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American Comparative Law
American
Comparative Law
A History
DAV I D S . C L A R K
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University Press, at the address above.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195369922.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Note to Readers
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject
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To Marilee and Lee, Susanna, Eliina, Liisa, and David;
For the future—to Sienna, Ileana, Levi, Anika, Vida, Cai, and Piers.
Contents
Preface xiii
Abbreviations xvii
Index 527
Preface
1 T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding, in Four Quartets 31, 39, verse 5 (1943).
xiv Preface
2 L.S. C[ushing], Civil and Criminal Laws of Modern States, 21 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 56 (1839).
[T]he advantages of such a collection of modern law, in the study of what may be called the science
of comparative law, are chiefly . . . of a more practical nature, resulting from the absolute necessity
of knowing the laws of foreign states, as so many positive and living institutions, operating directly
upon the rights and obligations of the citizen in the daily business of life. Id.
Preface xv
simplicity, to doctrinal detail.3 The experience from the centuries, from diverse
lands, was available to them and they drew from those examples to understand,
create, and reform law and to strive toward the promised more perfect union.
Finally, there is the matter of the law of Great Britain, today the United
Kingdom. Modern American comparative law as it has evolved does not pay
much attention to common law jurisdictions. There is no solid theoretical reason
for this. One explanation might be the American tradition among lawyers to
refer to the Anglo-American tradition as if there were dominant, seemingly in-
evitable, similarities between the United States and England.4 Of course, there
are important similarities, shared also by other common law jurisdictions. Above
all, the legal language is English, whether the common law country is in Asia or
Africa, which facilitates the study and use of foreign examples within that legal
tradition. Many traditional private law rules in contracts, torts, and property are
related. There are also important structural and procedural similarities such as
the role for judges in court procedures, the doctrine of precedent, equitable rem-
edies, and resistance to rule codification.
This emphasis on continuity with England has been the traditional approach
to legal history in the United States, although the past half century has seen the
rise of a vibrant American legal history that emphasizes the uniqueness of the
legal system of the United States. Even though the two fields of legal history and
comparative law have substantial overlap, this book’s focus will exclude most
efforts to emphasize the common Anglo-American legal heritage. Those efforts
toward commonality have yielded many useful insights into American law. In
fact, most American lawyers today readily accept those insights as standard
wisdom.
However, the United Kingdom and the United States have distinct histories,
cultures, and political and social structures that have resulted in singular legal
systems that deserve more attention from comparatists. This focus on difference
seems even more obvious in comparisons between the United States and other
common law countries such as Australia, India, or Nigeria. Consequently, I dis-
agree with the implication that because English has been the dominant language
3 I am aware of the risks associated with “Whig history.” Although I will use the anachronism of
comparative law as shorthand for law-trained persons who used Roman and civil law examples to
sharpen their thinking about a legal problem in eighteenth-and nineteenth-century America (be-
fore comparative law developed an organizational base), I attempt to refrain from characterizing the
march of history as progress or to make moral assessments about people or circumstances of the past
beyond what they themselves made. See Michael E. Parrish, Friedman’s Law, 112 Yale L.J. 925, 954–
59 (2003) (book review). See generally Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History
(1931, reprinted 1978).
4 For recent examples, see, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, The Anglo- American Legal
Heritage: Introductory Materials (2d ed. 2004); John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner,
& Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American
Legal Institutions (2009).
xvi Preface
in the United States, English legal institutions and rules flowed easily, almost in-
evitably, into the American legal system.5 Certainly, it is wrong to imagine that
somehow the colonists, especially the large number of Germans, Scots, and later
other European settlers in the first decades of the republic “carried” English law
with them.6 There were simply too many differences. In truth, it may be that
the concept of a transnational common law legal tradition impedes our under-
standing of the reality of the American legal system.
I divide this book by era to treat the history of comparative law activities in
British North America and then in the United States. Recent research suggests
that the civil and Roman law have had a greater impact on American law, even
during the colonial period, than commonly acknowledged. This book’s chal-
lenge is to look beyond the common history with Great Britain and to discover
the many other sources of ideas about law that have influenced the legal system
of the United States. It is no longer adequate to say, “Not known, because not
looked for.”7 Furthermore, the dominant approach to American legal history
today emphasizes social history rather than the traditional intellectual history
and its attention to change and adaptation of legal rules and doctrine. However,
comparatists continue to use both approaches, and one’s preference will affect
her choice of method.
I am grateful to Mathias Reimann for many useful suggestions associated
with Chapter 2, an earlier version of which appeared in the American Journal of
Comparative Law.8 I also am indebted to Justin Simard, who read and critiqued
the first chapter, which improved the clarity and accuracy of the text. I thank
Galin Brown, access services manager at Willamette University College of Law
Library, for helpful interlibrary loan assistance. Finally, for their continuing
support and encouragement, I recognize Lawrence Friedman and the late John
Henry Merryman, two teachers who made a difference.
The history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge
of what the law is.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.1
A. Introduction
Legal history and comparative law overlap in important respects.2 This is more
apparent with the use of some methods for comparison, such as legal transplant,
natural law, or nation building.3 M.N.S. Sellers nicely portrayed the relationship:
The past is a foreign country, its people strangers and its laws obscure. . . . No
one can really understand her or his own legal system without leaving it first,
and looking back from the outside. The comparative study of law makes one’s
own legal system more comprehensible, by revealing its idiosyncrasies. Legal
history is comparative law without travel.4
Legal historians, perhaps especially in the United States, have been skeptical
about the possibility of a fruitful comparative legal history, preferring in general
to investigate the distinctiveness of their national experience.5 Comparatists,
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 33 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963; 1st
ed. 1881).
2 James Gordley concisely and persuasively made the argument that one should study com-
parative law and legal history together. James Gordley, Comparative Law and Legal History, in The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 753–73 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Oxford Handbook]; see Charles Donahue Jr., Comparative Legal History
in North America: A Report, 65 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 1 (1997). A recent inter-
esting treatise explored comparative law historically. See O.V. Kresin 1–2 Comparative Legal
Studies: 1750 to 1835 (W.E. Butler, ed. & trans., 2019) (Ukrainian orig. 2017).
3 See David S. Clark, Comparative Law Methods in the United States, 16 Roger Williams U.L.
Law in a Free State 99 (2003); see David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (1985).
5 Hermann Wellenreuther, Introduction: German-American Constitutional History—The Past and
American Comparative Law. David S. Clark, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195369922.003.0001
2 American Comparative Law
in The Comparative Approach to American History ix–x (Woodward ed., 1968) [hereinafter
Woodward, Preface]; Woodward, The Comparability of American History, in The Comparative
Approach to American History, supra, at 3–11 [hereinafter Woodward, Comparability]. In
European civil law nations, legal history traces back to a period of relative universality with Roman
and canon law prior to the nationalism and statism of the eighteenth century. The European Society
for Comparative Legal History has its own journal combining the two disciplines.
6 Woodward, Preface, supra note 5, at x–xi; Woodward, Comparability, supra note 5, at 12–16.
Comparisons “compel Americans to see their past in a new light; to revise complacent assumptions
of national exclusiveness, uniqueness, or excellence; to reconsider commonplace myths and flat-
tering legends; and to put to the test of comparison many other traditional assumptions that are
rarely subjected to such scrutiny.” Woodward, Preface, supra, at xi.
7 TFEU arts. 288–89.
8 See, e.g., the nine-volume series, Comparative Studies in the Development of the Law of Torts in
2. Methodological Issues
11 Ibbetson described some examples of institutional or external elements that influenced legal
change. Ibbetson, supra note 9, at 8–11. For the social factor historically on a global level, see David
S. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, in Comparative Law and Society 1–36 (Clark
ed., 2012).
12 William Nelson found that the primary issue in pre-1960 American legal history concerned
the reception of the common law in the United States. William E. Nelson, Legal History before the
1960s, in The Literature of American Legal History 1, 7–15 (William E. Nelson & John Phillip
Reid eds., 1985) [hereinafter Nelson, Legal History]. Some legal historians still value the continui-
ties between English law and American law. John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner, & Bruce
P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal
Institutions xxv–xxvi (2009).
13 I will often use the word lawyers to include all law- trained persons, including judges, law
professors, and politicians.
14 For this purpose, I build on the recent work of several scholars who combine legal history and
comparative law—especially Michael Hoeflich and M.N.S. Sellers—but also Daniel Coquillette,
Richard Helmholz, David Ibbetson, Mathias Reimann, Peter Stein, and Reinhard Zimmermann.
15 M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law and the Development of Anglo- American
Jurisprudence in the Nineteenth Century 2–3 (1997); see id. at 26–49 (Joseph Story); David
S. Clark, The Civil Law Influence on David Dudley Field’s Code of Civil Procedure, in The Reception
of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World: 1820–1920, at 63 (Mathias Reimann ed.,
1993); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in Oxford
Handbook, supra note 2, at 441–47.
4 American Comparative Law
16 Hoeflich, supra note 15, at 2–3; see Alan Watson, The Transformation of American Property
Law: A Comparative Law Approach, 24 Geo. L. Rev. 163 (1990). Hoeflich noted that an important
difficulty with this approach, beyond examples of direct exportation via conquest or centralized and
systematic colonization, is definitively to distinguish between direct influence and parallel develop-
ment. Hoeflich, supra, at 3.
17 Sellers, supra note 4, at 6–25.
18 See infra ch. 3, pt. D (republican form of government).
19 See Graziadei, supra note 15, at 461–63, 465–74.
20 See Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in Oxford
Handbook, supra note 2, at 382, 385, 396–408, 412–18; Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of
Comparative Law, in Oxford Handbook, supra, at 339, 343–66, 373–76, 378–81.
Legal History and Comparative Law 5
The debate about foreign law influence has been especially contentious for the
crucial American legal documents of the revolutionary period (1776 to 1791).
Involving historians, political scientists, lawyers, and classicists, each group has
tended to bring its own perspective or perspectives to the question.21 Many years
after Gordon Wood’s remarkable book, The Creation of the American Republic,22
he identified two central issues that commentators had raised in reviewing his
work. These were, first, the connection between ideology and behavior, and
second, the temporal relation between classical republicanism and liberalism.
The first point concerns the influence or causation question while the second
point illustrates the dynamic character of any foreign influence on the design of a
nation’s core legal institutions.23
The connection between ideology and behavior illustrates the belief in Western
social sciences that the mind and body are separate and that ideas or culture may
affect action. For some scholars, Wood contended, ideas are discrete things that
might “cause” people to act, but usually stronger material “causes,” such as so-
cial class or economic interest, overwhelm those ideas. Many “realists” believe
that legal ideology simply cannot explain much legal or political activity. Wood
responded that no one can prove causation one way or the other, but that ideas
constantly accompany our actions and give them meaning. “Ideology creates
behavior.”24 During the arguments concerning the Constitution, the Federalists
ended up being more persuasive, but the Anti-Federalists still believed their ev-
idence that the document was aristocratic and undemocratic. In 1787, as today,
there was no one true meaning of the Constitution.25
Wood’s second issue about the temporal relation between classical republi-
canism and liberalism involved the relevance of foreign ideas before 1791 and
those during the decades following, matters discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and
4. Wood asserted that the contemporary polemic about republicanism and liber-
alism creates an unnecessary dichotomy that the Constitution’s framers did not
have. Jefferson, for instance, did not have to choose between Niccolò Machiavelli
21 Sellers, supra note 4, at x– xi, 20–23 (lawyer and historian); Paul A. Rahe, 3 Republics
Ancient and Modern (Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime)
27–30 (1994) (historian); Meyer Reinhold, Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman
Heritage in the United States 17–20 (1984) (classicist); Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural
Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition 92–96
(1996) (political scientist).
22 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (1969).
23 Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 628 (1987).
24 Id. at 631; see id. at 628–31. “In 1787–1788 Federalists and Antifederalists argued over the ‘aris-
tocratic’ and ‘democratic’ nature of the Constitution. Each side tried to persuade Americans to accept
its particular attribution of meaning to the document. The Federalists made a brilliant case for the
view that the Constitution was thoroughly republican and democratic, and they could do so because
of the way republicanism and democracy had developed by 1787.” Id. at 631–32.
25 Id. at 632. Lawyers may need the fiction of a “correct” interpretation of the Constitution, but
historians should be open to deeper complexities of culture and action. Id. at 632–34.
6 American Comparative Law
(1469–1527) and John Locke (1632–1704); he could believe that the danger of
corruption in American government was as serious as the need to protect in-
dividual rights. Nevertheless, the framers did write about “republicanism” in
their arguments, but none referred to “liberalism” with the meaning currently
ascribed to that term. That does not mean that the framers failed to recognize
the self-interested pursuit of happiness; however, the emergence of party com-
petition, the liberal world of business, and an acquisitive society occurred in the
early nineteenth century.26
Beyond the revolutionary period, the dominant view among American legal
historians has been that the significance of Roman and civil law was minor for
the origin and development of American law.27 This applies both to general
works in social history as well as to those in intellectual history. Prior to 1960,
most American legal history was intellectual history, usually from the profes-
sional perspective of lawyers, conservative in nature. It often argued to promote
the rule of law and to restrain judicial decision-making but also included the
study of constitutional history, a field in which political historians were also ac-
tive. Since 1960, a more academic tone to intellectual legal history appeared, es-
pecially related to constitutional history.28 In addition, social history—regularly
concerned with law and social change—became more important in the 1960s
and 1970s.29 By the twenty-first century, legal history has blossomed in ways un-
imaginable 50 years earlier.30
26 Id. at 634–402; see John M. Murrin, Gordon S. Wood and the Search for Liberal America, 44 Wm.
American Social Tradition xv–xx (David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman eds., 1975) [herein-
after Sources]. It is more accurate to think of an approach to legal history on a continuum between
emphasis of intellectual or cultural factors and of social factors, with many scholars utilizing both.
Roscoe Pound and Willard Hurst illustrated the variation in the twentieth century. Nelson, Legal
History, supra note 12, at 6.
30 Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, Preface, in 1 The Cambridge History of Law
in America: Early America (1580– 1815) vii, xiii–xiv (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter 1 Cambridge History]; see A Companion to American Legal
History (Sally E. Hadden & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2013); Michael H. Hoeflich & Steve Sheppard,
Disciplinary Evolution and Scholarly Expansion: Legal History in the United States, 54 Am. J. Comp.
L. 23 (Supp. 2006); Assaf Likhovski, The Intellectual History of Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Legal History 151–69 (Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018).
Legal History and Comparative Law 7
31 My division reflects major changes in comparative law activity. There has been a reassess-
ment since 1980 in the traditional periodization of early American legal history. Stanley Katz, al-
ready in the mid-1960s, asserted that the broadening range of source materials suggested significant
continuity between the pre-revolutionary period and the early republic. Stanley N. Katz, Looking
Backward: The Early History of American Law, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 882–84 (1966) (book review).
Legal historians prior to 1980 generally followed Roscoe Pound’s thesis of a “formative era” begin-
ning after 1776. James A. Henretta, Magistrates, Common Law Lawyers, Legislators: The Three Legal
Systems of British America, in 1 Cambridge History, supra note 30, at 555, 561–62; see Roscoe
Pound, The Formative Era of American Law vii (1938) [hereinafter Pound, Formative Era].
8 American Comparative Law