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 Chapter 10
REASONABLY ACCOMMODATING
DISABILITY AND RELIGION
OUTLINE
Reasonable Accommodation of Disability
Clippings
Elements of a Claim: Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Disability
Disability
Actual Disability
Record of a Disability
Perceived Disability
Qualified Individual with a Disability
Able to Perform the Essential Functions of the Job
Henschel v. Clare County Road Commission
Meets Job-Related Qualification Standards
Just the Facts
Not a Direct Threat
Reasonable Accommodation
The Process of Reasonably Accommodating Disability
What Makes an Accommodation Reasonable?
Keith v. County of Oakland
Just the Facts
Clippings
When Does an Accommodation Impose Undue Hardship?

Reasonable Accommodation of Religion

Religion
The Changing Workplace: Religion in the Workplace
Failure to Reasonably Accommodate Religion
Elements of a Claim
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners
Clippings
Just the Facts
Religious Advocacy and Religious Harassment
Clippings

Religious Organization Exemption

KEY TERMS
CHAPTER SUMMARY
PRACTICAL ADVICE SUMMARY
CHAPTER QUESTIONS
 CASE QUESTIONS

Horgan v. Simmons
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36915 (N.D. Ill.)

The plaintiff Horgan had been diagnosed as HIV positive ten years previously, but chose
to keep his status confidential. His job performance remained good and he was promoted
to the position of General Manager of the company’s Chicago facility. Simmons is the
president of the company and was Horgan’s supervisor. Simmons requested a meeting
with Horgan. The meeting was purportedly a “social visit,” but Simmons began to press
Horgan for information about his medical condition. In response to Simmons’ insistent
questioning, Horgan felt compelled to reveal his HIV positive status. Simmons asked
questions about Horgan’s prognosis and then asked him "how he could ever perform his
job with his HIV positive condition and how he could continue to work with a terminal
illness." Simmons also allegedly said that he "did not know how [Plaintiff] could lead if
the employees knew about his condition." Simmons allegedly told Horgan that he needed
"to recover" and that he should "go on vacation" and "leave the plant immediately.” An e-
mail sent out to other managers the next day stated that Horgan had been terminated.

1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the court decide?

The court had to decide whether Horgan was disabled with the meaning of the ADA (as
amended by the ADA Amendments Act), for purposes of determining whether the
employer should be granted summary judgment on his discriminatory termination claim.
The court also had to decide whether summary judgment should be granted on Horgan’s
claim that the employer had violated by the ADA by inquiring about his medical
condition. The court decided that the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to avoid
summary judgment on both of his ADA claims.

2. On what basis does the court conclude that this employee is disabled? If the court
had not found him to have an actual disability, would he have been able to successfully
argue that he was “regarded as” having a disability?

The court relied heavily on the ADA Amendments Act, and the EEOC’s regulations
implementing that law, in concluding that there was sufficient evidence that Horgan’s
HIV positive status was an actual disability. The employer conceded that it was a
physical impairment, but argued that the plaintiff had not shown substantial limitation
with respect to one or more specific major life activities. The ADAAA states that the
operation of "major bodily functions," including "functions of the immune system,"
constitute major life activities under the ADA's first definition of disability. In addition,
"an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially
limit a major life activity when active." The court concluded that “it is certainly plausible
-- particularly, under the amended ADA -- that Plaintiff's HIV positive status
substantially limits a major life activity: the function of his immune system. Such a
conclusion is consistent with the EEOC's proposed regulations to implement the ADAAA
which lists HIV as an impairment that will consistently meet the definition of disability.”

Alternatively, there might be grounds for arguing that this employer erroneously
regarded Horgan as disabled. Simmons’ comments reveal an inclination to assume the
worst about Horgan’s condition – despite evidence that his job performance had not
suffered. Simmons speculated about Horgan’s prognosis and the chances he would
develop AIDS, opined that his condition rendered him unable to lead, told him that he
needed to recover and go on vacation, removed him immediately from the workplace,
and terminated him the next day. Language in the ADAAA specifying that a perceived
disability can be established without showing that the defendant regarded the plaintiff as
substantially limited in performing a major life activity would also assist Horgan in
arguing for coverage under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s definition of disability.

3. Why was the employer’s questioning of this employee illegal? If, as it appears, the
termination was based on the employee’s disability, is there any way the employer could
defend its actions?

After hiring, the ADA restricts medical inquiries that might reveal the existence of a
disability to situations in which those inquiries are job related and consistent with
business necessity or voluntary. The questioning by Simmons, including both the initial
inquiries about “something physical or mental” that must be going on with Horgan and
the questions about his prognosis that followed the plaintiff’s admission that he was HIV
positive were certainly medical inquiries. The information would not be considered
voluntarily provided by Horgan, insofar as the purpose of the meeting had been
concealed and he divulged the information only under the pressure of insistent
questioning. It is unclear what exactly prompted Simmons to engage in this line of
inquiry – perhaps a rumor he had picked up on or possibly some discernible differences
in Horgan’s behavior. The limited evidence presented in the case suggests that there had
been no adverse effects on Horgan’s job performance. Thus, it seems unlikely that the
employer would be able to show that it had “a reasonable belief, based on objective
evidence” that a medical condition was making it not possible for the employee to
perform the essential functions of his job or that he was a direct threat to himself or
others. And if there were not sufficient grounds to ask him questions about his medical
condition, it is most unlikely that the employer would be able to defend the
discriminatory termination claim by showing that the employee’s HIV positive status
rendered him unable to perform the essential functions of the job or that he was a direct
threat.

4. Why do you think the company president acted as he did?

Normally, I would not use a brief district court decision as a chapter case. However, I
wanted a case illustrating the impact of the ADA Amendments Act and there were very
few cases available at the time at which this text was being prepared. But this case also
has the virtue of presenting us with a simple set of facts showing the potential for the
misunderstanding and stigma surrounding some conditions – especially HIV and AIDS –
to result in disability discrimination.

EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions

620 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010)

The plaintiff in this case is a deaf person who does office work for UPS. His primary
language is American Sign Language (ASL). He reads and writes in English at a fourth or
fifth grade level. He was able to successfully perform his job duties. However, he
encountered difficulties participating in weekly workplace meetings, job training, and
disciplinary meetings.

1. What was the legal issue in this case? What did the court decide?

The issue was whether UPS failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee. The
appeals court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer
and remanded the case.

2. What things did UPS do for this employee? Why does the court nonetheless allow the
employee’s failure to reasonably accommodate claim to go forward?

The plaintiff regularly complained about not being able to understand what was going on
at meetings and to participate in them by asking questions. He was given written notes
after meetings, although these were not very comprehensive. A system was briefly
adopted of having a co-worker take notes during the meeting and show them to the
plaintiff, but it was difficult for the note takers to keep up or provide more than the broad
outlines of what was being discussed. The plaintiff repeatedly requested assignment of an
ASL interpreter during meetings. After a period of complaining, a sign language
interpreter was provided for monthly meetings, but not for the weekly meetings. When
the plaintiff announced that he would not attend meetings if an ASL interpreter was not
present, he was written up as being insubordinate. However, managers’ treatment of the
question of his attendance was inconsistent. While being told that he needed to attend all
meetings, he was not actually disciplined when he did not do so.
Regarding job training, the plaintiff had been told for years that he needed
training to improve his Excel spreadsheet skills. He attempted to use an on-line training
program but could not understand the written material. After issuing numerous reminders
that he needed to complete this training, he was assigned a sign language interpreter for
the training. Upon being hired, the plaintiff had been issued a copy of the sexual
harassment policy, but was unable to understand it. There was subsequently an incident
where his behavior was construed as violating the company’s harassment policy. An
initial disciplinary meeting was held. An ASL interpreter was assigned. The plaintiff
apologized for the language and offensive gesture he had directed at another employee.
At a subsequent meeting to convey a written warning, no interpreter was provided. The
plaintiff had many questions about the meaning of the notice. He was told to look the
words he didn’t understand up in the dictionary. He was later asked to complete a
questionnaire and to sign for receipt of another copy of the company’s conduct and
harassment policies. Again, he had many questions about the materials and was told to
just look things up in the dictionary.

There was evidence that the accommodations offered during weekly meetings were
ineffective. The information was not sufficiently detailed and did not allow for
participation and questioning during meetings. The employee made regular requests for
interpreters and made it clear that he was frustrated with not receiving information. “[I]n
determining whether to provide an ASL interpreter for weekly meetings, UPS did not
consider the nature of the information being communicated in a particular meeting or the
length of the meeting, but instead relied on relatively arbitrary considerations. Schulz
testified that she decided to approve an interpreter for the monthly meetings but not for
the weekly meetings because she "felt once a month was sufficient." A trier of fact could
conclude that UPS refused to provide an interpreter for regular meetings that were less
than two hours long because there was a two-hour minimum charge for ASL interpreter
services. If UPS failed to consider whether the circumstances of a weekly meeting
necessitated the use of an ASL interpreter, then the trier of fact could find that UPS failed
to engage in the interactive process in good faith.” When it came to the training, an
interpreter was eventually provided, but not until several years after the need for training
was first identified. Problems in understanding the harassment policy and the meaning of
the disciplinary action taken against him were also known to the employer, but produced
inconsistent responses. ASL interpreters were sometimes provided, but at other times the
plaintiff was simply advised to consult the dictionary. “Even if Centeno did not
expressly request an interpreter to understand the Policy, a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that UPS was aware or should have been aware that the modification it offered--
consulting an English-language dictionary--was not effective.”
Fundamentally, this case is about the employer’s obligation to accommodate a
disabled employee so that he could fully participate in the workplace and enjoy the same
benefits and privileges of employment enjoyed by non-disabled employees. Conditions of
employment do not have to be made literally identical for disabled employees, but the
employer clearly has an obligation to ensure that a disabled employee is not isolated and
excluded by virtue of failure to make accommodations to a known disability. The
company’s actions in this regard were inconsistent, grudging, and somewhat arbitrary.

3. Why does UPS not argue that providing the ASL interpreter would be an undue
hardship?

Under the ADA, UPS would have to show that providing the requested accommodation
would result in significant difficulty or expense for the company. Given the size and
resources of UPS, and the fact that it was able to provide interpreters for monthly
meetings, they would have a difficult time arguing that providing the interpreter would be
an undue hardship. The court suggests that a primary motive for not approving the
interpreter for weekly meetings was that interpreters are assigned on the basis of a two-
hour minimum and that UPS would not get its money’s worth for meetings that last less
than two hours.
4. Is the issue in this case deafness or literacy? Are these connected?

While the literacy levels of deaf persons differ, it is common for deaf persons to have
difficulty learning to read and write in English and to read at a primary school level.
Deaf persons are at a severe disadvantage learning English or other languages because
they lack exposure to spoken language. Most people learn language by first hearing it and
then making associations between letters and sounds. It is also the case that deaf persons
who learn ASL are in the position of having to learn an entirely different English
language with a different grammar and without direct parallels for certain words or
concepts. For deaf persons, problems in reading and writing in English are a
manifestation of their disability.

5. Do you agree with the court’s decision? Why or why not?

Cloutier v. Costco
390 F. 3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4923

The employer instituted a dress code that included a “no facial jewelry” requirement. An
employee who wore facial jewelry informed the employer that she was a member of the
Church of Body Modification and that the policy conflicted with her religious practices.
The employee was eventually suspended and then terminated for non-compliance with
the policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on the grounds
that it had offered a reasonable accommodation that the employee refused, even though
the offer of accommodation did not come until after a charge was filed with the EEOC
and the parties were in mediation.

4. Should courts consider accommodations offered after an adverse employment action

has been taken, in determining whether an employer has failed to offer a reasonable
accommodation?

In general, post-filing actions of an employer cannot be used to excuse prior violations of

the law. Ruling otherwise would allow employers to violate the law and then avoid
liability by doing what should have been done before a charge had to be filed. Yet, there
are also benefits to allowing accommodations offered post-charge to be considered, as it
encourages mediation and voluntary settlements. The district court said the
accommodation offered during the mediation process was reasonable and had been
rejected by the plaintiff. The appeals court declined to decide the matter, focusing instead
on its conclusion that no accommodation could be given without undue hardship.

5. Does Costco meet its burden of showing that there is no accommodation acceptable to
Cloutier that it could provide without undue hardship? Under the logic of this decision,
would employers ever have to make exceptions to established dress and appearance
codes in order to accommodate religious practice?
The appeals court concluded that Costco had met its burden in this regard. This
conclusion rested primarily on the view that Costco has a basic right as an employer to
decide on personal appearance standards and to protect the image that its employees
convey to the public. Since exemption from the policy was the only accommodation that
Cloutier would accept, the cost of losing control of its public image, though non-
economic, was far more than de minimis. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that
there was no undue hardship shown because the employer’s concerns were purely
hypothetical, the employee had not received any complaints or comments during the time
that she worked with the facial jewelry in place, her job performance did not suffer, and
the policy was not consistently enforced anyhow. The court cited other cases in which
appearance requirements stood up to legal challenges on religious and other grounds, but
no cases in which courts have found for the plaintiffs.
Certainly, this would be an easier case if the plaintiff had been willing to cover
the facial jewelry in some fashion and the employer refused to go along with that. It is
hard to see how making an exception of this sort would impose undue hardship. But the
court’s rationale that employers have a basic right to control their public image by
establishing appearance requirements and that assumed customer preference trumps the
need to accommodate religion is very sweeping. Costco offered no evidence of hardship
other than the existence of the policy itself and its own notion about what looks
“professional.”
 JUST THE FACTS
Page 346 of text
A photography studio hired a profoundly deaf employee as a “performer.” She
communicates with hearing individuals by writing notes, gesturing, pointing, and
miming. She can also type, text message, use body language, employ basic American Sign
Language signs that most people can understand, and speak some words. However, she
cannot read lips effectively and she speaks only a few words. Her written communication
skills are poor and she scores below average on vocational tests. Performers have four
areas of responsibility: customer intake, sales, portrait photography, and laboratory
duties. The job description lists “strong verbal communication skills” and “strong
customer service skills” as job qualifications for performers. During peak (holiday)
periods, performers mainly work in one area of responsibility, and she was assigned to
work primarily in the camera room doing photography. However, during nonpeak
periods, only one manager and one performer are scheduled to work at a time. During
these periods, performers are expected to cover all four areas of responsibility. The
woman had the opportunity to shoot photographs on fifteen to twenty occasions with a
hearing performer and she conducted shoots by herself on a couple of occasions. She
communicated with photo subjects by writing notes, gesturing, and miming. She
experienced some difficulty doing this, particularly because the photo subjects were
usually young children. To sell photo packages to customers, she had to write notes,
gesture, or get assistance from a coworker. The woman made several requests for an ASL
interpreter, including during her initial orientation and then for a subsequent training
session for performers, but no interpreter was ever provided. After the holiday season,
the woman’s hours were eliminated and she was eventually terminated. She sued. What
should the court decide? Why? (See EEOC v. Picture People, 684 F.3d 981 (10th Cir.
2012).)

The court found in favor of the employer, upholding summary judgment, on the basis that
the employee was not qualified for the position of performer, with or without a
reasonable accommodation. The court found that verbal communication skills were an
essential function of the performer position, especially because a performer had only 20
minutes to communicate with young children for a photo shoot; notes and gesturing
would not be adequate to address these requirements. In fact, the court found that the
employee was unable to fully perform three of the four duties of a performer. The court
then considered whether a reasonable accommodations was available. The employee had
asked for an ASL sign language interpreter, but the court, reviewing case law, found that
interpreters were provided for meetings and the like, but not for the performance of an
essential function of the job. In each of the previous cases where a sign language
interpreter was provided or should have been provided, the employee was able to perform
the essential functions of the job without a sign language interpreter. Therefore,
supplying one would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because plaintiff was
unable to perform the essential functions of her job. Thus, no reasonable accommodation
was available. The court also reviewed whether the employer retaliated against her in
violation of ADA – cutting her hours - but everyone had hours cut after the end of the
busy holiday season. One judge filed a dissent, and would have vacated summary
judgment in favor of the employer, believing that plaintiff was qualified to do her job.

Page 356 of text

A schoolteacher was successful at teaching kindergarten for five years. She requested to
teach first grade and was then reassigned to a classroom that had no exterior windows.
She told the school principal that she suffered from seasonal affective disorder, a form of
depression. She made numerous requests to be moved to a classroom with natural light,
but the school refused to do so. She also presented the school district with a letter from
her psychologist stating that her depression was being exacerbated by the lack of natural
light. Another teacher who had been assigned to a classroom with exterior windows had
offered to switch rooms. There was also one vacant room with exterior windows, but this
room was being reserved for the possible addition of another class section. The woman’s
health deteriorated. She suffered from significant inability to concentrate, organize her
thoughts, retrieve words, make decisions, and focus on the needs of her students. She also
experienced racing thoughts, panic attacks, uncontrollable crying, inability to eat, and
thoughts of suicide. She went on medical leave. Eventually, she quit and went to work
elsewhere. Did this employer fail to reasonably accommodate this employee? (Ekstrand
v. School District of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972 [7th Cir. 2009]).

The appeals court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the school
district on the teacher’s failure to reasonably accommodate disability claim. [However,
summary judgment was affirmed on her additional claim that she was constructively
discharged .] The parties apparently did not dispute that the teacher’s seasonal affective
disorder was a disability. On November 28, 2005, the plaintiff’s doctor notified the
school district's workers' compensation claims representative of "the importance of
natural light for individuals with a history of this disorder" and that "Mrs. Eckstrand's
current episode of depression was most likely directly related to a change in her work
location, to a room lacking any [exterior] windows." Prior to then, the plaintiff had not
provided the school district with anything more than her own belief that natural light was
necessary to accommodate her. Thus, there was no evidence that the school district knew
natural light therapy was the only way to accommodate the plaintiff before November 28.

However, once the district became aware of the medical necessity of natural light,
and having been informed by the plaintiff two weeks earlier that she was willing and able
to return to work in a classroom with natural light, the school district was obligated to
provide Ekstrand's specifically requested, medically necessary accommodation unless it
"would impose an undue hardship" on the school district. “Little hardship would have
been imposed in providing Ekstrand an available classroom.” The school district would
have experienced costs associated with switching the items in the two rooms and with
performing any necessary readjustments specific to the teachers' respective curricula. If
the teacher had been accommodated by providing the empty room, it would have
experienced the costs of moving her items, plus the costs of switching and readjustment
due to the room being needed for a new third-grade section reduced by the probability
that creation of the third-grade section would not occur. These costs were judged to be
modest.

Page 370 of text

A cashier at a Costco store wore facial jewelry. The company subsequently revised its
dress code to prohibit all facial jewelry except earrings. Despite the change of policy, the
woman continued to wear her eyebrow piercings without managerial objection. A few
months later, however, managers started to actively enforce the policy. The woman was
told that she would have to remove her facial jewelry. At this point, the woman mentioned
for the first time that she was a member of the Church of body Modification and that her
facial piercings had religious significance. Members of this Church participate in various
forms of body modification, including piercing, tattooing, branding, and cutting. The
Church’s mission is to promote its adherents’ personal growth so that they may become
“confident role models in learning, teaching, and displaying body modification.” The
Church does not strictly require that its members wear or display facial jewelry at all
times, but the woman said that this is how she regarded its call to be a confident role
model. The woman was eventually terminated for noncompliance with the company’s
dress code. After she filed a charge with the EEOC, and during mediation, the employer
offered for the first time to allow her to come back to work if she would either use clear
plastic retainers or cover her facial piercings with Band-Aids. Although the woman had
made the same request when she was initially confronted by her supervisors, she now
took the position that only being allowed to openly wear the facial jewelry would fulfill
her religious obligations. Costco refused, and the case went to court What should the
court decide? Why?

The legal issue is whether the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the
religious practices of an employee by making an exception to the no facial jewelry
provision of its dress code. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the employer, but on the alternative grounds that the employer could not
accommodate the employee without incurring undue hardship.

Cloutier did suffer adverse employment consequences (suspension, termination)

and she informed the employer about the conflict between her religious practices and the
dress code before being suspended (although only after there was a confrontation with a
supervisor about the policy and she had not invoked her religious beliefs in an earlier
dispute over jewelry wearing that resulted in her transfer to a clerk position). The
existence of a sincere religious belief or practice is more in question. Cloutier’s
application to join the Church of Body Modification was dated two days after she was
first told to remove her facial jewelry, although she claimed that a prior application dated
three months earlier had been sent, but not processed due to a computer error. The tenets
of the church, as stated on its web site, do not include a requirement that body
modifications be visible at all times. Nevertheless, Cloutier asserted that she was called to
be a “confident role model” and thus, had to display her facial jewelry at all times. While
Cloutier’s recent adherence to the CBM and her broad interpretation of its tenets raised
questions about the sincerity of her practices, courts are very reluctant to find a practice
 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In light of the ADA, how should employers deal with employees afflicted by alcoholism?

Unlike current users of illegal drugs, persons who suffer from alcoholism are potentially
disabled under the ADA. To be protected, the employee would also have to “qualified.”
Someone whose drinking does not allow him or her to perform the essential functions of
a job and to meet the employer’s disciplinary standards, even with reasonable
accommodation, would not be protected. As a potentially disabling condition, prospective
employers should refrain from inquiring about whether an employee is an alcoholic or
about drinking habits more generally. However, inquiring about whether a job candidate
has been drinking would not be an illegal pre-employment medical inquiry. Blood or
other tests to determine alcohol use are considered medical exams and can lawfully be
conducted only after a conditional offer of employment has been made or after an
employee has been hired when the test would be job related and consistent with business
necessity. Reasonable suspicion that an employee might be abusing alcohol on the job is
one circumstance that would render such a test job related. An employee could not be
terminated for being an alcoholic, but could be terminated for violating rules about being
impaired in the workplace. The ADA explicitly provides that alcoholics can be held to
the same standards of performance and behavior as other employees. If an employee
misbehaves in a manner that warrants termination, that employee can be terminated even
if he or she then cites a problem with alcohol as the cause of the misbehavior. However,
if the appropriate discipline is something less than termination, the discipline can still be
administered, but the employer should also engage in the interactive process with the
employee to determine whether any reasonable accommodations could be made that
would help the employee meet the employer’s performance and behavioral expectations.
Accommodations might include referral to an EAP (Employee Assistance Program),
leave, or a modified work schedule. (EEOC. The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Applying Performance and Conduct Standards to Employees with Disabilities. Viewed
October 11, 2008. (http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html).

What reasonable accommodations would be most appropriate for persons with

psychiatric disabilities?

Psychiatric disabilities often limit employees who suffer from them in such major life
activities as learning, thinking, concentrating, sleeping, caring for oneself, speaking,
interacting with others, and working. Accommodations that could be helpful include
leaves of absence; part-time schedules; dividers, partitions, and other sound-proofing or
visual barriers; modified supervisory methods (e.g., adjusting the means of
communicating with supervisors, the level of supervision provided, and the amount of
structure); job coaches; and modified work rules. As with alcoholics, poor performance
or disciplinary infractions need not be excused or ignored simply because they might be
linked to a psychiatric disability. However, it should be considered whether performance
and behavioral problems are related to a disability and hopefully, reasonable
accommodations can be made that will alleviate these problems before they become
severe. (EEOC. Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Psychiatric Disabilities. March 25, 1997. Viewed. May 12, 2009
(http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html).

What are some ways of handling conflicts between work schedules and religious
obligations?

Conflicts between work schedules and religious holy days, celebrations, Sabbaths, prayer
times, and other religious observances are probably the most common issue encountered
by employers in terms of accommodating religion. Employers need incur only de
minimis hardship in order to meet their legal obligations, but should permit and facilitate
swaps between employees (e.g., by providing information about other employees’
schedules, allowing postings on bulletin boards), permit employees to use available
personal time, offer flexible schedules and break times (e.g., allow breaks to coincide
with prayer times), and if necessary, consider transfer or reassignment to positions or
shifts that would not pose the same conflicts. While authorization of vacation or other
paid time off might be appropriate for special needs, employees should not be required to
use up all of their time off in order to practice their faith.

How should employers deal with religious advocacy or proselytizing by employees?

This is potentially a problem for all employers, but especially for public employers who
are constrained by the dual requirements of the First Amendment that they permit the free
exercise of religion yet also not allow the establishment of religion in the workplace. In
general, employers should not attempt to stifle all religious communication in the
workplace. Nor should separate rules and policies be established for different religious
persuasions. Allowing space and opportunity for voluntary gatherings or communications
relating to religion that could be attended or ignored is often a workable option. Policies
on the display of religious articles should distinguish between areas of the workplace in
which co-workers, customers, and others are likely to be exposed to potentially
unwelcome religious messages and other areas where that is unlikely to happen.
Anything that the employer can do in the way of diversity training and promoting
tolerance and mutual understanding should be helpful with this issue. But ultimately, the
employer has to be most concerned with maintaining a productive workplace and one that
is free from religious and other forms of harassment.
 END OF CHAPTER QUESTIONS

1. A woman worked part-time as a clerk at a drug store. She worked mostly on weekdays
from 5 PM to 9 PM, but was occasionally given other shifts. Due to glaucoma, she
eventually lost all sight in her left eye. She had no difficulty performing her job, but she
did experience problems getting to work. She asked to be given a “day shifts only”
schedule because of the danger of driving home at night and the complete unavailability
of public transportation. Her supervisor said that she would not be given the schedule
she requested because that would not be fair to the store’s other employees. The woman
provided a doctor’s note recommending that she not drive during evening hours, but the
store did not change its position. Her union representative met with store officials and
reported that he “got nowhere.” Other attempts to arrange meetings involving the
woman fell through. She received rides from family members and did not miss any work
following the denial of her request. However, it became too difficult to continue to
arrange rides and she quit. Did the store fail to reasonably accommodate this employee?
Why or why not? (Colwell v. Rite Aid, 602 F.3d 495 [3d Cir. 2010])

The appeals court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer
on the plaintiff’s failure to reasonably accommodate disability claim. The appeals court
agreed that the effects of her glaucoma, including her eventual blindness in one eye and
inability to see at night, were sufficient evidence that she was substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing. Regarding the employer’s failure to reasonably
accommodate, the court said that “the questions at issue … are whether Rite Aid had any
duty to accommodate Colwell in her request for a shift change, and whether Rite Aid
satisfied its duty to accommodate Colwell.” The plaintiff’s requested accommodation –
modification of her shift assignment to the day shift – is an accommodation that the ADA
specifically lists among examples of reasonable accommodations. In this court’s view,
reasonable accommodation is not strictly limited to things that disabled employees need
after they report to work and are engaging in work activities. “We therefore hold that
under certain circumstances the ADA can obligate an employer to accommodate an
employee's disability-related difficulties in getting to work, if reasonable. One such
circumstance is when the requested accommodation is a change to a workplace condition
that is entirely within an employer's control and that would allow the employee to get to
work and perform her job.” The court distinguished its holding from other district court
decisions saying that employers do not have to provide accommodations aimed at helping
employees commute to work. Here, the accommodation was a requested shift change – a
modification that was entirely within the control of the employer. The plaintiff could get
to work on her own, provided that she was able to work during the day time so that she
could see where she was going.

The court also considered whether the employer had engaged sufficiently in an
interactive process. The employer claimed that it had because after a conversation with
the plaintiff, it was left that she would try to get rides from her grandson. There was no
further duty because the plaintiff did not inform them that she still needed an
accommodation. On the other hand, there was evidence that that she had told the
employer that the solution was unreliable and temporary. When she asked the union rep
to press the issue of a schedule change, he was rebuffed. At no point did the employer
inquire further with her or offer any other accommodation. A reasonable jury could find
that the interactive process was insufficient.

2. A woman with severe, chronic back problems that resulted in multiple surgeries
returned to her job as an inspector at a candy factory. Her physician cleared her for light
work that required no bending, stooping, or lifting of more than twenty pounds. The
factory had three lines on which inspectors worked. On two of them, inspectors could
remain seated while performing their tasks. On the third (line 7), inspectors had to stand
and repeatedly bend and twist to sort different-sized candies moving down the conveyor.
Initially, on her return, the woman was assigned to only one of the less physically
demanding lines. However, the company subsequently decided, due to the high incidence
of repetitive stress injuries at the plant, to implement a job rotation system. Under this
system, the woman would sometimes have to work on line 7. The woman requested an
exemption from the job rotation system, but this was denied. The woman was unable to
continue on the job. Has this employer failed to reasonably accommodate this employee?
Why or why not? (Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604 [3d Cir. 2006])

The appeals court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.
A reasonable jury could find that rotating between these positions was not an essential
function of the inspector job. Thus, the accommodation of allowing the employee to be
exempted from having to rotate between lines would constitute the elimination of a
marginal function, making it a “reasonable” accommodation. The court noted that the
inspector position does not exist for the purpose of having employees rotate between
lines; the use of a rotation system had no bearing on the number of employees needed to
perform the work; and rotating between lines is not a highly specialized function for
which the plaintiff was specifically hired (indeed, it is the opposite of a specialized skill).
The court also noted that neither the written job description for the inspector position nor
the collective bargaining agreement made reference to rotation. Nor has job rotation been
the general practice of this company in the past. The court stopped short of actually
deciding that job rotation is not an essential function of this job, leaving that
determination for a jury.

3. A bank loan officer who was taking medication for depression had numerous drinks at
a local bar, went to a cemetery, and, with a gun in his hand, threatened to commit
suicide. He eventually drove off but was intercepted by the police and committed to a
psychiatric facility for four days. His physician certified that he would be able to resume
all of his duties in a week, but the bank balked at reinstating him. Officials at the bank
expressed their shock that he was released from the hospital so quickly after threatening
to kill himself. He was told that he could not be immediately reinstated because of “the
impact of your action in the community and on the ability to perform your job.” He was
placed on a leave of absence and then terminated. Did the bank violate the ADA? Why or
why not? (Lizotte v. Dacotah Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1223 [D.N.D.]
The district court denied the employer’s request for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
ADA disparate treatment claim. The plaintiff argued that he was covered under the
ADA’s “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability. The relevant decision makers
were aware of the plaintiff’s psychological problems and that he was taking medication
and receiving treatment prior to the suicide threat. They made statements indicating that
they were concerned that his condition rendered him unfit for bank work because of
safety and public image concerns. One manager professed to be amazed that he had been
released so soon and was looking to return to work rather than in jail. “There is
undisputed evidence that Lizotte was terminated on December 14, 2006 because of the
Defendants' concerns about "safety," "reputation," "customer acceptance," "liability," and
a desire to protect the bank's image in Minot. The EEOC regulations and case law
explicitly state that such "attitudinal barriers" may reflect a perception of disability based
on "myth, fear or stereotype" and that this is a scenario the ADA is designed to guard
against. The Court finds that Lizotte has presented sufficient evidence at this stage to
show that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dacotah Bank officials
regarded Lizotte as being disabled or impaired under the ADA.”
The court concluded that his physician had certified his ability to return to his job
(hence, he was “qualified”) and that absent the incident in November 2006, he would not
have been terminated. The bank asserted that its decision to terminate was based on
concerns for the safety and customers and co-workers and for the public image of the
bank. However, the employer did not assert the direct threat defense (which, as an
affirmative defense, it must do) and there appeared to be little evidence that he continued
to pose a threat to safety. Arguments about reputation were also questionable, since the
bank did not suffer losses or adverse publicity in the wake of incident. The incident was
known to only a few other employees at the bank. The employer’s concerns appeared to
be highly speculative at best. The court concluded that “The ADA does not require that
Dacotah Bank officials put its staff and the general public at risk by employing an
individual who poses a direct threat to others. But the ADA does require the bank to
provide due consideration to an individual they arguably may have "regarded as" having
a mental impairment and who may be able, with reasonable accommodation, to perform
his work productively and safely.”

4. A delivery person injured his back on the job, resulting in a serious disc problem that
required surgery. Following surgery, the employee’s doctor imposed a lifting restriction
of twenty-three pounds. This restriction precluded a return to his former position. The
employee requested reassignment to another vacant job. The employer’s established
procedure was to post all job openings and to require that employees initiate any
requests for transfer. The employee completed one transfer request for a
computer/clerical position but was judged to be unqualified due to his limited computer
and office skills. The company also considered him for a telephone sales position and
contacted him to set up an interview. At the interview, it was determined that the
employee did not have sufficient motivation for sales. Within about a month of his request
for reassignment, it was concluded that there were no positions available for which he
was qualified and the employee was fired. The employee sued. What should the court
decide? Why? (Burns v. Coca-Cola, 222 F.3d 247 [6th Cir. 2000])

The Appeals Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Burns was disabled, as
evidenced by his being unable to perform at least fifty percent of the jobs previously
available to him. The court also acknowledged that reassignment to a vacant position is
an accommodation that an employer must consider once it becomes clear that he is
unable to perform his current job due to a disability. However, the court decided that the
employer had done enough to meet its responsibilities under the ADA. In order to prevail,
the employee would have had to request a transfer to a position for which he was
otherwise qualified or shown that he sought assistance in identifying such a position and
the employer did not provide the assistance. In short, the court concluded that Burns did
not comply with the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory transfer request policy.
The employee’s failure to identify an alternative position and request a transfer was fatal
to his case.
The issue of whether employers must modify or make exceptions to neutral
policies in order to reasonably accommodate disabled persons is important and is
especially likely to be encountered when reassignment is the only available
accommodation. The narrow view, evidenced in this decision and also in Huber v. Wal-
Mart Stores (see “Just the Facts”), is that accommodation is only required for those
obstacles or requirements that the disabled employee cannot surmount specifically due to
his or her disability. Under this view, requiring more than this of employers converts the
ADA to an affirmative action statute. The broader view is that the duty to reasonably
accommodate is distinct from and goes well beyond the obligation to not discriminate.
The employer who simply makes available the same process for reassignment that would
be available to a non-disabled employee appears to be doing little more than refraining
from discrimination. The Supreme Court suggested a leaning toward the narrower view
when it held in U.S. Airways v. Barnett that employers generally would not have to make
exceptions to seniority systems to accommodate disabled employees.

5. A call center representative suffered from a rare condition known as “brittle bone
disease” that permanently confined him to a wheelchair. The call center has a strict
policy on tardiness. Employees are penalized for reporting to work or returning from
lunch more than three minutes late. The representative was frequently late, especially
returning from lunch. His tardiness was caused by a variety of factors including an
insufficient number of disabled accessible parking spots in the company lot, a policy of
not assigning specific cubicles to representatives, cluttered aisles that made it difficult to
maneuver between cubicles, and lack of equipment in some cubicles. The representative
requested that he be given a grace period of an additional fifteen minutes when returning
from lunch. He would be responsible for working the same total amount of time, but he
would be allowed to start a few minutes later if needed. Adjusting his work schedule in
this manner would have eliminated almost all of the incidents of tardiness. His
supervisors refused the grace period request and terminated the representative. Did this
employer fail to reasonably accommodate this employee? (EEOC v. Convergys Customer
Service Group, 491 F.3d 790 [8th Cir. 2007])
 The issue was whether the employer failed to reasonably accommodate this
disabled employee. A jury found for the plaintiff and the appeals court affirmed. The
court first faulted the employer for failing to engage in an interactive process with the
plaintiff to identify a workable accommodation. They were clearly on notice of his need
for assistance and he had proposed at least one specific accommodation – being allowed
to report to work a few minutes later. The employer claimed that this accommodation
would require it to eliminate an essential function of his position – starting work in a
punctual fashion. The court accepted that punctuality was an essential function of the job,
but said that providing an additional 15 minutes to return from lunch would not eliminate
that requirement or create an open-ended work schedule. Had the employee been able to
have the additional time to return from lunch, almost all of his lunchtime infractions
would have been eliminated. The ADA specifically lists “modified work schedules”
among its examples of reasonable accommodations.

The accommodation discussed in the case is not the only one possible and
probably would not be enough by itself to eliminate problems with punctuality that
included the time at which he initially reported to work. Certainly, creating more parking
spots for disabled employees, making sure that they are not filled by non-disabled
employees, and perhaps even reserving parking spots could and should have been done.
Likewise, reserving a cubicle and making sure that it is adequately equipped would also
be a reasonable accommodation. Indeed, this was apparently done for the plaintiff for a
period of time, only to be removed when a new supervisor took over. It might turn out
that reserving cubicles works better for all employees, although a complete change of
policy would not be required.

6. A man diagnosed with schizophrenia worked for New York City as a case manager. He
took medication that made him drowsy and sluggish in the morning. Even though the
agency he worked for had a flex-time program that allowed employees to start work
between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. and to leave work anytime between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. (a
one-hour lunch break was required under a collective bargaining agreement), the man
was frequently late to work. Supervisors ignored his tardiness for over 10 years, allowing
him to make up hours by working later. However, it was eventually decided that he would
have to start reporting to work on time. The man checked with his doctor, who confirmed
that it was important for him to take his medication at that same time in the morning. He
requested that he be allowed to come in later, but make up time by working through
lunch and/or by working past 6:00 p.m. (the agency was open until 10:00 p.m.).
The agency refused these requests, citing the labor agreement’s lunch break requirement
and the fact that managers left at 6:00 p.m. The tardiness continued and the man was
suspended for 30 days without pay. He sued. What should the court decide? Why? (See
McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013).)

On appeal, the employee challenged the district court's findings (1) that arriving at
work by 10:15 a.m. was an essential function of his job; (2) that he was unqualified
because of his tardiness, which was undisputedly a result of his disability; (3) that his
requested accommodations were unreasonable; and (4) that his other failure to
accommodate claims were without merit.
The court found that arriving on or before 10:15 a.m. — or at any consistent time
— may not have been an essential requirement of the employee's particular job. For
many years prior to 2008, his late arrivals were explicitly or implicitly approved.
Similarly, the fact that the City's flex-time policy permitted all employees to arrive and
leave within one-hour windows implies that punctuality and presence at precise times
may not be essential. The court determined that a reasonable juror could find that arriving
at a specific time was not an essential function of the case manager position, provided
that the employee still would be able to complete his work in a sufficiently timely
fashion. Thus, summary judgment was not appropriate.
The employee had suggested as an accommodation that he could work through
lunch and work late in order to "bank" time. If his lunchtime, overtime and tardy arrivals
were approved, he would then be able to apply this banked time against future late
arrivals. The accommodation was plausible. The next question is whether this would this
be an undue hardship to the city. The court noted that the city already had a policy of
allowing employees to “bank” any hours they work in excess of 7/day, and apply banked
time against late arrivals, if approved. There was no evidence that approving late arrivals
would constitute an undue burden on city. But would the employee be able to bank
sufficient time to cover his late arrivals? Requiring a supervisor to work past 6 pm would
be undue hardship for the city, but the employee had been unsupervised when he made
home visits or worked past 7 pm. He proposed that he work through lunch, which is
permissible with approval. Approving such work does not involve “significant difficulty
or expense. ” Summary judgment in favor of the city was vacated, and the case
remanded for further fact-finding and trial.

7. A medical resident has Asperger’s disorder. Evaluations of his work by supervising

physicians were mixed, citing problems with communication skills, self-awareness, social
competence, and relationship management. After the hospital informed the resident that
they intended to terminate his residency, he provided them with information about his
condition and suggested that he could successfully complete the program if the other
nurses and physicians were informed about his condition, its symptoms, and the things
that trigger it. The hospital said that it lacked the resources to comply with his request,
but that it would assist him in locating a residency in a field such as pathology that
requires little patient interaction. The terminated medical resident sued. Did the hospital
fail to reasonably accommodate the resident? Why or why not? (Jakubowski v. Christ
Hospital, 627 F.3d 195 [6th Cir. 2010]; cert. denied, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4937))

The appeals court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the hospital. The parties did
not dispute that his condition is a disability. However, the issue was whether he was a
“qualified” individual with a disability. The hospital identified communicating with
professional colleagues and patients in ways that ensure patient safety as an essential
function. Medical care requires teamwork and communication between numerous parties.
“Accordingly, we agree that there is no dispute that these functions are essential to the
work of a family practice physician residency training program. Because Jakubowski
admittedly had difficulty performing these functions, some kind of accommodations
would be necessary for him to continue his work. Thus, whether Jakubowski was a
qualified individual depends on whether he proposed a reasonable accommodation to
account for his disability.” The court did not believe that the proposed accommodation of
greater understanding from others would allow the plaintiff to successfully communicate
and manage relationships with others, particularly patients who would not been the
recipients of this information. The court also found that the employer had adequately
engaged in the interactive process. “Because Christ Hospital met with Jakubowski,
considered his proposed accommodations, informed him why they were unreasonable,
offered assistance in finding a new pathology residency, and never hindered the process
along the way, we agree that there is no dispute that Christ Hospital participated in the
interactive accommodation process in good faith.”
A concurring (in the judgment only) opinion points to an interesting aspect of this
case. Although the plaintiff’s expert witnesses pointed to a number of other potential
accommodations, the court considered only the one accommodation actually requested by
the plaintiff prior to his termination. “But we have never squarely held, as the majority
does today, that the sufficiency of an ADA plaintiff's showing that he is otherwise
qualified must be analyzed exclusively in light of the scope of the accommodation he
requested from his employer prior to his termination from his position, even where more
ample evidence that a plaintiff is otherwise qualified or that a defendant acted with
discriminatory intent, emerges through discovery. The onus to prove—as a matter of
law—that an ADA plaintiff can do the job with the right accommodation is triggered by
the filing of a discrimination lawsuit, not by the prospect of termination. …“

8. An activities aide worked at a private, for-profit nursing home. Her job responsibilities
included reading newspapers to residents, playing games with them, performing a
nondenominational devotional reading, and keeping residents entertained. She was
called in to work on an off day and assigned to a different building than her normal
assignment. During the shift, a coworker asked her to pray the rosary with a Catholic
resident. The aide refused, saying that she was not Catholic and it was not her religion,
but if the coworker wanted to conduct the rosary herself, she was welcome to do so. The
aide was raised as a Jehovah’s Witness, but she was no longer a member of any
denomination and she did not practice any religion. Word of the refusal got back to a
supervisor who said that the refusal to pray the rosary with a resident constituted
“insubordination.” The aide was terminated. She sued. What should the court decide?
Why? (See Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Center, 762 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2014).

At trial, the jury found that the nursing home violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by unlawfully discharging the aide for exercising her religious beliefs. On
appeal, the determinative question is whether the aide failed to produce sufficient
evidence that the nursing home knew of her religious beliefs before it discharged her. We
find no such evidence anywhere in the record and hold that a reasonable jury would not
have had a legally sufficient basis to find that the nursing home violated Title VII by
discharging her. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of the nursing
home’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and remanded the case “for entry of
judgment consistent with this opinion.”
9. The younger brother of an employee committed suicide. The employee was profoundly
upset by the death, considered taking his own life, and experienced mental health
problems for years thereafter. The brothers had been raised in a strict religious family,
but both had subsequently rejected their religious upbringing. About six years after the
suicide, the employee was approached by the wife of the owner of the company for which
he worked. The wife, who was also a receptionist, said that she had a gift for speaking to
the dead, that she had been communicating with the employee’s brother, and that the
brother wanted the employee to know that he was suffering in hell and that the employee
should turn to God so that he could avoid the same fate. The employee became very upset
and told the woman not to speak with him again about his brother. Undaunted, the wife
continued to speak to him in the same manner each day for three and a half weeks. After
the employee complained to the woman’s husband, the daily communications stopped,
although the wife would bring up the topic of finding religion every week or two. About
six months later, the employee got into a heated argument with the wife at work and quit.
He sued for religious harassment and constructive discharge. What should the court
decide? Why? (Winspear v. Community Development, 574 F.3d 604 [8th Cir. 2009])

The appeals court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
employer and remanded. Apparently, the lower court had focused only on the
constructive discharge aspect of the case and failed to reach a separate conclusion as to
whether the employee had been subjected to a hostile environment. While all of the
appellate judges agreed that the plaintiff had asserted a religious harassment claim that
was independent of any constructive discharge claim, the majority did not offer any
analysis of the merits of the harassment claim because the lower court had not yet ruled
on it. However, one of the appellate judges wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
expressed the view that the facts did not support a religious harassment claim. The judge
pointed to testimony suggesting that the frequency of harassment subsided from an
almost everyday event for the first three or so weeks to a much more occasional
occurrence. The conduct had apparently ceased four or five months before the employee
quit. The dissenting judge also questioned the severity of the harassment, comparing it to
examples of egregious sexual harassment. The judge said it was relevant that the
comments were made to the plaintiff in private and did not embarrass him in front of co-
workers. Lastly, although the plaintiff claimed that the harassment interfered with his
ability to concentrate on his work and made him not want to come into the workplace, the
dissenting judge concluded that “Winspear alleged that Sierra's harassment affected him
at work, but he acknowledged that he was already "overloaded" at work before the
harassment began. He also made no allegation that he could not complete his work or that
he received discipline for performance deficiencies.” While the dissenting judge’s
analysis is plausible, it seems to ignore the reasons why this type of religious
communication about a dead brother would be particularly offensive and upsetting, as
well as the failure of the alleged harasser to stop making such statements despite the
employee’s reaction.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 The Project Gutenberg eBook of A

természettudomány fejlődésének története (1.

kötet)
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
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laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: A természettudomány fejlődésének története (1. kötet)

Author: Wilhelm Bölsche

Translator: Aladár Schöpflin

Release date: May 8, 2022 [eBook #68025]

Language: Hungarian

Original publication: Hungary: Franklin, 1912

Credits: Albert László from page images generously made

available by the Library of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A

TERMÉSZETTUDOMÁNY FEJLŐDÉSÉNEK TÖRTÉNETE (1.
KÖTET) ***
 Megjegyzés:
A tartalomjegyzék a 144. oldalon található.
 KULTURA és TUDOMÁNY

A TERMÉSZETTUDOMÁNY
FEJLŐDÉSÉNEK TÖRTÉNETE

IRTA WILHELM BÖLSCHE

FORDITOTTA SCHÖPFLIN ALADÁR

ELSŐ KÖTET

BUDAPEST

FRANKLIN-TÁRSULAT
MAGYAR IROD. INTÉZET ÉS KÖNYVNYOMDA

1912

A TERMÉSZETTUDOMÁNY
FEJLŐDÉSÉNEK TÖRTÉNETE
 IRTA

WILHELM BÖLSCHE
FORDITOTTA

SCHÖPFLIN ALADÁR

ELSŐ KÖTET

BUDAPEST

FRANKLIN-TÁRSULAT
MAGYAR IROD. INTÉZET ÉS KÖNYVNYOMDA

1912
TEREMTÉSI MONDÁK.
 Teremtési mondák.

A természet fejlődésének története egy gigantikus harcz képe

igyekszik megrajzolni. A sötétből mind fényesebb világosságra küzdi
fel magát egy világ: a mi világunk, amelyben járunk-kelünk s
amelyben magunk is szüntelen küzdők vagyunk.
Mintegy tükörképe ennek a nagy, vajudó küzdelemnek, ami –
szükebb keretben – elénkbe lép, amikor megpróbáljuk nyomon
követni a világról való szellemi felfogást, amint az emberi kultura
csekély számu évezredeinek folyamán utat tört magának. Itt is, ott is
kezdetben tétova ködök szállanak fel, formátlanul, árnyszerüen. Ott
a távol fekvő égi messzeségek kozmikus gőze, amelyből még csak
ezután kell csillagoknak kialakulni, az erők és az elemek nehezen
elgondolható mérlege, amely titokzatosan érinti a teljesen
felfoghatatlan dolgok határát. Itt a fantázia korlátlan alkotásainak
birodalma nyilik, az emberiség gyermekkorában, szintjátszó
egymásbafolyása a vallás, a költészet és a tudomány egymástól
még el nem vált csiráinak, a mithoszok világa, amely szétfoszlik
kezünkben, ha meg akarjuk fogni és amely mégis kétségbe nem
vonható módon magában foglalja a valódi természetismeret és a
fejlődéstan kiinduló pontját is.
Magában foglalja történetileg, nem abban az értelemben, mintha
valamely régi nép egyik vagy másik teremtési mondája misztikus, a
tapasztalat körén kivül eső uton-módon rejtené magában a valódi
tényállás csiráit.
Figyelmünkben kell tartani ezt a tényt, anélkül, hogy az éles
elítélésre való hangulatot kellene belőle meríteni. Ma ugyan, sajnos,
még sokfelől valódi ellentétül állítanak szembe a modern
természetkutatás eredményeivel egy régi, mithikus teremtési tant,
mely egy rég elváltozott kulturnép gyermekkorából származik s ezt a
mondát mint valami eleven dolgot állítják elénk, mint amelynek
szerepe kell hogy legyen egy világnézet szilárd megalapozásban; de
ez a képzelhető legnagyobb mértékben egyenlőtlen eszközökkel
folyó háboru. Az egyenetlen harcz azonban mindig kárhozatos
elkeseredettséget szül, megvetést az egyik, lehetetlen gúnyt a másik
oldalon és ezáltal a mesterségesen elferdített viszony által sokat
szenvedett az emberiség mithoszalkotó ifjuságáról való egész
felfogásunk. Ha az előitélet nélküli gondolkodás terén maradva
szabadulni tudunk ettől az elkeseredettségtől, akkor ama szines,
költőileg gazdag teremtési mesék országa a világismeret valódi
építményének előkertjévé lesz.
A valódi költészet minden arany és rózsafelhője ebben az első
korszakban rárajzolódik a természet hajtóerői után való kutatás
szigorú kupolájára. Nem egészen alaptalanúl tünt fel a világ
bizonyos értelemben szintelennek és kijózanodottnak, mikor a
tulajdonképpeni természetvizsgálat a mithosz nyomába lépett.
Gondoljunk például a mózesi teremtési legenda hatalmas vonalaira
(amely egyáltalán nem a költőileg legmegragadóbb az ismert
mondák között): amint a világszellem a vizek fölött lebeg, amint keze
elválasztja egymástól a fényt és sötétséget, amint felállítja az ég
alkotmányát, a szárazföldet elkülöníti és zöldellő növénytakaróval
borítja, állatokkal benépesíti, amint végül az embert egy viruló
kertnek, amelyet a keleti természetérzés minden pompája díszesít,
föltételekhez kötött urává teszi, amint az ember fenhéjázásában
bűnbe esik, úgy, hogy erre komor büntetésül a költőileg
leghatásosabb helyen lehet értékesíteni a valódi őskor addig
elhallgatott képét, az elvesztett természet lángoló villámkardjaival, a
létért való keserves küzdelemmel, kóbor nomádélettel, amelyben a
férfinak fegyvereket kell kitalálnia az állatok és az ellenség ellen,
állatbőrökbe kell burkolóznia az időjárás viszontagságai ellen, a
nőnek fájdalmak közt kell a vándorélet közben szülnie, mig végül a
föld rettenetességei a legelemibb erőszak tényében elérik
tetőpontjukat az emberi fajnak csaknem teljes elpusztulásával,
velkanikus eruptiókban, mikor tűz és kénkő eső hull az égből és
emberek kővé merednek, pusztító özönvizekben, mikor a megművelt
földterület két folyam között eltünik és a föld teljessége a láthatárig,
amely a tapasztalatlan szemében a világ határát jelenti, egyetlen
vízárba merül… Nagy, feledhetetlen képek ezek, melyeken
évezredek fantáziája dolgozott és a magasztosság érzése
számlálatlan generácziókon át méltán táplálkozott belőlük.
Ezzel szembeállítva szegényesnek és terméketlennek tünik fel a
természetről való fogalmak másik útja: a részletkutatás, legalább
hosszu ideig. S a gúny a tudatlanok részéről sohasem hiányzott.
Idézzünk fel képzeletünkben egy a középkor végéről való növény-
gyüjtőt, kinek minden bölcsessége abban áll, hogy ki tudja ragadni a
csunya természeti tárgyak egy kicsiny sorozatát és le tudja irni őket
(alapjában véve egyelőre nagyon is problematikus) hasznuk
szempontjából bizonyos betegségek ellen, keskeny, füstös
szobájában, egy kicsinyes, vad és czéltalan viharoktól szaggatott
korban, minden fölemelkedés nélkül a nagyság felé, a gyakorlati
gyógyszer egyetlen kicsiny szempontjára szorítkozva… Képzeljük el
az első, rossz távcső előtt álló megfigyelőt, aki arra áldozza szeme
világát, hogy néhány bolygó fénypontot a Jupiter bolygó mellett mint
holdakat állapítson meg vagy hogy foltokat fedezzen fel a napban.
És mégis, ez a józan regisztráló munka törte akkor a haladás
útját!
Ami valahára utat tört magának mint természet-megismerés,
amely egész világot, kozmoszt épít, ma már bizonyára fölébe
emelkedett nagyság és szingazdagság dolgában is a mithosznak.
Semmiféle naiv kozmogoniának nincsenek olyan képei, mint a mai
csillagászati kutatásnak: a nap felületének vérvörös, izzó vizgőz-
eruptiói, melyek 20,000 mérföld magasságnyira vetődnek fel, a hold
mérhetetlen, borzalmas kráter-üregei, amelyekbe napszálltakor mind
csipkézettebben és kisértetiesebben hull bele tépett szélük
hajszálnyi éles árnyéka, a Saturnus szabadon egyensulyozódó
gyürürendszere, melynek arányaihoz képest a föld holdjával együtt
csak törpe számba megy, a közös súlypontok körül keringő kettős
csillagok rubinvörös és smaragdzöld napjai, melyek szines fénye
felváltva mágikusan változékony nappalokkal lángolja körül felváltva
a hozzájuk tartozó bolygórendszereket. És még hány más példát
lehetne felhozni! A legnagyobb eredmény pedig végül az exakt
alapokra fektetett fejlődéstörténet maga, a mithosz igazában való
helyettesítője és beteljesítője!
Mert a mithosz – még a képzelhető leggyermetegebb, legnaivabb
és legesetlenebb világmagyarázat is – akaratlanúl összeolvad ugyan
a szabadon csapongó költészettel, alapjában véve azonban nem
akart semmi egyebet adni, mint a jelenségek valóban kielégítő
magyarázatát a meglévő oksági szükségérzeten belül. A költői elem,
bármennyire gátak nélkül hullámzott, velejében szintén a valóságos
tapasztalatok bizonyos sorozatában gyökerezett, mert az ember
össze tud kapcsolni, rendezni, bizonyos harmonikus, neki kedvező
sorrendbe tud csoportosítani (amint hogy a valóságok elszigetelt
tényeit bizonyos ritmusba, kielégítő harmóniába tudja juttatni), de
sohasem képes arra, hogy költői intuitió révén, önmagából új
alkatrészekből álló pozitiv dolgot hozzon létre.
Csakhogy a mithoszt két dolog akadályozta és terhelte. Egyfelől
a végzetes, bár az emberiség fejlődésének menetében
elkerülhetetlen szerep, melyet az okság törvénye a vallás
keletkezésében játszott, amely a költészetnél is szorosabban
szövődik bele a kozmologiai mithosz lényegébe.
A természeti ember, vagyis egy bizonyos kezdetleges fokon álló
ember környezetében a hatások egy kicsiny körét látja, amelyeknek
okát megadja neki a tapasztalat és a hatások egy rengeteg nagy
körét, amelyekre nézve nem tudja eligazítani semmiféle tapasztalat.
Egészen jól érzi már, hogy nagyon hasznos dolog az okokat tudni s
ez a magva a természetkutatás mint kulturafejlesztő eszköz
forrásának. Hiszen hangsúlyozták még azt is, hogy az okságra való
egész törekvést alapjában véve a természet tenyésztette ki az
emberben a létért való küzdelem folytán, mivel óriási forrása van
benne a védelemnek s a védekezés lehetőségeinek az egyén
számára.1) A villám okát tudni annyit jelentene, mint eszközöket
találni pusztító hatása ellen. Ezt a következtetést megcsinálta a
meztelen vadember éppúgy, mint a villámhárító feltalálója. A
vadember következtetésének tévessége rendszerint csak abban
van, hogy nem tud rálépni a lassú kutatás fáradságos útjára, hanem
azonnal magyarázni kezd. A legközelebb álló valósághoz nyúl:
önmagához. A villám, vagy aki a villámot dobja (itt már két fokozat
van) egy az emberhez hasonló lény. Ezzel a lénynyel, mivel
emberileg van elgondolva, bizonyos értelemben tartósan meg lehet
magát értetnie, mint az embertárssal, a törzsbélivel. Hogy úgy
mondjuk, szocziális viszonyba lehet vele jutni. Most már: a villám
nagyon hatalmas. Ugy kell tehát megkörnyékezni, mint a törzs
hatalmasait: könyörögni hozzá, feláldozni, hizelegni neki, békítgetni.
A megszemélyesítés hamarosan, szilárdan beleéli magát és
(hozzájárul még a közvetlen kisértethit az áloméletbe, a beteges
viziókba benyuló gyökereivel) a vallás roppant szerepének,
amennyiben a természet magyarázója akar lenni, rés nyilik. Ez a
szerep – mint mondottuk – az igazi természet-magyarázatra
lényegében nagyon végzetes. Mert ebből az alapból jut bele a
kozmogoniai mithoszba a természeti erők helyettesítése lelkes,
emberhez hasonló, de emberfölötti erőkkel ellátott lényekkel. Az
istenek lépnek a kozmogoniai mithoszba, annak vesztére.
A másik aggodalmat keltő oldalát a dolognak, mint az előbbinél
másodlagosan szereplő tényezőt már említettük: a tapasztalatok
korlátozottságában rejlik. Ezek emelkedő vagy csökkenő száma
szerint alakulnak ki a teremtési mithoszok különbségei a különböző
népeknél. Ezeket mindjárt szemügyre fogjuk venni. Különbség nélkül
valamennyi a causalitas törvényéből indul ki. Személyesítésekkel és
emberiesítésekkel is dolgozik valamennyi, de már váltakozó
intensitással. Költőileg, azaz harmonizáló, kikerekítő, schematizáló
módon van valamennyi kialakítva. Végeredményben azonban a
valódi tapasztalatok különböző mennyisége és módja adja meg az
elválasztó pontokat. Egy őserdei népnek a teremtési mithosza az
egyenlítő alatt nem fog jégóriásokról beszélni; déli félgömbünk
lakóinak csillagászati legendáiból a kereszt csillagképe ragyog ki, a
melyet a mi északi egünk nem ismer. Ezek a tapasztalatok azonban
sehol sem nagyon bőségesek. Ez könnyen kiviláglik. Mint a látható
mindenségben a ködképződmények, ugyanúgy a mithoszképzés is
még mindig folyamatban van a mi természeti állapotban élő
népeinknél: a mi kulturnemzeteink hagyományosan ránk származott
teremtési mondáiról azonban tudjuk, hogy keletkezésük ideje
évezredekkel mögöttünk van; magától adódik a sejtelem, hogy itt,
amennyiben a tapasztalati kincs csak valamennyire is gazdag,
bizonyos igen régi s előttünk máskülönben sem ismeretlen
természeti eseményekre való vonatkozások rejlenek. A támasztó
pontok azonban meglehetős szegényesek. A legnagyobb
valószinüség szerint beleesett az ember korába egy óriási földi
természetjelenségnek a kezdete és bizonyosan a kiterjedése és a
lecsökkenése. Ez a természeti jelenség a jégkorszak. Egy pálmákkal
benőtt meleg klimából, melynek az ember még alighanem tanuja
volt, az ázsiai-európai szárazföld tetemes része jégsivataggá
változott. Mesés méretü glecserek csuszamlottak lassan lefelé a
hegyekről és hegymagasságú kőtömegeket szállítottak a
legtávolabbi helyekre. A még lakható területeken steppei növényzet
terjedt el, mosusz-ökrök csordái, ahogy ma a sarkkör táján élnek,
elvándoroltak a mai bódeni tó tájékáig, a roppant agyaru, gyapjas
mammuth-elefánt taposta mai kulturerdeink avarát. Ebben a
jégkorszakban az ember már kétségtelenül megvolt. A
legkülönbözőbb helyeken levő barlangokban lehet nyomait
megtalálni, vadászott a mammuthra, talán maga is irtotta ki, mikor a
jégkorszak végére járt. Ezekhez a mammuth- és rénszarvas-
vadászokhoz azonban nem fűződik semmiféle teremtési monda.2)
Egyszer mintha valami nyoma földerengene. A tunguzok, egy
keletszibériai mongol vadásznép mondáiban szerepelnek félelmetes
fekete szörnyetegek, bikák, melyek egyetlen szarvat viselnek
homlokukon, akkorát, hogy külön szánkó kellett az elszállítására. A
környéken talált csontmaradványokból tudjuk, hogy ott valóban élt,
talán az ember koráig egy orrszarvu, barna melynek homloka
páratlan módon csont-párnával volt ellátva egy óriási szarv
támasztékául. A rés elefántnyi nagyságú állat, az elasmotherium,
azonban, amely számunkra nyilik, itt is bizonytalan. Éppen tunguz
vadászok élvezték először azt a látványt, hogy szibériai folyam-
torkolatok megfagyott mocsártalajából még véres, friss mammuth-
hullák bukkantak fel, melyeket a fagy talán százezer évig konzervált.
Igy tehát ezek a tunguzok a legtávolabbi kerülővel, elkésve is
visszaálmodhatták magukat a jégkorszakba és a feltámadt állat-
kolosszusok láttára új, független mondatraditiót fejleszthettek ki.
 Az «özönvíz» látszólag legjobban indokolt s oly gyakran
visszatérő mithosz-alkatrésze éppen egyenesen ellenkezőről tett
tanubizonyságot: mert a geologia nem ismer egyetlen az egész
földre kiterjedő tapasztalatot sem, amely itt tekintetbe jöhetne.
Helyileg korlátozott alásülyedések történtek sok helyütt még az
emberi történelem korszakában is. A tenger árjából vulkanikus
jelenségek közben hirtelen szigetek emelkedtek ki, igy például a
tizenkilenczedik század harminczas éveiben Sziczilia és Afrika
között. Pusztító hatásu árvizek, amelyek a röghöz kötött síkföldi lakó
szemében valóságos halál-áradás számba mehettek, egyes erősen
benépesedett vidékeken periódikusan újra meg újra bekövetkeztek.
Suess Eduárd, a kitünő bécsi geologus megpróbált szemlélhetővé
tenni éppen a történetileg és mithologiailag rendkivül fontos
mesopotámiai völgyre nézve az Euphrates és Tigris alsó folyása
táján egy földrengéssel egyidejüleg egy a perzsa öbölből a tenger
felől jövő cziklont, amelyre eshetőlegesen a mi semita-keresztény
özönviz-mondánk, melyet a biblia tekintélye támogat, vonatkozhatik.
China történetileg fontos folyamvölgyében, a Hoanghón az
iszaptömegek ősidők óta felhalmozódott rétege a folyammeder és
partszélei fölemelkedését idézte elő a környező síkság széles
területei felé, magas őszi vízállások idején a folyam periodikusan
átszakítja ezeket a mesterséges csatornafalakat, megváltoztatja útját
és óriási kultur-földeket temet el: még 1887-ben (a chinai traditió
kezdete óta körülbelül tizedszer) az emberek millióit pusztította el.
Magas hegygerinczeken talált kagylók kissé finomabb
következtetéssel könnyen az egész földet átfogóvá növelhettek ilyen
képeket.3) Ma azonban tudjuk, hogy éppen a legtöbb bizonyító erejü
esetekben azok a kagylók sok idővel az emberi nem keletkezése
előtt éltek és az Óczeán kimutathatólag nem emelkedett az Alpesek
csúcsai fölé, hanem a hegyláncz csúcsosodott fel lassankint,
törvényszerüen és magával emelte föl az egykori tengerfeneket.
Tudomásunk szerint a lakható föld teljessége sohasem volt teljesen
viz-réteggel körülvéve, legkevésbbé pedig abban a rövid időközben,
melyen az emberi hagyomány átér.
Ha a különböző természeti és kulturnépek teremtési mithoszai
nem volnának egyebek, mint a tapasztalat legrégibb használható
csapadékai, akkor legalább azt lehetne remélni, hogy az összes
népfajok eredeti kapcsolatára való végső emléket láthatunk bennük,
amilyent a modern kutatás megkiván. Szó sincs azonban semmi
efféléről. Még egymáshoz aránylag közel álló népekből is kiveszett
minden egymásról való tudomás, hát még az egymástól messzire
eltávolodottak! A biblia népsorozatában hasztalan keresnénk helyet
a polinéziaiak vagy az indiánusok számára, ez oly tény, amely már
kevés idővel Columbus fölfedezése után is sok fejtörést okozott a
mózesi mindentudás hiveinek. Bizonyos, bár akaratlan kapcsolatokat
azonban mégsem lehet tagadni. Ha egy nép egyházi szentesítés
útján változatlanul megőrzött ősrégi mithoszaiban olyan
csillagképekhez ragaszkodik, melyek jelenlegi tartózkodása helyén
nem is vehetők észre, akkor ebben tagadhatatlanul egy
mesterségesen megőrzött tapasztalati maradvány rejlik, amely
amellett szól, hogy az illető nép egy messzefekvő helyről vándorolt
mostani tartózkodási helyére. Ha bizonyos kicsiny vonások
visszatérnek a germán és görög mesékben, az indusok
elbeszéléseiben, a déli Óczeán Fidzsi-szigeteinek lakóinál és a
délafrikai hottentottáknál, akkor a kutató ebben a legrégibb
örökséget sejti, amely talán becses ujjmutatásokat ad. Mindezeknek
a népeknek valóságos tudatából azonban kiveszett az egykori
kapocs leghalványabb emléke is és amaz utólagos magyarázatok
területe is szük és ingatag, mert nem tudni, mily gyakran vezettek
hasonló indítékok hasonló mithoszi alakulatokra.
*
Ezek után a bevezető elmélkedések után vizsgáljunk át egy
sereg jellemző teremtési mithoszt a föld különböző területeinek
köréből s próbáljuk belőlük a karakterbeli jellemvonások egy sorát
megállapítani. Mózes teremtési legendáját még ma is aktuális
érdekével utolsóul fogjuk tárgyalni.
Először is ott keressük fel a mithoszt, ahol még ma is
hamisítatlanúl és egyeduralkodón él: a természeti népeknél. A
történelem előtti és történelmi időben való nagyszámu vándorlások
valószinüvé teszik, hogy a legrégibb, legalacsonyabb rendü
emberiség maradványai egy természeti törvénynek megfelelően a
kontinensek határai felé szorultak, a poláris zóna kezdetének széles
északi partvidékeire épp úgy, mint mindenek előtt a nagy
szárazföldterületek pyramisszerüen kihegyezett vagy szigetekre
darabolódott déli nyúlványaira. Ugyanarról a törvényről van itt szó,
amely régi, már csak ereklyeképpen ránk maradt állatformákat
szigetekre, vagy messzeeső, szigetszerü szárazföldekre és
félszigetekre tolt ki: a csőrös és erszényes állatokat, melyek a
magasabbrendü emlős állatok őseiül tekintendők, Ujhollandba, a
reptilia-szerü, tehát valószinüleg legrégibb madarakat (Dinornis) és a
családfában minden élők közt legalább álló gyikot (Hatteria) Uj-
Zélandba, a nagy vastagbőrüek többségét, melyek virágkora a
régesrég elmúlt harmadkor volt, Délafrikába, a hasonlóképp régóta
hanyatlásra jutott edentatákat (lajhár, örvös állat) Délamerikába, az
ősvilági rák- és pók-fajtákat (Limulus, Liphistium) középamerikai és
indiai szigetekre, a félmajmokat Madagaszkarba stb. Csakugyan,
aránylag kezdetleges népmaradványokkal feltünő módon
találkozunk, ha Ujhollandot Taszmániával, a délamerikai Tűzföldet,
Délafrikát és másfelől az új és óvilági poláris zónát vesszük
szemügyre. Az ausztráliai néger, a tűzföldi, az eszkimó akkor is igen
alacsony sorban állanak, ha megengedjük, hogy tökéletesen
kulturátlan és művelődésre képtelen népek mai ismereteink szerint
nincsenek. Afrika óriási földrészén a bushmannok és hottentották
kicsiny, világos szinü törzsei a földrész félszigetszerüen kihegyesedő
déli részén meglehetős biztonsággal tekinthetők legalább az egy
földrész őslakossága maradványaiul. Érdekes lesz tehát a
legnaivabb kozmogoniának a nyomait ilyen messzire előretolt
előörzöknél vizsgálni. Ha az emberiségnek volna valahol
kijelentésszerü «ősbölcsesége», akkor itten volnánk a forráshoz
legközelebb.
A bushmanoknál teremtési mithoszról abban a zárt formában,
ahogy a bibliából ismerjük, nem lehet szó. A mithosz szilárd
bordaszerkezetét többnyire a vallási fogalmak további kifejlődése
adja meg. Ezeknél a vad népeknél azonban a vallás a lehető
legalacsonyabb fokon áll. Igy tehát nem marad más, mint néhány
tapasztalat és a költői elem. A kóbor vadember naiv meséi, melyek a
dolgok eredetéről szólnak, a csillagokhoz és állatokhoz, szükös
életének legfontosabb tárgyaihoz fűződnek. Afrika csillagai és állatai
ezek. Egy szöcskét – meséli a fokföldi bushman – üldöztek a tengeri
macskák. Ez széttépte egy antilop epehólyagját. Ebből keletkezett a
sötétség. Hogy azonban ismét világosságot nyerjen, a szöcske az
égbe dobta papucsát. Ebből lett a hold. Szine a bushmanföld pirosas
porából való, amely a bőrhöz volt tapadva. Azért hideg, mert bőr-
papucsból származik. A nap eleinte mint férfi élt a földön, fénye a
hónaljából sugárzott ki. De ez a fény csak kunyhójának legközelebbi
környezetét világította meg. Ezért a régi bushmanok az égbe dobták
a napembert, ahonnan most mindenkire árasztja fényét. Máskor meg
a hold is ember. A nap azonban haragjában egyre-másra egy-egy
darabot vág le róla éles sugaraival. Nagy könyörgésére meghagy
neki egy darabot gyermekei számára. Ez a darabka aztán lassankint
megint egészszé növekszik (teli hold), mire a levagdalás megint
megkezdődik. A bushmanok ideje előtt, mondja továbbá a monda,
élt egy nép, amelynek mécs nélkül kellett útját megtalálnia a
sötétben. Akkor egy ravasz leány izzó hamut dobott az égre s ebből
lett a tejút. Bizonyos fényes csillagok a déli koronában és a
keresztcsillagzatban, az antipodusok egének legszebb
csillagképében, emberekből és oroszlánokból keletkeztek, melyeket
egy másik leány gonosz pillantása kővé változtatott. Özönvíz-
mondák elenyésző nyomai, melyek állítólag a bushmanokkal rokon
hottentottáknál jelentkeznek, valószínűleg modern misszionáriusok
hatására vezethetők vissza. A valóság szerint Afrika az özönvíz-
mondák legterméketlenebb talaja s az óriási földrész négertörzseinél
való hiányuk a legtalálóbb argumentum az ellen a gyakran nagyon
könnyelműen kimondott állítás ellen, hogy az özönvíz minden nép
mondájában visszatér, tehát egyetemes eseményhez kell fűződnie.
Az ausztráliaiak kozmogoniai mithoszai az ujhollandi
szárazföldön ezekkel sok tekintetben feltünően egyező vonásokat
mutatnak fel. Itt a nap a nagy strucz-madárforma állat, az Emu
tojása, amely az «előbbi embereket» az égbe dobta, a tejút pedig a
korábbi földi lakók tüzeinek füstje. Más mesékben a hold a nap férje
s a nap minden hónapban egyszer fölemészti. A dél-ausztráliaiaknál
egy Muramura nevű jó szellem teremtette a napot az emberek
számára, miután ezek sokáig könyörögtek hozzá tánczukkal; mert
szükségük volt napmelegre – magyarázza elég naivul a mese –
amely ellankaszsza a gyorsjárású emustruczczot, legfontosabb
vadászzsákmányukat és a kezükbe juttassa. Esténkint a nap
végigjárja az elhunyt emberek lelkeinek sorait. Akit megajándékoz
kegyével, az ellenszolgáltatásul neki adja egy vörös kenguru bőrét.
Azért látszik reggel pirosnak, mert rajta van ez a bőr. Az embereket
is ez a Muramura nevű jó szellem csinálta, még pedig állatokból.
Kezdetben kicsiny, fekete gyikokat teremtett. Ekkor mint a bibliai
Jehova megtekintette művét és annyira meg volt vele elégedve,
hogy elhatározta, a fekete gyikoknak hatalmat ad minden csúszó-
mászó teremtmény fölött a földön. Igy tehát lábaikat ujjakra osztotta,
arczukból orrot, szemet, fület és szájat mintázott és végül
megtanította egyenesen állni. Mivel ebben a hosszú gyikfark
akadályúl szolgált, hát levágta és kész volt az ember. Még csak a
nemeket kellett elkülöníteni. A régi időkben, úgy gondolja az
ausztráliai néger, minden változó volt. A kenguru eredetileg óriási
szörnyeteg volt. Egy erős vadász széttépett egy ilyen óriási kengurut
darabokra és ezekből csinálta a mostani kengurufajokat. Igy
találkozik egy-egy ponton a legnyersebb természeti népek
kezdetleges mithosza öntudatlanúl csaknem darwini fejlődési
gondolatokkal: a vadember érzése szerint még közelebb áll a
természethez, mint a bizonyos fokon álló kulturember, neki az a
gondolat, hogy egy gyikból formáltatott a többi gyikok legyőzőjéül,
elég fenségesnek és emberhez méltónak tünt, mig nem egy
filozofusa egy olyan kornak, mely megnemesedett isteneit
márványcsarnokokban és gothikus templomokban tisztelte, de
emellett mindjobban elidegenedett a természettől, az embernek
mindennemű kapcsolatát a legmagasabb rendű állattal is mint
erkölcsileg megvetendőt megbélyegezni valónak tartotta. Az
ausztráliai szárazföld lakóinak szegényes özönvíz-mondái közül a
nyugatausztráliai nyilvánvalóan egy helyi személyhez fűződik: két
néptörzs egy folyam két partján sokáig barátságban él; aztán az
egyik gőgös lesz és elszigeteli magát; jön egy végtelen erő, a folyam
megdagad és a folyam déli partjáról elmenekül a lenézett törzs;
mikor visszatérnek, odaát nyilt tengert látnak, mely elnyelte egykori
barátjaikat. Ha ilyen elbeszélések misszionáriusok fülébe jutnak, akik
hisznek a mózesi történetben és mindenütt a maguk özönvizének
nyomait keresik, akkor könnyen állnak be elváltozások és a feketék
élénk fantáziája észrevétlenül is hamar meghamisítja a saját
hagyományukat az újnak a kedvéért, amelyet a fehér ember rág a
szájukba. Ebben az esetben azonban hihetőleg nagyon hiteles és
hamisítatlan ősforrásához jutottunk a teljesen lokális özönvíz-
mondáknak s ez az egy fényt vet a legtöbb ilyennek eredetére.
Az ausztráliai négertől Amerika legészakibb részének
eszkimójáig s ennek európai és ázsiai rokonáig meglehetős nagy
ugrás. A megváltozott háttér egészen más természeti képeket hoz
létre. Az eszkimó fantáziája szerint a mennyboltozat egy északon
fekvő csúcsos hegyen nyugszik és ezen forog. Mithologiája a mi
Gönczöl-szekerünk csillagképéhez fűződik, amelyben ő egy
rénszarvast lát; az Urin-övben fókavadászokat lát, akik egykor
vadászat után nem tudták megtalálni a hazafelé vezető utat és az
égbe jutottak. Az ember, mondja a grönlandi, az égből keletkezett. Ő
nemzette egy görönggyel a nőt. Az első emberek aztán czivakodtak
azon, hogy halhatatlanok legyenek-e az emberek, vagy sem. A nő
igy szólt: «Hadd haljanak meg, hogy helye legyen az utódaiknak.»
Egy másik monda szerint az első ember a saját hüvelykujjából
teremtette meg a nőt. Az egyik északamerikai eszkimófaj egyik
özönvíz-mithosza olyan víztömegekről szól, melyek jéggel borítva
túlemelkedte a hegycsúcsokon. Mikor aztán lefolytak, a jég ott
maradt függve a hegycsúcsokon, czethalak és kagylók nagy tömege
feküdt a szárazon s még ma is meg lehet őket ott találni. Az
embereknek vagy akár az emberiség többségének teljes
elpusztulásáról azonban nem tudnak. Ennek a mithosznak magváúl
könnyen fel lehet ismerni az örök hóval födött hegycsúcsok és
megkövesült kagylók megmagyarázására törekvő hypothesist s ez a
két természeti jelenség kétségkivül alkalmas arra, hogy az
embereket gondolkodóba ejtsék rajtuk.
Melancholikus varázsa van azoknak a jövőre vonatkozó
képeknek, melyekkel, mint az istenek alkonyáról szóló német
mondával, a grönlandi világmithosz záródik. Egykor majd minden
ember meg lesz halva. Akkor egy óriási árvíz fogja végig söpörni a
földet. Az elsimult vizfelületen azonban a szél a megtisztult port
összesöpri uj, szebb és boldogabb emberfajjá. Néhány vonás mintha