Investigation of the effects of critical incident energy
parameters using ETAP® to reduce arc flash hazards
Abeera Khan
Department Of Electrical Engineering
NED University of Engineering and Technology
Karachi, Pakistan
abeera2014@gmail.com
Abstract— Arc flash is one of the major causes of injuries and
death in electrical work related incidents. Arc flash risk
assessment is required to protect the working personnel from the
hazards of an arc flash event. This paper conducts an
investigation to analyze the effects of critical parameters that
influence incident energy level at different locations in a power
system. An electrical network, a representative of small industrial
facility, is modelled and in different scenarios, incident energy is
determined by simulating an arc flash analysis based on IEEE
1584 standard on Electrical Transient Analyzer Program
(ETAP). The results of simulation are then presented, plotted and
discussed. Different mitigation techniques are also proposed to
reduce incident energy. The results could help the field personnel
to know about the parameters that are crucial to incident energy.
This will help them to explore different mitigation techniques
against arc flash event.
Keywords-arc flash analysis; incident energy; IEEE 1584
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A rapid release of energy, caused by an arcing fault that
results from a short circuit between two live conductors, can be
defined as an arc flash event. The electrical arc that occurs
between these energized conductors, with exception to laser, is
the hottest known substance on earth. The arc can reach
temperatures up to and beyond 20,000 K, which is
approximately four times as hot as the sun’s surface [1][2]. It is
a hazardous incident because of the release of energy due to an
electrical arc, which is the flow of current through the air
between two phase conductors or between a phase conductor
and ground. Arc flash hazard is quantified in terms of incident
energy (calories per square centimeters, cal/cm2). A rapid
heating of air, in the proximity of arc fault, takes place due to
the rise in pressure and temperature and consequently arc flash
produces. This releases intense heat, light and pressure waves
with a loud sound. Molten steel is spread out to large distances
and causes complete damage to equipment and severe injuries
or even death of working personnel. The injuries may result
from shock waves, radiations, gases inhaled, flying shrapnel
and blinding light [3].
The main cause of the arc flash event is the insulation
failure occurs between two energized conductors which are at
sufficient voltage level. The insulation failure can have many
reasons like aging, overheat, treeing, loose connections and
human error etc. [2]. Degree of injury or burn is the function of
978-1-5386-5482-8/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
Mohammad Mohsin Aman
Department Of Electrical Engineering
NED University of Engineering and Technology
Karachi, Pakistan
mohsinaman@neduet.edu.pk
the arc flash power, the distance of the person from the arc
flash source and the personal protective equipment (PPE) worn
by the worker at the instant when arc flash event takes place.
Common injuries include broken bones, collapsed lungs,
inhalation of toxic gases and effects on the eye sight and
hearing [4].
Relating to the potential dangers and their prevention, many
codes and standards exist, which are updated with time. As per
the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) act, it is the sole
responsibility of the employers to provide a safe and healthful
work place to the employees. Employers must ensure
compliance with every applicable OSHA standards. For this
cause, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is referred by
the OSHA. Employers are responsible for assessing the
workplace to determine if hazards exist or may exist and
should also make sure that every working personnel uses the
appropriate PPE for their protection [5]. Moreover, the workers
exposed to the energized equipment while working, must be
qualified and well trained for the tasks, they are performing and
must be using the appropriate PPE [6]. There must be adequate
PPE for specific body parts and when working around live
equipment, insulated tools are necessary to use [7].
National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA 70®),
National Electrical Code (NEC®) has laid the foundation for
electrical safety in industrial, commercial facilities in the
United States and around the globe. In 2002, a new
requirement was added as Article 110.16 to the 2002 edition of
the NEC which was the first arc flash hazard reference, NFPA
had. It required that the equipment must be labeled to warn
qualified working personnel about electrical arc flash dangers
[8].
To have protection against electrical arc flash hazards,
PPEs are used. PPE is the clothing worn by the working
personnel and is necessary when working around live
equipment (Fig. 1) because even though safe work practices
and timely maintained equipment reduce the occurrence of an
arcing fault, the workers who are exposed to hazards need to be
appropriately protected. If PPE rating is adequate with the
incident energy level then survivability from arc flash gets
increased [9]. For selecting proper PPE, the incident energy
calculated at various system locations, provide basis. Based on
the incident energy level, PPE may include flame resistant
clothing, flash suits, arc hoods, hardhat, safety glasses, shoes,
gloves, face shield, etc. PPE should be appropriate means that

Figure. 1 A workman wearing PPE
it should not be as little as to leave the personnel unshielded
and not much bulky as it could restrict movement or could
cause other problems like increased heat stress or increased risk
associated with a specific work. Unlike the previous editions of
NFPA 70E, where levels of PPE were determined as per hazard
risk category (HRC), the levels of PPE needed for different
tasks has been described as per arc rated PPE category in the
latest edition. For actual requirements, it is advisable to look
for NFPA 70E.
Arc flash study is necessary to find out the various system
locations, potentially exposed to arc flash hazards. The study is
based on understanding the hazards, calculating the incident
energy values, protecting the equipment and personnel by
reducing the incident energy levels which is a major concern in
industrial facilities that are in the design phase or already in
existence. For this purpose, it is essentially important to
investigate the different system parameters that are influencing
the incident energy levels and then employ arc flash mitigation
techniques accordingly.
This paper attempts to investigate the parameters to which
incident energy is sensitive at large, by modelling and
simulating a small typical network using ETAP software.
Based on the simulated results, different methods to mitigate
the arc flash hazards are also briefly discussed.
The organization of the paper is as described. Section II
presents a mathematical model which helps to calculate the
arcing fault current, incident energy and the boundary distance.
Then in section III, test network is described, modeled and
simulated using the ETAP software. The simulated results are
presented and are discussed in detail, along with different
mitigation methods in section IV, followed by conclusion in
section V.
II. INCIDENT ENERGY CALCULATIONS
To provide the theoretical foundation and background for
the arc flash energy calculation, IEEE standard 1584 acts as an
elaborate reference. It contains the formulations that can be
used to calculate the incident energy in an arc flash event. Once
the power system model is developed with all the required data
defined, the ETAP software can perform the calculations. The
formulations included in IEEE standard 1584 is based on an
empirical method and are true for a system having the
following specifications [10]:
x Voltage level: 208V-15kV.
x Frequency: 50Hz-60Hz.
x Bolted fault current: 700A-106kA.
x Gaps between conductors: 13mm-152mm.
x Three phase faults.
Following equations are used to calculate the arcing fault
current, normalized incident energy, the actual incident energy
and the boundary distance [10]:
log Ia = K + 0.662 log Ibf + 0.0966 V + 0.000526 G
+ 0.5588 V*log Ibf ̶ 0.00304 G*log Ibf (1)
where Ia represents the arcing fault current in kA. K equals
0.153 for open configurations and -0.097 for box
configurations. Ibf represent the bolted fault current in kA. V
and G refers to the system voltage in kV and gap between the
conductors respectively.
Log En = K1 + K2 + 1.081 log Ia + 0.0011 G (2)
where K1 is -0.792 for open configurations and -0.0555 for
box configurations. K2 is taken as 0 for underground and high
resistance grounded system and -0.113 for grounded system.
E = Cf En ( )( ) (3)
where Cf is taken as 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV and 1.5
for voltages at or below 1 kV. t represents the arcing time. D
represents the working distance in mm. x refers to the distance
exponents that are defined in IEEE standard 1584.
(4)
where DB is the boundary distance in mm and EB is the
incident energy value at the boundary in cal/cm2.
III. NETWORK MODELLING AND SIMULATION
Network modelling and simulation is done on the ETAP
software which is an efficient software and a comprehensive
analysis platform for the simulation, design and protection of
the distribution and industrial power systems. Many EPC
companies, consultancies and utilities use ETAP for load flow
study, short circuit study, reliability analysis, harmonic
analysis, arc flash analysis, protection coordination etc. to
determine the safe limits of the system.
The system is supplied by the utility at 13.8 kV with
available short circuit current as 7.949 kA and X/R ratio of 20.
The system is fed through a delta-wye step down transformer
of 3 MVA, supplying a switchgear at 0.48 kV. The switchgear
bus (Swgr) feeds a Motor Control Center (MCC) and a
distribution power panel (Pwr_panel) at 208 V through a delta-
wye transformer of 0.75 MVA. The single line diagram is
shown in Fig 2.
The parameters are set as per IEEE 1584 to model the
system and short circuit study is perform on the test system to
find out the available bolted fault current (Ibf) values at each
bus in order to determine the arcing current (Ia) and incident
energy (E) along with arc flash boundaries (AFB). The results
are mentioned in Table I.
IV. RESULTS
In order to determine the effects of significant parameters that
contributes in the incident energy levels, one parameter at a
time is varied, keeping the remaining unchanged while
performing arc flash analysis. The effects of following four
parameters related to incident energy are examined:
x The gap between conductors or buses (in mm) of the
electrically energized equipment (G) where an arc can
occur.
x The distance of the working personnel (in inches) from
the arc flash source (D).
x The available short circuit current (in kA) from the
utility.
x The time (in sec) required to clear an arcing current (t).
The base value of every parameter is varied by the same
ratio: one-fourth, one-half, twice, quadruple and octuplet to get
a fair enough comparison. The effects of the above mentioned
parameters are analyzed through simulation and results are
tabulated and discussed as follows:
A. Incident energy vs gap between conductors
The base values of gap between conductors for BUS 1,
Swgr, Pwr_panel and MCC are 153 mm, 32 mm, 30 mm and
25 mm respectively. These values are changed with a defined
ratio and the results are simulated for incident energies. The
Table II shows the simulated incident energies of all equipment
or buses with adjustment in gap between conductors. The
incident energies against variation in the gap between
conductors for all buses are plotted in Fig. 3. As the gap
between conductors increases, the incident energy also
increases. Likewise, as the gap decreases, the incident energy
also get reduced showing a direct relation between them.
However, incident energy of Swgr varies to a greater extent
with the variation in gap since its graph is steeper than that of
BUS 1, Pwr_panel and MCC as shown in Fig. 3, implying that
the effect of change in gap has more impact on the incident
energy of the Swgr bus. Additionally, it should be noted that
several of the ranges tested are outside of those recommended
by IEEE 1584 “Equipment and Voltage Class Factors” [10]. It
is to be mentioned here that once the gap between conductors
are set, it is difficult to adjust it to get reduced level of incident
energy. However, other methods can be considered for this
purpose which do not require adjustment in the conductor gaps.

TABLE II. INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT VARRYING GAPS BETWEEN

CONDUCTORS (G)

Incident energy (cal/cm2)

G G G 2G 4G 8G
Bus ID

BUS1 0.543 0.6 0.73 1.071 2.325 6.196

Swgr 13.093 13.361 13.914 15.088 17.744 24.538
Pwr_panel 5.857 5.962 6.19 6.682 7.778 10.541
MCC 4.554 4.636 4.77 5.091 5.778 7.444

Figure. 2 Single line diagram of network

TABLE I. BOLTED FAULT CURRENT, ARCING CURRENT, INCIDENT

ENERGY AND ARC FLASH BOUNDARY

Ibf Ia E AFB
Bus ID (kA) (kA) (cal/cm2) (ft)
BUS1 8.02 7.82 0.73 1.17
Swgr 51.49 24.66 13.91 10.55
Pwr_panel 27.81 8.92 6.11 4.05
MCC 51.49 26.59 4.78 3.48 Figure. 3 Simulated incident energy vs gaps between conductors for all buses.
B. Incident energy vs distance from energized equipment
The base working distance from electrically energized
equipment for BUS 1, Pwr_panel and MCC are 18 inches and
24 inches for Swgr bus. The distances are varied and the results
are simulated. The incident energy against the variation in the
working distances at each bus is tabulated in Table III. Fig. 4
shows the graph between simulated incident energies at
different distances for each bus.
As the working distance from an exposed electrical
equipment gets increased, the incident energy decreases; as the
distance decreases, the incident energy increases showing an
inverse relation between the two.
adjustment in the utility available short circuit current, at each
bus is presented in Table IV, keeping all other parameters
unchanged. Fig. 5 shows the graph between simulated incident
energies at different utility available short circuit current for
each bus.
As the utility available short circuit current gets increased,
the short circuit current level gets increased throughout the
network which increases the arcing current and so the incident
energy. As the utility available short circuit current gets
decreased, it decreases the short circuit current level
throughout the network which reduces the arcing current and
hence incident energy also gets reduced.

Taking in to account the relation between incident energy Although the available short circuit current from the utility
level and the working distance of the worker, methods can be cannot be altered to get reduced incident energy levels, the
employed that allow the working personnel to work with simulated results in the Table IV shows that the reduced
increased distances. Remotely operated devices are available energy levels can still be achieved if short circuit current
from various manufactures for the safe operation of switching limiting methods can be used to reduce short circuit currents
and protection devices. Racking operation of breakers is much within the system at suitable locations. Fault current levels at
hazardous task and major proportion of electrical work related numerous locations in the system can be minimized with
injuries and accidents belong to this type of operation. The current limiting reactors but using current limiting reactors is
remote racking device enables the worker to stand aside and an expensive approach. The best method to reduce fault
the device perform racking function, resulting in reduced current is using the current limiting fuses or circuit breakers
energy due to increased working distance [11]. which functions by good protection schemes like relays
having less time delay, better security, sensitivity and also
with backup protection schemes. A fault current limiter (FCL)
C. Incident energy vs available short circuit current
or triggered current limiter (TCL) limits the fault current in
The network is supplied by the utility at 13.8 kV with 7.949 time and magnitude by operating in ¼ to ½ cycles, rendering
kA as available short circuit current. This short circuit current no resistance to the load current. With the help of fast fault
value is changed as per defined ratio and the results are clearance, the energy is much limited [3].
simulated. The effects on incident energy caused by the
The fault current can also be reduced by avoiding parallel
operation of transformers where possible. Parallel operation
TABLE III. INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT VARRYING WORKING restricts the working between the secondary side of
DISTANCES (W)
transformer and the downstream secondary breaker which is
one of the highest arc flash hazard area. This results due to the
Incident energy (cal/cm2) reason that the primary side breakers sense low value of
current passes through that area and would trip after a long
delay sensing low value of current at that side which results in
W W W 2W 4W 8W
Bus ID high arc flash energy [12].
BUS1 11.631 2.908 0.73 0.182 0.045 0.011
Swgr 107.221 38.625 13.91 5.012 1.806 0.65 D. Incident energy vs time required to clear the fault
Pwr_panel 60.236 19.314 6.11 1.988 0.637 0.204 To find out the effects of the time required by the
MCC 46.482 14.904 4.77 1.532 0.491 0.158 upstream over current protective device (FCT) to clear an
arcing fault, on the incident energy, the base values of them
are varied and the results are simulated. The base values are
0.048 sec, 0.249 sec, 0.208 sec and 0.05 sec for BUS 1, Swgr,
Pwr_panel and MCC respectively. The simulated results are
presented in Table V. Fig 6 shows the graph between different
values of FCTs and corresponding incident energy values of
each bus, tabulated in Table V. It can be observed that the
incident energy values for all buses are directly proportional to
the fault clearing time of their respective upstream protective
devices.
This suggest that if the fault clearing time can be reduced
by revising the protection settings of the devices or by
replacing the existing protective devices with efficient one,
this would result in reduced arc flash energies.
Figure. 4 Simulated incident energy vs distance from energized euipment This is also implemented on the test system under
for all buses
TABLE IV. INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT VARYING AVAILABLE SHORT long time pickup current of 2000 A, short time pickup current
CIRCUIT FROM UTILITY (I)
of 3200 A and instantaneous pickup current value of 6400 A.
With these pickup settings, LVCB_3 clears the associated
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) arcing fault current at Pwr_panel in 0.208 sec. This time can
be reduced by employing an overcurrent relay (excluding the
trip device of LVCB_3) having a wider range for pickup
I I I 2I 4I 8I values to select. The instantaneous pickup value of the OCR is
Bus ID
then set to be as 1600 A, while maintaining the security
BUS1 0.17 0.35 0.73 1.51 3.15 6.58 towards normal load current. As a result, the current values
Swgr 9.14 11.80 13.94 15.37 16.22 16.68
above 1600 A will get tripped instantaneously, causing a
Pwr_panel 5.53 5.9 6.11 6.22 6.28 6.31
MCC 3.10 4.03 4.78 5.29 5.59 5.75 reduced fault clearing time upto 0.066 sec and incident energy
at Pwr_panel reduced to 1.94 cal/cm2 as shown in Fig. 7.
Moreover, it can be noticed that the incident energy at
Swgr is 13.91 cal/cm2 with a fault clearing time of 0.249 sec,
which is substantially a long time to clear the arcing fault
current of 24.66 kA. The upstream protective device LVCB_1
has a solid state type trip device with 2000 A, 40000 A and
36000 A as long time, short time and instantaneous pickup
current values respectively. These settings of pickups are
adjusted and revised while taking care of the coordination
among the protective devices of the system, with 2000 A,
8000 A and 20000 A to be as long time, short time and
instantaneous pickup current values respectively, which
reduces the incident energy up to 3.34 cal/cm2 and fault
clearing time now limited to 0.06 sec as shown in Fig. 8.

Figure. 5 Simulated incident energy vs short circuit current for all buses
consideration. The Pwr_panel has arcing current of 8.92 kA
which is seen as 3.86 kA to the upstream protective device,
installed at the primary side of the TRANSFORMER_2. The
trip device of LVCB_3 is a solid state type trip device with
Furthermore, the digital relays currently available, allow
the time current curve to be custom-fit. This feature is very
useful because it can help to achieve faster clearing time for
fault current while keeping a coordination among devices [13].
Such devices are more flexible in developing settings with

TABLE V. INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT VARYING FCTS OF THE

UPSTREAM PROTECTIVE DEVICES (T)

Incident Energy (cal/cm2)

T T T 2T 4T 8T
Bus ID

BUS1 0.18 0.36 0.72 1.45 2.89 5.79

Swgr 3.47 6.93 13.92 27.85 55.69 111.39
Pwr_panel 1.53 3.05 6.11 12.21 24.42 48.84
MCC 1.15 2.39 4.78 9.56 19.11 38.23

Figure. 7 Reduced incident energy at Pwr_panel

Figure. 8 Reduced incident energy at Swgr

Figure. 6 Simulated incident energy vs fault clearing time for all buses
selective curve shapes and adjustable delays to multiple
instantaneous element. Low arc flash circuit breakers are
manufactured, which can open the contacts within time
intervals comparable to FCLs [14].
V. CONCLUSION
The arc flash events are much hazardous and causes severe
injuries even death to the working personnel. The best strategy
is to de-energize the equipment when possible. To find out the
effects of parameters to which incident energy is sensitive, a
network representative of an industrial facility or electrical
plant was modeled and simulated to determine the effects. The
incident energy has a direct relationship to the gap width. By
increasing the distance from equipment, incident energy
reduces. By increasing utility available short-circuit current,
incident energy increases. As the time increases for each
protective device to clear the arcing fault current, the incident
energy increases showing a direct relationship.
Among the four parameters, the working distance and the
fault clearing time is influencing the incident energies to a
greater extent. In order to mitigate the incident energies,
different methods can be used. More attention is to be given to
such methods that can enhance the working distances and
reduce the fault clearing time.
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Wiley & Sons
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Practices.
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Federal Regulations,” CFR 1910.335, Safeguards for personnel
protection.
[21] NFPA 70-2002, the “National Electrical Code” (NEC).
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The reduction factor of the arc current”, IEEE Transactions on Industry
Applications, 2013. 49(4): p. 1703-1710
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assessments and safety improvements”, Petroleum and Chemical
Industry Technical Conference, 2007. PCIC’07. IEEE.
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calculations: life after arc flash analysis”, IEEE 2007
[26] Rakan El-Mahayni, Jamal Bugshan, and Ritchie Pragale, “Arc-flash
mitigation”, IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, may/june 2017.
[27] Nicolas Bardat, “IEC and CENELEC standards used to protect the
electrical worker against an Arc Flash”, 12th International Conference
on Live Maintenance (ICOLIM) 2017.
[28] Kadri, K. Raahemifar and F. Mohammadi, “Impact of parameter
variation of arc flash on hazard mitigation in low voltage power
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