Later retirement and the labor market

re-integration of elderly unemployed

workers Wolfgang Frimmel
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 The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Journal of the Economics of Ageing

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jeoa

Full length article

Later retirement and the labor market re-integration of elderly

unemployed workers
Wolfgang Frimmel *
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Christian Doppler Laboratory Aging, Health and the Labor Market, Linz, Austria

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

JEL Classification: This paper studies the impact of raising the eligibility age of early retirement on the re-integration into the labor
J14 market of elderly unemployed workers. I exploit two Austrian pension reforms increasing the early retirement
J26 age step-wise for different quarter-of-birth cohorts. Empirical results based on Austrian administrative data
J68
reveal a substantial gender difference in how unemployed workers are affected by the policy change. While
Keywords: unemployed women only benefit little with shorter unemployment duration, modest higher re-employment
Pension reform
probability as well as labor income after unemployment, unemployed men benefit in several aspects: although
Early retirement
Active labor market policies
unemployment duration remains unaffected, re-employment chances, labor income and participation in active
Unemployment labor market policies significantly increase. Elderly unemployed workers closer to their early retirement age are
systematically assigned to programs increasing their job application and job search skills, while workers more
than five years away from their early retirement age are more likely to participate in programs increasing their
skills. The gender difference may be explained by the nature of the pension reforms. From a policy perspective,
these results suggest that increasing the early retirement age is not only a feasible way to improve the financial
sustainability of public pension systems but also improves the re-integration of elderly unemployed male
workers.

Introduction probability of a transition to early retirement in particular when they are

A lot of societies face a demographic transition to an increasing share
of older people in the population. This particularly challenges the
financial sustainability of public pension systems. As a response, gov­
ernments react with policies and reforms to raise the participation in the
labor market of elderly workers. Such policy changes focus on offering
financial incentives for longer employment or raising the eligibility age
of (early) retirement. These policies, however, primarily affect a rather
vulnerable group of workers with less promising labor market perspec­
tives; the labor market participation rate of workers above 55 among
OECD countries is only 73% for men as compared to 90.1% of prime-age
workers in 2018. This paper uses data from Austria, where the labor
participation rate of elderly workers of 63.5% is substantially below
OECD average and these workers are particularly affected by long-term
unemployment.1
The re-integration of unemployed elderly workers is challenging.
Ichino et al. (2017) report that elderly workers also face a higher
unemployed. In this context, it is important to study and understand
how raises in the (early) retirement age affect these workers. Theoreti­
cally, there are two obvious channels through which such a policy re­
form could affect employment prospects of elderly unemployed workers.
First, Hairault et al. (2010) argue that the probability of older workers’
employment is affected by the distance to retirement. A raise in the
eligibility age of early retirement extends the expected time to retire­
ment and could therefore support the re-integration of unemployed
workers. Second, retirement reforms may increase the returns to (on-
the-job) training for elderly workers. Standard neo-classical human
capital theory would predict that later early retirement should have
positive effects on human capital formation because the period in which
benefits from human capital investments may materialize, is longer
(Becker, 1975). Less surprisingly, training of older workers is often
promoted as a policy to keep older workers employed or bring them out
of unemployment (Mayhew and Rijkers, 2004).
This paper directly connects to these two channels. I study how

* Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Altenbergerstraße 69, A-4040 Linz, Austria.
E-mail address: wolfgang.frimmel@jku.at.
1
Data from the Austrian Public Labor Agency (AMS) show that the average unemployment duration for male workers aged 30–34, for example, is 122 days in
comparison to 197 days of workers aged 55–59.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2021.100310

Available online 13 February 2021

2212-828X/© 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
W. Frimmel
raising the eligibility age of early retirement affects unemployment
duration, the re-integration on the labor market and the participation in
active labor market policies (ALMP) as a potential mechanism. I exploit
a natural experiment in the Austrian pension system as an exogenous
variation in early retirement age. In two pension reforms, the eligibility
age of early retirement was increased stepwise for different quarter-of-
birth cohorts from 60 to 65 for men and 55 to 60 for women. I use
comprehensive social security data and detailed data on active labor
market policy participation of unemployed people in Austria between
2000 and 2013. Based on a sample of unemployed workers due to plant
closures and mass layoffs I find a significant gender gap in how workers
are affected by a raise in the early retirement age. While unemployment
duration is unaffected for men and lower for women, men benefit from
an enforced later retirement in terms of larger re-employment proba­
bilities and better subsequent job quality (measured by days in
employment and labor income after unemployment) as compared to
women. In terms of participation in active labor market policies (ALMP),
men are more likely to be assigned to training programs, which pri­
marily focus on improving job search/application skills rather than job
qualification trainings. The latter effect is, however, not homogenous for
all workers. There are no such effects observable for women.
This paper contributes to several strands in the literature. First, it
relates to the extensive economic literature on the labor market effects
of pension reforms. These studies find – consistently across countries and
nature of pension reforms – positive employment effects as a response to
retirement policies which restrict access to (early) retirement or reduce
financial incentives for earlier retirement.2
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on unemployment, job
displacement and retirement decisions. Ichino et al. (2017),Hairault
et al. (2010) or Marmora and Ritter (2015) document that unemploy­
ment of elderly workers affects retirement timing and re-employment
probabilities. Using the Regional Extended Benefits Program in
Austria, Inderbitzin et al. (2016) show that extending unemployment
insurance for older workers generates a substantial increase in the
incidence of early retirement. Tatsiramos (2010) shows that in countries
with more generous unemployment insurance provisions for older un­
employed workers including a pathway to early retirement, displaced
older workers have lower re-employment and higher retirement rates.
Finally, the paper also supplements the strand of literature about
training and older workers’ employment. To avoid skill obsolescence of
older workers, investment in training is recognised as an important
element to the benefit of workers and employers (Picchio, 2015).
Particularly the ongoing fast technological progress prevalent in many
sectors makes training of the older workforce a useful policy. Existing
studies focus on employed workers and on-the-job training, which is
typically (partly) funded by employers, and find positive effects on older
workers’ employment (e.g. Belloni et al. (2015), Picchio and van Ours
(2013), Berg et al. (2017)).3 Only a few papers study the relationship
2 a third leaves the labor market through disability pensions (Frimmel
For Germany, Engels et al. (2017) and Hanel (2010) exploit raises in the
NRA and actuarial deductions and find significant postponement of retirement
and no substitution into unemployment. For Austria, Staubli et al. (2013) and
Manoli and Weber (2016) show substantial labor supply effects as a response to
increases in the eligibility age of early retirement. Mastrobuoni (2009) for the
US and Cribb et al. (2016) for the UK document an increase in the mean
retirement age and employment rate following increases in the eligibility age
for retirement, Hanel and Riphahn (2012) for Switzerland and Hernaes et al.
(2016) for Norway find positive labor supply effects due to changes of financial
incentives. Vestad (2013) shows that a reduction in the lower age limit leads to
earlier retirement and generates substantial costs.
3
However, there is no evidence that specific training for old employees is
associated with higher relative productivity of these employees (Göbel and
Zwick, 2013) and mixed evidence regarding the training wage premium (Bel­
loni and Villosio, 2015). Zhang et al. (2020) show that on-the-job training has a
significantly positive effects on job match quality. Stenberg et al. (2012) look at
more general adult schooling and find no effects on the timing of retirement.
2
The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310
between (early) retirement institutions and on-the-job training of
employed workers: Fouarge and Schils (2009) show that generous early
retirement schemes discourage older workers from taking part in
training, while more flexible schemes encourage. Brunello and Comi
(2015) show that an increase in the minimum retirement age in Italy
substantially increased training participation by private sector em­
ployees aged 40–54. Montizaan et al. (2010) exploit a Dutch pension
reform reducing pension rights and find significant increases in training
course participation among older employees in large organizations.
However, there is no study so far looking at re-training of unemployed
workers and – closely related – for publicly funded training programs.
The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold: it is the first paper
to study the effect of a pension reform on unemployed elderly workers,
and shows how raising the eligibility age of early retirement affects the
re-integration of these workers in terms of employment and job quality.
Second, this paper also considers a potential mechanism for re-
integration into the labor market and provides first evidence on
whether public labor market institutions react to pension reforms and
adapt their policies to improve skill set of workers and re-employ elderly
workers. Thus the paper also complements the literature on on-the-job
training by studying training participation of unemployed workers in
publicly funded training programs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section ‘Institutional background’
provides an overview of the institutional background in Austria and
describes the pension reforms implemented in Austria. Section ‘Research
design’ presents the empirical model, data and descriptive statistics,
Section ‘Estimation results’ summarizes the empirical findings and re­
sults from a heterogeneity analysis, and Section ‘Concluding remarks’
concludes.
Institutional background
The Austrian pension system The public pension system in Austria
covers all private-sector workers and provides early retirement, old-age
and disability pensions, and is by far the most important pillar in old-age
financial provision for retirees in Austria. The pension depends on the
number of insurance months collected during one’s working life and
income histories. For most individuals in the sample the assessment base
of the pension is based on the 15 best annual earnings years.4
Austria is associated with a low labor force participation of elderly
workers: although the statutory retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for
women, the factual retirement age including disability pensions for men
(women) in 2018 is 61.3 (59.3) years. An important factor for the gap
between statutory and factual retirement age for men is disability.
Without disability pensions, average retirement age of men is 63.5 years
in 2018. Access to disability pension requires a medical examination to
assess the degree of physical or mental health impairments5. In 2018
approximately 14% of all accepted pension claims are disability pen­
sions, of which a third is due to psychiatric problems (e.g. burn-out)
(Hauptverband, 2019). Particularly among blue-collar workers, almost
et al., 2018).
At the same time, the Austrian public pension system offers a
generous gross pension replacement rate of 76.5% in 2018 as compared
to the OECD average of 49% (in 2018) (OECD, 2019), and has long been
criticised as actuarially unfair (e.g. Hofer and Koman (2006) or Hanappi
(2012)). To smooth the transition into retirement, the Austrian gov­
ernment introduced partial retirement schemes for older employees in
the early 2000s, where the working time reductions of elderly workers
4
In 2004, the system gradually changed to a pension account system, which
considers lifetime income.
5
Disability pensions are granted for 2 years but can be extended in case of
ongoing reduced work capacities. Practically, a return to the labor market of
older workers after a disability pension was once granted, is extremely rare.
W. Frimmel
Fig. 1. Eligibility age of early retirement in Austria. Notes: The figure illustrates
the stepwise increase of the eligibility age of early retirement over birth-quarter
cohorts for men and women, consistent with the 2000 and 2003 pension re­
forms. The red horizontal line indicates the corridor pension at age 62 for men.
are subsidized. Also employers influence their workers’ behavior by
offering special severance payments (i.e., golden handshakes) to
workers for earlier job exits if wage costs of older workers are too high
(Frimmel et al., 2018).
Pension reforms To ensure the fiscal sustainability of the public
pension system, the Austrian government implemented several pension
reforms during the sample period of 2000–2013. This paper focuses on
the two pension reforms in 2000 and 2003. Later reforms affect older
workers in the sample only marginally given the typically long transition
periods of implementation of reforms.
The key element of the reforms in 2000 and 2003 is the gradual in­
crease in the eligibility age for early retirement.6 The first reform
increased eligibility age from 60 to 61.5 for men, and from 55 to 56.5 for
women. This raise was implemented stepwise for different birth-quarter
cohorts.7 More precisely, men born before October 1940 were still
eligible for early retirement at the age of 60, whereas for men born in the
fourth quarter of 1940, the eligibility age was increased by two months.
For every subsequent birth quarter, the eligibility age was raised until
the total increase of 1.5 years was reached. The same stepwise increase
applies to women, where women born after September 1945 had a two-
month higher eligibility age than women born before. The second re­
form in 2003, further increased the eligibility age for early retirement,
from 61.5 to 65 years for men and from 56.5 to 60 years for women, via a
similar stepwise increase for each birth-quarter cohort. Fig. 1 shows the
development of the early retirement age over birth quarters, for men and
women. Workers with at least 40 social insurance years were allowed to
retire at age 62 via the so-called corridor pension. Thus, the gradual
increase in early retirement age for men is practically capped at age 62
(see horizontal red line in Fig. 1). Also men (women) with more than 45
(40) insurance years, or workers with heavy labor were exempted from
the reform and remained at age 60 (55) as the earliest possible retire­
ment age.
6
Further relevant changes on account of the reforms included a stepwise
extension of the assessment base, from the best 15 earning years to lifetime
earnings and increased penalties for early retirement, from 2% to 4% of the
pension per year (capped at 10%).
7 8
Note that the step-wise increase for birth cohorts was implemented for all
cohorts at the same time in 2000 and 2004 respectively.
3
The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310
The effect of the reform on employment, unemployment and retire­
ment is illustrated in Fig. 2 where I compare workers of three different
birth cohorts, each associated with a one-year difference in the eligi­
bility age of early retirement, ranging from 60 to 62 for men, and 55 to
57 for women. For both, men and women, I consistently find a shift with
the eligibility age to a higher share in employment during the extended
working age period (see sub-figures (a) and (b)), e.g. men with an
eligibility age of 61 have a higher employment rate between 60 and 61
as compared to the cohort with the unchanged eligibility age of 60. A
very similar pattern can be observed for the share of unemployed
workers (sub-figures (c) and (d)) as well as the share of retired workers
(sub-figures (e) and (f)). Sub-figures (c) and (d) also suggest that the
reform might lead to increased unemployment during the extended
working life period, but there is no – descriptive – evidence that later
cohorts are associated with a different unemployment risk before the age
of 60. Generally, all three cohorts show identical trends and shares in
employment, unemployment and retirement before the original eligi­
bility age of early retirement of 60 and 55, respectively.
This graphical evidence is more thoroughly discussed in Staubli et al.
(2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016). Staubli et al. (2013) find that the
increase in the early-retirement eligibility age increased employment by
9.75 percentage points for men and 11 percentage points for women.
The reforms generated substantial spillovers on the unemployment in­
surance program but not on disability pensions. Using a regression-kink
design and a slightly different sample of more labor market attached
workers, Manoli and Weber (2016) find that a one-year increase in the
early retirement age increased the average job exit age by 0.4 years.
The Austrian unemployment insurance system The Austrian public un­
employment insurance offers a universal coverage for unemployment
benefits for all private-sector employees and apprentices.8 The system is
financed by withholding 3 percent of income from employers and 0–3
percent from employees (depending on their income). In case of un­
employment, workers receive unemployment benefits which amount to
55–60 percent of prior net income plus possible additional payments for
family members. The duration for receiving unemployment benefits
depends on age and collected social insurance years; generally, unem­
ployment benefits are granted for 20 weeks, which increases to 30 weeks
in case of 156 collected social insurance weeks. Unemployed workers
older than 40 years with 312 weeks of social insurance within the last 10
years receive unemployment benefits for 39 weeks. For unemployed
workers above 50 and 468 weeks of social insurance during the last 15
years, unemployment benefits duration is extended to 52 weeks. The
duration may also be extended for rehabilitation purposes.
The Austrian labor agency is responsible for the payments of un­
employment benefits. Apart from these financial benefits, the Austrian
Labor Agency offers various labor market activating programs and
subsidies to support unemployed workers finding new jobs or to improve
their skills. Table 1 summarizes the most important unemployment
subsidies and active labor market policies offered by the Austrian Labor
Agency. The spectrum reaches from training programs to increase skills
or programs for job applications and job interviews up to programs
specifically designed for firm founders.
Research design
Data
The empirical analysis is based on two Austrian administrative data
sources. All labor market and retirement-related information is drawn
from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which is a matched
employee–employer dataset collected to verify pension claims for all
Austrian private-sector workers (Zweimüller et al., 2009). It contains
Marginally employed workers are excluded, while self-employed can
voluntarily opt into unemployment insurance since 2009.
W. Frimmel
detailed information on workers’ employment and earnings histories
and basic socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. age, broad occupation,
experience, and tenure). The ASSD also contains information on the start
of the pension, as well as pathways into retirement (i.e. disability
pension, early retirement, or regular old-age retirement). Information
on the first jobs after unemployment is also drawn from the ASSD. I use
days in employment, and daily labor income as proxies for job quality.
The ASSD is merged to data from the Austrian Labor Agency
comprising detailed information on the receipt and duration of unem­
ployment benefits, training and qualification programs, outplacement
trusts or job integration subsidies between the years 2000 to 2014. Apart
from unemployment duration, I use information on all labor market
activating programs described in Table 1. Since the focus of this study is
on older workers, the sample consists of all unemployment spells of male
and female private-sector workers born between 1938 and 1955 - co­
horts directly affected by the stepwise increase of eligibility age of early
retirement - and who become unemployed in the period between 2000
until 2013. I also exclude unemployment spells of individuals who are
already eligible for early retirement, i.e. all unemployment spells
beyond age 60 for men and 55 for women are ignored. So workers
cannot directly move from unemployment to (early) retirement except
for disability reasons. This also rules out effects of the reform on direct
4
The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310
Fig. 2. Employment, unemployment and retirement
by cohorts. Notes: Figures compare the share of
employed (figures (a) and (b)), unemployed (figures
(c) and (d)) and retired (figures (e) and (f)) men (left)
and women (right) for different birth cohorts. These
cohorts differ in the eligibility age of early retirement
(ERA), e.g. men of cohort 1940q3 (born in third
quarter of 1940) have an ERA of 60 years, while
cohorts 1942q1 and 1944q2 have an increased ERA
of 61 years and 62 years respectively. Equivalently
for women, ERA for birth cohorts 1945q3, 1947q1
and 1949q2 is 55, 56 and 57 years respectively. All
figures are based on data from the ASSD..
retirement and inflow to unemployment9.
As entry into unemployment is likely selective, I focus on a more
exogenous inflow into unemployment, and restrict the sample to in­
dividuals subject to plant closures or mass layoffs.10 There is no evidence
that the increase in early retirement age is associated with plant closures
or mass layoffs (Frimmel, 2020). If individuals were affected by plant
closures or mass layoffs in several years, they enter the data multiple
times.11 Overall, the sample consists of 94, 648 individual unemploy­
ment spells for men and 45, 063 unemployment spells for women. This
unbalanced panel corresponds to 66, 128 men and 35, 602 women.
Empirical strategy
To analyze the effect of raising the early retirement age, I examine a
set of important outcome variables for unemployed workers, i.e. un
9
Staubli et al. (2013) show that spillover effects of the reform to the un­
employment insurance program mainly occur beyond the age of 60 for men.
10
Mass layoff is defined as a reduction of the workforce of at least 25 percent.
11
In robustness checks, I also present results for (i) the sample of all unem­
ployed individuals and (ii) for a sample of the first unemployment spell per
worker to check for persistency into unemployment.
W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 1 Table 2
Overview of Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP). Descriptive statistics of sample
Subsidy Description (I) (II)
Men Women
Training Educational programs to gain new qualifications, to support
job orientation or to help in active job search Early retirement age 61.77 57.32
Qualifications Certificated training programs and courses specifically (0.257) (1.002)
offered to increase the qualifications necessary for (new) Age at unemployment 54.63 53.25
jobs of unemployed workers. (4.128) (3.660)
Job Orientation Assistance for job orientation or occupational choices, e.g. Educational attainment
tests to find out possible appropriate occupational areas, Compulsory schooling 0.397 0.518
counseling or provision of information to support new job Apprenticeship 0.494 0.298
orientation… Matura 0.074 0.146
Active job search Training offered to support the active job search, e.g. job Academic 0.035 0.038
application training. Occupation
Outplacement trusts Labor market policy specifically for a larger group of Blue-collar 0.792 0.590
workers who are (expected to be) unemployed due to mass White-collar 0.208 0.410
layoffs or plant closures; the focus lies on specific Experience (in years) 22.34 18.32
qualification measures, e.g. training programs, job (8.705) (8.133)
orientation measures, support for active job search or firm Annual gross income 22,840.7 14,924.3
founding programs. (25,197.3) (14,392.5)
Firm founding Support for unemployed who become self-employed. Also
Observations 94,648 45,063
program counseling is offered and there is a possibility to acquire
# of individuals 66,128 35,602
necessary qualifications. Support may be granted up to 9
months. Notes: Descriptive statistics for men (column (I)) and women (column (II)) are
Job interview Partial refund of cost which occur at supra-regional job based on the sample described in Section ‘Data’. Standard deviations for non-
support applications
binary variables in parentheses.
Job integration Job integration support is a program to incentivise firms to
support employ workers of age 50 or older, often with health
restrictions and long unemployment durations or re-entry
into labor market. The Labor Agency offers a subsidy to firms
80 percent for both gender have compulsory schooling or apprenticeship
who employ older workers. Possible up to 6–12 months.
as the highest educational attainment. Similarly, 79.2 (59.0) percent of
Notes: This table summarizes the most important unemployment subsidies and men (women) are blue-collar workers. The average annual gross income
active labor market policies of the Austrian Labor Agency. before unemployment amounts to 22,840 euros for men and 14,924
euros for women.
Outcome variables are summarized in Table 3. The average duration
employment duration, re-employment, job quality as well as participa­ of unemployment is 185.3 days for men and 203.2 days for women with
tion and duration in labor market activating measures. The empirical substantial variation (standard deviation is between 258 and 272 days).
strategy follows Brunello and Comi (2015) and I estimate the following For men, approximately 11 percent receive some training, and spend on
empirical model: average 6.4 days in training.12 A closer look at the types of training
program reveals that 50 percent of these trainings (or 5 percent of the
outcomeit = β0 + β1 erait + ΓXit + γ i + γt + ∊it
entire sample) are programs to increase qualifications, another 4.9
where the set of outcome variables of individual i who became unem­ percent deal with active job search. Another 5.7 percent find jobs
ployed in year t is regressed on the exogenous individual-specific policy- through the job integration support of the labor agency. Other labor
determined eligibility age of early retirement erait . The variable erait is market activating policies are only of minor importance. The pattern for
60 for men born before October 1940 (55 for women born before women is very comparable: 12.3 percent receive some training measure,
October 1945) and increases for every subsequent quarter of birth as i.e. 6.5 percent for qualifications and 4.4 percent for active labor search.
summarized in Section ‘Institutional background’ and in Fig. 1. Note 5.3 percent receive the job integration support.
that the eligibility age is not constant for cohorts affected by the reform 64.8 percent of men (58.2 percent of women) found a new job after
2003 if they have unemployment spells before and after the imple­ unemployment by the end of 2014, 1.3 (0.8) percent of unemployed
mentation of the reform. Cohort of birth fixed effects γi and year fixed become self-employed. 8 percent of men (11.2 percent of women) re-
effects γt capture cohort, age and business cycle effects. Additionally, enter the labor market through marginal employment. Job quality is
local unemployment rates should account for regional labor market proxied by days of employment within the first two years after unem­
conditions. Individual characteristics summarized by the vector Xit ployment and the daily labor income.13 The average days of employ­
include industry indicators of the previous job, last gross income, job ment for men (women) is 155.5 (157.0) days with an average daily labor
experience, binary indicator for blue-collar workers (vs. white-collar income of 32.21 (17.25) euros.
workers), unemployment spell and regional fixed effects. All binary Fig. 3 compares Kaplan–Meier estimates for males and females with a
outcomes are estimated with a probit model, duration outcomes with higher or lower eligibility age of early retirement (ERA). The threshold
OLS. between high or low ERA is defined at 61.5 years for men and 56.5 years
for women, which corresponds to workers affected by the first pension
reform in 2000 (low ERA) and the second reform in 2003 (high ERA).
Descriptive statistics Kaplan–Meier estimates in Panel A reveal that the longer unemployment
duration for high-ERA men is in the range between 100 and 250 days,
The sample comprises 66, 128 men and 35, 602 women born be­
tween 1938 and 1955 who were subject to a plant closure or mass layoff
during the years 2000 until 2013. Table 2 shows individual character­ 12
Note that every individual in the sample receives unemployment benefits
istics of these men (Column (I)) and women (Column (II)). Based on the and potential job offers by the labor agency, but only a relatively small fraction
cohorts in the sample, the average eligibility age of early retirement is is assigned to a training program. The latter is typically relevant if job vacancy
61.77 for men and 57.3 for women. In comparison, the average age at requirements and workers’ qualifications do not match.
the beginning of the unemployment spell is 54.63 years for men and 13
In case of unemployment, daily labor income and days of employment are
53.25 for women. There is a significant educational gradient, more than set to zero.

5
W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 3 Unemployment duration and re-employment

Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
(I) (II) Unemployment duration Table 4 summarizes results of the effect of the
Men Women raise in eligibility age (ERA) on unemployment duration of men (Col­
Unemployment duration (in days) 185.3 203.2 umn I) and women (Column II). In line with the descriptive
(272.1) (258.7) Kaplan–Meier estimators, the point estimates are positive and larger for
men, but rather imprecisely estimated. Although this result contradicts
ALMPs
Training 0.108 0.123 evidence on bridging the time between job exit and retirement entry, it
Outplacement trusts 0.010 0.010 has to be considered that the sample comprises individuals being un­
Firm founding program 0.005 0.003 employed before the age of 60, so bridging is not feasible.14 In contrast,
Job interview support 0.009 0.005
unemployment duration of women is lower by approximately 50 days.
Job integration support 0.057 0.053
Employment and job quality Ultimately, the question whether raising
Type of training program the eligibility age of early retirement affects re-employment perspec­
Qualifications 0.049 0.065
tives of unemployed workers is most essential. As stated, the effect can
Job orientation 0.010 0.013
Active job search 0.049 0.044 be ambiguous: unemployed workers with a higher ERA are associated
with a longer future employment perspective, which could make such
Duration in ALMP
Days in training 6.402 7.830
workers more attractive for firms to hire. So re-employment should in­
(28.16) (30.31) crease. However, if firms generally discriminate elderly workers and do
Days in outplacement trusts 3.595 3.102 not provide jobs once a certain age is reached, a higher ERA would
(52.13) (41.31) simply lead to longer unemployment durations at older ages or a higher
Days in firm founding program 0.838 0.543
drop-out rate of the labor force.
(14.16) (11.39)
Days with job integration support 2.081 2.440 Table 5 summarizes estimation results for re-employment probabil­
(26.72) (28.39) ities and job quality after unemployment. For men (Panel A), re-
employment increases by 14.2 percent, but is only marginally signifi­
Subsequent employment
Employed 0.648 0.582 cant.15 Because the gradual increase of eligibility age is on a monthly
Self-Employed 0.013 0.008 basis, the effect size corresponds to a 1.2 percent increase in re-
Marginal employment 0.080 0.112 employment for a one-month increase in ERA. Days in employment
Not employed 0.259 0.298
within 2 years after unemployment16 is on average 113 days longer. The
Job quality (2 yrs after unemployment) average daily labor income increases by 16.6 euros, so workers tend to
Days in employment 155.5 157.00 benefit financially. Whether this wage premium is due to a higher
(214.40) (233.17)
training incidence cannot be answered within the presented research
Daily labor income 32.21 17.25
(37.10) (25.32) strategy. Overall these findings corroborate evidence that firms prefer
Observations 94,648 45,063 hiring workers with longer future employment perspectives in the firm,
and job quality of elderly workers is improved. Women tend to benefit to
Notes: Descriptive statistics for men (column (I)) and women (column (II)) are
based on the sample described in Section ‘Data’. Duration in ALMP and job a lesser extent from raising the ERA in terms of re-employment and job
quality variables are set to zero if they do not apply. Standard deviations for non- quality: a one-year raise of the ERA increases employment probabilities
binary variables in parentheses. by 7.6 percent, marginal employment increases by 3.5 percent, days in
employment increase by approximately 35 days and daily labor income
by 3.9 euros (Panel B of Table 5).
while for women this difference is absent. Training duration is only Gender difference Although women show shorter unemployment
longer for high-ERA males during the first 50 days of training (Panel B), durations with a higher eligibility age, men tend to benefit more,
but this pattern reverses with training duration. This might indicate that particularly with respect to re-employment and labor income. Expla­
these unemployed workers tend to receive substantially shorter quali­ nations for this significant gender difference may be manifold. First, the
fication measures. Re-employment probability for high-ERA males is on average retirement age of women is generally much closer to the stat­
average reduced and subsequent days of employment is shorter (Panel C utory retirement age. For instance, compared to men, where the factual
of Fig. 3). This could be driven by a greater assignment to training average retirement age is around 5 years below the statutory age of 65,
programs. The pattern is less pronounced for unemployed women. the average retirement age of women with a ERA between 55 and 57.5
Generally, there should not be given any causal interpretation to all years is on average 58.13 years, hence only approximately 2 years below
these observed differences, e.g. they could simply reflect an age effect, the statutory retirement age of 60. This is mostly due to a lack of social
because individuals with higher eligibility age are on average older at insurance years collected over lifetime, e.g. because of family obliga­
unemployment; also seasonal effects may influence the relationship. A tions (parental care for children or informal care for sick relatives). As a
regression analysis will control for these potentially distorting effects result, the response of women to the reform of the early retirement age
more thoroughly. was weaker as compared to men.
Second and closely related, firms may not differentiate on the one
Estimation results hand between employment perspectives of women with high or low

This section presents the empirical findings of the model described in

Section ‘Empirical strategy’. I present the main results for unemploy­
ment durations and subsequent employment and job quality in Section
‘Unemployment duration and re-employment’. Section ‘Potential
mechanism: Active labor market policies’ discusses results for active
labor market policies as a potential mechanism through which the re-
integration into the labor market is triggered. Section ‘Heterogeneous
effects’ summarizes results from a heterogeneity analysis and Section
‘Robustness’ provides robustness checks.
14
The reforms, however, had adverse effects on unemployment after the age
of 60. Staubli et al. (2013) provide evidence of increased bridging due to the
reforms. Based on a sample of employed workers, they find an increase in
unemployment for workers with higher eligibility age for the extended working
period induced by the reforms.
15
When looking at the sample of all unemployed workers, estimates remain
quantitatively similar but become more precisely estimated. Results are shown
in Column (1) of Table 11.
16
In case of no re-employment, the variable is set to zero.

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Fig. 3. Kaplan–Meier estimates. Notes: Kaplan–Meier estimates are based on sample described in Section ‘Data’ Panel A shows unemployment duration for men (left)
and women (right) with high and low eligibility age of early retirement (ERA). The threshold for high ERA is defined at 61.5 years for men and 56.5 years for women.
Correspondingly, Panel B compares training duration and Panel C the duration in the subsequent job after re-employment (conditional on being employed)..

ERA, because retirement behavior changes to a substantially lesser de­
gree, but on the other hand the increased employment perspectives of
men may provide sufficiently large incentives for firms to hire these
unemployed workers. A similar argument may arise for the assignment
to training programs by the public labor agency (see Section ‘Potential
mechanism: Active labor market policies’).
Third, the pension reform affects men and women at different ages. A
raise of the ERA between 55 and 60 as for women or between 60 and 65
for men could simply trigger differential responses by the labor agency
or firms employing elderly workers.
Potential mechanism: Active labor market policies
Although unemployment durations for men are unaffected by the
increase of the eligibility age of early retirement, it does not imply that
activities during unemployment remain unchanged. At the same, the re-
integration into the labor market as well as subsequent job quality is
improved with higher eligibility age of early retirement. In this section, I
study one potential mechanism behind these developments, namely the
assignment of unemployed workers into active labor market programs
(ALMP). Unemployed workers with different eligibility ages may sys­
tematically be assigned to more or less ALMPs and/or spend a different
amount of time in such programs. Given unemployment duration, if a
higher ERA affects the probability of training during unemployment,
this might have an impact on subsequent employment prospects and job
quality. Hence, studying ALMP participation may shed some light on
how the re-integration into the labor market was implemented. It also
provides evidence whether the labor agency adapt their policies to in­
crease workers’ skill set as a response to pension reforms.17 Although
such an analysis provides interesting insights into a potential mecha­
nism for the re-integration process, it cannot be interpreted as a causal
analysis about the effectiveness of ALMPs for the re-integration of
elderly workers into the labor market.
Table 6 summarizes results for the participation in five different
labor-market activating policies: participation in training programs,
17
ALMPs are in principle accessible for all unemployed workers and not
specifically targeted at elderly workers. These policies already existed prior the
reform, hence are independent from the raise in the eligibility age of early
retirement.

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 4 participate in a training program by 16.2 percent (Column (1)), which

Unemployment duration (in days) corresponds to an 1.4 percent increase in training participation per
(1) (2) month increase in eligibility age. Panel A of Table 7 takes a closer look at
Men Women the type of training program for men, i.e. for qualifications, job orien­
Early retirement age 34.960 − 49.518*** tation or active job search. It turns out, that the positive training effect is
(55.987) (4.223) entirely driven by increased training for active job search (Column (3) of
Table 7), such as job application trainings (plus 18.2 percent). So it
Educational attainment (baseline: compulsory schooling):
Apprenticeship 12.714*** 5.068* seems that the labor agency tries to bring those workers with longer
(1.718) (2.822) future employment perspectives due to later expected retirement back to
Matura 54.119*** 16.905*** the labor market as fast as possible and equip them with the necessary
(4.247) (3.953)
tools to be successful in job applications. They are on average not more
Academic degree 59.731*** 44.134***
(6.377) (8.791)
likely to receive relatively cost-intensive programs to acquire new
qualifications for a new job, although these could pay off more in case of
White-collar worker 25.929*** 7.193***
higher expected retirement ages. However, this effect is not homogenous
(2.547) (2.734)
Experience − 0.001*** − 0.001*** among all male workers (see Section ‘Heterogeneous effects’). Second,
(0.000) (0.001) the probability of being employed through the job integration support
Gross income − 0.000*** − 0.000 significantly increases by 21.8 percent (Column(5) of Table 6). The job
(0.000) (0.000) integration support temporarily reduces labor costs for firms if they
Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes employ elderly workers. So this result suggests that the temporarily
Regional FE Yes Yes subsidized hiring of elderly workers becomes more attractive, the longer
Local unemployment rate Yes Yes
future employment prospects are.
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Again, there is a very pronounced diverging pattern between men
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes and women observable, as results for female ALMP participation (Panel
B of Table 6) show. A one-year higher ERA does not change the proba­
Number of observations 94,648 45,063
Mean of dep. var. 175.83 200.48 bility of receiving a training program, other programmes are only
marginally affected. Only the job integration support increases with the
Notes: The sample consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or
early retirement age by 2.2 percent. Consistently, when looking at the
mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are based on OLS estimation.
types of training programs (Panel B of Table 7), there are no significant
Standard errors are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
or relevant effects for training types.
I find consistent effects when considering the duration spent in
outplacement trusts, firm founding program, job interview support and
ALMPs (Table 8). Men (Panel A) spent on average 11 days per year more
job integration support. The last policy is particularly designed for
in training programs. There is only a marginal statistical significant
elderly workers. Panel A shows the average marginal effects for men:
change in the duration in the job integration support. For women, ALMP
first, a one-year higher ERA significantly increases the probability to
durations only marginally change (Panel B of Table 8).

Table 5
Employment and job quality
Employment Job quality

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Marginal Days in Daily labor
Employment Self-employment Employment employment income

Panel A: Men
Early retirement age 0.142* − 0.004 0.028 81.913*** 14.022***
(0.082) (0.027) (0.052) (32.463) (5.458)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 94,648 94,648 94,648 94,648 94,648
Mean of dep.var. 0.70 0.01 0.07 173.36 35.55

Panel B: Women
Early retirement age 0.076*** 0.002 0.035*** 34.740*** 3.941***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (3.613) (0.366)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 45,063 45,063 45,063 45,063 45,063
Mean of dep.var. 0.66 0.01 0.12 186.05 20.35

Notes: The sample consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Estimates for binary employment outcomes are
average marginal effects based on a probit estimation. Estimates for job quality are based on an OLS estimation. Outcome variables are set to zero if not assigned to a
programme. Educational attainment, occupation, gross income,work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates are included as covariates.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 6
Active labor market policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outplacement Firm founding Job interview Job integration
Training trusts program support support

Panel A: Men
Early retirement age 0.162** 0.049* 0.040 0.033 0.218***
(0.073) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.073)

Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Number of observations 94,648 94,648 94,648 94,648 94,648

Mean of dep.var. 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06

Panel B: Women
Early retirement age 0.003 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)

Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Number of observations 45,063 45,063 45,063 45,063 45,063

Mean of dep.var. 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06

Notes: The sample consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are average marginal effects based on a
probit estimation. Educational attainment, occupation, gross income, work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates are included as covariates.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Heterogeneous effects
Table 7
Training program types
Table 9 for men and Table 10 for women summarize results from a
(1) (2) (3) heterogeneity analysis along several pre-determined dimensions, i.e. age
Qualifications Job orientation Job search
before ERA (less/more than 5 years before ERA), occupation (blue-col­
Panel A: Men lar/white-collar), level of educational attainment (high/low) and local
Early retirement age − 0.027 0.038 0.182***
labor market conditions at unemployment (above/below average local
(0.046) (0.038) (0.058)
industry-specific unemployment rate). There are several interesting
Covariates Yes Yes Yes patterns observable. It turns out that the age of getting unemployed due
Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes
to mass layoffs and plant closures has a substantial influence which type
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes of ALMP workers receive. Male workers who are more than 5 years away
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes from the early retirement age are 9.8 percent more likely to receive a
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes training in new qualifications while this effect is totally absent for un­
Number of observations 94,648 94,648 94,648 employed workers closer to the ERA. These workers are, however, 14.3
Mean of dep.var. 0.05 0.01 0.05 percent more likely to receive trainings to support job search but the
labor agency refrains from re-training these workers. This is also re­
Panel B: Women flected in re-employment; since training in qualifications is time-
Early retirement age 0.004 0.002 − 0.006**
consuming, workers further away from the ERA are less likely to be
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
employed after one year of unemployment.
Covariates Yes Yes Yes In terms of socio-economic differences, white-collar and more
Previous industry affiliation FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
educated workers have a higher propensity to receive a training in job
Unemployment year FE Yes Yes Yes search, while blue-collar workers and workers with a lower educational
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes attainment are more likely to be employed through the job integration
Unemployment spell FE Yes Yes Yes support. This is consistent with the observation that particularly firms
Number of observations 45,063 45,063 45,063 requiring skilled manual labor make use of the job integration support.
Mean of dep.var. 0.07 0.02 0.05 Less surprisingly, if the local labor market (measured by the local
Notes: The sample consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or industry-specific unemployment rate) is tighter, workers participate
mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are average marginal effects significantly more in ALMPs.
based on a probit estimation. Educational attainment, occupation, gross income, For women, differences across subgroups are less pronounced.
work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates are However, women further away from their ERA are much less likely to be
included as covariates. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on in­ assigned to a training program or to receive the job integration support,
dividuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 while women closer to the ERA receive more job integration support and
also have higher re-employment chances. There are no remarkable dif­
ferences in other analyzed dimensions for women.

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 8 2008. Results shown in column (2) of Table 11 do not differ from the
ALMP duration results of the main estimation sample, so business cycle effects stemming
(1) (2) (3) (4) from the economic crisis do not affect the results. This is not too sur­
Outplacement Firm Job prising as unemployment rates of elderly workers were only modestly
founding integration affected by the crisis.18
Training trusts program support
Column (3) for a sample of plant closures and column (4) for mass
Panel A: Men layoffs only shed light on whether estimated effects differ between the
Early retirement age 11.195*** 5.355 0.477 6.771* two different groups of unemployed workers in the sample. Clearly, the
(3.233) (3.890) (1.114) (3.800)
number of observations drops, so precision of estimates slightly suffers.
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes In terms of unemployment duration and re-integration into the labor
Previous industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
market, the two groups are remarkably similar. With respect to assign­
affiliation FE
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ment to training, it appears that the effects are driven by the group of
Unemployment year Yes Yes Yes Yes workers coming from mass layoffs. This suggests that responses of the
FE labor agency is related to the original cause of unemployment. In fact,
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes particularly plant closures receive a high attention by the public and are
Unemployment spell Yes Yes Yes Yes
often accompanied by specific social plans between employers and
FE
workers, which make further actions by the labor agency less relevant.
Number of 94,648 94,648 94,648 94,648 Finally, columns (5) and (6) of Table 11 deal with potential persis­
observations
Mean of dep.var. 6.42 3.59 0.86 2.36
tency into unemployment. First note that the empirical model directly
controls for unemployment spell fixed effects and standard errors are
Panel B: Women clustered on individual level. To further address this issue, column (5)
Early retirement age 0.997** 2.136*** 0.440** 1.599*** restricts the main sample to the first unemployment spell per worker
(0.468) (0.535) (0.202) (0.409) during 2000 and 2013, column (6) excludes workers with the 5 percent
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes most unemployment spells. While for the latter scenario, results do not
Previous industry Yes Yes Yes Yes change at all, the positive training effect for male workers disappears
affiliation FE
when restricting the sample to the first unemployment spell. This in­
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment year Yes Yes Yes Yes
dicates that the public labor agency may assign unemployed workers to
FE cost-intensive training programs to a lesser extent at the first time they
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes get unemployed. The main results for re-employment still remain un­
Unemployment spell Yes Yes Yes Yes changed in the very restricted sample (column 5) but are less precisely
FE
estimated. Estimates for women are mainly unaffected. So persistency
Number of 45,063 45,063 45,063 45,063 into unemployment should not systematically affect the results to a large
observations degree.
Mean of dep.var. 8.60 3.58 0.64 2.95

Notes: The sample consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or
mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are based on an OLS estimation.
Outcome variables are set to zero if not assigned to a programme. Educational
attainment, occupation, gross income, work experience before unemployment
and local unemployment rates are included as covariates. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robustness
The baseline sample consists of unemployed workers who were
subject to a plant closure or a mass layoff during 2000 and 2013 because
of selective entry into unemployment and spillover effects from the
pension reform. Table 11 summarizes several robustness checks with
respect to the sample in order to check whether and to what extent se­
lective entry into unemployment, the economic crisis in 2008 onwards,
the nature of unemployment, i.e. mass layoff vs. plant closure, or
persistence in unemployment change the results.
Column (1) of Table 11 extends the sample to all unemployment
spells between the years 2000 and 2013. All remaining sample re­
strictions and the empirical model remain unchanged. Given endoge­
nous selection into unemployment, estimates on this sample cannot
necessarily be interpreted causally, but may still be insightful to eval­
uate the main results of the paper in a potentially wider context. For
both, men and women, I do not find any systematic differences of results
in comparison to the restricted baseline sample, but estimates are more
precisely estimated due to sample size. So, potentially selective entry
into unemployment does not seem to significantly alter the main find­
ings and results do not appear to be specifically driven by the exogenous
group of unemployed workers.
To check, whether results are specifically driven by the economic
downturn in 2008 onwards, I re-estimate the model for a sample of
unemployed workers subject to a plant closure or mass layoff before
Concluding remarks
The demographic transition towards an older society led to ongoing
reforms of public pension systems to ensure future financial sustain­
ability. The need of a higher labor force participation of elderly workers
also requires a higher (early) retirement age. In this study, I analyze how
an increase in the eligibility age of early retirement affects unemployed
elderly workers in Austria, a group particularly vulnerable in the labor
market. I exploit two Austrian pension reforms increasing the early
retirement age step-wise for different quarter-of-birth cohorts to identify
the causal effect of a raise in early retirement age on unemployment
duration, re-employment probability and participation in active labor
market policies (ALMP) and training programs. Empirical results based
on Austrian administrative data reveal a substantial gender difference in
how the raise in early retirement age affects unemployed workers. While
unemployed women only benefit little with a shorter unemployment
duration, modest higher re-employment probability as well as labor
income after unemployment, unemployed men below the age of 60
benefit in several aspects: although unemployment duration remains
unaffected, re-employment chances and participation in active labor
market policies significantly increase. Men also receive larger labor in­
come increases after unemployment. Elderly unemployed workers closer
to their early retirement age are systematically assigned to programs
increasing their job application and job search skills, workers more than
five years away from their early retirement age are more likely to
participate in training programs increasing their skills. The result for
women not benefiting to a similar degree than males does not
18
Microcensus data from Statistics Austria show that the unemployment rate
(ILO definition) for men aged 55–64 only marginally increased from 3.4% in
2007 to 4.4% in 2011.

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 9
Heterogeneous effects for male unemployed workers.
Age Occupation Education Local labor market

> 5 years < 5 years Blue-collar White-collar High Low Low High
before ERA worker unemployment rate

Training 0.073** 0.113 0.030 0.580*** 0.356* 0.118 − 0.005 0.203**

(0.031) (0.070) (0.079) (0.162) (0.210) (0.078) (0.141) (0.085)
in qualifications 0.098*** − 0.053 − 0.078 0.074 0.085 − 0.073 − 0.160 0.023
(0.018) (0.051) (0.054) (0.098) (0.151) (0.053) (0.103) (0.057)
in job search − 0.033 0.143*** 0.084 0.521*** 0.337** 0.151** 0.127 0.193***
(0.026) (0.051) (0.060) (0.158) (0.144) (0.064) (0.135) (0.065)

Job integration support 0.108*** 0.161** 0.204** 0.300*** 0.130 0.305*** 0.171 0.244***
(0.024) (0.071) (0.100) (0.119) (0.132) (0.102) (0.158) (0.076)

Employment − 0.471*** 0.142 0.008 0.496*** 0.293 0.112 0.320 0.098

(0.036) (0.105) (0.094) (0.174) (0.220) (0.088) (0.220) (0.088)

Number of observations 53,771 40,877 74,060 20,588 10,937 83,711 21,499 73,149

Notes: The sample consists of all male unemployed workers between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are average marginal effects based on a probit estimation. Educational
attainment, occupation, gross income, work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates as well as industry, province, unemployment year,cohort
of birth and unemployment spell fixed-effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01

Table 10
Heterogeneous effects for female unemployed workers
Age Occupation Education Local labor market

> 5 years < 5 years Blue-collar White-collar High Low Low High
before ERA worker unemployment rate

Training − 0.266*** 0.021* -0.005 0.016* 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.004

(0.066) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
in qualifications − 0.075* 0.014 0.001 0.007 0.020* 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.041) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
in job search − 0.216*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.001 -0.012 -0.004 0.001 − 0.008**
(0.055) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)

Job integration support − 0.134*** 0.030*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.050) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)

Employment 0.022 0.049*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.102*** 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.075***

(0.062) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)

Number of observations 11,160 33,903 26,458 18,605 8,289 36,774 12,330 32,733

Notes: The sample consists of all female unemployed workers between 2000 and 2013. Estimates are average marginal effects based on a probit estimation. Educational
attainment, occupation, gross income, work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates as well as industry, province, unemployment year, cohort
of birth and unemployment spell fixed-effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on individuals; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01

necessarily imply that the extended working life for women is not
helpful for reintegration at all, but could rather reflect that (i) the
Austrian pension reform affects women at a younger age and (ii)
women’s response to these particular reforms was substantially weaker.
The results are in line with theoretical predictions that an expected
longer employment of workers increases the re-integration of elderly
workers (Hairault et al., 2010) and supports human capital formation by
incentivizing investments to train elderly workers and upgrade their
qualifications (Becker, 1975). Public labor agencies adapt their assign­
ments to ALMPs to the extended expected working life by supporting
elderly workers for a faster re-integration – either through job applica­
tion trainings or financial support for firms employing elderly workers –
and by upgrading workers’ skills in comprehensive training programs.
Whether and to what extent these ALMPs contribute to the re-
integration of these unemployed workers – the causal effect of ALMPs
– is beyond the scope of this paper, but is definitely worth studying in
future research.
From a policy perspective, these results suggest that increasing the
early retirement age is not only a promising way to improve the financial
sustainability of public pension systems but also sufficiently incentivizes
the re-integration of elderly unemployed workers (below the age of 60).
The latter is an important contribution to increase the labor force
participation of older workers and to keep the public pension systems
financially viable in the future.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Wolfgang Frimmel: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation,
Formal analysis, Data curation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review
& editing.

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W. Frimmel The Journal of the Economics of Ageing 19 (2021) 100310

Table 11
Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Before Plant Mass Only 1st Exclude
Outcome spells 2008 closures layoffs spell top-5%

Panel A: Men
Unemployment duration 74.650** 31.760 65.443 6.742 − 92.483 32.198
(23.923) (56.281) (117.75) (59.794) (166.02) (56.142)

Training 0.141*** 0.158** − 0.010 0.189** − 0.070 0.163**

(0.031) (0.073) (0.107) (0.090) (0.190) (0.074)

Employed 0.183*** 0.126* 0.124 0.168** 0.053 0.152*

(0.036) (0.076) (0.143) (0.094) (0.268) (0.084)

Daily labor income 16.682*** 13.126** 13.940 13.570** 14.689 13.101**

(2.397) (5.497) (9.857) (6.188) (10.809) (5.472)

Number of observations 566,216 71,942 38,214 65,813 12,614 87,189

Panel B: Women
Unemployment duration − 46.687*** − 41.779*** − 45.823*** − 53.451*** − 30.315*** − 50.905***
(1.633) (4.357) (6.754) (5.011) (9.763) (4.382)

Training 0.008*** − 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.003

(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005)

Employed 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.097*** 0.079***

(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007)

Daily labor income 3.794*** 3.556*** 3.769*** 3.961*** 3.570*** 3.898***

(0.162) (0.377) (0.574) (0.441) (0.870) (0.377)

Number of observations 291,016 36,753 18,391 31,084 9.129 43,350

Notes: Column (1) consists of all unemployed workers between 2000 and 2013, column (2) consists of all unemployed workers due to plant closures or mass layoffs
before the economic crisis in 2008, column (3) considers only unemployed workers due to plant closures between 2000 and 2013, column (4) only unemployed
workers due to mass layoffs between 2000 and 2013. Column (5) restricts the main sample to the first unemployment spell between 2000 and 2013 per individual, and
finally column (6) excludes individuals above the 95 percentile in the number of unemployment spells. Estimates for the binary training and employment outcome is an
average marginal effect based on a probit estimation. Estimates for unemployment duration and daily labor income are based on an OLS estimation. Educational
attainment, occupation, gross income, work experience before unemployment and local unemployment rates as well as industry, province, unemployment year, cohort
of birth and unemployment spell fixed-effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on individuals (except for column (5)); *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from the Christian
Doppler Laboratory on Aging, Health, and the Labor Market is gratefully
acknowledged.
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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Vanha rouva asettui tavalliselle paikalleen ikkunan luona olevan
ompelupöydän ääreen; mutta tällä kertaa hän ei ottanut esille
tavanmukaista reikäompelustaan tai virkkuutaan, vaan kääri auki
kirjeen. Hänellä oli samalla kummallisen juhlallinen ilme. Hannan
sydäntä kouristi; hän aavisti jotain erikoista tapahtuneen.

»Rakas lapsi, ota tuo palli ja istuudu tänne ja kuuntele mitä minulla
on sinulle sanottavaa. Kuten tiedät, olen minä sinun suhteesi äidin
asemassa. Minun täytyy valvoa etuasi ja suojella sinua. Pelkään
sinun olevan… liian kiemailevan… Sinun ikäisenäsi olin tosin
minäkin kiemaileva, mutta ainoastaan sellaisille ihmisille, joille äitini
luvalla sain kiemailla. Olen vakuutettu, että sinulla ensi talvena on
tilaisuus keskiviikkokutsuissani tehdä sopivia valloituksia. Siellä on
esimerkiksi majuri, paroni Schimmerer, joka on leskimies ja omistaa
kolmikerroksisen talon jossain Wienin esikaupungissa…»

Hanna kävi kärsimättömäksi.

»Onko tuo kirje paroni Schimmereriltä vai ehkä hänen

kolmikerroksisen talonsa porttivahdilta?» kysyi hän.

»Hanna, sinulla on jo jonkun aikaa ollut hyvin nenäkäs käytös.

Anna minun puhua. Tämä kirje on naimatarjous, mutta se ei
valitettavasti ole paronin.»

Hanna tunsi kalpenevansa, mutta syynä siihen oli suloinen kauhun

tunne.
Nuoren tytön elämän tärkeimmät tapaukset ovat juuri
naimatarjoukset.

»Kenen, Dori kummi… kenen? Näytä minulle kirje!» hän huudahti.

 »Anna minun ensin puhua loppuun. Sitäpaitsi tiedät varsin hyvin,
keneltä se on. Etkö luule minun nähneen hänen kulkevan tästä ohi
joka päivä… ja huomanneen, miten sinä aina pälyilet hänen
jälkeensä ikkunassa?… Mutta kuten näet, olet antanut hänelle liiaksi
toivomisen aihetta. Nyt täytyy meidän antaa miesparalle rukkaset ja
siten hankimme itsellemme vihollisia.»

»Ja miksi rukkaset?»

»Miksi? Tämä ei ole sinulle mikään sopiva naimiskauppa, Hanna.

Ei suinkaan sinun, joka tuskin olet täysi-ikäinen, sovi myöntyä
ensimäiseen tarjoukseen? Koulunopettaja! Ja neiti von Orfalvy, vielä
niin kaunis ja etevä kuin sinä! Sinä et tosin kuulu kermaan… tiedän
hyvin, ettet voi joutua kaikkein hienoimpiin naimisiin…»

»Ja miksi en! Äiti sanoi aina, että minusta on tuleva kreivitär tai
miljoonain omistaja…»

»Äiti parkasi oli liian haaveileva…»

»Mutta avioliiton ei pidä perustua maallisiin etuihin, Dori kummi…

sehän on sydämen asia. Minä antaisin aina käteni miehelle, jota
rakastan, olkoon hän sitten jalosukuinen tai porvari, kerjäläinen tai
pohatta.»

»Nyt haaveilet vain. Onneksi on sinulla viisas, käytännöllinen

kummitäti, joka ei anna sinun heittäytyä kenelle tahansa.»

»Anna minun lukea kirje! Anna minulle se!»

»En, tekisin sinut vielä haaveellisemmaksi», vastasi rouva von

Orfalvy katkeroituneena ja pisti kirjeen taskuun.
 Ovi avautui.

»Tahtoisiko kenraalitar antaa tarpeet taikinaa varten? Se tarvitsee

pitkän ajan noustakseen.»

»Tulen heti.» Kenraalitar otti avainkimpun pöytälaatikosta. »Siis,

Hanna kultaseni, pois tuhmat haaveet.»

Näin sanoen hän lähti huoneesta seuratakseen keittäjätärtä

ruokakammioon.

Hanna oli tuskin jäänyt yksin, kun jo suli kyyneliin. Nyt hän vasta
selvästi tunsi rakastavansa nuorta tiedemiestä. Ja tämä… tämä oli
pyytänyt häntä vaimokseen; varmaankin riippui hänen elämänsä
vastauksesta… ja kummitäti aikoi musertaa hänen sydämensä
rukkasilla. Ei, tapahtukoon mitä hyvänsä, hän vastaa myöntyvästi.

Jos kenraalitar olisi tälle nuorelle tytölle näyttänyt Ballmannin

kirjeen, jossa tämä kylmin, liian varmoin sanoin pyysi neiti von
Orfalvyn kättä, jos hän vielä käytännöllisistä syistä olisi kehottanut
suostumaan tarjoukseen ja lisännyt: »Sinä et ole rikas, sinä et kuulu
'kermaan', herra Ballmann on kyllin hyvä sinulle ja hän pitää sinusta
huolta», niin olisi Hanna varmaan ruvennut luulemaan olevansa
luotu komeampaa tarjousta varten. Koko avioliitto ja kuiva kosinta
olisivat tuntuneet hänestä kovin arkipäiväisiltä, ja hän olisi
varmaankin vastannut »ei». Mutta Dori täti ei näyttänyt hänelle
kirjettä, »jottei tekisi häntä vieläkin haaveellisemmaksi»; siinä oli siis
runollinen rakkaudentunnustus, ja hänestä tuntui, kuin nuori mies
olisi joutuva kurjien »käytännöllisten» syiden takia onnettomuuteen.
Hän ei voisi elää ilman Hannaa; hän tiesi varmaankin, miten paljon
korkeammalla häntä Hanna oli, mutta rakkaus uskaltaa kaiken ja hän
piti Hannaa sellaisena ihanteena, että luuli hänen uhraavan maalliset
edut, lahjoittaakseen hänelle sydämensä.

»Hän ei saa pettyä!» huudahti Hanna jatkoksi omille ajatuksilleen.

Samassa joku koputti oveen. Hanna hypähti pystyyn, pyyhki

nopeasti silmänsä ja sanoi hiljaa:

»Sisään!»

Ovi avautui, ja kynnykselle ilmaantui Ewald Ballmann. Nuoren

tytön sydän sykki kiivaasti; hän ei ollut milloinkaan tuntenut itseään
niin kiihtyneeksi. Nuori mieskin oli nähtävästi liikutettu; hän oli luullut
saavansa nähdä kenraalittaren ja seisoikin rakastettunsa edessä…

Hän rakastikin ensi kertaa elämässään, ja tämä kaunis tyttö sai

hänet vapisemaan. Mitäpä hän olisikaan antanut, jos
kihlausmuodollisuudet olisivat ohi, jos tämä vieras neitonen, jota hän
rakasti, jo olisi hänen vaimonsa! Rakkaudesta ja avioliitosta hän ei
tiennyt muuta kuin että ne olivat välttämättömiä tapahtumia
ihmiselämässä; ja kun naisellinen sulous ensi kerran teki häneen
valtavan vaikutuksen, arveli hän hetken tulleen ja rohkaisten
mielensä teki mahdollisimman pian avioliittotarjouksensa.

Nyt hän seisoi kynnyksellä kalpeana ja ahdistetuin mielin. Yhtä

kalpeana ja tuskaisena oli Hanna ikkunakomerossa nojaten
ompelupöytään.

Ballmann puhui ensin.

»Suokaa anteeksi, neiti; luulin rouva von Orfalvyn olevan täällä.»

 Hänen äänensä, jonka Hanna nyt kuuli ensimäisen kerran, oli
matala ja kaunissointuinen ja se sai Hannan värisemään. Miten
ihanalta kuuluisikaan tämän äänen kiihkeä »minä rakastan»…

»Dori kummi tulee kohta», vastasi hän tuskin kuuluvasti.

»Te sallitte siis?» sanoi hän ja astui sisään sulkien oven.

Hanna seisoi aivan hiljaa. Lyhyt vaitiolo.

»Neiti Hanna, olen tänään kirjoittanut kummitädillenne ja… olen

tullut kuulemaan vastausta.»

»Mitä riippuu vastauksesta?» kysyi Hanna ja odotti hänen

vastaavan:
»Elämäni».

Ballmann vastasi siihen suuntaan:

»Tulevaisuuteni.»

Uusi vaitiolo. Nuorten sydämet sykkivät yhä kiivaammin.

»Tunnetteko kirjeeni sisällyksen?» kysyi Ballmann sitten, astuen

askeleen eteenpäin.

»Tunnen, kyllä tunnen.»

Ewald lähestyi yhä.

»Silloinhan voin kuulla vastauksen heti teiltä itseltänne, Hanna…

Onko se kieltävä? Onko se myöntävä?»
 Hetki oli ratkaiseva. Hanna ymmärsi kahden ihmisen
tulevaisuuden riippuvan hänen huultensa liikkeestä… Hän sulki
silmänsä kuin suinpäin veteen syöksyvä ja sanoi:

»Vastaus on myöntävä.»

Hanna luuli onnellisen kosijan huudahtavan riemusta, syöksyvän

hänen jalkainsa juureen tai sulkevan hänet tuliseen syleilyyn, mutta
mitään sellaista ei tapahtunut. Ewald tarttui hiljaa hänen käteensä,
suuteli sitä ja lausui sydämellisesti:

»Kiitos, neiti Hanna! Koetan tehdä teidät onnelliseksi.»

IV.

Dori kummi antoi pian suostumuksensa. Kuultuaan nuoren tytön jo

antaneen myöntävän vastauksen ei hän tahtonut joutua puretun
kihlauksen herättämän huomion alaiseksi, vaan tuli siihen
lopputulokseen, ettei Hanna ollut hänestä riippuvainen, vaan oli
oikeutettu antamaan kätensä kenelle tahtoi ja että hänellä oli
edellytyksiä tulla onnelliseksi seuratessaan sydämensä ääntä, ehkä
onnellisemmaksi kuin paroni Schimmererin kolmikerroksisessa
talossa.

Ewald Ballmann kuului olevan erinomaisen »mallikelpoinen» mies,

minkä lisäksi hänellä oli paitsi professorinpalkkaansa myöskin
pienen omaisuuden useaan sataan guldeniin nousevat korot
käytettävänään. Sitäpaitsi tuli hän perimään rikkaan sedän. Tämä
avioliitto oli köyhälle, orvolle tytölle käytännölliseltäkin kannalta
katsoen edullinen. Kaiken miettimisen jälkeen kenraalitar katsoi
parhaimmaksi liikutettuna sanoa:

»Koska te niin välttämättä tahdotte toisenne, täytynee minun antaa

siunaukseni, lapset.»
 Hannasta kaikki oli aivan toisenlaista, kuin mitä hän oli ajatellut.
Kihlausaika ei vastannut hänen toiveitaan. Ewaldin onni tuntui
hänestä liian rauhalliselta; oli kuin Ewald ei ensinkään olisi osannut
panna arvoa hänen suostumuksensa osoittamaan uhrautuvaan
jalomielisyyteen. Hän oli rakkauden alttarille uhrannut tulevaisuuden
hänelle sylissään kantamat kruunut, jalokivet ja helmet, ja Ewaldista
se oli luonnollisin seikka maailmassa. Hänellä ei ollut aavistustakaan
näistä uhratuista haavetimanteista.

Ewald puhui kenraalittaren kanssa heidän tulevan pienen

asuntonsa sisustamisesta. Kolme huonetta ja keittiö. Suuri, valoisa
keittiö. Makuuhuoneessa pähkinäpuiset huonekalut, salissa
mahonkiset. Hänen kirjoituspöytänsä, kirjakaappinsa ja Hannan
ompelupöytä olisivat salissa. Kolmannessa huoneessa olisi kaappeja
ja laatikoita ja sitä voitaisiin ehkä myöhemmin käyttää
lastenkamarina. Palvelustyttö voisi asua keittiössä.

Tällaiset keskustelut saattoivat Hannan alakuloiseksi. Jos Ewald

olisi sanonut tämän olevan vallan liian huonoa hänen kuninkaalliselle
morsiamelleen, jos hän olisi kauhistunut sellaista kotia ajatellessaan,
olisi Hanna ilomielin huudahtanut olevansa valmis seuraamaan
sydämensä valitsemaa miestä vaikka vuorenluolaan ja urheasti
kärsimään punaista huonekalukangasta; mutta kauheinta oli, että
Ewald esitti nämä pöyristyttävät asiat joinakin hauskoina ja
miellyttävinä. Koko hänen käytöksensä oli samalla kylmä ja jäykkä;
ei hän koskaan päästänyt tunteitansa vallalle; hän puheli mitä
joutavimmista asioista; opinnoistaan, oppilaistaan, lapsuudestaan,
tulevaisuuden tuumistaan. Ellei hän niin usein olisi ihaillen ja hellästi
katsonut morsiameensa, ei olisi ensinkään voinut luulla häntä
rakastuneeksi. Hannan alottamat keskustelut lempikirjailijoistaan,
ulkomaisesta kirjallisuudesta, hän katkaisi vakuuttaen, ettei ollut
koskaan lukenut romaaneja tai sentapaisia teoksia eikä koskaan
aikonut tuhlata aikaansa semmoisiin; sellaiset mielikuvat eivät
ensinkään viehättäneet häntä.

»Etkö sinä siis myöskään suosi teattereita?» kysyi kenraalitar

kerran.

»Minä en koskaan käy teatterissa enkä iltamissa; en ole vielä

milloinkaan ollut tanssiaisissa.»

»Hanna, sinusta tulee kadehdittava vaimo!» huudahti Dori täti,

»niin vakava aviomies, joka paraiten viihtyy kotonaan, on
harvinainen. Sinä olet selkäni takana todellakin valinnut viisaasti,
rakas onnenlapsi.»

Hanna huokasi.

Ewaldin virkaloma loppui pian, ja hänen täytyi palata kaupunkiin.

Hän tuli nyt vain sunnuntaisin viettämään pari kolme tuntia
molempien naisten luona. Häät oli päätetty viettää syyskuun lopulla.
Hannan pieni pääoma hupeni yksinkertaisten myynien ja muutamien
talouskapineiden ostoon. Hankittiin kaksi ompelijatarta, ja kaikilla oli
kyllin työtä leikatessa ja neuloessa. Hanna ei tuntenut itseään
onnelliseksi. Toisinaan hän saattoi, ajatellessaan sulhastaan, vaipua
runolliseen haaveiluun, kuten ensi aikoina hänen tuntemattomana
osoittaessaan ihailuaan, ja sellaisina hetkinä hän ajatteli: »Niin, minä
rakastan Ewaldia; me tulemme onnellisiksi», mutta toisinaan taas,
varsinkin sunnuntaisin, jolloin Ewald niin rauhallisena saapui ja taas
lähti, hänestä tuntui, kuin hän olisi allekirjoittanut elinkautisvanki-
tuomionsa. Purkamista hän ei ajatellut; arpa oli heitetty. Ja
avioliitossa, joka nuoren tytön mielessä väikkyy niin salaperäisenä,
muuttui kai Ewald häntä kohtaan toisenlaiseksi; hän oli löytävä
hänessä ensimäisen rakkausunelmansa sankarin.

Häät vietettiin Dori kummin luona tavallisten keskiviikko-vieraiden

läsnäollessa. Myöskin kehuttu paroni Schimmerer oli läsnä ja
kuiskasi ihanalle morsiamelle: »Te olette kuin sulotar.» — Hanna
silmäili majuria hyvillään, ensinnäkin koska hän oli imarrellut häntä ja
toiseksi, koska hänen läsnäolonsa oli hänelle lohdutuksena.
»Tuollaisen kaljupäisen ukon kanssa olisi Dori kummi tahtonut minut
naittaa»? — hän ajatteli. — »Minä voin toki ylpein mielin katsella
solakkaa, vaaleakiharaista nuorta sulhastani!» Alttarin edessä
sulhanen, joka oli hyvin liikutettu, lausui »tahdon» väräjävällä
äänellä. Hanna vastasi varmasti ja päättävästi, ikäänkuin sillä
vahvistaakseen sankarillisen uhrin.

Häämatkaa ei Ewaldin virka sallinut, ja nuorikot lähtivät

hääpäivällisten jälkeen uuteen kotiinsa. Äänettöminä he olivat
istuneet vaunuissa, vaiteliaina nousseet kolmannessa kerroksessa
olevaan asuntoonsa. He astuivat sisään. Sali oli täynnä tuoreita
kukkia. Palvelustyttö, joka oli avannut heille oven, otti Hannan hatun
ja palttoon ja poistui. Ewald meni vaimonsa luo, syleili häntä hellästi
ja sanoi:

»Nyt olet kotona, rakas lapsi… Nyt olet vaimoni, toverini,

kaikkeni.»

Hanna nojasi päänsä hänen olkaansa vasten, ja liikutuksen

kyyneleet vuotivat pitkin hänen poskiaan.

»Rakastatko sinä minua todellakin, Ewald?»

»Kaikesta sydämestäni, Hanna.»

V.

Ewald oli puhunut totta. Hän rakasti kaunista vaimoaan kaikesta

sydämestään, mutta hän ei ollut mikään kokenut rakastaja. Hän ei
kyennyt osoittamaan mitä sydämensä tunsi; hän oli arka, miltei ujo.
Rakkaudentunnustuksia ja -vakuutuksia hänen huulensa eivät
koskaan lausuneet. Hän oli sanonut vaimolleen, tämän astuessa
ensi kerran hänen kynnyksensä yli, rakastavansa häntä, ja se oli
hänestä kylliksi. Hänen vaimonsa tiesi sen. Hanna olisi mieheltään
tahtonut kuulla niitä rakkauden sanoja, joita oli oppinut lukemastaan
draamallisesta ja eepillisestä runoudesta, mutta semmoinen ei
juolahtanut Ewaldin mieleenkään. Hän oli tässä suhteessa niin
lapsellinen, että hillitsi sopimattomina palavan nuoruuden tulen
vaatimat tunnepurkaukset. Hän koetti seurustelussaan vaimonsa
kanssa olla niin levollinen ja jokapäiväinen kuin mahdollista. Hän ei
koskaan laskenut leikkiä, eikä keksinyt lempinimiä, vaan sanoi aina
vain »rakas Hanna» tai »rakas vaimo» ja puheli hänen kanssaan
vähäpätöisistä asioista. Kun Hanna laski leikkiä tai yritti hyväillä,
ehkäisi hän sen; hän ei antanut Hannan suudella, kun meni tai tuli.
Jos Hanna halusi antaa keskustelulle hauskan tai haaveellisen
suunnan, niin hän ei sitä tavallisesti ymmärtänyt, vaan johti sen
jollakin kuivahkolla huomautuksella entiseen uomaansa.
 Professori Ballmann kuului niihin ihmisiin, jotka luulevat eräiden
asiain tietämättömyyden osoittavan jonkinlaista etevämmyyttä.
Heistä ovat jotkut seura- ja sielunelämän puolet pintapuolisia,
kevytmielisiä, luonnottomia, ja he ovat ylpeitä siitä, etteivät itse tunne
niitä. He unohtavat, että tuntemattoman asian tuomitseminen on aina
ennakkoluuloa ja että mahdotonta on kohottautua semmoisen asian
yläpuolelle, jota ei tunne. Vaikka Ewald ylpeilikin siitä, ettei tuntenut
kaunokirjallisuutta, oli se kuitenkin suuri puute. Hänen olisi pitänyt
ajatella, että tietämättömyys joka suhteessa on paremmin häpeän
kuin ylpeilyn arvoinen. Luonnollisesti ei tarvitse tietää ja osata
kaikkea — se ei olisi kenellekään edes mahdollista — mutta jokainen
tieto ja taito on eduksi. Kirjoissa, joita Ewald ei katsonut maksavan
vaivaa avata, koska ne hänestä olivat pelkkää kuvittelua ja
epätodellisuutta, ne kun eivät sisältäneet numeroita, karttoja tai
tosiasioita, kuvastuu yhteiskunta kokonaisuudessaan inhimillisine
mielenliikutuksineen, intohimoineen, tunteineen, kohtaloineen,
ajatuksineen. Eikö se ole todellisuutta?

Hanna oli lukemalla liiaksi romaaneja tullut haaveilevaksi.

Kasvatus oli siihen syynä. Ewaldin sielussa taas eivät kaikki kielet
olleet päässeet väräjämään, vaan muutamat olivat velttoina ja
äänettöminä; se oli sivistyksen puutetta. Jos Ewald olisi kyennyt
johonkin määrään seuraamaan vaimonsa ajatusten lentoa, olisi
hänen varmaankin onnistunut hillitä hänen haaveellisuuttaan ja
palauttaa hänet järjellisyyden ulkopuolelle ulottuvilta harhateiltä;
mutta vieras kun oli hänen unelmilleen, ei hän kyennyt häntä
johtamaan ja tukemaan. Hanna tunsi, ja syystä kyllä, että miehensä
tässä suhteessa oli häntä alempana. Täten kohoutui muuri heidän
välilleen, mutta siitä oli Hanna yksin tietoinen. Ewald ei sitä
huomannut, sillä se, mikä Hannan mielestä osoitti Ewaldissa tiedon
puutetta, oli Ewaldista etuna pidettävä.
 Tämän lisäksi oli Ewaldissa suurena puutteellisuutena hänen
seurusteluhaluttomuutensa. Tässäkin suhteessa hän halveksi sitä,
mitä ei tuntenut. Hänen vaimostaan näytti siltä, kuin hän olisi
pikemmin ollut maallisiin iloihin sopimaton kuin niiden yläpuolella.
Sillä häneltä puuttui seuramiehen siro varmuus ja vapaa käytös. Kun
hän joskus suostui seuraamaan Hannaa vierailuille tai olemaan
läsnä kenraalittaren keskiviikko-kutsuissa, istui hän tavallisesti
jossain nurkassa, ottamatta milloinkaan osaa vilkkaaseen
keskusteluun, vastaili lyhyesti, ja saattoi selvästi huomata, miten
ikävää hänellä oli sekä miten hän kärsi seuraelämästä. Ja siten
hävisi sekin luultu ansio, että hän muka pani suuremman arvon
kotielämän rauhalle ja tutkimuksilleen kuin maallisille tyhjille huveille,
sillä hän ei tuntenut sellaisia iloja; hän ei kyennyt nauttimaan niistä.
Hänellä ei ollut oikeutta pitää salonkikeskusteluja itseään alentavina,
sillä hän ei ollut osoittanut kykenevänsä ottamaan niihin osaa.

Hanna raukka ei voinut tuntea itseään onnelliseksi. Hän ei ollut

ylpeä miehestään; hän ei katsonut häneen kuin etevämpäänsä; hän
tiesi, ettei miehensä ymmärtänyt häntä. Hän myönsi kylläkin, että
hänen miehellään oli hyvä sydän, tasainen ja lempeä luonne, että
hän oli rehellinen ja ennakkoluuloton, mutta häneltä puuttui jotain.
Hyvää ymmärrystä, joka oli tehnyt hänestä etevän matemaatikon,
älykkään luonnontutkijan, erinomaisen shakinpelaajan, tunnustetun
tieteellisen kirjailijan (hän oli avustajana arvokkaammissa
tieteellisissä ja kasvatusopillisissa aikakauslehdissä), ei Hanna
pitänyt arvossa, osaksi siitä syystä, ettei ollut siihen suuntaan
kehittynyt, osaksi siksi, että miehensä oli tässä suhteessa häntä
kohtaan suljettu. Ewald piti pikku vaimoansa kykenemättömänä
ymmärtämään tämmöisiä asioita; se oli muuten hänestä aivan
luonnollista, eikä hän siksi koettanutkaan johtaa vaimoansa
ajatuspiiriinsä. Jospa hän kuitenkin olisi koettanut! Ellei Hanna
olisikaan ymmärtänyt häntä, olisi häntä kuitenkin riemastuttanut
miehensä etevämmyys siinä suhteessa. Hanna olisi mielellään
myöntänyt tämän olevan vastapainona niille henkisen kehityksen
aloille, missä hän itse tunsi olevansa etevämpi.

Vielä eräs seikka kiusasi Hannaa, ja se oli heidän miltei köyhyyttä

osoittava yksinkertainen taloutensa. Hän olisi helpommin kestänyt
sitä, jos miehensäkin olisi kärsinyt siitä, jos olisi saanut miehensä
sylissä kaivata puuttuvaa komeutta, jos hänen olisi ollut pakko
lohduttaa ja rohkaista miestään ja jos tämä sitten olisi ihaillut hänen
rohkeuttaan. Jos Ewald olisi ihmetellyt, että hänen pieni vaimonsa
mielellään hänen takiaan kieltäytyi komeuksista, olisi Hanna ilomielin
ollut niitä vailla, mutta Ewald ei edes huomannut, ettei kotinsa ollut
kyllin kaunis ja mukava. Hän ei ollut vanhempainsa kodissa muuhun
tottunut. Vaatimattomuus ja tyytyväisyys olivat hänen
miellyttävimmät ominaisuutensa; turhamaisuus oli hänelle vierasta
— ja siksi hänen pieni kotinsa, jota hänen nuoren vaimonsa
kukoistava sulous kaunisti ja jonka ylläpitämiseksi hänen tulonsa
hyvästi riittivät, oli hänestä ihanteellinen. Hän oli sanalla sanoen
onnellinen.

Huomatessaan vaimonsa monasti olevan surullisen ja luullessaan

syynä siihen olevan seuraelämänkaipuun — Hanna kun ei voinut
tuntea vakavien tutkimusten tuottamaa iloa, mutta tarvitsi kuitenkin
iloa — Ewald päätti, että hänen piti saada mielin määrin huvitella.
Itse hän ei tosin aikonut ottaa osaa vihaamiinsa huveihin, vaan uskoi
vaimonsa Dori tädin huostaan. Tämän hilpeän vanhan rouvan
seurassa Hanna saattoi käydä teattereissa, tanssiaisissa, kävelyillä
ja vierailuilla mielensä mukaan, arveli Ewald. Vanhan,
huvitteluhaluisen naisen paraimpana keinona ihmisten kokoomiseksi
ympärilleen on nuoren kaunottaren läheisyys.
 »Puvuistasi pidän kyllä huolen», sanoi kenraalitar Hannalle tämän
pudistaessa päätään miehensä esittäessä ehdotustaan.

»Ei, ei… pukujen takia en epäile… mutta jos Ewald ei ole mukana,
on kai sopimatonta…»

»Joutavia, Hanna! Jos miehesi hyväksyy sen, niin ei kai siinä

mitään sopimatonta ole, kun sinä olet minun siipieni suojassa…
minun, joka olen ollut sinulle kuin äiti… Sinunkaltaisesi nuoren
naisen ei sovi aina kotona kököttää.»

»Rouva kenraalitar on aivan oikeassa, rakas lapsi. Sinulta puuttuu

huveja, ne tulevat tekemään sinulle hyvää. Asia on siis päätetty.
Huomenna on keskiviikko, ja silloin Hanna nuorena rouvana astuu
seuraelämään ja tanssii katrillin majuri Schimmererin kanssa, koska
se on niin hauskaa.»

»Etkö sinä ole mustasukkainen, rakas Ewald?» härnäili

kenraalitar.
»Majuri on Hannan entisiä ihailijoita.»

»Minä? Mustasukkainen? En, se tunne on minulle aivan outo.

Luullakseni sitä tavataan ainoastaan romaaneissa, eikä sillä saa
ahdistaa kunniallista vaimoa.»

»Hanna, sinun miehesi on enkeli, toistan sen vieläkin, etkä sinä

voi kyllin minua kiittää siitä, että saatoin teidät yhteen. Hyvästi nyt,
rakkaat lapset! Asia on siis päätetty; minä odotan sinua huomenna,
Hanna.»

Kun vastanaineet jäivät yksin, meni Hanna miehensä luo, pani

kätensä hänen olalleen ja katseli häntä suoraan silmiin sanoen
vakavasti:

»Ewald, sydämestäni kiitän sinua hyvyydestäsi… mutta etkö luule

olevan parempi, ettet antaisi minun yksin joutua ihmisten pariin? Se
tulee näyttämään heistä kummalliselta. Ja minähän olen sinun
vaimosi ja tahdon jakaa kanssasi elämäsi semmoisenaan. Opeta
minua löytämään oma elämäni kodissamme, äläkä anna minun
vaeltaa omia teitäni.»

»Rakas Hanna, sinulla on niin kummallisia liioiteltuja

päähänpistoja», vastasi Ewald ottaen Hannan käden olkapäältään ja
kääntyen pois. »Ethän sinä voi alituisesti olla läheisyydessäni;
antaessani esimerkiksi tuntejani lukiossa et voi olla vierelläni. Ja
minä taas tahtoisin nähdä sinut iloisena ja tyytyväisenä; seuraelämä
huvittaa sinua, siksi sinun tulee nauttia siitä. Otat asian aivan yhtä
surkeasti, kuin jos lähettäisin sinut pohjoisnaparetkelle tai johonkin
muuhun vaaraan, sen sijaan että otat osaa joihinkin viattomiin
iltamiin.»

»Etkö luule vaaroja väijyvän seuraelämässäkin?»

»Vaaroja? En tiennyt… Et kai tarkoittane ansoja viritettävän

uskollisuutesi tielle? Olipa sekin kummallinen päähänpisto. Mutta
siinä suhteessa minä olen aivan levollinen, ja silloin voit kai sinäkin
olla.»
VI.

Ewald Ballmann ei itse asiassa ajatellut panevansa nuorta, kaunista

vaimoaan alttiiksi vaaroille lähettäessään hänen ilman suojaansa
maallisten ilojen pyörteeseen. Hän tunsi, kuten niin monet muut,
jotka eivät pitäneet maallista huvittelua muuna kuin mitättömänä
ajanhukkana, seuraelämän pintapuolisesti ja piti salonkikeskustelua
ainoastaan kuluneiden korulauseiden vaihtamisena ja tanssia
musiikin tahdin mukaan hyppimisenä, naamiohuvia pilapukujen
näyttelemisenä. Hän ei tiennyt, että Eros on näiden huvien
näkymättömänä johtajana. Ewald Ballmannin kaltaisilla miehillä ei
ollut aavistustakaan hehkuvista, toisiaan hakevista katseista,
viuhkojen takaisista hymyilyistä, aavistetuista ajatuksista, sydänten
nopeista lyönneistä, kiemailun ja intohimojen leikistä, valloituksista,
vastarinnasta, joka lopulta herpaantuu, — koko tuosta tanssiaisten
herkästä rakkaushengestä.

Mutta tuskinpa on olemassa ainoatakaan nuorta tyttöä, joka olisi

yhtä tietämätön. Jo tanssisalin kynnyksellä kiehtoo hänet lämmin,
rakkautta uhkuva ilma. Valssin sävelissä, valojen hohteessa, hänen
omien kukkiensa tuoksussa se väräjää huumaavana. Silloin hänen
silmänsä loistavat ilosta, hänen huulensa raottuvat voitolliseen
hymyilyyn; kuten tuulen kannattamana liitelee kevyt olento tanssin
pyörteissä… ja oven suussa seisova isä tai vanhanpuoleinen
aviomies seuraa häntä ylpein mielin ja sanoo:

»Katsokaas, miten hyvin hän tanssii ja miten hauskaa hänellä on.

Huomaa sen selvästi, sehän on niin luonnollista, sillä hän on siinä
iässä; se on viatonta iloa… Pelaammeko uudelleen!»

Viiden ajoissa aamulla saa whistiin väsynyt, uninen vanha herra

pienokaisensa taivutetuksi lähtemään kotiin.

»Oh, miten ikävä ilta!» hän huokaa. »Miten olet nyt huvitellut
lapsi?»

»Kuninkaallisesti!»

Niin, kuninkaallisesti. Hän tuntee kukoistavansa nuoruuden

kuninkaallisessa loistossa; kukkakiehkura tukassa on kruunu, ja
leningin laahus kuninkaallinen mantteli. Hän tuntee olevansa
valtiatar, suosionosoitusten jakaja, ja hänestä melkein tuntuu, kuin
elämä ja kuolema olisivat hänen tahdostaan riippuvaisia; eikö hänen
kavaljeerinsa kotiljongin aikana ollut uhannut ampua itsensä, ellei
hän olisi hänelle suosiollinen?… Sanalla sanoen, hän oli huvitellut
kuninkaallisesti.

Kenraalittaren keskiviikkokutsut eivät olleet likimainkaan niin

vaarallisia. Ja muutkaan iltamat ja tanssiaiset, joihin Hanna
suojelijansa kanssa otti osaa, eivät vaikuttaneet ensinkään niin
hurmaavasti nuoreen rouvaan, kuin tämä oli luullut. Maailma, mihin
hän näin oli joutunut, ei vastannutkaan hänen loistavaa, komeaa
unimaailmaansa. Ajatuksissaan hän oli ollut läsnä hovitanssiaisissa
ja lähetyskuntain palatseissa, seurustellut ruhtinaitten, miljonäärien
ja valtiomiesten kanssa; porvarillinen pikkukaupunkimaisuus, joka
vallitsi siinä piirissä, missä hän nykyään liikkui, tuntui hänestä
kaikkea muuta kuin »hienoston» ilmakehältä. Hänen liialliset
odotuksensa, hänen vallan toisaanne suuntautuvat mielikuvansa
synkistyttivät häntä ympäröivän maailman, joten hän ei elämästään
löytänyt sitä hurmausta, joka saattoi hänen seurapiirinsä nuoret
rouvat ja neitoset huvittelemaan »kuninkaallisesti».

Suostuessaan Ewaldin ehdotukseen, Hanna oli vakaasti päättänyt

olla miehensä luottamuksen arvoinen, päättävästi estää
ihailunosoituksia sekä varjella mainettaan ja miehensä kunniaa.
Ylpein tyydytyksen tuntein hän teki tämän lupauksen. Ja hän piti
sanansa. Se tuntui hänestä vain liiankin helpolta; hän oli kuvitellut
taistelua vaikeammaksi ja mielenlujuutta kysyvämmäksi. Useat
nuoret herrat tosin hakivat hänen suosiotaan, mutta heidän
intohimoa ja runollisuutta puuttuvat lähentelynsä eivät panneet
hänen voimiaan vähääkään koetukselle.

Hannasta tuntui, kuin hän olisi kunnianhimoinen,

kunnostautumista janoava upseeri, joka lähetetään sotaan, mutta
saa aina jäädä jälkijoukkoon, pääsemättä taistelun tuoksinaan.
Hänellä ei ollut luotituiskua kestettävänä, lippua pelastettavana,
linnoitusta puolustettavana.

Viimein oli taistelu edessä. Mutta kunnianhimon sokaisema raukka

ei ollut saapa siinä urhoollisuuspalkintoa — hän sai kuolettavan
haavan.

Se tapahtui keväällä. Keskiviikkokutsujen osanottajat panivat

usein toimeen huvimatkoja. Eräänä päivänä oli huvimatkan
päämääränä kreivi Edelbergin tilukset, joissa sekä puisto että linna
olivat katsomisen arvoiset.
 Vaunut pysähtyivät kyläravintolan edustalle, missä aiottiin syödä
päivällinen hiukan myöhemmin. Sitä ennen oli määrä jalan kulkea
linnaan, tarkastaa puistot, huoneet, kokoelmat ja tallit. Mutta seuraa
odottikin katkera pettymys. Huvimatkailijat, kahdeksan luvultaan,
olivat jo astuneet suuresta portista sisään ja majuri Schimmerer
silmäili joka taholle löytääkseen oppaan, kun samassa linnanvartia
kiiruhti heidän luokseen.

»Herrasväki haluaisi kaiketi käydä linnassa? Se on mahdotonta;

kreivi saapui tänne eilen.»

»Sepä vahinko. Emmekö saa nähdä edes kokoelmia ja kappelia?»

Samassa pysähtyi ratsastaja portille. Hän hyppäsi hevosen

selästä, heitti ohjakset ratsupalvelijalle ja astui sisään. Ratsastaja oli
tilusten omistaja. Kreivi Edelberg, joka oli noin kolmenkymmenen
ikäinen, oli pitkä ja solakka, itävaltalaisen aatelismiehen perikuva.
Huomatessaan vieraat, jotka hänen tullessaan aikoivat vetäytyä
pois, hän ymmärsi heti mistä oli kysymys ja meni, ottaen hatun
päästään, heidän luokseen.

»Herrasväki kai haluaa nähdä taloani? Älkää antako minun häiritä

itseänne.»

Hän viittasi linnanvartiaa opastamaan seuruetta.

Itse hän aikoi poistua, mutta samassa hänen katseensa osui

Hannaan. Tämä oli juuri luonut tummat silmänsä häneen, mutta
käänsi ne punastuen heti pois. Hanna oli sinä hetkenä hurmaavan
kaunis. Kreivi tarkasti häntä yllätettynä… ja Hanna tunsi sen.

»Hyvin mielelläni näytän itse herrasväelle kokoelmani», sanoi hän.