FAL 48-20-Add.1 - Report Of The Facilitation CommitteeOn Its Forty-Eighth Session (Secretariat)

E
FACILITATION COMMITTEE FAL 48/20/Add.1

48th session 25 April 2024
Agenda item 20 Original: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE

ON ITS FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION
Attached are annexes 1 to 9 to the report of the Facilitation Committee on its forty-eighth
session (FAL 48/20).
I:\FAL\48\FAL 48-20-Add.1.docx
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Page 2
LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 DESCRIPTION OF MARITIME SERVICE 8
ANNEX 2 EGDH PRIORITY LIST OF DATA SETS
ANNEX 3 TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EGDH
ANNEX 4 ROAD MAP ON ADDRESSING MASS ISSUES RELATED TO THE FAL

CONVENTION
ANNEX 5 RESOLUTION FAL.17(48) – REVISED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION

AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SMUGGLING OF WILDLIFE ON SHIPS
ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC
ANNEX 6 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE
ANNEX 7 POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE
ANNEX 8 LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE PROVISIONAL

AGENDA FOR THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE
ANNEX 9 STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 1
ANNEX 1
DESCRIPTION OF MARITIME SERVICE 8
MS 8 – Vessel shore reporting
8.1 Submitting organization
FAL Committee, NCSR Sub-Committee
8.2 Coordinating bodies
IMO, Norway and Singapore.
8.3 Description of the Maritime Service
This MS provides information exchanges between shore and ship. It covers both:
.1 ship to shore reporting typically connected to port calls; and
.2 ship reporting systems linked to the safety of navigation.
The first is closely linked to the MSW concept in the FAL Convention of the Organization and
the second, ship reporting systems as defined in SOLAS regulation V/11, is closely linked to
ships' routeing.
Ship reporting systems can be mandatory or non-mandatory. If adopted by IMO, a ship

reporting system will be mandatory for use by all ships, certain categories of ships, or ships
carrying certain cargoes.
Ship to shore reporting
This service can cover information and guidelines related to reporting formalities and
instructions (when, what and how) for reporting to a specific port. In addition, this service can
be extended to the full exchange of information required in a single window ship reporting
system. Information in a ship to shore reporting regime may contain the following elements:
• reporting formalities
• information requested through a single window system
• security regulations
• vessel traffic services zones regulations
• customs regulations
• immigration regulations
• port State regulations
• health and veterinary regulations
• environmental regulations
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 2
Many of these elements are addressed by the IMO Facilitation Committee (FAL Committee),
which developed guidelines for setting up a maritime single window reporting system. The FAL
Committee also maintains and extends the IMO Compendium on Facilitation and Electronic
Business (IMO Compendium),1 a tool for software developers that design the systems needed
to support transmission, receipt and response via electronic data exchange of information
required for the arrival, stay and departure of the ship, persons and cargo to a port.
By harmonizing the data elements required during a port call and by standardizing electronic
messages, the IMO Compendium facilitates the exchange of information ship to shore and the
interoperability of single windows, reducing the administrative burden for ships linked to
formalities in ports.
The IMO Compendium consists of an IMO Data Set and IMO Reference Data Model agreed
by the main organizations involved in the development of standards for the electronic
exchange of information related to the FAL Convention: World Customs Organization (WCO),
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). The IMO Compendium includes new areas beyond the FAL
declarations such as the reporting of stowaways, the Maritime Declaration of Health, ship and
company certificates and inspections and timestamps related to the port call and the provision
of relevant services in the port. A data set on ship reporting systems has also been included
in the IMO Compendium.
This work is linked to e-navigation Strategy Implementation Plan Solution 2 – Means for
standardized and automated reporting (see MSC.1/Circ.1595, as revised).
E-navigation solution 2, regarding automated ship reporting, is one of the most important
solutions to reduce the crew workload (amount of time spent on preparing and submitting
reports to shore-based authorities). To achieve this, reports should be automatically generated
and transmitted as far as possible from existing onboard systems. Data fields within the single
window, where possible, should also be auto populated from onboard and shore systems, for
the vessel master to do a simple verification check before sending via the appropriate
communication means.
Ship to shore reporting as envisaged by e-navigation solution 2 aims to reduce time-consuming

paperwork on board.
This service can facilitate the necessary needs related to a single window reporting system
that also includes automation.
Figure 8-1 –Ship to shore reporting
1
The IMO Compendium on Facilitation and Electronic Business
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 3
Ship reporting systems
The practice of following predetermined routes for shipping are adopted for reasons of safety.
Related provisions were subsequently incorporated into the original SOLAS Convention.
Traffic separation schemes (TSS) and other ships' routeing systems have now been
established in many of the major congested shipping areas of the world. IMO's responsibility
for ships' routeing is enshrined in SOLAS chapter V, which recognizes the Organization as the
only international body for establishing such systems.
Ships' routeing systems, including TSS, that have been adopted by IMO may be tightly linked
to ship reporting systems. SOLAS regulation V/11 provides the authority for the adoption of
ship reporting systems by IMO.
The IMO publication Ships' Routeing is updated regularly. There are currently 23 IMO-adopted
ship reporting systems. In addition, a number of local ship reporting systems are established.
The reporting obligations in a ship reporting system are typically fewer than in a ship to shore
reporting regime, e.g. vessel name, IMO identification number, position, speed, course and so
on. However, parts of the information are the same or similar. Currently, much of the ship
reporting is done via voice communications and/or paper.
Resolution MSC.433(98) on Guidelines and criteria for ship reporting systems recalls that
communication between a shore-based authority and a participating ship should be limited to
information essential to achieve the objectives of the ship reporting system. The initial report
required from a ship entering the system should generally be limited to:
• ship's name
• call sign
• IMO identification number if applicable
• position
The existing resolution is based on SOLAS regulation V/11, as follows:
"Ship reporting systems contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of
navigation and/or protection of the marine environment. A ship reporting system,
when adopted and implemented in accordance with the guidelines and criteria
developed by the Organization pursuant to this regulation, shall be used by all ships,
or certain categories of ships or ships carrying certain cargoes in accordance with the
provisions of each system so adopted.
The Organization is recognized as the only international body for developing

guidelines, criteria and regulations on an international level for ship reporting systems.
Contracting Governments shall refer proposals for the adoption of ship reporting
systems to the Organization. The Organization will collate and disseminate to
Contracting Governments all relevant information with regard to any adopted ship
reporting system."
Although the regulation refers to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and/or
protection of the marine environment, resolution MSC.433(98) states that other supplementary
information may also be requested in the initial report, if justified to ensure the effective
operation of the ship.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 4
This information may include the intended movement of the ship through the area covered by
the reporting system and any operational defects or difficulties affecting the ship, as well as
the general categories of any hazardous cargoes on board.
Information required to be transmitted as part of a ship reporting system report is generally

transmitted to the VTS centre, or the relevant authority, via VHF voice communication.
Some MRSs also accept reports transmitted through AIS, Internet-based reporting systems,
email, fax, Satcom, mobile phone or a combination of these communication means.
Figure 8-2 – Examples of reporting points from Bay of Fundy
Current communication systems
Currently, the following communication systems are normally used to report information:
• AIS
• Internet-based reporting systems
• Email
• Fax
• SATCOM
• mobile phone
• a combination of these systems
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 5
Figure 8-3 – Examples of current communication systems

used to report information
8.4 Purpose
Vessel shore reporting
The purpose of this MS is to:
• facilitate a fully digital exchange system in accordance with the needs defined by
the actors;
• secure submission and exchange of information by electronic means required by

shore-based authorities in the harmonized standard and in the required time
frame;
• reduce the administrative burden to the crew and ashore;
• reduce the number of human errors and missing information by automating the
reporting processes as much as possible; and
• provide real-time access to information to relevant stakeholders in a secure

manner, including the use of authentication.
The purpose of this MS is also to:
• enhance safety and security in ship reporting system areas by utilizing existing
modern technology and digital information, taking cyber risk management into
account;
• make use of existing modern technology to reduce the administrative burden and
reduce human errors; and
• enhance shore capacity for efficient, optimized and environmentally friendly traffic
organization.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 6
8.5 Operational approach
Future ship to shore reporting
Electronic systems for ship to shore reporting should use the same protocols and product
specifications, in a single window solution, to send digital pre-arrival information such as the
FAL-related declarations and other regional/national requirements. This will ensure a common
harmonized platform for all ship reporting systems.
National competent authorities should provide information about reporting formalities and
ensure that all information regarding reporting is easy to understand, accessible and even
automated for the master or operator.
This service should provide appropriate ICT tools for shipboard and shore-based personnel to
streamline the processes and procedures associated with the generation and distribution of
required reports, including retrieval of information from other ship systems (ballast management,
waste management system, emission control system, navigation system, etc.) and from
shore-based sources (cargo and passenger booking offices, crewing agents, stevedores, etc.).
Examples of information to provide can be:
Information related to: Examples

Reporting regulations • what to report. The pre-arrival information may consist of ship
particulars, arrival notice, crew and passenger lists, crew and
passenger effects declarations, stores list, HAZMAT
information, waste declaration, ship's certificates, seafarers′
certificates (both as e-certificates), ports of call list, dangerous
cargo declaration, ISPS and manifests, vaccination list, narcotic
list, ship's money declaration, etc.;
• when/what to report (e.g. 24h, 48h, 72h, 96h before arrival); and
• to whom (e.g. immigration, police, harbour master).
Reporting tools • security, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality solutions
• web, app, etc.
• interfaces and endpoints
• secure access to digital data repositories (e.g. e-Certificate
repository MyCert)
• communication
• guidelines and rules
Shore receivers • contact information

and support • support information
• information about local reporting aid/support such as coastal
radio stations and agencies
The type of information required and reporting periods may differ from country to country and
create some confusion on the ships' side if the information requested is not clearly stated.
Also, the reporting periods in some situations start as far in advance as 96 hours before a ship
enters a coastal administration's waters. This may pose challenges with respect to the
communication means available to provide the required information all along the voyage.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 7
In order to achieve the operational goal for future ship to shore reporting, the ship should be
able to make use of a complete set of product specifications that ensure a simple and
harmonized system for providing reporting information.
Without such a global maritime single window environment (GMSWe), new systems may be
introduced that do not interoperate with one another. The consequence will be that the
administrative burden on board is not reduced and instead be increased through the added
complexity of more interfaces to deal with.
The following non-exhaustive list of notifications should be provided through a GMSWe:
• port arrival notification (location, timing, purpose etc.) including the Arrival
notification to the Defence system
• port (arrival) departure notification for ships carrying dangerous or polluting cargo
• notifications of bunkers on board
• notifications of NOx information
• notifications of landing of waste
• notifications of Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC) voyage
• notifications of intent to cross the national baseline
• maritime security notifications
• Port State control notifications
• customs declarations (in accordance with the FAL Convention)
• border control notifications
• Immigration and Health declaration
• terminal berth booking request at port
• pilot booking request
When considering new product specifications regarding ship to shore reporting, the IMO
Compendium should be consulted to see if a data set is already produced and can be used for
the product specification.
Future ship reporting system in conjunction with a ship reporting system
As the scope, transmission capacity and data format of each of these systems differ, the
possibility of developing standardized protocols with their product specifications to automate
the collection of data on board and communicate it to shore-based authorities might constitute
a real issue. There is a possibility of packaging the reporting information with a route exchange
format (e.g. S-421), but the security of the means of communication would need to be carefully
evaluated. The same is true for the new Port Call Message Standard (S-211) as a
complementary data stream integrable with S-421.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 8
Some of these reporting systems are not using a digital format, which prevents provision of an
automated service. The first step in an operational approach would be the use of a
communication system capable of transmitting digital data. Secondly, and given reporting
requirements differ among coastal States, a library containing information required by each
administration should be developed, which complies with the standardized product
specifications principle.
To avoid duplication, overlap and unnecessary administrative work, information should be

exchanged between ship reporting systems in the same region and with a relevant ship to
shore reporting system.
This can be achieved once the product specification and digitalization of all elements required
is done. The product specification should be based on the IMO data set on ship reporting
systems included in the IMO Compendium.
The data that comprise the ship reports are typically either of a fixed, dynamic or
voyage-related character. Fixed information, such as the ship name, call sign, IMO number,
country codes, certificates and contact information, should be stored as basic information in a
database and retrieved upon request. Thus, the fixed data are registered only once.
Dynamic information such as the ship position, heading, and speed, can be automatically
collected from the ship's positioning- and/or AIS systems, and should not have to be manually
registered. Lastly, the voyage-related information, such as port of departure and arrival, cargo,
and crew/passengers, will possibly, in the near future, have to be manually maintained.
However, the voyage-related information could in many cases be extracted from internal or
external databases, further optimizing the automation process on board the ship.
Combining the fixed, dynamic or voyage-related information in a dynamic, secure and

automated reporting service will result in a major reduction of the workload for the crew when
it comes to reporting.
Figure 8-4 – Example of electronic communication systems
8.6 User needs
Ships' masters are facing considerable administrative burden to comply with different vessel
shore reporting requirements and transmission of information. Different procedures, data
formats, documentary requirements and formalities are applied depending on the country, ship
reporting system or port of destination. One of the main challenges is that the ship has to
communicate in different manners through different systems.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 9
This, in turn, requires building and maintaining a library of required reports that are uniquely
identified and characterized by their requirements for format, deadline, content, etc. The ship
reporting system also requires developing and maintaining an S-100 product specification for
IMO Common Maritime Data Structure (CMDS) that can be used to generate all required
reports in the library. Lastly, it requires that ships' systems that generate reporting information
be certified to be compliant with an international machine-to-machine interface standard or
ship network standards such as IEC 61162 series.
Several advantages of digitalized ship reporting have been identified:
• one single window for ship reporting makes it easier for shipping to send
mandatory information to authorities;
• the number of notifications is reduced as various authorities receive one common

notification instead of many singular notifications from individual vessels;
• it reduces administrative burdens on board, which enables seafarers to spend

more time on navigational tasks;
• already registered users can reuse data previously registered in the system,
reducing administrative time;
• the system is designed so that it becomes easier for shipping to meet reporting
obligations;
• the transition to digital and consistent messages from shipping to ports facilitate
more efficient port logistics;
• quick and easy access to digitized and automated ship notifications frees up time
and resources in the government administration;
• easy access to important information needed in emergency situations; and
• transparency and reuse of information among stakeholders increase efficiency

between the transport modes.
Ship reporting system
In ship reporting system areas, shore authorities can provide more automated and efficient
reporting systems by using technology such as AIS and VDES, in combination with common
data structures and product specifications.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 10
Figure 8-5 – BAREP SRS between the Russian Federation and Norway
8.7 Information to be provided
Ship to shore reporting
Several initiatives related to ship to shore reporting are ongoing. The largest is probably the
work regarding the establishment of a European maritime single window environment
(EMSWe). Standards for approximately 1200 required reporting elements will be the basis for
a 100% digital solution. The data set of the EMSWe is aligned with the IMO Compendium
which by FAL 46 has already more than 400 data elements and is incrementally growing.
Once this specification is done, exchange and reuse of information can be realized.
The reporting party does not need to relate to all the elements, but the system has the capacity
to exchange and reuse the various data elements.
IMO-adopted ship reporting systems
The currently 23 IMO-adopted ship reporting systems follow the structure based on resolution
A.851(20), as amended by resolution MEPC.138(53).
Parts of the required information, such as ID, course, speed, position, are normally captured
by sensors such as AIS and LRIT. Remaining information is often already available from a
VRS system. The sharing of information between systems will have several benefits.
The IMO data set on ship reporting systems (resolution A.851(20)) is available in the IMO
Compendium on Facilitation and Electronic Business and should be used when developing
electronic services.
Ship to shore reporting and maritime single window
Ship to shore reporting is a generic term and a supporting reporting system to receive
information from the ships could, in principle, be any system suitable for the purpose. However,
some kind of single window system is often the case.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 11
The term "maritime single window" (MSW) can be defined as a one-stop service environment
that covers maritime and port administrative procedures, such as port entry/departure
declaration, notice of security reports, and other related information between private sectors
and public authorities nationwide. In other words, an MSW is a single window in the scope of
maritime and port fields.
The system depicted on the right represents a conceptual architectural model that defines the
structure and behaviour of the MSW. This model assumes that a single authority centralized
information mode (CIM) has the responsibility to operate the system that receives information
electronically via the single window and thereby disseminates this information to all relevant
stakeholders.
The conceptual model illustrates that the MSW consists of an environment whereby ship data
providers can submit information electronically either through a user interface or a
system-to-system interface. The information is digitized, and the individual data elements will
be submitted once only.
Further information is available in the IMO Guidelines for setting up a maritime single window.
In addition, a GISIS module collects information on existing MSW systems in Member States.
Figure 8-6 – MSW conceptual architectural model
8.8 Associated technical services
To be capable of generating this information automatically and transmitting it automatically, a

realistic operational implementation of ship to shore reporting and ship reporting systems
would require the involvement of both competent authorities and ship operators.
The concept of an automatic reporting schema comprises in principle two technical systems
or services:
• onboard system (ship side); and
• onshore system(s) (shoreside).
The principal figure below visualizes the scope of the reporting and shows how the two systems
or services interact at various stages of a ship voyage.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 12
The reporting obligations usually lie with the master on the ship, but the actual reporting might
be done by a third party such as a ship agent. For simplicity the third party is left out of the
figure. Using existing data communication systems, ship information will be transmitted to the
authorities, ports, VTSs and shore centres during the ship voyage or ship arrival in-port.
The authorities' (shore) side, illustrated in the figure on the right, is included to visualize the
holistic picture of ship reporting. The authorities will receive relevant information from the
reporting ship, using the existing connections and exchange mechanisms implemented in the
relevant system, i.e. NSW(s).
The main area of interest for is depicted in the grey area of the figure. This represents the area
where automatic ship reporting typically operates, and where the systems interact and
communicate with or affect each other. The endpoints typically make visible one or more
services that enable submission, retrieval and exchange of information.
The endpoints indicated in the figure comprise at least two principal sets of services that are
common in both ship to shore reporting and ship reporting system reporting; one that enables
the ship and shore to request and receive information, and another service that enables the
transmission and reception of the reporting information.
Figure 8-7 – Ship reporting during voyage
Request and respond services
Various reporting systems have different reporting obligations and procedures. The reporting
obligations (information element to be reported) should be in accordance with
resolution A.851(20), as amended by resolution MEPC.138(53), the FAL Convention or other
regional/national requirements. However, not all reporting systems require all the information
that is specified in the resolution and the reporting procedures will vary based upon different
parameters.
One of the central services that should be found in request and respond services (RRS) is the
ability for the ship's system to request the reporting obligations for a particular voyage or port
call. Based on, for example, the ship particulars and voyage information, such as type and size
of the ship, port of departure, crew and passengers, the ship system should have the
opportunity to request the shore-based reporting system for the reporting obligation for that
particular ship voyage. The shore-based system should in return respond to the requester in
a structured message of the obligatory reporting information and reporting procedures that
would be required for the ship and voyage.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 13
Therefore, seen from the ship perspective, the ship to shore reporting and ship reporting
system makes visible an information service and is able to digitally respond to information
requests from ships. Both types of shore services should as a minimum respond by giving the
requesting system the accurate current reporting obligation for that particular reporting system,
in both cases ship to shore reporting or ship reporting system.
Additional functions in the service could give responses to other requests as indicated earlier
in this document.
Transmit and receive services
Transmit and receive services (TRS) would work in a similar manner as to the RRS service,
thus the ship to shore reporting and ship reporting system should be able to consume and
acknowledge the submitted reports (new or updates) from the ships.
The information that is exchanged between ship and shore will result in series of digital
messages between the two parties. This is often elaborated and depicted in a particular notion
and is dealt with in section 8.9 Message exchange.
8.9 Message exchange
In every reporting scheme and, in particular automatic reporting schema, there needs to be
well defined message exchange mechanisms in place. These exchange mechanisms should
in principle be independent of the context in which the exchange is taking place.
The exchange is often described as message exchange sequences (patterns) and

corresponding information elements that are necessary to execute the exchange. Each pattern
can represent several different concrete exchanges between different parties. However, when
it comes to ship reporting, the message sequences should be the same generic flow of
information both for single window data exchanges or ship reporting to VTS or any other ship
reporting system.
Figure 8-8 – Client-Server sequence diagram
The sequence diagram(s) presented in this document consists of vertical lines representing an
abstract time axis for respectively client (ship) and server (shore), and in some cases a proxy
(catalogue). Arrows between the parties represent the sequence of messages that need to be
exchanged. A thick line from an arrow end to a new arrow start shows synchronous processing
by the respective party.
The e-navigation services message flow and representation are being discussed in the IMO
Expert Group on Data Harmonization (EGDH), is a slightly modified version of the figure found
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 14
in annex 3 to IMO document EGDH 1/9. 2 The modification to the original generic drawing is
done to visualize a specific sequence diagram for the pattern which describes a service request
in relation to the concept of automatic reporting.
In figure 8-9 -Request reporting, the ship requests the RRS from the shore centre; in this case
the requests are for the Reporting obligations and procedures for clearance to go to port or
entry to a ship reporting system area. A receipt is sent to acknowledge that the request for
service is received by the shore centre. The shore centre proceeds with some work to handle
the request and will respond to the requesting ship with the relevant reporting requirements
and procedures for the particular ship and voyage. In the generic sequence diagram, there are
also sequences for loops and options related to the message exchange. Loops and options
might not be relevant in the example.
In the example above a catalogue service (proxy service) could make the service visible on
behalf of the shore centre.
In a sequence where the ship actually submits a report (TRS service), loops and options would
be very relevant. As an example, a single window system that has received a ship report would
check that the data received is correct and on the right format. The single window will then
forward the relevant information to the correct authorities. Results of the work done by the
shore centre are sent to the ship as a service response, for instance, by a single window; this
can be a clearance to enter the port. The ship can both update and cancel the request in
several iterations. For port clearance, this corresponds to sending a clearance message
multiple times, when the ship has available more information to submit. The ship can also
cancel the service request, for instance cancel the port clearance request.
Figure 8-9 – Request reporting obligations and procedures
2
ISO (2019), input paper to IMO EGDH 1/9, submitted by ISO: "IMO DATA SET RELATED TO
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPTS", 4 October 2019.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 15
To enable a sequence of data exchange similar to what is described in the examples above
would require definitions of additional data elements (beyond conventions and regulations).
The data elements would be within the computer and communication domain and will not
require additional human interactions or administrative burdens.
The pattern can also be used to describe a use case where the client subscribes to updates
from server until some time-out or until cancellation.
Note that for simplicity and consistency, the sequence diagram is foreseen to be an information
exchange between the ship and shore. However, from a practical and real-world point of view,
systems and services "on board" might be implemented elsewhere i.e. onshore or in some
kind of cloud implementation. These sequence diagrams should be interpreted with these facts
in mind.
Standards and harmonized data
The harmonization of data should be based upon the new revision of the IMO Compendium,
which supports the transmission, receipt and response of information required for the arrival,
stay and departure of the ship, persons and cargo via electronic data exchange.
The IMO Compendium constructs the IMO Data Set, which identifies and defines all of the
data elements related to reporting information requirements and the IMO Reference Data
Model to establish the underlying hierarchical data structure used in electronic data exchange.
The IMO Data Set combined with the IMO Reference Data Model promotes harmonization
among the relevant international standards used for electronic business from the World
Customs Organization (WCO), the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic
Business (UN/CEFACT), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and other
organizations.
8.10 Relation to other Maritime Services
Digital information from the ship reporting system using common standards is beneficial for
several stakeholders and actors involved.
In addition to authorities (e.g. border police, immigration, defence, coastguard, customs)

requesting the information, the list below gives example of services that can benefit from
access to ship reporting information.
Maritime Service Examples of information related to MS 8

MS 1 – Vessel traffic service Type of vessel, nationality, MMSI, IMO number, contact
information, draught, cargo
MS 4 – Port support service The majority of the information in a ship reporting system
is useful and can be reused for an effective and
transparent port operation
MS 5 – Maritime safety information Provides information on changes to reporting
service requirements
MS 6 – Pilotage service Ship reporting systems can exchange information with
the pilot system.
Easy access to information can be important for the pilot.

A digital pilot requesting/booking system connected to the
ship reporting system will increase efficiency.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 16
Maritime Service Examples of information related to MS 8

MS 10 – Maritime assistance service Information about cargo, dangerous goods and persons
on board can reduce time before assistance and
contribute to the allocation of the appropriate resources
for the actual situation
MS 11 – Nautical chart service Contains charted information about areas where
reporting is required
MS 12 – Nautical publications service Contains detailed information about reporting
requirements, such as who must report, when reports are
due, and to whom the reports must be submitted
MS 13 – Ice navigation service Information from the ship reporting system can contribute
to a more tailor-made and effective icebreaker service
MS 16 – Search and rescue service Salvage information, drifting patterns, SAR areas, rescue
capabilities in the area
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 17
APPENDIX TO MS 8
SRS - Ship reporting systems product specifications
DETAILED REPORTING
DESIGNATOR FUNCTION INFORMATION REQUIRED TYPE S-100 REFERENCE
REQUIRMENTS
Before or as near as possible to the The ship shall transmit the sailing S-127 (not report
time of departure from a port within plan (SP) on entry into the ship content), S-212, S-421.
SP Sailing plan DIGITAL
a system or when entering the area reporting system area by crossing S-212 makes reference
covered by a system. the reporting line. to a S-421 data set.
The ship shall transmit the position S-127 (not report

When necessary to ensure
PR Position report report (PR) on passing the DIGITAL content);
effective operation of the system.
reporting points. categoryOfShipReport
When the ship's position varies

significantly from the position that
S-127 (not report
would have been predicted from
DR Deviation report DIGITAL content);
previous reports, when changing
categoryOfShipReport
the reported route, or as decided
by the master.
The ship shall transmit the final

On arrival at destination and when S-127 (not report
report (FR) when finally exiting
FR Final report leaving the area covered by a DIGITAL content);
from the ship reporting system
system. categoryOfShipReport
area by crossing the reporting line.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 18
DETAILED REPORTING
REQUIRMENTS
Primary reports should contain
S-127 (not report
items, A, B, C (or D), M, Q, R, S, T,
content);
U, X of the standard reporting
DIGITAL categoryOfShipReport,
format; details for R should be as
S-212; ShipInformation
follows: (See details reporting
with cargoInformation.
requirement in R)
If the condition of the ship is such
that there is danger of further loss
S-127 (not report
of packaged dangerous goods into
content);
the sea, items P and Q of the
standard reporting format should
be reported; details for P should be
as follows: (See details reporting
requirement in P)
When an incident takes place
involving the loss or likely loss
overboard of packaged dangerous
Dangerous good
DG goods, including those in freight
report
containers, portable tanks, road
and rail vehicles and shipborne
barges, into the sea.
S-127 (not report

Particulars not immediately
content);
available should be inserted in a
supplementary message or
messages.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 19
DETAILED REPORTING
REQUIRMENTS
In the case of actual discharge
primary HS reports should contain
items A, B, C (or D), E, F, L, M, N,
S-127 (not report
Q, R, S, T, U, X of the standard
content);
reporting format. In the case of
probable discharge (se 3.4), item P
should also be included. Details for
P, Q, R, T and X should be as
follows: (See details reporting
requirement in P, Q, R, T and X)
After the transmission of the
information referred to above in the
initial report, as much as possible
of the information essential for the
S-127 (not report
When an incident takes place protection of the marine
content);
involving the discharge or probable environment as is appropriate to
Harmful discharge of oil (Annex I of the incident should be reported in a
HS S-212; ShipInformation
substances report MARPOL 73/78) or noxious liquid supplementary report as soon as
substances in bulk (Annex II of possible. That information should
MARPOL 73/78). include items, P, Q, R, S and X.
(See details reporting
The master of any ship engaged in

or requested to engage in an
operation to render assistance or
S-127 (not report
undertake salvage should report,
content);
as far as practicable, items A, B, C
(or D), E, F, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T,
U, X of the standard reporting
format. The master should also
keep the coastal State informed of
developments.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 20
DETAILED REPORTING
REQUIRMENTS
In the case of actual discharge,
primary MP reports should contain
items, A, B, C ( or D), M, Q, R, S,
S-127 (not report
T, U, X of the standard reporting
content);
format. In the case of probable
discharge (see 3.4), item P should
also be included. Details for P, Q,
R, T and X should be as follows:
(See details reporting
After the transmission of the
information referred to above in the
initial report, as much as possible
of the information essential for the S-127 (not report
In the case of loss or likely loss protection of the marine content);
overboard of harmful substances in environment as is appropriate to DIGITAL categoryOfShipReport,
packaged form including those in the incident should be reported. S-212; ShipInformation
freight containers, portable tanks, That information should include with cargoInformation.
Marine pollutants items P, Q, R, S and X. (See
MP road and rail vehicles and
report details reporting requirement in
shipborne barges, identified in the
International Maritime Dangerous P, Q, R, S and X)
Goods Code as marine pollutants
(Annex III of MARPOL 73/78).
The master of any ship engaged in

or requested to engage in an
operation to render assistance or
S-127 (not report
undertake salvage should report,
content);
as far as practicable, items A, B, C
(or D), M, P, Q, R, S, T, U, X of the
standard reporting format. The
master should also keep the
coastal State informed of
developments.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 21
DETAILED REPORTING
REQUIRMENTS
S-212;
The probability of a discharge
The nature of the damage, failure BroadcastAccident;acci
resulting from damage to the ship
or breakdown of the ship, DIGITAL dentShipInformation;ac
or its equipment is a reason for machinery or equipment; and cidentShipCargoInform
making a report. In judging whether
ation
there is such a probability and
S-212;
whether the report should be
Sea and wind state and also traffic BroadcastAccident;acci
made, the following factors, among
density in the area at the time and DIGITAL dentShipInformation;ac
others, should be taken into
place of the incident. cidentShipCargoInform
account:
ation
Damage, failure or breakdown
S-212;
which affects the safety of ships;
BroadcastAccident;acci
examples of such incidents are
DIGITAL dentShipInformation;ac
collision, grounding, fire,
Probability of cidentShipCargoInform
PROBDIS explosion, structural failure,
discharge ation
flooding, cargo shifting; and
It is recognized that it would be
impracticable to lay down precise
definitions of all types of incidents
Failure or breakdown of machinery
involving probable discharge which
or equipment which results in
would warrant an obligation to
impairment of the safety of S-212;
report. Nevertheless, as a general
navigation; examples of such BroadcastAccident;acci
guideline the master of the ship
incidents are failure or breakdown DIGITAL dentShipInformation;ac
should make reports in cases of:
of steering gear, propulsion plant, cidentShipCargoInform
electrical generating system, ation
essential shipborne navigational
aids.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 1, page 22
DETAILED REPORTING
REQUIRMENTS
Where language difficulties may
exist, the languages used should
include English, using where
possible the Standard Marine most S-100 based
Navigational Vocabulary. product specifications
Alternatively, the International have a complex
LANG Language DIGITAL
Code of Signals may be used to attribute with language
send detailed information. When attribute using the
the International Code is used, the ISO639-3 code list
appropriate indicator should be
inserted in the text, after the
alphabetical index.
Chart datum is World Geodetic

REFCHART Reference chart Indicate the reference chart DIGITAL ??
System 1984 (WGS 84) datum
Any other report should be made in

accordance with the system
All VHF, telephone, radar, AIS and
procedures as notified in
other relevant information will be
GIVE IN FULL Any other report accordance with paragraph 9 of the DIGITAL S-127, possibly S-212
recorded and the records stored for
General Principles. (See details
30 days.
reporting requirement in resolution
A.851(20))
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 2, page 1
ANNEX 2
EGDH PRIORITY LIST OF DATA SETS
Information domain Data set brief description Priority

FAL Convention Delivery bill for mail consignment as described in the Acts of the Universal Postal Union, the Universal
Postal Convention and its Regulations currently in force 2
Ship Sanitation Control Certificate or extension as set forth by the International Health Regulations 2
Environmental information Data set on Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) 1
Safety information Data set related to Container Inspection Programme (FAL 45/INF.2) 2
Notice of Hazardous Condition: Hazardous condition means any condition that may adversely affect the
safety of any vessel, bridge, structure or shore area or the environmental quality of any port, harbour or
navigable waterway of the United States. It may, but need not, involve collision, allision, fire, explosion, 2
grounding, leaking, damage, injury or illness of a person aboard, or manning shortage.
IHO S-100 package "Data set on berth locations (S-131 (Marine Harbour Infrastructure))" Information supporting berth-to-berth
2
route planning FAL 45/06/7
Location Terminal codes (Child code of UN/LOCODE, IMO Port facility number, SMDG, BIC facility codes and IHO
S-131 product specification) 2
Cargo information IMO data set related to the electronic bill of lading: Data set related to the bill of lading (B/L) as the legally
binding document issued by the carrier (or their agent) to the party shipping the goods to acknowledge 2
receipt of the cargo for shipment
Added cargo details on dangerous goods
(FAL 43/INF.3; FAL 43/7/1) 2
Persons PNR data set: Passenger name record or booking information such as the contact details of the
passenger, method of payment, travel agent, etc. 2
Other persons on board: Information related to special personnel on board ships 2
Maritime Services in the
2
context of e-navigation
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 3, page 1
ANNEX 3
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EGDH
The Committee agreed to the following terms of reference of the IMO Expert Group on Data
Harmonization:
1 continue work related to the maintenance of the IMO Compendium on

Facilitation and Electronic Business;
2 propose sub-models to be included in the IMO Compendium on Facilitation

and Electronic Business;
3 consider data sets, based on the priority list, and giving priority to data sets
with priority 1;
4 update the priority list of data sets;
5 provide additional implementation guidance to explain the use of the

Compendium, including what instruments or business processes the
sub-model or data set is derived from, the parties exchanging information
and for what purpose, what data elements may be mandatory or voluntary,
and any other information that is important for the use of the Compendium;
6 provide the NCSR Sub-Committee with information on the work in progress,

when relevant; and
7 submit a report for consideration by the Facilitation Committee.
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 4, page 1
ANNEX 4
REVISED ROAD MAP ON ADDRESSING MASS ISSUES

RELATED TO THE FAL CONVENTION
SESSIONS OF FAL WORK PLAN
FAL 48 1. consider documents FAL 48/8/3, FAL 47/22/Add.1, annex 6

(spring 2024) and the comments made and decisions taken in plenary during FAL
48; and
2. update the road map.
FAL 49 1. assess the finalized non-mandatory MASS Code and

(spring 2025) consider the need for amendments to, and interpretation of, the
annex to the FAL Convention based on the outcome of the
MASS-JWG as well as the outcome of MSC and LEG; and
2. update the road map as necessary.
FAL 50 1. assess the adopted mandatory MASS Code and consider

(spring 2026) the need for further amendments to, and interpretation of, the annex
to the FAL Convention;
2. consider the proposed amendments to the annex to the FAL

Convention developed by the Working Group on FAL MASS, as set
out in annex 7 to document FAL 47/22/Add.1; and
3. update this road map as necessary.
FAL 51 1. adopt amendments to the FAL Convention.

(spring 2027)
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 1
ANNEX 5
RESOLUTION FAL.17(48)
Adopted on 12 April 2024
REVISED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION

OF THE SMUGGLING OF WILDLIFE ON SHIPS ENGAGED IN
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC
THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE,
RECALLING that the Facilitation Committee at its forty-sixth session approved and issued the
Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of wildlife on ships engaged
in international maritime traffic (FAL 5/Circ. 50),
RECALLING ALSO that the Facilitation Committee at its forty-sixth and forty-seventh sessions,
respectively, adopted amendments to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic, 1965, as amended, which recommend measures to combat illicit activities including
illicit trafficking in wildlife,
RECALLING FURTHER United Nations General Assembly resolutions 69/314

of 30 July 2015, 70/301 of 9 September 2016, 71/326 of 11 September 2017, 73/334
of 30 August 2019, 75/311 of 23 July 2021 and A/77/L.99 of 25 August 2023 on tackling illicit
trafficking in wildlife,
COGNIZANT of the application and the resolutions under the agreement between Contracting
Governments under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora to ensure that international trade in specimens of flora and fauna does not
threaten the survival of the species,
COGNIZANT ALSO of the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code among others, which call for
cooperation of all States and between ships operating in international maritime traffic and port
facilities to detect and deter certain acts which pose a threat to maritime security,
NOTING that the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, 2017, calls for signatory
and participatory States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent to repress transnational
organized crime in the maritime domain among other illegal activities at sea,
BEING MINDFUL of the work undertaken by United Nations agencies and other international
organizations in assisting Contracting Governments with preventing and suppressing illegal
wildlife trade in all its forms through road, air and sea transport,
RECOGNIZING that the prevention and suppression of smuggling of wildlife and its products
require concerted cooperation to ensure the survival of endangered species and counteract
the environmental, economic and social impacts of the illegal trade,
RECOGNIZING ALSO the close connection between smuggling of wildlife and transnational
organized crimes, such as smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking, money laundering and
drugs trafficking and the need to enhance coordination of efforts at national, sub-regional,
regional and international levels to strengthen a global response to threats to international
security,
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 2
COGNIZANT of the measures being undertaken by industry stakeholders including to enhance

awareness of the threats presented by illicit trafficking in wildlife,
APPRECIATING the intrinsic value of biological diversity and its various contributions to
sustainable development and the need for Contracting Governments to cooperate and ensure
that international trade of wild animals and plants does not threaten the survival of the species
through illegal trade,
RECOGNIZING the need to strike a balance between facilitation of international trade and
management of risks to prevent and suppress smuggling of wildlife on board ships,
1 ADOPTS the Revised guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling
of wildlife on ships engaged in international traffic, set out in the annex to the present
resolution;
2 STRONGLY URGES Contracting Governments to implement the Revised guidelines

as from 1 May 2024;
3 INVITES maritime administrations to enhance awareness on illegal wildlife trade by

encouraging maritime transport stakeholders to participate in available e-learning platforms
including IMO's e-learning platform following the launch of the e-learning course on
"Introduction to Counter Wildlife Trafficking in the Maritime Supply Chains";
4 INVITES Member Governments, inter-governmental agencies and non-governmental

organizations in consultative status with IMO to circulate the Revised guidelines as widely as
possible in order to ensure their widespread promulgation and implementation and to bring
them in particular to the attention of shipping lines, maritime transport operators, seafarers,
shippers, forwarders and consolidators and other stakeholders; and
5 INVITES, where appropriate, Member Governments to consider amending their

national legislation to give effect to the Revised guidelines.
6 REVOKES the Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of
wildlife on ships engaged in international maritime traffic approved by FAL 46 (FAL 5/Circ.50).
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 3
ANNEX
REVISED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION

OF THE SMUGGLING OF WILDLIFE ON SHIPS ENGAGED IN
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC 1
Preamble 5
Abbreviations 8
Definitions 9
1 Introduction to illegal wildlife trade in international maritime transport 10
1.1 Wildlife species subject to trafficking 10
1.2 Methods used by traffickers to conceal illegal wildlife on a ship 11
1.2.1 Container cargo 11
1.2.2 Passenger cruise ship 12
1.2.3 Ferry 12
1.2.4 Roll-on/roll-off ("ro-ro") vessels 12
1.2.5 Bulk cargo 12
1.2.6 Crew members 12
2 Measures to prevent, detect and report wildlife trafficking on ships 12
2.1 Action by officers of competent government agencies 12
2.1.1 Assessment of vulnerability to wildlife trafficking 13
2.1.2 Security at the port 13
2.1.3 Use of electronic and automated systems 14
2.1.4 Wildlife crime intelligence 14
2.1.5 Inspections of vessels 15
2.1.6 Inspection of passengers, baggage and cargo 16
2.1.7 Inter-agency, cross-sectoral and international collaboration 16
2.1.8 Investigation and prosecution 18
2.1.9 Additional measures related to investigation and prosecution 19
2.1.10 Prevention and deterrence of corruption 19
2.1.11 Education and training 19
2.1.12 Best practices in the sector 20
2.2 Action by companies 20
2.2.1 Security strengthening and risk reduction 21
2.2.2 Reporting 21
2.2.3 Cooperation 22
2.2.4 Training and awareness-raising 22
2.2.5 Other 22
1
Track changes were created using "grey shading" to highlight all modifications and new insertions.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 4
ANNEX 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE CITES CONVENTION AND APPENDICES

Types of CITES documents 23
Permits 24
Certificates 24
Notifications 24
ANNEX 2: EXAMPLES OF SMUGGLING TECHNIQUES FOR AUTHORITIES AND
MARITIME OPERATORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 25
ANNEX 3: RED FLAGS INDICATING POSSIBLE ILLEGAL TRADE 26
1 Shipment of commodities incongruous with the origin and/or destination
country 26
2 Weight and appearance discrepancy 26
3 Dubious or vague descriptions 26
4 Value of cargo does not tally with description or size 26
5 Questionable paperwork 26
6 Consignment split across multiple shipments 26
7 Shipping route is abnormal for the product and destination 27
8 Change of shipping route once the ship has left port 27
9 Switch bill of lading 27
10 Request for use of letter of indemnity without just cause 27
11Use of free trade zones and free ports 27
12 Failure to disclose true shipper or consignee information 27
13 First-time shipper and shipper's reluctance to offer information about
their business and end use of a product 27
14 Last-minute request for shipment clearance 28
15 Cash payments 28
ANNEX 4: USEFUL RESOURCES 29
Wildlife trafficking and red flags 29
Safety and security framework 29
Capacity-building for government agencies and companies to prevent illegal
wildlife trade and other illicit trade in transport supply chains 30
Corruption and whistle-blowing 31
Resources from International organizations – combating illegal wildlife trade 31
Regional organizations – combating illegal wildlife trade 31
National initiatives 32
Joint industry guidelines 32
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 5
Preamble
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed these Revised guidelines for the
prevention and suppression of the smuggling of wildlife on ships engaged in international
maritime traffic.
The Revised guidelines are intended to complement international instruments and

recommendations issued by various bodies – for example, the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Secretariat, the World
Customs Organization, the United Nations and the International Tropical Timber Organization
in order to assist those engaged in the facilitation of international maritime traffic to prevent
and suppress smuggling of wildlife on ships.
Despite numerous efforts by IMO and related organizations – for example, through
development of international instruments to assist in the regulation of the shipping industry at
the national, regional and international levels – there is a significant abuse of legitimate
international shipping services by criminal groups illegally smuggling wildlife through maritime
trade. These Revised guidelines provide basic procedures related to the detection,
investigation and prosecution of illegal wildlife smuggling activities in maritime transport and
make prevention the principal means of ensuring that smuggling of wildlife does not damage
the world's economy and well-being.
The Revised guidelines serve as an additional tool to prevent and combat smuggling of wildlife
by enhancing awareness and involvement of shipowners, shipping lines, maritime transport
operators, shippers, seafarers, passengers, competent government agencies and others
closely involved in the operation of ships. They provide information on the nature and context
of maritime smuggling of wildlife, and on the prevention, detection and cooperative
suppression of wildlife trafficking. They may also be used to complement guidance on
preventing and combating other forms of transnational organized crime in the maritime domain
and other illicit activities.
These Revised guidelines aim to encourage collaboration and coordination at international,

regional, and national levels, port level, and between competent government agencies,
maritime transport operators, shippers, seafarers and other stakeholders in the prevention and
suppression of wildlife trafficking.
IMO recognizes the relevance of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which accords varying degrees of protection to
2
over 38,000 species of animals and plants. The aim of CITES is to ensure that international
trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten the survival of species. IMO
is also cognizant of the acute global biodiversity crisis provoked by the illegal wildlife trade and
its connection with transnational organized crime. IMO recognizes the work undertaken by
Member States, and regional and international organizations to tackle illegal wildlife trade; this
work has now gained unequivocal international acceptance.
These Revised guidelines will assist:
.1 maritime administrations to coordinate activities related to the prevention and

suppression of smuggling of wildlife on board ships between the public and
private sectors;
2
https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 6
.2 competent government agencies to execute their mandate in terms of

prevention, detection, interception and investigation of smuggling of wildlife
cases; these agencies include revenue/customs officers, port policing
authorities, CITES management authorities and scientific authorities
(wildlife, fisheries, forestry), law enforcement officers (coastguard service,
national intelligence, criminal investigations) and immigration officers;
.3 shipowners and shipping lines to consider adopting or improving procedures

aimed at enhancing due diligence over shipping operations, and at
preventing smuggling of wildlife on board ships; such procedures may vary
from one ship to another, depending on the type of ship, their cargo and the
routes they serve; and
.4 seafarers, shippers and other maritime transport operators to gain more

knowledge on wildlife trafficking as a criminal offence that may lead to
prosecution, to enhance information-sharing and to encourage them to report
suspicious activities.
Several high-level international statements have been adopted in recent years by the
3
United Nations that identify wildlife trafficking as a global concern and encourage Member
States to integrate appropriate measures to address illegal wildlife trade. United Nations
conventions have set principles to govern international action on issues of global concern.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is fundamentally important
to the application of these Revised guidelines, with its emphasis on the principle of cooperation
as a prerequisite for achieving common objectives on the basis of shared responsibility.
Action against smuggling of wildlife is ultimately a joint responsibility, requiring an integrated
and balanced approach involving all parties in the maritime supply chain.
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) notes the
need to adopt measures to fight organized crime that transcend single jurisdictions.
These measures include the creation of domestic criminal offences (participation in an
organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice); the
adoption of frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement
cooperation; and the promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading
the necessary capacity of competent government agencies to fight similar crimes.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provides measures to be adopted
by Member States, directed at both the public and private sectors, towards eradicating different
forms of corruption, which is also consistent with these Revised guidelines.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/69/314 on tackling illicit trafficking in

wildlife encourages Member States to "adopt effective measures to prevent and counter the
serious problem of crimes that have an impact on the environment, such as illicit trafficking in
wildlife and wildlife products". The resolution urges Member States to treat wildlife trafficking
involving organized criminal groups as a serious crime and implement anti-money laundering
measures, establish national-level inter-agency wildlife crime task forces, strengthen judicial
processes and law enforcement efforts, prevent and counter corruption, and reduce the
demand for threatened wildlife.
3
UNGA Resolution 69/314 (2015): https://undocs.org/A/RES/69/314
UNGA Resolution 70/301 (2016): https://undocs.org/A/70/301
UNGA Resolution 75/311 (2021): https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/311
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 7
These Revised guidelines take cognizance of the global efforts under the Buckingham Palace
3
Declaration of the United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce, which recognizes the devastating
impact of illegal trade in wildlife and establishes commitments that apply to the transport
industry to counter illegal wildlife trade.
The Revised guidelines take into account the contribution of IMO through the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code. This provides a comprehensive mandatory security regime for
international shipping to which contracting governments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), port authorities and shipping companies must adhere. In doing
so, it strengthens the security system in ports to detect and prevent criminal activities, including
those related to wildlife trafficking.
The Revised guidelines echo the spirit and incorporate aspects of the World Customs
Organization SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. The SAFE
Framework is an international instrument that establishes modern supply chain security
standards and management of goods moving across borders, while recognizing the
significance of a closer partnership between customs and businesses. The SAFE Framework
balances facilitation and control, while promoting the security of the global trade supply chain.
In addition, the Revised guidelines are in line with the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code
of Conduct (DCOC), which calls on signatory States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent
to repress transnational organized crime in the maritime domain. This includes arms trafficking,
trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances, illegal trade in wildlife, and other criminal
activities.
Familiarity with the content of the international instruments mentioned above is advisable
because they complement each other. The relevant provisions of these international
instruments should be incorporated into national and local policies, programmes and plans,
supported by relevant enabling legislation.
CITES Member Parties have designated management, scientific and enforcement authorities,
as well as proper procedures, for effective implementation of the CITES licensing system. IMO
Member States are therefore encouraged to the greatest extent possible to examine, enact,
amend or adapt existing legislation, to enhance protection of wildlife and the protection status
of national endangered species, and combat illegal wildlife trade. Companies are also
encouraged to examine and strengthen existing infrastructure and operational frameworks to
prevent illegal wildlife trade in maritime transport.
Invaluable information may also be obtained from practices in various jurisdictions, as well as
publications and materials from TRAFFIC, the United Nations Development Programme,
United for Wildlife, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Wide Fund for
Nature and industry, among others, in the development of these Revised guidelines. A list of
examples of relevant guidance is attached in annex 4.
3
http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-
programmes/environmental-crime/united-for-wildlife/ufw-transport-taskforce-buckingham-palace-
declaration.pdf?la=en
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 8
Abbreviations
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
FATF Financial Action Task Force
IMO International Maritime Organization
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WCO World Customs Organization
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 9
Definitions
Bill of lading: A document that evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the taking over or
loading of goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods
against surrender of the document. A provision in the document that the goods are to be
delivered to the order of a named person, or to order or bearer, constitutes such an
undertaking.
Competent government agencies: In these Revised guidelines, such agencies include port
authorities/regulators, maritime administrations, customs/revenue officers, CITES
Management Authorities and Scientific Authorities (fisheries, wildlife, forestry), national and
financial intelligence services, veterinary services, national museums, coastguard services,
criminal investigation services, attorney general/prosecution services and the judiciary.
Consignee: A person entitled to take delivery of goods under a contract of carriage, a transport
document or an electronic transport record.
5
Controlled delivery: A special investigative technique that allows illicit or suspect
consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the
knowledge and under the supervision of their competent government agencies, with a view to
the investigation of an offence and the identification of people involved in the commission of
the offence.
Maritime transport operators: In these Revised guidelines, such operators include

shipowners, shipping lines, ship agents, port facility operators, terminal operators, freight
forwarders, clearing and forwarding agents, cargo consolidators, container freight stations,
empty depots, and so on. The terms "company" and "maritime transport operator" may be used
interchangeably.
Red flags: In these Revised guidelines, these are indicators and warning signals, which may be
explicit or implicit, suggesting that something is "not quite right" and may require further
investigation.
Shipment: The act of transporting cargo under the terms of a single bill of lading.
Shipper: A legal entity or person named on the bill of lading, sea waybill or equivalent
multimodal transport document (e.g. "through" bill of lading) as shipper and/or with whom (or in
whose name or on whose behalf) a contract of carriage has been concluded with a shipping
company.
Smuggling of wildlife: In these Revised guidelines, "smuggling" means the illegal

transportation or trafficking of wildlife in the form of export, re-export, trans-shipment and import
in contravention of international law and national legislation of the country of origin restricting
export. In these Revised guidelines, "smuggling of wildlife" is synonymous with the terms
"trafficking in wildlife", "wildlife trafficking" and "illegal wildlife trade".
Wildlife: In these Revised guidelines, this refers to all species of wild animals and plants, whether
alive or dead, and parts and derivatives of those species, whose international trade is regulated
under CITES, as well as those protected under international law, and those whose exports are
restricted under national legislation implementing of the same.
Wildlife trade: In these Revised guidelines, this refers to commerce in wildlife.
5
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-8/key-issues/special-investigative-
techniques/controlled-deliveries.html
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 10
1 Introduction to illegal wildlife trade in international maritime transport
Trade in wild animals and plants is a vast business that encompasses multiple industries, from
food, furniture and fashion to healthcare, pets and zoos. The majority of the trade is legal and
is governed by national and international instruments and national laws implementing those
instruments. At the international level, the main treaty governing wildlife trade is the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, also known
as the Washington Convention; see annex 1).
The growing demand for wildlife, especially species used in traditional medicine, high-end
furniture and decorative items, and as exotic pets, is fuelling a parallel illegal market that is
6
valued at more than $200 billion per year. Wildlife trafficking is considered the fourth largest
illegal trade, after trafficking in counterfeit products, drugs and humans. The illegal trade in
wildlife is a logistics- and transport-intensive activity. Although high-value illegal wildlife is often
transported by air, by overall volume, maritime shipping seems to be the preferred method of
transport, since it provides cost-effective opportunities for perpetrators to smuggle large
volumes of wildlife undetected. Ninety per cent of the global trade is seaborne, where less
7
than 2% of containers undergo inspection; considering these volumes, controls may very
much rely on intelligence, among other national or regional measures.
The majority of perpetrators take advantage of the substantial legitimate wildlife trade to
commingle licit and illicit commodities. There is evidence of convergence between wildlife
trafficking and other forms of serious crime, including money laundering, financial crime and
corruption. Perpetrators use approaches for wildlife trafficking similar to those deployed for
illicit drug trafficking through international shipping.
Although most of the volume of smuggled wildlife may be found in cargo, there may be
instances of smuggling of wildlife by passengers on their person or in luggage. These
Revised guidelines therefore also provide recommendations for passengers on cruise ships.
1.1 Wildlife species subject to trafficking

8
Over 38,000 wildlife species are listed in appendices I, II and III of CITES as either at current
risk of extinction from international trade, potentially threatened in the future if trade is not
controlled, or protected in one country and therefore requires controlled trade (see annex 1).
Wildlife that is illegally traded using maritime transport channels typically includes
non-perishable products of commonly traded species, such as timber, elephant ivory, pangolin
scales, dried animal products such as shark fins, sea cucumbers, seahorses, seashells, big
cat bones and claws, giant clams and rhinoceros' horns, as well as dried plants such as aloe,
American ginseng and other plant-derived medicines. These are often transported in raw form
but may have been processed before being shipped. Live animals such as reptiles, birds and
mammals are also known to be transported internationally across short distances via ferries
and bulk cargo vessels.
Some wildlife is completely banned from international commercial trade (under CITES or
specific national law restricting exports). The only way for perpetrators to smuggle them is to
hide and mis-declare them as licit commodities. Regarding wildlife that can be legally traded,
the illegality arises from the lack of provision of proper and necessary permits or requirements
that will demonstrate compliance with CITES and relevant national regulations.
6
https://gfintegrity.org/report/transnational-crime-and-the-developing-world/
7
https://www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/en/drogas/global-container-control-programme-ccp.html
8
https://cites.org/eng/disc/species.php
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 11
1.2 Methods used by traffickers to conceal illegal wildlife on a ship
Any country can be a source, transit or destination point for illegal wildlife trade.
Although wildlife trafficking routes evolve over time to avoid detection and interception by law
enforcement agencies, a better understanding of trafficking patterns, routes and methods
through use of up-to-date information on illegal wildlife trade is essential to build effective
intelligence, to target enforcement efforts in high-risk areas and to assist stakeholders to better
mitigate risks associated with illegal wildlife trade.
Ships can be misused and exploited for trafficking in wildlife. Some common methods used by
traffickers include the following:
1.2.1 Container cargo
Misdeclaration
The commodities are declared as another legal product to conceal illegal wildlife.
Legal products that have low value or that benefit from reduced taxation are commonly used
to conceal illegal trade in wildlife. These are either:
.1 hidden among other legitimate products;
.2 hidden in secret built-in compartments inside the container; or
.3 mixed with look-alike species – this happens when species of the same
group are granted licences or permits with different protection levels and
trade requirements. Wildlife for which trade is either completely banned or
that would require special permits is smuggled with similar species that can
be more easily traded, making their correct identification very challenging for
law enforcement.
Use of forged or altered permits and other documents to fraudulently legitimize the trade in
species that require specific permits.
The permits and certificates required in the trade of CITES specimens include the export
permit, import permit, re-export certificate, pre-convention certificate, certificate of origin,
certificate of captive bred animals, certificate of artificially propagated plants, and introduction
from the sea certificate. Fraudulent activities may include:
.1 intentional declaration of false information on documents – parties tendering

goods may intentionally mis-declare by providing false information
(regarding species, quantity, source, value); this can reduce the chance of
the shipment attracting attention, reduce the amount of tax paid, or falsely
bring the shipment into compliance with export quotas;
.2 documents modified after issue – information is altered to allow trade that has
not been authorized;
.3 counterfeit documents – fake permits, sometimes of very high quality, are

used fraudulently to trade specimens;
.4 reusing or photocopying documents – the same permit is used multiple times

or duplicated;
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Annex 5, page 12
.5 expired documents – permits are used beyond the date of expiry;
.6 stolen documents – stolen permits can be used to trade CITES-listed wildlife;

or permits may be falsely declared as lost, damaged or stolen, and the
replacements also used to trade wildlife; and
.7 concealed information – perpetrators will try to conceal the true shipper,

consignee, ownership and business activities related to the shipment in the
bill of lading by using shell companies and providing incomplete or fraudulent
shipment documentation.
1.2.2 Passenger cruise ship
Wildlife may be hidden in passengers' luggage or on their person.
1.2.3 Ferry
Wildlife may be hidden in passengers' luggage, on their person or inside vehicles.
1.2.4 Roll-on/roll-off ("ro-ro") vessels
Wildlife may be hidden inside vehicles or concealed within compartments of a vehicle.
1.2.5 Bulk cargo
Wildlife may be hidden among other legitimate products.
1.2.6 Crew members
Crew members may conceal illegal wildlife as part of their personal property or on their person
(see annex 2 for smuggling examples).
2 Measures to prevent, detect and report wildlife trafficking on ships
Both public and private actors can contribute to combating illegal wildlife trade on ships
engaged in international maritime traffic. This section describes actions and measures that can
be put in place by competent government agencies and by companies to prevent, detect and
collaborate in the suppression of wildlife trafficking.
2.1 Action by officers of competent government agencies
Officers of competent government agencies have certain duties to fulfil with respect to all
vessels arriving from and departing for foreign countries.
Some government agencies of coastal States have been empowered by their national laws to
board ships of foreign flag States within their ports, or transiting or remaining in the coastal
State's territorial sea, and to inspect and examine any part of the ship for suspected illegal
wildlife. Government agencies may also be empowered to exercise, in the contiguous zone,
the control necessary to prevent infringement of coastal States' customs and fiscal laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Such procedures vary according to respective
national legislation, but must at all times be consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 13
Some government agencies of coastal States may also be empowered by their national laws
to board and search suspect ships located seaward of the territorial sea or contiguous zone, if
permission is granted by the flag State (in the case of foreign flag ships) and those laws and
powers must at all times be consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS.
2.1.1 Assessment of vulnerability to wildlife trafficking
Relevant competent government agencies are encouraged to adopt the following measures:
.1 Establish a risk profiling system that will identify shipments that are high-risk
and are likely to contain illegal consignments as early as possible in the
supply chain, at or before the port of departure. This system uses a variety
of risk indicators that identify suspicious containers, cargo or passengers.
The criteria may include commodity code, country of origin, destination of
consignment, licensing indicator, value, trader, level of compliance, purpose
of the stay in the customs territory, financial consequences, financial situation
of the trader, ports implicated in illegal trade in wildlife, and suspicious
companies or ships that have been complicit in illegal trade in wildlife.
.2 Ascertain the authenticity or legitimacy of documentation submitted. This can

be a verification process, to identify whether submitted documents are
genuine or forged; whether the documents contain particulars or details
commonly found in shipments related to smuggling of wildlife;
inconsistencies in the full cargo manifest and other trade documentation;
inconsistencies in weight, density or appearance of the shipment that do not
match documentation; inconsistencies in CITES permits or certificates;
inconsistencies between the source and destination, and the common trade
routes of the shipment or ship; and missing documentation.
.3 Where possible, ascertain whether there are discrepancies between the

declared gross mass and the actual gross mass of the packed container,
taking into account the mandatory verification of the gross mass of packed
containers.
.4 For an effective risk assessment mechanism, regularly update the database

based on recent seizures and trends, among other related data.
.5 Where the vessel contains a shipment of wildlife and the species can be
identified, ascertain from the CITES appendices whether the species is
subjected to trade restrictions, whether it can be traded and whether the
appropriate documentation has been provided.
.6 Request the ship's plan and ask whether there have been any recent
structural adjustments or restructuring. If in doubt, schedule a physical
inspection.
2.1.2 Security at the port
Competent government agencies are encouraged to:
.1 Enhance the national legal framework and adopt measures to promote

transparency and deter the misuse of free trade zones located within port
limits for illegal wildlife trade.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 14
.2 Review port facility security plans and consider ways in which they can be
adjusted to enhance the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of
wildlife, whilst not compromising their primary purpose as set out in the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.
.3 Recall the effective control of access to port facilities, ships and cargoes
conducted pursuant to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
will also contribute to the prevention of the smuggling of wildlife.
2.1.3 Use of electronic and automated systems
The use of secure electronic systems for transmission of documents and/or advance clearance
processes improves transparency of operations and facilitates expeditious detection of
irregularities. Competent government agencies are therefore encouraged to adopt the
following measures:
.1 Establish a secure, standardized electronic customs clearance system that

facilitates expedited customs processes and clearance, and ensures
interoperability. These systems permit tracking of shipments in real time and
detect anomalies and potential fraud.
.2 Establish a secure maritime single window system that integrates with other
port operation systems, including those related to CITES controls, to facilitate
electronic submission of documents for port users through a single entry
point, for expedited clearance of ships, crew, passengers and cargo.
.3 Establish an electronic system for issuing CITES permits (for CITES Member
Parties), to deter use of forged documentation. In addition, consider its
integration with maritime single window among other associated port
systems.
2.1.4 Wildlife crime intelligence
Wildlife crime intelligence entails the collection, collation and analysis of information that can
be used to create tactical, operational and strategic intelligence assessments to combat crimes
such as smuggling of wildlife. Various measures can be used to facilitate the establishment of
a database for useful intelligence in accordance with national legislation. Competent
government agencies are encouraged to consider the following:
.1 Establish a specialized joint port intelligence unit comprising customs officers

and law enforcement officers from various related agencies to collect and
analyse intelligence.
.2 Establish a database and regularly update entries on previous seizures and

risk indicators. 9
.3 Establish a network for information-sharing between competent government
agencies, maritime transport operators, shippers, seafarers and other
stakeholders to encourage reporting of wildlife trafficking cases.
.4 Establish a mechanism for receipt of intelligence to facilitate verification of

the intelligence and interception of the illegal wildlife trade, including a
system allowing anonymous submission of reports of suspicious activities.
9
Refer to annex 3 for list of indicators.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 15
.5 Establish and update a database of suspicious ship activities, which may

include: 10
.1 suspicious ship movement patterns (e.g. unexpected and

unexplained diversions, prolonged delays in arrival);
.2 a ship's automatic identification system transponder being turned

off, resulting in the temporary disappearance of a ship; and
.3 vessels being non-responsive to call-ups; and
.6 Scrutinize documentation submitted from high-risk areas, whether or not

wildlife is declared.
2.1.5 Inspections of vessels
Where vessels have been identified as suspicious, competent government agencies

empowered to undertake vessel inspection are encouraged to undertake measures including
the following:
.1 Coordinate the national joint port control unit to undertake the inspection.
.2 Implement standard operating procedures to facilitate efficiency in

inspections, and ensure that the appropriate procedures and processes are
followed.
.3 Escort the vessel to a secure location at the port.
.4 Cordon off the area.
.5 Guard the vessel.
.6 Establish a controlled access system for the vessel.
.7 Undertake an inventory on board the vessel.
.8 Where wildlife is found, liaise with the relevant national agency to establish
and verify that it is being exported and imported with the requisite permit or
certificate.
Competent government agencies of coastal States involved in customs administration should

encourage the implementation of transit measures without compromising their supply chain
security measures. Competent agencies are therefore encouraged to establish cooperation
agreements to facilitate inspections of suspect vessels in transit in line with international law,
including UNCLOS. Alternatively, they can undertake the controlled delivery technique
(see "Definitions").
10
Refer to annex 3 for other indicators.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 16
2.1.6 Inspection of passengers, baggage and cargo
Competent government agencies are encouraged to undertake inspections in accordance with

established standard operating procedures. They are also encouraged to consider the
following measures:
.1 Adopt or establish non-intrusive inspection equipment such as scanners,

X-ray machines and radiation detectors that permit inspection of containers,
cargo and baggage.
.2 Use sniffer dogs for passenger baggage and cargo.
.3 Where possible, subject cargo in containers to the risk profiling system,
followed by scanning of the container.
.4 Subject cargo in containers to physical inspection where a scanned image
or sniffer dog has detected anomalies. Where possible, designate a special
secure area for restricted container inspection.
.5 Use a biometrics identification system for passengers.

.6 For cargo declared to contain wildlife, verify the permits or certificates to
ensure that the transported wildlife has been documented and is not
concealed with other legitimate products.
.7 Government agencies in charge of veterinary and phytosanitary inspections,

and other authorities carrying out specific checks on shipments, are
encouraged to collaborate with law enforcement counterparts in cases of
suspected illegal wildlife trade.
.8 Where possible, apply the controlled delivery technique (see "Definitions") to

the recipient(s) of the illegal wildlife consignment.
.9 Obtain and record statements from crew, take photographic or video
evidence, and secure and safeguard evidence and/or exhibits. Where live
wildlife is found, employ measures to protect and preserve the wildlife, in
consultation with national CITES authorities.
2.1.7 Inter-agency, cross-sectoral and international collaboration
The establishment of a joint port control unit or intelligence unit, comprising officers from
various government agencies, enhances the capacity to prevent, detect, inspect, investigate,
intercept and prosecute perpetrators of smuggling of wildlife, and other serious related crimes.
These units provide a secure system of exchange of information and intelligence on suspicious
consignments.
Where this has not been done, maritime administrations are encouraged to initiate the
establishment of such a joint taskforce or unit of officers and, where possible, coordinate the
activities.
Competent government agencies are therefore encouraged to enter into national inter-agency
collaborative frameworks. The agencies may include:
.1 intelligence agency;
.2 customs/revenue authority;
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Annex 5, page 17
.3 ports authority or regulator;
.4 maritime administration;
.5 CITES authorities (fisheries, wildlife and forestry agencies);
.6 veterinary service;
.7 criminal investigations unit;
.8 forensic laboratories;
.9 prosecution service/attorney general's office;
.10 judiciary;
.11 financial intelligence unit; and
.12 national museum.
Competent government agencies are further encouraged to enter into arrangements with
regional and international organizations or associations to support the enhancement of
national legal and institutional frameworks; and facilitate information-sharing for prevention,
detection, interception, investigation and prosecution of cases of smuggling of wildlife.
Some of these institutions provide intelligence that would facilitate implementation of the
controlled delivery technique for investigation and identification of perpetrators. These regional
and international organizations include:
.1 CITES;
.2 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL);
.3 International Tropical Timber Organization;
.4 regional police chief associations;
.5 Financial Action Task Force (FATF); and
.6 World Customs Organization (WCO).
Competent government agencies are further encouraged to enter into regional and
international initiatives aimed at sharing expertise, intelligence, updates on red flags or
indicators, and best practices on illegal wildlife trade. These initiatives include the International
Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime, the United for Wildlife Transport Taskforce, United
for Wildlife Financial Taskforce, the Lusaka Agreement Task Force, regional Trade in Wildlife
Information Exchange platforms (e.g. EU-TWIX, AFRICA-TWIX, SADC-TWIX, EASTERN
AFRICA-TWIX), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global
Programme on Crimes that Affect the Environment.
Competent government agencies are further encouraged to establish informal networks,

regional maritime information centres and networks with military intelligence to enhance
information exchange and sharing. Competent government agencies are encouraged to
consider, adopt and implement regional, international and intergovernmental programmes,
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Annex 5, page 18
including those developed to facilitate enhanced supply chain security and efficiency in
international trade, those related to the suppression of illicit trade, and those related to
global anti-money laundering and counter- terrorist financing. These include the WCO SAFE
11
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development Recommendation of the Council on OECD legal
instruments countering illicit trade, FATF recommendations on global anti-money laundering
and counter-terrorist financing standards, and the UNODC-WCO Container Control
Programme.
2.1.8 Investigation and prosecution
Competent government agencies are encouraged to establish offences within their national
laws to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of smuggling of wildlife. They are further
encouraged to consider implementing the following measures:
.1 Classify or categorize animal and plant species as endangered or

non-endangered.
.2 Establish the offence and provide for commensurate penalties under national
laws; where possible, take into account regional consistency to facilitate
cross-border initiatives.
.3 Provide for stringent penalties for crimes involving endangered and critically
endangered species.
.4 Promote cross-border investigations and prosecutions.
.5 Develop standard operating procedures (a rapid reference guide or manuals)

to facilitate investigations and prosecutions, as well as evidence collection
and preservation. These may include guidelines on recovery of exhibits.
.6 Empower law enforcement to undertake financial investigation, obtain

access to and freeze bank accounts during investigations.
.7 Where possible, establish laws that empower officers within national CITES
authorities to conduct delegated prosecutions of illegal wildlife trade.
.8 Develop a case management system and a mode of sharing information with

partner States. This will facilitate seizures that are across borders.
.9 Examine, amend or adapt existing national laws that provide penalties for
ancillary and inchoate offences related to the smuggling of wildlife.
11
Supplementary tools include Authorized economic operator validator guide; Mutual recognition
arrangement/agreement strategy guide; Advance cargo information (ACI) implementation guidelines;
Integrated supply chain management guidelines (updated); Guidelines on trader identification number; and
Handbook on data analysis (see http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-
tools/frameworks-of-standards/safe_package.aspx).
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 19
2.1.9 Additional measures related to investigation and prosecution
Competent government agencies are encouraged to consider, adopt and/or implement further
measures related to the suppression of smuggling of wildlife, including the following:
.1 Identify the profit from illegal wildlife trade and pursue asset forfeiture to
recover criminal proceeds and related assets.
.2 Conduct parallel financial investigations to trace perpetrators and identify

linkages with other forms of illicit or illegal activities.
.3 Collect additional evidence to support identification of predicate wildlife

offences.
.4 Enhance bilateral arrangements on mutual legal assistance and extradition

to facilitate investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of illegal wildlife
trade.
.5 Strengthen national financial investigation units through establishment of

cooperation arrangements between central banks or bankers associations to
aid in knowing their customers.
.6 Allocate resources towards surveillance, which can help identify other

members of the criminal network.
.7 Establish a collaborative framework entailing both government agencies and

companies providing maritime transport services to facilitate coordination
and harmonization of various intervention measures, as well as to provide a
platform for information-sharing.
2.1.10 Prevention and deterrence of corruption
Competent government agencies are encouraged to examine, amend and implement existing
national laws related to the fight against corruption. To this end, they are encouraged to adopt
and implement the following measures:
.1 Establish a secure system for submission of reports for both the public and
private sectors on corruption allegations, taking into account the need to
maintain confidentiality and, where necessary, anonymity.
.2 Facilitate independent investigations and, where possible, afford

opportunities for protection of witnesses.
.3 Implement national laws on treatment of corrupt officials, taking into account

processes such as interdiction, agency inquiry, prosecution, surcharge,
dismissal and imprisonment.
2.1.11 Education and training
Continuous training of competent government agencies involved in prevention, detection and

prosecution of smuggling of wildlife should be encouraged and undertaken. Officers deployed
to risk profiling systems will also be required to undergo regular training to keep abreast of
updated risk indicators. Officers deployed to image analysis of containerized cargo should
regularly be trained so that they remain up to date with, and can identify, different methods of
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 20
concealing smuggled wildlife. Customs/revenue and law enforcement officers working within
the port's limits should receive regular training on CITES regulations; methods of detection;
identification; effective ways of searching containers, cargo and baggage; seizure of smuggled
wildlife; and wildlife forensic sampling. Where possible, the use of dogs trained to detect wildlife
in containers, cargo and baggage should be considered. Continuous training should be
undertaken for law enforcement agencies based within the port limits on port security, ship
security and security of cargo. Law enforcement officers from competent government agencies
should undergo regular training on new concealment methods.
Competent government agencies are encouraged to consider joint training or capacity-building

forums for both the public and private sectors on prevention, identification and reporting of
smuggling of wildlife cases. They are also encouraged to organize capacity-building forums for
seafarers, maritime transport operators, shippers and other maritime transport stakeholders on
aspects of wildlife trafficking and their role in the suppression of the illegal wildlife trade.
Regular training is encouraged for competent government agencies based within the port limits
on corruption prevention measures and reporting.
Training on the principles of Know Your Customer will help competent government agencies
verify the identity of customers linked to the illegal wildlife trade and other illicit activities.
2.1.12 Best practices in the sector
Competent government agencies are encouraged to create a mechanism or an enabling

environment for sharing best practices on public-private cooperation and inter-agency
cooperation, including use of the following tools:
.1 portal for information-sharing (see links provided in annex 4);

.2 Loolhotlines for specific organizations; and
.3 media platforms that enhance multi-agency collaboration, showcasing best
practice and results.
Competent government agencies are further encouraged to:

.1 enhance media coverage on seizures to relevant private sector stakeholders
to raise awareness, using platforms such as website updates, journals,
newsletters, publications and the national media; and
.2 establish a whistle-blower award system to raise awareness and support the
use of available mechanisms on reporting.
Competent government agencies are further encouraged to establish a system to monitor
compliance with requirements under the SOLAS for mandatory verification of the gross mass
of packed containers.
2.2 Action by companies
Shipowners, shipping lines, shippers and other maritime transport operators providing services
in maritime transport play an important role in preventing and detecting smuggling of wildlife.
Adopting measures aimed at strengthening supply chain processes and compliance
measures, as well as remaining vigilant, knowing what to look out for, improving risk analysis
skills and acting as the "eyes and ears" for law enforcement, are practices that are encouraged.
These roles should be supported by sharing relevant information and intelligence by
competent government agencies. When operating in or with countries with high levels of
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Annex 5, page 21
corruption, due diligence should be undertaken on customers and shipments.
Depending on the role played by companies, they are encouraged to adopt the following
measures:
2.2.1 Security strengthening and risk reduction
.1 Implement supply chain security programmes such as the WCO Authorized

Economic Operator (AEO) Programme and the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (CTPAT). Such programmes, which also address
cybersecurity, cargo security and control of physical access to vessels and
facilities, help businesses reduce risk from exposure to illicit activities while
benefiting from facilitated trade transactions.
.2 Implement due diligence and screening procedures on employees,

passengers, business partners, shippers and consignees (including Know
Your Customer and Know Your Supplier best practices). Implementation of
Know Your Customer best practices and a risk-based approach when
bringing new customers and employees on board is particularly important for
companies operating out of countries known to be of high risk for wildlife
trafficking.
.3 Implement retention of transactional data information in accordance with

national legal framework;
.4 Implement cargo screening tools to facilitate detection of suspicious

consignments.
.5 Integrate specific red flag indicators for wildlife trafficking into the company's
cargo risk assessment systems that may already be in place to detect other
forms of contraband (see annex 3). Trafficking trends, routes and
concealment methods evolve with time; therefore, companies should keep
informed and up to date. Companies should encourage their local
enforcement agencies such as customs to share actionable information with
parties in the supply chain (without compromising intelligence sources and
methods).
.6 Prioritize the use of electronic and automated systems for business

transactions (e.g. e-bill of lading) to improve traceability and transparency
of operations. This will allow faster detection of irregularities, possible
fraudulent attempts and corruption. It also supports integration with other
systems aimed at improving system interoperability.
.7 Establish standard operating procedures to strengthen physical integrity of

cargo, safety of company facilities, checking and verification of cargo
documents, and responses to suspicious customer behaviour or potential
illicit consignments.
2.2.2 Reporting
.1 Use national whistle-blowing systems and anonymous lines, when available,

to report corrupt practices and illegalities, or support the development of
a whistle-blowing policy for the maritime sector. With the assistance of the
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Annex 5, page 22
respective professional associations, develop an internal whistle-blowing

policy and coordinate training on reporting measures.
2.2.3 Cooperation
.1 Cooperate with competent government agencies in identifying and disrupting

trafficking flows. Support the work of the local competent government
agencies with timely provision of documentation and access to ship
manifests to enable effective cargo and passenger risk analysis and
investigations. Facilitate access to ship manifests for enforcement officers
to support the risk analysis or development of intelligence.
.2 Network with local, national, regional or international initiatives aimed at

strengthening cooperation between the public and private sectors on
information- or intelligence-sharing on wildlife trafficking and dissemination
of best practices.
.3 Network with relevant business professional associations to facilitate sharing

of information and best practices on prevention and reporting of illegal wildlife
trade activities.
2.2.4 Training and awareness-raising
.1 Organize and undertake continuous capacity-building and training for

employees, and subcontracted companies on latest trends, concealment
methods, trafficking routes, and related standard operating procedures on
how to handle and report suspicious activities.
.2 Train employees on the application and usage of cargo screening tools to

facilitate detection of suspicious consignments.
.3 Raise awareness of the risks associated with wildlife trafficking with business
partners, customers and passengers. Incorporate actions against wildlife
trafficking into corporate social responsibility and security practices, and
adopt a zero-tolerance corporate policy for any act linked to wildlife trafficking
and related corrupt behaviour; convey this directly to all employees,
subcontractors, clients and passengers. Review terms of carriage policy on
the transportation of smuggled wildlife.
2.2.5 Other
.1 Implement best practices and tools that have already been developed to
support maritime stakeholders in addressing illegal trade in wildlife, timber
and other contraband (see annex 4).
.2 Implement the SOLAS requirements on verified gross mass for all packed
containers to which the International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC)
applies.
.3 Enhance implementation of the World Customs Organization Harmonized

System codes.
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Annex 5, page 23
Annex 1
Introduction to the CITES Convention and appendices
Adopted in 1973 and having entered into force in 1973, the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is a legally binding agreement
12
between government signatories. As of December 2020, there were 183 Parties to the
Convention (182 and the European Union). The agreement aims to ensure that the
international trade in wildlife does not threaten the existence of a species. CITES regulates the
international trade in approximately 38,000 species of wild plants and animals. Trade in
specimens of species listed under the three CITES appendices requires the issuance of official
trade documentation in the form of a CITES permit or a certificate.
CITES appendices are as follows:
.1 Appendix I includes species that are at risk of extinction from international

trade, such as all eight pangolin species and African elephant (except for
elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe,
which are included in appendix II).
.2 Appendix II includes species that may become threatened with extinction if

trade is not controlled (e.g. lions; timber species such as Gonystylus spp.,
also known as ramin), as well as so-called "look-alike" species where trade
regulation is necessary to ensure that trade in appendix I and appendix II
species that are threatened is effective and enforceable.
.3 Appendix III includes species protected in at least one country, which has
asked other CITES Member Parties for help in controlling the trade.
The full text of the Convention can be found on the Convention website
(https://cites.org/eng/disc/text.php). The appendices can be consulted at
https://cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php
CITES annotations are notes attached to particular plant species in the appendices to indicate
which parts or derivatives are included in, or exempt from, the CITES controls. This is usually
indicated by a hashtag (#) and a number next to the species name in the appendices. In some
cases, other notes are attached to the species, particularly in the case of animals, indicating
which populations contain special conditions related to the inclusion of the species.
Information about CITES-listed species and the listing date of each species under the
Convention is available on the CITES Checklist (https://checklist.cites.org/#/en).
Types of CITES documents
Each import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea of specimens of species covered
by the Convention must be authorized by a CITES permit or certificate. Each CITES Party
13
designates one or more CITES Management Authorities to be in charge of administering the
licensing system and one or more Scientific Authorities to advise the national CITES
Management Authority or other authorities on the effects of trade on the status of the species.
12
List of CITES Parties:
https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php?order=field_country_official_name&sort=asc
13
https://cites.org/eng/parties/country-profiles/national-authorities
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 24
Permits
14
According to the CITES definitions and Resolution Conf. 12.3 (Rev. CoP18), a permit is an
official document issued by a CITES Management Authority to authorize the export of a
specimen of a species included in appendix I or II, the export of a specimen of a species
included in appendix III from the State that included the species therein, or the import of a
specimen of a species included in appendix I. To be valid, a permit must conform to the
requirements of the Convention and the resolutions of the Conference of the Parties. For
example, an export permit may be issued only if the specimen was legally obtained; the trade
will not be detrimental to the survival of the species; and, for appendix I-listed species, an
import permit has already been issued.
For specimens from species listed in appendix I, an import permit is issued by the Management
Authority of the importing Party. This should be issued only if the specimen is not to be used
for primarily commercial purposes; the import will be for purposes that are not detrimental to
the survival of the species; and, in the case of a live animal, the proposed recipient is suitably
equipped to house and care for the animal.
A CITES document is required each time a specimen of a CITES-listed species crosses an

international border. Note that separate permits are not required for transit if the specimens
remain under the control of the customs authorities.15
Certificates
A certificate is also an official document issued by a Management Authority and used to

authorize different types of trade in CITES specimens. The most important types of certificate
are:
.1 re-export certificate;
.2 pre-convention certificate;
.3 certificate of origin;
.4 certificate of captive bred animals;
.5 certificate of artificially propagated plants; and
.6 introduction from the sea certificate.
More information on CITES permits and certificates can be found at

https://cites.org/eng/prog/Permit_system.
Notifications
The CITES Secretariat issues notifications to the Parties that contain information and reports
on the implementation of the Convention. Notifications are used to officially communicate
information on lost or stolen permits or security stamps, details on Parties' stricter domestic
measures, suspension of permits, and forthcoming meetings, among other matters.
CITES notifications are listed at https://www.cites.org/eng/notif/index.php.
14
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-12-03-R18.pdf
15
A sample CITES permit template: https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/res/12/E-Res-12-03R16-A2.pdf
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 25
Annex 2
Examples of smuggling techniques for authorities and maritime operators

to take into account
Example 1: Hundreds of pieces of ivory and pangolin scales hidden in logs inside three
containers were detected by a mobile non-intrusive scanner. The logs were hollowed out, filled
with the illegal contraband, sealed with wax and fitted with concealed lids. The cargo was
declared as wood.
Example 2: The CITES Management Authority of country A confirmed that it had not issued
any CITES export permits for Siamese rosewood (Dalbergia cochinchinensis) (CITES
Appendix II) since its listing in 2013, and Notification No. 2017/023 states that any permits are
therefore counterfeit. Country B, however, reported importing sawn D. cochinchinensis
wood and timber from Country A each year between 2013 and 2015, all of which presumably
took place using counterfeit permits.
Example 3: An ivory trafficking network operating out of Country C employed a series of

specially modified containers with false compartments installed into the back to hide the
contraband. At least three such modified containers were uncovered and linked to a used tyre
business. Seized paperwork revealed that the three containers had travelled at least 12 times
along the same Country C – Country D route on which the seizure was made.
Example 4: A large open-top fishing boat was used to smuggle 1.4 tonnes of African elephant
ivory between Country E and Country F.
Example 5: Seven large open-top barter trade boats were intercepted, illegally
carrying 3,000 exotic birds and 1,960 logs from Country G to Country H.
Example 6: A large open-top fishing boat was intercepted in Country L waters carrying
10 tonnes of frozen, descaled pangolins smuggled from Country I; the destination is believed
to have been Country M.
Example 7: 630 kg of pangolin scales and 2,660 kg of mercury were seized in a 40-foot
container declared to contain plastic scrap.
Example 8: Ivory and pangolin scales were concealed in several drums of tar loaded in
containers shipped from Region A to Region B. The nature of the shipment rendered any
inspection very laborious.
Example of convergence: There is a high level of convergence between ivory and pangolin
trafficking and the timber trade, with some individuals trading in both wildlife and timber
products. Timber also serves as a method of concealment for ivory and pangolin trafficking,
often packed into 20-40 ft containers together.
Example of concealment: Cashew nuts are commonly used as a "filler" or concealment

method for ivory and pangolin scales sent by sea freight from Country N to other countries in
Region A. Intelligence suggests that sacks of ivory and pangolin scales are loaded into
shipping containers, tightly surrounded by cashew nut bags as further concealment.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 26
Annex 3
Red flags indicating possible illegal trade
Many risk indicators for suspicious cargo are common to all forms of contraband, including
trafficking of wildlife. Examples are given below. High levels of corruption in countries and at
ports should be considered a major overarching red flag, since traffickers can exploit these
weaknesses in international trade chains.
1 Shipment of commodities incongruous with the origin and/or destination

country
The commodities being shipped may appear to be incompatible with a country's technical
capabilities or natural resources, or the origin of the commodities – for example, timber shipped
to a country that is already a major timber producer and exporter.
2 Weight and appearance discrepancy
Actual weights of the consignment may not correspond to those provided in the bill of lading
or seem grossly at odds with a reasonable weight for the declared commodity. Similarly, if the
appearance of the shipment does not match its documentation, this should be a concern.
3 Dubious or vague descriptions
Descriptions of commodities may be vague or misleading. Examples of vague descriptions for

wildlife shipments include "fish", "shell", "horn" and "rosewood" (there are many species of
rosewood, some of which can be traded legally, and others that are prohibited from
international trade).
4 Value of cargo does not tally with description or size
The value of cargo can help triangulate evidence as to whether a proposed cargo to be loaded
onto a vessel is the same as the one stated in the shipping documents.
5 Questionable paperwork
Questionable paperwork may include use of photocopies instead of original documents;

spelling mistakes or inconsistencies, such as a permit number or date that does not match; an
invoice issued with "#1"; expired documents; odd formatting or blurry text, which may occur
when documents are altered; evidence that documents have been tampered with, but not
officially countersigned; and poor-quality documents (e.g. with logos that have been cut and
pasted).
6 Consignment split across multiple shipments
The splitting of consignments may occur for legitimate reasons and purposes. However, it can
also be a tactic used by traffickers to spread the risk of loss in case of interception by law
enforcement. It is also used to provide a benefit from smaller volumes, which can more easily
be hidden within shipments of legitimate commodities. The illegal shipment is spread across
multiple containers under one booking or across multiple bookings.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 27
7 Shipping route is abnormal for the product and destination
The shipment may appear to make no commercial sense – for example, if the shipment is
being sent via a long, slow route involving multiple stops when more direct routes exist, or the
shipment is declared as a commercial product but has no clear market value in the country for
which it is destined. Criminal networks also have been known to use multiple trans-shipment
zones to obscure the origin of shipments and confuse surveillance.
8 Change of shipping route once the ship has left port
Change of destination or diversion of cargo is a legitimate procedure, but it could also be an

indicator of illicit activities and an attempt to evade controls.
9 Switch bill of lading
A switch bill of lading occurs when a freight or shipping agent files a new bill of lading for a
shipment that is already en route. Used legitimately, the procedure typically aims to protect
proprietary supply chain information. However, this practice is often abused by traffickers to
obfuscate information about the port of loading (origin), port of discharge (destination) and
routeing of a shipment, to reduce the likelihood that illegal shipments will be flagged for
inspection and hinder after-the-fact investigations if the contraband is seized. Switching bill of
lading mid-shipment to support an illegal shipment requires traffickers to cooperate with a
complicit freight or shipping agent. According to published reports, complicit freight agents are
known to charge a fee based on the size of the illegal shipment they facilitate, with one
reportedly charging $45 per kilogram of smuggled pangolin scales and $145 per kilogram of
ivory.
10 Request for use of letter of indemnity without just cause
The use of a letter of indemnity can be legitimate if, for instance, the voyage is too short to
issue a bill of lading. The letter of indemnity can request different receivers, consignees and
bill of lading contents; as such, it presents a risk to shipowners. The issuing of a letter of
indemnity could be used as a way to evade enforcement agencies by using different receivers
at short notice and to change the port of discharge.
11 Use of free trade zones and free ports
The simplified import, export, transit and trans-shipment procedures and lax controls of free
trade zones and free ports can mean that they are prime sites for the diversion of illicit
shipments and commodities to sanctioned countries.
12 Failure to disclose true shipper or consignee information
Addresses may appear to be fictitious (e.g. incomplete or overly simplistic addresses);

consignee names may be similar to those of large, well-known companies; or the consignee
address may be incompatible with the businesses associated with the declared commodity.
13 First-time shipper and shipper's reluctance to offer information about their

business and end use of a product
First-time shippers or new customers should be subject to robust screening to confirm that
they are who and what they claim to be, to help identify shell companies created to obfuscate
the actual ownership of the cargo.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 28
14 Last-minute request for shipment clearance
Shipper requests for shipment clearance at the last minute might be an attempt to avoid
customs controls due to the time factor.
15 Cash payments
Cash payments can be a preferred payment method for legitimate reasons, but they can also
be a sign of an illegal transaction – for example, if there is a willingness to pay a large amount
of money in cash when wire transfer or financing is commonly used.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 29
Annex 4
Useful resources
CITES
.1 Checklist of CITES Species: https://checklist.cites.org/;

https://www.speciesplus.net/
.2 List of national CITES authorities:

https://cites.org/eng/cms/index.php/component/cp
.3 Full list of CITES certificates:

https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/prog/exemptions/SUMMARY-OF-
USE-OF- PERMITS-CERTIFICATES-IN-CITES-2018.pdf
.4 CITES notifications: https://www.cites.org/eng/notif/index.php
Wildlife trafficking and red flags
.1 Red flag indicators for wildlife and timber trafficking in containerized sea
cargo: a compendium and guidance for the maritime shipping sector
(TRAFFIC and WWF, 2021): https://apps5.wwf.org.hk/red-flag-compendium/
.2 UNODC – World Wildlife Crime Report, Trafficking in Protected Species,

2020: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html
.3 United for Wildlife Taskforce Intelligence Bulletins – joint monthly advisories

for both Buckingham Palace Declaration and Mansion House Declaration
signatories on issues of high concern related to wildlife trafficking and the
finance and transport sector (contact report@unitedforwildlife.org)
.4 Wildlife Trade Portal – an interactive tool that displays TRAFFIC's open-

source wildlife seizure and incident data: https://www.wildlifetradeportal.org/
.5 Environmental Investigation Agency Global Environmental Crime Tracker:

https://eia- international.org/global-environmental-crime-tracker/
Safety and security framework
.1 WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate

Global Trade: http://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/instruments-and-
tools/tools/safe-package/safe-framework-of-
standards.pdf?la=en#:~:text=The%20SAFE%20Framework%2C%20based
%20on,other%20Government%20Agencies%20co%2Doperation
.2 WCO Harmonized System codes:

https://www.wcotradetools.org/en/harmonized-system
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 30
.3 Transit handbook: to establish effective transit schemes for LLDCs

(WCO, 2014): https://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/key-issues/ecp/2015/transit-handbook-
for-upload-en.pdf?la=en&la=en&la=en&la=en&la=en&la=en&la=en&la=en >
.4 Transit guidelines: route for efficient transit regime (WCO, 2017):

http://www.wcoomd.org/-
/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/instruments-and-
tools/tools/transit/transit- guidelines.pdf?la=fr
.5 Code of practice on security in ports which compliments the provisions of the

ISPS Code
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/ILO
IMOCodeOf PracticeEnglish.pdf
.6 International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of

terrorism & proliferation, FATF recommendations 2012, updated November
2023: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-
recommendations.html
.7 ICCWC Toolkit:
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/prog/iccwc/Toolkit%20implementation
%20-%20step%20by%20step%20v3.pdf
.8 PortMATE – Port/Border Crossing Monitoring and Anti-Trafficking Evaluation

Tool
https://www.traffic.org/site/assets/files/16117/portmate_categories_overview_a
nd_template_sept2021.pdf
.9 Recommendation of the Council on countering illicit trade: enhancing

transparency in free trade zones (OECD, 2019):
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD- LEGAL-0454
Capacity-building for government agencies and companies to prevent illegal wildlife

trade and other illicit trade in transport supply chains
.1 Introductory digital course on CITES:

https://www.informea.org/en/introductory-course- convention-international-
trade-endangered-species-wild-fauna-and-flora-cites
.2 FIATA (International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations) digital

course on the prevention of wildlife trafficking for freight forwarders. The
course is available in English, Spanish, French, Chinese, Arabic, Russian
and Portuguese: https://training.fiata.org/courses/course-
v1:FIA+TRA001+2019/about
.3 Ports & the Supply Chain Online Course, Reducing Maritime Trafficking of
Wildlife between Africa and Asia by the Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers
(ICS) & the UNDP Training Programme:
https://www.traffic.org/site/assets/files/16117/ics-undp-ports-training-
course-flyer.pdf
.4 INTERPORTPOLICE: International Organization of Airport and Seaport

Police: https://interportpolice.org/
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 31
.5 Due diligence: increasing safety and security throughout the supply chain (TT
Club, 2020): https://www.ttclub.com/-/media/files/tt-club/stop-loss/stop-loss-
21---due-diligence.pdf
Corruption and whistle-blowing
.1 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International):

https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/tha
.2 Targeting Natural Resource Corruption:

https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/tnrc-about- the-project
.3 Scaling back corruption: a guide on addressing corruption for wildlife

management Authorities (UNODC, 2019):
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2019/19-
08373_Scaling_Back_Corruption_ebook.pdf
.4 Rotten fish: a guide on addressing corruption in the fisheries sector

(UNODC, 2019): https://www.unodc.org/documents/Rotten_Fish.pdf
.5 Maritime Anti-Corruption Network: https://macn.dk/
Resources from International organizations – combating illegal wildlife trade
Updates of additional resources could be found in: https://www.interpol.int/

https://www.unodc.org/ and https://www.fatf-gafi.org/
.1 INTERPOL – Environmental Crime:

https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Environmental- crime
.2 International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC)

https://cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc_new.php
.1 UNODC's Global Programme on Crimes that Affect the

Environment:
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/environment-climate/
.2 UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme:

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ccp/index.html
.3 Wildlife crime status update 2017 (UNODC, 2017):

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/wildlife/Research_brief_wildlife_su.pdf
.4 Money laundering and the illegal wildlife trade (FATF, 2020):

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Environmentalcrime/Money-
laundering-wildlife-trade.html
Regional organizations – combating illegal wildlife trade
Updates of additional resources could be found in:
.1 Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at

Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora: https://lusakaagreement.org/
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 5, page 32
.2 East African Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement:

https://eanece.org/
National initiatives
.1 United States Customs and Border Protection: Customs Trade Partnership

Against Terrorism (CTPAT) – a voluntary public-private sector partnership
programme with multi-layered cargo enforcement strategy:
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/ctpat
Joint industry guidelines
.1 Combatting Illegal Wildlife Trade – A Shared Responsibility:

https://www.worldshipping.org/s/Combatting-Illegal-Wildlife-Document_-
Publication.pdf; https://www.worldshipping.org/protectingwildlife
.2 Red Flags for Suspicious Illegal Wildlife Trade:

https://www.worldshipping.org/s/Red-flags-Leaflet_Publication-Version.pdf;
https://www.worldshipping.org/protectingwildlife
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 1
ANNEX 6
BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
FACILITATION COMMITTEE (FAL)

Reference to Output Description Target Parent Associated Coordinating Status of Status References
SD, if number completion organ(s) organ(s) organ output for of
applicable year Year 1 output
for
Year 2
1. Improve 1.2 Input on identifying Continuous TCC MSC/MEPC/ No work MEPC 78/17, section 12;
implementation emerging needs of FAL/LEG requested MEPC 79/15, section 7;
developing countries, in MEPC 80/17, section 12
particular SIDS and LDCs
to be included in the ITCP
1. Improve 1.7 Identify thematic priorities Annual TCC MSC/MEPC/ No work MEPC 78/17, section 12;
implementation within the area of maritime FAL/LEG requested MEPC 80/17, section 12
safety and security,
marine environmental
protection, facilitation of
maritime traffic and
maritime legislation
2. Integrate 2.8 Revision of the Guidelines 2025 MSC FAL MSC No work FAL 48/20, para 17.13
new and on Maritime Cyber Risk requested
advancing Management
technologies in (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2)
the regulatory and identification of next
framework steps to enhance maritime
cybersecurity
Notes: FAL 48 extended the target completion year to 2025.
2. Integrate 2.26 Measures to address 2025 FAL In progress FAL 46/24,
new and maritime autonomous paragraph 14.11
advancing surface ships (MASS) in FAL 48/20, section 8
technologies in the instruments under the
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 2

for
Year 2
the regulatory purview of the Facilitation
framework Committee
2. Integrate 2.7 Development of joint FAL- 2026 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
new and LEG-MEPC-MSC 2.12
advancing guidelines on electronic
technologies in certificates
the regulatory
framework
Notes: FAL 49 invited LEG, MSC and MEPC Committees to become associated organs
2. Integrate 2.11 Development of a 2027 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
new and comprehensive strategy 17.3
advancing on maritime digitalization
technologies in
the regulatory
framework
Notes: FAL 49 invited MSC and MEPC Committees to become associated organs
4. Engage in 4.2 Input to the ITCP on Continuous TCC MSC/MEPC/ No work MEPC 72/17, section 12;
ocean emerging issues relating FAL/LEG requested MEPC 73/19, section 13;
governance to sustainable MEPC 74/18, section 12
development and MEPC 78/17, section 12;
achievement of the SDGs MEPC 80/17, section 12
5. Enhance 5.1 Application of single- Continuous FAL Completed FAL 39/16,
global window concept paragraph 13.4.1
facilitation and
security of
international
trade
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 3

for
Year 2
5. Enhance 5.6 Analysis of possible 2024 FAL Completed FAL 44/21,
global means of auditing paragraph 18.2
facilitation and compliance with the FAL 48/20,
security of Convention on Facilitation paragraph 11.4
international of International Maritime
trade Traffic
5. Enhance 5.8 Review and revision of the Continuous FAL Completed FAL 41/17,
global IMO Compendium on paragraph 14.1.
facilitation and Facilitation and Electronic FAL 42/17,
security of Business, including paragraph 14.5.
international additional e-business TCT extended to 2021.
trade solutions FAL decided to convert
this output to a continuous
output (FAL 43/20,
paragraph 7.11.4).
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 4

for
Year 2
5. Enhance 5.13 IMO's contribution to 2025 MSC/FAL/LEG In progress FAL 41/17,
global addressing unsafe mixed paragraph 7.15;
facilitation and migration by sea MSC 98/23, paragraph
security of 16.14;
international FAL 43, paragraph 10.7;
trade MSC 101/24,
paragraph 19.8;
MSC 104/18,
paragraph 9.5;
MSC 105/20, section 10;
FAL 46/24,
paragraph 11.4,
MSC106/19, section 8;
resolution MSC.528(106);
MSC 107/20, section 9
Notes: MSC 107 extended the target completion year to 2025.
5. Enhance 5.14 Development of 2024 FAL Completed FAL 44/21/1,
global guidelines for the paragraph 18.4;
facilitation and prevention and FAL 46/24,
security of suppression of the paragraph 15.7
international smuggling of wildlife on FAL 48/20, paragraph
trade ships engaged in 9.9
international maritime
traffic
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 5

for
Year 2
5. Enhance 5.16 Introduction of the 2024 FAL Completed FAL 45/22, paragraph
global API/PNR concept in 19.3
facilitation and maritime transport
security of
international
trade
5. Enhance 5.17 Development of 2024 FAL Completed FAL 46/24,
global guidelines on port paragraph 21.3
facilitation and community systems FAL 48/20, paragraph 7.8
security of
international
trade
5. Enhance 5.18 Review and update the 2024 FAL Completed FAL 48/20,
global Explanatory Manual to the paragraphs 4.8 and 4.10
facilitation and FAL Convention
security of
international
trade
5. Enhance 5.7 Amendments to the FAL 2025 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
global Convention to introduce 17.5
facilitation and mandatory reporting of the
security of API and BRI/PNR for
international maritime transport
trade
5. Enhance 5.9 Development of 2027 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
global amendments to the 17.7
facilitation and Revised guidelines for the
security of prevention and
suppression of the
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 6

for
Year 2
international smuggling of drugs,
trade psychotropic substances
and precursor chemicals
on ships engaged in
international maritime
traffic (resolutions
FAL.9(34) and
MSC.228(82))
Notes: FAL 49 invited MSC to become associated organ
5. Enhance 5.10 Amendments to the FAL 2026 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
global Convention to review the 17.10
facilitation and provisions of a key worker
security of during a public health
international emergency of
trade international concern
6. Address the 6.5 Revision of the Guidelines 2025 FAL FAL 48/20, paragraph
human on minimum training and 19.4
element education for mooring
personnel
7. Ensure 7.1 Unified interpretation of Continuous MSC/MEPC/ III/PPR/CCC/ Ongoing MSC 76/23,
regulatory provisions of IMO safety, FAL/LEG SDC/SSE/ paragraph 20.3;
effectiveness security, environment, NCSR MSC 78/26,
facilitation, liability and paragraph 22.12; MEPC
compensation-related 78/17, section 4, and
conventions paragraph 5.6 and 5.7;
MEPC 79/15, paragraphs
4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to
6.29; MEPC 80/17,
paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 7

for
Year 2
7. Ensure 7.6 Consideration and Annual MSC/FAL Completed
regulatory analysis of reports and
effectiveness information on persons
rescued at sea and
stowaways
8. Ensure 8.1 Endorsed proposals for Continuous Council MSC/MEPC/ Completed MEPC 78/17,
organizational the development, FAL/LEG/TCC paragraph 4.45;
effectiveness maintenance and MEPC 79/15,
enhancement of paragraphs 6.1 to 6.5 and
information systems and 9.4; MEPC 80/17,
related guidance (GISIS, paragraphs 6.11 to 6.13
websites, etc.)
8. Ensure 8.9 Revised documents on Annual Council MSC/MEPC/ Completed MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5/Rev.5,
organizational organization and method FAL/LEG/TCC subject to MEPC's
effectiveness of work, as appropriate concurrent approval
MEPC 78/17, section 13;
MEPC 79/15, section 11;
MEPC 80/17, section 13
FAL Circ.217Rev.2, FAL
48/20, paragraph 16.8
8. Ensure 8.12 Consideration for the Continuous Council MSC/MEPC/ No work
organizational enhancement and FAL/LEG/TCC requested
effectiveness improvement of
multilingualism and the
language services at IMO
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 6, page 8

for
Year 2
OW. Other OW 3 Endorsed proposals for Annual Council MSC/MEPC/ Completed MEPC 78/17, section 14;
work new outputs for the FAL/LEG/TCC MEPC 79/15, section 12;
2024-2025 biennium as MEPC 80/17, section 14
accepted by the
Committees
OW. Other OW 8 Cooperate with the United Continuous Assembly MSC/MEPC/ Council Completed C 120/D, paragraphs
work Nations on matters of FAL/LEG/TCC 17(a).1-17(a).5 MEPC
mutual interest, as well as 78/17, paragraph 7.6 and
provide relevant section 8; MEPC 79/15,
input/guidance paragraphs 7.3 to 7.5;
MEPC 80/17,
paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4
OW. Other OW 9 Cooperate with other Continuous Assembly MSC/MEPC/ Council Completed C 120/D,
work international bodies on FAL/LEG/TCC paragraphs 17(a).1 to
matters of mutual interest, 17(a).5 MEPC 78/17,
as well as provide sections 7 and 8;
relevant input/guidance MEPC 79/15, sections 7
and 8; MEPC 80/17,
sections 7 and 8
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 7, page 1
ANNEX 7
POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE

Number Biennium Reference to Description Parent Associated Coordinating Timescale References
(when the Strategic organ(s) organs(s) organ(s) (sessions)
output was Direction, if
placed on applicable
the post-
biennial
agenda)
2022-2023 2 Consideration of MSC FAL/NCSR
descriptions of Maritime
Services in the context of
e-navigation
2022-2023 7 Development of guidelines MSC/FAL III 2 MSC 107/20, para 17.41
for harmonizing the date
format of various certificates
issued under IMO
instruments
2024-2025 5 Review and update the FAL 2 FAL 48/20, paragraph 4.10
Explanatory Manual to the
FAL Convention
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 8, page 1
ANNEX 8
LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA

FOR THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE
Adoption of the agenda; report on credentials
Decisions of other IMO bodies
Consideration and adoption of proposed amendments to the Convention
Amendments to the FAL Convention to introduce mandatory reporting of the API and BRI/PNR
for maritime transport *
Amendments to the FAL Convention to review the provisions of a key worker during a public
health emergency of international concern*
Application of single window concept
Review and revision of the IMO Compendium on Facilitation and Electronic Business, including
additional e-business solutions
Development of a comprehensive strategy on maritime digitalization*
Development of a joint FAL-LEG-MEPC-MSC guidelines on electronic certificates*
Measures to address Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) in the instruments under
the purview of the Facilitation Committee
Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines for the prevention and suppression of
the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged
in international maritime traffic (resolutions FAL.9(34) and MSC.228(82)) *
Revision of the Guidelines on minimum training and education for mooring personnel
(FAL.6/Circ.11/Rev.1) *
Unsafe mixed migration by sea
Consideration and analysis of reports and information on persons rescued at sea

and stowaways
Technical cooperation activities related to facilitation of maritime traffic
Relations with other organizations
Application of the Committee's procedures on organization and method of work
Work programme
*
Subject to endorsement by the Council.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 8, page 2
Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2026
Any other business
Consideration of the report of the Committee on its forty-ninth session
***
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 1
ANNEX 9
STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS
OPENING
Statement by the delegation of Australia
"The emerging news of the Mozambique ferry disaster is shocking, and it looks like it has cost
more than 90 lives. Australia's thoughts are with the families and friends those lost. Our
thoughts are also with the families, friends, and colleagues of the victims of the recent collision
of the DALI in the United States. We also offer full solidarity and sympathy to Bangladesh on
the hijacking of the MV ABDULLAH and its 23 seafarers.
These incidents come on the back of other tragedies including the two Filipino and one
Vietnamese seafarer killed by the Houthi attack on the Barbados-flagged bulk carrier TRUE
CONFIDENCE. This Organization should not let a day pass without thinking of the seafarers
who are being subject to missile and drone attacks.
These attacks purposefully target civilians, and those involved in the attacks know that the only
injury and death on board these civilian ships will be of civilian seafarers. As well as targeting
civilians, the attacks also erode navigational rights and freedoms, damage international trade,
and increase broader maritime security risks such as piracy.
The Houthi attack on the TRUE CONFIDENCE came after the attack and subsequent sinking
of the Belize-flagged RUBYMAR, which resulted in the spilling of large amounts of oil and
fertilizer into the marine environment.
Australia thanks Bahamas and Japan for raising once again the plight of the GALAXY LEADER
and the impact Houthi attacks on shipping more broadly. We applaud them for their leadership
and perseverance championing the welfare of the 25 crew kept four months in captivity.
We also thank the Secretary General for the IMO's engagement on leadership on this matter.
We are concerned that the Houthis have assistance carrying out their attacks.
Australia draws the attention of member states to Security Council Resolution 2722. Australia
remains committed to upholding the rules-based order and the principle of freedom of
navigation."
Statement by the delegation of the Bahamas
"Thank you Chair, Secretary-General, Excellencies, Distinguish Delegates present and online,
NGO's and IGO's Observers, Interpreters, Greetings.
Chair as we begin the 48th Session of the Facilitation Committee, The Bahamas joins with the
Secretary-General, the Delegation of Singapore and other Member States in expressing our
sympathy to the Delegation of the United States over the loss of Six workers when the Francis
Scott Key Bridge collapsed into the Patapsco River as a result of the unfortunate collision of
the Container Ship Dali with the bridge structure.
Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and loved ones of the deceased. In this instance
there were no major injuries to those onboard.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 2
Chair, this devastating incident in a sad way once again highlights the importance of
International Shipping and Ports to the World's Supply Chain.
The Port of Baltimore is able to handle substantially larger ships than other East Coast Ports
and is a major source of employment across the region accounting for some 15,000 direct jobs
and nearly 22,000 other jobs either supported by or indirectly related to activities at the port,
generating some $4.7 billion in Economic Value to the State of Maryland.
For International Shipping the blockage of access to the Port of Baltimore comes at a time
when exporters and importers are contending with delays at the Panama Canal and route
disruptions along the Suez.
Chair it is of the utmost importance that Safe Shipping once again return to the Gulf of Aden,
the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea as soon as possible, so that the deadly incident
involving the M/V True Confidence can be properly mourned and the Ecological Disaster of
the M/V Rubymar may be promptly dealt with.
Chair, The Bahamas reiterates the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722 (2024),
which "Demands that the Houthis immediately cease all such attacks, which impede global
commerce and undermine navigational rights and freedoms as well as regional peace and
security, and further demands that the Houthis immediately release the Bahamas flagged
Galaxy Leader and its crew."
The Bahamas also call for the unconditional and safe release of the 23 Crew Members of the
Bangladesh Flagged Cargo Vessel M/V Abdullah hijacked by Somali Pirates on March 12.
The crew members are now barred from staying in the cabin. There is a shortage of fresh
water. The captives are facing difficulties with water usage, and everyone is required to share
one toilet. They are also facing challenges with food further creating a humanitarian
emergency.
Chair, Kindly append this statement to the final report of FAL 48, Thank you."
Statement by the delegation of Belgium
Bonjour à vous
Bonjour aux distingués délégués
La Belgique voudrait tout d'abord exprimer son plein soutien au gouvernement du Bangladesh
2uíte à la prise em otage du MV Abdullah par des pirates somaliens et demande la libération
des 23 membres de son équipage et du navire sans délai.
La Belgique au nom des Etats Membres de l'Union Européenne condamne fermement les
attaques menées par les Houthis contre les navires commerciaux, qui constituent des
violations inacceptables du droit international et de la convention de l'OMI et représentent une
menace pour la sécurité maritime et la paix dans la région.
Nous demandons la libération immédiate et inconditionnelle du Galaxy Leader et des 25

membres de son équipage.
Nous présentons nos sincères condoléances aux familles des victimes suite à l'attentat
meurtrier perpétré contre le vraquier "True Confidence". Nos pensées vont aux blessés et
aux marins, pour la plupart d'origine philippine, présents lors de l'attaque et qui n'auraient
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 3
jamais dû subir un tel traumatisme dans le cadre de leur travail. Nous exprimons notre entière
solidarité avec les autorités de la Barbade et les gouvernements philippin et vietnamien, dont
les marins ont perdu la vie…
Nous tenons aussi à exprimer notre solidarité avec le gouvernement du Belize suite au
naufrage du 'Rubymar'. Nous sommes soulagés qu'il n'y ait pas eu de perte de vie humaine.
Le Rubymar est le premier navire perdu depuis le début des attaques dans la région.
Ces attaques, qui mettent en danger la vie de marins innocents tout en perturbant le commerce
3ondial, doivent cesser immédiatement.
On se félicite de l'adoption de la résolution 2722 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies du

10 janvier, qui condamne fermement les attaques des Houthis en mer Rouge. Le maintien de
la liberté de navigation en mer Rouge est essentiel à la libre circulation du commerce mondial
et à la sécurité régionale. Comme le rappelle la résolution 2722 du Conseil de sécurité des
Nations unies, les États ont le droit de défendre leurs navires contre ces attaques,
conformément au droit international.
Nous demandons instamment aux Houthis de stopper cette escalade de violence en mer
Rouge et dans l'ensemble de la région. Dans ce contexte, nous rappelons l'obligation de tous
les États de respecter l'embargo sur les armes prévu par la résolution 2216 du Conseil de
sécurité des Nations unies.
Le 19 février l'opération défensive EUNAVFOR ASPIDES a été lancé, qui a répondu à la

nécessité de rétablir la sécurité maritime et la liberté de navigation dans un corridor maritime
hautement stratégique. L'opération jouera un rôle clé dans la sauvegarde des intérêts
commerciaux et de sécurité, non seulement dans l'intérêt des Etats Membres de l'Union
Européenne et de la communauté internationale au sens large, mais aussi dans la protection
des marins et la sauvegarde de la liberté de navigation.
En plus d'attenter à la vie et à la sécurité des marins, ces 3taques ont des conséquences non
négligeables sur le climat et sur l'environnement marin.
En effet, nous regrettons les émissions atmosphériques supplémentaires générées par les
milliers de navires qui sont contraints de changer leur route en empruntant le Cap de Bonne
Espérance à cause de la situation actuelle en Mer Rouge.
Nous sommes également très préoccupés par le risque environnemental que les tonnes
d'engrais transportées par le navire Rubymar et les fuites potentielles de son fuel représentent
pour les écosystèmes marins de la Mer Rouge et, en particulier, pour ses récifs coralliens.
Nous nous joignons également aux mots du secrétaire général et la délégation du Singapour
et autres délégations concernant l'accident avec le MV Dali à Baltimore et nos pensées sont
avec les victimes. Nos pensées vont également aux victimes de l'accident survenu au large
des côtes du Mozambique, et à leurs familles.
Nous vous demandons que cette déclaration soit jointe au rapport de ce comité.
Merci Monsieur le Président."
(English translation of the statement)
"Hello distinguished delegates
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 4
Belgium would first like to express its full support to the government of Bangladesh following
the taking hostage of the MV Abdullah by Somali pirates and calls for the release of the 23
members of its crew and the vessel without delay.
Belgium, on behalf of the Member States of the European Union, strongly condemns the
attacks carried out by the Houthis against commercial ships, which constitute unacceptable
violations of international law and the IMO convention and represent a threat to maritime
security and peace in the region.
We demand the immediate and unconditional release of the Galaxy Leader and his 25 crew
members.
We extend our sincere condolences to the families of the victims following the deadly attack
on the bulk carrier "True Confidence". Our thoughts are with the injured and sailors, most of
them of Filipino origin, present during the attack and who should never have suffered such
trauma in the course of their work. We express our full solidarity with the authorities of
Barbados and the Philippine and Vietnamese governments, whose sailors lost their lives…
We would also like to express our solidarity with the government of Belize following the sinking
of the 'Rubymar'. We are relieved that there was no loss of life. The Rubymar is the first ship
lost since attacks began in the region.
These attacks, which endanger the lives of innocent seafarers while disrupting global trade,
must stop immediately.
We welcome the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722 of January 10,
which strongly condemns the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Maintaining freedom of navigation
in the Red Sea is essential to the free flow of global trade and regional security. As recalled by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2722, States have the right to defend their ships
against these attacks, in accordance with international law.
We urge the Houthis to stop this escalation of violence in the Red Sea and across the region.
In this context, we recall the obligation of all States to respect the arms embargo provided for
by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216.
On February 19 the defensive operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES was launched, which

responded to the need to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation in a highly
strategic maritime corridor. The operation will play a key role in safeguarding trade and security
interests, not only in the interest of European Union Member States and the wider international
community, but also in protecting seafarers and safeguarding freedom of navigation.
In addition to endangering the lives and safety of sailors, these attacks have significant
consequences on the climate and the marine environment.
Indeed, we regret the additional atmospheric emissions generated by the thousands of ships
which are forced to change their route by taking the Cape of Good Hope because of the current
situation in the Red Sea.
We are also very concerned about the environmental risk that the tonnes of fertilizer
transported by the Rubymar ship and the potential leaks of its fuel represent for the marine
ecosystems of the Red Sea and, in particular, for its coral reefs.
We also join the words of the Secretary General and the Singa delegation for and other
delegations regarding the accident with the MV Dali in Baltimore and our thoughts are with the
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 5
victims. Our thoughts are also with the victims of the accident off the coast of Mozambique,
and their families.
We request that this statement be attached to the report of this committee.
Thank you Mr President"
Statement by the delegation of Canada
"Thank you Chair.
Canada reiterates our condemnation of the illegal and unjustifiable attacks by Houthi militants
against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. These attacks pose a direct threat to the
freedom of navigation in one of the world's most critical waterways and are causing major
disruptions to regional and global trade, are impeding the movement of critical food, fuel,
humanitarian assistance and other essential goods throughout the world, are jeopardizing the
lives and safety of seafarers, and are directly destroying the marine environment.
These attacks are unacceptable and are in direct violation of the IMO Conventions and the
principles of this organization.
To keep this brief, Canada wishes to align with the intervention of the United States, United
Kingdom, and others and call on the Houthis to cease these attacks immediately, and to
release all hostages. We also call on Iran, as a member of this organization, to stop providing
support to the Houthis, which enables these very attacks.
These destabilizing actions must end.
We ask that our statement be included in the report. Thank you."
Statement by the delegation of Finland
"Thank you Chair.
First of all, Finland would like to express our sympathies to all those who were affected by the
recent accidents. Finland fully aligns itself with the statement made by Belgium on behalf of
the member states of the European Union.
Finland strongly condemns Houthis attacks on commercial ships, which are unacceptable
violations of international law, present a threat to maritime security and endanger the lives of
innocent seafarers.
We call for an immediate and unconditional release of the Galaxy Leader and its crew. Finland
kindly asks the statement to be reflected in the report of this committee.
Thank you."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 6
Statement by the delegation of France
"La France remercie le Secrétaire Général pour son engagement et s'associe à la déclaration
de la Belgique, prononcée au nom des Etats-membres de l'UE.
Elle présente ses condoléances aux Etats-Unis et aux familles des victimes de la catastrophe
de l'effondrement du pont à Baltimore, ainsi que du naufrage d'un navire au large des côtes
du Mozambique.
Elle renouvelle ses appels à la libération immédiate de tous les marins détenus et rappelle que
les Houthis sont les seuls responsables de l'escalade en cours en mer Rouge, en particulier
des dangers qu'ils font courir à la sécurité des marins, des conséquences négatives sur la
stabilité régionale et le commerce maritime international.
La résolution 2722 du Conseil de sécurité rappelle que l'exercice des droits et libertés de
navigation doit être respecté, en accord avec le droit international.
Elle doit être pleinement appliquée et la France y contribue dans le cadre de l'opération
ASPIDES de l'UE, au profit de la liberté de navigation de tous, et remercie les Etats qui
contribuent aux efforts de sécurité.
Nous demandons que cette 6eclaration soit jointe au rapport de ce sous-comité.
Je vous remercie."
"France thanks the Secretary General for his commitment and associates itself with the
declaration by Belgium, delivered on behalf of the Member States of the EU.
She offers her condolences to the United States and to the families of the victims of the disaster
of the bridge collapse in Baltimore, as well as the sinking of a ship off the coast of Mozambique.
It renews its calls for the immediate release of all detained sailors and recalls that the Houthis
are solely responsible for the ongoing escalation in the Red Sea, in particular for the dangers
they pose to the safety of sailors, the negative consequences on regional stability and
international maritime trade.
Security Council Resolution 2722 recalls that the exercise of navigation rights and freedoms
must be respected, in accordance with international law.
It must be fully applied and France contributes to this within the framework of the EU's
ASPIDES operation, for the benefit of freedom of navigation for all, and thanks the States
which contribute to security efforts.
We request that this statement be attached to the report of this subcommittee.
Thank you."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 7
Statement by the delegation of Germany
"Thank you Mr. Chair.
It is a pleasure to see you chairing this Committee.
Firstly, my delegation echoes the condolences expressed to the Delegations of the United
States and Mozambique in connection with the recent incidents.
Regarding the situation in the Red Sea:
Germany strongly condemns the violent and unjustifiable attacks by the Houthis on commercial
shipping. Endangering the life of innocent seafarers or holding them hostage is inacceptable.
Their actions are contrary to international law, interfere with the security of global shipping and
are serious threat to the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation.
Germany supports the Secretary General in all his efforts and also demands the immediate
and unconditional release of seafarers held hostage. We are committed to contribute securing
the area at hand in connection with the mission ASPIDES.
Lastly, we would like to align ourself with the statement given by Belgium, Bahamas, Japan
and others on this matter.
Mr Chair, please attach my statement to the report.
Thank you Mr. Chair."
Statement by the delegation of Japan
"Japan would like to congratulate you, Mr. Watchara Chiemanukulkit san, for being the new
Chair of this Committee. We look forward to working with you, the Chair, to address our
common challenges.
Japan expresses our condolences to all those affected by the recent accident of the
containership Dali, occurred in Baltimore in the US, resulted in the collapse of the Francis Scott
Key Bridge. Japan further expresses our condolences to the families of those who lost their
lives due to the latest accident on the passenger ship occurred in Mozanbique.
On the matters on hand, Japan thanks the Secretary-General for expressing your strong
commitment to ensure the safety of shipping and seafarers, and Japan supports your
statement. Any actions impeding the free and safe navigation of vessels, including the seizure
of "Galaxy Leader", by the Houthis, are totally unacceptable, and Japan firmly condemns such
actions.
Japan support the intervention by the Bahamas. We strongly call for early release of "Galaxy
Leader" and its crews. Besides, we share deep concerns on the attack by the Houthis to
"Rubymar", which causes serious environmental impacts in addition to the threat to safety of
shipping. In addition, regarding the attack on the cargo ship "True Confidence" by the Houthis
and the casualties of the crew, Japan expresses our heartfelt condolences to the families of
the innocent crews, and pray for the speedy recovery of the injured.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 8
The Houthis has been attacking the Red Sea and other areas around the Arabian Peninsula
since November last year. Japan firmly condemns the continued attacks on ships navigating
the sea.
Japan recalls that the UN Security Council adopted the resolution 2722 on January 10, which
condemns the Houthis' attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and demands that the Houthis
immediately cease all such attacks and immediately release the Galaxy Leader and its crew.
Last March, as the Presidency of the UN Security Council, Japan issued a press statement
condemning in the strongest terms Houthi attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
In this regard, Japan strongly urges all parties to act in a good faith in accordance with the
UNSC resolution.
Furthermore, on the recent incident on the hostage of Bangladesh-flagged vessel "MV

ABDULLAH", Japan expresses our solidarity to the people and the government of Bangladesh
and supports the interventions by the Secretary-General on this matter.
We kindly ask you that our statement be annexed to the report.."
Statement by the delegation of Malta
"Thank you Mr Chair.
Good morning everyone.
Malta strongly condemns the Houthi attacks which are a violation of international law and which
are a threat to maritime security and endanger the safety of lives at sea, the freedom of
navigation and the maritime environment, apart from hindering the free flow of trade. Malta
also calls for the immediate release of the vessel GALAXY LEADER and its crew. Malta fully
supports the statement made Belgium on behalf of the European Union and aligns itself with
such.
Malta would like to extend its condolences to the families of those who died in the recent
maritime incidents.
In conclusion, Malta congratulates you Mr Chair on your appointment and wishes you success
in this role.
Thank you, Mr Chair."
Statement by the delegation of Panama
"Muchas gracias Sr. Presidente.
Buenos días a los todos los presentes en este plenario, y buenos días, tardes y noches a los
que nos siguen de manera remota.
Quisiera primeramente extender nuestras profundas condolencias a los Estados Unidos y a

las familias de los fallecidos como resultado del accidente acaecido en Baltimore del 26 de
marzo de 2024 debido a la colisión del buque portacontenedores Dalí con el puente Francis-
Scott. De igual manera extendemos nuestras condolencias a los familiares y amigos de los
fallecidos en Mozambique por el incidente del buque pasajeros y quedamos al pendiente
sobre actualizaciones futuras de dicho accidente.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 9
En cuanto a la situación en el Mar Rojo, La República de Panamá agradece al Secretario

general por la actualización brindada y quisiéramos expresar nuestra preocupación por esta
situación que afecta el comercio marítimo internacional, a Panamá como estado de
abanderamiento le preocupa la frecuencia con la que ocurren estos ataques a buques civiles
que afecta el comercio internacional.
Es evidente que la situación en el Mar Rojo y Golfo de Adén está impactando negativamente
al comercio marítimo internacional y la cadena de suministro global, pero sin duda alguna los
que están siendo directamente afectados son nuestra gente de mar y los buques objeto de
los ataques hutíes, a pesar de ser buques de navegación comercial y que no tienen nada que
ver con los conflictos armados que están desarrollándose en esa región.
Es inaceptable que personal civil y buques comerciales, dedicados a mantener la cadena de

suministro en funcionamiento y el transporte de bienes esenciales para todo el mundo, sean
víctimas de ataques injustos que ya han provocado eventos graves para la seguridad de la
navegación, protección del medio marino, y la facilitación del comercio marítimo, como el
hundimiento del M/V Rubby Mar o las tristes pérdidas de vidas humanas y heridos en el ataque
al buque True Confidence, y ofrecemos nuestras profundas condolencias por estas dolorosas
perdidas. Además, reiteramos nuestro apoyo de exhortar a la liberación inmediata y segura
del buque de navegación comercial GALAXY LEADER y su tripulación, al igual que los 23
tripulantes del buque Adbullah víctima de piratería, para que estos tripulantes puedan reunirse
con sus familias con la mayor brevedad.
Quisiéramos aprovechar este momento para informar que el 23 de marzo, el buque de

bandera panameña M/V Huang Pu fue atacado en la zona del Mar Rojo por un impacto de
proyectil en la cubierta, afortunadamente no hubo pérdidas de vidas humanas y el buque
sufrió daño considerables, que requirió ir a dique seco a reparación y el incendio a bordo como
resultado del ataque fue extinguido rápidamente.
Sr. Presidente, la gente de mar realiza su trabajo en buena fe para traer a nuestros hogares
y comercios los bienes esenciales que todos, incluyendo nuestras familias, amigos y
conocidos necesitan, y por lo tanto nunca deberían ser víctimas colaterales de este tipo de
conflictos. En este sentido, quisiéramos reiterar un respetuoso llamado al diálogo y la
negociación pacifica a las partes involucradas en estos hechos para que cesen de inmediato
estos ataques, en beneficio del restablecimiento de la paz y la seguridad de la navegación en
la zona y darles fiel cumplimiento a las normas internacionales relativas a la seguridad y
protección de las embarcaciones y la gente de mar en buques comerciales civiles.
Muchas gracias sr. Presidente."
Statement by the delegation of Philippines
"Good morning Mr. Chair,
since this is the first time we take the floor, our delegation would like to express our sympathies
to the delegation of the United States for the loss of lives during the Mozambique incident and
to the delegation of Mozambique for the unfortunate loss of lives due to the capsizing incident.
We would like to congratulate you for your new role.
With regard to the seized ship, galaxy leader, where majority of the crew are Filipinos, we
commend the Secretary General and other relevant organizations for the collective action at
the highest level not only for the release of the captive seafarers but also to ensure the safety,
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 10
security of shipping and navigation and marine environmental protection in other affected
areas and ships.
We also inform you that following Houthi attacks on ships and the tragic death of two Filipino
seafarers, our Philippine authorities and manning agencies will further limit the deployment of
Filipino seafarers to ships sailing through known global hotspots. Our seafarers have also been
given the option to refuse to sail in warlike and high-risk areas, with provision for repatriation
and compensation at company cost.
Thank you Chair."
Statement by the delegation of Poland
"We fully support Belgium's statement on behalf of the European Union member states, and
other interventions, expressing our deepest sympathy to the United States and Mozambique
delegations for the recent incidents, showing solidarity with the Government of Bangladesh
and the Philippines, and condemning the actions of the Houthis against commercial ships
transiting the Red Sea.
These aggressive actions pose a serious threat to maritime security and international shipping.
It is imperative that such unlawful behaviour is promptly and effectively addressed to ensure
the safety and security of maritime operations in the critical area.
We request that our statement be reflected in the report."
Statement by the delegation of Singapore
"Chair,
Singapore remains deeply concerned by the continued unlawful attacks on international

merchant shipping in the Red Sea.
As our delegation had expressed at previous meetings, it is imperative that the freedom and
safety of navigation of international shipping are upheld, sea lines of communication remain
open and safe for the free flow of trade, and the safety and well-being of seafarers preserved.
In this regard, we call for the urgent cessation of such attacks.
Thank you."
Statement by the delegation of Slovenia
"Thank you, Mister Chair,
allow me to use this opportunity to congratulate you chair for taking the reigns to steer our
committee towards our common goal. We believe we are in good hands and that we will reach
a favourable final destination under your able leadership.
To the matter at hand,
Slovenia fully aligns itself to the statement made by the delegation of Belgium. Slovenia echoes
the call of those who spoke before us and demand Houthis to immediately stop attacks on
merchant, commercial vessels in Red Sea. Slovenia as a member of the Security Council
voted in favour of the resolution 2722 and underscored the importance of safeguarding the
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 11
freedom of navigation. Slovenia would like to voice our concern over the deteriorating situation
in the Red Sea worsening the security and safety of this crucial waterway, whilst also
endangering the maritime environment. Such attacks undermine international maritime
security and jeopardize critical flows of food, fuel and humanitarian assistance. We would also
express our condolences for all the unnecessary lives lost at sea due to these attacks.
Again we urge the Houtis again to refrain from any actions that jeopardize the lives of innocent
seafarers and threat to cause harm to the marine environment and safety of navigation.
Slovenia would like this statement to be reflected in the report of the meeting.
Thank you, Mister Chair"
Statement by the delegation of Ukraine
"Mr. Chair,
Ukraine joins other delegations in expressing our condolences to the delegations of the US
and Mozambique for the recent tragic accidents.
Ukraine aligns itself with the delegations of the Bahamas, Japan, US, UK, Belgium et al in
unequivocally condemning the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, leading to the losses of
innocent seafarers, ships and the contamination of the marine environment.
This jeopardizes international navigation rights and freedoms along the critical trade routes
around the Arab peninsula.
Supported by Iranian backers, the terrorist group has stepped up attacks and expand their
reach geographically, inspiring the piracy groups.
Ukraine adds its voice to recalling the UNSC resolution 2722, which requested the Houthis to
cease the attacks against the merchant vessels. This delegation also supports the demand for
the immediate and unconditional release of mv Galaxy Leader and its crew.
We call on the international community to exert pressure on Houthis and, in particular, their
Iranian sponsors and, if needed, consider options to limit the latter's participation in the IMO
activities, as its deeds do not correspond to the principles of this Organization related to
maintaining free, safe and secure commercial shipping.
I thank you, Mr. Chair, and request that this statement is included in the report of the
Committee."
Statement by the delegation of United Kingdom
"Thank you, Chair
The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are illegal, unacceptable and resolutely condemned by the
UN Security Council and Resolution 2722.
Despite this the Houthis have continued to carry out their attacks, which have cost innocent
seafarers lives, had a detrimental effect on the marine environment, continue to put others at
risk and impede the delivery of humanitarian aid. We also call for the Houthis to immediately
and unconditionally release the MV Galaxy Leader and its crew.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 12
These actions threaten the stability of the coastal States of the Red Sea and presents
significant risks to wider international peace and security.
Protecting the safety of seafarers and the freedom of navigation is foundational to our work at
the IMO and to international shipping, there is no lawful justification for intentionally targeting
civilian shipping and our seafarers.
These attacks threaten these principles and continue to place innocent lives at risk. The
support to the Houthis provided by Iran has enabled these attacks and we call on Iran, a
member of the IMO, to immediately cease this support.
The United Kingdom remains determined to hold those responsible accountable and remain
strongly committed to the international rules-based order, defending the freedom of navigation
and safe passage at sea.
Thank you, Chair"
Statement by the delegation of United States
"Good morning, Mr Chair
The United States thanks the Secretary-General for his continued focus on the dire impact of
the Iran-backed Houthis' attacks on seafarers and commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf
of Aden, and for keeping Member States apprised of the situation.
The United States is deeply saddened by the death of three innocent seafarers and injury of
four others that occurred when the Houthis deliberately fired an anti-ship ballistic missile at the
civilian commercial motor vessel (M/V) True Confidence on March 6. We offer our condolences
to the delegations of the Philippines and Vietnam and to the families and friends of those
innocent seafarers who lost their lives while simply doing their job.
We join other Member States in calling for the Houthis to immediately and unconditionally
release the M/V Galaxy Leader and its 25 crew members whom the Houthi have held captive
since they illegally seized the ship on November 19, 2023.
We recall UN Security Council Resolution 2722, which underscores broad support for the
navigational rights and freedoms of vessels in the Red Sea, condemns these Houthi attacks,
and demands that they cease.
We note again, as we have in other IMO meetings, that the Houthis' reckless attacks on
commercial ships jeopardize the safety and welfare of seafarers whom this organization is
charged to protect and threaten the marine environment and navigational safety.
These concerns were made more urgent following the Houthis' February 18 attack on M/V
Rubymar. Here again, the Iran-backed Houthis deliberately targeted a civilian commercial ship
with an anti-ship ballistic missile. The Rubymar's crew was forced to abandon ship, fortunately
without casualties, but the ship slowly took on water and sank. It now poses a significant risk
to navigational safety and has damaged the fragile marine environment in this vital waterway.
Iran has made no secret of its support to the Houthis. It is no secret that Iran provides weapons
to the Houthis in violation of the UN arms embargo. Iran has provided the Houthis the training
needed to use these weapons and carry out attacks like these. Iran also provides the Houthis
extensive financial support. We know that without Iran's continued support, the Houthis would
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 13
struggle to track and strike commercial vessels like the True Confidence, the Rubymar, and
numerous others.
Every member of this organization – and especially those with direct channels to Iran – should
urgently press Tehran to cease providing these weapons and support to the Houthis before
more innocent seafarers are killed by their reckless and abhorrent actions.
Likewise, every Member State of this organization should adhere to and uphold the arms
embargo on the Houthis established under UN Security Council Resolution 2216 — an
embargo that Iran has previously been found in non-compliance with by the Panel of Experts
on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 for its failure to prevent the transfer
of Iranian origin ballistic missiles, UAVs and related technologies to Houthi militants.
The United States remains committed to restoring stability in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,
while protecting seafarers and commercial ships from Houthi attacks and upholding the
fundamental principle of freedom of navigation.
•
Thank you, and we request that this statement be included in the final report of the Committee."
AGENDA ITEM 2
"Chair,
Russia's full-scaled armed invasion of Ukraine has created a wide range of fundamental
challenges to the rules-based international order in clear violation of international maritime law.
The aggressor has systematically continued the practice of neglecting and distortedly
interpreting the norms and provisions of IMO instruments in force, including FAL Convention.
This factor definitely creates additional ferocious threats to the freedom and safety of
navigation worldwide.
While this Committee endeavors to enhance international maritime traffic facilitation, Russia
consistently engages in disruptive actions within our Organization's framework. In a complete
reversal, Russia openly replaces the principle of 'facilitation' with 'sophistication,' 'complexity,'
and 'perverse tactics.'
Examples of such disruptive behavior of this terrorist state have become countless and the
treats it created to the regional and international maritime domain are significant.
Chair,
Following the disruption of the Grain initiative by Russia in mid-2023, Ukraine successfully
established a special maritime corridor in its sovereign waters in the Black Sea for commercial
vessels heading to and from Ukrainian ports. This endeavor has undoubtedly proved its
viability and resilience.
Over the 7 months of its 24/7 functioning the corridor has made it possible to export more than
36 million tons of cargo, which exceeds the performance indicators of the failed 'Grain
initiative', with vessels left the ports of Greater Odesa to 40 countries in Asia, Africa and
Europe.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 14
Through these efforts, Ukraine increased the turnover of goods through its seaports to 75% of
the pre-war level. To enable it we have introduced a much more efficient logistics route without
the participation of the aggressor state, whereas continuing to be a guarantor of the world's
food security. This is our joint victory, as we appreciate your support in supporting this initiative
at the 129th Council's and 33rd Assembly's session.
And what about Russia? This terrorist state has launched 1,000 missiles, about 2,800 Shahed
drones and almost 7,000 guided bombs since the beginning of 2024 alone. A significant part
of these "death gifts" was also directed at Ukrainian port cities in order to impede free
navigation. But the attacks are not limited to the critical infrastructure, and mainly deal damage
to residential buildings, hospitals, schools and kindergartens, causing loss of life to hundreds
of civilians, including elderly, women and children.
On top of that, the enemy applied the tactics of distant mining of sea routes leading to the
Danube River and ports of Greater Odesa using guided aviation bombs. Over 100 mines were
spread and, as a result, over a dozen of merchant vessels and auxiliary boats were affected.
Luckily, Russian mines contain small amount of explosive, and there were no major
consequences for vessels, which continued their movement.
Moreover, Russia continues to promulgate navigation warnings about the closures of the
marine areas withing Ukraine's sovereign waters in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov for
shipping under different pretext with a view to create obstacle for the free merchant shipping.
And last but not the least, Russia still fails to disassemble the illegally built Kerch bridge that
from the time of its construction limited the ability of the certain types of merchant vessels to
reach Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. Since it attempts to use the bridge as a main
transportation artery to support Russian occupation troops in Crimea, it has become a
legitimate military target, and it is only a matter of time for this impediment to be completely
removed.
Thus, the Russian Federation has purposely disregards the persistent demands made by the
35th extraordinary and the 129th regular sessions of the Council and the 33rd session of the
Assembly.
I would like to specifically draw attention to Resolution A.1183 (33) "The impact of the Russian
Federation's armed invasion of Ukraine on international shipping," which has reaffirmed the
decisions taken by the IMO bodies, including this Facilitation Committee. Our heartfelt
appreciation goes out to the resolution's co-sponsors and the nations that cast their votes in
favor, contributing to the creation of a significant and dynamic document.
The strong demands embedded in this Resolution should be complied with by the aggressor
state unconditionally, namely to cease actions aimed at disrupting free and secure international
shipping, including but not limited to harassment of vessels, interference with navigation,
generation of naval mines threats and attacks on maritime infrastructure and therefore
threatening international supply chains that supported other countries, and to refrain from
endangering the safety and welfare of seafarers.
Chair,
In light of the above, the delegation of Ukraine invites the Committee to take following actions,
namely to:
.1 condemn in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's armed aggression
against Ukraine that started in 2014 and took the form of a full-scale invasion on 24 February
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 15
2022, which is a violation of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of a UN Member State,
extending to its territorial waters, and inconsistent with the principles and purposes of IMO, as
well as the 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic;
.2 express grave concern over the impact of the Russian Federation's armed invasion
of Ukraine on the freedom of international navigation in the northern part of the Black Sea, the
Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait, and on the safety and well-being of seafarers and
commercial vessels;
.3 express concern that the aforementioned armed invasion by the Russian Federation
and its attacks against commercial vessels compromised the implementation of the FAL
Convention in the maritime areas of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait;
.4 demand that the Russian Federation immediately cease the use of force against
Ukraine, withdraw all of its troops from Ukraine, and abide by its obligations under relevant
international treaties and conventions, to ensure navigation rights and freedoms of vessels in
the northern part of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, in accordance with
international law;
.5 commend the efforts of Ukraine in restoring the free navigation for commercial vessels
heading to and from Ukrainian ports via the special maritime corridor, established in its
sovereign waters in the Black Sea;
.6 request the Secretary-General to provide updates on developments and the

implementation of Resolution A.1183 (33);
.7 agreed to keep this matter under review and invited Member States concerned to
provide relevant reports to the Committee.
Chair, and let's be consistent in using correct language in compiling the Final Reports both of
this Committee and other bodies of the Organization. This would involve replacing the wording
'ongoing military conflict' with a more adequate formulation 'impact of the Russian federation
armed invasion of Ukraine', and that would be in accordance with miscellaneous documents
adopted under the auspices of the UN system, including IMO.
I thank you, Chair, and kindly ask that this statement is reflected in the Final Report and be
attached to its Annex."
Statement by the delegation of Australia
"Australia aligns with the views expressed by the other states that have already taken the floor.
We condemn Russia's illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine. Aside from terrible damage and
loss of life, the invasion has been a major cause of global food insecurity. Russia's invasion
has directly affected seafarers and shipping. It has damaged maritime infrastructure and
training institutions – and has resulted in harm to the marine environment in the Black Sea and
Sea of Azov. Member states have continuously spoken of the impact of Russia's invasion on
international shipping and the environment. IMO Assembly clearly communicated this through
IMO Resolution A. 1183(33). Australia notes Ukraine's success in establishing a special
maritime corridor in its sovereign waters in the Black Sea for commercial vessels heading to
and from Ukrainian ports. Australia also supports Ukraine's proposed actions as set out in their
earlier intervention. Australia continues to support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity
and is working closely with our partners to support Ukraine to end the war on its own terms."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 16
Statement by the delegation of Belgium
"Merci monsieur le Président
Je veux encore prendre l'occasion, au nom du Royaume de la Belgique, de vous souhaiter

beaucoup de succès dans votre nouvelle capacité de président de ce comité. Cette délégation
est convaincue que ce comité est entre de bonnes mains.
Monsieur le Président, distingués délégués
La Belgique, au nom des États membres de l'Union européenne, condamne avec la plus
grande fermeté l'agression armée de la Russie contre l'Ukraine, qui a débuté en 2014 et a pris
la forme d'une invasion totale de l'Ukraine le 24 février 2022, et qui constitue une violation de
l'intégrité territoriale et de la souveraineté d'un État membre des Nations unies, s'étendant à
ses eaux territoriales, et incompatible avec les principes et les buts de l'OMI, tels qu'ils sont
énoncés à l'article 1er de la Convention de l'OMI.
Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, tous les organes clés de l'OMI ont condamné les actions illégales de la
Russie contre l'Ukraine. En outre, l'Assemblée de l'OMI, lors de sa 33ème session, a
également condamné l'agression de la Russie dans sa résolution A33/Res.1183.
La guerre d'agression menée par la Russie contre l'Ukraine continue de menacer la paix et la
sécurité en Europe et dans le monde et a de graves conséquences mondiales sous la forme
d'une insécurité alimentaire accrue et d'une hausse des prix de l'énergie.
La Russie, ses dirigeants politiques et toutes les personnes impliquées dans les violations du
droit international et du droit humanitaire international en Ukraine doivent rendre des comptes.
Les États membres de l'Union européenne ne reconnaîtront jamais les territoires
temporairement sous contrôle militaire russe comme autre chose qu'une partie de l'Ukraine et
continueront à soutenir les efforts de l'Ukraine pour restaurer son intégrité territoriale à
l'intérieur de ses frontières internationalement reconnues aussi longtemps que nécessaire.
Nous demandons que cette déclaration soit jointe au rapport de ce comité.
Merci monsieur le Président."
"Thank you Mr President
I would like to take the opportunity again, on behalf of the Kingdom of Belgium, to wish you
much success in your new capacity as president of this committee. This delegation is
convinced that this committee is in good hands.
Mr. President, distinguished delegates
Belgium, on behalf of the Member States of the European Union, condemns in the strongest
terms Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and took the form of
a total invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and which constitutes a violation of the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Member State of the United Nations, extending to its
territorial waters, and incompatible with the principles and purposes of the IMO, as set out in
Article 1 of the IMO Convention.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 17
Until today, all key IMO bodies have condemned Russia's illegal actions against Ukraine.
Furthermore, the IMO Assembly, at its 33rd session, also condemned Russia's aggression in
its resolution A33/Res.1183.
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine continues to threaten peace and security in Europe
and the world and has serious global consequences in the form of increased food insecurity
and rising food prices. energy.
Russia, its political leaders and all those involved in violations of international law and
international humanitarian law in Ukraine must be held accountable. The Member States of
the European Union will never recognize the territories temporarily under Russian military
control as anything other than part of Ukraine and will continue to support Ukraine's efforts to
restore its territorial integrity within its borders. internationally recognized borders for as long
as necessary.
We request that this statement be attached to the report of this committee.
Thank you Mr. President."
Statement by the delegation of Canada
"Thank you Chair.
Canada reiterates its solidarity with Ukraine and continues to strongly condemn Russia's war
of aggression against Ukraine. The war has crippled marine infrastructure, taken the lives of
seafarers, caused significant damage to the marine environment and violated the fundamental
principle of freedom of navigation for merchant vessels transiting in this region. These attacks
constitute a clear violation of the UN Charter and the conventions and principles of this
organization.
Canada wishes to align with the statements by the United States, Belgium and others, and
supports the actions requested by Ukraine. We also call for the complete and immediate
withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine's sovereign territory.
We ask that our statement be included in the report. Thank you."
Statement by the delegation of France
"Merci Monsieur le Président
chers collègues,
La France s'associe à la 17ember17rial prononcée par la Belgique, au nom des États

17ember17 de l'Union européenne, ainsi qu'aux interventions précédentes, et soutient celle
du distingué 17ember17rial17 de l'Ukraine.
Nous condamnons à nouveau avec la plus grande fermeté l'agression armée de la Russie
contre l'Ukraine, qui constitue une violation de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité 17ember17rial,
y compris de son espace maritime, d'un État 17ember des Nations unies, contraire à tous les
principes du droit international et de l'OMI.
Nous rappelons à cet égard notamment la Résolution A.1183 adoptée par notre Assemblée.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 18
Nous dénonçons l'impact de ces attaques incessantes sur la liberté de navigation dans cette
région et sur la sécurité des marins et des navires marchands, qui compromettent notamment
la mise en œuvre de la Convention FAL que nous examinons cette semaine.
Je vous remercie monsieur le Président et souhaite que cette déclaration soit jointe au rapport
de ce comité."
"Thank you Mr President
Dear colleagues,
France associates itself with the statement made by Belgium, on behalf of the Member States
of the European Union, as well as with previous interventions, and supports that of the
distinguished representative of Ukraine.
We once again condemn in the strongest terms Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine,
which constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, including its maritime
space, of a United Nations member state. , contrary to all principles of international law and
the IMO.
In this regard, we recall in particular Resolution A.1183 adopted by our Assembly.
We denounce the impact of these incessant attacks on freedom of navigation in this region
and on the safety of sailors and merchant ships, which notably compromise the implementation
of the FAL Convention which we are examining this week.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and hope that this statement will be attached to the report of this
committee."
Statement by the delegation of Germany
"Thank you, Mr. Chair,
Germany condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's armed aggression against
Ukraine and their unlawful invasion of Ukrainian sovereign territory; including their territorial
waters.
Our support and solidarity for Ukraine, its people, their territorial integrity and independence
remains unwaivered.
We demand that the Russian Federation withdraws its troops and military equipment from
Ukraine's internationally recognized borders immediately and unconditionally.
Germany aligns itself with the statement given by Belgium.
We further support the intervention by Ukraine and ask the committee to take action
accordingly.
Lastly Mr. Chair, I kindly request that this statement will be included in the committee's final
report.
Thank you, Mr. Chair."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 19
Statement by the delegation of Ireland
"Thank you, Mr. Chair
Ireland fully supports the statement made by the delegation of Belgium on behalf of the EU,
as supported by other delegations.
Ireland wishes to offer our sincere condolences to Ukraine on the losses they continue to
suffer.
The immediate withdrawal of the Russian military from Ukrainian territory is required. We are
unwavering in our solidarity with the people of Ukraine and our support for Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We would request that our statement is included in the report of the Committee."
Statement by the delegation of Italy
"Italy aligns itself with the statement just made by the distinguished delegation of Belgium, on
behalf of the EU Member States.
After more than two years since the Russian Federation armed invasion of Ukraine, the Italian
delegation, once again, condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation's
unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine, a sovereign state of Europe, whose
people are unjustly paying for the atrocities of a deliberate military attack.
In addition to this, we would like to remind that all key IMO bodies and the IMO Assembly, at
its 33rd session, have already condemned Russia's aggression.
Therefore, Mr. Chair, Italy, as well, demand that the Russian Federation immediately cease its
military actions and fully respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of
Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
We ask this statement to be attached to the final report of this committee."
Statement by the delegation of Japan
"Japan aligns Ukraine, and others, and would like to reiterate our firm position on this matter.
Russia's aggression against Ukraine is an attempt of unilateral change of the status quo by
force and an infringement of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which constitutes a
clear violation of international law, and is a grave breach of the United Nations Charter. We
further recall that this Organization adopted the Assembly Resolution A.1183(33), on 4
December 2023.
All actions that shake the very foundation of international order are absolutely unacceptable,
and Japan condemns Russia's actions in the strongest terms.
Japan urges Russia to cease its ongoing aggression and to withdraw its troops and military
equipment immediately, completely and unconditionally from the entire internationally
recognized territory of Ukraine.
We request that the statement being attached to the report."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 20
Statement by the delegation of Spain
"España apoya en su totalidad la intervención de la delegación de Bélgica en nombre de la

Unión Europea, en la que se condena la agresión militar no provocada e injustificada de la
Federación de Rusia contra Ucrania.
Nos gustaría aprovechar esta oportunidad para volver a expresar nuestro compromiso y
solidaridad con el pueblo ucraniano ante la agresión de la que está siendo objeto por parte de
la Federación de Rusia.
España comparte las mismas preocupaciones manifestadas por la delegación de Ucrania en

relación con las consecuencias que para la facilitación del tráfico marítimo suponen las
acciones militares llevadas a cabo por la Federación Rusa en el Mar Negro y el Mar de Azov.
En ese sentido, destacamos la importancia de la implementación de la Resolución de la

Asamblea de la OMI A. 1183(33) y de la cooperación internacional para apoyar a Ucrania en
la implementación de los instrumentos de la OMI.
Por ello, España apoya que el FAL 48 tome las acciones que han sido propuestas por la
delegación de Ucrania.
Solicitamos por último que esta declaración sea incluida en el informe final del Comité."
Statement by the delegation of United Kingdom
"Thank you, Chair
The United Kingdom continues to support the Ukrainian government in its defence against
Russia's unprovoked, premeditated, and barbaric attack. We stand united with our
international partners against the actions of the Russian government which are an egregious
violation of international law and the UN Charter.
Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld. Russia's
attempts to stifle the economy of Ukraine by disrupting the Black Sea Grain Initiative are cynical
and cowardly. With world now further away from its goals to eliminate world hunger and
malnutrition, Ukraine's exports through the Black Sea ports are crucial to global food security.
As the war enters third year, we stand united to ensure Ukraine emerges from the war as a
strong, sovereign, and free country.
The United Kingdom will continue to denounce and condemn the illegal war of aggression
waged by Russia against Ukraine in flagrant violation of international law and to call for the
complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian armed forces from all Ukrainian
territory.
Thank you, Chair."
Statement by the delegation of United States
"The United States supports the proposal of the delegation of Ukraine. We condemn in the
strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine.
The Russian Federation's war on Ukraine is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine as well as the United Nations Charter. It is inconsistent with the purposes
of the IMO as set out in Article 1 of the IMO Convention. We recall Assembly Resolution
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 21
A.1183(33) concerning the impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international
shipping which endorsed similar decisions previously taken by this committee. The United
States deplores this war. We deplore the Russian Federation's attacks that strike commercial
vessels and ports that disrupt global market access by sea and threaten the safety and welfare
of seafarers, the marine environment, and global food security.
We continue to demand that the Russian Federation cease its unlawful invasion and withdraw
all its forces from Ukrainian territory, including its territorial waters. We also demand that
Russia cease its threats to the safety and welfare of seafarers, the security of international
shipping, and the marine environment.
We request that this statement be included in the final report of the Committee.
Thank you, Chair."
Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation
"Уважаемый г-н Председатель,
Мы в очередной раз потратили наше драгоценное время, оторванное от работы

Комитета, ради того, чтобы вновь оказаться вне мандата Организации и стать
свидетелями откровенной лжи и манипуляции фактами, попытками показать белое
черным.
На все эти выпады мы реагировали, и неоднократно. В очередной раз заявляем, что

Российская делегация решительно отвергает все безосновательные обвинения,
сделанные в адрес России делегацией Украины и другими, в особенности, что касается
намеренного разрушения российской стороной гражданских объектов и атак на
гражданские суда.
В свете же постоянных обвинений в терроризме от одной делегации, хотели бы

напомнить коллегам о страшной трагедии, которую Россия пережила и переживает до
сих пор. Речь идет о кровавом теракте в «Крокус Сити Холле» в Москве вечером 22
марта, в котором пострадали более 550 человек.
Из всех уголков мира мы получили и получаем слова поддержки в связи с трагедией,

соболезнования жертвам, их родным и близким, и заявления о безоговорочном
осуждении теракта. Важно то, что весь мир сопереживает с нами, сочувствует и
отрицает любое проявление терроризма.
Совбез ООН осудил этот теракт и почтил погибших минутой молчания. Члены ООН
призвали все государства активно сотрудничать с Россией для привлечения к
ответственности всех причастных к этой страшной трагедии. Генеральный секретарь
ООН А.Гутерреш также самым решительным образом осудил нападение.
Ведущееся сейчас скрупулезное расследование событий произошедшего все

отчетливее и прямолинейнее указывает не только на то, что заказчики, но и кураторы и
пособники этого теракта находятся на Украине. От высших руководителей этого
государства мы слышим открытые признания в совершении других терактов, в том числе
на российской территории (это все есть в открытом доступе). Весь мир наблюдает как
киевский режим стремится уничтожить как можно больше мирного населения,
сбрасывая бомбы на российские мирные города, школы, торговые центры и жилые дома
и при этом открыто заявляет, что гражданские объекты (в том числе и например
Крымский мост) являются законными целями для бомбежек.
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 22
Уважаемые коллеги, если мы здесь на сессии нашего Комитета что-то и хотим сегодня
осудить, то мы должны прямо и честно, следуя принятой в ООН линии, осудить любые
действия и проявления терроризма в любом уголке мира (в том числе и
террористические акты, как совершенные в Крокус Сити Холле, так и направленные
против Керченского моста), а также осудить всех тех, кто участвует в их исполнении,
организации и финансировании. Просим в явном виде отразить это решение в отчете
нашего Комитета.
Помимо отражения в тексте отчета нашего выступления, просим также приложить весь
текст выступления к финальному отчету (мы передадим текст в Секретариат).
"We have now once again wasted our precious time, taken away from the work of the
Committee, in order to again find ourselves outside the mandate of the Organization and
witness outright lies and manipulation of facts, attempts to show white as black.
We have already repeatedly reacted to all these statements. Our delegation once again,
strongly rejects all baseless accusations made against Russia by the delegation of Ukraine
and others, especially with regard to the deliberate destruction of civilian objects and attacks
on civilian ships.
In light of the constant accusations of terrorism from one delegation, we would like to remind
our colleagues of the terrible tragedy that Russia has experienced and is still living through.
We are talking about the bloody terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow on the
evening of March 22, in which more than 550 people were killed or injured.
From all parts of the world we have received and are still receiving words of support in
connection with this tragedy, condolences to the victims, their families and friends, and
statements of unconditional condemnation of the terrorist attack. The important thing is that
the whole world empathizes with us, sympathizes and denies any manifestation of terrorism.
The UN Security Council condemned this terrorist attack and honored the victims with a minute
of silence. UN members called on all states to actively cooperate with Russia to bring to justice
all those involved in this terrible tragedy. UN Secretary-General A. Guterres also condemned
the attack in the strongest possible terms.
The scrupulous investigation which is now underway into the events of what happened
indicates more and more clearly and straightforwardly that not only the sponsors, but also the
curators and accomplices of this terrorist attack are in Ukraine. From the leaders of this state
(Ukraine) we hear open admissions of committing other terrorist attacks, including on the
Russian territory (all this is in the public domain). The whole world is watching as the Kiev
regime seeks to destroy as many civilians as possible by dropping bombs on Russian peaceful
cities, schools, shopping centers and residential buildings, and at the same time openly
declares that civilian objects (including, for example, the Kerch Bridge) are legitimate targets
for shelling.
Dear colleagues, if we want to condemn something here today at the session of our
Committee, then we must directly and honestly, in line with the United Nations, condemn any
actions and manifestations of terrorism in any part of the world (including terrorist acts such as
those committed in the Crocus City Hall, and those directed against the Kerch Bridge), as well
as condemn all those involved in perpetrating, organising and financing acts of terrorism.
We ask this to be clearly reflected in the report of our Committee as the decision of this body.
We also ask to append the text of this statement to the report of the Committee."
FAL 48/20/Add.1
Annex 9, page 23
"Mr. Chair,
Ukraine condemns international terrorism in all its manifestations.
The statements by the Russian delegation about the "Ukrainian trace" in the terrorist attack in
Crocus city hall are unfounded and deliberately false.
By accusing Ukraine of terrorism, the Russian delegation is trying to hide its own terrorist
nature and distract the world from the mass atrocities against the civilian population in Ukraine.
The Putin regime is in conflict with some terrorists and at the same time supports others, like
the Taliban.
The organization Islamic State-Khorasan claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in
Moscow on March 22.
I thank you, Mr. Chair, and request this this statement is reflected in the Committee's report."
AGENDA ITEM 7
Statement by the delegation of China
"谢谢主席。在FAL 48/7/2号文件中，我代表团赞赏并支持摩洛哥作为协调人提交的通信组报告
FAL 48/7。本文件认为PCS作为海事"单一窗口"的补充，对提高贸易便利化程度、优化营商环
境有积极作用，我们也完全支持通信组制定的PCS指南。
在此基础上，FAL 48/7/2号文件建议本委员会及未来会议在有关PCS话题的讨论中，一方面注
意到有关码头自动化、智能化的创新发展趋势，重视标准化、自动化和健全的港口服务所带来
的潜在利好；另一方面，建议本组织积极与包括ISO在内的相关国际组织开展合作，致力于在
不同国际组织之间寻求协调一致的方法，以便应对网络和数据等方面存在的潜在风险。
谢谢主席允许我们做出以上介绍和澄清
"Thank you, Chairman. In document FAL 48/7/2, our delegation appreciates and supports
Morocco's submission of the Communication Group Report FAL 48/7 as the coordinator. This
document considers that PCS, as a supplement to the " Maritime Single Window", has a
positive effect on improving trade facilitation and optimizing the business environment. We also
fully support the PCS Guidelines developed by the Communication Group.
On this basis, document FAL 48/7/2 suggests that in the discussion of PCS made by the
Organization and its future meetings, on the one hand, the innovative development of ports
and terminals automation,intelligence and standardization should be noted , as well as the
potential benefits brought by standardization, automation, and sound port services; On the
other hand, the Organization is encouraged to actively collaborate with relevant international
organizations, including ISO, in a holistic manner to address potential risks in network and data
aspects.
Thank you, Chairman, for allowing us to make the above introduction and clarification."
___________

FAL 48-20-Add.1 - Report Of The Facilitation CommitteeOn Its Forty-Eighth Session (Secretariat)

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E

FACILITATION COMMITTEE FAL 48/20/Add.1

REPORT OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE

ANNEX 1 DESCRIPTION OF MARITIME SERVICE 8

ANNEX 2 EGDH PRIORITY LIST OF DATA SETS

ANNEX 3 TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EGDH

ANNEX 4 ROAD MAP ON ADDRESSING MASS ISSUES RELATED TO THE FAL

ANNEX 5 RESOLUTION FAL.17(48) – REVISED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION

ANNEX 6 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE

ANNEX 7 POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE FACILITATION COMMITTEE

ANNEX 8 LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE PROVISIONAL

ANNEX 9 STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS

DESCRIPTION OF MARITIME SERVICE 8

MS 8 – Vessel shore reporting

8.1 Submitting organization

FAL Committee, NCSR Sub-Committee

8.2 Coordinating bodies

IMO, Norway and Singapore.

8.3 Description of the Maritime Service

.1 ship to shore reporting typically connected to port calls; and

.2 ship reporting systems linked to the safety of navigation.

Ship reporting systems can be mandatory or non-mandatory. If adopted by IMO, a ship

Ship to shore reporting

• information requested through a single window system

• vessel traffic services zones regulations

• port State regulations

• health and veterinary regulations

Ship to shore reporting as envisaged by e-navigation solution 2 aims to reduce time-consuming

Figure 8-1 –Ship to shore reporting

Ship reporting systems

The existing resolution is based on SOLAS regulation V/11, as follows:

The Organization is recognized as the only international body for developing

Information required to be transmitted as part of a ship reporting system report is generally

Figure 8-2 – Examples of reporting points from Bay of Fundy

Current communication systems

• Internet-based reporting systems

• a combination of these systems

Figure 8-3 – Examples of current communication systems

Vessel shore reporting

The purpose of this MS is to:

• secure submission and exchange of information by electronic means required by

• reduce the administrative burden to the crew and ashore;

• provide real-time access to information to relevant stakeholders in a secure

The purpose of this MS is also to:

8.5 Operational approach

Future ship to shore reporting

Examples of information to provide can be:

Information related to: Examples

Shore receivers • contact information

The following non-exhaustive list of notifications should be provided through a GMSWe:

• notifications of bunkers on board

• notifications of NOx information

• notifications of landing of waste

• notifications of Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC) voyage

• notifications of intent to cross the national baseline

• maritime security notifications

• Port State control notifications

• customs declarations (in accordance with the FAL Convention)

• border control notifications

• Immigration and Health declaration

• terminal berth booking request at port

• pilot booking request

Future ship reporting system in conjunction with a ship reporting system

To avoid duplication, overlap and unnecessary administrative work, information should be