Food and Foodways

Explorations in the History and Culture of Human Nourishment

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Vegetarianism without vegetarians: Caste ideology

and the politics of food in India

Aseem Hasnain & Abhilasha Srivastava

To cite this article: Aseem Hasnain & Abhilasha Srivastava (2023) Vegetarianism without
vegetarians: Caste ideology and the politics of food in India, Food and Foodways, 31:4,
273-295, DOI: 10.1080/07409710.2023.2261721

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07409710.2023.2261721

Published online: 28 Sep 2023.

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Food and Foodways
2023, VOL. 31, NO. 4, 273–295
https://doi.org/10.1080/07409710.2023.2261721

Vegetarianism without vegetarians: Caste ideology

and the politics of food in India
Aseem Hasnaina and Abhilasha Srivastavab
a
Department of Sociology, California State University at Fresno, Fresno, California, USA; bDepartment
of Economics, California State University at Fresno, Fresno, California, USA

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Climate change debates have helped frame vegetarianism as a Climate Change;
conscientious choice across the globe and also projected India vegetarianism; ideology;
as a shining example of vegetarianism. Before this Euro- caste; meat; plant-based;
American vegetarians had long romanticized India as an ideal althusser; state apparatus
vegetarian society, and have assumed it to be based on pro-
gressive ethics. This article challenges such assumptions and
complicates the Euro-American association of vegetarian dietary
preferences with the ethical concerns of virtue, animal welfare,
and sustainability. We contend that neither is India a vegetarian
society nor is mainstream vegetarianism in contemporary India
based on progressive ethics. We use in-depth interviews and
extensive news reports to show that vegetarianism in India is a
majoritarian political ideology associated with caste-based dis-
crimination and violence, making it inimical to notions of
non-violence, equality, and freedom. Majoritarian vegetarianism
in contemporary India aims to conserve the caste system and
its attendant inequalities. This study traces the ideological and
repressive state apparatuses through which the fantasy and
norms of vegetarianism are propped up in contemporary India.
We argue that an uncritical acceptance of mainstream vegetar-
ianism in contemporary India as a benevolent cultural prefer-
ence whitewashes its discriminatory and violent nature, helps
the caste system persist, and can undermine the well-being
and nutritional outcomes of a majority of the Indian popula-
tion especially those from non-elite social groups that have
historically been omnivorous.

1. Introduction
While scholarly interest in the benefits of plant-based diets emerged in
the nineteenth century (Whorton 1994), popular attention to vegetarianism
has spiked since 2019 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change recommended it for ecological security. Vegetarians in Europe and
America have long idolized India as a haven where vegetarianism, health,
spiritualism, and non-violence converge (Preece 2008). They often assume

CONTACT Aseem Hasnain aseemhasnain@mail.fresnostate.edu Department of Sociology, California State

University at Fresno, 5340 N Campus Drive, M/S SS 97, Fresno, CA 93710, USA
© 2023 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
274 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

that vegetarianism in India is rooted in progressive ethical concerns, such

as animal welfare, humaneness, and environmental care (Dietz et al. 2010).
Authors of the recent and influential EAT-Lancet study (Willett et al.
2019) have also identified India as a shining example of a vegetarian
society.
This article challenges such generalizations and contends that neither
is India a vegetarian society nor is contemporary Indian vegetarianism
based on progressive ethics. Vegetarians in India make up approximately
one-fifth of the population and are heavy consumers of commercial dairy
products that defy the ethics of animal welfare. Unlike Europe and USA
where vegetarianism is an expression of norm-breaking and progressive
ethics (Boyle 2011), mainstream vegetarianism in India reflects conformity
to conservative caste-based norms. We use the terms “Indian vegetarian-
ism” and “vegetarianism in India” for the broad set of rules and taboos
prevalent among Hindu communities, which make up the vast majority
of the Indian population. This majoritarian vegetarianism is also central
to Hindutva politics championed by Hindu nationalists in contemporary
India. Authors acknowledge that vegetarianism is also prescribed or prac-
ticed in Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism and is based on ethical principles.
However, this study does not lump their vegetarianism with Hindu major-
itarian vegetarianism as they neither participate in politicizing vegetari-
anism nor champion its exclusionary public imposition. In fact, Hindu
nationalism has a tense relationship with both Indian Buddhists, mostly
Ambedkarite and Dalit neo-converts, and Sikhism as both communities
have resisted getting folded into the exclusive definition of the nation
imagined in Hindutva politics (Natrajan 2022; Rai 2011). This study dis-
cusses vegetarianism primarily in relation to the practices and beliefs
associated with Hindu communities, and its politicized version championed
by Hindu nationalists in contemporary India.
Partisans of Hindu nationalism weaponize vegetarianism to demonize
omnivores. They have assaulted and lynched hundreds of Muslims and
Dalits on the pretex of consuming beef or for transporting cattle
(Bajoria 2019). Unlike cow slaughter which is prohibited in several
provinces cattle trading is completely legal. Yet, violence against cattle
traders and transporters has become pervasive. Scholars have begun
theorizing this majoritarian vegetarianism as a norm enforced by a
powerful minority over a diverse and omnivorous majority (Fischer
2019; Natrajan and Jacob 2018; Shepherd 2019). Vegetarianism is also
used to discriminate against omnivore communities, such as Muslims
and Dalits in the housing market and their dietary choices are mar-
ginalized in schools, colleges, and office cafeterias (Pathania 2016;
Thorat et al. 2015). Thus majoritarian vegetarianism in contemporary
India not only diverges from the ethical undergirding of Euro-American
 Food and Foodways 275

vegetarianism, it is also inimical to the fundamental values of non-vi-

olence and freedom.
This study focuses on the discriminatory character of vegetarianism in
India, which is the preference of only a minority of citizens belonging to
“upper” castes.1 We propose that Indian vegetarianism is primarily neither
an individual preference, nor a norm followed by the majority, but an
ideological construct related with Brahminism. We also contend that veg-
etarianism is an everyday boundary-making practice between in-groups
and out-groups to maintain and perpetuate Brahminism, its hierarchical
logic of caste, and its attendant inequalities. Brahminism is a socio-political
worldview that justifies the superiority of Brahmins (priestly castes among
Hindus) and the hierarchical caste system prevalent in India. It places the
caste group in a vertical arrangement of sliding status, privilege, oppor-
tunity, and representation. While the emergence of Brahminism and the
caste system are traced to 500 BC (Bronkhorst 2017), its contemporary
version remains pervasive through the support of India’s influential cultural
nationalist organization, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS). A multitude
of its formal and informal organizations including the political party
Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) advance conservative Hindu majoritarian norms
(Jaffrelot 2011). It is important to remember that even though the deep-
ening of capitalism, economic reforms, spread of industries, and increasing
urbanization have created greater interactions across caste lines, caste
system has not declined in significance (Carswell et al. 2017; Deshpande
2019; Jodhka and Manor 2018).
This study contributes to scholarship on foodways by complicating
Euro-American association of vegetarian dietary preferences with the eth-
ical concerns of virtue, animal welfare, and sustainability. We use the
Althusserian model of repressive and ideological mechanisms to ground
our evidence from in-depth interviews and news coverage to emphasize
the role of political context and coercion in shaping dietary preferences.
We show that vegetarianism in contemporary Indian political discourse is
ideological and is used for political mobilization for Hindu majoritarianism.
Therefore we caution against glorifying Indian vegetarianism uncritically,
which has already begun in influential climate change debates (Willett
et al. 2019). Such uncritical acceptance can easily encroach upon poli-
cy-making and contribute to the maintenance of caste/religion-based
inequalities and discrimination in India.

2. The construction of dietary preferences

Development economists studying nutrition and food generally see income
as the main predictor of dietary preferences. Barring a few studies empha-
sizing the role of religion and caste (Dahiya and Viswanathan 2015;
276 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

Meenakshi and Ray 1996), this literature relegates non-economic factors

to social identity and separates the analysis of food preferences from its
socio-political context. Resulting policies and programs remain blind to
such contexts that shape food consumption. Sociologists and anthropolo-
gists, however, see dietary preferences deeply connected with culture,
morality, ethics, and religious beliefs (Douglas 1979; Fabre-Vassas 1997;
Kaplan 2012; Khare 1992). Food preferences are shaped by social organi-
zation, manners, propriety, and cultural codes (Douglas 1979; Lévi-Strauss
1996; Murcott 1986). Social scientists argue that food preferences depend
on socialization and mealtimes are sites where children learn “commen-
sality, communicative expectations, and the symbolic, moral, and senti-
mental meanings of food and eating” (Ochs and Shohet 2006, 35). However,
even these literatures don’t center the role of politics and ideology.
Mechanisms shaping specifically vegetarian preferences, especially in India
remain unstudied (Natrajan and Jacob 2018). This study fills these gaps
as we dissect food and eating practices through a focus on ideology and
politics, and how they enforce majoritarian vegetarianism in contempo-
rary India.

3. Conceptual framework: vegetarianism as ideology

Ideology is an imaginary construct that shapes social structures and rela-
tions (Engels and Marx 1970). Althusser (2014) extends this understanding
and argues that though ideologies do not correspond to reality they always
make allusions to reality and create an imaginary relationship between
individuals and their actual conditions of existence. Ideology is also a
central ingredient of group identities (Balibar 1991). Identities are con-
structed through perceived differences with “others” and these differences
are established through boundary-making processes (Lamont and Molnár
2002). This understanding of ideology and group identity helps see major-
itarian vegetarianism in India as an ideological tool and a material practice
used by “upper” castes to establish the relationship between a person’s
social status and food in general, and meat in particular. Maintaining and
reinforcing this relationship is essential for the hegemonic perpetuation
of the hierarchical system of caste and its privileges that benefit
“upper” castes.
According to Manusmriti, an ancient code in Hinduism, the caste system
organizes people into four distinct groups or varna in a vertical status
hierarchy, with specific types of occupations allocated to each varna. These
occupations range from priestly work at the top (reserved for Brahmins)
to hard labor at the bottom (reserved for Shudras). A fifth group (Dalits)
exists outside of the four varnas and includes communities condemned
to “unclean” jobs, such as cleaning latrines, sweeping streets, scavenging
 Food and Foodways 277

cattle carcasses, and so on (Olivelle and Olivelle 2005). Each varna is

stratified into numerous castes (jati), and clans within each caste. In
Ambedkar’s view (1916) this complex vertical order of graded inequality
is maintained through caste endogamy transposed over clan exogamy. He
also sees caste not just as a system of division of labor but a rigid system
that assigns permanent social, economic, and political status to people
based on their position within caste hierarchy. The logic of Brahminism
and caste provides an ideological framework through which these extractive
social relations of labor, production, and their attendant inequalities are
justified and made resilient (Srivastava and Willoughby 2023).
One of the most effective mechanisms sustaining Brahminism is the
binary notion of pollution and purity which is used to maintain caste
boundaries (Béteille 2012; Lipner 2010; Mines 2009). Purity and pollution
are embedded in everyday practices include defining acceptable and unac-
ceptable foods, and the segregation of shared dietary spaces, such as
college cafeterias, dining halls, office lunch-rooms, and restaurants. Within
the worldview of Brahminism, eating is an important everyday practice
that reproduces the social relations of caste and which reinforces bound-
aries between in-groups and out-groups. In this schema, vegetarianism
does not simply reflect a deliberate preference guided by the ethics of
animal welfare or an innocent cultural habit learned from the family but
an instrument of Brahminism for marking boundaries between the pure
self and the polluting other (Gupta 2000).
The final element of our conceptual framework involves mechanisms
for the everyday maintenance of caste norms. For this, we draw upon
Althusser’s work on ideology in the context of the modern nation-state.
Althusser emphasizes that the formation of desirable subjects is neces-
sary for reproducing social relations that maintain elite hegemony. The
desirable subject is constructed through Repressive State Apparatuses
(RSA) and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). RSA presents itself as
a unified whole in the public sphere and includes laws, courts, police,
and the prison system all of which threaten violations with retaliatory
violence. ISA includes a multitude of institutions dispersed in the private
sphere including social norms, family, educational institutions, religion,
morality, politics, and civil society organizations aimed at socializing
the subject in gentler ways. Contemporary India’s majoritarian vegetar-
ianism has elements of both ISA and RSA as they are deployed through
norms and socialization within the family, school, workplace, religion,
and media, as well as through threats of structural violence. This con-
ceptual framework focuses on the relationship between caste-based veg-
etarianism and its everyday operationalization through socialization and
coercion. While Althusser’s theory might be inapplicable to Brahminism
as it existed in the pre-modern era, we use it for specifically analyzing
278 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

the normalization of vegetarianism in contemporary India, a modern

nation-state.

4. Vegetarianism in India: a phantasmic ideology

There have been long-held misperceptions that India is primarily a veg-
etarian society (Fischer 2019). However, data has consistently shown oth-
erwise. Chakravarti (1974) found 35% or fewer Indians to be vegetarians
and government data estimates vegetarians between 12 and 29% (GoI
2014). Natrajan and Jacob (2018) estimate vegetarians at around 20% of
the population. While there are considerable regional variations, no reli-
gious group except the Jain and Sikh–both comparatively very small com-
munities–is majority vegetarian. Recent scholarship has begun unpacking
the assumptions of a vegetarian India by engaging with complex issues,
such as aspirations of the emerging middle class, deepening of the markets,
affinity for cosmopolitan modernity, and contradictions of vegetarianism
in belief and practice (Fischer 2023; Staples 2020). The contradiction
between India being predominantly omnivorous and its projection as a
vegetarian society reveals the ideological nature of Indian vegetarianism.
Yet, the normative power of vegetarianism in India persists and can be
seen through the fact that the standard term for omnivores is the deeply
otherized label “non-vegetarian” (Novetzke 2017). This normative power
is also reflected in the exclusion of meat from college and office canteens
and pressures on restaurants for having separate “pure vegetarian” cooking
stations (Ramkumar 2015). Vegetarianism in contemporary India causes
even meat-eating Hindu individuals to feel embarrassment. Many omnivore
households cook meat outside the kitchen in separate utensils and conceal
meat consumption from other in-groups (Khara et al. 2020). In recent
years vegetarianism has also become a signifier of Indianness. Ghassem-
Fachandi’s ethnography (2012) details how vegetarianism is deployed by
Hindu nationalists to frame Hindus as pious, peaceful, and true Indian
while meat eating Muslims are otherized as violent, bloodthirsty, and
therefore un-Indian.
The normalization of vegetarian dietary preferences marginalizes the
foodways of the majority of Indians at the cost of a small number of elite
“upper” caste groups invested in Brahminism (Shepherd 2019). This nor-
malization has been legitimized by those Western scholars who seek evi-
dence to fit their preconceptions about vegetarianism as a healthy lifestyle.
They assumed Brahmins and trading castes (Baniyas)—both historically
powerful groups–to represent the Indian population and projected the
foodways of these influential minorities onto the entire population (Fischer
2019; Preece 2008). In contrast, the Indian sociologist and Dalit public
intellectual Shepherd (2016) argues that the majority of “upper” caste
 Food and Foodways 279

Hindus, such as Brahmins, and Baniyas can thrive on a vegetarian diet

because they have the privilege of sedentary lifestyles complimented by
relative affluence that allows them to consume high quantities of vegeta-
bles, legumes, and meatless animal proteins, such as milk, yogurt, cheese,
and clarified butter. “Lower” caste communities with labor-intensive life-
styles and weaker economic status cannot afford an expensive vegetarian
diet and plant-based proteins in sufficient quantities. He also argues that
the imposition of a virtuous, and low-protein vegetarian diet is causing a
long-term nutritional undermining of “lower” caste communities.
Nevertheless, food norms of the vegetarian elite “upper” castes have
historically dominated state policy to favor vegetarianism. These elites
managed to insert Article 48 into the Indian constitution which discour-
ages the slaughter of cows, calves, and other milch animals, such as water
buffaloes. This constitutional provision laid the ground for future prohi-
bitions on cow slaughter in some provinces. Over the last few decades as
the Hindu majoritarian political party BJP has gained political power in
many provinces and at the federal level, several provinces have even
opposed the inclusion of eggs in state funded nutritional programs in
pre-schools and child-care centers.2 This is despite scientific recommen-
dations and cultural preferences of communities that consume meat and
eggs. The correlation between provincial vote share of the BJP and lower
incidence of meat-eating also hints at the political and ideological bases
of vegetarianism (Natrajan and Jacob 2018). A recent survey echoes this
correlation, “Hindus who express a favorable view of the BJP are more
likely than others to be vegetarians” (Sahgal et al. 2021).

5. Methods and materials

This research project was approved by the IRB of the Bridgewater State
University (Case #2019145) in 2019, and a fresh approval was received in
2022 from the IRB at Fresno State University (Case#1653). Primary data
was collected using in-depth interviews which are effective for gathering
qualitative data on complex issues (Ritchie et al. 2014). Our semi-struc-
tured questionnaire included a list of basic questions, some of which were
asked in the beginning of each interview. Follow-up questions and their
sequence were decided during the course of each interview depending on
responses and the inclination of the respondent toward discussing select
themes. Such interviews are aimed at understanding complexity through
conversations rather than at measuring accuracy or discerning generalizable
patterns across a population (Arksey and Knight 2009). Accordingly, our
sample was purposive where respondents were recruited based on their
willingness to share perspectives on food and eating held by them and
members of their extended family. Respondents were recruited by
280 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

snowballing through contacts and their contacts while ensuring that a

majority of the respondents were not known to us personally. In our
sample of 20 we were familiar with seven respondents, but the other 13
were strangers for us before the interview. Interviews were conducted over
phone and the Internet. Sample size in qualitative methods is an ongoing
debate (Mason 2010) and one of the main parameters for size is data
saturation where no new meaningful information is added by conducting
more interviews (Morse 2015). Studies suggest that in-depth interviews
saturate between 12 and 24 interviews (Hennink et al. 2017; Guest, Bunce,
and Johnson 2006). Our sample includes respondents from multiple castes
and regional backgrounds. Fourteen interviews were audio recorded after
getting verbal informed consent, as outlined in the IRB approval, and 8
were noted down manually when respondents declined to be recorded.
Interviews averaged around 70 min with the shortest being 35 min and the
longest being 110 min. All respondents were college educated, professionally
qualified, and identified with middle class backgrounds.3 Table 1 summa-
rizes their location and caste backgrounds in the following way: respon-
dents from the formerly untouchable varna are labeled Dalit; respondents
from the Shudra group are labeled “lower” caste; and respondents from
Brahmin, Kshatriya, and Vaishya groups are labeled “upper” caste. Our
sample also includes two Muslim respondents to include their perspectives.
All caste labels are based on self-identification by respondents.
We complement our interviews with news coverage focused on prohi-
bitions on sale and consumption of meat, enforced vegetarianism by state
and non-state actors, speeches and arbitrary decisions taken by elected
representatives, law enforcement personnel, and vigilante violence related
to meat and transport of cattle. News is an important source of data for
understanding the working and prevalence of RSA, which often operates
outside of the formal channels of state, law, and policy in contemporary
India. We used Proquest as well as Internet-based searches using relevant
key term combinations to purposefully capture items that covered infor-
mation of interest. Analysis of in-depth interviews and news stories helped
us understand how vegetarianism in contemporary India is a carefully
orchestrated practice imposed upon individuals in the arenas of family,
religion, educational institutions, workspaces, mass media, and politics.
The Althusserian framework helps trace these processes. We wish we could
have conducted archival research into legislation and regulation of

Table 1. Respondents by region and self reported caste background.

North South East West
Dalit 1 3 0 2
“Lower” caste 1 1 1 1
“Upper” caste 4 1 1 2
Muslim 1 0 1 0
 Food and Foodways 281

slaughterhouses and the transport and sale of meat. This study could have
been also strengthened with interviews of police officers and members of
vigilante groups involved in the physical enforcement of vegetarianism in
public spaces.

6. Findings
6.1. The role of ideological and repressive state apparatuses in the private
sphere

Respondents in our sample emphasized that parents or grandparents pri-

marily procure, cook, and provide food to the young making the family
the primary arena for learning about food and eating. Older respondents
also reflected that there was a relative absence of eating-out culture among
their extended families until the government opened the market to foreign
investors in the 1990s. This meant that most individuals consumed home-
made food, especially among the middle class. Complemented with tra-
ditional gender norms this meant that in most homes women cooked and
regulated eating. Since women are disproportionally burdened with main-
taining norms their preferences have a stronger impact on children. These
norms hold sway into adulthood. An “upper” caste female respondent
shared, “I was 13 when I first went to a restaurant. Eating out was unheard
of. All our meals were cooked by my grandmother and mother who didn’t
even eat onions or garlic. I can still not handle the smell of garlic.” Garlic,
onions, and several other root vegetables are taboo in many “upper” caste
households, especially for women (Zubaida 2009). A “lower” caste respon-
dent from rural North India shared her family’s norms which socialized
her into strict vegetarianism, with a gendered caveat, “my mother ran a
strictly vegetarian kitchen but my brothers could eat meat as long as they
ate outside. I never had that opportunity. There were none where women
like me could visit, and even now I am expected to not eat out.”
Among most vegetarians in India, meat and meat eating are associated
with abjection—the experience of revulsion, disgust, or horror when a
norm is broken by an intruding object, idea, or act (Kristeva 1982). For
some, its smell is revolting and for others, it is repulsive to even see it.
Another “upper” caste respondent from North India described their abjec-
tion, “I can’t stand the smell of meat. Even looking at it makes me cringe.
I have now trained myself to eat at the same table as other meat eaters
but not if they are eating something like roasted chicken that has to be
worked through with hands, bones, and fiber all visible. I feel like vom-
iting when I hear the bones cracking as it is consumed. I once accompa-
nied friends to a joint where various meats were on display near the brick
oven. The sight killed my appetite.” Such abjection ensures that meat stays
282 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

expunged from the household and enforces vegetarianism among children.

The same respondent shared:
“My husband eats meat but he eats out. I never allowed it in my kitchen because I
cannot imagine myself cleaning up after it is cooked or eaten here. If I allowed my
child to eat meat then I would also have to clean up after him. I couldn’t bring
myself to change his diaper, handle his vomit, or clean up his mess on the dining
table if he ate meat. I decided that my kids wouldn’t eat meat until they were 12 or
13 years old. After that they become self-sufficient for their hygiene and will be free
to choose their dietary preferences.”

This is a common justification for inducting children into vegetarianism

as an “upper” caste respondent from Central India echoed, “My son can
eat what he wants once he grows up and decide on his own.” While it is
possible that some children of vegetarian mothers will choose to be omni-
vores later in their life, early socialization into morally coded food is likely
to remain influential. Our sample of respondents reflects the continuity
of vegetarianism among grown children, with the exception of an “upper”
caste respondent from North India:
“I grew up vegetarian because my parents were, but also because we lived in a
strictly vegetarian neighborhood. But my father always taught me to never judge
people by their food or work. I started eating meat when I left home for education
and later for my job. A lot of my friends there did too. I am presently again a veg-
etarian because most of my current friends are. But I will eat meat when I am
hanging out with old friends who do.”

An omnivore “upper”-caste respondent from Western India shared mem-

ories of abjection from his childhood about not only meat but anything
red because of its resemblance with blood. In his ancestral home tomatoes
and beets were taboo, as they “bled.” This aversion even spilled out into
semantics, “the word for chopping vegetables was portioning. If someone
used the term cut or cutting for vegetables, then those vegetables had to
be trashed. Only meat could be cut, vegetables were to be portioned.”
Family control over food seamlessly extends to the neighborhood as shared
by an “upper” caste respondent from North India, “as a girl child most of
my time was spent at home or school. I could only visit a few friends in
my immediate neighborhood. Coincidentally, all of them were vegetarians.”
The “coincidence” in this quote flags an important fact. Most neighbor-
hoods, even in cities, are segregated across social hierarchies (Bharathi
et al. 2018). While housing in old enclaves in cities is organized by stricter
caste and religious lines, newer neighborhoods in cities are segregated along
“upper” and “lower” caste lines. Only government-built housing complexes,
which are very few in comparison, have a modicum of integration because
these units are allocated randomly through a lottery system. Therefore in
most cases, similar groups self-segregate and it is less likely for people to
 Food and Foodways 283

encounter eating cultures different than theirs. Rural India demonstrates

more rigid caste-based segregation that makes foodways similar within
neighborhoods that are usually organized around caste. This insulation can
make vegetarianism so common-sensical that it does not even beget ver-
balization. An “upper” caste respondent from Central India shared:
“I don’t remember any discussion in our house around food when I was growing up.
We ate a vegetarian diet, everyone we visited were vegetarians, everyone who visited
us were vegetarians. I didn’t know anyone who ate non-vegetarian food before col-
lege. We had no exposure to meat and eggs at all, and there was never any discus-
sion about it.”

Such insularity continues into middle and high school where norms
ensure that students only bring vegetarian meals in their lunch boxes even
if they are from omnivorous families. An “upper” caste respondent from
North India mentioned, “I shared my school lunch with a few friends.
Everyone brought different things and sharing meant we ate a great variety
during the recess. I don’t remember anyone ever bringing non-veg items
to school.” This was a widespread norm even in southern provinces where
upwards of 90% of the population is omnivore. Violations of this unsaid
code attract scorn, which can traumatize young children. A “lower” caste
respondent from Eastern India shared, “we never pack eggs or meat in
our daughter’s school tiffin. Other children look down upon it.” A Dalit
respondent from South India also echoed this sentiment:
“In middle school my mother once packed an omlette in my lunch box. One of my
friends saw it during recess, stood up and left, refusing to sit with me at the same
table ever. He told everyone to not share food with me because it was non-veg. I
never took eggs or meat to school after that.”

ISA does not just shape the attitudes and behaviors of vegetarians, but
also of omnivores. This creates several interesting behavioral patterns, such
as concealing meat eating from ingroups. While the majority of Brahmins
in North and South India self-identify as vegetarian and publicly favor
vegetarianism, meat eating within the community has increased over time.
However, it is kept under wraps. An “upper” caste respondent from South
India shared, “today Brahmins consume more meat, more often, more
than even Muslims. But they keep it secret. I eat meat, but I never tell
others in my community. For other Brahmins, I am a vegetarian.” Further
probing showed that in most cases close relatives know about meat eating
but outside of that circle, a vegetarian preference is projected to avoid
embarrassment. Even in marriages among Brahmins where both parties
might be omnivores the wedding dinner remains vegetarian because a
larger social circle is invited as guests from whom meat eating is to be
concealed. Secrecy is a defense against being judged by vegetarian friends
and members of the extended family.
284 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

An “upper” caste respondent from Western India acknowledged this

dilemma, “Most Hindu meat eaters are hypocrites. They know it is wrong,
but they do it. They claim to be vegetarians in public.” The “hypocrisy”
in indulging in a known “sinful” act reflects how meat is perceived as
morally inferior among “upper” castes, and how meat consumption is
assumed to affect one’s moral attributes. The same respondent argued,
“consuming meat makes one a “durjan” (evil person) because it involves
taking away life. There is no doubt about this. It is a sin to take a life
to sustain oneself.”
This “hypocrisy” is also contextualized by the gradual emergence of
vegetarianism within Brahminism and its influence on other caste groups.
Before the sixth century CE diets among various castes included meat
even from cows but the post-Vedic period (roughly sixth CE onwards)
shows ambivalence toward meat, a shift attributed to the rising influence
of rival traditions, such as Jainism and Buddhism, both opposed to animal
slaughter. However, scriptures continued to permit and sometimes even
prescribe animal sacrifice and meat consumption for ritual and medicinal
reasons (Jha 2002). These contradictions reflect the overall moral universe
of “upper” caste groups and can explain their dilemma toward meat eating.
On probing his meat eating, an “upper” caste respondent from Eastern
India explained, “we like eating meat, and also encourage our children to
do so because of its benefits but it is definitely wrong to kill. Maybe at
some point in my life, I will become a vegetarian.” Several “upper”-caste
respondents shared how meat was cooked and eaten in specific spaces
that made sure the household remained “clean.” An “upper” caste respon-
dent from Eastern India shared, “growing up we often ate meat but it was
always cooked in the backyard, outside the kitchen. My father and uncle
would cook, and we had a separate stove and separate utensils for cooking
and eating. Those utensils could never contaminate the kitchen.”
Some respondents also emphasized meat eating as a phase of life that
should eventually pass and the omnivore individual is assumed to return
to a more desirable vegetarian lifestyle later in life. Young men got some
leeway due to this attitude. A “lower” caste respondent from eastern India
shared how meat consumption among young boys was completely accept-
able in his community because males needed strength, “there is a general
belief that young boys need meat while they are growing up. It helps them
grow strong and healthy. Once they marry and have their children, they
are expected to turn vegetarian. None among my grandparents’ generation
and very few in my parents’ generation eat meat now. They all did when
they were young.” The coded reference to strength signals pervasive beliefs
about meat eating as a catalyst for sexual desire. These practices marked
“omnivore vegetarianists” who ate meat but acknowledged its undesirable
effects that needed to be regulated.
 Food and Foodways 285

Respondents from communities outside the pale of Brahminism espe-

cially Dalits didn’t reflect any guilt about meat eating. A Dalit respondent
from South India said, “my father brought meat often and my mother
would cook it for us. We grew up eating meat of all sorts. My father
loved goat, pork, fish, and even buffalo meat. There used to be a variety
of meats that we ate.” Another Dalit respondent from Western India
stressed that meat consumption among Dalit communities has remained
completely normal with no distinction for chicken, goat, and buffalo meat,
“Here we don’t care what these Hindutva groups preach. We eat what we
like.” A Dalit respondent from South India who converted to Christianity
a few generations ago shared that among Dalit-Christians meat eating
continues to be normal. “The church leadership is very clear about this.
There is no problem in eating meat, of any sort. The bishop of my church
openly eats meat even pork and is vocal about the benefits of animal
protein. All Church weddings have meat served to guests.”
However, that is changing. These changes are brought about by Hindu
Nationalists’ new focus on bringing Dalits within their fold (Teltumbde
2021). The same respondent shared that political mobilization driven by
the BJP and its affiliate organizations has motivated some Dalit families
to discontinue meat: “members of my extended family who remained
Hindu started turning to vegetarianism since the late 1990s after the Ram
temple movement. Now they wear a prominent tilak on their foreheads
and flinch at meat. We have to arrange vegetarian food for them during
weddings.” This shift resonates with the process of caste-norm emulation
described by Ambedkar (1916) also called Sanskritization (Srinivas 1952)
where upwardly mobile “lower” castes emulate “upper” caste norms.
Several respondents reflected anxieties with specific types of meats that
mark group boundaries. An “upper” caste respondent from Eastern India
asserted that some meats should be avoided because they are consumed
by “lower” castes, “I only eat chicken and fish. I can’t handle even goat
meat, it looks like beef, especially the color and the fibers.” An “upper”
caste respondent from a traditionally vegetarian community in South India
reflected no problems with meat per se but was unequivocal about the
type of meat, “only chicken and fish. That’s it. My family doesn’t eat
anything else.” Another “upper” caste respondent from North India shared,
“we eat chicken, fish, and goat but nothing else. Cows are a strict no,
and pork and buffalo are out of the question. These are common among
Dalits, and Muslims (respectively).” A “lower” caste respondent from east-
ern India elaborated on the widely shared association between types of
meats and castes:
“Brahmins are usually assumed to be vegetarian, Harijan eat pork, and Muslims eat
buffalo. In my community, only chicken and goat were permitted. The only exception
286 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

for us would be game meat. I once ate snails and mollusks with friends from the
fishermen community, and when my parents came to know all hell broke loose. They
told me it was unbecoming of us to eat meats consumed by such low caste
people.”

While Dalit communities have historically consumed a variety of meats

including carrion that they were forced to scavenge in rural areas, new
patterns have emerged through caste-based abjection. Dalit respondents
echoed this, including one from Western India, “my grandparents ate pork
and carrion when they skinned dead cattle. My parents stopped eating
them as people in the village humiliated them for it. Some among my
community still eat pork but no one eats carrion now.”
Caste-based abjection about meat is so influential that its shadow looms
even over traditionally omnivorous groups. Muslims eat poultry, fish,
chicken, goat, buffalo, and beef (in some provinces) but our respondents
reflected a new shift. A Muslim respondent from North India shared, “we
usually eat goat and chicken, and some types of fish. Buffalo meat was
frequently eaten in the past but not so much now.” Another Muslim
respondent from Eastern India shared how some meats are concealed, “we
use buffalo for kebabs. But we don’t share it with others. Buffalo meat is
a taboo for a lot of my Hindu friends. They don’t consider it clean.”
These interviews help us identify two aspects about food habits in
general and vegetarianism in particular. The first is about the moral hier-
archy of foodways which places vegetarian foods at the top followed by
chicken, fish, goat, buffalo, pork, other smaller animals, and carrion at
the bottom. This confirms Ambedkar’s claim about the caste-like hierarchy
of food among Hindus (Ambedkar 1948). The other aspect is about social-
ization into vegetarianism among vegetarians, and within a narrower band
of acceptable meats among omnivores. Both these aspects are steeped in
Brahminist sensibilities and emphasize a theoretical understanding received
through primary socialization in the family and in educational institutions.
The most important finding from these interviews is that vegetarianism
in India is driven not only by those who are actually vegetarians but also
by those “upper” caste Hindus who eat meat. Our Dalit respondents were
an exception. Across our sample, we had one extraordinary “upper” caste
respondent who helped understand how the immediate community and
peers have an influence on what one can eat, but if socialization against
meat is not ideological, then one can continue to be autonomous in
choosing dietary preferences despite pressures. Broadly, vegetarian as well
as “vegetarianist omnivores” drive the ideological project of vegetarianism.
Interviews also helped discern that the entire purpose of normative training
around food is to teach the rules of caste, which stand for the overarching
logic of Brahminism. However, this socialization cannot be seen simply
as cultural because there are political processes behind this cultural façade.
 Food and Foodways 287

Socialization into vegetarianism is ideological, as caste itself is an ideo-

logical construct that undergirds Brahminism (Franco et al. 2009).

6.2. The role of ideological and repressive state apparatuses in the public
sphere

We found ample evidence showing that institutions beyond the family also
coerce people into vegetarianism. Colleges and universities either serve
only vegetarian food or offer meat sporadically in dining halls. In 2014
the Minister of Education of the BJP-led government of India proposed
to make government funded educational institutions vegetarian.4 Since
2014, when the BJP rose to power at the center and in several states,
many educational institutions have attempted to purge meat from their
menu. In some cases meat-consuming students have been forced to eat
in segregated areas in dining halls to prevent the ritual pollution of veg-
etarian students. These processes are driven by “upper” caste groups which
have a historical monopoly over most institutions in India (Pathania 2016).
However, such proposals have been fiercely opposed by omnivorous stu-
dents and activists from “lower” caste groups who frame it as food fascism5
and defend their foodways from Brahminism (Sathyamala 2019). A Dalit
respondent from South India described the influence of vegetarian norms
in public places even in South India which has remained on the periphery
of Hindutva politics, “I eat meat openly, and I have a few colleagues in
my college with whom I eat meat even in the shared lunch room. But
most of our colleagues look down on us. They can’t object to our face,
but they avoid sharing the table with us. They are all ‘upper’ caste folk.”
Vegetarian ideology also plays out in public daycare centers and primary
schools where the government funds breakfasts and mid-day meals. BJP
governed states are notorious for opposing the inclusion of eggs and meat
in such programs despite the fact that the affected families might be
predominantly omnivorous. Chief Ministers of BJP ruled states have
declared complete bans on serving anything other than vegetarian options,6
and other leaders have publicly claimed that egg consumption in schools
would initiate children into cannibalism.7 Similar examples of forced veg-
etarianism have been observed even in private organizations, such as the
progressive newspaper “The Hindu.”8 Even popular culture marginalizes
meat from visual depictions by overrepresenting vegetarian foods in the
backdrop of TV shows and movies, and associates meat consumption with
villainous characters.9 We argue that these coercive practices in public and
private spaces are constitutive of a unified institutional context that can
be explained through RSA and ISA.
As we discussed earlier, RSA include the law, courts, police, and the
prison system. Laws as well as the police and prison system are actively
288 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

used in India to prohibit beef consumption. In 20 out of 28 states, there

are laws that prohibit the slaughter or consumption of cows or their
progeny (Bajoria 2019). This is remarkable given India is formally a secular
polity. Apart from these cow-centric laws, many towns and cities of reli-
gious importance to Hinduism have been “purified” (made meat and egg
free) either through explicit local laws or through unsaid rules that are
enforced by the police.10 In 2018, the Central Ministry of Environment
ordered a blanket ban on cattle slaughter, which was revoked after nation-
wide protests and legal wranglings. In 2017, the Government of India’s
most populous state Uttar Pradesh banned animal slaughter for several
months resulting in meat shortages and livelihood loss for people engaged
in the industry.11
While the use of RSA requires legislation and legal enforcement that
produce resistance, the use of ISA is much more subtle and efficient. For
the purpose of socialization ISA include, but are not limited to, religion,
politics, family, education, media, and so on. While our interviews described
the working of family ISA in detail, the following section briefly describes
the working of religious and political ISA.
The RSS (India’s influential cultural nationalist organization- Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh) is the key organization that has promoted a cultural
nationalist worldview in India since its inception in 1925. This worldview
hinges on Brahminism which supports caste-based hierarchy and its fun-
damental elements of purity and pollution. The RSS operates both directly
and through a plethora of formal/informal organizations, movements,
campaigns, and vigilante groups that share its ideology and are controlled
by it (Andersen and Damle 2019). These organizations use a diverse rep-
ertoire of actions to enforce vegetarianism in various parts of India. This
includes RSS’s formal door to door campaign, kutumb prabodhan–family
counseling that emphasizes the ideal Hindu household should follow veg-
etarianism among other values.12
RSS affiliated vigilante groups have been involved in violent campaigns
to oppose not only cow slaughter but all trade and consumption connected
with cattle and meat across the country. These groups terrorize cattle
traders, cattle owners, slaughterhouse owners, and cattle transporters as
well as butchers and meat serving restaurants.13 India has witnessed numer-
ous instances of mob lynching of individuals, mostly Muslim and Dalit,
over the last decade on allegations of cow slaughter or beef consumption.
Lynchings have become very frequent and brazen since 2014 after the BJP
stormed to power in the center and in several Indian states. Between 2016
and 2019 itself, 44 people were lynched and 280 were injured by cow
protection vigilantes.14 The absence of formal documentation for such
lynchings creates dependence on journalistic sources.15 Human Rights
Watch asserts that in almost all cases the police stalled investigations,
 Food and Foodways 289

ignored procedures, and even played a complicit role in the killings and
cover-ups. Instead of investigating and arresting suspects, police filed
complaints against victims and witnesses. In several cases, political leaders
of Hindu nationalist groups, including elected BJP officials, defended the
assaults (Bajoria 2019). Elected representatives of the BJP have openly
honored the accused and provided them financial and legal help for their
defense.16 These actions demonstrate pervasive and robust political ISA
as well as RSA in support of vegetarianism.
Additionally, religious ISA operates through spiritual centers and reli-
gious leaders. While gurus and swamis have been a staple in India (Brent
2006), their numbers and influence have grown exponentially with the
growth of private TV channels (Lewis 2016). There are now dozens of
highly influential gurus with regional following, and many who are active
at local levels. The more influential ones usually follow a similar organi-
zational model including resort style sanctuaries spread across India which
they periodically visit and preach at, in addition to daily or weekly sermons
transmitted through satellite TV. There are now dozens of TV channels
in India dedicated to spiritual/religious content, a majority of which cover
Hindu gurus. A quick review of websites of these gurus shows that veg-
etarianism is a prominent theme often presented as a necessary first step
toward initiation into their organization. An “upper” caste respondent
from North India described his father’s transition to vegetarianism, “my
father ate meat 7 days a week. My mother who is a vegetarian would have
to cook for him. He left meat abruptly when his guru initiated him into
his cult. He became a strict vegetarian that day onwards.” While most
gurus are formally unaffiliated with any political party, several among
them tend to align with the Hindu right wing (Upadhyay 2016) and many
have warm relations with the BJP.17

7. Conclusion
This study focuses on majoritarian vegetarianism in contemporary India,
an apparently benevolent practice that is being increasingly framed in
global climate change narratives as a conscientious lifestyle. India has long
been perceived as a vegetarian majority society, and Indian vegetarianism
has often been celebrated in Europe and the Americas as a symbol of
non-violence, spiritualism, and a healthy lifestyle. We show how the seem-
ingly benevolent vegetarianism associated with contemporary India is in
fact a deeply political and ideological project. It is followed mainly by
“upper” caste Hindu communities and is championed by Hindu Nationalists.
This version of vegetarianism aims to police caste boundaries and actively
maintain the self-other distinctions within the social hierarchy of the caste
system. Unlike the more egalitarian Sikh and Buddhist communities where
290 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

vegetarianism is also practiced, “upper” caste Hindu communities and

Hindu nationalist supporters of vegetarianism favor the conservation of
caste-based status through notions of purity and pollution and discriminate
against outgroups, especially members of “lower” caste groups within
Hindus and religious minorities, most of whom are omnivores. This par-
ticular type of exclusionary vegetarianism masquerades as a cultural pref-
erence and is promoted in both private and public spaces through a
combination of caste-based socialization and coercive mechanisms adopted
by Hindu-nationalist organizations and state apparatuses.
Since this version of vegetarianism is mainly followed by “upper” caste
Hindu communities who have had a historical monopoly over economic
and political power in India, their ability to maintain caste boundaries
through dietary taboos, as well as the persistence of discriminatory prac-
tices through food have negative consequences over the life outcomes of
a vast majority of the Indian population. Connections between caste iden-
tity and inequalities in India are well-established, especially in the context
of poverty (Borooah et al. 2014), education (Desai and Kulkarni 2008),
health (Nayar 2007), business opportunities, labor markets and development
in general (Mosse 2018). Equitable developmental outcomes require policies
that are cognizant of economic, political, and cultural factors so that their
execution can bring about improvements, especially among the marginal-
ized. On the contrary, excluding these factors from developmental planning
and policy making is likely to reproduce caste-based inequalities. In short,
caste matters in both politics and policy planning and ignoring its role
in social life can perpetuate existing inequalities.
This study argues that an uncritical acceptance and glorification of
majoritarian vegetarianism in contemporary India through influential voices
in the climate change debate creates many risks. Treating vegetarianism
as a cultural preference without its larger ideological context risks rein-
forcing social hierarchies and discrimination. Such acceptance, and any
policies or development programs shaped by such an acceptance can be
detrimental to the health and development of a majority of the population
in India.

Notes
1. We use “upper” and “lower” caste expressly to communicate how certain caste groups
are perceived and labeled popularly. We unequivocally reject the origin myths and
status claims of these labels.
2. https://scroll.in/article/731585/not-just-madhya-pradesh-denying-eggs-to-malnourished-
children-is-common-in-bjp-run-states
3. We discontinued asking respondents about their income and actual place of work
after sensing hesitation in the first few interviews, and limited our question to their
self-identified class backgrounds in later interviews.
 Food and Foodways 291

4. https://www.firstpost.com/living/shuddh-vegetarian-in-iit-delhi-rss-activists-spur-smriti-
irani-to-dictate-hostel-food-1825509.html
5. See: https://scroll.in/article/905692/untouchability-at-iit-madras-segregation-of-dining-
hall-for-pure-vegetarian-students-sparks-row; https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/
chennai/iit-madras-beef-festival-students-take-out-protest-march/articleshow/58924325.
cms
6. See: https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/eggs-chauhan-says-no-cm-rejects-govt-
proposal-for-mid-day-meal-menu/cid/482385; https://www.business-standard.com/
article/current-affairs/most-bjp-ruled-states-skip-eggs-in-mid-day-meal-cite-vegetarian-
sentiments-118073100120_1.html
7. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mid-day-meal-eggs-may-turn-kids-into-
cannibals-madhya-pradesh-s-leader-of-opposition/story-uuvl0whufoylmlmwVdmaxJ.
html
8. https://scroll.in/article/662132/liberal-hindu-newspaper-reiterates-no-meat-policy-in-
office-sparks-debate-on-vegetarian-fundamentalism
9. https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/06/29/vegetarian-tv_n_10522076.html
10. See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/mp-women-take-to-streets-over-
meat-shops-in-ujjain/articleshow/65691680.cms; https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
travel/destinations/welcome-to-palitana-worlds-first-vegetarian-city-in-indias-gujarat/
as71049380.cms; https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/haryana-imposes-ban-
on-sale-of-meat-in-thanesar-and-pehowa-municipality-areas/story-dkvNYl8iIij4av81fq9
MDK.html
11. See: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/up-s-slaughterhouses-a-rs-15-000-
crore-industry-that-provides-livelihood-to-25-lakh-people/story-7ZLE81JFynBFWz
RGZFVLfK.html
12. https://www.nagpurtoday.in/rss-starts-family-counselling-campaign-kutumb-
prabodhan/07201850
13. See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/gurgaon/hindu-groups-demand-meat-ban-
during-navratri-vandalise-shops/articleshow/66155539.cms; https://www.outlookindia.
com/newswire/story/bajrang-dal-seeks-complete-beef-ban-death-penalty-for-defying/
913955; https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/bajrang-dal-5-ransack-womens-food-
stall-on-beef-pretext/cid/1683987
14. https://acleddata.com/2021/05/03/cow-protection-legislation-and-vigilante-violence-in-
india/
15. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/20/mobs-killing-muslims-india-
narendra-modi-bjp; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65229522
16. See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/bjp-mla-justifies-lynchings/
articleshow/65111591.cms; https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2019/05/03/bjp-helped-
with-legal-fees-lynching-accused-minister-jayant-sinha.html
17. See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Sangh-Parivar-and-BJPs-frontal-
organizations-jump-in-support-of-Asaram-Bapu/articleshow/22069963.cms; https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sri-sri-ravishankar-to-be-chief-
guest-at-rss-function/articleshow/35792283.cms; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/
magazine/the-billionaire-yogi-behind-modis-rise.html

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank our respondents who gifted us their invaluable time and shared
their experiences, observations, beliefs, and perspectives about food and eating. We are
thankful to Bridgewater State University, MA for partially supporting this research through
292 A. HASNAIN AND A. SRIVASTAVA

a summer grant. Our colleagues Dr. Walter Carrol at Bridgewater State, and Dr. Justin
Myers at Fresno State generously read earlier versions of the manuscript and gave us very
productive feedback that helped us fully develop the manuscript. The anonymous reviewers
and Dr. Counihan at Food and Foodways have our gratitude for engaging deeply with our
work and for mounting several intellectual challenges that helped sharpen our thinking.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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