7.9.

24 2AC Covid Waivers Drill

1NC
 1nc---innovation
Innovation inevitable---international medical innovation solves and any crisis can
prompt emergency responses that solve the impact---covid proves

No disease impact.
Ord ’20 [Toby; 2020; Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy
from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette
Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126]

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10
The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague
of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11

When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years
each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by
far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox.

During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to
great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the
Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be
attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent
of the world’s people.13

Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the
end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote
Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the
First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined.

Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15
[FOONOTE]

In addition to this historical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories
suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the
empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill
more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they
progress and the theory of optimal virulence. However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction
of their hosts.

[END FOOTNOTE]

In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25
to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed
the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to
believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if
they were global in scale.

The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it
was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of
history.16
It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly
a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the
accompanying violence and imperial rule. The
strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the
fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is
incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only
works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We
have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their
damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.

ALT CAUSES to leadership---south china sea, Taiwan, Ukraine all matter more than
biotech---AND the AFF doesn’t check other adversaries like Iran and North Korea

The U.S. is behind in everything, not just biotech.

Luckenbaugh ’23 [Josh; July 17; reporter for National Defense; “U.S. falling behind China in critical
tech race,” https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/17/us-falling-behind-china-in-
critical-tech-race-report-finds]

However, the picture of the industrial base Ark.ai currently paints is not encouraging for the United States, the report
said. Govini found that in all 12 technology areas, “the United States is falling behind China in the core science as measured
by the patents granted in each country.”

Patents are “a leading indicator of technological dominance in the future,” said Govini Chairman and former Deputy
Secretary of Defense Bob Work. They are “the seed corn for making new discoveries that put you on the top of the competitive food
chain. And that's what scares me the most: China's doing far better than us in terms of the overall number of patents.”

For most of the critical technologies, “the United States is largely stagnating in patents in these areas, [and] in many cases United
States patent grants are actually declining,” Govini CEO Tara Murphy Dougherty said during the company’s release briefing for the report.
And for the capabilities actually in development, the United States heavily relies upon Chinese suppliers, she said.

“This is not just a defense problem,” Dougherty said. “This isn't just a microelectronics problem. This
is an overriding trend that
spans all U.S. federal programs and activities.” All 12 of the critical technologies Govini analyzed “are highly dependent
on Chinese entities for completing their projects, for developing their products, for bringing their goods and services
to the market, and that market includes some of our most sensitive national security programs.”

One of those critical technologies is artificial intelligence, and over the last five years the United States’ total spending on AI has
increased incrementally at best, even as “the technology advancements in AI have been staggering,” Dougherty said.
Meanwhile, China has openly stated its commitment to be the global AI leader by 2032, and has granted patents for AI
systems significantly faster than the United States in recent years, she added.
And when it comes to AI development, the Defense Department “is not actually the pacing spender, or setting the course on the trends that we
see with respect to AI activity in the federal space,” she said. While that shows the
United States sees the race for AI dominance as more
than a military issue, the department has historically struggled “with aligning itself bureaucratically to really drive
adoption and acceleration of AI within DoD activities and programs,” she said.
Dougherty noted the Defense Department’s Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office “has been given a revamped mandate to … accelerate
and adopt AI within the department,” and said she hopes the CDAO recognizes “how much room for acceleration there is, which … goes beyond
simply spending to the outcomes that are driven by that investment.”
Beyond the fact the AI supply chain is heavily reliant on entities based in China “or in other adversarial
countries,” the report also revealed the top U.S. vendors for AI “are the traditional defense contractors and traditional primes,” Dougherty
said.

“There's a disconnect there,” she said. There is a need for the national security ecosystem “to attract and scale companies
that are outside the Beltway and outside the traditional defense system, particularly in areas like artificial intelligence.”

Dougherty said that around five years ago, Govini analyzed the top 100 defense vendors and the top 100 AI companies,
“and we found almost no overlap. Five years later … we've made very little progress, and while we might be attracting some of
these non-traditional entrants into the defense procurement system to contribute to AI on national security problems, we certainly aren't
scaling them, at least not based on these numbers.”

China won’t ‘tear up the liberal order’ NOR start a war.

Swaine '21 [Michael; 4/21/21; PhD in Government from Harvard University, director of the East Asia
program at the Quincy Institute; "China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America,"
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/]

Finally, the
latter set of supposedly existential normative or ideological threats consists of many elements,
including Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order, Chinese
influence operations aimed at U.S. society, the export of China’s political values and state-directed economic
approach, and its sale of surveillance technologies and other items that facilitate the rise or strengthening of
authoritarian states. These threats all seem hair-raising at first glance. But while significant, they are greatly exaggerated
and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat.

Beijing has little interest in exporting its governance system, and where it does, it is almost entirely
directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States. In addition, there is no
evidence to indicate that the Chinese are actually engaged in compelling or actively persuading
countries to follow their experience. Rather, they want developing nations to study from and copy China’s
approach because doing so would help to legitimize the Chinese system both internationally and more importantly to Beijing’s
domestic audience.

In addition, the notion that Beijing is deliberately attempting to control other countries and make them more
authoritarian by entrapping them in debt and selling them “Big Brother” hardware such as surveillance
systems is unsupported by the facts. Chinese banks show little desire to extend loans that will fail, and
the failures that do occur are mostly due to poor feasibility studies and the incompetence and excessive zeal of
lenders and/or borrowers. Moreover, in both loan-giving and surveillance equipment sales, China has
shown no specific preference for nondemocratic over democratic states.

Even if Beijing were to attempt to export its development approach to other states, the actual attractiveness
of that approach would prove to be highly limited. The features undergirding China’s developmental
success are not replicable for most (if any) countries. These include a high savings rate; a highly acquisitive and
entrepreneurial cultural environment; a state-owned banking system and nonconvertible currency;
many massive state-owned industries that exist to provide employment, facilitate party control over key sectors, and drive huge
infrastructure construction; and strong controls over virtually all information flows. Moreover, such a model (if you
can call it that) is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive
corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free
information flows are required to drive global innovation.
Although China’s combination of economic reform policies and authoritarian political
system has been around since the
early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion.
There are certainly many authoritarian states and fragile democracies on China’s periphery, but none of them
were made that way by China.

China’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated. In the first place, it is
highly debatable whether in fact a single coherent global order even exists. What observers usually
refer to as the “liberal international order” (a relatively recent term) actually consists of an amalgam of disparate regimes
with different origins, including international human rights pacts, multilateral economic arrangements, and
an international court.
The United States certainly plays an important or leading role in many of these regimes. But it did not create and does not drive all global
regimes—and in fact does not support some of them, such as the International Court of Justice, and has not ratified some critical pacts such as
the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many very important global regimes (e.g., regarding the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, trade and investment, climate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are
supported by Beijing, albeit sometimes more in letter than in spirit.

The challenge for the United States is not how to fend off the imagined existential threats posed by
China. Rather, it lies in developing a much clearer and factually based overall understanding of the limited
challenges, threats, and indeed opportunities China poses to the United States and the policies needed to address
them. Rejecting the specious notion that China is threatening to destroy an entire way of life will make
this task much easier.

China’s not revisionist.

Jyalita ‘21 [Vincentia Vahistha Hirrya; 2021; Professor of Social and Political Sciences at the University
of Katolik Parahyangan in Indonesia; “Defensive Realism’s Perspective on Rising China’s Behavior as A
Status Quo State,” Sentris, https://journal.unpar.ac.id/index.php/Sentris/article/view/4621]

Identifying rising China as a status quo state a. Official Statements and Actions Relating to International Norms Using
the first indicator that determines a status quo state by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He, it can be considered
that official statements from China matter in the way that statements of support or disagreement provide a
glimpse into how it might view the current internationally accepted norms like sovereignty and limitations on the use of
force. If China was a status quo state it would express support for these international norms, while if it was a revisionist state then would be
keen on challenging these international norms. It was found that throughout recent years, China has consistently expressed in its
official statements that it seeks to develop itself while still maintaining international peace and stability . Since
late 2003, China has insisted through various public statements that it strives for a “peaceful rise” which will not disrupt the
international order. Zheng Bijian, a former prominent senior government official in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), first cemented
the idea of China’s peaceful development during a speech at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia that year.37

Then in 2005, China revealed its white

paper with the name “China’s Peaceful Development Road”. The white
paper contained China’s commitment to pursue domestic development and still actively contribute to the greater
good of the global community.38 In one part, China states that it seeks to respect sovereignty, promote world security, and strive for common
development.39

Moreover, China reaffirmed its commitments to peaceful development in the 2019 White Paper titled “China
and the World in the New Era”. Within the White Paper, China states it has no intentions to strive for hegemony and
challenge other states even when its strength is growing.40 It claims that doing so would only result in losses and that it is satisfied with the
current international order from which it has largely benefited from.41
Based on the evidence of official statements alone for the first indicator of a status quo state, it is clear that China
has continuously expressed its desire to develop itself while still following international norms such as
sovereignty and limitations on the use of force. China’s consistent expression of support for these norms can be
interpreted as a reflection of their firm belief towards the international norms of sovereignty and limitations on
the use of force.
Using the theory of defensive realism, it can be analyzed that the evidence from China’s official statements that indicate support for
international norms also shows that is a status quo state since they tend to wish avoiding attracting unwanted caution from other countries
under the circumstances of anarchy where their security is not guaranteed. If China were to explicitly express that it detests
the internationally accepted norms of sovereignty and limitations on the use of force, then it would be seen as a possible
threat that warrants suspicion from other states. So, expressing itself as a status quo state that respects international
norms are safer for China’s security. However, for their words to hold more weight, its actions need to be analyzed
as well.
As a part of the first indicator outlined by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He, China’s actions also matter since it determines whether it
statements of support for the internationally accepted norms are actually implemented. A true status quo state would act in support for these
international norms while a revisionist state would actively challenge these international norms. Based on its actions, China’s
actions
have thus far reflected their claims of international norms of sovereignty and limitations on the use of
force. In terms of respect to sovereignty, China has prioritized bilateral negotiations that follows international
laws as mechanism to settle territorial disputes. For instance, China resolved land or sea disputes with 12
neighboring countries including Vietnam through negotiations.42 By preferring to settle territorial disputes through
bilateral negotiations that follows the international laws instead of forcefully imposing its territorial claims, it means that China respects the
international norm of sovereignty and limitations on the use of force. Here it is evident that China’s actions are aligned with its claims of
wanting to pursue peaceful development without breaking the international norms of sovereignty and limitations on the use of force.

Through the perspective of defensive realism, it can be analyzed that the evidence from China’s actions of support towards international norms
also indicates that it is a status quo state because they tend to avoid violating other states’ sovereignty and using force. This is because under
anarchy, attempts from China to dominate other states, that would clearly violate sovereignty and the limitations on the use of force, would be
countered through military means by other states who also wish to defend their security. The defensive
military response from
other states is one of the disincentives of attempts to dominate other states that anarchy creates.
Another disincentive that anarchy creates is the lack of assurance of success for China and as a result they
could even experience further loss consisting of damage to its own military resources and security.
Meanwhile, implementing support for international norms of sovereignty and limitations on the use of force in its actions
give China a friendly image among other countries and lowers tensions that would otherwise be caused if China
disregarded the aforementioned international norms.

b. Participation in International Organizations, Accords, and Conventions In the second indicator by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu,
and Kai He, membership or lack of in international organizations tells China’s willingness to participate and cooperate alongside other states
under the current international order. A status quo state would be keen on beinginvolved in international organizations and contribute to the
common good while a revisionist state would be reluctant to join international organizations. Early in its history China was not an active
member of international organizations. Only after it started opening itself to the world in the 1970s did it begin to assume active membership in
several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).43 In 1971, China finally became a member of the United Nations.44 Not long
after, it became increasingly involved in other IGOs such as the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank.45 To put into perspective the extent of its activeness over the years, in 1966 China was a member of only one IGO while in 2000 its
membership exceeded 50 IGOs.46 Based on China’s growing membership in international organizations, it is apparent that China has shown
increasing commitment to cooperate with other states alongside its rapid development under the current international order that is led by the
U.S. It can be interpreted that China is keen on being a fellow cooperative state for the common good.
From the view of defensive realism, this evidence of China’s growing membership in international organizations also shows that it is a status
quo state since status quo states wish to preserve its security under the circumstances of anarchy in a way that will not be met with hostility by
other states. The reason for this is because under anarchy, China will face a security dilemma if it attempts
to increase its own security where it is challenged by other states who feel threatened. China’s participation in
international organizations can therefore reduce this security dilemma by creating opportunities to
cooperate with other states in creating mutual security.
Then as a continuation of the second indicator by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He, international accords and conventions shows China’s
stance in various global issues. If China was a status quo state then it would be keen on joining agreements alongside other states on various
global issues which means they are willingly a part of the international community for the sake of the common good, while if China was a
revisionist state then it would be on the opposite side. It was found that in international accords and conventions, China
has signed and
ratified the following agreements but not limited to; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Paris
Agreement.47 The ratification of these agreements indicate that China also acknowledges the importance of these
topics alongside other countries and is willing to be a part of the international community for the sake of the
common good.
Utilizing the view of defensive realism, this evidence of China’s participation in various global agreements shows that it is behaving like a status
quo state by presenting itself as agreeable across several topics which can be a useful tool for status quo states to obtain security. It can be
concluded that in defensive realism, the end goal of the state after all is to achieve security because this is what anarchy pushes them to do.
This method of joining global agreements is useful because it adds positivity to China’s image as a fellow
cooperative state that is willing to contribute to the common good and does not raise tensions from other states.

c. Voting History in the UN In the third indicator by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He, China’s voting history in the UN matter
because it shows whether China’s preferences are aligned with other states in the UN that represents the international community. If China
was a status quo state then its voting history in the UN would tend to agree with the majority of the international community, while if it was a
revisionist state then China would tend to disagree. The following data lists China’s voting history in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 1971-
2018 across six topics: IsraelPalestinian conflict (ME), Nuclear Weapons (NU), Arms Control (DI), Human Rights (HR), Colonialism (CO), and
Economic Development (EC).

Based on the data above, it is apparent that a majority of China’s voting history in the UNGA consists of agreements with the
resolutions proposed across six topics. The total for agreements is 3950 from 1971-2018.49 In comparison, disagreements
consist the least of China’s voting history with a total of 176 times from 1971 until 2018 while the choice to abstain from voting amounts to 437
times.50 From
this data it is apparent that China tends to frequently agree with the majority of the
international community on all the topics discussed at the UNGA. In the UN Security Council (UNSC), China is a
permanent member with the right to veto resolutions. The following data lists China’s veto history compared to other
permanent members in the UNSC.

According to the data, China has used its veto right the least along with France. China’s use of veto totals to 14.52 In percentages, China’s
frequency to veto would be at 11.5% from the years 1971 until 2019.53 In comparison, the U.S. has used its veto right the most out of the other
countries in the list with a total of 80 vetoes with a frequency of 65.5% in the same period.54 Based on the data above, it is apparent
that China usage of veto is a part of the lowest out of the other states which shows that it mostly agrees with the rest of
the international community on resolutions proposed in the UNSC.

From the perspective of defensive realism, it can be analyzed that China

would face disincentives from attempting to
challenge and dominate the system such as deterrence by other states. This evidence of China’s tendency to agree
alongside most of the international community in terms of its voting history in the UN shows it is a status quo state because China can be
interpreted as reluctant to challenge the current international order because it is aware of the disincentives. These disincentives exist
in the first place because according to defensive realism in the circumstances of anarchy, the security of
states is not guaranteed by a world government.
2. Reasons Behind Rising China’s Preference to be a Status Quo State In the previous section, it has been proven that rising China can be
categorized as a status quo state. This would partly explain why rising China is not seeking to displace the U.S. and alter the international order.
To get a more complete picture, the reasons why rising China has preferred to be a status quo state instead of a revisionist state will be
explained in this section from the perspective of defensive realism.
It can be argued using the theory of defensive realism that rising China
prefers to be a status quo state because it has benefits
for their security in the circumstances of anarchy. The first benefit that China earns by being a status quo state in the world condition
of anarchy is that they will not face any significant challenge from other states because they are not viewed as anaggressor.
The evidence of this can be seen from the partnerships that is has been able to conduct with other countries in various sectors like the
economy. For example, China
was able to create partnerships with 78 countries and 5 regional organizations
like the European Union and ASEAN as 2016 came to a close.55 These partnerships include partnerships for common
development, friendship and cooperation, strategic mutual benefits and more.56 Hence, it is apparent that China benefits by being a status quo
state in the circumstances of anarchy since they can avoid being treated with hostility by other states and can even form partnerships with the
other states.

The second benefit for China as a status quo state in this anarchic world is that it can ensure its economic
security without resorting to aggressive means that undermines their economic security . Economic security
can be undermined when aggressive means are used because there are high costs involved in the activity of waging war against other states.
The high costs can involve funding for the usage of resources such as military troops, transportation, fuel and ammunition. There are also
additional costs that may come after the war ends and require a long time to recover such as the loss of resources, lives, and property. Take for
example, the estimated costs that burdens the U.S. for carrying out wars against Afghanistan and Iraq are around $US 4
trillion to $US 6 trillion, excluding the economic costs in the long run.57 The effort of waging war for China does not necessarily bring
guarantee either that it will be successful due to the condition of anarchy that pushes other states to respond to security threats. Looking at the
case study, it is apparent that accordingly, China has ensured its economic security under the current international order led by the U.S. without
the necessity of using aggressive means. Within 40 years, China has grown economically to become the world’s second-biggest economy
despite being one of the world’s poorest country before with more than 88% of its citizens living below $US 2 each day.58 This was largely
possible due to the economic reforms that opened China to the outside world and foreign investment in 1978.59 Moreover, in 2010 China
eventually surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-biggest economy which earned it the title of an economic powerhouse after the
U.S.60 It has been predicted by some economists that China’s
economy will eventually overtake the U.S. by 2030.61 All
of this has occurred alongside China’s increasing involvement in the international community through joining
international organizations, agreements, and partnerships that have been mentioned before. So here it is clear that China’s economic security
has benefited under the current international order that is dominated by the U.S. without having to conduct any wars with the U.S. for power
over this international order.

The third benefit that China receives by being a status quo state is increasing its security without being viewed
with suspicion through the establishment of mutual security with the international community. As mentioned before using defensive realism,
under anarchy there is asecurity dilemma where attempts by a state to increase its security causes other states to respond against them. To
mitigate this,China has contributed in efforts to enhance world security by contributing to the UN’s
peacekeeping forces. In fact, China comes second in the list of countries who contribute most towards UN peacekeeping forces.62 By
showing that it contributes to world security, then other states are less likely to treat China with
hostility and more willing to cooperate with them through security partnerships . For example, in the Southeast
Asia region, China has formed security partnerships with countries like Laos and Malaysia in the form of
defense dialogues and military exercises.63 This means that China has been able to increase its security under the framing of
mutual security with other countries to avoid the suspicion that it would have received from other states if it had suddenly increased its
security on its own.

No democracy impact.
Chiba ’21 [Daina and Erik Gartzke; February 19; Associate Professor of Political Science in the
Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D in Political
Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi
University; Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political
Science from the University of Iowa; Office of Naval Research, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in
the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace,” p. 1-44]

The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states— is one of
the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the
relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous
scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a
broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement
remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically
(e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).

At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg,
andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government
involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson
2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore
1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and
natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also
associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may
contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly
they are not.
We seek to contribute to this literature, not by proposing yet another theory to explain how democracy vanquishes war, but by estimating the
causal effect of joint democracy on the probability of militarized disputes using a quasi-experimental research design. We begin by noting that
some of thecommon causes of democracy and peace may be unobservable, generating an endogenous
relationship between the two. Theories of democracy and explanations for peace are at a formative state; it is not possible to utilize
detailed, validated and widely accepted models of each of these processes to assess their interaction. Indeed, to a remarkable degree
democracy and peace each remain poorly understood and weakly accounted for empirically, despite their
central roles in international politics. We address the risk of spurious correlation by applying an instrumental variables
approach. Having taken into account possible endogeneity between democracy and peace, we find that joint
democracy does not have an independent pacifying effect on interstate conflict. Instead, our findings show
that democratic countries are more likely to attack other democracies than are non-democracies. Our
results call into question the large body of theory that has been proposed to account for the apparent pacifism of
democratic dyads.

RUSSIAN influence thumps democracy

 1nc---sustainability
CANT SOLVE---developing countries won’t follow US lead through IP law---the AFF isn’t
a universal solution

Warming will be gradual, cushioned by inevitable intermediate mitigation.

Wade ’21 [Robert H.; 2021; Professor of Global Political Economy at the London School of Economics,
DPhil and MPhil in Social Anthropology from Sussex University, Master’s in Economics from Victoria
University, BA in Economics from Otago University; Global Policy Journal, “What is the Harm in
Forecasting Catastrophe Due to Man-Made Global Warming?”
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/22/07/2021/what-harm-forecasting-catastrophe-due-man-
made-global-warming]
Conclusion

I have argued that the “plausible” risks of climate change are commonly exaggerated within the climate community. Recall
for example, Christiana Figueres, 2020, “The scary thing is that after 2030 it basically doesn’t really matter what humans do”; Kevin Drum, 2019,
“[The Green New Deal] would only change the dates for planetary suicide by a decade or so”; Frank Fenner, 2010, “We’re going to
become extinct. Whatever we do now is too late.” Many more in the same doomsday vein.

We have seen that the

standard global warming models have a powerful built-in bias to exaggerate the rate of
future temperature rise, as seen in (most of) them “hindcasting” temperature rises several times faster than
actually observed. We have seen that forecasters commonly take “worst-case scenarios” as “likely scenarios in the
absence of radical action” (eg reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2050), to the point where Nature recently published a paper sub-titled,
“Stop using the worst-case scenario for climate warming as the most likely outcome”.

The dismaying thing is that scientists and advocates have

been making catastrophising global warming forecasts of this
kind fordecades past, normally dated some 10 to 30 years into the future. The due date comes without catastrophe,
but never a retrospective holding to account. Rather, on to the next catastrophising forecast another 10 to 30 years
ahead. Scientists-writers-activists know the catastrophe forecasts get the attention, the clicks, the research funding.
We saw the exaggeration mechanism spelled out by Richard Betts of the BBC, Holman Jenkins of the Wall St Journal, and climate scientist Judith
Curry.

The built-in exaggeration of the costs of climate change blunts the parallel with nuclear power plants. We know with high certainty the costs of
nuclear explosions. We know the costs of global temperature going above 1.5 C above “pre-industrial” much less certainly, and we can see the
mechanisms by which the likely costs are being systematically exaggerated.

On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that even without the doomsday exaggerations the plausible risks of climate change could be very serious, in particular because of the inherent
political economy difficulty of getting needed global or regional cooperation when political action is mostly at the level of sovereign nation states (see the G20).

Coal power generation is the single biggest source of GHG emissions, and emissions from coal consumption will probably not fall fast, whatever the promises. First, coal is cheap, accessible and
generates reliable power for many developing countries; in Asia, coal alone generates 40 percent of energy consumption, much higher than the world average of 29 percent. (12) Second,
developing countries, including China, assert a strong claim on carbon space to power their economic development. They see it partly as a matter of fundamental justice, since developed
countries emitted most of the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere and seas as the necessary condition for them becoming developed. Developed countries promise finance and technical
assistance on a massive scale to accelerate the energy transition in developing countries – and have a long track record of leaving promises as promises. (See the global distribution of Covid
vaccines. See the results of vaunted “voting reform” in the World Bank, leaving the US with 17% and China with 6%.) What is more, the Japanese government plans up to 22 new coal power
plants, as it closes nuclear plants in the wake of Fukushima.

Then comes a question: does drawing attention to the doomsday exaggerations of the CCC – “disaster”, “catastrophe”, “extinction”, “fiddling while the planet burns” - serve to reduce the
political and public pressures for necessary ameliorative action, in a world where powerful fossil lobbies seek to block or delay such action for reasons independent of “evidence”? Should
“Third Way” essays like this one not be published, because “give them (deniers, sceptics) an inch and they will take a mile”? To what extent must mass publics be “panicked” in order to induce
enough collective political and business action – national, international – to substantially slow the growth of GHG emissions? If we can sustain emission- and temperature-curbing action only
by holding up the certainty of disaster, catastrophe, extinction, then better to let the doomsday exaggerations continue as the necessary condition for that ameliorative action. What is the
harm, when the alternative is ruin for humanity and the biosphere?

The danger is that the repeated wild exaggerations produce a public backlash, a discrediting, and a strengthening of the many “deniers” who see “leftists, governments, and the United
Nations” as the source of malevolence in the world. A more accurate accounting of the evidence would (hopefully) produce a more calibrated and sustained public and business response.
What to do? (13)

The IPCC should allocate some 10% of its budget to a Red Team, dedicated to independent scrutiny of its evidence and conclusions (especially the Summary for Policymakers). (14) The IPCC
should revise its mandate to require it explicitly to focus on interactions between natural forces and human actions, as it is now almost required not to, biassing its assessment of the state of
scientific knowledge towards “man-made global warming” as an almost separate system.

Learned societies should more actively seek to understand and publicize the reasons for repeated large-scale discrepancies between “hindcasts” and “forecasts” on the one hand and actual
observations on the other, discrepancies strongly biased towards “disaster”.

It is particularly important that the knee-jerk attribution of extreme weather events to global warming be challenged with reference to evidence. Judith Curry explained – quoted earlier -- why

CCC advocates have a powerful incentive to attribute cases of extreme weather to global warming, tout
court. She has recently written, “Apart from the reduced frequency of the coldest temperatures, the signal of global
warming in the statistics of extreme weather events remains much smaller than that from natural
climate variability, and is expected to remain so at least until the second half of the 21rst century .” She goes
on to amplify a point made earlier about the limits of the climate models used for the IPCC assessment reports: they are driven

mainly by predictions of future GHG emissions. They do not include predictions of natural climate
variability arising from solar output, volcanic eruptions or evolution of large-scale multi-decadal ocean
circulations. They do a particularly poor job of simulating regional and decadal-scale climate variability.
(15)

Participants on both sides have to learn the art of respecting the principle of free speech while maintaining the standards of civil discourse.

While I have stressed the CCC’s support for urgent and radical changes to the way we live, work and govern, some CCC champions argue that the world economy could continue on a largely
unchanged growth trajectory provided that we switch fast from fossil fuels to renewables. Indeed, this switch is beginning to happen fast, with coal and nuclear energy production unable to
compete without subsidies in areas where natural gas, wind and solar resources are readily available.

But to say that life can continue as before provided we substitute renewables for fossil fuels obscures the huge difficulties for many developing countries of getting out of fossil fuels while
growing fast enough to reduce the income gap with developed countries.

We must give high priority to investments in “clean coal” technologies, such as carbon capture, storage and use, to make the dirtier coal cleaner in existing and new coal-power plants; and link
coal-power retirement to the coming on-stream of attractive alternatives. The multilateral development banks have recently or will soon announce bans on coal power. The G7 leaders
meeting in mid 2021 promised to stop using government funds to finance new international coal power plants by the end of 2021. China’s Belt and Road Initiative should increase its pressure
on host countries to cut back on dirty coal and boost clean coal and renewables.

A high and immediate priority is to build a robust financing and technical assistance mechanism for help from developed to developing countries. The Paris Agreement instituted a Mitigation
pillar and an Adaptation pillar. Intense debate took place around the third, Loss and Damage, the name of a mechanism to compensate for the destruction that Mitigation and Adaptation
cannot prevent. Developed countries by and large have sought to marginalize the Loss and Damage pillar, as they have long sought to marginalize Special and Differential Treatment for
developing countries in trade and investment agreements. “Finance is something that really rich countries, particularly the US, have made sure that there is no progress and not even
discussion on”, remarked Harjeet Singh, senior advisor at Climate Action Network International. (16)

My “forecast” is that in
the next two to three decades to midcentury we will make rapid progress in scientific knowledge
about weather and climate, helped by longer and more accurate satellite and ocean records and by a new generation of
climate models that operate at one to ten kilometers scale (as distinct from the current models’ 50 kilometer scale). We will probably
continue to make rapid progress in decoupling GHG from GDP growth, with a combination of state direction-
setting and private innovation focused on transformations in energy, transport, buildings, industry and agriculture, using incentives
like research and development subsidies and tax credits for technology investment, and penalties for carbon-intensive activities. (17) In
transport, this entails coordination across urban planning decisions, public transport investment, future of remote working, infrastructures for
electric charging and hydrogen loading. (18) Transformations in these systems are
already underway, and the prospect of
vast new green investments, supported and under-written by the state, will intensify them. These green investments will
open productive investment opportunities previously limited by stagnant wages and rising debt, which have driven investment into increasingly
speculative ventures. If by two or three decades ahead it looks as though the second half of this century could well experience globally extreme
climate and ocean events, we will be much more knowledgeable about what to do than we are today. (19)

Adaptation is guaranteed, zeroing the impact.

Lomborg ’21 [Dr. Bjorn; 2021; President of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, Former Director of the
Danish Government's Environmental Assessment Institute, PhD in Political Science at the University of
Copenhagen, M.A. in Political Science at the University of Aarhus, BA from the University of Georgia;
Wall Street Journal, “Climate Change Calls for Adaptation, Not Panic,”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-adaptation-panic-exaggerating-disaster-11634760376]
It’s easy to construct climate disasters. You just find a current, disconcerting trend and project it into
the future, while ignoring everything humanity could do to adapt. For instance, one widely reported study found
that heat waves could kill thousands more Americans by the end of the century if global warming continues apace—but only if you assume
people won’t use more air conditioning. Yes, the climate is likely to change, but so is human behavior in response.

Adaptation doesn’t make the cost of global warming go away entirely, but it does reduce it dramatically.
Higher temperatures will shrink harvests if farmers keep growing the same crops, but they’re likely to adapt by growing other
varieties or different plants altogether. Corn production in North America has shifted away from the Southeast toward the
Upper Midwest, where farmers take advantage of longer growing seasons and less-frequent extreme heat. When sea levels rise,
governments build defenses—like the levees, flood walls and drainage systems that protected New Orleans from
much of Hurricane Ida’s ferocity this year.

Nonetheless, many in the media push unrealistic projections of climate catastrophes, while ignoring
adaptation. A new study documents how the biggest bias in studies on the rise of sea levels is their
tendency to ignore human adaptation, exaggerating flood risks in 2100 by as much as 1,300 times. It is also
evident in the breathless tone of most reporting: The Washington Post frets that sea level rise could “make 187 million people homeless,” CNN
fears an “underwater future,” and USA Today agonizes over tens of trillions of dollars in projected annual flood damage. All three rely on
studies that implausibly assume no society across the world will make any adaptation whatever for the rest of the
century. This isn’t reporting but scaremongering.

You can see how far from reality these sorts of projections are in one heavily cited study, depicted in the graph nearby If you assume no society
will adapt to any sea-level rise between now and 2100, you’ll find that vast areas of the world will be routinely flooded, causing $55 trillion in
damage annually in 2100 (expressed in 2005 dollars), or about 5% of global gross domestic product. But as the study emphasizes, “ in reality,
societies are likely to adapt.”

By raising the height of dikes, the study shows that humanity can negate almost all that terrible projected damage by
2100. Only 15,000 people would be flooded every year, which is a remarkable improvement compared with the 3.4 million people flooded in
2000. The total cost of damage, investments in new dikes, and maintenance costs of existing dikes will fall sixfold between now and 2100 to
0.008% of world GDP.

Adaptation is much more effective than climate regulations at staving off flood risks. Compare the two types of policies in isolation. Without any
climate mitigation to help, dikes would still safeguard more than 99.99% of the flood victims you’d see if global warming continued on current
trends. Instead of 187 million people flooded in 2100, there would be only 15,000. Climate policy achieves much less on its own. Without
adaptation, even stringent regulations that keep the global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius would reduce the number of flood victims
only down to 85 million a year by the end of the century.

Stringent climate policy still has only a mild effect when used in concert with dikes: Instead of the 15,000 flood victims you’d get with only
adaptation, you’d have 10,000. And getting there would cost hundreds of trillions of dollars, which is hardly mitigated by the $40 billion drop in
total flood damage and dike costs climate regulations would achieve. As I’ve explained in these pages before, this kind of policy has a high
human cost: the tens of millions of people pricey climate regulations relegate to poverty.

You don’t have to portend doom to take climate change seriously. Ignoring the benefits of adaptation may make for better
headlines, but it badly misinforms readers.

NO MODELING---its too costly for countries to follow on

No food wars.
Vestby ’18 [Vestby, Ida Rudolfsen, and Halvard Buhaug; 5-18-18; Doctoral Researcher at the Peace
Research Institute Oslo; doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at
Uppsala University and PRIO; Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor
of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor
of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography; “Does hunger cause conflict?” Prio,
https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little

scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food
increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict
requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in
the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to
be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to
coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In
reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land
ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price
of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international
media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the
Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

NO BRINK---when will patents provide solutions to food or move us to successful gene

editing? There’s zero brightline for AFF solvency

Gene editing is infeasible at a large scale AND will be controlled regardless.

Karoui ’19 [Meriem, Monica Hoyos-Flight, and Liz Fletcher; August 7; Centre for Synthetic and Systems
Biology in the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Edinburgh; Innogen Institute in the
School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Edinburgh; Frontiers, “Future Trends in
Synthetic Biology—A Report,” https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbioe.2019.00175/full]
Tackling Risk

Synthetic biology is an example of a dual-use technology: it promises numerous beneficial applications, but it can also cause harm. This has led
to fears that it could, intentionally or unintentionally, harm humans or damage the environment. For example, there is huge value in our ability
to engineer viruses to be more effective and specific shuttles for gene therapies of devastating inherited disorders; however, engineering
viruses may also lead to the creation of even more deadly pathogens by those intent on harm.

“Synthetic biology should be regarded as an extension of earlier developments and technologies”

Some would argue that synthetic biology poses an existential risk and needs to be treated with extreme
caution. However, many new technological advances across the decades have met similar concerns. The
uncertainty and remote possibility of such risks could hamper the development of useful technology. Scientists, their host institutions
and funding bodies should (and indeed already do) consider whether the research planned could be misused.
Measures that reduce the likelihood of misuse and its consequences should be implemented and clearly communicated. The synthetic biology
community needs to be aware of, and respond to, these challenges by engaging in horizon scanning exercises as well as open dialogue with
regulatory bodies and the media.

“Don't avoid risk – manage it”

Being more open about risks, and how they are controlled, provides an opportunity to shift discourse toward the benefits of synthetic biology in
addressing urgent global needs, such as the production of biofuels, food security and more effective medicines, and potentially improve public
acceptance.

“The questions should not be ‘what’s the next big thing for synthetic biology' but ‘where is the greatest unmet need’.”
Despite the efforts by individual countries to establish synthetic biology research roadmaps, broader, international agreement on common
standards (and red lines) across the field may help establish trust and to advance the best pre-competitive research into useful applications.

Meeting participants highlighted the importance of training in responsible research conduct and ethics. Given students' future role as science
ambassadors and influencers, their training should not only convey skills and knowledge but also awareness and critical thinking about the
prospects and potential for dual use of synthetic biology. All researchers must remain vigilant regardless of the many pressures and
distractions of running a successful research lab; they may not have specialist training in identifying the risks of misuse but they are the people
best placed to maintain informed oversight of risks.
One example of current synthetic biology research with potential dual use is gene drive technology, which can be used to propagate a particular
suite of genes throughout a population. The benefits of using gene drive technology include the eradication of disease-carrying insect
populations and the elimination of invading pest species but it has raised concerns about the unintended ecological impacts of reducing or
eliminating a population (Callaway, 2018; Collins, 2018).

Similar release concerns surround research that is harnessing the ability of pathogens to target particular tissues in the body or particular
chemicals in the environment, which could greatly aid efforts to deliver targeted therapies or clean-up contaminated sites. To date, such
large-scale release for environmental bioremediation interventions has not been possible.
“We need to mind the gap between R&D scale up and communications …. One bad blog can kill a commercial product”

There was consensus that the need for regulation over this community remains important. Regulation
needs to keep up to speed with the emerging technologies and should focus on the product rather than
the process used to create it (Tait et al., 2017). Unsuitable regulatory frameworks (as well as unfavorable public perception)
could discourage private sector investment in synthetic biology.
Advantage 1
 O/V
Status quo - COVID waivers in the status quo kills innovation which destroys US
competitiveness and public health
Chinese hegemony and disease outweighs:
China is revisionist – SCS and Taiwan proves Chinese aggression and the worst thing is
China has an edge in biotech right now, biotech is the backbone to national security
And China revisionist now and COVID proves disease can come out of nowhere
 L/L
1. No International Innovation, WTO waiver kills innovation on global scale, and
countries are expected to follow international standards. NO emergency
response because companies are afraid to gamble with uncertainty that’s 1AC
Popper and Bush
2. Moving on to pandemics impact! Prefer more recent researches on pandemic
and their evidence is pre-COVID, the inherent complexity of the modern world
increases the chances of pandemic through poor sanitary conditions, climate
change, animal concentration, and turns public health that’s 1AC Jones and Kim
3. Group 1NC 3 and 4 – No alt cause because biotech is the backbone for building
national security, international cooperation on health, climate, and energy of
US leadership in this age of tech race, that’s 1AC Kelley. And their Luckenbaugh
card measures tech progress by the number of patents created, and of course
US fall behind after Alice-Mayo and COVID waivers and this is exactly what the
aff is arguing for, thank you neg for this card
4. The neg conceals China’s aggressiveness. Extend 1AC Wang, SCS and Taiwan
proves China is flexing and willing to flex its revisionism once US opens its
window of opportunity Their Swaine card said that “China wants developing
nations to study from and copy China’s approach and legitimizing the Chinese
system” and even if it doesn’t start a war it leads to a tech authoritarian which
is extinction that’s Brand
5. Yes democracy impact! Totalitarian states are war-prone, famine,
mismanagement, that’s Brands, Mao’s China, Stalin’s Soviet Union historically
proves
6. No Russia thumpers because they’re busy fighting in Ukraine and not
economically strong as China and US and sanction checks
Advantage 2
 O/V
Covid Waivers kills biotech innovation which is key to solve 1. Global warming and 2.
Gene Editing
Multiple scenarios on global warming – food wars, civilization collapses, authoritarian
aggression, extreme weather – extinction on all scales
We outweigh on gene editing which is key to net-zero economy and reduce ghg
emission for sustainability
We outweigh on timeframe and probability!
1. 1AC Kemp says 75% of the world will be facing extreme weather conditions
latest by the end of the century
2. Once it reaches the tipping point it becomes 100%. We should do anything to
prevent that day from coming
 Line By Line
1. Even if the aff isn’t an universal solution it’s try or die! Countries follow US
hegemony and international standards. And even if it doesn’t model to other
countries US competitiveness is key
2. Group their food war and warming impact. Warming is comprised of different
elements as mentioned in the overview which all independently leads to
extinction, not just extreme climate itself And warming’s not exaggerated
because once it reaches a tipping point it accelerates, and 1NC Wade pollutes
the Earth until inevitable extinction actually happens.
3. No adaptation humanity has never experienced true effects of climate change
before, and the solution the neg proposed is to have temporary solutions such
as damns against natural disasters and only biotech win in the long-term
debate.
4. No cost issues, countries model or kills innovation and that turns their too
costly to model argument.
5. 1NC 5 - Yes food war impact! 1AC Karagul says food insecurity lead to price
shock, geopolitical instability and goes nuclear, and revisionist countries take
the opportunity – turns their impact
6. Group their last two arguments on gene editing. Companies will keep trade
secrets in the future so of course. Their Karoui card literally says regulation
need to keep up with emerging technology which is consistent with the plan
 7.9.24 2AC Covid Waivers Drill (Redo)
Glow:

1. Very good substance (using opponents’ cards against them by pointing out contradictions)
2. Persuasive (using real world examples) and confident
3. Good transition and labelling

Grow:

1. Cut down overview and adv 2 impacts are too repetitive in order to increase efficiency

Redo:

1. 3 min  2 min
2. Focus on cutting down repetitive parts and overview
3. Work on speaking clearly too and slow down on important parts
4. Try doing the speech off a flow instead of typing anything off the comp
Advantage 1
 O/V
Status quo waivers kill innovation and destroy competitiveness and turns public
health
China is revisionist now and they have an edge – US companies are disincentivized or
move overseas – authoritarian regime leads to extinction
And Covid proves disease can come out of nowhere
 L/L
1. No international innovation, WTO waiver kills innovation on global scale. No
crisis response because companies are afraid to gamble with uncertainty after
covid that’s 1AC Popper and Bush
7. Moving on to pandemics! Prefer recent researches over pre-covid evidences,
increasing complexity of the modern world like poor sanitary conditions,
climate change, and animal concentration cause evolved disease that’s 1AC
Jones and Kim
8. No alt cause because biotech is the backbone for building national security,
international cooperation and leadership in this age of tech race, that’s 1AC
Kelley. Their Luckenbaugh card measures tech progress by the number of
patents created, thank you neg for this card, this shows how US fall behind
COVID waivers and thus do the plan
9. The neg conceals China’s aggressiveness, SCS and Taiwan proves revisionism.
Their Swaine card said that “China wants developing nations to study from and
copy China’s approach and legitimizing the Chinese system” and even if it
doesn’t start a war it leads to a tech authoritarian and extinction that’s Brand
10. Yes democracy impact! Totalitarian states are war-prone, famine,
mismanagement, that’s Brands, Mao’s China, Stalin’s Soviet Union historically
proves
11. No Russia thumpers because 1. Ukraine and sanction checks and 2. They’re not
as economically competitive as China 3. They will even work with China
Advantage 2
 O/V
Covid Waivers kills biotech innovation which is key to solve 1. Global warming and 2.
Gene Editing
Multiple scenarios on global warming – food wars, civilization collapses, authoritarian
aggression, extreme weather – extinction on all scales, and 75% of the world will face
it latest by the end of the century and know that it’s inevitable
Gene editing which is key to net-zero economy and reduce ghg emission for
sustainability, it’s try or die
 Line By Line
7. 1NC 1 Even if the aff isn’t an universal solution it’s try or die! Countries follow
US hegemony and international standards or else extinction
8. Group their food war and warming impact. Warming is extinction on multiple
layers and 1NC Wade pollutes the Earth until extinction comes
9. No adaptation since climate change has never been faced before and neg
solution is to have temporary solutions such as damns while only biotech win in
the long-term debate.
10. No cost issues and C/A 1NC 1, countries model or waivers kills innovation and
that turns their too costly to model argument.
11. Yes food war impact! 1AC Karagul explains food insecurity lead to price shock,
geopolitical instability and goes nuclear, and plus adv 1 revisionist countries
take the opportunity which turns
12. Group their last two arguments on gene editing. Companies will keep trade
secrets in the future so it’s of course hard to keep up Their Karoui card literally
says regulation need to keep up with emerging technology so thus the plan