CONCLUSION

T
he autocrat of the Breakfast Table counsels that when
faced with an interlocutor “too fond of paradox,” one should
“stick a fact into him like a stiletto.” Diffidence prevents me
from claiming that I wield anything so incontestable as a “fact”
with which to puncture the overblown esteem for paradox in reli-
gious discourse. Nevertheless, I do try in this book to offer a defla-
tionary account of religious paradox. Drawing on social scientific
theory and philosophy, I attempt a sober explanation of the reli-
gious fascination with paradox, an explanation that does not itself
wax mystical or affect a misplaced humility in the face of religious
paradox. Indeed, if my approach proves sound, it even helps ex-
plain the scarcely concealed piety afflicting most scholarly discus-
sions of religious paradox. Piety may well be a religious virtue, but
it is the besetting sin of the humanistic study of religion.
In brief summary I have argued a number of points. I have dis-
cussed several prominent religious paradoxes (the paradox of im-
manence and transcendence, the paradox of the absolute maxi-
mum, the paradox of the emptiness of emptiness, the performative
self-contradiction of uttering “All is one”) and argued that nothing
except heavy investment in the doctrines that produce them pre-
vents one from treating the paradoxes as reductiones ad absurdum
on those doctrines. When a religious thinker is too heavily invested
in a paradox-generating doctrine to revise or reject the doctrine,
his social attitudes condition his response to the paradox. Reflect-
ing this basis in social attitudes, different responses to paradox
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 # 108  conclusion

arouse strong affects that suit paradox for projects of religious self-
transformation. Paradox will horrify and offend a religious thinker
fearful for the external boundary of his or her group. Such a thinker
may use the cognitive dissonance and offense aroused by paradox
ascetically to alter his or her volitional complex. Conversely, a
thinker concerned to bring outsiders into his or her group will feel
awe or reverence for paradox and view it as a sacred mediator. The
mystic’s awe or reverence renders the doctrine (e.g., that God is
immanent, that all is one, that everything is empty) motivationally
efficacious. I have also argued that Skeptics, who claim to use con-
tradiction to divest themselves of all belief, misrepresent their
practice. They in fact cultivate a volitional complex that avoids all
cognitive or affective disturbance.
My contention that a thinker’s attitude toward the external
boundary of whatever social group most concerns her correlates
with her response to entrenched paradox is one of my principal
claims. It underlies much of my argument. It bears noting that this
contention is not a conceptual or a priori claim. It’s an empirical
observation based on the cases I examine, and is open to falsifica-
tion by appeal to further examples. Douglas’s work provides the
inspiration to look for the correlation and prompts reflection about
its cause, but my claim that the correlation, in fact, obtains rests on
an empirical basis. My explanation in terms of availability bias is a
hypothesis that attempts to account for the correlation I have
found. Examples that deviate from the pattern I describe, and
whose anomalousness in this respect I cannot suitably explain,
would throw my argument into disarray. Potential counterexam-
ples must be carefully vetted, however, because, if my hypothesis is
correct and availability bias explains the correlation, we can expect
that the tendency toward bias will be disrupted in some circum-
stances. Cognitive bias can be corrected or defeated by other cog-
nitive factors in a given instance. My deflationary intentions de-
pend on this very capacity to rectify cognitive bias. That some
individuals in some circumstances do not (for one reason or an-
other) fall victim to subjective sample bias does not, however, ne-
gate the fact that humans have a tendency to make judgments on
the basis of subjectively biased samples.
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 conclusion # 109 

My conclusions in this book may be most pertinent to the phi-

losophy of mysticism. Most philosophical discussion of mysticism
begins with a consideration of the phenomenology of mystical ex-
perience. What do the descriptions of mystical experiences tell us
about their felt quality? Does the peculiar felt quality of these expe-
riences safeguard (or, more modestly, support) the claims mystics
make on their behalf? What does the human susceptibility to these
altered states contribute to our best account of the cosmos? By
contrast I have emphasized that altered states of consciousness are
incidental to mysticism, and that when analyzing mystical experi-
ence one must attend to the cognitive commitments that compose
the intentionality of the experience. Whatever cognitive import
mystical experience might have, the mystic invests it in a merely
physiological capacity for altered states of consciousness. She does
not derive the cognitive import from the consciousness.
Sometime in the early twentieth century, philosophers turned to
language as the most fruitful avenue of philosophical inquiry. They
diverted their attention from the phenomenological constituents
of consciousness and focused on language as the key to under-
standing the human condition. Likewise, I am suggesting that phi-
losophers of mysticism divert their attention from the phenome-
nology of mystical states of consciousness and instead focus on the
logic and language of the paradoxes that inform mysticism. In
short, I urge the philosophy of mysticism to make the linguistic
turn. Such a turn better enables us to understand mystical reports
and explain why mystics describe their experiences as they do. By
giving us access to the ideas and inferences informing mystical ex-
perience, moreover, the linguistic turn I advocate provides the
critical purchase to deflate the cognitive claims made on behalf of
mystical experience. The linguistic turn does not by itself do any
deflationary work, but it locates mystical experience squarely
within the space of reasons, where philosophical criticism and so-
cial scientific theory can be brought to bear.
At risk of grandiosity, I justify my purpose in deflating religious
paradox by appealing to the ever unfinished Enlightenment proj-
ect of human emancipation. The Enlightenment and its legacy are
highly controversial, but one (admittedly, some would say naive)
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 # 110  conclusion

way of conceiving the Enlightenment sees its central motivation as

enlarging the scope of human freedom. Understanding ourselves
and the causes that impinge on us emancipates us from blind cau-
sality. Bearing that self-knowledge, we can take a more active
stance with regard to ourselves, our attitudes, and our behavior. In
that spirit I contend that understanding the causes that drive the
inflation of religious paradox enlarges the scope of our freedom.

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