determines what the
ball can do in certain circumstances. I would argue, then, that qualities and
dispositions play different metaphysical roles, contrary to what the identity
theory suggests.
There are other good reasons for thinking that qualities and dispositions
are distinct. I said above that qualities are self-individuating, but in contrast it
is overwhelmingly plausible that dispositions are metaphysically individuated
relationally, by the types of manifestation that they are dispositions for (see
e.g. Bird 2007, ch. 6, Lowe 2010, and section 2.3 of this work). For example,
knowing what fragility is amounts to knowing that fragile things are such that
they can break fairly easily. Hence, one cannot understand what it is to be
fragile without understanding the essential connection between fragility and
the possibility of breakage.
I suspect that some philosophers will object to my use of the terminology
of dispositions, and therefore some further clarificatory remarks are in order.
Recently, Alvarado (2020, 220–1) has argued that the dispositions termin
ology is problematic because it is closely bound up with a certain history in
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century philosophy. For example, there have
been many attempts to show that disposition predicates are conceptually
equivalent to counterfactual conditionals of various kinds (see Mumford 1998
and Schrenk 2016 for historic summaries), and related attempts to conceive
of dispositions as entities that necessitate certain manifestations when trig-
gered (see e.g. Ellis 2001, 286). Alvarado thinks that both of these ideas are
deeply problematic,8 and therefore recommends that metaphysicians drop the
terminology of dispositions and speak instead of causal powers.
8 Alvarado thus agrees with Martin (1994) that the semantic project fails, and agrees with Schrenk
(2010) and Mumford and Anjum (2011) that it is implausible to think that dispositions necessitate
their manifestations when triggered.
To be clear, I do not intend to use the term ‘dispositions’ in a way that

commits me to the views about dispositions that Alvarado describes. I have said,
minimally, that dispositions (and the laws on which they depend) make certain
behavioural manifestations naturally possible. I leave it as a further question
as to whether disposition predicates like ‘is fragile’ are conceptually equivalent
to counterfactuals. I also leave it open as to whether dispositions that manifest
in certain circumstances do so necessarily. What I do claim is that there is a
necessary connection between properties on the one hand, and laws and
dispositions on the other. However, this view leaves it open as to whether
dispositions that manifest in certain circumstances do so necessarily.
Why, then, do I stick with the terminology of dispositions rather than
causal powers? I do so, first, because the main opponents with whom I engage
in this book, such as Martin, Ellis, Mumford, and Bird, continue to employ
the dispositional idiom. And a more substantial reason is that there are
reasons for avoiding talk of causal powers. Given that the laws of fundamental
physics are typically functional in nature and often exhibit certain symmet
ries, many have doubted whether causation can properly be said to take place
at the fundamental level of nature (see e.g. Russell 1912–13 for an early
expression of this view). But even if causation is a fairly ‘macro’ phenomenon,
this should not force us to deny that, say, quantum systems have certain dis
positions for behaviour. Indeed, the Schrödinger equation seems precisely to
describe dispositions for motion. Since our aim is to provide a theory of nat
ural modality that is abstract enough to apply to all sciences and develop-
ments therein, it would be a mistake to replace talk of dispositions with talk
of causal powers. Indeed, Nolan (2015) argues that there are actual cases of
non-causal dispositions at the fundamental level, such as those observed in
the EPR experiment. It is not my aim here to assess the various cases that
allegedly involve non-causal dispositions; the important point is just that we
should be open-minded about the possibility of behavioural dispositions
which are not causal powers.
1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization
An assumption of this work, which I take to be relatively uncontroversial, is the

Quinean idea that existence is a univocal notion: existence is an ‘all-or-nothing
affair’ and there are not different modes of existence.9 I also accept that
9 See van Inwagen (2009) for a detailed articulation of the Quinean credo. For a defence of an
opposing approach, see McDaniel (2017).
existence claims carry ontological commitment and that we are so committed

only to the things that exist (contra Meinongianism). In other senses, though,
I am ontologically permissive, since I am happy to say that non-fundamental,
derivative entities (such as dispositions, on my view) exist just as much as the
fundamental entities that ground them (see also Schaffer 2009 and Bennett 2017,
ch. 8). I therefore reject what Bennett (2011) calls ‘flatworldism’, which
eliminates non-fundamental entities from our ontology. I am also happy to use
‘existence’ and ‘real’ as synonyms. All fundamental and non-fundamental entities
are real.10 Finally, I deny that all non-fundamental entities are ontologically
reducible, and therefore I do not use ‘irreducible’ and ‘fundamental’ as synonyms.
On my view, the fundamental entities are the independent, ungrounded ones.
However, not all irreducible entities are ungrounded.11 Indeed, I am drawn to
the view that non-fundamental entities are generally ontologically irreducible to
fundamental entities and I say a little more about this below.
Another important assumption about existence is that every existing entity
is actual. This claim might seem too obvious to mention; indeed, as Lewis
notes (1986a, 97), ‘exists’ and ‘actual’ are often taken as synonyms. However,
in philosophical circles this equivalence is a matter of dispute, and I would
not go as far as to say that it is an analytic truth that every existing entity is
actual. This is because some philosophers find theoretical reasons to posit
non-actual entities, particularly in modal contexts; for example, real but non-
actual possible worlds are sometimes posited in order to account for modal-
ity. However, as a property- driven theorist I reject the possible- worlds
approach to modality (see Chapter 10), even though I accept that talk of pos
sible worlds can be useful for heuristic or logical purposes. In short, my
property-driven theory offers an ‘actualist’ theory of modality.
If there are no non-actual entities, how do we draw the distinction between
possibilities that are realized and those that are not? Clearly, if we take an
actualist approach to modality, we cannot say that modal realization is a mat-
ter of a non-actual entity becoming actual. The answer is that, according to
Modal Platonism, a possibility is realized when the relevant properties
become instantiated. Platonic properties are the metaphysical source of
modality but many properties remain in an uninstantiated (but actual) state.
10 Fine (2001), in contrast, appears to employ a technical sense of ‘real’ which seems to apply only
to entities that are absolutely fundamental.
11 I shall not defend this assumption here, but see Bennett (2017, ch. 5) for a defence of the connection
between fundamentality and independence. One way of disputing the link between independence and
fundamentality is to argue that there are fundamental cases of symmetrical grounding (see e.g. Thompson
2016 and Barnes 2018). However, I accept the orthodox view that there are no cases of symmetrical
grounding. Such cases would yield circular metaphysical explanations, which I take to be problematic.
Platonic abstracta are necessarily actual, but (typically) only contingently

instantiated. I discuss these issues at greater length in Chapter 10 and elsewhere.
1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding
A core claim of Modal Platonism is that natural laws are collectively grounded
by the qualitative universals. Let us now say more about the contemporary
metaphysical notion of grounding. As a first pass, grounding can be described
as a form of non-causal metaphysical dependence which occurs with meta
physical necessity: necessarily, a grounded entity exists if its full grounds exist.
More precisely, metaphysical grounding is a non-causal relation of determin
ation or necessitation that is typically held to be irreflexive, transitive, and
asymmetric (see e.g. Schaffer 2009). Grounding is thus said to impose strict
partial order on reality. Grounded entities are metaphysically explained by
their grounds. Given that, on my view, property universals collectively ground
laws, this means that properties metaphysically explain laws, and once all the
properties exist, the laws of nature cannot fail to hold. In short, laws are rela-
tional facts that are grounded in, and less fundamental than, existential facts
concerning properties (universals).
Much work in recent years has been devoted to the notion of grounding,
but few property-driven theorists have explored the idea that qualities ground
laws and dispositions. However, some recent papers have bucked this trend
(e.g. Yates 2018, Azzano 2021, Coates 2021a, 2021b; Tugby 2021b; Kimpton-Nye
2021), and this book is a contribution to this new school of thought. Appealing
to the notion of grounding is somewhat risky, of course, given how many dis-
putes about grounding have emerged in recent years—such as the debate about
whether grounding is a singular, primitive relationship (Berker 2018), or whether
we should accept a pluralistic stance and allow that grounding (or what Bennett
calls ‘building’) comes in different forms (Wilson 2014, Bennett 2017). Given
that the basic structure of Modal Platonism can be captured in terms of meta
physical dependence, why not avoid grounding terminology and just say that
laws and the dispositions of objects depend on qualitative universals? The prob-
lem is that metaphysical dependence claims themselves do not express all that
I want to say about the relationships between the various levels of natural
modality. For example, metaphysical dependence is neutral as regards whether
the dependee fully or merely partially determines the dependent entity.12
12 If x fully grounds y, the grounding entity x by itself is metaphysically sufficient for the existence
of the grounded entity y. If x partly grounds y, then x is a mere proper part of the full ground and does
not by itself necessitate the grounded entity y. For example, one of the conjuncts in a conjunctive fact
is only a partial ground of the conjunction.
Although I think that second-order relations of dispositional directedness are

fully grounded by the universals alone, I do not think that universals by
themselves ground their instances (see Chapter 7). Moreover, not all meta-
physical dependence relations are suitably explanatory. For example, if laws
were strongly emergent entities that emerged from properties, then it might
be true that laws metaphysically depend on properties even though the latter
do not explain and ground the former. Fortunately, however, although Modal
Platonism requires something like grounding in certain parts of the picture it
proposes, we can remain neutral about many of the fine-grained debates
about grounding. For example, as far as I can tell, Modal Platonism is consist-
ent with both the unitary and the pluralist approaches to grounding. In the
current context this issue comes down to the question of whether the sense in
which properties determine laws and dispositions is to some extent unique,
or whether the kind of determination involved is the very same as that
involved in all other cases of so-called grounding.
1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship
Grounding is sometimes characterized primarily as a feature of propositions

or concepts. This is something I reject. This book is an exercise in realist
metaphysics, which theorizes about what the world in itself is like. Grounding
would thus be of limited interest if it only concerned how concepts or pro
positions relate to each other. It may well be that there are grounding relations
between propositions, but I take it that such relations only hold in so far as
there are corresponding grounding relations between the entities that the
propositions describe.13
More precisely, this book argues for a realist conception of properties (and
relations), which I take to be universals. Thus, I take the fundamental build-
ing blocks of reality to be universals, together with the things that instantiate
those properties. I am therefore happy to say that the world contains facts as
well as things, and this is consistent with the popular view that grounding is a
relationship between facts. As far as I can tell, everything I say about ground-
ing in this book can be expressed in terms of facts, providing that we permit
talk of a range of logically constructed facts, including relational facts, dis-
junctive facts, conjunctive facts, existential facts, and so on. For example, we
can express my view about laws as the view that relational (second-order)
13 I therefore have no objection to expressing grounding using a sentential operator, as Fine some-
times does (2001, 2012). However, metaphysically speaking I take grounding to be a worldly relation-
ship between worldly entities.
nomic facts are grounded in existential facts concerning universals. However,

I am perfectly happy to allow, in line with Schaffer (2010a, 36), that grounding
can hold between entities in other ontological categories. For those who dis-
like facts, the grounding claims of Modal Platonism could be explicated in
terms of grounding between things, providing that Platonic universals are
included among the things.
By saying that Modal Platonism is understood along factualist lines, I do
not mean to commit to a particular realist metaphysical theory about the
nature of substances. In contemporary philosophy the metaphysics of facts is
often associated with D. M. Armstrong’s states of affairs ontology, on which
facts are analysed as bare particulars instantiating universals. However, I
employ the notion of a fact in a more liberal way that is compatible with other
conceptions of matter and substance. For example, I would have no objection
to those who endorse a bundle theory of substances speaking in terms of
facts, in so far as they can speak of bundles of properties as instantiating those
properties. And I take it that the property-driven approach to natural modal-
ity is compatible with different metaphysical views about the ontological sta-
tus of matter at the fundamental level of physics. As Chakravartty (2019, 12)
notes, the ontological categories of objects, events, and processes are all ones
whose members have properties, since some of those members will differ in
some ways but not others.14
1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction
To avoid confusion in following chapters, it is important to note that I do not

take grounding to imply either conceptual or ontological reduction. In other
words, if one entity grounds another, this does not automatically mean that
the latter is reducible to the former. Indeed, it is even arguable that grounding
precludes ontological reduction. In later chapters I shall argue that properties
ground laws and dispositions in various senses. Yet I also say that laws and
14 At present, ontic structural realism is a popular metaphysical theory in the philosophy of phys-
ics, and if some version of this view is correct, then the fundamental facts will be relational ones. To be
clear, though, my account of qualitative properties is consistent with the idea that some (or all) prop-
erties are irreducibly polyadic. Note also that the ontic structural realists’ structures are certainly apt to
be property bearers. Again, it is difficult to see how this can be denied if various structures are to differ
in some ways but not others. Interestingly, Dumsday (2019, ch. 3) has argued that a version of the
property-driven approach to natural modality (dispositionalism) might even entail a form of ontic
structural realism. But as noted, I shall remain neutral about views like ontic structural realism, which
fall squarely within the philosophy of physics.
dispositions are real and ontologically irreducible. What I take Modal Platonism
to be offering is a non-reductive account of modality. I do not see inconsist-
ency here. I say more about this issue in Chapter 6, but offer some preliminary
observations now.
In the first place, it should be fairly obvious that grounding claims do not
imply conceptual reduction. For example, some physicalists claim that mental
facts are grounded in physical facts, but as far as I know few physicalists think
that mental descriptions can be conceptually reduced to physical descriptions.
For similar reasons, the relation of grounding should not be conflated with
entailment, which is a relation between concepts or propositions rather than
worldly entities. That grounding does not imply ontological reduction is per-
haps less obvious. Rosen (2010, 124–5) for one has argued that there is a rela-
tionship between grounding and reduction and endorses the so- called
grounding–reduction link, the claim that if q reduces to p, then p grounds q
(see also Fine 2001 and Correia and Skiles 2019). However, there are reasons
for being sceptical about the grounding‒reduction link, as well as its converse.
Here I am in agreement with Audi (2012a, 2012b). As I understand onto
logical reduction, to say that Fs reduce to Gs is to say that Fs just are Gs. In
cases of ontological reduction, then, talk of Fs and Gs are just different ways
of picking out the same worldly entities. However, if ontological reduction
tracks identities in this way, it is difficult to see how cases of grounding can be
cases of ontological reduction. As I understand grounding, it is an irreflexive
and asymmetric relation; grounding relations are directed such that grounded
entities are less fundamental than their grounds. In contrast, identity is reflexive
and symmetric, which makes it difficult to see how grounding and ontological
reduction are compatible. I discuss Audi’s version of this argument further
in Chapter 6.15
I note, though, that even if this generalized argument fails, it suffices for our
purposes that not all cases of grounding involve ontological reduction. I take
this more modest claim to be much less controversial, and it is one that is
consistent with Rosen’s grounding‒reduction link. Again, grounding physical
ists hold that mental properties are grounded in physical properties, but these
are typically not reductionist theories (see e.g. Kroedel and Schulz 2016,
Schaffer 2017, Stenwall 2021). Likewise, I argue that laws are collectively
grounded in the existence of Platonic universals. But laws are numerically
distinct from those universals. On my view, laws are second-order relational
facts which are grounded in the existence of the universals that are their relata
15 I first discussed this point in my 2021b, 11195.

(i.e. existential facts). Given that facts are individuated by their constituents,
these facts are not one and the same. Similarly, dispositions are not reducible
to qualitative properties because they are metaphysically individuated in dif-
ferent ways (see Chapters 2 and 3).
1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity
The orthodox view of grounding is that it is a metaphysically necessary rela-

tionship: if p fully grounds q then, necessarily, q holds if p does. Among those
who advocate grounding necessitarianism are (for example) Audi (2012a),
Dasgupta (2014), deRosset (2010), Fine (2015), Rosen (2010), and Trogdon
(2013). I shall also accept this orthodoxy in this book, even though I do not
agree with all of the arguments that have been offered for necessitarianism
about grounding. Here I merely note that when we consider paradigmatic
cases of grounding, grounding necessitarianism seems overwhelmingly
plausible. To use a stock example, Plato grounds the existence of the singleton
set containing Plato. It is very difficult to see how a world in which Plato exists
could be one in which the corresponding singleton set fails to exist.
Importantly, this means that my Platonic theory of modality is a form of
necessitarianism about the laws of nature, given that universals collectively
ground laws in the full sense. Like the dispositional or nomic essentialists and
identity theorists, I agree that the relationship between properties, laws, and
dispositions is not contingent. But on my view the source of this necessity lies
in grounding rather than claims about the identities or essences of universals.
As we shall now see, such a view is viable providing we accept the plausible
idea that not all necessary features of an entity are essential features.
1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence
What, then, is the relationship between the notion of grounding and the
notion of essence? In Chapter 3 it will be argued that we must not say that
grounded entities are part of the essences of the entities that ground them.
Grounded entities are supposed to be less fundamental than their grounds,
and it would be metaphysically problematic to say that a fundamental ground-
ing entity has an essence involving something that is less fundamental than
itself. If x is part of y’s essence, then surely y metaphysically depends on x rather
than vice versa.
If there is a connection between grounding and essence at all, the source of

the connection is more likely to lie in the nature of the grounded entity. There
is an option, therefore, for a Modal Platonist to say that it is part of the essence
of a disposition that it is grounded in a certain quality rather than some other
(see Tugby 2021b, sect. 4 for discussion). We might call this a ‘top-down’
essentialist explanation for the grounding of dispositions. As we shall see in
Chapter 3, the question of whether to accept this sort of top-down explan
ation is related to the question of whether or not dispositions are multiply
realizable, which in turn is related to the question of whether the nomic
structure of a world could exhibit symmetries. If a disposition could be fully
grounded by each of several different qualitative properties (in which case the
disposition would be multiply realizable), this means the disposition is not
essentially dependent on a specific qualitative property, which rules out a
simple top-down essentialist explanation of the grounding facts. In that case,
an obvious alternative is to accept the so-called ‘trialist’ view of grounding
(deRosset 2013, sect. 5), which simply takes it that grounding facts are primi-
tive and cannot themselves be explained in more basic terms. I discuss these
issues further in Chapters 3 and 6, where I tentatively accept the possibility
of multiple realization. However, other Modal Platonists may wish to reject
such possibilities.
As noted earlier, when we reflect on various cases of (full) grounding, it
seems overwhelmingly plausible that it occurs with metaphysical necessity:
where full grounding is concerned, the existence of a grounding fact necessitates
the existence of that which it grounds. Yet grounding is not the same thing as
essence. All of this points to the conclusion that the concepts of metaphysical
necessity and hyperintensional notions like essence must be clearly distinguished
(Fine 1994).16 Gorman (2005, 286) puts the point by saying that grounded
entities are necessary accidents. However, I am not entirely happy with this
terminology, as the term ‘accident’ makes it sound as though the grounding
profile of an entity is arbitrary. Although the singleton containing Plato is not
part of the essence of Plato, there seems to be something about Plato that
makes him fit for grounding that singleton rather than some other set. The
same point plausibly applies in the cases of qualitative properties grounding
dispositions. On my view, the disposition to roll is not part of the essence of
16 This means we must reject a simple modal conception of essence and either accept that essence
is primitive (see e.g. Fine 1994; Lowe 2013, ch. 8), or else accept a sophisticated modal conception of
essence (see e.g. Cowling 2013 and Wildman 2013).
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Then, after taking an affectionate leave of his mother and sisters,
he was carried to the low council-house. Here he was offered any
minister he chose to be with him, but he preferred being attended by
a friend then in company, and proceeded cheerfully to the
Grassmarket, surrounded by an immense multitude, which was the
greater, that executions had not been so frequent of late. On the
scaffold, he sang the 103d Psalm and read Revelations, chap. xix.
Then he prayed, commending his soul to the Lord through the
Redeemer, and his cause to be vindicated in his own good time. He
blessed the Lord for the honour of the crown of martyrdom—an
honour the angels are not capable of! Being disturbed in his
devotions, he regretted the circumstance, but continued with
ennobling anticipation. “By and by I shall be above these clouds, and
enjoy, and worship, and glorify thee without interruption or
intermission for ever.” After he had finished, he addressed the
people, and stated the heads of his testimony, in terms similar to
what he had used before the council, adding—“Ye that are the
people of God, do not weary in maintaining the testimony of the day
in your stations and places; and whatever you do, make sure an
interest in Christ, for there is a storm coming which will try your
foundations. And you that are strangers to God, break off your sins
by repentance, else I will be a sad witness against you in the day of
the Lord.” Here he was ordered to stop and go up the ladder. There
he prayed again, and was heard to say—“Lord, I die in the faith that
thou wilt not leave Scotland, but that thou wilt make the blood of thy
witnesses to be the seed of thy church, and return again and be
glorious in this land.” When the napkin was tying over his head, he
said to his friend—“Farewell, be diligent in duty, make your peace
with God through Christ. There is a great trial coming to the remnant
I leave. I have committed them to God. Tell them from me not to
weary nor be discouraged in maintaining the testimony. Let them not
quit nor forego one of these despised truths. Keep your ground, and
the Lord will provide you teachers and ministers; and when he
comes he will make all these despised truths glorious upon the
earth.” He was turned over the ladder with these words upon his lips
—“Lord, into thy hands I commit my spirit; for thou hast redeemed
me, O God of truth!”
Thus fell a standard-bearer in the Scottish Zion, at the early age of
twenty-six—the last legal murder during this black period. Cut off in
the prime of life and in the midst of usefulness, the death of this
faithful witness appeared a dark dispensation; but as he himself had
anticipated, it did more service to the good cause than his preaching
might have done, even had his life been prolonged many years;
because, being perpetrated by a government which made strong
professions of liberality, the question naturally arose, How far can we
trust specious profession in political men, without not only legal but
bona fide security for our rights? The principles for which he died
were the principles which the Revolution sanctioned and settled; and
wo to the country should they ever be despised or forgotten; and
those principles which by the “conform ministers” were deemed
“heights,” have since been declared the only bases upon which the
best and the most thoroughly tried practical system of national and
personal freedom can stand:—the obligation of the original compact
[i. e. the coronation vow] between a king and a people, and the
accountability of both the contracting parties. The less, however,
such subjects are theoretically agitated the better—nor will they ever
be violently urged, except when they are practically forgotten—but it
was to the unshaken assertion of these principles, invigorated and
chastened by principles of religion, that we owe the liberty we now
enjoy—a liberty far beyond what any of the famed republics of old
ever possessed, and which will only perish when these foundations
are destroyed.
After the death of Mr Renwick, Mr Alexander Shiels, author of “The
Hind let Loose,” continued to preach in the fields to the indomitable
wanderers, who, immoveably attached to the covenanted work of
reformation, refused to be ensnared by any precarious liberty which
they rightly judged was only intended to pave the way for the
introduction of popery; or receive any favour from a papistical
usurper, who, by the fundamental laws of the country, was
constitutionally excluded from the throne; and their conduct was
more than justified by the treatment their compliant brethren
received. There now, however, began to appear some streaks in the
sky—some dawnings of the coming day.
The Rev. John Hardy, M.D., minister at Gordon,[171] had in a
sermon, last year, used some such expression as the following:
—“They thanked his majesty for the toleration; but if they behoved to
take away the laws against popery, sectarianism, &c., it were better
to want it, and that any that consented to it, Zechariah’s flying roll of
curses would enter the house and eat the stones and timber.” He
was dealt with, says Fountainhall, to retract, which not finding liberty
to do, he was continued [i. e. his case was delayed] with a
reprimand. But, on the 22d November, a letter came from the king
“ordaining him to be panelled criminally before the justices for his
preaching,” on which he was imprisoned, as “he would not fly,
though he had leisure and advertisement.” On February 13, this
year, an indictment was raised against him, for using seditious
expressions and leasing-making, endeavouring to alienate the
affections of the people from the king. He replied, “that upon
Presbyterian principles, idolatry, even under the gospel, is
punishable by death, and that popery is such. That the expressions
had no sedition in them, seeing that he might regret that Socinians
and others had liberty to vent their doctrine against Christ’s deity,
&c.;” and the criminal lords, who appear to have had some
prognostications of the coming change, “took the courage to find the
expressions libelled not relevant to infer sedition,” therefore
assoilzied him from the crimes libelled, and liberated him from
prison. One Bold was indicted for having acted as precentor to Mr
Renwick, and condemned to be hanged, but was reprieved; and
Gilbert Elliot, who had been forfeited for engaging with Argyle, was
not only pardoned, but admitted as an advocate.
171. Several of the young men who intended the ministry, went over to Holland
and studied medicine, and took degrees, and thus got their education without
taking tests; but they had contracted a liberality (or, as it was termed, a
looseness) of sentiment with regard to the rigid principles held by the
wanderers, which occasioned a separation between them when they
returned. The wanderers were naturally more wedded to the principles for
which they had suffered so much, and which they had seen so many seal
with their blood. The others had met with a variety of sects in Holland living in
harmony, and were not over zealous for the uniform profession even of their
beloved Presbytery:—on this they split at the Revolution.
On the 17th, Sir George Mackenzie was restored to his lord-
advocateship; but no criminal informations were lodged during the
short time that intervened between his appointment “and the glorious
Revolution,” though several petty vexatious harassments showed
that the tiger was only asleep, not dead. The Rev. Thomas Cobham,
a native of Dundee, was, on the 23d May, imprisoned for having
performed family-worship at his cousin Mr Smith’s, in that town, and
both were committed to jail for the offence. About the same time, the
council issued a proclamation, forbidding booksellers to disseminate
any treatises tending to alienate the people from his majesty, or vend
any translations of “Buchanan de Jure Regni,” “Lex Rex,” “Jus
Populi,” “Naphtali,” “The Apologetical Relation,” “The Hind let Loose,”
and the treasonable proclamations published at Sanquhar, or those
issued by the late Monmouth or Argyle. At Edinburgh, one of the
councillors went into the shop of Mr Glen, a firm Presbyterian, to
search for the proscribed books, but having found none, when
retiring, asked the bookseller if he had any books against the king’s
religion. Mr Glen said he had a great many. The councillor asked to
see them, and was immediately carried to where a goodly stock of
Bibles were lying. “O! these are Bibles!” quoth the councillor. “True,”
replied the other, “and they are all against popery from the beginning
to the end.” For this the bookseller was summoned before the
council, where he appeared the same afternoon, and was, we are
told, brought to some trouble.
In nothing, however, did the ruling powers relax with regard to the
wanderers. Having learned that a Mr David Houston had been
proposed by the societies to succeed Mr Renwick in his perilous
labours in the fields, he was apprehended in Ireland and brought
prisoner to Scotland. Being ordered to Edinburgh, a general meeting
which had convened at Lother’s, heard of his seizure, and fearing he
would be murdered as Renwick had been, determined “to relieve him
from these bloody murderers;” and immediately a few friends,
armed, attacked the party escorting him at Carbelpath, and, after a
sharp skirmish, in which some soldiers were killed, succeeded in
rescuing him; but he having his feet bound under the horse’s belly,
was knocked over in the scuffle, and his head trailed some time on
the ground before he could be unloosed, by which he lost his teeth,
and was otherwise so much wounded about the head, that his
elocution was rendered very indistinct. So he returned to Ireland, and
there died. The last whose blood was shed, was George Wood, a
youth about sixteen years of age, who was wantonly shot, without
any questions being asked, by one John Reid, a trooper, whose only
excuse when challenged for it, was—“He knew him to be a Whig,
and these ought to be shot wherever they were found!”
Shortly after, the news of William Prince of Orange’s landing in
England reached Scotland; and to the honour of the persecuted, be
it recorded, the Revolution was accomplished without bloodshed, or
any one act of retaliation being inflicted by them, notwithstanding all
they had suffered.
THE END.
EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY HUGH PATON, ADAM SQUARE.

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3. Against Dispositional Essentialism: A Grounding Theory

Appendix I: Logical Proofs of Chapter 4 253

2 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

Armstrong’s words, ‘[t]here is something that exists in reality, independent of

Metaphysical questions about the nature of properties have been neglected

4 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

1.2 The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism

In this section I introduce the main metaphysical concepts and assumptions

1.2.1 Properties and Predicates

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 5

6 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 7

stories look like. Modal Platonism is sufficiently abstract that it should be

1.2.2 Qualities and Dispositions

According to Modal Platonism, universals have a qualitative rather than dis­

8 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

their possessors. Since qualitative universals are the primitive elements of my

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 9

10 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

To be clear, I do not intend to use the term ‘dispositions’ in a way that

1.2.3 Existence, Actuality, and Realization

An assumption of this work, which I take to be relatively uncontroversial, is the

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 11

existence claims carry ontological commitment and that we are so committed

12 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

Platonic abstracta are necessarily actual, but (typically) only contingently

1.2.4 Metaphysical Grounding

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 13

Although I think that second-­order relations of dispositional directedness are

1.2.5 Grounding as a Worldly Relationship

Grounding is sometimes characterized primarily as a feature of propositions

14 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

nomic facts are grounded in existential facts concerning universals. However,

1.2.6 Grounding Does Not Entail Reduction

To avoid confusion in following chapters, it is important to note that I do not

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 15

15 I first discussed this point in my 2021b, 11195.

16 Properties, Laws, and Dispositions

1.2.7 Grounding Occurs with Metaphysical Necessity

The orthodox view of grounding is that it is a metaphysically necessary rela-

1.2.8 Ground, Necessity, and Essence

The Core Metaphysical Concepts of Modal Platonism 17

If there is a connection between grounding and essence at all, the source of

EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY HUGH PATON, ADAM SQUARE.

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

Appendix I: Logical Proofs of Chapter 4 253

According to Modal Platonism, universals have a qualitative rather than dis

Although I think that second-order relations of dispositional directedness are