Week 4: Terrorism

Lecture 1: Definitional challenges

What is terrorism and why does it matter?
‘Terrorism’ is a powerful label!
Used to legitimise and delegitimise, used to condemn, and justify.
Counterterrorism comes into our daily lives.
Designating something as ‘terrorism’ activates a range of controversial special powers.
Not just things that have happened or when someone is preparing but even pre-
preparatory.
Defining terrorism, an impossible task?
Salient (a few defining features, the essence) features?
Terrorism is like an elephant…Hard to define, but you know it when you see it (?)
Put simply, definitions tend to have three core points in common:
-Violence (and/or fear)
-Instrumentalized (used)
-For a cause
A sub-set of political violence
Deceptively simple – and too broad?
1. Violence
2. As a tool
3. For a cause

Seems to cover a lot that we would not usually think of as terrorism -

• State violence: criminal justice (we use force to imprison people for a reason, image of
society, ensure safety by putting away dangerous people), war?
• What forms of violence? Against whom? Psychological.
• Used – to what end? What is a cause? Who is the object of violence, non-combative?
Not just political but ethnic, ideological, religious etc.

Terrorism and crime

Can be difficult to separate.
“The crime-terror nexus” – the overlap with organised crime (overlapping infrastructures,
funding terror through revenue; ‘learning from each-other’ Cartels in South America
involving same kind of modus operandi as terror organisations in the middle East and vice
versa as terror organisations often run organised crime to fund their operations.
Explaining terrorism as 'self-help' -
Why does terrorism happen? Addressing a ‘highly moralistic’ grievance, perception of
having been wronged and terror as a pursuit of justice, a sense of ‘collective liability’. Ties to
idea of political exclusion.
Links terrorism and crime (‘self-help’ model emerged as an explanation for crime)
Terrorism as crime
 Particularly important because how we understand terrorism shapes how we
respond to terrorism, how we might punish and how we try to prevent terrorism.
 Terror as crime means it’s not special and affects protection status, no longer a
political prisoner but a common offender. Thinking of terrorists as criminal offenders
and prosecuting them through the criminal justice system might make things fairer.
(Criminal Justice model contrasts with ‘war on terror’ which sees a war like response)
 In the UK, this is historically important and politically charged.
 Concerns for protections and status
 Criminal justice infuses fairness and due process? (In contrast to ‘war on terror’)
 Or counterterrorism undermines the justice process/system?

 Note that ‘crime’ itself is a label brought into question by criminologists and critical
scholars.
Terrorism and politics
A powerful label
The label ‘terrorism’ is dually powerful
In its legal consequences (1), and as a powerful political tool (2):
(1) Activates (and justifies) special powers
(2) A signal that condemns and de-legitimizes
Terrorism and borders
Terrorism is international
Terrorism crosses borders – including perpetrators, preparation, causes. Means we need
international consensus on definitions. Not only physically crossing borders but base in one
country, attack in another, planning in another, funding from another. Ideologies and causes
cross borders.
• The international element is central – so central that some definitions have defined
terrorism as necessarily transnational: no border-crossing, no terrorism. (See UN Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, Saul 2019)
• Terrorism as transnational raises a series of additional challenges! For ex…
 Jurisdiction and control, extraditions
 Cooperation (resolutions, joint working definitions)

International problem, international response?

• Finding common ground: the effort to de-politicize ‘terrorism’ as a common, global,
concept for the last century (Saul) As terrorism is so politicised, we need to take out the
political to have cooperation and common ground.
• Generally broad agreement that terrorism should be condemned at the international
level – but a failure to agree on a definition.
• A core issue lies in the scope of application.
• What is/is not terrorism? Liberation and state violence and non-state violence in context
of armed conflict. In order to act we need to have some sort of common ground.

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• What is the status of liberation violence; state violence; state and non-state violence in
armed conflicts?
Avoiding the problem? Focus on common ground, leave the details
• Basic legal consensus at the international level: criminal violence used to intimidate
and coerce a government or population.

• In the absence of agreement on a definition, the international approach has

primarily been pragmatic:

• Requiring the criminalisation of certain conduct but leaving the wording and
definition to the national legislators. E.g., preparing to commit an act of terror.
Hands off approach that allows national level to decide how.
Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Charter: obligation for member states to criminalise
terrorism in domestic law, no definition of terrorism.
UNSC resolution 1566 2004, paragraph 3
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism”
(See discussion in Saul, p.43-44)
• Does give an indication but is relatively narrow and is merely a recommendation.
Offers no definition. Not binding.
The devil is in the details
• Some common ground – enough to set some shared obligations.
• How effective has this been? Saul suggests not very.
• Room for varied use, and abuse – giving rise to concerns for human rights and civil
liberties.
• Room for disagreements - just causes; self-defence; freedom fighters?
Critical perspectives: state terrorism?
• Terrorism as a term through which we may explore state abuses of power.
• Can a state be terrorist?
• Chomsky's ‘state-terrorist’ perspective – the nation alone has the capacity to widely
deploy terror as a mode of domination (Chomsky, 2002)
 Recall Saul on the origins of the term – state terror during the French revolution (Saul
2019 p.34)
 The role of perspective
 Difficult to exclude the state from a 'salient features' definition (violence for a cause) - is
this a problem?
 Is the ‘War on Terror’ Terrorism? (Blakeley 2007, 2009) This has been a very powerful
critique.

The future of terrorism?

A developing threat?

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• An evolution from specified local objectives to multinational networks of cells.
Constantly evolving thus difficult to define. Especially as tech helps both counter
terrorism and organisation and communication as we move away from local to
international.
• Marked by organisational fluidity and flexibility, facilitated by technological advances
and a more connected world
• The rise of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism? Individuals being radicalised instead of extremist org’s.
• The move online: impacts every stage from recruitment to ultimate acts.
• Forums and chats, encryption and de-centralisation, cyber-attacks? As terrorism looks
different means that defining it continues to be difficult to define.

Reflective questions
• Why is terrorism so difficult to define? (political dimension, terror and crime, borders,
counter)
• What is the relationship between terrorism and politics?
• Why, and how, has international agreements on countering terrorism avoided the
definitional difficulties?
• How does the crossing of borders complicate the study of terrorism, and the work of
counterterrorism?
• Does it make sense to exclude state violence from the ‘terrorist’ label?

Lecture 2: Terrorism and cyberspace

• Concerns are borne out in practice
• Amplifies challenges
-of definition
-of response
• Beyond borders
• The future of terrorism?

A brief history of terrorism: Rapoport’s ‘wave theory’

• An important (and widely discussed and debated) theory that looks at terrorism to
identify patterns in the form of global waves
• Engages with the modern history of global terrorism as having emerged in 1880 and
moving in generation-long waves
• Explains and predicts the future of terrorism (?)
• A tool we can use and engage critically with! A useful analysis or a reductive historical
account?
• Rapoport argues that anti-state (“rebel”) terrorism is cyclical and tends to occur in 40-
year waves driven by particular ideological forces (‘energy’)

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• A modern history of terrorism: anarchism (1880-1920), anti-colonial (1920-1960), new
left (1960-1980) and religious radicalism (1979-2020s?)

The future of terrorism? A fifth wave?

• ‘The technological wave’ (Simon, 2010)
• The far right? (Rapoport 2021; Auger 2020)
• As we will see, maybe ‘religious’ terrorism is not the key player online…

Terrorism, technology, and the internet

Modern global terrorism and technology
• Rapoport’s ‘wave theory’ helps contextualize terrorism in the modern era, and the role
of technology.
• The observed move online impacts every stage, from recruitment to acts of terror
• The internet adds flexibility and fluidity
• We focus on terrorism today, but the internet equally benefits counterterrorism!
Terrorist organisations online
• Brown and Pearson (2018, p.149-152) outlines terrorist use of the internet and social-
media:
 Communicative: Wider external communication Speed, reach, accessibility (low skill
needed), low-cost, relative anonymity. Various formats, recruitment and
radicalisation. Global reach.
 Social: Internal communication – lower (perceived) risks of detection, easy-to-access
encrypted chat apps
 Symbolic: Identity and shared reality – constructing the ‘terrorist world’
 Operational: connections to ‘offline’ – planning

The internet as a vehicle to terrorism

• Tools for recruitment: social media – billions easily within reach
• Tools of planning and communication – access and sharing of information
• Tools for evasion
• Challenges in interception
• How to detect and disrupt? How to counter radicalising narratives?
• Jurisdictional challenges
• Challenges for research
The internet as a site of terrorism
• Plenty of key infrastructure now resides in cyberspace
• The state and its population rely on the internet:

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• Groceries, pay, work and education, entertainment, social life, travel…
• The internet is also integrated in key infrastructure: public services, government
websites and information, …
• Recall jurisdictional challenges!

Cyber-terrorism or cyber-crime?
• Definitional challenges – where is the line, and how do we tell them apart?
- Ex 1: Targeting of critical infrastructure for profit?
- Ex 2: online harassment and extremist groups?
• Rogers separates the two by primary objective (profit or damage)
• What about cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare?
• Will a couple of case studies help us think about these questions?

Case study 1: The Islamic State online?

The cyber-capabilities of ‘religious radical’ terrorist actors

• A brief case-study of terrorism in the age of cyber-space and the future of ‘religious
radical’ terrorism
• Focus on two facets of activity -
• (1) Official presence online (social and communication, operational)
• (2) Affiliated groups (operational, internet as a site of terrorism)

IS online
• IS (Islamic State) a violent extremist group, also known as ISIS, ISIL, Daesh.
• A militant group founded in 1999
• Gained prominence in the mid 2010’s, started referring to itself as ‘IS’.
• Designated as a terrorist organization by UN
• Well known for a long series of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity
• Today’s focus: recent and current online presence, use of the internet, and cyber-
capacity
1. Official presence online
• Official news outlets; spokespersons; official members
• Disseminates propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, communication, and
coordination
• The Electronic Horizons Foundation (EHF) official IS cyber-branch
• Back-ups, security, and protection online, information-sharing
• Primarily defensive and social, operational as opposed to offensive
• An online presence disproportionate to their factual size and capabilities

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 2. Pro-IS groups – cyber-attacks in support of IS?
• Pro-IS, but not necessarily affiliated.
• Informal network: Islamic State Hacking Division; The United Cyber Caliphate; Islamic
State Hackers; Cyber Caliphate Army
• Limited evidence of commitment to ideology - affiliated or exploiting the IS brand for
publicity?
• Activity: Online recruiting, website defacement, social media hacks, DoS attacks, and
doxing with 'kill lists’ (generating fear as opposed to destructive cyber-attacks)
• Further pressure on cyber-terrorism / cyber-crime differentiation
Responding
• Recall broad agreement to condemned terrorism at the international level – but a failure
to agree on a definition
• The pragmatic solution: requiring the criminalisation of certain conduct, but largely
setting aside the defining
• International obligations to criminalise recognise the role of the internet and has made
efforts to govern cyber-space through obligations and cooperation:
• Obligations to criminalise certain terrorist activity (offline and online) - information
sharing and planning offences.
• Cooperation: for example, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance.

Case study 2: A 5th wave? Right-wing extremism and Incel

Beyond ‘religious’ 4th wave terrorism? A 5th wave?
• Rapoport’s theory gives ‘religious radical’ terrorism an expiration date – the 2020s
• Are we seeing a shift towards a new form of terrorism?
• De-centralisation, right-wing extremism, and online forums pouring into the real world?
• A long history, but a rising threat since the 2010s? 22 July 2010 in Norway, Christchurch
in 2019; and a dramatic increase in preparation offences committed with extreme right-
wing ideology
Right wing extremism – the 5th wave?
• Right wing extremists and other extremist groups (for example ‘Incels’) are increasingly
seen as a predominant violent extremist threat in the UK
• Extreme right is marked by a rejection of democracy, racial nationalism, and a
promotion of violence as a legitimate means of pursuing this
• The online plays a key role – for example, recent focus on recruitment via online gaming
chatrooms and online harms (giving some credence to the ‘technological wave’
argument)
Terrorism, extremism, hate-crime?
• Overlapping concepts, sometimes tricky to separate
• Extremist/incel groups challenge some of the ‘typical’ characteristics of terrorism
 ‘Lone wolf’ actors
 Targeting specific groups (women; BAME individuals; LBTQ+) – hate crime?
 ‘Non-traditional’ forms of violence/fear (the online plays a key role)

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• Important links to wider societal power structures – should not be treated as unique but
as structural?
• On the classification question in the UK see Terrorism Review 2019 paras 2.27-2.65

Concluding summary
• The use of the internet and social media in terrorism -
The internet as a vehicle to terrorism, from recruitment to planning
The internet as a site of cyber-terrorism
• How definitional challenges explored in lecture 1 bear out in practice in border-less
cyber-space
• The crossing borders complicates definitions, research, and response
• A new era of terrorism? Incel and right-wing extremism
Reflective questions
• How does the lack of borders impact responding to terrorism? How does this apply
to cyberspace?
• What are the challenges of cyberspace in studying and responding to terrorism?
• Why is it hard to differentiate terrorism from other illegal violence?
• How does today’s case-studies of terrorism in cyber-space help illustrate definitional
challenges explored in lecture 1?

Further readings
• David C. Rapoport (2021) The Capitol Attack and the 5th Terrorism Wave, Terrorism and
Political Violence, 33:5, 912-916
• Auger, V. (2020). Right-Wing Terror: A fifth global wave? Perspectives on Terrorism,
14(3), 87–97.
• Simon, J. (2010). Technological and lone operator terrorism: Prospects for a Fifth Wave
of global terrorism. In: Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy, J E Rosenfeld Ed. Routledge.
• Bernard, R. (2017) ‘These are not the terrorist groups you’re looking for: an assessment
of the cyber capabilities of Islamic State. Journal of Cyber Policy, 2(2), p.255-265

Definition:
Extreme fear but diversity of context & applications, geo-politics.
Focus on methods, targets, effects, victims, perpetrators, intention, motive?
Lack consensus – normative differences.
Used to discredit political opponents.
Instrumental/coercive violence against citizens. Justified?
Selective application.
Not included in ICC as no consensus,
The elimination of the political offence exception in the context of such wide definitions of
terrorism is especially problematic, since it substantially curtails the freedom of populations
to resort to domestic political resistance to violent, oppressive governments.

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Also legitimises state-sponsored terrorism
Any means can be justified.
Post 9/11 UN Security Council directed all states to criminalize terrorism in domestic law.
US power on SC?
decentralized and haphazard national implementation
For Anarchy, liberation, new-left, religion

1. Mechanisms
Communicative role, influence broad audiences, motivate members & sympathisers,
inform public of ideas/actions. Speed, scope, scale.
Largely unregulated, low cost, relative anonymity. E.g., Daesh developed own Twitter
app to counteract closing of accounts.
Some argue does not convert just reinforces.
Specifically target individuals (engagement & algorithm/echo chamber/polarisation) e.g.,
kids cartoons, video games for young males
Provides social space to debate, organise, network. Use of ‘dark’ net.
Allows expression often not possible offline e.g., women
Creates shared identity encourages people to see themselves as part of movement.
Operational: cyberterrorism (attacks on digital infrastructure or psychological warfare)
2. Cyberspace as initiator/ facilitator/multiplier in ‘real world’
Ability to radicalise people (correlative in aiding real-world radicalisation, not
causive) e.g., 2010 lone-actor, British student Roshonara Choudhry stabbed her MP
in revenge for his support of the Iraq war after hours of watching jihadi videos
though she had no al-Qaeda links. Influence on lone-terrorist actors, still some
interaction.
Pre-sharing online. Planning through online research. Communication during attacks.
Terrorism not increased thus availability doesn’t equal reach or uptake.
Fundraising & donations via internet.
Gives attention to acts. Aimed at people watching.
3. Online counter-radicalisation efforts (negative: to inhibit T movements online &
positive: counter-narratives/ alt content to challenge & interfere with radical messages.
Preventative approaches promote alt. & counter narratives
Each element of radicalisation needs to be countered by credible messengers
Repressive models: removing/restricting sites. Policy makers calling on social media
platforms to be more aggressive & pro-active. Direct impact. Whack-a-mole yet disrupts
them.
Alliance of netizens, hackers, gov. agencies. E.g., using humour to subvert message, non-
combative constructive comment, hashtag campaigns, gov efforts to improve digital
literacy, negate messages spread, promote own national values. Should be distanced
from gov? Hacktivism.
Suspension seen as online martyrdom
Issues around civil liberties & transparencies: challenges freedom, no agreed def. so how
do you identify? Gather evidence then bring to justice. Quantity & language.
4. Gaps in knowledge & areas for future research
Need empirical research, keep pace with internet. Not just understanding content but
how it effects. Civil engagement, capacity building netizens. Widen research to other
movements. Conceptual weakness.

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3. Why is it difficult to define terrorism? What are the key obstacles that
stand in the way of a unified definition?

Defining ‘terrorism’ is difficult for three key reasons, the need for
international agreement, an understanding of what is justified; and the
need for a flexible approach. After analyzing how we have reached an
international impasse when it comes to a definition, we can question
further ideas such as the justification of violence, especially by non-state
actors against what they perceive to be oppressive regimes. Finally, we
will focus on the changing nature of terrorism in relation to the use of
social media and ‘cyberterrorism’ which highlights the need for specific
types of flexible counterterrorism responses. Ultimately, it is clear that
the complex nature of ‘terrorism’ and varying international
understandings of it, make terrorism difficult to define and thus prevent a
unified definition.

In order to understand why terrorism is difficult to define it is important

to note the complexities that international consensus creates. The need
for a unified definition of ‘terrorism’ emerged from the need for
cooperation in the process of establishing jurisdiction and extraditing
perpetrators. While there has been progress in imposing laws and
regulations surrounding ‘terrorism,’ by the United Nations Security
Council which requires the criminalization of certain conduct, there
continues to be a focus on dealing with these issues at a national level
and further, exclusion of the concept of ‘Terrorism’ from these
discussions. International consensus on the idea of the utilization of

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violence or fear to induce terror among civilians and government for a
cause, provides a wide definition which leaves much uncertainty and is
open to abuse as governments are able to tailor their definitions to suit
their interests. The fact that terrorism is increasingly transnational means
that cooperation between states is necessary now more than ever.
International disagreement on these core issues surrounding ‘terrorism’
is a dilemma which has left definitional debates at a standstill and
prevented a unified definition.

One of the main issues in defining ‘terrorism’ is the legitimization,

condemnation, and justification of violence as a political tool and whether
this can be justified as an exception. A large part of ‘terrorism’ is this idea
of a cause which can be political, ideological, religious, ethnic, or
philosophical. With the use of what is considered ‘terrorism’ by non-state
actors such as resistance movements for liberation and freedom fighters
in many countries, debate continues about whether there should be
exceptions for specific causes. The notion of violence being utilised for a
specific cause closely resembles all modes of political violence, stretching
so far as war and brings to question the idea that state-sanctioned
violence itself can resemble concepts of ‘terrorism’. By simply labelling all
political violence as ‘terrorism’ we run the risk of de-incentivising actors
from following basic International Human Rights practices. Therefore, a
major obstacle to achieving a unified definition of ‘terrorism’ is the fact
that international institutions avoid politicising themselves by legitimising

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or condemning political movements and possibly removing citizen’s
means of resisting oppressive governments.

The final issue in defining ‘terrorism’ is the fact that terrorism is

constantly evolving and thus requires counterterrorism responses to be
flexible. The rise of cyberterrorism has seen a move online in major
aspects of terrorism such as the use of social media for recruitment and
radicalisation, online surveillance in planning attacks and even
communication throughout attacks. Furthermore, as terrorism moves
online, the issue of domain intensifies as what may be considered
domestic attacks often have international links and thus require
international responses. As social media and cyberspace become vehicles
for violence counterterrorism responses shift, yet a fragmentation in
response, perhaps stemming from difficulty agreeing what is and is not
considered ‘terrorism’ limits effective prevention. Yet given the fluid
structures of terrorist organisations and networks as well as
developments in medical technology it is clear that as ‘terrorism’
develops along with technology, flexible definitions and responses are
necessary.

Through these three points it is clear that the nature of terrorism is what
makes it difficult to define. Without international consensus, mutual
recognition of legal decisions and agreement on the extent that violence
can be justified when used by both state and non-state actors it remains
difficult to measure effectives responses, especially in relation to the fluid

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nature of ‘terrorism’. Thus, the key obstacles of international
disagreement, the political element of ‘terrorism’ and its evolving nature
and responses, prevent a unified definition of ‘terrorism’.

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