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Chapter 14 - Monopoly
CHAPTER 14
MONOPOLY
Chapter Overview
Monopolies can use their market power to hold price above the level that would prevail in a
competitive market. By doing so, they turn consumer surplus into positive economic profits and
reduce total social welfare. This poses a tricky problem for policy-makers, who want to regulate
or break up monopolies to increase social welfare. Practically speaking, it can be difficult to
accomplish this goal without causing more inefficiency. Policies designed to address the
problems associated with monopolies run the risk of setting prices at the wrong level or raising
costs by breaking up a natural monopoly.
This difficult situation is complicated further by the fact that few firms are truly perfect
monopolies. Instead, many markets include firms with some degree of market power, ranging
on the spectrum from perfect monopoly to perfect competition. We can call markets in this
range “imperfectly competitive.” It turns out that small differences in the structure of
imperfectly competitive markets can make big differences in how firms behave; those
differences can give policy-makers headaches. In the next chapter, we’ll take a close look at two
specific varieties of imperfect competition.
Learning Objectives
LO 14.1: List four barriers to entry into monopoly markets.

LO 14.2: Explain why a monopolist is constrained by demand.
LO 14.3: Calculate the profit-maximizing production price and quantity for a monopolist.
LO 14.4: Calculate the loss in total social welfare associated with a monopoly.
LO 14.5: Describe the pros and cons of common public policy responses to monopoly.
LO 14.6: Explain why a firm has an incentive to use price discrimination when possible.
Chapter Outline
DIAMONDS WEREN’T ALWAYS FOREVER

Why Do Monopolies Exist?
Barriers to Entry (LO 14.1)
BOX FEATURE: REAL LIFE – CHINA’S RARE EARTH
How Monopolies Work
Monopolists and the Demand Curve (LO 14.2)
Monopoly Revenue (LO 14.3)
Problems with Monopoly and Public Policy Solutions
The Welfare Costs of Monopoly (LO 14.4)
BOX FEATURE: FROM ANOTHER ANGLE – POOR MONOPOLISTS
14-1
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill
Education.
Public Policy Responses (LO 14.5)

BOX FEATURE: REAL LIFE – ROCKERS VS. TICKETMASTER
Market Power and Price Discrimination
What Is Price Discrimination? (LO 14.6)
BOX FEATURE: FROM ANOTHER ANGLE – RICKSHAW RIDES: PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Beyond the Lecture
Class Discussion: Barriers to Entry (LO 14.1)

In order to highlight monopoly behavior and entry barriers, consider showing a clip from the TV
show The Simpsons. Show students the segment 10:20-14:30 of the episode Who Shot Mr.
Burns? Part I. In this episode, Mr. Burns is trying to monopolize the power industry by blocking
the sun.
1. Are there any substitutes for electricity?
2. What are the entry barriers to supplying electricity?
Class Discussion: Barriers to Entry (LO 14.1)

Consider discussing New York City taxis. To limit the number of drivers, the city requires the
purchase of a very expensive medallion, which acts as a barrier to entry into the cab market.
However, the new firms Uber and Lyft continue to expand and take market share away from
traditional cabs. Taxi cab unions are fighting Uber and Lyft, often trying to get the programs
removed from the city. See this article for some more information. There is an embedded
video on the page as well.
1. Why would the taxi system require a medallion? How does it create an entry barrier?
2. Why would cab drivers want to eliminate Uber and Lyft from the city?
Writing Assignment/Class Discussion: The Welfare Costs of Monopoly and Public Policy
Responses (LO 14.4, LO 14.5)
Consider discussing the FTC case against Whole Foods in order to highlight potential welfare
losses of monopoly and potential public policy responses. This case is particularly interesting as
the FTC viewed Whole Foods as dominating a relatively narrow market. Not everyone agrees
with the policy response; you can find an argument that it was unjustified here. Students can be
asked to write a short essay either supporting or disagreeing with the decision to use public
policy in this case.
Class Discussion: What Is Price Discrimination? (LO 14.6)

Have students read this blog post about airline price discrimination. It is an interesting subject.
You can tell your students that on a flight with 100 people, there very well may have been 100
different prices for those tickets sold!
1. How do airlines use price discrimination?
2. What generally happens to the price of flights as the flight date approaches?
3. What are the conditions necessary for price discrimination to occur?
14-2
Education.
Clicker Questions
There are three main purposes to clicker questions. First, they are a great way to do a quick
and instant “on demand” test of student understanding of the material. You can cover
material, and instantly get feedback on student comprehension. You can see whether you need
to explain certain topics again, or move on to the next subject. Second, they are a great
method to break up the class and take a moment away from lecture. It gets the students
actively involved. Finally, certain clicker questions can be framed in a “discussion” manner, in
which you can invite students to talk about the possible right answer with their peers. You can
instruct students to convince their classmate of a right or wrong answer.
1. Why would the government purposefully create an entry barrier by granting patents to
firms? [LO 14.1]
A. We don’t want all markets to be competitive
B. Patented products tend to stimulate the economy more than unpatented products
C. We want to incentivize innovation and the invention of new products
D. Patents generally lower the prices of goods
Feedback: Without patents and copyrights, many new goods wouldn’t have been created at
all!
2. As the only seller, why doesn’t a monopoly have face a vertical demand curve? [LO 14.2]
A. Not everyone is aware of the monopoly firm and the product it sells
B. The monopolist can charge any price it wants, and people will pay the price
C. At very high prices, the government will remove entry barriers
D. There may still be some substitute, even if it’s not that close of a substitute
Feedback: Example: Maybe there is only one movie theater in town. They still can’t charge
$50 per ticket. People would go miniature golfing instead, or stay home and watch TV.
3. When total revenue is maximized, what is true about marginal revenue (MR)? [LO 14.3]
A. MR > 0
B. MR < 0
C. MR = 0 and is increasing
D. MR = 0 and is decreasing
4. Why are monopolies generally undesirable according to economic theory? [LO 14.4]
A. Deadweight loss exists in the market (compared to perfect competition)
B. More competition always reduces costs of production
C. The monopoly produces too much output
D. Consumer surplus increase too much with monopolies
5. What will be the most effective (profitable) example of price discrimination? [LO 14.6]
14-3
Education.
A. A restaurant charges higher prices for kids and lower prices for adults
B. A software company charges full price to faculty but gives a discount to students
C. The movie theater charges senior citizens a higher price than middle-aged adults
D. A car dealer sells vehicles to veterans at a higher price
Feedback: Remember that we’d want to charge a higher price to the relatively inelastic group.
This would be the group that has higher incomes and is willing to pay more for the good.
Solutions to End-of-Chapter Questions and Problems
Review Questions
1. If competition places discipline on costs, motivating firms to innovate and find more cost-
effective ways to produce, explain why in some markets a single firm without competitors will
produce at a lower cost than if the firm faced competition. [LO 14.1]
Answer: If a firm faces economies of scale, the more output it produces, the more it lowers
its average total costs. Sometimes, economies of scale are so large that they exist for the
entire range of the demand curve. If this is the case, a single producer will be able to
achieve lower costs than would be possible if production were split among several
producers.
2. Suppose a city has a chain of fitness centers (gyms) all owned by the same company, Fit
Fun. A new company is considering opening a gym in the city. Give an example of an aggressive
tactic Fit Fun might take to maintain its monopoly. [LO 14.1]
Answer: One possible tactic might be temporarily cutting prices. Fit Fun could slash
membership prices low enough to make it impossible for a new gym to compete. Large
firms and chains will sometimes accept temporary losses to fend off entry by smaller
competitors.
3. Suppose that De Beers and the local water utility are both monopolists, in the markets for
diamond jewelry and water, respectively. If both monopolies decided to raise prices 15 percent,
which monopoly would be more likely to see its total revenue decrease? Why? [LO 14.2]
Answer: De Beers would be more likely to see total revenue decrease as a result of
increasing prices. Diamonds are a luxury good, whereas water is a necessity. Recall that
when a good is elastically demanded, raising prices will cause total revenues to fall.
4. Suppose that a producer in a previously competitive market is granted the sole right to
produce in the market. Given that demand in the market is unchanged but now all consumers
must purchase from the same producer, why might the new monopolist produce less than the
quantity that was produced when the market was competitive? [LO 14.2]
14-4
Education.
Answer: When the market was competitive, producers were price takers. For each
producer, the profit-maximizing choice was to produce all output for which the market price
was greater than or equal to his marginal costs. As a monopolist, however, the producer will
raise his profit by reducing output below the efficient level. The monopolist will still choose
the output quantity where MR = MC, but this will occur at a lower output than the quantity
that would be produced in perfect competition.
5. Suppose that an inventor discovers a new chemical compound that can change the color of
people’s eyes with no negative side effects. Since she holds a patent on this chemical, she has a
monopoly over the sale of the new eye-color treatment. However, she’s an inventor, not a
businessperson. Explain to her how she should set the price for the eye-color treatment in
order to maximize her profits. [LO 14.3]
Answer: The inventor will need to know the demand for her product at different prices.
Once she has estimated the demand curve, she should produce all units for which the
marginal revenue she would receive on the unit is greater than or equal to the marginal
cost to produce that unit. This will be her profit-maximizing quantity. Once she knows the
quantity that will maximize her profits, she should sell this quantity for the highest price
that demand will bear. She can get this price from her estimated demand curve.
6. Suppose a monopolist has to purchase new equipment and his fixed costs increase. Explain
what will happen to the monopolist’s profit-maximizing output quantity and the monopolist’s
profits. [LO 14.3]
Answer: The profit-maximizing output quantity will not change. The profit-maximizing
quantity is where MR = MC. A change in fixed costs will not affect MR or MC. The increase in
fixed cost, however, will decrease the monopolist’s profit, as profit is determined by TR − TC
and TC includes fixed costs.
7. Until the 1980s, AT&T held a monopoly over the national market for phone services.
Suppose that AT&T argued that it was a natural monopoly because the fixed cost of creating a
nationwide phone network generated huge economies of scale, and that there was therefore
no welfare loss associated with its monopoly. Counter this argument by explaining how even a
natural monopoly causes deadweight loss. [LO 14.4]
Answer: If AT&T is a natural monopoly, it does make sense for it to be the sole provider of
phone services due to its large economies of scale. However, if AT&T is not regulated, it will
maximize its profits by producing a quantity that is less than the efficient quantity and by
charging a price that is less than the efficient price. There is no reason to believe that AT&T
will choose an efficient outcome rather than a profit-maximizing outcome.
14-5
Education.
8. Suppose you are advising a mayoral candidate in your town. The candidate’s platform
includes strong opposition to monopoly suppliers because consumer welfare is compromised
by monopoly pricing. Present your candidate with an alternative view about why it may make
sense to tolerate the existence of some monopoly firms. [LO 14.4]
Answer: Monopolies do reduce consumer surplus by producing less and charging more than
the outcomes that would occur in a competitive market, but at times it makes sense to
sacrifice some efficiency. For example, there are some goods that may not exist if it were
not for the monopoly profits that a patent ensures to create incentives for research and
development. And for some goods, it may even make more sense for a good to be provided
by a monopolist rather than by multiple producers, as when there are very large fixed costs
in production.
9. Suppose that your state is considering a law that would force all monopolies to charge no
more than their average total costs of production. Explain to your legislator the pros and cons
of this approach. [LO 14.5]
Answer: Under this pricing regulation, the monopolist would make a normal rate of return
(zero economic profit) and could stay in business. Compared to monopoly pricing, charging
a price equal to ATC will reduce deadweight loss. On the downside, it is very difficult for
government to know the true costs of production such that it can accurately regulate price.
Regulating price to equal ATC also removes the incentive for the firm to find innovative
ways to reduce costs. If the firm reduces its ATC, the government will just lower the price to
match the new ATC. This is great for consumers, but the firm has no incentive to invest in
cost-saving innovation.
10. Suppose that your state is considering a law that would force all monopolies to charge the
efficient price that would prevail if the market were competitive. Explain to your legislator why
the state will have to subsidize natural monopolies if this law goes into effect. [LO 14.5]
Answer: The defining characteristic of a natural monopoly is that economies of scale are so
large that ATC is falling for the entire range of demand. Recall that if ATC is falling, MC must
be below it. (MC crosses ATC at the minimum of ATC.) If price is set at the efficient level,
price will equal MC. Given that MC is necessarily below ATC for a natural monopoly, this will
mean negative profit. Therefore, if a natural monopolist is forced to charge the efficient
price, it will go out of business without a subsidy.
11. Suppose a small town has one theater for live performances and several restaurants,
including one Indian restaurant. Will it be easier for the theater or for the Indian restaurant to
price discriminate? [LO 14.6]
Answer: It will be easier for the theater to price-discriminate than for the restaurant to do
so. Price discrimination is more successful when there is more market power. There may be
no or few good substitutes for the only live theater venue in town. Although there may only
14-6
Education.
be one Indian restaurant, there are likely substitutes in the form of other restaurants. It
would also be harder for the Indian restaurant to prevent side trades and resale to other
customers, especially if the restaurant has a take-out service. Customers who had access to
a discount could purchase food for those who do not have access to the discount.
12. Suppose a museum charges different entrance fees for children, students, adults, and
seniors, but these groups all pay the same amount for souvenirs at the gift shop. Explain why
the museum price discriminates on admission but not souvenirs. [LO 14.6]
Answer: It is easy to distinguish between children, students, adults, and seniors when
collecting entrance fees. However, price discrimination would be undermined at the
souvenir shop. If children are given a discount and adults are not, adults can get children to
buy their souvenirs for them.
Problems and Applications
1. The U.S. Postal Services maintains a monopoly on mail delivery in part through its exclusive
right to access customer mail-boxes. Which barrier to entry best describes this situation: scarce
resources, economies of scale, government intervention, or aggressive tactics? [LO 14.1]
Answer: The entry barrier that best describes the situation is government intervention: The
United States Postal Service is granted exclusive access to mailboxes by Congress.
2. Which (if any) of the following scenarios is the result of a natural monopoly? [LO 14.1]
a. Patent holders of genetically modified seeds are permitted to sue farmers who save seeds
from one planting season to the next.
b. Doctors in the United States are prohibited from practicing without a medical license.
c. There is one train operator with service from Baltimore to Philadelphia.
d. Coal is used as the primary energy in a country with abundant coal deposits.
Answer: c. Railroads have large fixed costs. Economies of scale suggest that it does not
make sense to lay multiple track routes to the same destination.
3. Due to arduous certification requirements, Nature’s Crunch is currently the only certified
organic produce grower in a region that produces lots of nonorganic produce alternatives. From
a profit-maximizing perspective, would it be better for Nature’s Crunch to lobby the
government to relax organic certification requirements or to require grocery stores to clearly
label its produce as organic? [LO 14.2]
Answer: Nature’s Crunch would not want the government to relax organic certification
requirements because doing so would create competition. As the only certified organic
grower, Nature’s Crunch has a regional monopoly on selling organic produce. Nature’s
Crunch would be better off lobbying the government to require that certified organic
produce be clearly labeled in grocery stores so that consumers can easily identify it.
14-7
Education.
4. Nature’s Crunch is currently the only certified organic produce grower in a region that
produces lots of nonorganic produce alternatives. To be certified organic, a producer cannot
use chemical pesticides. Which of the following scenarios would increase Nature’s Crunch’s
profits? Check all that apply. [LO 14.2]
a. A tomato blight affecting chemically treated plants.
b. An increase in the cost of chemical pesticides.
c. A new report about the environmental dangers of chemically treated plants.
d. Income tax cuts for all consumers.
e. A new report showing that there is no nutritional difference between organic and non-
organic produce.
Answer: a, b, c, and d.
A tomato blight affecting chemically treated plants: Supply of nonorganic produce
decreases, raising its price, and demand for organic produce increases.
An increase in the cost of chemical pesticides: Due to an increase in production costs,

supply of nonorganic produce decreases, raising its price, and demand for organic
produce increases.
A new report about the environmental dangers of chemically treated plants: Demand for
nonorganic produce decreases, and demand for organic produce increases.
Income tax cuts for all consumers: Incomes increase, and demand for normal goods (organic
produce) increases.
14-8
Education.
5. Table 14P-1 presents the demand schedule and marginal costs facing a monopolist
producer. [LO 14.3]
a. Fill in the total revenue and marginal revenue columns.
b. What is the profit-maximizing level of output?
c. What price will the monopolist charge for the quantity in part b?
Answer:
a.
Q P TR MR MC
($) ($) ($) ($)
0 10 0
9 --
1 9 9
7 2
2 8 16
5 2
3 7 21
3 2
4 6 24
1 2
5 5 25
-1 2
6 4 24
-3 2
7 3 21
-5 2
8 2 16
-7 2
9 1 9
-9 2
10 0 0
b. The profit-maximizing decision rule is to increase production as long as MR is > or = MC.

This monopolist should produce 4 units. The marginal revenue of increasing production to 4
units is $3, while the marginal cost is $2, so it makes sense to produce the fourth unit.
However, the marginal revenue of increasing to 5 units is $1, while the marginal cost is $2.
The monopolist should not increase to 5 units.
c. The monopolist will charge the highest price consumers are willing to pay for 4 units,
which is $6 per unit.
14-9
Education.
6. Table 14P-2 presents the demand schedule and marginal costs facing a monopolist
producer. [LO 14.3]
a. Fill in the total revenue and marginal revenue columns.
b. What is the profit-maximizing level of output?
c. What price will the monopolist charge for the quantity in part b?
Answer:
a.
Q P TR MR MC
($) ($) ($) ($)
0 8 0
7 1
1 7 7
5 2
2 6 12
3 3
3 5 15
1 4
4 4 16
-1 5
5 3 15
-3 6
6 2 12
-5 7
7 1 7
-7 8
8 0 0
b. The profit-maximizing decision rule is to increase production as long as MR is > or = MC.
This monopolist should produce 3 units. The marginal revenue of increasing production to 3
units is $3, and the marginal cost is $3, so it makes sense to produce the third unit.
However, the marginal revenue of increasing to 4 units is $1, while the marginal cost is $4.
The monopolist should not increase to 4 units.
c. The monopolist will charge the highest price that consumers are willing to pay for 3
units, which is $5 per unit.
14-10
Education.
7. Figure 14P-1 presents the demand curve, marginal revenue, and marginal costs facing a
monopolist producer. [LO 14.3, 14.4]
a. What is the profit-maximizing level of output?
b. What price will the monopolist charge for the quantity in part a?
c. Plot the profit-maximizing price and quantity from parts a and b on the graph.
d. What are the efficiency costs (deadweight loss) of monopoly output/pricing? Provide a
numerical answer and illustrate this area on the graph.
e. What is consumer surplus under monopoly output/pricing? Illustrate this area on the graph.
Answer:
a. The profit-maximizing level of output is 4, because this is where MR = MC.
b. The monopolist will charge $12, because the demand curve shows this is the highest
willing to pay for a quantity of 4.
c.
d. DWL = 0.5(12-6)(8-4) = $12 and represents the lost surplus from the monopolist
producing less than the efficient quantity and charging more than the efficient price.
e. Consumer surplus is 0.5(18-12)(4) = $12.
14-11
Education.
8. Figure 14P-2 presents the demand curve, marginal revenue, and marginal costs facing a
monopolist producer. [LO 14.3, 14.4]
a. What is the profit-maximizing level of output?
b. What price will the monopolist charge for the quantity in part a?
c. What are the efficiency costs (deadweight loss) of monopoly output/pricing? Provide a
numerical answer and illustrate this area on the graph.
d. What is consumer surplus under monopoly output/pricing? Illustrate this area on the graph.
e. What is the loss of consumer surplus under monopoly outcomes versus efficient out-
comes? Provide a numerical answer.
Answer:
a. The profit-maximizing level of output is 3, because this is where MR = MC.

b. The monopolist will charge $35, because the demand curve shows this is the highest
willingness to pay for a quantity of 4.
c. DWL = 0.5(4.5 − 3)(35 − 20) = $11.25 and represents the lost surplus from the
monopolist producing less than the efficient quantity and charging more than the efficient
price.
d. Consumer surplus is ($50 - $35) × 0.5 × 3 = $22.50.
e. In this example, the efficient price is $27.50, which is the price at which supply (MC) and
demand intersect. Under efficient outcomes, consumer surplus is the area under the
demand curve and above $27.50. This is equal to 0.5(4.5 − 0)(50 − 27.5) = $50.63. Under
monopoly outcomes, consumer surplus the area under the demand curve and above the
monopoly price of $35, which is equal to 0.5(3 − 0)(50 − 35) = $22.50. Therefore, the loss of
consumer surplus under monopoly outcomes versus efficient outcomes is $50.63 − $22.5 =
$28.13.
14-12
Education.
9. Figure 14P-3 presents the demand curve, marginal revenue, marginal costs, and average
total costs facing a monopolist producer. [LO 14.5]
a. Plot the profit-maximizing price and quantity on the graph.
b. Under monopoly pricing, are profits positive, negative, or zero?
c. Draw the deadweight loss under monopoly pricing.
d. If government mandates P = ATC, are profits positive, negative, or zero? Compared to
monopoly pricing, is deadweight loss smaller, larger, or the same size?
e. If government mandates efficient pricing, are profits positive, negative, or zero? Compared to
monopoly pricing, is deadweight loss under efficient pricing smaller, larger, or the same
size? Compared to a mandate where P = ATC, is deadweight loss under efficient pricing smaller,
larger, or the same size?
f. Is this a natural monopoly?
Answer:
a. The profit-maximizing level of output is 4 because this is where MR = MC. The monopolist
will charge $30 because the demand curve shows this is the highest willingness to pay for a
quantity of 4.
b. Positive: Price exceeds average total cost at Q=4.
c. DWL = 0.5(30-10)(8-4) = $40 and represents the lost surplus from the monopolist
producing less than the efficient quantity and charging more than the efficient price.
d. Zero: When price equals average total cost, there is zero economic profit. Deadweight
loss will be smaller because the quantity is closer to the efficient quantity
e. Negative: MC is everywhere < ATC for the range of demand, so at the efficient price
where P = MC, profits are negative. Deadweight loss will be smallest in this case because
there is no deadweight loss at the efficient quantity.
f. Yes: There are economies of scale, and ATC is falling for the entire range of the demand
curve.
14-13
Education.
10. Use Figure 14P-4 to answer the following questions. [LO 14.5]
a. If this monopolist were regulated, would it prefer average total cost pricing (P = ATC) or
efficient pricing?
b. Is this a natural monopoly?
Answer:
a. This monopolist would prefer the efficient price. The efficient price (where supply MC =
demand) is higher than ATC, so profits would still be positive.
b. No. The defining characteristic of a natural monopoly is that it has economies of scale so
large that ATC is falling for the entire range of the demand curve.
11. Suppose a monopolist discovers a way to perfectly price-discriminate. What is consumer

surplus under this scenario? What are the efficiency costs? [LO 14.6]
Answer: If a monopolist discovers a way to perfectly price-discriminate, consumer surplus is

zero because each consumer is paying exactly her willingness to pay. There are no efficiency
costs. The monopolist will make all trades for which the consumer willingness to pay is
greater than or equal to its marginal costs. Therefore, all efficient trades will occur.
12. Suppose there are three types of consumers who attend concerts at your university’s
performing arts center: students, staff, and faculty. Each of these groups has a different
willingness to pay for tickets; within each group, willingness to pay is identical. There is a fixed
cost of $1,000 to put on a concert, but there are essentially no variable costs. For each concert
there are 140 students willing to pay $20, 200 staff members willing to pay $35, and 100 faculty
members willing to pay $50. [LO 14.6]
a. If the performing arts center can charge only one price, what price should it charge?
b. What are profits at this price?
c. If the performing arts center can price discriminate and charge two prices, one for students
and another for faculty/staff, what are its profits?
d. If the performing arts center can perfectly price discriminate and charge students, staff, and
faculty three separate prices, what are its profits?
Answer:
a. If the performing arts center can charge only one price, it should charge $35. At this
price, both staff and faculty will purchase. Total revenue will be highest at 300($35) =
$10,500. If the performing arts center charged $50, only faculty would purchase for a total
revenue of 100($50) = $5,000. If the performing arts center charged $20, everyone
(students, staff, and faculty) would purchase, but total revenue would be 440($20) =
$8,800. Revenues are highest when the price is $35.
b. Profit = TR – TC.
Profit = 300 (35) − $1,000.
Profit = $10,500 − $1,000.
Profit = $9,500.
c. Students: 140 ($20) = $2,800.
14-14
Education.
Faculty/Staff: 300 ($35) = $10,500.

TR: $2,800 + $10,500 = $13,300.
Profit = $13,300 − $1,000 = $12,300.
d. Students: 140 ($20) = $2,800.
Staff: 200($35) = $7,000.
Faculty: 100($50) = $5,000.
TR: $2,800 + $7,000 + $5,000.
Profit: $14,800 − $1,000 = $13,800.
14-15
Education.
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Title: The end of the house of Alard
Author: Sheila Kaye-Smith
Release date: July 11, 2022 [eBook #68503]
Language: English
Original publication: United States: E. P. Dutton, 1923
Credits: Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file
was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE END OF

THE HOUSE OF ALARD ***
Transcriber’s Note:
The cover image was created by the transcriber
and is placed in the public domain.
THE END OF
THE HOUSE OF ALARD
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
Tamarisk Town
Joanna Godden
Green Apple Harvest
The Challenge to Sirius
The Four Roads
The Tramping Methodist
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

THE END OF THE HOUSE OF
ALARD
BY
SHEILA KAYE-SMITH
AUTHOR OF “JOANNA GODDEN,” ETC.
“We only know that the last sad squires ride slowly towards the sea,
And a new people takes the land....”
—G. K. Chesterton.
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
681 FIFTH AVENUE
Copyright, 1923
BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
All Rights Reserved
First printing Aug., 1923

Second „ Nov., 1923
Third-Sixth printing Dec., 1923
Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS
PART ONE
PAGE
Conster Manor 1
PART TWO
Leasan Parsonage 79
PART THREE
Fourhouses 145
PART FOUR
Starvecrow 237
PART I
CONSTER MANOR
THE END OF THE HOUSE
OF ALARD
PART I
CONSTER MANOR
§1
There are Alards buried in Winchelsea church—they lie in the
south aisle on their altar tombs, with lions at their feet. At least one
of them went to the Crusades and lies there cross-legged—the first
Gervase Alard, Admiral of the Cinque Ports and Bailiff of
Winchelsea, a man of mighty stature.
Those were the days just after the Great Storm, when the sea
swallowed up the first parish of St. Thomas à Becket, and King
Edward laid out a new town on the hoke above Bukenie. The Alards
then were powerful on the marsh, rivals of De Icklesham and fighters
of the Abbot of Fécamps. They were ship-owners, too, and sent out to
sea St. Peter, Nostre Dame and La Nave Dieu. Stephen Alard held
half a knight’s fee in the manors of Stonelink, Broomhill and
Coghurst, while William Alard lost thirty sailors, thirty sergeants-at-
arms, and anchors and ropes, in Gascony.
In the fifteenth century the family had begun to dwindle—its
power was passing into the hands of the Oxenbridges, who, when the
heiress of the main line married an Oxenbridge, adopted the Alard
arms, the lion within a border charged with scallop shells. Thus the
trunk ended, but a branch of the William Alards had settled early in
the sixteenth century at Conster Manor, near the village of Leasan,
about eight miles from Winchelsea. Their shield was argent, three
bars gules, on a canton azure a leopard’s head or.
Peter Alard re-built Conster in Queen Elizabeth’s day, making it
what it is now, a stone house with three hipped gables and a huge red
sprawl of roof. It stands on the hill between Brede Eye and Horns
Cross, looking down into the valley of the river Tillingham, with
Doucegrove Farm, Glasseye Farm and Starvecrow Farm standing
against the woods beyond.
The Alards became baronets under Charles the First, for the
Stephen Alard of that day was a gentleman of the bedchamber, and
melted down the Alard plate in the King’s lost cause. Cromwell
deprived the family of their lands, but they came back at the
Restoration, slightly Frenchified and intermarried with the Papist.
They were nearly in trouble again when Dutch William was King, for
Gervase Alard, a son in orders, became a non-juror and was expelled
from the family living of Leasan, though a charge of sedition brought
against him collapsed from lack of substance.
Hitherto, though ancient and honourable, the Alards had never
been rich, but during the eighteenth century, successful dealings
with the East India Company brought them wealth. It was then that
they began to buy land. They were no longer content to look across
the stream at Doucegrove, Glasseye and Starvecrow, in the hands of
yeomen, but one by one these farms must needs become part of their
estate. They also bought all the fine woodlands of the Furnace, the
farms of Winterland and Ellenwhorne at the Ewhurst end of the
Tillingham valley, and Barline, Float and Dinglesden on the marshes
towards Rye. They were now big landowners, but their land-hunger
was still unsatisfied—Sir William, the Victorian baronet, bought
grazings as far away as Stonelink, so that when his son John
succeeded him the Alards of Conster owned most of the land
between Rye and Ewhurst, the Kent Ditch and the Brede river.
John Alard was about thirty years old when he began to reign. He
had spent most of his grown-up life in London-the London of gas
and crinolines, Disraeli and Nellie Farren, Tattersalls and Caves of
Harmony. He had passed for a buck in Victorian society, with its
corruption hidden under outward decorum, its romance smothered
under ugly riches in stuffy drawing-rooms. But when the call came to
him he valiantly settled down. In Grosvenor Square they spoke of
him behind their fans as a young man who had sown his wild oats
and was now an eligible husband for the innocent Lucy Kenyon with
her sloping shoulders and vacant eyes. He married her as his duty
and begat sons and daughters.
He also bought more land, and under him the Alard estates crept
over the Brede River and up Snailham hill towards Guestling Thorn.
But that was only at the beginning of his squireship. One or two
investments turned out badly, and he was forced to a standstill. Then
came the bad days of the landowners. Lower and lower dropped the
price of land and the price of wheat, hop-substitutes became an
electioneering cry in the Rye division of Sussex and the noble
gardens by the river Tillingham went fallow. Then came Lloyd
George’s Land Act—the rush to the market, the impossibility of sale.
Finally the European war of 1914 swept away the little of the Alard
substance that was left. They found themselves in possession of a
huge ramshackle estate, heavily mortgaged, crushingly taxed.
Sir John had four sons—Hugh, Peter, George and Gervase—and
three daughters, Doris, Mary and Janet. Hugh and Peter both went
out to fight, and Hugh never came back. George, following a tradition
which had ruled in the family since the days of the non-juring
Gervase, held the living of Leasan. Gervase at the outbreak of
hostilities was only in his second term at Winchester, being nearly
eighteen years younger than his brother George.
Of the girls, only Mary was married, though Doris hinted at a
number of suitors rejected because of their unworthiness to mate
with Alard. Jenny was ten years younger than Mary—she and
Gervase came apart from the rest of the family, children of middle
age and the last of love.
§2
A few days before Christmas in the year 1918, most of the Alards
were gathered together in the drawing-room at Conster, to welcome
Peter the heir. He had been demobilised a month after the Armistice
and was now expected home, to take on himself the work of the
estate in the place of his brother Hugh. The Alards employed an
agent, and there were also bailiffs on one or two of the farms, but the
heir’s presence was badly needed in these difficult days. Sir John
held the authority, and the keenness of his interest was in no wise
diminished by his age; but he was an old man, nearly seventy-five,
and honourably afflicted with the gout. He could only seldom ride on
his grey horse from farm to farm, snarling at the bailiff or the
stockman, winking at the chicken girl—even to drive out in his heavy
Wolsey car gave him chills. So most days he sat at home, and the
work was done by him indeed, but as it were by current conducted
through the wires of obedient sons and servants.
This afternoon he sat by the fire in the last patch of sunlight, which
his wife hankered to have shut off from the damasked armchair.
“It really is a shame to run any risks with that beautiful colour,”
she murmured from the sofa. “You know it hasn’t been back from
Hampton’s a week, and it’s such very expensive stuff.”
“Why did you choose it?” snarled Sir John.
“Well, it was the best—we’ve always had the best.”
“Next time you can try the second best as a new experience.”
“Your father really is hopeless,” said Lady Alard in a loud whisper
to her daughter Doris.
“Sh-sh-sh,” said Doris, equally loud.
“Very poor as an aside, both of you,” said Sir John.
The Reverend George Alard coughed as a preliminary to changing
the conversation.
“Our Christmas roses are better than ever this year,” he intoned.
His wife alone supported him.
“They’ll come in beautifully for the Christmas decorations—I hope
there’s enough to go round the font.”
“I’d thought of them on the screen, my dear.”
“Oh no! Christmas roses are so appropriate to the font, and
besides”—archly—“Sir John will let us have some flowers out of the
greenhouse for the screen.”
“I’m damned if I will.”
Rose Alard flushed at the insult to her husband’s cloth which she
held to lie in the oath; none the less she stuck to her coaxing.
“Oh, but you always have, Sir John.”
“Have I?—Well, as I’ve just told my wife, there’s nothing like a new
experience. I don’t keep three gardeners just to decorate Leasan
church, and the flowers happen to be rather scarce this year. I want
them for the house.”
“Isn’t he terrible?” Lady Alard’s whispered moan to Doris once
more filled the room.
Jenny laughed.
“What are you laughing at, Jenny?”
“Oh, I dunno.”
She was laughing because she wondered if there was anything she
could say which would not lead to a squabble.
“Perhaps Gervase will come by the same train as Peter,” she
ventured.
“Gervase never let us know when to expect him,” said her mother.
“He’s very thoughtless. Now perhaps Appleby will have to make the
journey twice.”
“It won’t kill Appleby if he does—he hasn’t had the car out all this
week.”
“But Gervase is very thoughtless,” said Mrs. George Alard.
At that moment a slide of wheels was heard in the drive, and the
faint sounds of a car coming to anchor.
“Peter!” cried Lady Alard.
“He’s been quick,” said Doris.
George pulled out his watch to be sure about the time, and Jenny
ran to the door.
§3
The drawing-room was just as it had always been.... The same
heavy dignity of line in the old walls and oak-ribbed ceiling spoilt by
undue crowding of pictures and furniture. Hothouse flowers stood
about in pots and filled vases innumerable ... a water-colour portrait
of himself as a child faced him as he came into the room.
“Peter, my darling!”
His mother’s arms were stretched out to him from the sofa—she
did not rise, and he knelt down beside her for a moment, letting her
enfold him and furiously creating for himself the illusion of a mother
he had never known. The illusion seemed to dissipate in a faint scent
of lavender water.
“How strange you look out of uniform—I suppose that’s a new
suit.”
“Well, I could scarcely have got into my pre-war clothes. I weigh
thirteen stone.”
“Quite the heavy Squire,” said Sir John. “Come here and let’s have
a look at you.”
Peter went over and stood before his father’s chair—rather like a
little boy. As it happened he was a man of thirty-six, tallish, well-
built, with a dark, florid face, dark hair and a small dark moustache.
In contrast his eyes were of an astounding blue—Saxon eyes, the eyes
of Alards who had gone to the Crusades, melted down their plate for
the White King, refused to take the oath of allegiance to Dutch
William; eyes which for long generations had looked out on the
marshes of Winchelsea, and had seen the mouth of the Rother swept
in spate from Romney sands to Rye.
“Um,” said Sir John.
“Having a bad turn again, Sir?”
“Getting over it—I’ll be about tomorrow.”
“That’s right, and how’s Mother?”
“I’m better today, dear. But Dr. Mount said he really was
frightened last week—I’ve never had such an attack.”
“Why didn’t anyone tell me? I could have come down earlier.”
“I wanted to have you sent for, dear, but the children wouldn’t let
me.”
The children, as represented by George Alard and his wife, threw a
baffled glance at Peter, seeking to convey that the “attack” had been
the usual kind of indigestion which Lady Alard liked to enoble by the
name of Angina Pectoris.
Meanwhile, Wills the butler and a young footman were bringing in
the tea. Jenny poured it out, the exertion being considered too great
for her mother. Peter’s eyes rested on her favourably; she was the
one thing in the room, barring the beautiful, delicate flowers, that
gave him any real pleasure to look at. She was a large, graceful
creature, with a creamy skin, wide, pale mouth, and her mother’s
eyes of speckled brown. Her big, beautifully shaped hands moved
with a slow grace among the teacups. In contrast with her Doris
looked raddled (though she really was moderate and skillful in the
make-up of her face and hair) and Rose looked blowsy. He felt glad
of Jenny’s youth—soft, slow, asleep.
“Where’s Mary?” he asked suddenly, “I thought she was coming
down.”
“Not till New Year’s eve. Julian can’t come with her, and naturally
he didn’t want her to be away for Christmas.”
“And how is the great Julian?”
“I don’t know—Mary didn’t say. She hardly ever tells us anything
in her letters.”
The door opened and the butler announced—
“Dr. Mount has come to see her ladyship.”
“Oh, Dr. Mount” ... cried Peter, springing up.
“He’s waiting in the morning room, my lady.”
“Show him in here—you’d like him to come in, wouldn’t you,
Mother?”
“Yes, of course, dear, but I expect he’ll have had his tea.”
“He can have another. Anyhow, I’d like to see him—I missed him
last leave.”
He crossed over to the window. Outside in the drive a small green
Singer car stood empty.
“Did Stella drive him over?—She would never stay outside.”
“I can’t see anyone—Hello, doctor—glad you’ve come—have some
tea.”
Dr. Mount came into the room. He was a short, healthy little man,
dressed in country tweeds, and with the flat whiskers of an old-time
squire. He seemed genuinely delighted to see Peter.
“Back from the wars? Well, you’ve had some luck. They say it’ll be
more than a year before everyone’s demobbed. You look splendid,
doesn’t he, Lady Alard?”
“Yes—Peter always was healthy, you know.”
“I must say he hasn’t given me much trouble. I’d be a poor man if
everyone was like him. How’s the wound, Peter? I don’t suppose you
even think of it now.”
“I can’t say I do—it never was much. Didn’t Stella drive you over?”
“No—there’s a lot of medicine to make up, so I left her busy in the
dispensary.”
“What a useful daughter to have,” sighed Lady Alard. “She can do
everything—drive the car, make up medicines——”
“Work in the garden and cook me a thundering good dinner
besides!” The little doctor beamed. “I expect she’ll be over here
before long, she’ll be wanting to see Peter. She’d have come today if
there han’t been such a lot to do.”
Peter put down his teacup and walked over again to the window.
Rose Alard and her husband exchanged another of those meaning
looks which they found a useful conversational currency.
§4
Jenny soon wearied of the drawing-room, even when freshened by
Dr. Mount. She always found a stifling quality in Conster’s public
rooms, with their misleading show of wealth, and escaped as early as
she could to the old schoolroom at the back of the house, looking
steeply up through firs at the wooded slope of Brede Eye.
This evening the room was nearly dark, for the firs shut out the
dregs of twilight and the moon that looked over the hill. She could
just see the outlines of the familiar furniture, the square table on
which she and Gervase had scrawled abusive remarks in the intervals
of their lessons, the rocking chair, where the ghost of Nurse
sometimes still seemed to sit and sway, the bookcase full of
children’s books—“Fifty-two Stories for Girls” and “Fifty-two Stories
for Boys,” the “Girls of St. Wode’s” and “With Wallace at
Bannockburn”—all those faded gilded rows which she still
surreptitiously enjoyed.
Now she had an indefinite feeling that someone was in the room,
but had scarcely realised it when a shape drew itself up against the
window square, making her start and gasp.
“It’s only me,” said an apologetic voice.
“Gervase!”
She switched on the light and saw her brother standing by the
table.
“When did you come?”
“Oh, twenty minutes ago. I heard you all gassing away in the
drawing-room, so thought I’d come up here till you’d finished with
Peter.”
“How sociable and brotherly of you! You might have come in and
said how d’you do. You haven’t seen him for a year.”
“I thought I’d be an anti-climax—spoil the Warrior’s Return and all
that. I’ll go down in a minute.”
“How was it you and Peter didn’t arrive together? There hasn’t
been another train since.”
“I expect Peter came by Ashford, didn’t he? I came down on the
other line and got out at Robertsbridge. I thought I’d like the walk.”
“What about your luggage?”
“I left that at Robertsbridge.”
“Really, Gervase, you are the most unpractical person I ever
struck. This means we’ll have to send over tomorrow and fetch it—
and Appleby has something better to do than tear about the country
after your traps.”
“I’ll fetch ’em myself in Henry Ford. Don’t be angry with me,
Jenny. Please remember I’ve come home and expect to be treated
kindly.”
He came round the table to her and offered her his cheek. He was
taller than she was, more coltish and less compact, but they were
both alike in being their mother’s children, Kenyons rather than
Alards. Their eyes were soft and golden-brown instead of clear
Saxon-blue, their skins were pale and their mouths wide.
Jenny hugged him. She was very fond of Gervase, who seemed
specially to belong to her at the end of the long, straggled family.
“I’m so glad you’ve come,” she murmured—“come for good.
Though I suppose you’ll be off to a crammer’s before long.”
“I daresay I shall, but don’t let’s worry about that now. I’m here till
February, anyway. Who’s at home?”
“Everybody except Mary, and she’s coming after Christmas.”
“I wish she’d come before. I like old Mary, and I haven’t seen her
for an age. Is Julian coming too?”
“I don’t suppose so. He and Father have had a dreadful row.”
“What about?”
“He wouldn’t lend us any of the money he profiteered out of those
collapsible huts.”
“Well, I call it rather cheek of Father to have asked him.”
“It was to be on a mortgage of course; but I quite see it wouldn’t
have been much of an investment for Julian. However, Father seems
to think it was his duty as a son-in-law to have let us have it. We’re
nearly on the rocks, you know.”
“So I’ve been told a dozen times, but the place looks much the
same as ever.”

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Solutions to End-of-Chapter Questions and Problems

Problems and Applications

An increase in the cost of chemical pesticides: Due to an increase in production costs,

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Faculty/Staff: 300 ($35) = $10,500.

Title: The end of the house of Alard

Author: Sheila Kaye-Smith

Release date: July 11, 2022 [eBook #68503]

Original publication: United States: E. P. Dutton, 1923

Credits: Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE END OF

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

All Rights Reserved

First printing Aug., 1923

Printed in the United States of America

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