Day 2 Presentation - Dubrovnik

2016 V2500 Regional Forum
Welcome to Dubrovnik!
25-27 October 2016
This page contains No Technical Data subject to the EAR or the ITAR
Detail Agenda - Wednesday
Day 2 - Wednesday, October 26, 2016
Title Presenter Start Duration Location
Agenda Review Ed Lagoy 8:30 0:05 Soderini Ballroom
Airbus Nacelle Christelle Rinjonneau (Airbus)/Carl Jacobs (UTAS) 8:35 0:45 Soderini Ballroom
N1 Fan harness Hau Bui 9:20 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
EGT Hardware Improvements Hau Bui 9:35 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
Morning Break 9:50 0:30
V2500-A1 Service Event Update Aprila Chatman 10:20 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
No.3 brg Aprila Chatman 10:35 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
HPT Stage 1 Blade/Ignitor Plug Barry Beckwith/Francesca Echegaray 10:50 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
New oils Aprila Chatman 11:05 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
ACOC Randy Gionfriddo 11:20 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
VSVA Randy Gionfriddo 11:35 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
Training & Return on Investment Study Bruce Hall 11:50 0:30 Soderini Ballroom
Lunch 12:20 1:30
Power Take Off (PTO) Shaft Toshi Komatsu 13:50 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
HPC Stage 4 Jon Sullivan 14:05 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
HPC Stage 7 Jon Sullivan 14:20 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
TCA bolts Barry Beckwith 14:35 0:15 Soderini Ballroom
Afternoon Break 14:50 0:30
Breakout Sessions 15:20 1:00
Troubleshooting: Faults Flight Deck Effect & Best Practices 15:20 1:00 Soderini-3
Cold & Hot Sections: Updated Limits & Best Practices 15:20 1:00 Wind Roses South/West
Forum Day Ends 16:20 Open Evening
The V2500® Engine: Proven Power that Keeps Getting Better

2
IAE International Aero Engines AG Proprietary Information
Breakout Sessions – Wednesday
 V2500 troubleshooting Location

• Faults and flight deck effect / best practices Soderini 3
 Cold and Hot section

• Updated limits and best practices Windroses S/W
The V2500® Engine: Proven Power that Keeps Getting Better IAE International Aero Engines AG Proprietary Information
3
Christelle RINJONNEAU
AIRBUS - Nacelle Engineering Support
Airbus
A320 Fleet Overview
Nacelle Topics
IAE Regional forum - Cebu - A320 Family Propulsion System Reliabiility - SEEE1 - Ref. D71PR1615420 - Issue 1 September 2016
IAE Regional forum - Cebu

Presented by Cecile RAULOT
IAE/CFM Propulsion Systems Product Leader
A320 Family Fleet

Overview
CONTENTS
A320 Family Fleet Status
A320 Family Propulsion System Reliability (CEO)
Conclusion
Page 6
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

A320 Family Fleet Status
Page 7

A320 Family Fleet Status – Orders and Backlog

July 2016 Data
15 A/C
1455 A/C
4296 A/C
12,714 firm orders

7,156 deliveries
1325 A/C
6,843 order backlog
Page 8
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. Includes both A320ceo and A320neo aircraft
A320 Family Fleet Status - Repartition As of June 2016
V2500-A5 CFM56-5A
2873 Aircrafts 423 Aircrafts
CFM56-5A
164 Operators 6% 59 Operators
141M PPS FH 43M PPS FH
V2500-A5
42%
CFM56-5B
51%
CFM56-5B
V2500-A1 V2500-A1
1% 3441 Aircrafts
90 Aircrafts 234 Operators
26 Operators 150M PPS FH
10M PPS FH
6827 Aircrafts / 366 operators ~344M cumulated PPS FH since EIS

Page 9

CONTENTS
A320 Fleet Status
A320 Family Propulsion System Reliability (CEO)
Conclusion
Page 10

A320 Family ceo Propulsion Systems Reliability – Airbus Objectives
• Operational Reliability Indicators

In Flight Shut Down
• < 0.005 (per 1000 EFH)
• ETOPS (180 min) requirement rate: 0.02
Flight Interruptions
• ATO / IFTB / DIV
• < 0.007 (per 100 take-offs)
Delays & Cancellations

• D&C > 15 min recorded
• < 0.10 (per 100 take-offs)
Page 11
IFSD: In Flight Shut Down ATO: Aborted Take Off IFTB: In Flight Turn Back
DIV: Diversion
D&C: Delays & Cancellations EFH: Engine Flight Hours
A320 Family ceo Propulsion Systems Reliability – IFSD - Benchmark

July 2015 – June 2016 - 12 months rolling
0.009
V2500-A5 IFSD rate CFM56-5B
0.008
0,009 0.007 0.009

0.009
0,008 0.008
0.008
0.006
0,007 0.007 0.007
ATA 2612 & 3021
ATA 2612&3021
0.005
0,006 0.006 0.006 ATA 71&78 (Nacelle)
0,005 0.004 0.005
ATA 2612&3021 ATA 71 & 78ATA(Nacelle)
70-80 (71-78 Excluded)
0.005
ATA 71&78 (Nacelle)
PPS Target
0,004 0.003
0.004 0.004 ATA 70-80 (71-78 Excluded)
0,003 0.003
PPS Target ATA 70-80 (71 – 78 Excluded)
IFSD tot
0.003
0.002 IFSD tot
0,002 0.002 0.002
0.001 PPS Target
0,001 0.001 0.001
0,000 0.000
0.000 0.000
Page 12

A320 Family ceo Propulsion Systems Reliability – Flight interruption - Benchmark

0.020
V2500-A5 Flight Interruption rate CFM56-5B

0.020 0.020
0.015
0.015 0.015 ATA 2612&3021
0.010 ATA 71&78 (Nacelle)

ATA 70-80 (71-78 Excluded)
0.010 0.010
ATO rate
PPS Target
0.005
0.005 0.005
0.000 0.000
Page
Page13
13

A320 Family ceo Propulsion Systems Reliability – D&C - Benchmark

0.40
V2500-A5 D&C rate CFM56-5B

0.35
0.40
0.40
0.30
0.35
0.35
0.25 0.30
0.30
ATA 2612&3021
0.20 0.25
0.25
ATA 71&78 (Nacelle)
0.20 0.20 ATA 70-80 (71-78 Excluded)
0.15
0.15 PPS Target
0.15
0.10
0.10 0.10
0.05 0.05
0.05
0.00 0.00
Page 14

CONTENTS
A320 Family CEO Fleet Status
A320 Family CEO Propulsion System Reliability
Conclusion
Page 15

Conclusion
• A320ceo ~7000 aircrafts and growing
• A320ceo fleet reliable and mature
A320ceo Fleet Overview
Page 16

© Airbus S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of
its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements
made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.
Page 17

IAE Regional Forum - Dubrovnik
V2500 Nacelle
A320 Family
September 2016
Agenda
Oil Filler Door Loss
Thrust Reverser Shut-Off Valve

Fire Shield Cracking
Fan Cowl Door Loss Prevention
Page 19
© AIRBUS Operations S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel.


A320 Family
September 2016
Oil Filler Door (OFD) Loss - Background
28 events of Oil Filler Door Loss  Improper

Latching
• OFD Latch configurations improvement performed to reduce
maintenance-related issues
• Final Fix
 SB A320-71-1061 (April 2015 ) introduced final latch
configuration (Generation # 3 Latch)
VSB V2500-NAC-71-0328 for laminate door
& V2500-NAC-71-0329 for sandwich door
 Design applicable to both sandwich and laminate OFD

Fully Open Fully Closed Intermediate position
Page 21

September 2016
Oil Filler Door (OFD) Loss – Field Feedback
Event: Oil Filler Door Loss with “Generation # 3” Latch
Root cause: Under-Rigged latch (manufacturing quality escape)

leading to intermediate position
Fix:
- Production: Improved latch rigging procedure prior to delivery
(since MSN6512 )
- In-Service: Latch rigging check - VSB V2500-NAC-71-0332
(August 2016)
- Communication to operator: UTAS AOL V2500-16-001
Generation # 3 Latch Effective
Page 22

September 2016
Conclusion
• Final design available since early 2015
• Manufacturing Quality escape fixed with

appropriate communication
TFU 71.13.00.059 – Final Fix

TFU 71.13.00.072 – Quality escape
Page 23

Thrust Reverser Shut-

Off Valve Fire Shield
Cracking
A320 Family
September 2016
Thrust Reverser Shut-Off Valve (TRSOV) Fire Shield Cracking
Description:
- TRSOV fire shield located in the top of the fan compartment
Page 25

September 2016
Description:
- TRSOV fire shield located in the top of the fan compartment
Issue:
- Cracking on the fire shield near the attachment lugs
- 2 scenario
For V2500 fleet:
Fire shield still in place
- 15 fan cases damaged,
 Fire shield liberated. - 3 fan case removals.
Potential Engine fan case Damage (AOG situation)
Page 26

September 2016
Root cause
- High Cycle Fatigue (HCF) due to engine environmental vibrations
- All fire shield designs affected
Cracks
Page 27

September 2016
Mitigation:
- Damaged Fire shield:
 Temporary bolted repair by Technical Adaptation,
 Temporary dispatch with damaged fireshield as is on a case by case basis
- Inspection of fire shield - UTAS VSB V2500-NAC-78-0260 - Q4 2016

If fire shield liberated: No dispatch allowed and Fan case inspection required
Fix:
- Fire shield redesign in progress - Q2 2017
Page 28

September 2016
Conclusion
• Fire shield cracking due to HCF
• Mitigation solution available
• Final fix expected for Q2 2017
TFU 78.37.00.009
TRSOV fire shield cracking
Page 29

Fan Cowl Door Loss

Prevention
A320 Family
Fan Cowl Loss Prevention
42 events since 1992

100% human factor
90% operators not impacted
 Enhancements to increase operators

awareness
 Additional information provided to

operators
- OIT
- Safety Conferences
- Training videos
Fan Cowl Loss events still occur

September 2016
Fan Cowl Loss Prevention – Lockable latch

New Latch Design:
- Key with “Remove Before Flight” Flag
Key & New Latch
- L1 position only Flag Design
Keeper
Page 32

September 2016

New Latch Design:
- Key with “Remove Before Flight” Flag
- L1 position only
New Latch Operation:

- Key stored in the cockpit
- Key mandatory for Latch handling
- Key stays on open Latch until
Fan Cowl Door & Latch safely closed
Further improve detectability of unlatched Fan Cowl Door
Page 33

September 2016
Fleet introduction:
- New production aircraft: Since January 2016
- Monitored Retrofit Campaign:
Airbus SB 71-1069 / VSB V2500-NAC-71-0331
Retrofit Status for V2500 fleet:

- Embodiment Progress: 5.5 % (159 A/C)
- Suppliers Delivery Progress: 20%
Lockable Latch mandated by EASA (AD 2016-0053)

Compliance Target: 28 March 2019
NPRM: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking SB: Service Bulletin
AD: Airworthiness Directives VSB: Vendor Service Bulletin
Page 34

September 2016
Conclusion
• 42 events on A320 Family in 25 years
• Lockable Latch: Final design solution to

minimize the Human Factor risk
TFU 71.13.00.060
Fan Cowl Loss Prevention
Page 35

September 2016
© AIRBUS Operations S.A.S. Tous droits réservés. Document confidentiel. Ce document et son contenu sont la propriété d’AIRBUS Operations S.A.S. Aucun droit de propriété intellectuelle n’est accordé par la communication du présent document ou son contenu.
Ce document ne doit pas être reproduit ou communiqué à un tiers sans l’autorisation expresse et écrite d’AIRBUS Operations S.A.S. Ce document et son contenu ne doivent pas être utilisés à d’autres fins que celles qui sont autorisées. Les déclarations faites dans
ce document ne constituent pas une offre commerciale. Elles sont basées sur les postulats indiqués et sont exprimées de bonne foi. Si les motifs de ces déclarations n’étaient pas démontrés, AIRBUS Operations S.A.S. serait prêt à en expliquer les fondements.
AIRBUS, son logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380 et A400M sont des marques déposées.
Page 36
Carl Jacobs
Technical Support Manager
Aerostructures
UTAS AEROSTRUCTURES
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
IMPROVEMENTS
2016
This presentation contains no ITAR technical data, nor EAR controlled technology. It is UTAS proprietary & confidential.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT IMPROVEMENT
“Incomplete and untimely responses to technical inquiries”, “AOG support lacking”
Improvement Action Plans :
Customer Service Training for Technical Support Team Completed May, 2016
Nacelle Damage Description Form w/ instructions (1st PY) Completed July, 2016
Recording the timeliness of first response (Responsiveness) ECD: Oct, 2016
Recording the completeness of response (Quality) ECD: Oct, 2016
100% AOG requests get phone call within one hour ECD: Dec, 2016
Immersion/Exchange Program with customers As requested
Airbus-AIRTAC Benchmarking Exercise Completed July, 2016
Airbus-AIRTAC/Aerostructures Exchange program ECD: Oct, 2016
Committed to timely and complete responses in technical support
UTC AEROSPACE SYSTEMS PROPRIETARY & CONFIDENTIAL

38 This document is subject to the controls and restrictions on the Export Declaration page
DOCUMENTATION IMPROVEMENT
Quality of Manuals: “too many errors” Improvement Action Plans:
Implemented monthly tracking of all Escapes
Focused effort to burn down back-log ECD: Completed
for minor revisions to manuals
For each escape, now performing a Root Cause with
countermeasures
ECD: Completed
Additional quality review added for Service Bulletins
ECD: Completed
Addition of email notification to customers who identify
YTD at 66
errors
ECD: On-Going
Implementation of new auto-editing software
(Corena™) to eliminate errors
ECD: Completed
Action Plan in Place for Quality Process Improvements
“Not enough repairs in the manuals” Improvement Action Plans:
Increase of manual repairs & ADLs in 2016 6 for
V2500
7 ECD: Completed
 Poor Performance 
6 Additional 5 for V2500
5 New Repairs/ADLs ECD: Q1 2017
4
Communication improvement: will send revision letter to
3 operators highlighting new repairs
2 ECD: Completed
1 Coordinating plan with Airbus to reduce manual
0 incorporation time
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Process Agreement: Completed
Process validation: On-Going
Process Improvement: more repairs in 2016, forward notification at revision cycle

Notification to go out to Operators at

each SRM publication highlighting new
or expanded repairs and ADLs
Introduced August 2016

“portal not user friendly” “cannot download all manuals in one action”
All delivery is via UTAS tech pubs portal
Improvement Action Plans:
Entire suite of A320 manuals available for

download as zip file:
ECD: Completed
UTAS wide Portal enhancement

ECD: Mid-2017
Contact ASM for alternatives to internet

delivery
Improvements to current distribution method a priority for UTAS
Questions?

This document is subject to the controls and restrictions on the Export Declaration page
Format
Picture:
Height: 1.82”
Width: 1.42”
Hau Bui
Accessories Team
Customer Technical Services
N1 Fan Harness
WARNING -- This document contains technical data the export of which is or may be restricted by the Export Administration Act and the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited. The export, re-export, transfer or re-transfer of this technical data to any other
company, entity, person, or destination, or for any use or purpose other than that for which the technical data was originally provided by P&W, is prohibited without prior
written approval from P&W and authorization under applicable export control laws – ECCN 9E991
This document contains material which is proprietary to IAE International Aero Engines AG and is delivered
on the express condition that it is not to be used, disclosed or reproduced in whole or in part for any
purpose without IAE’s express written permission.
N1 Fan Harness – Background A5 A1 S1
 N1 harness (5A0244) signal errors have

resulted in UERs
Terminal Block
• N1 harness replacement requires engine
removal
 Manufacturing improvements implemented in
early 2015 (no part number change)
• IAE reviewed if recent manufacturing changes
could reduce UERs
N1 Harness
EAR Export Classification: ECCN 9E991

45
N1 Fan Harness – Investigation A5 A1 S1
 14 harness returned to IAE for investigation

• All units manufactured prior to 2015
• Units showed voids in the solder connections
in terminal block (pin) cups Terminal Block
• Analysis concluded symptoms of N1 signal

error could be addressed with post-2015
improvements
 IAE plans to implement part number change
to track improvements
Terminal Block with
Housing Tube Removed
46
N1 Fan Harness – Improvements A5 A1 S1
Wire
Longer length
Larger Inner Diameter
Void Air Hole
Pin cup
Pre-2015 Post-2015
Comparison between pre-2015 and post-2015 configuration

shows solder flow improvement
47
A5 A1 S1
N1 Fan Harness - Summary
 N1 Fan Harness replacement requires engine removal
 New changes address field issues
 New part number and SB March 2017
Manufacturing
Improvements New P/N and SB Release
(Jan 2015) IAE Investigation (March 2017)
(Q1 2016)
2015 2016 2017 On Target to

Complete

48
A5 A1 S1
N1 Harness Improvements
Questions?
EAR Export Classification: No Technical Data

49
Hau Bui
Accessories Team
EGT Hardware Improvements
EGT Hardware Improvements – Background A5 S1
 Operator reported EGT fault messages

occurring post SB 77-0011 and SB 77-0012
 IAE team formed to investigate at various
sites
 Hardware returned to IAE & OEM supplier
for investigation
Engine Troubleshooting

51
EGT Hardware Improvements – Mitigation A5 S1
 SB 77-0011 probe and SB 77-0012 harness

provide improvements
• Continue to incorporate on attrition basis Water Evidence
No Lubricants
 Best practices provided to operators which on Hardware
reduced frequency of faults
 Incorporate SCN22 – chooses best EGT
signal during start
Correct Drip-loop Installation

52
EGT Hardware Improvements – Investigation Results A5 S1
 Areas identified for additional

improvements Junction Box
• Core Harness Chaffing
• Nacelle door and EGT harness physical
contact
• Thrust Reverser HOR and J-Box
interference
• Water Ingress Core Harness
• Thermocouple (T/C) probe internal wire EGT Harness
Water Impact Areas
management

53
EGT Hardware Improvements – Solution A5 S1
EGT core harness + EGT harness & J-Box/bracket

=
One Single Harness + Water Shield
Harness Post SB 77-0012 New Single Harness/Water Shield SB 77-0015

54
EGT Hardware Improvements - Harness Benefits A5 S1
Issue Solution
EGT Core Harness chaffing, oversize & Integral clamps & wear sleeve
worn clamps
Water Ingress & Wet electrical contacts Water Shield & elimination of J-Box
T/R HOR and J-Box Interference Elimination of J-Box
Nacelle door / harness contact Reduction of harness OD
90 deg backshell wire chaffing Teflon sleeve for each wire
P-Clamp Integral Clamp Worn Clamps Add Wear Sleeve Teflon Sleeve
55
EGT Hardware Improvements – Water Shield Design A5 S1
 Located at Turbine Exhaust Case (TEC) bottom

center
• Divert water dripping away from harness
 Supported by 3 piece bracket
 Durability validated by stress analysis
Water Shield
 Water shield with new harness fit-checked on 15
engines
• Including water and rain test to verify water
protection

56
EGT Hardware Improvements – Probe Redesign A1 A5 S1 D5
 Optimize internal wiring

 IAE part number 2A4529, Harco p/n 30404-000
 Applicable to A1/A5/D5
 Fully interchangeable with previous configurations
 SB, Cat 7, Feb 2017
Probe
57
EGT Hardware Improvements – Retrofit Plan A5 S1
 Harness Retrofit Kit, Harco p/n 30558-001

• Single Harness
• Water Shield & Water Shield Bolts (Qty 2)
• 1 Bolt, & 1 washer
• 10 P-clamps
 New Installation procedure be utilized
 Periseal translating on ACC tube
 Using existing attachment points
 Supplier commercial support available
Periseal
58
EGT Hardware Improvements - Lead the Fleet A5 S1
 Purpose: Monitoring EGT Hardware performance

 Monitoring Period: 2 A-checks
• Inspect hardware conditions pre-installation and at each A-checks
• Document any anomalies with photos
 Participants: 5 operators at 5 different locations
• Selection based on location & previous field events
• On-site support from CTS

59
EGT Hardware Improvements - Summary A1 A5 S1 D5
 Lead-the-Fleet strategy to monitor performance - Oct 2016

 Single harness with water shield - Feb 2017
 Redesigned probe with improved wire management - Feb 2017
 Supplier Commercial support available
Lead the Fleet
(Oct 2016)
Improvements Harness &

IAE Conducts Probe SB
Investigation Identified
(Feb 2017)
(Q1 2014) (Q4 2015)
2014 2015 2016 2017 On Target to

Complete

60
EGT Hardware Improvements A1 A5 S1 D5
Questions?

61
Morning Break
30 minutes
Aprila Chatman
Oil System Team
V2500-A1 Service Event Update

Service Event Update – Background A1
 Un-contained / IFSD Event – V2500-A1

• Event Date: 21st Aug 2014
• “Engine 2 Fire” and “EGT Over Limit”
• Fractured HPT 1-2 Seal identified
 ICAO Annex 13 investigation
 Service Bulletin (SB) 72-0670 released to
address suspected V2500-A1 population
 FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) to be released
 V2500-A5/D5 fleet not effected by this SB/AD
64
Service Event Update – Mitigation Plan A1
 SB 72-0670 requires the following:

• Selected V2500-A1 engines only
• One-time replacement No. 4 bearing seal plates
• SB must be accomplished before 31-Dec-2016
• Oil consumption monitoring (0.15 qt/hr)
• Turbine Exhaust Case (TEC) weep hole
inspection

65
Aprila Chatman
Oil Systems Team
No. 3 Bearing
No. 3 Bearing – Background A5 S1
 IAE observed an increase in No. 3 Bearing Unplanned

Engine Removals (UER)
No.3 Bearing

67
 Since January 2015, nine confirmed low time No. 3 Bearing UERs
• Bearings were produced from two ball Lots (A & B)
• Event bearing time ranged from ~2,500 – 7,500 hours
 Summary of UERs: 2 IFSD

4
• 6 within Lot A Reduced to idle
• 3 within Lot B
3 MCD catch

68
 IAE observed a higher event rate on two lots of No. 3 Bearings

in 2015 - 2016
• IAE initiated an investigation in Q3 of 2015
 328 bearings within Lots A & B
• 80 for Lot A
• 248 for Lot B
 Demonstrated lives of Lot A bearings
are much lower than Lot B
Distressed No.3 Bearing

69
No. 3 Bearing – Investigation A5 S1
 Root cause efforts narrowed to bearing balls and associated lots

 IAE has been working closely with suppliers
• Supplier assessment confirmed no
manufacturing or quality anomalies
• Heat treat processing was within
specification

70
No. 3 Bearing – Investigation A5 S1
 Metallurgical investigation of balls – Completed

• Hot Acid Etch – no discrepancies identified
• Residual Stress – no discrepancies identified
 Unique microstructure found within
Lot A & B bearing balls
• Investigation focused on carbides within
the raw material of the bearing ball

71
No. 3 Bearing – Root Cause Investigation A5 S1
 The microstructure of Lot A bearing ball shows abnormal condition –

damaged carbides
Lot A Ball Typical M50 Ball -
500X 500X
Arrows show
damaged carbides
 Damaged carbides may indicate an un-acceptable material condition

• Resembles inclusions or porosity
72
No. 3 Bearing – Fleet Management A5 S1
 Action required per Safety Risk Assessment (SRA)

• Reduced MMCD inspection for Lot A bearings
 Lot B bearings do not exceed safety thresholds - reduced MMCD
inspection deemed appropriate
 Non-Modification Service Bulletins (NMSB) released – March 2016
• NMSB 72-0671 for Lot A – 125 hour MMCD interval
• NMSB 72-0672 for Lot B – 125 hour MMCD interval
 FAA Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) issued
for Lot A bearings - Airworthiness Directive (AD) to be released
73
No. 3 Bearing – Fleet Management A5 S1
 Two additional NMSB’s released – June 2016

• Lot A NMSB 72-0673 – Cat 4 - bearing replacement at next shop visit
• Lot B NMSB 72-0674 – Cat 6 - bearing replacement at next exposure
 Lower Category level for Lot A due to the
statistical lower life than that of Lot B

74
No. 3 Bearing – Corrective Action A5 S1
 Focusing on bearing ball raw material carbides

 Sample all new lots of No. 3 Bearing balls
 Implement material specification changes as applicable
 Continue monitoring bearing in-service demonstrated life

75
No. 3 Bearing – Summary A5 S1
 Ball Lots A & B have a lower life than the general population
 SRA indicates action is required for Lot A
 Four NMSB’s released
• Reduced MMCD inspection Lot A & B NMSB’s (AD anticipated for Lot A)
• Replacement of bearings Lot A & B NMSB’s
 Identify Root Cause / Corrective Action – targeted 16-Dec-2016
Investigation NMSBs
Identify Root Cause
Initiated Released (Dec 2016)
(Sep 2015) (Jun 2016)
2015 2016 On Target to

Complete

76
No. 3 Bearing A5 S1
Questions?

77
Barry Beckwith Francesca T Echegaray

Hot Section Manager Accessories and Components Manager
Customer Technical Services Customer Technical Services
HPT T1 Blade/ Igniter Plug
T1 Blade/ Igniter Plug- Background
T1 Blade
 Operators have reported damage to HPT stage 1 blades
• Damage on leading edge near tip
• Typically found during scheduled BSI of HPT
• 35 first run engines
• 33 overhaul engines
• Hole is small typically 0.1 inch (2.5mm) radially
• Results in a 600-hour repeat inspection
Fig. 1: V2500 HPT T1 Blade Impact Damage

79
T1 Blade/ Igniter Plug- Investigation
 IAE evaluated blades from 4 different engines
• Wall thickness meets blueprint specifications
• No blockage found
• Clearly impact damage
 Six Engines inspected at shop visits for source of impact damage
• No damage or loss of material found in HPC
• All combustor nuts in place
• No signs of liberated material from combustor hardware
• Only sign of liberated material was from igniter plug
• Ignitor was operating normally with no reported starting issues

80
Igniter Plug Entry into Service History
• Champion Igniter Plug was introduced in Aug 2012 by SB 70-1003
• Customers requested IAE to pursue Champion igniter plug design
• Damage to HPT T1 Blade found during BSI on Q1 2015
• First tip erosion with ground electrode liberation reported in Q2 2016
Champion Champion T1 Blade- 1st Igniter

PMA SB70-1003 low 1st run Plug
2007 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

81
Igniter Plugs
 Igniter plugs (Pre and Post SB
70-1003) were returned to
Champion for detailed analysis
• No impact to function of igniter
plug
• Examination revealed tip Igniter Plug Ground Electrode
erosion and ground electrode

(washer) was found missing
Fig. 2: V2500 Champion Igniter Plug

82
Igniter Plug Ground Electrode detachment
 Areas of investigation on probable causes:
• Over Temperature Exposure
• Excess Spark Erosion
• Fuel Nozzle Changes
• Immersion Depth
• Quality
• Manufacturing non-conformances

83
Investigation Sources & Findings
• Quality Audit: Review at Champion revealed no recent changes in
manufacturing process
• Engine Test: Igniters instrumented to examine the temperature profile of the
igniter plug tip showed inconclusive results. Additional testing planned
Fig. 3: Igniter Plug Tip Wear Stages

84
T1 Blade/ Igniter Plug- C/A
Mitigation / Corrective Action
 HPT T1 Blade inspection interval extended to 1500 hrs.
• Doc 16VC284 is on ADDS
 A new design ignitor plug that eliminates the ground
electrode
• Corrective Action Plan to be provided on November 2016
• Lead the fleet program

85
T1 Blade/ Igniter Plug- Summary
 Operators have reported damage to HPT stage 1 blades
 Igniter plugs show tip erosion and material liberation
 HPT T1 Blade reduced inspection interval extended to 1500 hrs.
 A new igniter plug design removing ground electrode to be introduced
 Implementation plan identify by November 2016
Implementation
Plan
(Q4)
2007 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

On Target to
Champion Champion T1 Blade Impact 1st Igniter Plug Complete
PMA SB 70-1003 low 1st run (Q1) Missing Ring (Q1)

86
Questions?

87
Aprila Chatman
Oil System Team
Approved Oils Service Bulletin (SB)
Approved Oils SB – Background A1 A5 D5 S1
 2015 Regional Forum – Published new oil SB

to capture all pertinent information concerning
IAE approved oils
• Supersedes previous IAE publications
• New engine oil & Field Service Evaluation
(FSE) guidelines
• Oil type change-over best practices
Engine Oil Tank

89
Approved Oils SB – Background A1 A5 D5 S1
 Customer caucus request:

• “Do not release engine oils that are not
approved at the aircraft level”
 After review with Airbus, IAE has decided not
to release Aeroshell Ascender to the V2500-
A1/A5 fleet at this time
• Aeroshell Ascender has not been approved for
the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG)

90
Approved Oils SB – Approval Overview A1 A5 D5 S1
 Process to publish new engine oils
Engine Testing FAA Approval Certificate Airframe Approval Letter

Publish New Oils Maintenance IAE Processing Final
Service Bulletin Document Updates Paperwork
91
Approved Oils SB – FSE Guidelines A1 A5 D5 S1
 FSE guidelines:
• Six engines for evaluation
• Utilize “Top-off” method
• Oil sampling - each “A” check (750 hrs.)
• Oil scavenge filter replacement/inspection requirement –
 Visually inspect, photo document and analysis filters
 Flush and collect contaminants
• FSE success criteria, first 4 of 6 engines to meet 5000 hours
• Operator to provide a detailed report of all oil and filter analysis
• Once completed the SB will be revised to allow full use of oil

92
Approved Oils SB – Best Practices A1 A5 D5 S1
 Oil Type Change Over Methods List of Approved Oils for A1/A5/D5
• “Top-Off” method High Thermal Stability (HTS) Oils

AeroShell Turbine Oil 560
• Utilized for engines on-wing Eastman Turbo Oil - ETO 2197
• Typical industry method ExxonMobil Jet Oil 254
Standard Oils
• Recommended for oil
ExxonMobil Jet II
conversion Eastman Turbo Oil - ETO 2380
• “Drain and Refill” method Turbo Nycoil 600
• Not recommended for engines

on-wing New Oil Introduced: (V2500-A1/A5)
ExxonMobil Jet 387

93
Approved Oils SB - Summary A1 A5 D5 S1
 New oils SB to capture all pertinent information including approved oils

 Service Bulletin to be released 4Q 2016
 Limited Field Service Evaluation for new oils
2015 Regional –
New Oils Customer IAE Manual FAA
Approved Feedback Approved Issue SB
(December 2016)
(January 2015) (October 2015) (June 2016)

Complete

94
Approved Oils SB A1 A5 D5 S1
Questions?

95
Format
Picture:
Height: 1.82” The V2500® Engine: Proven Power that Keeps Getting Better
Width: 1.42”
Randy Gionfriddo
Accessories & Components – Fuel System
Air Cooled Oil Cooler (ACOC)
ACOC – Background A5 S1
 ACOC part number 50069001-1 was introduced

in Jun 2008 to address service leaks
• SB 79-0094 Cat 7
• Replaces part number 50026001-1
 ACOC part number 50069001-1 has experienced
oil leaks in service
• Thermal stress cracking within the matrix
• Causes delays and cancellations – no operational events
 New ACOC design to be introduced with

improved thermal durability ACOC

97
ACOC – Construction A5 S1
 ACOC is a corrugated fin cross flow

• Aluminum alloy
• Brazed matrix, headers, mounting flanges and a bypass
valve
 Matrix, headers and mounting flanges are ACOC Air/Oil Flow
welded to each other

 Matrix is composed of:
• Corrugated fins
• Tube plate (Separator plate/sheet)
• Side bars ACOC Matrix Detail

98
ACOC – Investigation A5 S1
 Since 2010, 37 reported units returned due to

oil leaks
• Between 8000 to 28000 hours
 Leaks typically observed during walk around
 Has not resulted in operational impact
 Matrix cracks at the tube plate
• Results in oil leakage
Location of
Reported leaks

99
 Air modulating valve regulates during

operation
 Fan air flows into the ACOC
 ACOC matrix cools and shrinks ACOC Air/Oil Flow
Schematic
• Thermal stress occurs on separator sheet
and side bar
 Potential for separator sheet cracks into
the side bar due to fatigue
ACOC Air/Oil Flow

100
 Several items evaluated

• Structural durability
• Thermal cycle testing
• Quality
• Manufacturing process Location of Oil Tube Plate Crack
 Root cause understanding:

• Material thermal fatigue characteristics identified
as marginal
Example of Oil Tube Plate Crack

101
ACOC – Corrective Action A5 S1
 Introduce a new ACOC design New

Partial
Blocker
Material
• Change material in matrix separating
sheet to more durable aluminum
• Improved tolerance for expand/shrink
• Introduce partial blocker
• Redistributes potential stresses New ACOC Design
 Installation and interfaces remain ACOC
unchanged
 Design validated by endurance test
 SB 79-0109 target Jan 2017, Cat 6 Test Setup

102
ACOC - Summary A5 S1
 ACOC part number 50069001-1 reported with service leaks

 Root cause understood
 Improved ACOC design to be introduced
 Delay and cancellation reduction
 SB 79-0109 April 2017, Cat 6
Investigation Root Cause

Issue SB
Initiated Identified (April 2017)
(Jan 2014) (Oct 2015)
2014 2015 2016 2017 On Target to

Complete

103
ACOC A5 S1
Questions?

104
Format
Picture:
Width: 1.42”
Randy Gionfriddo
Accessories & Component – Fuel System
Variable Stator Vane Actuator (VSVA)

VSVA – Background A5 S1
 New standard VSVA introduced in 2014 after

successful In Service Evaluation (ISE)
• SB 75-0122, part number G4000VSVA01
 Addresses reliability driver
• ECAM “ENGX COMPRESSOR VANE” – track
check fault “SVATK”
• Observed during flight phase 2, 3, 8 (low speed)
and 5/6 (high speed)
 Improved VSVA force margin resolved
interaction faults VSVA

106
VSVA - Summary of G4000VSVA01 Changes A5 S1
LVDT Laser etched nameplate

• Improved based on • Replaces strapped
Lessons learned nameplate
New Servotronics Servovalve

• Replaces Moog incumbent
New Rig Pin Location

• Improved accessibility
• Requires new tool
Reconfigured control valves

• Improves assembly /
manufacturability
Increased filter area HP Inlet Larger Piston
No change to filter rating • Improved force margin

107
VSVA – Service Experience A5 S1
 SB 75-0122 Rev 1 released to fleet in Sept 2014

• Approximately 1075 delivered to date based on
incorporation records
• 670 delivered on new engines / 405 in aftermarket
• More than 2.5 million hrs / 1.2 million cycles accumulated
fleet wide through 25 August VSVA Installed on Engine
 New design has resolved interaction faults

108
VSVA – Post-mod Reported Removals A5 S1
 1st Dec 2015 V17926 experience Comp Vane Faults in cruise,

subsequent ATB – No engine parameters were impacted
• TT / TC 198 hours / 62 cycles
• Unit returned to vendor for investigation
 Vendor advised additional units were returned in 3Q – 4Q 2015
 9 unit investigation confirmed the fault to the servo valve
• Torque motor
• Screen port blockage
• Flapper extension interface

109
VSVA – Servo Valve Findings (Torque Motor) A5 S1
 2 VSVA units isolated the fault to torque motor

• Total time of 2449 hours and 394 hours
 Removed for single Channel ‘B’ fault message “SVAWAF” – electrical
• Marginal wire management Cover
Flapper
Retainer
Channel B
Filter
Channel A Ports
Channel B Contact/leadwire
VSVA Servo Valve Servo Valve exploded view Connection

110
VSVA – Servo Valve Findings (Clogged Screens) A5 S1
 3 VSVA units isolated to clogged screens

• Total time between 1051 – 4484 hours
 Removed for dual channel and single channel fault message “SVATK”
• External factor, not attributed to VSVA design
Cover
Flapper
Retainer
Channel B
Filter
Channel A Ports
VSVA Servo Valve Clogged filter screens - Circled
Servo Valve exploded view
111
VSVA – Servo Valve Findings (Flapper Retainer) A5 S1
 4 VSVA units isolated the fault to flapper retainer interference

• Total time between 97 – 370 hours
 Removed for single and dual Channel fault message “SVATK”
• Interference at the flapper retainer
Interference Location
Flapper
Retainer
VSVA Servo Valve Servo Valve Exploded View Flapper Retainer Direction of Movement

112
VSVA – Investigation Findings A5 S1
 Low time units returned – fault confirmed

 As is test isolated the fault to the servo valve Flapper
Retainer
 Investigation did not identify a batch issue
Channel B
 Investigation identified two areas for
manufacturing improvement on the servo valve
• Torque motor wire management (Channel A/B)
• Flapper retainer interface
Channel A

113
VSVA – Mitigation Actions A5 S1
 Torque motor assembly

• Clarify instructions related to wire management Flapper
Retainer
 Flapper retainer
Channel B
• Over inspection to confirm acceptable clearance
Channel A
Flapper Retainer Clearance
 Actions implemented in Feb 2016
• VSVA serial number AAG16-146 and up
114
VSVA – Corrective Action A5 S1
 Servo valve manufacturing improvements identified

• Eliminate retaining plate
• Wire management, connector contact, and increase wire gauge
 VSVA part number change to identify manufacturing improvements

• Servo valve body cover change – environmental
• SB release planned for April 2017
 No fleet action required for in-service VSVAs

115
VSVA – Rig Pin for Post SB75-0122 VSVA A5 S1
 Background:
• New VSVA has a different rig pin orientation/depth
• Pin does not fully seat, though engaged
• 0.250 inch gap between shoulder/rig pin housing
 New Rig Pin:

(Current procedure in AMM)
• Part number IAE1P16614 validated and released
• Only valid with a post-mod 75-0122 VSVA
• SB 75-0122 Rev 2 released
• AMM and EM to be updated
• Task available on ADDS – EC16VC046

116
VSVA – Summary A5 S1
 Post-mod SB 75-0122 VSVA effective to eliminate interaction faults

 Low hour returns related to the servo valve
 Mitigating actions in place since Feb 2016
 SB with manufacturing improvements and part number change: July 2017
 New rig pin required for post-mod 75-0122 VSVA
ISE Complete ATB Event Root Cause Issue SB

(Aug 2015) (Dec 2015) Identified (July 2017)
(May 2016)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 On Target to

Complete

117
VSVA A5 S1
Questions?

118
CUSTOMER TRAINING
A Generation Ahead
C17 PW6000
U.S. Export Classification: EAR ECCN 9E991 P&W PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

CUSTOMER TRAINING
Providing Service for Over 85 Years
Frederick Rentschler, founder of Pratt & Whitney.

Aircraft: Vought O2U-1 Corsair.
Engine: Pratt & Whitney R-1690-42 Hornet engine,
rated at 600hp.

CUSTOMER TRAINING
We Are Proud of Our History

CUSTOMER TRAINING
A Changing Landscape

CUSTOMER TRAINING
Customer Training: A Global, Modern Operation
North Berwick
Plant Satellite
Training Site
N. Berwick,
Customer ME, USA China Customer Training
Training Center Center
East Hartford, Beijing, China
Columbus CT, USA
Engine Center
Satellite Training Site India Customer
Columbus, GA, USA Training Center
Hyderabad, India
Christchurch Engine
Center Satellite
Training Site
Christchurch,
New Zealand
CUSTOMER TRAINING
On-Demand and Interactive Training
V2500
PW1100G PW1100G

PROXIMITY
Training Centers Around the World

PROXIMITY
Reaching More People by Being There in Person
PW4000
V2500

INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN

INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN - ANALOG
PW4000

INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN – DIGITAL EVOLUTION

INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN – DIGITAL INTERACTIVE

INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN – DIGITAL 3D MOTION
3-D Animation

INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY - DIGITAL 3D INTRACTIVE MOTION
3-D Modeling
PW1100G

3-D Modeling
PW1100G

3-D Modeling
PW1100G

INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY - IMMERSION
Virtual Reality
PW1100G

Virtual Reality
PW1100G

Virtual Reality
PW1100G

INSTRUCTIONAL DELIVERY
Engaging Instruction

Mobility in the Learning Environment
PW1100G

A Mobile Classroom
PW1100G

MEASURING TRAINING IMPACT
Using Data in Decision Making

Identifying Key Metrics

Linking Training Quality and Frequency to Fleet Performance

Objectives
• Improve fleet reliability and performance
• Use fleet and training data analytics
• Plus training impact survey process
• Consistently measure training effectivity and impact – dollarize it
• Adjust curriculum focus to optimize impact and performance
$25 D&C $/EFH Impact Results

$20
D&C $/EFH
10
$44K/Event
Average PRE in points

Average POST in points
$15 8
6
$10
4
$5
2
$0 0
3 yrs 4-5 yrs >6yrs
People Customer1 Total Years Trained
Trained/1kEFH2 0.3 0.4 1.0
Increased training on a regular basis leads to cost savings
Source: IAE Mkt Support
2represents the avg # of people trained per 1K EFH
1Included operators with > 0.1 people trained per EFH
P&W Strategic Planning

What training to do?
Who to train and how often?
How much to invest in training?

TRAINING COLLABORATION

TRAINING COLLABORATION
Customer Collaboration
Optimized Courses
New Content and Venues
Shared Metrics
Improved Impact and Performance

THE GENERATIONS AHEAD
Looking forward and anticipating the next evolution in training

Visions for the Future

PW1100G

Questions ?
Lunch sponsored by
Format
Picture:
Width: 1.42”
Toshimitsu Komatsu
Fan and LPC
Power Take Off (PTO) Shaft

PTO Shaft – Background A1 A5 D5 S1
 In-Flight Shut Down (IFSD) on an engine in

March 2016
• PTO shaft fracture
• Appeared source was center bearing distress
• Hardware damage difficult to investigate
 Unplanned Engine Removal (UER) occurred
on another engine following Magnetic Chip
Detector (MCD) catch from Angle GearBox
(AGB)
• Spallation found on center bearing
• Allowed detailed investigation to identify
potential cause PTO Shaft Center Bearing and Housing
153
 Historical search identified another nine similar findings since 2003

 All 11 findings occurred within 3,000 cycles since last PTO shaft
installation
• 4 IFSD’s – PTO shaft fracture
• 5 UER’s – MCD findings
Serviceable PTO Shaft (Top) and Spallation on Center Bearing

Fractured PTO Shaft (Bottom)

154
 PTO shaft
• PTO shaft connects High Pressure (HP)
shaft and gearbox
• During start, air starter supplies rotation
to spool up HP shaft HP Shaft
• In operation, power is taken off from HP
shaft to run gearbox components PTO Shaft
Center
Bearing
 Center bearing
• Supports PTO shaft midway
Gearbox
PTO Shaft Location

155
PTO Shaft – Investigation A1 A5 D5 S1
 Center bearing with spallation investigated

• Dents found on corners of spalled rollers
Dent on Spalled Roller General View of Center Bearing Rollers

156
 Shop-level tear down findings

• IAE queried overhaul shops of rejected center bearings
• Similar dents reported on roller corners
Dents on Center Bearing Corners from Three Different Engines

157
 PTO shaft center bearing assembly process

• Adjusting washer (shim) installed for proper
center bearing position
• Setting master shaft tool (dummy shaft) used to
determine correct shim size during assembly
Center
Bearing
Center
Bearing
Housing Adjusting Washer
(Shim)
Setting Master Shaft
Center Bearing Housing (Dummy Shaft)

158
 Assembly observation
• CTS visited overhaul shop and
witnessed installation process
• Identified items that can contact
center bearing rollers
• Shaft end
Shaft End
• Inner race
• PTO shaft
• Sharp edges
• Harder than bearing rollers
• Setting master shaft
• Heavy - weighs 12 lbs(5kg) Setting Master Shaft
(3 times heavier than PTO shaft) (Dummy Shaft) Inner Race
PTO Shaft

159
 Horizontal vs. vertical installation

• PTO shaft is installed in different orientations
• Either from side or bottom at overhaul shops
• From top at production build
PTO Shaft Installation in

Vertical Orientation
Horizontal Orientation Vertical Orientation
• Bearing roller sagging with vertical orientation

• Top rollers sag down due to gravity
• More prone to shaft contact during installation Roller Sagging
160
PTO Shaft – Root Cause A1 A5 D5 S1
 Root cause
• Installation damage identified as most
likely root cause
• Dent caused during installation
• Spallation originated from dent
 Safety risk assessment
• Indicates no thresholds exceeded that
require action
• IAE plans to implement corrective action
PTO Shaft Spline End Contact with

Center Bearing

161
PTO Shaft – Corrective Action A1 A5 D5 S1
 Mitigation
• Problem awareness – October 2016
• Service Information Letter (SIL)
 Corrective Action
• Assembly process and tooling improvements– March 2017
• Setting master shaft modification
• PTO shaft installation tool modification
• Production process / Engine Manual (EM) update
 On-wing action not required

162
PTO Shaft – Summary A1 A5 D5 S1
 PTO shaft center bearing events have resulted in IFSD’s

 Installation damage on rollers identified as most likely root cause
 Safety risk assessment shows no thresholds exceeded that require
action
 Mitigation and corrective action include problem awareness and
improved assembly process / tooling
Corrective
Issues Root Cause
Action
Reported Identified
(April 2016) (Aug 2016) Implemented
(Mar 2017)

Complete

163
PTO Shaft A1 A5 D5 S1
Questions?

164
Format
Picture:
Width: 1.42”
Jonathan Sullivan
Manager – Cold Section
HPC Stage 4 Blade
HPC Stage 4 Blade – Background A5 D5
 Current standard HPC Stg 4 blade introduced

August 2001 – SB 72-0295
• Pre-SB 72-0295 standard susceptible to
aerodynamic excitation
• Corrected issue for fracture at root leading
edge
 Several HPC Stg 4 IFSD events and shop
findings reported 2004-2005 on post SB-72-
0295 blade standard
• Tip rub considered most likely cause of events
HPC Stage 4 Blade
166
HPC Stage 4 Blade – Background A5 D5
 NMSB 72-0505 Ultrasonic Inspection (USI) introduced July 2005

• Both On-Wing and In-Shop
• On-Wing USI resulted in false pulls
• Four of seven engines removed were false pulls
• No additional findings after 1800 inspections on 1400 engines
• No events between 2005 and 2010
• On-wing USI high maintenance burden
• IAE reviewed and concluded on-wing inspection could be eliminated in
2007

167
HPC Stg 4 Blade – Background A5 D5
 Six events since 2014 - A5 / D5 events (No Select One)

 Engineering Root Cause Investigation launched in September 2015
V11013
May 2015
V11353 V20108
Apr 2015 Jun 2015
V20101 V11289
V10420
Nov 2014 Dec 2015
Mar 2016
Jan-14 Jan-15 July-16

Jan-16
168
A5 D5
HPC Stage 4 Blade– Investigation
 Investigation initiated:
• Data from events
• Review of hardware findings
• Post event hardware typically not helpful
due to significant damage
• Previous reports / historical information
HPC Stage 4 Blade Root Crack
• Shop Practices
• Manufacturing history
• Fault Tree / Fishbone generation
• Root Cause Identified December 2016
• Corrective Action Plan February 2017
HPC Stage 4 Blade Root
Fracture
169
A5 D5
HPC Stage 4 Blade– Investigation
 Detailed dimensional inspections on root contact
faces and airfoil frequency testing conducted :
 Event hardware (multiple sets)
 Service run hardware
 Production hardware
Dimensional Points on Root
 Dimensional data to be compared to manufacturing
tolerances
 Frequency data still under review but initial findings

show negligible differences in response
Frequency Response
170
HPC Stage 4 Blade– Investigation A5 D5
 Hardware review of lock plate /

retaining plate interaction
 Results inconclusive
 Engine V11289 fractured 4th blade and 2

additional cracked blades found during
engine teardown at interfaces
 Recent event hardware review from

V10420 has shown event blades
positioned at center of retaining plates
away from lock plates

171
HPC Stage 4 Blade – Fleet Management A5 D5
 Safety Risk Assessment shows no thresholds exceeded
 No change to the current recommendation

• Cat 4 SB 72-0505 inspections accomplished at every shop visit
• USI at module level
• FPI at piece part level
 On-wing inspection is not required

172
A5 D5
HPC Stage 4 Blade- Summary
 HPC Stage 4 post SB 72-0295 blade has experienced cracks in blade root
 On wing action is not required
 Engineering root cause investigation progressing
Root cause Identify Corrective

investigation Root Cause Action Plan
launched (December 2016) (February 2017)
(September 2015)
2015 2016 2017 On Target to

Complete

173
Questions?

174
Jonathan Sullivan
Manager – Cold Section
HPC Stage 7 Blade

HPC Stage 7 Blade – Background S1
 SelectOneTM introduced without blade damper wire

based on test data to address HPC drum wear in wire
grooves
 44 Findings to date:
• 1 Stage 6
• 43 Stage 7
• Zero Stage 8
 SelectOneTM engines in service without damper wire

• At risk for blade events
HPC 7th Blade Dovetail
2
HPC Stage 7 Blade – Investigation S1
 No correlation to stage length, region, thrust rating
 Reduced damping leads to blade root dovetail fretting

 Fretting can lead to crack initiation, root fracture, blade release

3
 Events/Findings Breakdown:
Most events occur during climb Proportional to fleet population

4
 Events/Findings Breakdown:
86% of events do not result in IFSD

5
HPC Stage 7 Blade – Root Cause S1
 Root cause:
• Uneven attachment loading & vibration lead to fretting
• Fretting may result in High Cycle Fatigue (HCF)
• Damper wire prevents HCF by reducing vibration and fretting/fracture
Damper Wire locations

6
HPC Stage 7 Blade – Fleet Management S1
 Studies / Actions Underway

• Operational Drivers Study underway: Flight data
review
• Preliminary results do not show any flight parameters which appear
to be drivers
• Ultrasonic inspection development study

7
 Operational Study: Initial Data Review

• Reviewed DFDR data from four operators with higher fracture rates
• 91 flights
• Compared to operator with good experience
• 220 flights
• No correlation found on initial review
 Expanded review for cumulative time in N2 speed resonant zones
• Operator with high fracture rates ~50,000 flights
• Operator with good experience ~11,000 flights
• Study ongoing - initial results November 2016
 Outcome of study may not identify practical solution

8
 USI on-wing probe prototype development

• On-wing trials by end of 2016
 Due to HCF crack propagation, blade fracture time not understood
• Inspection interval could be maintenance burden to customer
• Frequency of inspection could be weekly
• 8 hour inspection duration
USI Modeling Handheld Trials Phased Array

9
HPC Stage 7 Blade – Corrective Action S1
 Select One Fleet safety risk assessment - no thresholds exceeded

• IAE has implemented corrective action
 Corrective Action: Install Damper Wire
• Available at overhaul via SB 72-0642 since 2Q 2014
• Available in production 4Q 2013 (V17182 and up)
• New Damper Wire assessment ongoing
 40% damper wire incorporation in SelectOne fleet (production and
overhaul)

10
HPC Stage 7 Blade – Summary S1
 Root Cause has been identified for below platform fractures

 Corrective Action is incorporation of damper wire
 Operational Study and On-wing USI development ongoing
 Select One Fleet - no thresholds exceeded
New Damper
Operational Study
Root Cause SB72-0642 Wire
initial results
First Event Identified Released (November 2016) assessment
(December 2010) (March 2014) (2017)
(September 2012)
2010 2012 2013 2014 2016 2017
Damper Wire USI Trials

(December 2016) On Target to
at Production Complete
(December 2013)
11
Questions?
12
Barry Beckwith
Hot Section Manager
Turbine Cooling Air Tube Flange Bolts
S1
TCA Tube Bolts at HPT Case - Background
 C-Duct and Thrust Reverser (TR) Damage
found
• Result of missing TCA tube bolts at HPT case
• Hot air exits threaded through hole in HPT case
• 4 engines reported with TR damage
• All have been reported on 1st run engines
• No operational events reported
Missing TCA Bolt

188
S1
TCA Tube Bolts at HPT Case - Background
 Turbine Cooling Air (TCA) flows from the HPC to
the HPT via 4 external tubes
 The tubes are connected to the HPT case at 4

locations, 2, 4, 8 and 10 O'clock
 Each tube is attached by 4 bolts and secured by

cable or safety wire
• No locking feature in HPT case thread
 Customers have reported fractured cables

• In some instances bolts missing

189
S1
TCA Tube Bolts at HPT Case - Investigation
 Hardware from 3 engines returned to IAE for
investigation
 Investigation initiated Q1 2015
• Preliminary review has not identified the root cause of Bolt backed out
cable fracture
 Investigation plan to be provided – February 10 2017
Fractured cable

190
S1
TCA Tube Bolts at HPT Case - Mitigation
 IAE NMSB 75-0124 issued in December 2015
• NMSB inspection at subsequent “A” check and “C” thereafter
• NMSB is applicable to Select-One, V15001 and up
• Customers requested to provide feedback
 As of June 30, 2016
• 17 inspection reports with 11 findings of fractured cable
• No loose bolts
• Survey remains open and more data expected
 No TR damage reported since NMSB issued
• IAE continues to monitor the fleet

191
TCA Tube Bolts at HPT Case - Summary S1
 First issue reported on Q1 2014

 NMSB 75-0124 issued
 Ongoing root cause investigation
 Investigation plan provided – February 2017
First Investigation
Reported IAE Conducts NMSB 75- plan to be
Instance Investigation 0124 released provided
(Q1 2014) (Q1 2015) (Q4 2015)
On Target to
2014 2015 2016 2017 Complete

192
S1
TCA Tube Flange Bolts
Questions?
193
Ed Lagoy
Deputy VP
Customer Support
Afternoon Breakout Sessions

Breakout Sessions – Wednesday
 V2500 troubleshooting Location

• Faults and flight deck effect / best practices Soderini 3
 Cold and Hot section

• Updated limits and best practices Windroses S/W

195

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 Cold and Hot section

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