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How the Trinity explains the problem of

the one and the many

By Arne Verster
Husband, father, actuary & lay theologian. Founder of Apologetics
Central. Based in Pretoria, South Africa.

Updated: Jan 9, 2023

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A while ago I read that there is a running joke in philosophy

departments, which states that all undergrad papers in philosophy
begin in the same generic manner: "For centuries philosophers have
debated <insert subject here>". If there is one problem in philosophy of
which this can truly be said, it's the problem of the one and the many.
Even Dr. Bosserman, in his Ph.D. dissertation, couldn't escape
introducing the problem in this way when he wrote: "The one-many
problem has proven to represent one of the most pervasive quagmires
of Western philosophy". Likewise, Rushdoony starts his book on the
subject in the following manner, "One of the most basic and continuing
problems of man’s history is the question of the one and the many and
their relationship." So, let's get started...
The problem of the one and the many is probably one of the most
pervasive problems in the history of philosophy. Van Til spent a great
deal of time writing on the relationship between the trinity and one
and the many and presented the trinity as the solution to this seemingly
unsolvable problem (note, the claim is not that the trinity provides a
solution in the sense that it removes all mystery from the subject.
Rather we can better say that the trinity "explains" the problem). James
Anderson writes that the problem of the one and the many is often
considered to be the centrepiece of Van Til’s apologetic [1]

If Van Til was correct, it seems rather amazing that the most pervasive
philosophical problem will find its explanation/solution in the crown of
all Christian doctrines - that God is one being, existing as three co-
eternal, co-equal persons, each of them fully God: The Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit.

The scope of this article, therefore, aims to make the problem of the
one and the many tangible and to outline Van Til's solution as
presented by Van Tillians. It is an ambitious scope, and the topic at
hand is not easy to understand, but I'll do my best to explain the terms
as we move through the content and recommend a few resources on
the subject for further reading near the end.
Preliminary terms defined

To really understand the problem, it will do us well to first define some

common philosophical terms (check out the Apolopedia for more
terms defined). Note, that these are how the terms are mostly defined
in secular philosophy and might be used differently when reading Van
Tillian philosophers.

In metaphysics, there is a distinction between abstract and concrete. It

is better for us to try and illustrate the difference at the hand of a few
examples:

Abstract universal and concrete particular

1. Abstract universal: Tennis. Concrete particular: A tennis match.
2. Abstract universal: Redness. Concrete particular: A red light, or a
red apple.
3. Abstract universal: Running. Concrete particular: A particular
instance of a dog running.
4. Abstract universal: Dog. Concrete particular: A particular dog
(we'll introduce our example dog, Winston, later on).
5. Abstract universal: Apple. Concrete particular. A particular apple.

From the above examples, we can see that universals are generally
abstract (a universal is what particular things have in common),
whereas particulars are generally concrete.

Abstract particular

It is also useful to talk about abstract particulars (we'll introduce the

concept of concrete universal later on). Van Til mentions this in his
works, but it never comes with an explanation. Abstract particularity is
an issue that rears its head when we start to consider the existence of
many distinct things (e.g. many apples).

Van Til writes,

How do we know that the many do not simply exist as

 unrelated particulars? The answer given is that in such a
case we should know nothing of them; they would be
abstracted from the body of knowledge that we have; they
would be abstract particulars.

(We'll quote him in full later). If the many distinct things are unrelated,
we cannot say "this is an apple", and "that is an apple", bringing the
particulars together under the universal category of "apple" - because
they are unrelated particulars! The only way to salvage the situation is
to speak of "this apple" and "that apple" in two different senses of the
word "apple". But then "apple" is emptied of meaning and we can longer
talk about "apple" in any concrete sense as shown above.

Are you a Christian?

Yes

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Predication

And finally, predication. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy, properties (universals) are those entities that can be
predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them. Thus,
universals are often called predicables. For example, if we say that this
is a cup and it is yellow, we are attributing the properties "cupness" and
"yellowness" to it.

What is the problem of the one and the

many?

It would be useful for the reader to first watch the following 6min
video before reading the rest of the article. The video will introduce a
way of thinking which might assist in grasping the concepts discussed.
 Why the Trinity is the True Theism | The One and the …
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James Anderson writes that the ontological predicament in the

problem of the one and the many is notoriously difficult to state with
precision. He believes this is partly because any conceptual example
we might employ to express it will in the nature of the case exemplify
the problem (i.e. be an example of the problem itself) [2]. Anderson
continues by describing the problem in the following manner: One
intriguing feature of reality is that it exists in aspects of both unity
("human") and plurality (many distinct "humans"). He uses the example
of Angus and Shona. Both manifest a unity as they are both human, and
they manifest plurality as they are not one and the same, but distinct
persons. In order to have knowledge of Angus, you'd need to be able to
grasp both what unifies him with other things, in the world, and what
distinguishes him from those other things [3].

Hence, he continues, it follows as a general principle that in order to

have knowledge of objects in the world, the world must be such that its
unity and plurality are related yet distinct. As such, the expressions of
unity and plurality (e.g. Angus and Shona) in the world must
themselves manifest unity (through relations of commonality) and
plurality (through distinction).

The question naturally arises (as it did in ancient Greece) as to which

aspect of
reality is ultimate. Is it unity, or plurality? If it is plurality, we end up
with unrelated particulars of which nothing can be known in principle,
as they become abstract particulars. If it is unity, we end up being
unable to make any distinctions, so again, nothing can be known in
principle.

From another perspective, Vern Poythress is a Van Tillian philosopher-

theologian that has spent some time working on the problem. He
describes the problem as follows: There are many horses, but one
species of horse. There are many beautiful objects, but one idea of
beauty belongs to them all. To link in with Anderson's example, there
are two humans (e.g. Angus and Shona), but one idea of "humanness".
How do the many things fit together to display a common single idea?
[4].

R.J. Rushdoony is another philosopher-theologian that has done

extensive work on the subject. In fact, he wrote an entire book on the
topic. He greatly helps us in defining the one and the many.

The one can be a separate whole, or it can be the sum of things in their
analytic or synthetic wholeness. That is, it can be a transcendent one,
which is the ground of all being, or it can be an immanent one [5]. The
many refer to the particularity or individuality of things; the universe is
full of a multitude of beings; is the truth concerning them inherent in
their individuality, or is it in their basic oneness? [6] So, does
everything exist as unrelated particulars, or is everything essentially
one?

Brant Bosserman perhaps captures it the best when he writes that the
problem of the one and the many can be summarised from an
epistemological perspective and is ultimately one of how we may be
certain that our rational categories (the one) do justice to the Spatio-
temporal objects (the many) they supposedly represent [7]. The
common way presuppositionalists ask this question is in the form of
"How do you know your sense perceptions correspond to reality".

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In summary: In our general, everyday experience, we observe

particulars and we organize them into categories that are supposed to
encapsulate them. Every proposition in every language requires both
universals (the one) and particulars (the many). Consider the phrase,
"That dog is running." "That dog" is referring to a particular dog. But
"particular dog" refers to a universal dogness by which one can
reference a particular member of the universal category of dog. "...is
running" has the same problem. It's a particular instantiation of an act
known by the universal category of "to run."

So which comes first (logically), the universal categories of dog and

run, or a particular dog that does an act known as running? That
question is the problem of the one and many.

Greg Bahnsen describes the problem as follows (and he does so in a

way that brings it all together quite nicely):

[We now think of the] reality of abstract entities or notion.

[The question] is raised in a variety of forms, in connection
with universals, ideas, general concepts, essences,
categories, classes, set definitions, resemblances,
predicates, properties, etc. - all of which are said to be
applicable to, or inclusive of, many particulars. Although
our observational experience is always of concrete,
particular things, we often reason and speak in terms of
abstract entities or concepts. In the sentence "The tree has
green leaves," there is a reference to a particular tree, yet
the term "tree" does not itself name that specific object;
other objects take that designation as well. Likewise, may
things have the term "green" applied to them, not simply the
 particular leaves of this particular tree... How can such
references to unobserved generalisties, universals, and laws
be made intelligible? Van Til noted, "The whole problem of
knowledge has constantly been that of bringing the one and
the many together".

Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, pg. 238

The example of the many dogs

Let's imagine for a moment that we have two dogs in front of us

(Winston and Porchy). When we say that "Winston is a small dog" it
refers to the particular dog that is Winston. When we say that "dogs are
incredibly cute", we are talking about the universal category of all dogs.

Although Plato and Aristotle (one of the earliest and greatest Greek
philosophers) each prioritize the relationship between the one and the
many differently, both are in agreement that universals are defined by
their abstract forms [8][9].

Take Winston as an example. We first learn to classify him as a dog. We

then learn to recognize similarities among similar animals and
differences between them and other types of animals. We learn to
classify Winston as a dog among many dogs. The form of "dog" is
abstracted from the particulars, of Winston and Porchy.

But then, dogs can be grouped into larger classes still: canines,
mammals, animals, living beings, beings, being [10]. The process of
abstraction continues upward until we reach the highest level of
abstraction - being (see fn 4). Each step goes deeper into the nature of
reality - the essence of things. If we can know this, the secular
philosopher thinks, we can know something of everything. We can gain
a God's Eye view of the world.
 Abstraction. The form of "dog" is abstracted from the particular dogs.

But note that the process of abstraction (that keeps on generalizing),

has a result of cognitive loss. Winston is more than just a dog. He has
certain characteristics - he is white, has a long tail, is rather small, fat,
etc. None of these qualities can be derived by simply calling him a dog.
Some dogs have the qualities possessed by Winston, but others don't.
So, every step on this ladder of abstraction is a step toward emptiness.
The highest abstraction, being (or being in general), covers everything,
but it includes nothing specific [11]. To say that Winston is being is to say
nothing about him.

It is useful to point out that abstract forms do not exist somewhere in

reality apart from the particulars. The abstract form of "dog" is not an
actual existence like this dog or that dog (Winston or Porchy). Close
your eyes and image "dog", without thinking of a specific dog. It's not
possible. So, in a sense to say that Winston is a dog, is to say nothing
about him as well. "Dog" is a meaningless concept in and of itself. There
is nothing in the abstract universal itself that can relate it to Winston
and Porchy. Note that in our previous figure, in the abstract form, we
had the outline of a dog. But, this would be incorrect as even that
would be a particular dog!
Abstract reasoning involves divorcing certain characteristics and
features of the creation from their concrete contexts (e.g. being, "dog"),
and treating them as if they were self-intelligible, immutable
principles. So, we've seen that the process of abstraction leads to non-
existent universals and that abstraction leads to cognitive loss.

But now, this abstract thinking not only leads to non-existent abstract
universals but also "abstract particulars" that cause more problems [12].
If we are to really honor the uniqueness (particularity) of Winston and
Porchy (existing in distinction from each other), we would be forced to
give up the abstract universal that is "dog", and rather speak of this dog
(Winston) and that dog (Porchy) equivocating on the word "dog". But in
this case, the word "dog" loses its definition and each individual dog
(Winston and Porchy) becomes its own abstract particular [13].

Hence, we can no longer meaningfully designate Winston or Porchy as

"dog" in any concretely determined sense [14]. And so, the designation
of Winston as a "dog" is carried into nothingness.
 Abstract particulars

In summary: If we abstract Winston and Porchy into a single category

of "dog" that should be understood in and of itself, we end up with an
abstract universal that destroys particularity. If "dog" is more ultimate
than Porchy or Winston, we have no accounting for how Porchy or
Winston can arise in the first place. If we then try to honor their
particularity by referencing them as "this dog" and "that dog", "dog"
becomes an abstract particular that has no content. If all we have is
abstract unity, there is no way to relate this to the particulars of
experience. If all we have is abstract particularity, these particulars are
by definition unrelated and we lose unity of experience

At this point, let's provide a well-known quote from Cornelius Van Til
on the subject:

In seeking for an answer to the One-and-Many question,

philosophers have admittedly experienced great difficulty.
The many must be brought into contact with one other. But
how do we know that they can be brought into contact with
one another? How do we know that the many do not simply
exist as unrelated particulars? The answer given is that in
such a case we should know nothing of them; they would be
abstracted from the body of knowledge that we have; they
would be abstract particulars.

On the other hand, how is it possible that we should obtain

a unity that does not destroy the particulars? We seem to
get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the
particulars in order to include them into larger unities. If
we keep up this process of generalization till we exclude all
particulars, granted they can all be excluded, have we then
not stripped these particulars of their particularity? Have
we then obtained anything but an abstract universal?
Van Til, The Defense of the Faith

Application to society

The question of the one and the many goes deeper than simply the
objects of our experience. It's vast in its scope and consequences. We
won't expand on this instance of the problem further than this section,
but it is useful for the reader to see the far-reaching consequences of
the problem.

Rushdoony in Jerusalem and Athens expands on the problem in terms

of societies. The question of the one and the many is also a question
that is basic to every area of life. It makes a vast difference in society if
we hold that the basic structure of man’s life is to be sought in the state
as the unity or oneness of man and society [15], or if the basic structure
of man's life is found within each individual man. Historically, if the
basic structure is found in the state (the oneness is more ultimate than
the particulars [people]) you end up with a totalitarian state. If the
particulars are more ultimate, you end up with anarchy where each
person does what he/she feels is right in their own eyes ( Judges 21:25).

This is also a point reiterated by Pastor Brant Bosserman in his many

online discussions on the topic [16]. These discussions are incredibly
helpful in addition to this article to understand the scope of the issue
that is at stake here.

Something of this sort can be seen in a recent article The Economist.

This was the header image on the article.
 China, a totalitarian state (The Economist)

China is a classical example of a totalitarian state. This means that they

have a system of government that is centralized and dictatorial and
requires complete subservience to the state. The image captures
something of how the many are swallowed up by the one, almost to the
extent they have been eliminated. Although there are many people in
the image, they are somehow swallowed up by the bigger person,
losing their identity.

Common answers to the problem of the one

and the many

In the past philosophers have either tended toward nominalism or

realism when it comes to the one and the many.

The broad category of nominalism

Basically stated, nominalism can be defined as the view that general

categories such as horse and beauty are simply names ("nominal"
etymologically means “of a name”). The names are invented by us after
the objects already exist. So the many objects are prior to and more
ultimate than the one name that unites them. [17]

Nominalism would state that the particular objects are more ultimate
than the one name that unites them (i.e. dog, cup). There exist no
inherent link between them, and the names, that we use to describe
them are exactly that, simply a name that is invented.

If nominalism is the case, we are plagued by the perpetual problem of

how we know that the categories we impose on the particulars do them
justice. If it is the case that the ultimate nature of reality is that of
distinct particulars with no inherent relationship with each other,
nominalism as an approach is deficient as an explanation, because if
the multiplicity of the many is the ultimate reality, why do they have
anything at all in common that would justify the unity that we
acknowledge by using a single name? We end up with abstract
particulars.

It can be said that the name "dog" is simply something that is imposed
on the particulars after some observation, but that would derail the
intuition that there is something real called "dog" that actually connects
that particular dog together. Is it then not the case that there is really
something common to all the particulars we call dogs? Moreover, if our
reality consists of unrelated abstract particulars, there is no unity
between them that will allow us to group them together.

Even if somehow we get unity in the concept of "dog", this concept is

not identical to any one dog. So how can we still say that any one dog is
a dog, using a concept not identical to any one dog? Can it perhaps be
via the matter of degree, in the sense that a particular conforms to
some kind of exemplar? If this is the case, we still haven't solved the
problem as there is no universal exemplar. Remember that according to
nominalists, reality is ultimately many unrelated particulars.

It seems to be the case that we cannot produce real unity from

particularity if it does not already actually exist [see fn. 17].

The broad category of realism

Realism can be defined as the philosophical approach known as

realism says that general categories such as horse and beauty are real,
in the sense that they exist somewhere (e.g. Plato's realm of forms).
These real ideas are in some sense prior to and more ultimate than the
particular instances of dogs. In particular instances, we see copies or
embodiments of the ideas from which they derive. According to this
way of thinking, we start with the one, namely, an idea. It might be the
idea of "dogness". Then we derive the many, that is, the many instances
of dogs in objects.
But this explanation does not provide a satisfying answer for how the
many come about. If we start with a monolithic (indivisible) one, how
can this one ever become many? In other words, if there really is only
one idea, with unity and no diversity, how can diversity ever arise? It
seems to be the case that we cannot imagine how to create diversity
unless we already have it!

To state it differently, if all we have are abstract forms that shed the
details of all the particulars of experience that are more ultimate than
the particulars, where does the particularity come from?

Moderate realism

Moderate realism is opposed to both extreme realism (or realism in the

sense as discussed above) (such as the theory of Platonic forms) and
nominalism. Aristotle espoused a form of moderate realism, as did
Thomas Aquinas. Moderate realism can be summarised as follows:
There is no realm in which universals exist (against platonism), nor do
they really exist within the individuals as universals, but rather universals
really exist within the particulars as individualized and multiplied [18].

The Thomistic Institute has produced awesome videos on YouTube that

explain a lot of the concepts in the thought tradition of Thomas
Aquinas. One such video is on moderate realism. From the start of the
video, you get a nominalist flavour to moderate realism (which makes
sense as it's supposed to be a middle ground between the two). Near
the end, it is explained that "The forms (universals) exist first within
the particulars themselves". Furthermore, "when we apprehend a dog,
we abstract the form of dogness in our minds".

It remains it seems, as discussed at the beginning of the article, that we

either end up with an abstract universal or an abstract particular that
destroys any meaningful predication.

The Form-matter scheme

According to the Greek form-matter scheme, form is distinct from

matter. The matter is what brings differentiation between different
"dogs", where "dog" is the form. This scheme is unique as it seems to
provide a middle-ground between those who believe reality is
ultimately one, and those who believe it is ultimately many. The form-
matter scheme seems to imply both.

This view, however, seems to imply some kind of defect on the side of
the particulars. For example, if we have the form of "dogness", no one
dog is identical with this form of "dogness", so this would imply that no
one dog is perfect.

There is more to be said about the form-matter scheme as a way to

ultimately understand reality. Vern Poythress has a chapter dedicated
to it in his book, 'The Mystery of the Trinity' and ultimately concludes
that it is useful, but has its limitations - and should not be used as the
scheme to try and reach a Gods-eye view of reality, trying to fit
everything under form and matter.

Bosserman also mentions the dialecticism of the form-matter scheme

more in context of a critique. Dialecticism can be defined as a
philosophical system that envisions the world to exist of two opposite
but not opposed ideas. In this case, form and matter would be the
opposites. The extreme, on the one hand, pure form, has no
distinction. And on the other hand, prime/ultimate matter is
indefinable. Frame writes that if we were to discover some ultimate
matter, what would it be? If it were identifiable and describable then it
would be subject to further analysis. Thus, if it were really ultimate,
nothing can be said about it.
 Form and matter

Both concepts of pure form and pure matter and empty and
uninformative. These concepts are meaningless and cannot relate to
each other - yet this is exactly what many people put forth as some
kind of solution [19].

Moreover, even if these concepts were to relate somehow, it still leaves

us with the unanswerable question of how the relationship between
the one (pure form) and the many (ultimate matter) will continue to be
conducive to knowledge [20]. We seem to be without a standard for
supposing that the flux and irrationality of the many will not somehow
swallow up the one, or that the one will not swallow up the many and
bring everything to a standstill [21]. What stops the principle of pure
chance from swallowing up the law-like structure of the forms? What
stops the lawlike structure of the forms from swallowing up the pure
chance?

The origin of the problem of the one and the

many [22]

By now the reader might wonder where this problem comes from, and
why it doesn't really seem like a problem in our everyday lives. In short,
the answer to the former is because of sin, and the answer to the latter
is because reality is God's created reality, with all the particulars pre-
interpreted by Him. We've spent quite some time defining the problem.
It is useful to trace its roots, as that will assist us in seeking to find an
explanation for the problem later on.

In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. On the sixth
day, He created Adam. Adam knew His Creator immediately on
creation, and naturally obeyed God when he was confronted with the
requirements of the covenant God made with him.
With his covenantal vision of reality, Adam was able to organize the
world around him. He could reason systematically (relating facts to a
system of thought) where special revelation was allowed to illuminate
natural revelation, and vice versa so that he would develop an ever
deeper knowledge of reality.

In the fall (Genesis 3), Adam and Eve were for the first time invited to
reason abstractly by the serpent, and this way of thinking has governed
secular philosophy ever since.

The serpent, by suggesting that God lied about the penalty that would
follow from eating from the Tree of Good and Evil, the serpent in effect
asked man to reason autonomously. No longer should special
revelation and natural revelation be used in harmony, but in fact,
special revelation should be regarded as inessential or questionable.

No longer is systematic reasoning, as informed by divine revelation,

possible. Think about it. We cannot hope to know the entire universe in
exhaustive detail (perhaps that is why God created the universe as big
as it is - so we are continuously confronted with our own finitude).
Hence, we cannot confidently engage in systematic reasoning. If
knowledge is about relating things to an all-encompassing whole, we
must either know everything or nothing can be known [23]. It is not
inconceivable that an unforeseen fact might render everything we
currently believe false.

Fallen man, then, recognizes the need to have certain immutable

reference points if we are to possess any knowledge. The solution,
then, is to turn to abstractions as we discussed previously. These
abstractions are supposed to replace God by accounting for the relative
unity/normalcy we find in the particulars.

But these abstractions, since they shed the details of the particulars,
will not be able to account for the particularity that gives diversity to
experience (only having the form of dog cannot account for the diverse
amount of dogs we experience!). Therefore fallen man must appeal to
some principle of irrational chance that acts as some kind of anti-
principle to the abstractions (one) that brings about change and
diversity (many). In this way, brute facts (things that have no
explanation - pure chance) can exist alongside unchanging laws.

And so, the fallen man is not able to think in a way that is
independent of their Creator and His revelation but ends up creating
for himself the problem of the one and the many.

The answer

Trinity

Unity in God is no more fundamental than diversity, and diversity in

God is no more fundamental than unity. The persons of the Trinity are
mutually exhaustive of one another. The Son and the Spirit are
ontologically on par with the Father [24]. In God’s being, there are no
particulars not related to the universal and there is nothing universal
that is not fully expressed in the particulars.

Bosserman writes that on the presupposition of the Trinity, Van Til

believes it to be clear why He (God) would not be subject to the problem
of the one and the many. He Himself is harmony between unity and
diversity. The one God cannot recede into oblivion as an abstract
universal because He is concretely and infinitely defined in
relationship to the many (three) persons. Nor can the three degrade
into irrational particulars that evade definition at some point, for they
are defined by the trinitarian dynamic.

In God, the one and the many are equally ultimate. It is interesting that
some in the Reformed Thomist camp believe that the many lies solely
on the side of creation. But this seems rather strange, as God is the
eternal one and many. He existed from all eternity as the Trinity - the
Faher, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as one God.

The importance of Christian reasoning and the derivative

one and many

Poythress provides a sober warning for us at this point. In doing this

reasoning, he writes, it makes all the difference whether we are
operating with a Christian or a non-Christian view of knowledge of
God. If we are using classes and instances and harmonious
associations in creation as a model to which God must conform, we are
bringing God down to the level of creature. On the other hand, we may
say that our experience of classes, instances, and associations is an
experience that is not self-sufficient but has its origin and final
explanation in God. God is the archetype and reflects who is His in the
ways in which he relates to the created world.

This is to say that creation is modelled after the Creator, and not vice
versa. God has named the creature according to what is found in the
Creator. We would be incorrect to use our experience of the one and
the many as a model for what God must be like. If we do this, we don't
escape the problem, and it's unclear how God would escape the
problem to act as a sufficient explanation - he would be subject to it!

Van Til mentions this as well and writes, that the Christian finds it
necessary to distinguish between the Eternal One-and-Many and the
temporal one and many. Non-Christian philosophers on the other hand
find it unnecessary to make this distinction. We find this necessary of
course because our conception of God as the triune God stands at the
centre of our thinking. We may express this thought philosophically by
saying that for us the eternal one and many form a self-complete unity.

It goes without saying that if we hold to the eternal one and many in
the manner explained above, we must hold the temporal one and many
to be created by God. Reality is marked by unity and diversity because
it is the creative work of the Triune God who is the ultimate unity and
diversity. Creation is inspired by nothing other than the Triune God
[25], and hence creation is an analogue of the Creator who made it.

If the creation doctrine is thus taken seriously, it follows that the

various aspects of created reality must sustain such relations to one
another as have been ordained between them by the Creator, as
superiors, inferiors, or equals. All aspects being equally created, no
one aspect of reality may be regarded as more ultimate than another.
Thus the created one and many may in this respect be said to be
equal, they are equally derived and equally dependent upon God who
sustains them both [26].

To state it in simple terms, both Winston and Porchy (our two dogs)
and the relation between them are both products of the creation of the
Triune God. To demand that the relation between them be more
ultimate than Winston on Porchy, or vice versa, is not to reckon with
the doctrine of creation in a proper manner.

In Jerusalem and Athens, Rushdoony writes the following,

As Van Til makes clear, the metaphysical implications of the

creation doctrine are that the ultimacy of the one and the
many is to be found only and exclusively in God, and that
therefore the one and the many can never exist
independently of one another or in essential conflict with
one another, in that both are derivative. The one and the
many are thus not essentially alien things which imply a
dualism and can be held together only in dialectical tension
lest the one reduce the other to nothing and itself to
meaninglessness. The one and the many are absolutely
under God and therefore totally subject to God and his law.
They are absolutely subject to his creative purpose and a
part of his sovereign decree.

It follows, [also], that, since the answer to the one and the
many problem is found in God, Van Til points out that the
doctrine of the ontological trinity brings to an end the
necessity for any tension between the two. It is not the one
nor the many which is ultimate, but it is rather the equal
ultimacy of the one and the many because of the ultimacy of
 the triune God.

Rushdoony, Jerusalem and Athens

Freed from the problem

Frame writes that the mystery is not how abstract universals and
abstract particulars can meaningfully relate, they can't. We need to
reckon with the Christian God (trinity) at the start of our thinking
process as the personal one and many. The ultimate unity of creation is
not found in a concept (like being), but rather in a Person. The
particularities are also divine, as God's plan is his own self-expression
[27].

A world totally under God, a world in which the created one and many
are absolutely determined and governed by the eternal one and many,
is a world with purpose and meaning. History is rescued from
meaninglessness. Instead of being a collection of brute facts without
meaning, of abstract particulars and abstract universals, history has
purpose and direction [28].

God stands in contrast with the idolatrous concepts of abstract unity

and abstract particularity. His plan redemptive-historical plan is
perfectly unified, nothing is out of order, and nothing is not known to
Him.

Daniel Akande describes it as follows:

The Christian presupposes the Triune God whose creative

act accounts for the diversity in human experience. Every
fact, object, event, owe their being to the creative act of
God. Also, every fact, object, event, is related to every other
in the comprehensive system which has existed for all
eternity in God’s mind. For the Christian metaphysician,
God’s mind provides the unity. What we have in this system,
then, is an eternal unity.
Daniel Akande, Unity vs. Unity

This brings us to the necessity of God's verbal revelation.

The light of God's Word and revelation

We destroy arguments and every lofty opinion raised

against the knowledge of God, and take every thought
captive to obey Christ

2 Corinthians 10:5, ESV

Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path.

Psalm 119:105, ESV

God's revelation is the only light in Whom the creation can be

understood.

The Trinity can facilitate concrete thinking in men because He, as an

Absolute person can verbally disclose a finite, but a dependable
description of his eternal plan with which people may organize the
facts of nature and in turn, refine their vision of the whole. The
consistent believer accepts God's self-attesting revelation at the
beginning of his theoretical and practical project.

Without the concretely revealed knowledge of God's triunity and his

relation to the world as its Creator, the problem of particulars and
universals can only be tackled in the abstract fashion discussed above
[29].

Every human mind is endowed with an intrinsic awareness of God.

Christians and non-Christians alike participate in the truth of God and
His creation. Only in light of this truth can the human mind make
sense of the reality that we perceive [30].

The issue, however, is that we don't know all the details of God's plan in
history. We don't have a God-eye view of the world, and we never will.
So what do we make of this?

We need the trustworthy Word from the Creator who modelled the
creation after Himself on a finite level. As a child, we turn to God in
faith and take His Word as our interpretive framework which we use to
organize the facts around us. So, yes, we'll never have a comprehensive
view of reality, but we know the God who does. And via His revelation
we can start to reason analogically, having faith that through His
guidance, we can correctly interpret the world around us although
we'll never exhaustively understand it in the way God does.

Van Til brilliantly summarised it as follows:

My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through

the woods. The child is not afraid because its father knows
it all and is capable of handling every situation.

The summarised the answer once again, we quote at length from

Bosserman:

The Trinity solves the problem, not as a theoretical

explanation for how universal principles and ideas control
matters of fact, but as a personal Authority Who is a perfect
harmony of unity and diversity in Himself, and thus
uniquely qualified to guide man in developing an analogous
harmony in his own life and thought. Apologetically, the
Trinitarian perspective carries with it an illuminating
diagnosis of sinful thinking as the self-defeating attempt to
treat principles found in creation, rather than the Creator,
as the ultimate sources of unity and/or diversity in reality.
In terms of systematic theology, the doctrine of the Trinity
proves to foster the sort of coherence between Christian
doctrines after which unbelievers may only grope.

Bosserman, B. A. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til

But what do we make of "abstraction"?

J. Alexander Rutherford has written two interesting articles on the

issue of abstraction from a Christian perspective. The non-Christian
must resort the abstractions for knowledge simply because they've
never experienced and can never hope to experience all the particulars
of the world. They regard abstractions as true knowledge and disregard
particulars. If knowledge is about relating things to an all-
encompassing whole, “all things must be exhaustively known, or
nothing can be known”. [31]

But when you read Frame in Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, he makes
the point that we cannot really escape "abstraction". Indeed, even
names like Winston or Porchy are abstractions of the particular dogs
underlying those names. Do we as Christians not use categories like
"dog" to group Winston and Porchy as well? Yes.

We are not opposed to considering things in relative isolation from

their context to arrange them systematically. However, the negative
form of abstraction involves treating any feature of the creation as if it
were self-evident apart from revelation.

Rutherford writes,

In short, abstraction according to the Biblical worldview

describes relationships we perceive between the particular
objects of our experience. These relationships are not
themselves objects of knowledge but conceptual bridges
that allow us to utilize the knowledge we already have in
understanding new objects we experience.

Perhaps a Biblical example will suffice

By this we know love, that he laid down his life for us, and
 we ought to lay down our lives for the brothers.

1 John 3:16, ESV

How do we know love? We know what love is through the concrete act
of redemption on the cross when Jesus laid down His life for us. Love is
not an abstract concept that the atonement happens to partake in. No,
love is defined through the concrete act of the atonement, and we can
recognize relationships between the love of Christ for His church on
the cross and the self-sacrificing love of a husband for his wife. Love is
therefore a relationship we perceive between what Christ did, and
what a husband does for his wife.

The universal, love, is therefore not simply an abstract set of qualities

that are shared by multiple particular acts of our experience. It is a
definite history and trajectory, as well as the concrete interaction
between particulars that are marked by similar and congenial
attributes [32].

The red apple

In the embedded video at the top of this article, the example is used of
a red apple. If reality consists of abstract particulars, to designate the
perceived object as red and apple, is to bring the object together with
other objects in the class of "redness" and "apples". Knowing that reality
is the created analogue of the Triune God who Himself has called us to
organize the facts of experience around us, we have faith that the facts
of experience are not unrelated particulars. They are particulars
eternally related in the comprehensive plan and knowledge of God. We
can therefore bring the objects of experience into relation with each
other, and start to investigate creation more deeply and deeply as we
organize, classify and correct our system of knowledge.

We do this with the guidance of our Father, and the goal of our system
is to reflect His system on a finite level.
Closing thoughts and conclusion

Once we start to understand the problem of the one and the many,
we'll start to see it pop up everywhere. Here's a brief list to get your
mind going (keep in mind that men have avoided the answer to the
problem of the one and the many because they reject the God who is
the answer.):
One law or group of laws that do justice and meet the needs of
all the people in a country at the same time (that invites no
opposition in the parliament).
A coin toss (and every other statistical occurrence that can be
modelled). For example, there are many coins tossed, but they
are all related and described by the single probability
distribution.
Maleness. Is maleness a concept that we impose on particular
people that does violence to them as individuals/particulars?
The worldview underlying transgenderism seems to be
nominalistic at heart.
If at any point we deny the God who has pre-interpreted all of reality,
all we are left with are empty abstractions or abstract particulars,
neither of which can furnish us with knowledge.

Because the facts have been authoritatively and

comprehensively interpreted by God, in order to have
knowledge of facts, man must seek to mirror the system in
God’s mind. Since God’s interpretation is constructive of
the world of facts, man must consult that interpretation in
order to properly interpret the facts. Reasoning analogically
 is a necessary consequence of the Christian philosophy of
fact.

Daniel Akande, Brute Facts Are Mute Facts: A Van Tilian

Transcendental Argument

Footnotes

[1] Anderson, J., 2005. If knowledge, then God: The epistemological theistic
arguments of Plantinga and Van Til. Calvin Theological Journal

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Poythress, V.S., 2018. Knowing and the Trinity: How Perspectives in
Human Knowledge Imitate the Trinity. P & R Publishing. pg. 236

[5] Although Rushdoony provides his own clarification, it might prove

valuable to spend some more time on the definition of the one before
we move on. Rushdoony points out that the one can either be
imminent, or transcendent. Immanent means the sum of all things (e.g.
a group of objects categorized together), or a transcendent one as in
the case of Plotinus and Aquinas, where the one acts as the ground of
all other beings. This has links with a participation ontology which will
be discussed later in the article.

[6] Chalcedon (en-US). 2021. Philosophy: The Problem of the One and
the Many. [ONLINE] Available at:
https://chalcedon.edu/resources/articles/philosophy-the-problem-of-
the-one-and-the-many. [Accessed 14 April 2021].

[7] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (p. 52).

[6] The idea of abstract forms undergirds the process of abstraction as

applied to universals and particulars,that underlies a substantialist
way of thinking.

[7] Kai, S., 2018. G.W.F. Hegel. P & R Publishing Company.

[8] Frame, J.M., 1995. Cornelius Van Til. P&R Pub..

[9] Ibid.

[10] Kai, S., 2018. G.W.F. Hegel. P & R Publishing Company.

[11] An abstract particular is a particular object severed from its

defining idea. Without the species "dog" as its form, the name "Winston"
or "Porchy" is but the empty name of an individual object that cannot
be identified.

[12] Kai defines "concrete" as the ultimate unity of particulars and

universals, seen as an inseparable whole. Britannica defines concrete
as such entities as persons, physical objects, and events (or the terms
or names that denote such things), as contrasted with such
abstractions as numbers, classes, states, qualities, and relations.

So, when we say that "we can no longer meaningfully designate

Winston or Porchy as "dog" in any concretely determined sense", it
means that the form of "dog", when we honor the particularity of
different dogs, has lost its meaning and each dog (when we say this
dog, or that dog) has become an abstract concept linked to the
particular in question, hence abstract particular. "Dog" is no longer a
"abstract universal" with any meaning. It cannot the abstract particular
"dog" of Winston cannot be applied to Porchy.

[13] Rushdoony, Jerusalem and Athens.

[14] For example, see Bosserman's discussion with Eli Ayala and with
Parker Settecase.

[15] Poythress, V.S., 2018. Knowing and the Trinity: How Perspectives in
Human Knowledge Imitate the Trinity. P & R Publishing. pg. 237

[16] Ibid.

[17] Poythress, V.S., 2018. Knowing and the Trinity: How Perspectives in
Human Knowledge Imitate the Trinity. P & R Publishing. pg. 236

[18] Psychology Wiki. 2021. Moderate realism | Psychology Wiki |

Fandom. [ONLINE] Available at:
https://psychology.wikia.org/wiki/Moderate_realism. [Accessed 22
April 2021].

[19] Frame, J.M., 1995. Cornelius Van Til. P&R Pub..

[20] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (p. 52).

[21] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (p. 91-92).

[22] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til.

[23] Van Til, C. IST, pg. 163

[24] Poythress, V.S., 2018. Knowing and the Trinity: How Perspectives in
Human Knowledge Imitate the Trinity. P & R Publishing. pg. 244

[25] Bosserman, How The Trinity Explains Everything | w/Dr. Brant

Bosserman - PPP ep. 35, https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=syv22kpFoX4. 40:00.

[26] Poythress, V.S., 2018. Knowing and the Trinity: How Perspectives in
Human Knowledge Imitate the Trinity. P & R Publishing. pg. 244
 [27] Frame, J.M., 1995. Cornelius Van Til. P&R Pub..

[28] Rushdoony, The one and the many, Jerusalem and Athens

[29] Kai, S., 2018. G.W.F. Hegel. P & R Publishing Company.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (p. 91). Pickwick Publications, an
Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

[32] Bosserman, B. A.. The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian

Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological
Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til (p. 241-242). Pickwick Publications, an
Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Tags:

Van Til The one and the many

Van Til • Epistemology • Reformed

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