Disaggregating Diasporas as a Force in Role Contestation_ -- Matthew K_ Godwin -- Role Theory and International Relations, 2022 -- Routledge -- 9780367544904 -- ab2315bd54e1c082510c896289689fb5 -- Anna’s Archive

Disaggregating Diasporas as a
Force in Role Contestation
Using a Role Theory lens, this book investigates Tamil diaspora mass
movements and interest groups as marginalised forces of domestic for-
eign policy influence. Until now Role Theory has not considered diaspora
mass movements as collective action actors, nor looked at how marginal-
ised diasporas influence elite foreign policy decision-making.
Matthew K. Godwin employs a comparative, micro-level decision-
making narrative that looks incisively at decisions faced by the British
and Canadian governments in 2009 and 2013 towards the Sri Lankan
civil war and its aftermath. Through qualitative, elite-level interviews
and content analysis of other primary source data, Godwin convincingly
argues that when diaspora interest group elites are leveraging the power
of mass movements in concert with credible partisan advocates, they can
influence role contestation. However, international institutional con-
straints on role behaviour may stymie their preferred role performance,
especially if states are indispensable to the institutions their behaviour
may unravel. Ultimately, Godwin concludes that some states can’t behave
“badly,” even when they want to.
This book will be of interest to students and researchers of International
Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Comparative Politics, Migration
Studies and to non-government organisations who seek to influence
governments.
Matthew K. Godwin holds a PhD from the School of Public Policy, University
College London (UCL). He currently works as part of the Tony Blair Insti-
tute for Global Change. His research focuses predominantly on diasporas,
civil wars and on aspects of far-right movements. He has been recently
published in Politics and Governance, Globalizations and Israel Affairs.
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13. National Role Conceptions in a New Millennium

Defining a Place in a Changing World
Edited by Michael Grossman, Francis Schortgen & Gordon Friedrichs
14. Role Compatibility as Socialization

The Case of Pakistan
Dorothée Vandamme
15. Role Theory and Russian Foreign Policy

Rolling Changes in National Role Conceptions
Damian Strycharz
16. Disaggregating Diasporas as a Force in Role Contestation

Mobilising the Marginalised in Foreign Affairs
Matthew K. Godwin
Disaggregating Diasporas as a
Force in Role Contestation
Mobilising the Marginalised in
Foreign Affairs
Matthew K. Godwin
First published 2023
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490
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Contents
List of figures and tablesix

List of abbreviationsx
Acknowledgementsxi
1 Marginalised diasporas: A force in role contestation? 1

Surface-level similarities? Examining Tamil diaspora
mobilisation in Canadian and British role contestation 5
Case selection 7
Organisation of the book 10
2 Diaspora role contestation in Canada and the UK:

Theoretical and analytical frameworks 18
All the world’s a stage: Role theory, diasporas and
foreign policy analysis 19
Diasporas and foreign policy analysis 22
Disaggregating agency in foreign policy analysis:
Diasporas as role-makers in domestic role contestation 23
Role theory and agency: Mass movements
as role-making foreign policy agents 24
Role theory and agency: Government and
non-government elites as role-making
foreign policy agents 25
Role theory and agency: Interaction at the
intersection of mass movements, government
elites and diaspora interest groups 30
Disaggregating institutions in foreign policy analysis:
Domestic institutions, diaspora influence and
international role performance 32
Role theory and institutions: Institutional factors
and diaspora decision-making access 33
vi Contents
Role theory and institutions: Diaspora influence on
domestic role conception and role performance 35
Role Theory and constraints on international
role performance 36
Role Theory and role position ascription 39
Role Theory and “indispensable” states 42
Conclusion 44
3 A marginalised minority: The Sri Lankan civil war, the

Tamil diaspora and transnational regimes of marginalisation 51
Defining the “Tamil diaspora” 52
The Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK 54
The marginalization of the Tamil diaspora:
Decolonisation and regimes of migration and
securitisation 56
Theories of marginalisation 56
Colonial regimes of marginalisation and the
Sri Lankan civil war 59
Regimes of integration, settlement and
disempowering diasporas 62
Immigration, integration and settlement in Canada 62
Immigration, integration and settlement in the UK 63
Securitization: The taint of terror and the marginalisation
of the Tamil diaspora 66
The LTTE abroad: Transnational conflict and the
Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK 66
The proscription of the LTTE and securitisation
of the Tamil diaspora 68
Conclusion 72
4 From human security to enlightened self-interest?: Canadian and

British foreign policymaking permeability and international roles 83
The porousness of foreign policymaking: Who’s “in” in
Canadian and British role contestation 85
Models and means in foreign policy analysis 85
Multicultural foreign policy and diasporas as
“active” agents in role contestation 88
Processes of Canadian foreign policymaking 90
Processes of British foreign policymaking 92
From Liberal interventionism to enlightened self-interest?
Changing role conceptions for Canada and the UK 95
Contents vii
From Middle Power to disruptor? Recent
changes in Canadian role conception 95
From intervener to convenor? Recent changes
in British role conception 100
Middle Power revisited: Ascribing Canada’s role
position 103
A major power by any other name? Ascribing
Britain’s role position 105
Conclusion 108
5 Role contestation and the end of the Sri Lankan civil war:
Protest, pressure and role performance 120
The bloody final throes of the Sri Lankan civil war:
2002–2009 122
The evolution of Tamil diaspora role-making:
Overcoming the LTTE 124
Tamil diaspora interest group organisation in
Canada: A centralised model 125
Tamil diaspora interest group organisation in
the UK: A quick line to Labour 127
Role contestation and ending the war: Role-making in
Canada and the UK 128
The Tamil diaspora and role-making in Canada:
Early success followed by a faltering strategy 129
The Tamil diaspora and role-making in the UK:
Labour inside advocates open the door 131
Vertical role contestation and influencing role
conception and performance 133
Agency factors in role contestation 134
Institutional factors in role contestation 136
Diasporas and role contestation strategies 141
Role theoretical implications for disaggregating diasporas
in vertical role contestation 143
Conclusion 147
6 Role contestation for transitional justice: Role constraints

and the Commonwealth 156
Post-civil war Sri Lanka and the pursuit of justice 158
The evolution of Tamil diaspora role-making: The
post-conflict changing landscape of Tamil diaspora
organisations 161
viii Contents
Taking the fight abroad? Post-LTTE transnational
diaspora organisations 161
Tamil diaspora role-making in Canada: Aligning
with Conservative role conception 164
Tamil diaspora role-making in the UK: The founding
of the British Tamil Conservatives 167
Role contestation and mobilising for boycott: Role-making
in Canada and the UK 168
“Raising hell” at the Commonwealth 169
The Tamil diaspora and role-making in
the UK: A bridge too far 171
Vertical role contestation and influencing role conception
and performance 174
Agency factors in role contestation 175
Institutional factors in role contestation 177
Diasporas and role contestation strategies 182
Role theoretical implications for disaggregating diasporas
in role contestation 183
Conclusion 187
7 Conclusion: Diasporas are a force in role contestation,

so what’s next? 198
Theories of vertical role contestation: Disaggregating
agents and institutions 198
Expanding on non-elite role-makers: Marginalised
diasporas in role contestation 200
Diaspora role-makers and domestic and international
institutions 201
Mass movements and elite-level role-making: 2009 and
vertical role contestation to end the war 203
Elite-level role-making and mobilisation: 2013 and vertical
role contestation for justice in Sri Lanka 204
Disaggregating diasporas in vertical role contestation:
What now? 205
Appendix: Map of Sri Lanka 209
Index 210
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
4.1 Foreign policy processes91
A.1 209
Tables
2.1 Factor comparison framework 34
5.1 2009 factor comparison 134
6.1 2013 factor comparison 175
List of Abbreviations
AIPAC American Israel Political Affairs Committee

BTC British Tamil Conservatives
BTF British Tamil Forum
CFI Conservative Friends of Israel
CJC Canadian Jewish Congress
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CTC Canadian Tamil Congress
FACT Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GTF Global Tamil Forum
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICG International Crisis Group
LFI Labour Friends of Israel
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NDP New Democratic Party of Canada
NGO Non-government organisation
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SACEM Society for the Aid of Ceylon Minorities
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TAG Together Against Genocide
TESOC Tamil Eelam Society of Canada
TGTE Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
TOSIS Tiger Organisation of Service Intelligence Services
TYO Tamil Youth Organisation
UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council
WTM World Tamil Movement
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the extensive support from the
scholarly community since the inception of the research project, particu-
larly University College London and the School of Oriental and African
Studies. Earlier iterations of this project were gratefully reviewed and
supported by Dr. Sherrill Stroschein, Dr. Fiona Adamson, Dr. Camilla
Orjuela, Dr. Feargal Cochrane, Dr. Anita Singh, the series Editors
and a number of anonymous reviewers. I would like to thank the ded-
icated staff at Routledge for their patience and encouragement. I would
like to acknowledge the government and non-government interviewees
who were generous with their time and forthright in their contributions.
Finally, the support of my family has been a mainstay during this pro-
ject, specifically my partner and parents, who have overcome significant
health challenges to witness the publication of this book.
1 Marginalised diasporas
A force in role contestation?
Since Hill (1999) first called for more attention to “voices from below”
in international relations, much progress has been made to expand the
scope of non-elite agents explored in foreign policy analysis (FPA).
Scholars researching these questions through Role Theory have added
much to existing analyses, particularly through having developed a “ver-
tical role contestation” nexus, where domestic, non-elite forces contest
the way states conceive of and perform their roles abroad (Cantir and
Kaarbo, 2016). However, what the literature has yet to consider in a com-
prehensive way is whether or not marginalised diasporas influence role
contestation. Theories of international relations are often elite-focused,
which is not surprising given that decisions are made by elites and that
the traditional influences on elites are mostly driven by a select number
of domestic forces with access to decision-makers. But are elite-centric
approaches offering a thorough picture of foreign policymaking in plu-
ralist, democratic countries?
This book makes the case that they aren’t. At a time when mass move-
ments of marginalised minorities are reshaping government agendas
in respect of inclusion, the argument at the heart of this book is that
marginalised diasporas are also influential agents in the making of for-
eign policy and the contesting of international roles. An agent-centred
approach focused on these unlikely foreign policy actors raises a host of
questions discussed in this book: How does a marginalised community
end up influencing elite foreign policy? Are diasporas capable of altering
the very roles countries conceive themselves of playing internationally?
Do international institutions constrain the behaviour of states no matter
how much pressure is brought on them by domestic forces?
This book discusses these questions through a micro-level, role
theoretical analysis of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK.
Throughout the late 2000s and early 2010s, the Tamil diaspora in both
countries mobilised to influence Canadian and British foreign policy
towards Sri Lanka (Amarasingam, 2015; Godwin, 2012). In 2009, dias-
pora organisations put immense pressure on the Canadian government
of Stephen Harper and the British government of Gordon Brown to
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-1
take action to end the Sri Lankan government’s military offensive in the
north of Sri Lanka, which left many thousands dead, imprisoned and dis-
persed. Following the civil war, the lack of a transitional justice process
and continued human rights abuses against Tamils compelled continued
role contestation. These efforts came to a head in 2013, as Tamil diaspora
organisations lobbied for the British and Canadian governments to boy-
cott the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government summit in Sri Lanka.
Long a subject of inquiry in the Canadian context, the Tamil and other
diasporas have been explored as agents in foreign policymaking with
scholars arguing there is evidence that diasporas have influenced foreign
policy outcomes (Cochrane et al., 2009; Geislerova, 2007; Riddell-Dixon,
2008). There has been less of a focus on these questions in the UK and
very few comparisons on the subject between Canada and the UK. At
first glance, it might be expected that policy outcomes on the above issues
would resemble one another, given the Tamil diaspora in both countries
share many of the same characteristics, as do Canadian and British polit-
ical institutions. However, in 2009 the Brown government shelved its pre-
ferred convening role conception and did virtually everything it could to
remonstrate the Sri Lankan government in alignment with Tamil dias-
pora preferences, while the Canadian government’s response was tepid
at best. Only a few years later in 2013, the Harper government performed
its preferred disrupter role and boycotted the Commonwealth summit
in support of Tamil human rights, while UK Prime Minister David
Cameron attended. If the agents and institutions in these two cases are
so similar, why were there starkly different outcomes? What effect did
Tamil diaspora agents have on role contestation and what do interna-
tional role conceptions and role positions tell us about these foreign pol-
icy decisions?
FPA, a sub-field of international relations, is designed to explain these
quandaries. For decades, foreign policy analysts have considered the
personalities of leaders, conflicts within governments, domestic forces,
international institutions and a range of other factors to explain the
behaviour of states internationally (Alden and Amnon, 2016; Allison,
1969; Carlsnaes, 1992; Chittick, 1975). Scholarship has made significant
strides in this time, including viewing both agents and structures as
important determinants in foreign policy decision-making. One of the
approaches scholars have developed to answer theoretical problems that
involve both agents and structures is Role Theory. Role Theory asserts
that countries consciously create international roles for themselves, in
international institutions and in their relations with other countries
(Gaskarth, 2013; Holsti, 1970; McCourt, 2011; Thies and Wehner, 2019,
60). How states ultimately conceive of their roles influences how they
choose to perform internationally. However, Role Theory acknowledges
that states cannot simply behave any way they choose, as they are con-
strained in their options by how other states view them as well as the
Marginalised diasporas 3
international institutions in which they perform. In like manner, Role
Theory also advances that states are influenced by domestic forces which
compete to influence foreign policy decision-making. Recently, role the-
ory has begun to disaggregate domestic actors in FPA through homing
in on contestation between actors at the elite level, such as politicians and
senior bureaucrats, as well as non-elite influences such as public opin-
ion (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; 2016; Gaskarth, 2016, 107; Paris, 2014).
This approach is well-suited to explaining whether or not marginalised
diasporas, and other domestic forces for that matter, influence foreign
policy. In particular, it has utility in explaining role contestation pro-
cesses, which is to say debates about how a country views itself and how
it should act.
I explore the influence of the Tamil diaspora on Canadian and British
role contestation, arguing that they have influenced these processes in
both countries. From an agency standpoint, there is an extensive existing
scholarship that has looked empirically and theoretically at the impact
of diaspora mobilisation on foreign policy (Adamson and Demetriou,
2007; Carment and Landry, 2011; Koinova, 2011a; 2011b; Mearsheimer
and Walt, 2008; Orjuela, 2008; Saideman, 2001; Shain and Barth, 2003).
For instance, we know that conflict-generated, mobilised diasporas have
influenced “host” country governments, that they are more successful
when they are concentrated in electoral districts and that they are advan-
taged when governments view them as being politically salient (Dewitt
and Kirton, 2008, 70; George, 2011; Redd and Rubenzer, 2010). However,
scholarship has not considered to a great extent what happens when mar-
ginalised diasporas seek to influence role contestation as “role-makers.”
As argued in this book, marginalised diasporas can also have influence
through becoming “temporary entrants” in role contestation, that they
are more successful when supported by “inside advocates” such as MPs
and that they need to be seen as credible.
This book traces the journey of the Canadian and British Tamil dias-
pora, from being stigmatised, securitised and excluded, to becoming influ-
ential in role contestation in less than a decade. Through learning from
more established diasporas and from past experience, the Tamil dias-
pora developed sophisticated, professional interest groups that afforded
them temporary access to decision-making processes. The literature on
the influence of “voices from below” in foreign policy has discussed how
non-elite forces, such as public opinion, contest national roles (Gaskarth,
2016; Paris, 2014). This exploration of Tamil diaspora mobilisation adds
to the literature by disaggregating between mass movement actors as well
as diaspora elites. There is a wide literature on the mobilisation of collec-
tive action agents to petition governments, which, for instance, discusses
levels of contestation that have not been fully explored by foreign policy
scholars (McAdam et al., 2001; Stroschein, 2012; Tarrow, 1998). I argue
that diaspora mass movements can make a difference in role contestation,
but only when they are leveraged by diaspora elites and, in other circum-
stances, they can hinder advocacy.
I also consider the institutional implications for diasporas as role-making
agents, both in respect of domestic foreign policy processes and inter-
national role constraints. How governments make foreign policy has
been analysed extensively by the existing literature and these processes
are critical determinants in the role conceptions that emerge (Gaskarth,
2013; Hill, 2015; Rhodes and Dunleavy, 1995). In this book’s analysis of
“who gets in” in Canadian and British foreign policymaking, it emerges
that the more Cabinet-centric policymaking of the Harper government
was nevertheless permeable to outside sources of influence and that
despite the “opening up” of foreign policymaking during the Brown and
Cameron governments, porousness does not always translate into role
performance alignment. This is especially the case when the priorities
of interest groups do not conform to the preferences of non-partisan
officials. Diaspora influence is also not guaranteed when their priori-
ties align with government role conception, as was shown to be the case
when the Harper government did not take stronger action against the
Rajapaksa government in 2009. On the other hand, not aligning with
a country’s preferred role conception is a surmountable challenge, as
demonstrated when the Brown government directly took to task the Sri
Lankan government over its prosecution of the war against Tamil sepa-
ratists. Finally, when it comes to international role constraints, no mat-
ter how sympathetic a government might be to diaspora role conception
preferences, the roles played by “indispensable” actors such as the UK in
the Commonwealth mean it may have less liberty to act than other insti-
tution members, such as Canada.
The findings from the empirical investigations in this book greatly
expand the role theoretical literature, in particular with regard to verti-
cal role contestation and its utility in exploring non-elite agents in foreign
policy. When considering agency in role contestation, there is firstly a
need to theoretically disaggregate what we mean by the “masses.” Non-
elite mass movements and elite interest groups are distinct actors, but
their intersection with government elites has explanatory power on the
outcomes of role contestation. Secondly, it’s useful to consider non-
elite agents over time. As the below cases demonstrate, diasporas, for
instance, learn from other non-elite agents and also alter their strategies
having learned from earlier interventions and furthermore change their
approach depending on the institutional context. Thirdly, whether or not
diasporas are salient to the political interests of governments does have a
bearing on their ability to exert influence in role contestation. Finally, I
argue that marginalised, non-elite agents are never elite decision-makers in
foreign policy. However, they may become credible “temporary entrants”
in role contestation as role-makers and therefore influence the role con-
ception and performance of states. Future inquiries into role contestation
would benefit from considering the influence of non-elite actors such as
diasporas.
From an institutional standpoint, while parliaments are not often the
locus of foreign policy decision-making, I find that parliamentarians
may serve as pivotal “inside advocates” who help non-elite agents per-
meate institutions, become role-makers in the view of government elites
and ultimately influence role contestation debates. Secondly, discourses
in the literature have alighted on the importance of “policy alignment”
between non-elite agent preferences and those of governments. Applying
a role theoretical lens reveals that alignment between preferred role con-
ceptions is consequential, but misalignment is a surmountable barrier
and governments may take on and perform roles at variance with their
preferences. Finally, this book demonstrates why ascribing state role
positions are important to identifying when non-elite agents influence
role performance. Whether a state is a “Middle Power” or a “Major
Power” in various theatres of action reveals the international role con-
straints within which they operate and helps explain whether non-elite
agents influence role performance. States which are “indispensable”
to international intuitions, for instance, may have much less liberty to
respond to non-elite preferences than other member states.
Surface-level similarities? Examining Tamil diaspora

mobilisation in Canadian and British role contestation
This case study comparison explores both the agency and institutional
dynamics of marginalised diasporas in vertical role contestation. The
principal agents of interest are marginalised, mobilised Tamil diaspo-
ras in the form of mass movements and interest groups. The objective
of these non-elite agents is to become role-makers, persuading foreign
policy decision-making elites to adopt role conceptions and role perfor-
mances in line with their preferences. Since I want to know whether these
agents influenced role contestation in host countries, Canada and the UK
have been chosen as the country cases. Two temporal periods are con-
sidered within these country contexts: 2009 and 2013. These periods are
defined by decision-points wherein the governments of Canada and the
UK were required to make a decision in reference to events in Sri Lanka.
In the first instance, governments had to respond to the violent end to Sri
Lanka’s civil war. In 2013, these governments had to decide whether or
not to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting hosted
by Sri Lanka. The following explains the methodological process this
book uses to explain foreign policy decision-making and role contesta-
tion; it then discusses the selection of these cases.
Gerring (2001, 209) discusses several overarching methods available to
researchers: Experimental, statistical, Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA), most-similar, most-different, extreme-case, typical-case and
counterfactual. Over the last two decades, investigators have adopted
a number of these methods to unpack the involvement of diasporas in
foreign policymaking. Beginning with primarily descriptive forays, the
following discusses some of the existing methodological approaches used
in this field of inquiry and selects a most-similar, cross-case comparative
method.
Within-case analyses such as those of Amarasingam (2015), Hess and
Korf (2014), Orjuela (2008) and Wayland (2003; 2004) have offered foun-
dational descriptive depth to the study of the Tamil diaspora. Primarily
focused on Canada, with some attention to the British context, these
empirically rich inquiries have explored the Tamil diaspora’s extensive
community infrastructure, internal politics between Tamil groups and
the legacy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For the pur-
poses of this book, these studies provide essential data used to determine
which diaspora organisations were most active and at what time; which
ones engaged in lobbying or had roles in mass movements, versus which
were mainly service providers; and, they provide information on the
acute factors instigating mobilisation. However, the analytical processes
used in these enquiries are not designed to unpack micro-level foreign
policy decision-making.
In a comparative analysis with similar aims, Redd and Rubenzer
(2010) employ QCA to discuss causal relationships between ethnic lob-
bying and decision-making. This approach is not ideal for this inquiry
as there are too few cases being considered and QCA generally includes
only a few causal conditions (Ragin, 2008; Rihoux, 2013). As has been
advanced in the literature, there may be as many as a dozen possible
factors influencing the outcomes this inquiry is interested in explaining,
leading to an unmanageable number of possibilities for a QCA design.
The small number of cases also explains why statistical methods are not
possible. I analyse four cases, with a much larger number of explanatory
factors believed to contribute to decision-making. A statistical method
might be applicable if the inquiry were looking at state responses to the
Sri Lankan civil war across the entire system, but that would not speak
to the influence of diaspora interest groups as the Tamil diaspora is con-
centrated in large numbers in only a small number of states.
On the other end of Gerring’s list of possible methods are a range of
comparative methods. Fair’s (2005) comparison of the Tamil and Sikh
diasporas in Canada is likely the best-known comparative case study
involving the Tamil diaspora. Since then, there have been few analyses
directly comparing the diaspora in the two largest host countries: Canada
and the UK. Elsewhere in the literature on diasporas and foreign policy,
comparative case studies have predominated, such as Kenny’s (2000)
comparison of homeland attachments amongst the Irish, Polish and
Jewish diasporas in the US; the analysis of immigrant group influence
by Ogelman et al. (2002), which considers the Cuban diaspora in the US
and the Turkish diaspora in Germany; and Totoricagüena’s (2005) exam-
ination of the Basque diaspora with an emphasis on diaspora-homeland
relations. Smith and Stares’ (2007) authoritative collection of case stud-
ies considers diaspora involvement in peace processes and Cochrane
et al. (2009) offers a similarly compelling comparison between Canadian
Tamils and the American Irish diaspora, focusing on how these diasporas
impact conflict resolution.1 Lately, scholarship in this field has continued
to enhance comparative analytical rigour, as seen in Koinova’s (2011a)
inquiry comparing the Lebanese and Albanian US diasporas, which
unpacks the relationship between causal factors and outcomes with an
emphasis on intervening processes, in this instance through within-case
process-tracing.
Given the small number of cases in this inquiry and the relatively large
number of factors considered, the comparative method best suited to discuss-
ing the influence of diasporas on role contestation is the most-similar, cross-
case comparison design developed initially by J.S. Mill (van Heuveln,
2000). Mill’s “Method of Difference” begins firstly by observing that
more than one case exhibits the same phenomena; in this instance in
Canada and the UK, Tamil diaspora interest groups both lobbied gov-
ernments on the same issue and both governments were required to make
a foreign policy decision in response to the same extraterritorial impetus.
Secondly, these two cases exhibit at a superficial level similar agency and
structural factors, i.e. the same well-resourced diaspora, concentrated
mostly in one region of pluralist, parliamentary democracies. Finally,
despite the overarching similarities between these cases, there is varia-
tion in respect of outcomes. The paramount rationale for selecting this
method is its emphasis on identifying the distinctions in each case which
shed light on and help to explain divergent outcomes.
In each time period, two cases are compared: Canada and the UK.
Through the development of a micro-level narrative, the inquiry looks
for each factor to ascertain its presence or absence in role contestation.
If there is a different outcome in the cases, then the inquiry explains the
difference through isolating the presence or absence of these factors. For
instance, the literature argues that diaspora concentration in political
districts will lead diaspora interest groups to have more influence over
host country foreign policy. If, after considering all other factors and
finding that all others are present in all cases, with concentration in polit-
ical districts differing in both cases, then the inquiry will argue that this
is the factor with the most explanatory power.
Case selection
Comparative case selection considers the locations for comparison as
well as the actors within these locales which are expected to be compared
(Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000, 46). In this study of foreign affairs, the
principal actors of interest are groups advocating on behalf of the pref-
erences of the Tamil diaspora (i.e. the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC)
and the British Tamil Forum). The strategies of these actors are aimed
at persuading foreign policy decision-makers, primarily in government
to take on and perform roles in line with their preferences (i.e. Canadian
Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and British Foreign Secretary David
Miliband). Since I am interested in knowing whether diaspora interest
groups and mass movements had influence on domestic host country role
contestation, two country cases have been selected: Canada and the UK,
forming the spatial boundary of this comparison. Finally, two tempo-
ral periods are considered within these country contexts: 2009 and 2013.
These periods are defined by decision-points wherein the governments
of Canada and the UK were required to make a decision in reference to
events in Sri Lanka. In the first instance, governments had to respond to
the violent end to Sri Lanka’s civil war. In 2013, these governments had
to decide on whether or not to attend the Commonwealth summit hosted
in Sri Lanka. This section explains the selection of the above introduced
actors and contexts. This focus on decision-making is in keeping with
a number of earlier role theoretical interventions, including McCourt
(2011) who analysed the UK’s role performance during the Falklands
conflict and Oppermann (2012) who looked at Germany’s decision-making
with regard to 2011 interventions in the Libya.
As to the selection of agents in domestic role contestation, the Tamil
diaspora was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, I am interested in under-
standing the role of marginalised communities as domestic forces in
role contestation, necessitating the choice of a marginalised commu-
nity observably mobilised around foreign affairs issues. This led to the
decision to select a mobilised diaspora. The Indian or Chinese dias-
poras might have been compared if I were interested in understanding
how diasporas impact bilateral trade flows, but the likelihood of trade
or another non-conflict issue prompting mass movements is unlikely
(Brubaker, 2005). That said, the Sikh, Armenian, Kurdish or another
mobilised, conflict-generated, victim diaspora might have been selected
(Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Fair, 2005; Koinova, 2011b). However,
the Tamil diasporas of Canada and the UK are ideally suited to explain
outcome divergence in most-similar case comparisons as they are sim-
ilarly sized, mobilised, concentrated in electoral districts and share
comparable migratory patterns to a greater extent than many other dias-
poras. In short, the variation in agency factors was likely to be small,
leading to the isolation of factors explaining different outcomes.
Secondly, the descriptive evidence offered by earlier studies exploring
the organisation of Tamil diaspora groups produces evidence of organ-
isations founded specifically to lobby governments on foreign policy
(Amarasingam, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2010). In short, I knew
there would be diaspora interest groups to analyse, and this evidence
also indicated that the diaspora had been petitioning governments on
their policy towards Sri Lanka. The early hunch was that if these groups
existed, there would be evidence available to analyse, a series of micro-
level narratives to build and individuals to speak to who would be able to
provide information on their activities. Finally, because it was assumed
that there would be very little documentation due to the nature of the
foreign policy process, only diaspora interest groups which were recently
active could be chosen (Riddell-Dixon, 2008).
With regard to the selection of countries, Canada and the UK were
selected as country cases for comparison for three reasons: The agents
of analysis; the systemic characteristics of both polities and their inter-
national role positions. Firstly, I am interested in understanding Tamil
diaspora mobilisation oriented towards host country government deci-
sion-making. As noted, Canada and the UK are home to the largest
Tamil diasporas in the world and share a number of features in common,
including migratory and settlement patterns (Deegale, 2013; Zunzer,
2004). While other countries such as Norway and Switzerland also have
large Tamil diasporas, existing scholarship pointed to Canada and the
UK as having the most active diaspora interest groups and therefore the
greatest likelihood of activity for analysis.
Secondly, Canada and the UK share many institutional features in com-
mon with respect to foreign policymaking. They are both Westminster-
style parliamentary, first-past-the-post systems where foreign policy is
usually considered the sole preserve of Cabinet and, furthermore, influ-
ence on decision-making is normally confined to a small number of elite
bureaucrats and partisan appointees (Gaskarth, 2013; Gecelovsky, 2011;
Hill, 2015). Furthermore, they are both pluralist states with relatively
limited barriers to entry and participation in politics for newcomer com-
munities, even for marginalised groups (Fair, 2005). Given these paral-
lels, and those of the Tamil communities themselves, the expectation is
that there would be very little, if any, observable variation in respect of
institutional decision-making factors. Therefore, the observation that
there were substantially different role performance outcomes in these
most-similar institutional cases offers the possibility of isolating factors
which help explain the institutional variations which influenced out-
comes. Had the US been compared with Canada, for instance, systemic
divergence would have been an all-to-easy explanation. Similarly, com-
paring the UK with France from an agency perspective would yield little
of interest given France’s proportionally much smaller Tamil diaspora.
Finally, another similarity between the two countries emerges at the
international level in their common membership in the Commonwealth
(Mackrael, 2014). Cases three and four explore Canada’s and the UK’s
decision to attend the Commonwealth summit in 2013 located in Sri
Lanka. This decision point is unique to members of the Commonwealth,
which excludes non-member states such as the US or continental
European states. Australia offers a similarly constructive comparison,
not least because of the relatively large Tamil diaspora and parallel sys-
temic features, but fieldwork resource restrictions would have limited
data-gathering opportunities. From an international institutions stand-
point, a debatable variation is in the role conception and the interna-
tional role positioning of Canada and the UK at the Commonwealth;
whether these cases are similar or different in this respect is at the crux of
this book’s contribution to international relations scholarship. There is
ongoing debate about the role conception and positioning of these coun-
tries and this research is meant to inform these discourses.
Organisation of the book

Chapter 2 sets out the book’s theoretical scaffolding and details the the-
oretical contributions this book makes to role theory and FPA. I begin
by introducing Role Theory, which has more recently emphasised role
contestation between domestic agents in a “vertical” and “horizontal”
nexus where non-elite actors interact with elite decision-makers, which
is where the findings in this book contribute most. While diasporas have
rarely been discussed as agents in role contestation, the extensive litera-
ture on diasporas and civil wars is discussed. I then disaggregate mass
movement, elite and non-elite agents in role theory and FPA. Firstly, I
argue there must be a distinction between mass public opinion and mass
movements in contestation, where the focus of this book lies. Secondly,
I conceptualise foreign policy elite decision-makers as those empowered
with decision-making or those permanently embedded in decision-making
processes with influence over them. I argue that diaspora interest groups
have elite leadership, but that they may only ever become “temporary
entrants” in foreign policy decision-making. I then set out agency fac-
tors likely to permit diaspora elites temporary entrance into foreign pol-
icy decision-making. Finally, I consider interaction between the above
agents.
From a structural standpoint, the chapter considers the institutional
factors which serve to constrain diaspora agents in domestic role con-
testation. I move on to discuss institutional role conception and inter-
national role constraints by first defining “influence.” In respect of role
contestation, influence over decision-points on role conception and role
performance can be observed in respect of speeches and in informal
communications in the case of the former; whereas in the latter, influence
is observed in role performance. I briefly discuss some of the types of role
conceptions the literature has set out as well as how states are defined
within international hierarchies of power, noting that their conception
and status may differ between strata. In this area of research, I argue
for the need for additional theoretical rigour within role theory, offer-
ing a more systematised approach to ascribing international roles and
assigning role positions. I argue that these role positions denote perfor-
mance boundaries, setting the limits of foreign policy decision-making and
restricting the options available to states. Finally, I conclude by arguing
that there is a theoretical gap with regard to role constraints, as dominant
institutional actors may also be “indispensable states” which have less
liberty to act than less influential member states.
Chapter 3 focuses on the domestic agents of role contestation in these
cases: The Canadian and British Tamil diaspora. It firstly alights on a
working definition of the Tamil diaspora as a largely conflict-driven,
far, stateless, victim diaspora having an antagonistic relationship with
the home-state. In both host countries, the Tamil diaspora immigrated
through several “waves” and is largely concentrated in urban settings,
particularly the two countries’ largest cities. The chapter turns to a con-
ceptual discussion of marginalisation, where I argue that marginalisa-
tion means being excluded from opportunities for political participation.
I bring in a number of authorities to discuss the Tamil diaspora’s mar-
ginalisation, advancing that colonial, migratory and securitisation pro-
cesses are all forces of social and political marginalisation. I argue that
Sri Lankan Tamils were first marginalised by British imperial authorities
and that this process continued through decolonisation as nationalist
Singhalese governments institutionally marginalised Tamils. Regimes of
integration and settlement in Canada were more supportive of diasporas,
including the empowerment of diaspora groups as integration and set-
tlement service agents. In contrast, the British system of integration for
most Tamil migrants placed the onus of integration solely on immigrants
and settlement processes did not empower diaspora organisations in the
same manner. Finally, this chapter discusses the transnational networks
of the LTTE, their embeddedness in diaspora organisations and the pro-
cess of its eventual proscription in Canada and the UK. I argue that pro-
scription, coupled with wider securitisation discourses and policies in the
2000s, led to the collective stigmatisation of the diaspora, their further
marginalisation from political processes and a resulting “chilling effect”
on mobilisation for much of the 2000s.
Returning to a focus on institutions, Chapter 4 begins by selecting an
analytical model of foreign policy decision-making through which to dis-
cuss the Harper, Brown and Cameron governments. I then outline foreign
policymaking elites in common in both cases, distinguishing in particular
between partisan and bureaucratic elite advisors. While parliaments are
less relevant to foreign policymaking, I argue that parliamentarians may
be influential interlocutors between diasporas and Cabinet decision-makers
as “inside advocates.” I then consider the dynamics of foreign policy-
making in Canada and the UK, where the Harper government worked
to concentrate decision-making, the Brown and then Cameron govern-
ments expanded the scope of agents involved in foreign policymaking,
including external actors.
The second section of this chapter focuses on structures and considers
the role conception and the international role position of Canada and
the UK. I argue that to determine if marginalised diasporas do influ-
ence these processes, it is first necessary to understand states’ preferred
roles as well as behavioural role constraints. Beginning with Canada,
the Harper government deviated from Canada’s long-standing Middle
Power, policy entrepreneur role, preferring to act as a “disrupter” at
international institutions, in some cases with a view to encouraging more
powerful actors to take stronger action on international issues. The role
conception of the Brown and Cameron governments moved in the oppo-
site direction, as each cultivated an international role for Britain as a
convening power committed to multilateral problem-solving. Through
the systemised framework introduced in Chapter 2, I then consider the
international role position of Canada and the UK, arguing that while an
influential economic and development actor, Canada is best considered a
Middle Power. However, it is a more powerful actor in the Commonwealth
subsystem and maintains a strong bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka.
There has been somewhat more ambiguity in the international role posi-
tioning of the UK, but I argue that its international power projection
capabilities and virtually unrivalled power of attraction suggests the UK
is a Major Power. Furthermore, the UK is an “indispensable” actor in
the Commonwealth and is one of Sri Lanka’s most important bilateral
relationships, with the UK retaining a geopolitical interest in South Asia.
Having provided the agency and institutional contexts for the mobi-
lisation of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK, Chapter 5 turns
to the role contestation processes in 2009 which the diaspora mobilised
to influence. I begin by describing the brutal final stages of the civil war
in Sri Lanka and then discuss the many developments in the organisa-
tional landscape of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK. During
the 2000s, the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK created or revital-
ised diaspora organisations which led to more elite-level interaction with
governments, but more limited engagement with Conservatives. I then
present the micro-level decision-making narrative first in the Canadian
case, where I argue that mass movements and diaspora interest groups
achieved initial success at parliament, but faltered through a lack of
access to Cabinet and by losing control over mass movements, conse-
quently not becoming role-makers. During the same period in the UK,
the Tamil diaspora became temporary entrants in role contestation,
supported by Labour party inside advocates who were able to leverage
mass movement demonstrations over which they continued to have some
control.
The application of the book’s analytical framework reveals a number
of distinctions between cases. I argue that both diasporas were similarly
mobilised, large, concentrated in political districts, well-resourced and
had learned from more established diasporas. However, the British Tamil
diaspora was more advantaged as it was viewed as politically salient by
the governing party, credible and more united. Turning to structural fac-
tors, I advance that both countries are inclusive to the participation of
diasporas in politics, but that institutional permeability was less favour-
able as in the Canadian case. Both diasporas were challenged by the Sri
Lankan government rival constituency but, unlike in earlier years, the
Tamil diaspora was more successful in surmounting this opposition.
Regarding role conception, on the one hand the Tamil diaspora’s pref-
erence for disruptive action aligned with the Harper government’s dis-
rupter role conception. However, the diaspora’s perceived association
with a terrorist group conflicted with the government’s prioritisation of
security and the fight against terrorism. In the UK, Tamil diaspora pref-
erences were not aligned with the government’s preferred convener role
conception. Finally, regarding international role constraints, the Middle
Power status of Canada limited its performance options on the one hand,
but where it did have the capacity to take action aligned with diaspora
preferences it remained largely unmoved. In contrast, the UK performed
for the most part to the extent of its capabilities at the UN, with the
US and bilaterally. With respect to diaspora strategies, both diasporas
employed enormous mass movement demonstrations as well as interest
group lobbying, where they diverge is in UK Tamil diaspora’s success at
the intersection of these forces, as it was able to leverage mass movements
through inside elites while the Canadian diaspora was unable to do this. I
conclude by arguing that the Tamil diaspora in Canada did not influence
Canada’s role conception or performance in this case, whereas British
role performance aligned with their preferences.
Chapter 6 details the aftermath of the war in Sri Lanka where the gov-
ernment failed to put in place a credible transitional justice process, con-
tinued to repress Tamils, abuse human rights and worked to marginalise
Tamils both at home and abroad. In light of these events, the landscape
of diaspora organisations changed significantly in the years following
2009. I detail the creation of transnational Tamil diaspora organisations,
including the Global Tamil Forum (GTF). Domestically, I then discuss
the evolution of the CTC in Canada, where efforts to better position
diaspora elites with the governing Conservatives began to bear fruit as
Tories came to consider the CTC as more credible as well as the Tamil
diaspora as more politically salient. In the UK, the Tamil diaspora was
similarly viewed more credibly by the now governing Conservative party
through the creation of British Tamil Conservatives, which cultivated
powerful inside advocates and now had much more political leverage.
These developments proved consequential, as in the next section I pres-
ent the micro-level narrative of events leading up to the Commonwealth
Summit in Sri Lanka in 2013, with the Tamil diaspora in both countries
calling on governments to boycott. In the Canadian case, the Harper
Prime Minister chose to boycott, sending instead a lower-level delegation
mandated to “raise hell.” In the UK, as in 2009 Tamil diaspora elites
secured a position as temporary entrants in policymaking and pressured
the Cabinet to boycott the summit. Despite these efforts, the petitions of
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the potential that the
Commonwealth could unravel should the UK boycott ensured the Prime
Minister’s attendance. However, the Tamil diaspora was able to ensure
Cameron’s visit was used to shine a spotlight on the human rights abuses
of the Rajapaksa government against Tamils.
In comparing both cases, I argue that both diasporas were now
credible, homogeneous, temporary entrants in role contestation and
politically salient for both conservative governments. Both diasporas
had learned from 2009 and shifted their strategies as a consequence.
Structurally, the Tamil diaspora was able to see off efforts by the Sri
Lankan government to deflect attention from its human rights record.
Less favourable for the Tamil diaspora in the UK was permeability in
decision-making, while having gained significant access, they were not
able to surmount the opposition to their preferences by the FCO in this
case. With regard to role conception, the Tamil diaspora’s preferences
were entirely in line with the Harper government’s desired disrupter role,
whereas in the UK, the diaspora’s interests were again at odds with the
convening role the UK sought for itself. International role constraints
proved to be no hurdle in the Canadian case, but the UK’s indispensa-
ble role in the Commonwealth was an insurmountable barrier for the
Tamil diaspora, leading to the Prime Minister’s attendance. With regard
to strategies, both diasporas relied on direct lobbying to a far greater
extent than in 2009 where mass movement demonstrations proved a
hindrance in Canada. I conclude by arguing that the Tamil diaspora in
Canada was successful in aligning its priorities with the government’s
disruptive international role, which Canada was able to perform to full
effect. However, while the diaspora was able to influence role contesta-
tion in the UK and call into question it’s convening international role,
they were unable to instigate a change in performance as the UK is the
Commonwealth’s indispensable actor.
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter where I summarise the arguments
and contributions that this book makes, advancing that marginalised
diasporas do influence role conception and role performance, but that
diasporas are as constrained as any other domestic agent in foreign pol-
icymaking by international role positioning. Given that marginalised
diasporas are influential in vertical role contestation, I advance that FPA
and role theory in particular would benefit from greater attention to the
influence of marginalised, non-elite agents in role contestation. With
respect to further research, this book raises important normative ques-
tions about how FPA conceives of the “national interest” and whether or
not diaspora preferences should be considered a part of these debates.
Note
1. Also taking a qualitative approach, Uslaner (2012) uses Jewish diaspora
interest groups in the US as a foil for other groups to assess their compara-
tive influence. Considering a wide range of factors such as issue alignment
and homogeneity, he captures influence in part by providing activity data,
such as claims that Jewish diaspora interest groups influence the passage of
100 pieces of legislation per year and had 2000 meetings with members of
Congress, and considers the number and calibre of personalities attending
interest group events.
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2 Diaspora role contestation
in Canada and the UK
Theoretical and analytical
frameworks
In addition to unpacking the empirical story of how marginalised dias-

poras influence role contestation, this book theoretically broadens the
application of Role Theory into hitherto underexplored areas. The first
section of this chapter introduces Role Theory, concepts commonly uti-
lised in Role theoretical analyses and touches on its arenas of application
thus far, arguing that this inquiry is best situated into the growing body
of literature discussing “vertical” and “horizontal” domestic role contes-
tation. It then considers how the foreign policy analysis literature more
broadly has analysed diasporas and their influence on foreign policy.
The second section theoretically unpacks agency in three ways:
Firstly, I disaggregate involvement by the “masses” in role contestation
at the domestic level by returning to Holsti’s (1970) original view that
mass movements are one of the domestic forces involved in national role
contestation. Analytically, I canvass the social movements literature to
help define the use of contentious politics by marginalised diasporas.
Secondly, I further disaggregate “elites” as role-makers in domestic
role contestation by arguing that diaspora interest group elites, despite
representing a marginalised minority, may nevertheless become “tem-
porary entrants” in foreign policymaking. Additionally, I introduce the
analytical framework used to investigate diasporas as agents in foreign
policymaking. Finally, I conclude this section on disaggregating agency
by setting out how this project addresses interaction between mass move-
ments, government elites and diaspora interest group elites in domestic
role contestation.
In the final section of this chapter, I consider institutional perspec-
tives to discuss three implications arising from the application of Role
Theory to questions of marginalised diasporas as domestic sources of
role contestation. Firstly, I lay out the analytical framework that I use
to consider the permeability of policymaking institutions for domestic
forces in foreign policy through setting out a range of institutional fac-
tors which may abet or inhibit diasporas from achieving influence in role
contestation. Secondly, I discuss influence in domestic and international
contexts by arguing that domestic sources of foreign policy are interested
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-2
Diaspora role contestation in Canada and the UK 19
in both impacting role conception, but also role performance interna-
tionally. With respect to the latter, I develop a more systematic approach
to ascribing international role position. Finally, I conclude by arguing
that while Role Theory has set out how states behave within institutional
hierarchies of power, it does not account for “indispensable” actors,
which I advance are states whose performance can affect an institution’s
existence, thereby limiting performance options and responsiveness to
domestic agents.
All the world’s a stage: Role theory, diasporas

and foreign policy analysis
Derived originally from sociological traditions, Role Theory was intro-
duced to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) through a seminal article pub-
lished by Holsti (1970) who sought to add greater depth to the roles
played by newly emerged states in the non-aligned movement, which
scholarship had up to that point bundled together offering little explan-
atory power. Of critical importance to this inquiry, Holsti argued that
national roles can help explain foreign policy decision-making. Holsti
imagined the roles of individual political actors in a society (i.e. leg-
islators, bureaucrats, etc.) and scaled up this lens to the international
level, arguing a number of assumptions, including: In the absence of
international rules, national leaders will behave in accordance with
what they perceive as their country’s role in the world; states exist in
and are constrained by hierarchies of power; and state roles can be con-
sidered separately from national interests (Beneš and Harnisch, 2015;
Grossman, 2005).
Role Theory’s “toolbox” contains a range of analytically useful con-
cepts and I employ a number of these. Role conception refers to how for-
eign policy elites construct the view of their state’s role internationally,
which is sometimes referred to as the “ego” perspective (Ovah, 2013).
Foreign policy elites, and indeed other domestic forces that contribute
to role conception, are referred to as role makers. Role expectations or
prescriptions are how other actors exogenous to the state perceive it,
which is sometimes called the “alter” perspective. A role conflict emerges
when domestic role-makers disagree about the role the state should play
abroad or when role prescriptions are unaligned with the role the state
wants to play. In this inquiry, I focus in the first cases more on the role
conflict between opposing domestic role-makers with regard to how the
state’s role is conceived in what is termed domestic role contestation. In
the second cases, I am more concerned with contrasting domestic role
conceptions and performance. Finally, foreign policy decisions such as
adopting sanctions or intervening militarily are behaviour defined by
Role Theory as role performance, which will be considered as the policy
outcome in all of my cases.
20 Diaspora role contestation in Canada and the UK
In broad strokes, Role Theory offers a multi-level analysis that can
bring a lens to both agents and institutions; it incorporates a realist view
that emphasises resources and national interest gains, but it also looks
into domestic structures to ascertain why states may not always act in
their own interest, and it assigns importance to the intangible norms
which are part of role performance. Finally, Role Theory views national
role conceptions as “intervening variables” that mediate more traditional
indicators of state behaviour, such as wealth, national capabilities, terri-
tory, influence and leader psychology (Grossman, 2005).
Since the emergence of Role Theory in the 1970s, it has been widely
employed to explain state behaviour at the international system-level,
within state institutions and regions, in bilateral relations between states
as well as to explain domestic role change. From the standpoint of the
international system, Thies (2012) introduces the concept of “role social-
ization” in his exploration of Israel as an emergent international and
Middle East state, arguing that Israel was rejected as a state by regional
actors and transitioned from an early, non-integrationist state during the
Cold War to an orientation towards the US. From a Great Power per-
spective, Harnisch (2012) explores American, Chinese and German role
change and, as in this inquiry, considers democratic role contestation
through an interactionist approach focusing on the nexus of agency and
structure. In Europe, Bengtsson and Elgström (2012) discuss the role of
the EU as a “normative great power” vis-à-vis Eastern European coun-
tries and in regard to its development policies. I add to this literature with
a focus on performance at the United Nations (UN).
With regard to international institutions, Germany and the Czech
Republic in the European Union serve as case studies for Beneš and
Harnisch (2015), who unpack the institutional roles taken on by states
and point to the “socialising” influence of significant actors within inter-
national institutions. Thies and Wehner (2019) explore the “role location”
of states involved in addressing the Greek financial crisis, including their
roles within regional institutions like the European Union and interna-
tional financial institutions.1 With a focus on the bilateral relationship
between Denmark and the US, Kaarbo and Cantir (2013) discuss role
conflict with regard to Denmark’s contribution to the war in Afghanistan.
This book picks up on the attention to role conception, performance
and conflict in international institutions with a rare consideration of the
Commonwealth bloc of states. Bilaterally, I look at the varying role per-
formance of Canada and the UK with regard to Sri Lanka.
Role Theory has often also been employed to capture ideational shifts
in how governments conceive and re-conceive of the roles their coun-
tries enact abroad. As will be expanded on in Chapter 4, scholars have
discussed the UK’s recent role changes, with Gaskarth (2013, 67) empha-
sising the New Labour years in Britain where the UK was envisioned as
a “pivotal power” and a “trans-Atlantic bridge.” Paris (2014) also uses
Role Theory to capture efforts by governments to reconceive national
roles, discussing Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s efforts to
move the country away from a “liberal internationalist” role.2 This book
is meant to add to debates on the recent role conception and performance
of the UK and Canada.
In addition to a focus on states and international structures, Role
Theory has more recently expanded to better explain domestic sources
of role contestation. This inquiry is best situated into this strand, pio-
neered by Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), which seeks to address a perceived
shortcoming of Role Theory (and arguably FPA more generally) in that
it often takes the state as a monolithic actor, with theory focused on
inter-state role contestation only. Furthermore, when FPA does con-
sider domestic forces, it frequently focuses only on government pol-
icy elites and decision-makers. Instead, this new scholarship explores
domestic sources of role contestation, developing an innovative nexus
to investigate how role-makers manage tension and pressure when
agents inside states have competing role conception preferences. I
adopt Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) “vertical” and “horizontal” nexus,
where they take on the assumption that masses are disinterested in for-
eign policy and argue that substantive role conflict takes place between
“voices from below” and foreign policy decision-making elites, as well
as horizontally between elites themselves. Their range of cases include
horizontal role contestation in France during WWI, emphasising ide-
ological cleavages (Hagan, 2016, 23); Australia’s post-WWII role con-
ception as considered through inter-party elite contestation (Brummer
and Thies, 2016, 40); and vertical role contestation in the UK is high-
lighted through the role of public opinion on British foreign interven-
tions (Gaskarth, 2016, 105).
Finally, Role Theory has been employed by FPA scholars to illus-
trate role behaviour at specific foreign policy decision points. Chafetz
et al. (1996) use it to explain why some states possessing the capacity to
pursue nuclear weapons nevertheless choose not to; Oppermann (2012)
employed Role Theory to explain Germany’s decision-making with
regard to the 2011 Libya intervention; and McCourt (2011) considers
Britain’s decision-making towards the Falklands war through a sym-
bolic interactionist lens. The cases I compare in this inquiry are likewise
oriented around specific foreign policy decision-points, where states are
compelled to act and where role conception, performance and conflict
are best ascertained. For this inquiry, these decision points are the cul-
mination of vertical role contestation in the form of pressure brought to
bear on decision-making elites by marginalised diasporas. The outcome
of these processes is role performance, which evidences the success or
failure of marginalised diasporas in influencing state behaviour. The fol-
lowing discusses the largely distinct body of literature on diasporas as
domestic sources of foreign policy.
Diasporas and foreign policy analysis
Scholars have been discussing whether diasporas influence host country
politics since the 1970s, and despite originating at roughly the same time,
the scholarship on diasporas and foreign policy has rarely applied Role
Theory to investigate questions of influence. Armstrong’s (1976) primar-
ily functional foray analysing diasporas in the political sciences attempts
to give categorical structure to the subject-matter, and in response, for-
mer Senator Charles Mathias (1981) prompts a more normative discus-
sion on diaspora influence on US foreign policy, advancing that liberal
democracies are more prone to influence by ethnic diasporas because of
their heterogeneity and multiple institutional access points.
In his seminal piece, Shain (1995) argues that diaspora groups are
well-positioned to export American values abroad and their policy prefer-
ences often align with broader US objectives. In opposition, Huntington
(1997) argued that the end of the Cold War brought new opportunities
for domestic interventions into foreign policy, warning specifically of the
domestication of US foreign policy through diasporas influencing prior-
ities, where the benefits become increasingly transnational and represent
a cost to the domestic “common good.” This normative debate asks the
question: Does diaspora influence in host country foreign-policymaking
compromise the national interest?
A more recent debate in the normative diaspora literature is where
this field merges into the extensive literature on civil wars and whether
diasporas are best described as perpetuators of conflict or part of the
solution. Orjuela’s (2008) descriptive analysis of the Tamil diaspora finds
they are likelier to contribute to conflict continuation, while Koinova’s
(2011) research contends that diasporas may also play a moderating
influence. Smith and Stares’ (2007) edited volume on the subject crys-
tallised the debate with scholars on both sides demonstrating that the
role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution is very much case
dependent.
The most extensive studies considering the phenomena of diaspora
groups influencing foreign policy are centred in the US. Ambrosio’s (2002)
collection of case studies of ethnic lobbies in the US throughout the last
half century builds a picture of the dramatically increasing importance
of these groups and their capacity to “capture” American foreign policy.
Also, with a focus on the US, Redd and Rubenzer (2010) are amongst
the first to quantitatively test existing hypotheses related to diasporas
and foreign policy influence, finding that a diaspora’s proclivity to vote
likely garners them more capital than their size. Many qualitative inquir-
ies have identified specific factors that appear to impact diaspora influ-
ence. Saideman (2001) begins to unpack conditions by which diasporas
are more or less likely to influence foreign policy, a theme added to by
Ogelman et al. (2002) who compare the Turkish diaspora in Germany
and the Cuban diaspora in the US. These factors are returned to below
as the key components of my analytical framework.
With respect to the Tamil case in particular, Amarasingam (2015),
Godwin (2012), Fair (2005), Lahneman (2005) and Wayland (2003; 2004)
provide descriptive analyses of the Canadian Tamil diaspora and look at
how influential they have been on Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis the
conflict in Sri Lanka. Speaking directly to my question, a recent contribu-
tion by Seligman (2016) describes the changing foreign policy approach
of the Harper government since the beginning of the Conservative
Party’s mandate in 2006. Seligman argues that the Tories were initially
cool to Tamil diaspora preferences, owing to its association with the
LTTE. However, following the defeat of the LTTE and the Conservative
Party’s wider ethnic outreach strategy, the Harper government became
demonstrably more sympathetic to Tamil diaspora preferences. Carment
and Landry (2011) return the debate in Canada to a normative lens and
argue that recent Canadian governments have increasingly sought polit-
ical favour from diasporas through orienting Canadian foreign policy
towards the preferences of diaspora communities, referring specifically
to the Jewish and Tamil diasporas in Canada.
Holsti’s initial motivation in developing Role Theory was to create a
space for the study of less dominant actors in foreign affairs. This inves-
tigation of marginalised diasporas in domestic role contestation reflects
a similar desire and is a natural outgrowth of the turn in Role Theory
to considering how domestic sources of contestation influence role con-
ception and performance. Role Theory’s multi-level nimbleness makes
it ideally suited to consider diaspora influence on domestic role contes-
tation, as it permits the micro-level analysis of domestic foreign policy-
making and supports the inclusion of non-governmental actors, such as
marginalised diasporas. The second reason this approach is particularly
well-suited to these questions is my contention that we cannot fully assess
the “success” of domestic sources of role contestation without observ-
ing role performance. It may be enough to consider policy statements or
legislation domestically if we are only interested in capturing the effect
of domestic agents on role conception, but given that interest groups are
motivated to influence role performance, it is necessary to also consider
state behaviour internationally. As I argue below, Role Theory allows for
the application of both lenses.
Disaggregating agency in foreign policy analysis:

Diasporas as role-makers in domestic role contestation
As pointed out above, vertical and horizontal role contestation involves
the interaction of “masses” as well as “elites” in foreign policymaking.
Below, I disaggregate these role-making agents by homing in on mass
movements in vertical role contestation as well as identifying government
elites and interest group elites. These theoretical contributions are par-
alleled by the further conceptualisation of these role-making agents by
bringing in the literature on social movements and interest groups. At the
end of the section, I introduce how I observe these agents interactively.
Role theory and agency: Mass movements as role-making

foreign policy agents
In the theatre of domestic role contestation, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016)
have rightly emphasised the need to further disaggregate domestic
sources of vertical role contestation between masses and elites involved
in formation of role conception. Within Role Theory literature, a num-
ber of recent contributions have considered several components of the
former. For instance, Paris (2014) looks at contestation through pub-
lic opinion surveys to show that the majority of Canadians still viewed
Canada as occupying a liberal internationalist role during the Harper
era. In like manner, but in reference to the UK intervening in Libya in
2014, Gaskarth (2016) notes the power of public opinion on parliamen-
tary decision-making.
Here it is necessary to make a distinction between these “mass” sources
of domestic role contestation and the formation of a national role con-
ception. The concept of public opinion came to the fore in the early part
of the 20th century, and in recent decades public opinion has come to
mean the results of polling of members of the public, a random sampling
of the public-at-large, on a given issue (Converse, 1987). Alternatively,
“masses” as employed for instance by Gaskarth has come to include both
the views of the public-at-large, as represented by public opinion surveys,
and mass movements engaged in campaigning tactics such as demon-
strations and direct lobbying; these should not be construed as the same
domestic forces, and my inquiry largely concerns the latter. Hill (2015,
271) makes this distinction between public opinion and mass movements,
noting that these movements can grow very quickly in times of crisis as
will be seen in this book’s cases.
“Mass movements” as introduced by Holsti (1970) have received less
attention in Role Theory analyses and are a very different form of mass
opinion expression than public opinion. Mass movements are a form of
collective action or contentious politics. Contentious politics has been
defined as actions which are “episodic rather than continuous, occurs
in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is
recognized by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in
government as mediator, target, or claimant” (McAdam et al., 2001, 5).
It can be added that mass movements should be considered non-elite
level agents (Holdo, 2019). In the literature on lobbying, Dür (2008) notes
that “outside lobbying” is another form of lobbying by non-government
actors, along with direct lobbying by interest group elites. As Kollman
(1998, 8) argues in his seminal work on outside lobbying, these strategies
as employed by petitioners to government vary in their effect and can
have negative consequences for campaigner preferences as well as posi-
tive ones, depending on the extent of their contention.
McAdam et al. (2001, 7) discuss what is meant by “institutional” and
“unconventional” contention. Institutional contention is contention
where the groups and the actions are largely routinised in their frequency,
claims and with respect to the target of claims-making. An example of
institutional contention would be the nuclear disarmament movement in
the 1960s, which witnessed regular demonstrations over a long period
of time voicing similar demands and directed at consistent targets. An
example of unconventional claims-making might be anti-globalisation
protests taking place at a Group of 7 summit given these demonstrations
are likely not a regular occurrence in the jurisdiction in which they are
located.3
A range of concepts have been used in the political science literature
to describe mass mobilisations including social movements, outside lob-
bying, collective action, contentious politics and mass movements. I will
use Holsti’s concept of mass movements as it captures both massive pub-
lic mobilisation on salient foreign policy issues, such as protests in the
lead-up to the Iraq war in 2003, and mobilisation by specific sectors of
society who mobilise in the hundreds of thousands, but on an issue which
has not captured the attention of the public-at-large.
This inquiry’s first two cases focus on Tamil diaspora mass movements
in the UK and Canada which mobilised hundreds of thousands over sev-
eral months (Godwin, 2012). Employing the above definition, the analysis
of empirical cases includes considering the contentious vs. non-contentious
dichotomy as set out by McAdam et al. (2001). Ultimately, this book
brings in the mass movements of marginalised diasporas as role-makers
and consequently as influential agents in foreign policymaking. Mass
movements of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK seeking to influ-
ence role contestation interacted with government elites and Tamil dias-
pora interest group elites and I explore next the question of elite agents
in role contestation.
Role theory and agency: Government and non-government

elites as role-making foreign policy agents
As argued above, I explore Tamil diaspora mass movements as
role-making agents in Canadian and British role contestation. However,
the cases explored in this book also involve the interaction of two other
agents: Government and non-government elites. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to also disaggregate what is meant by “elites” in role contesta-
tion. In so-doing, I conceptualise below both government elites and
non-government, diaspora interest group elites beginning with a brief
introduction of elite theory.
Classical elite theorists, framed by the concept of “elite inevitability,”
posit that elites form a “political class” which is only replaced by another
set of elites as articulated in the foundational works of Michels, Pareto
and Mosca (Christensen, 2013). Yamokoski and Dubrow (2012) offer a
more contemporary definition of elites as “actors controlling resources,
occupying key positions and relating through power networks.” Higley
and Burton (2006, 7) argue that “elites are persons occupying the top of
powerful organizations and movements”; I take this to mean both gov-
ernment and non-government entities.4 Lopez (2013) advances that this
latter perspective creates “elite sectors” within a society, such as interest
groups in civil society. I apply this more expansive logic to conceptualise
government elites and non-government elites.
Government elites are those individuals who comprise the primary
decision-making body in Westminster-style democracies: The Cabinet
(executive). This sphere includes Cabinet Ministers, politically appointed
Special Advisors who are afforded unique influence over Cabinet
Ministers, as well as non-partisan bureaucrats who provide information
to Ministers and who have privileged access as purveyors of advice to
Ministers. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the Cabinet has
traditionally exercised Royal Prerogative over decision-making in foreign
policy and thusly over role contestation. Kalela (1976) argues that for-
eign policy elites are persons who actually or potentially “wield influence
over the formation of foreign policy,” and are those legally empowered
to take or enact a decision. As noted earlier, role theorists have attended
to these agents in horizontal role contestation in great depth and I offer
more empirical detail through considering the Cabinet in Canada and
the UK.5
The third role-making agents of interest to this inquiry are representa-
tives of non-governmental interest groups, which are sometimes consid-
ered agents in foreign policymaking, particularly in networked models
of the policy process (Gaskarth, 2013, 55). However, the literature has
thus far not been clear if they are similarly considered “elites” in the for-
eign policymaking process. As argued by Lopez (2013) above, it has been
established that non-governmental actors can be elites within their own
sector. I argue that representatives of Tamil diaspora interest groups who
interact with government elites on behalf of their constituencies are just
such elites. Below, I further define diaspora interest groups, arguing that
while diaspora interest group elites may be civil society elites, they are
not foreign policy elites; however, they can become “temporary entrants”
in the foreign policymaking processes. I begin by conceptualising “dias-
pora interest group.”
“Interest group” has often been ill-defined and yet is used frequently
across sub-fields under many synonyms like “pressure group” or “lobby
group.” Debate in the literature on what structured interests should be
considered interest groups ranges from Truman (1951), Wilson (1990) and
Richardson (1993) who broadly define an interest group as any organisa-
tion advocating its interests to government. Others argue for limits, such
as the exclusion of institutions and corporations from what should be
defined as interest groups (Jordan et al., 2004). For the purposes of this
book, Jordan et al. (2004) put forward a useful set of criteria for inter-
est groups which can be used as the basis for defining diaspora interest
groups.
Firstly, they argue that interest groups are only organised for a spe-
cific collective political end, such as the abolition of slavery or global
nuclear disarmament. Following from this, the goal must be attainable
and the group will likely disband following the realisation of the objec-
tive; interest groups as part of the suffragette movement seeking votes for
women would be considered such groups. Secondly, interest groups must
be non-governmental bodies and they must not be seeking to form a gov-
ernment themselves.6 Thirdly, interest groups are representative groups,
but their objective is not principally to elect representatives to parliament
with a view to forming government, but this may be a strategy employed
by them.7 Finally, interest groups possess formal, normally voluntary
membership which has some control over the leadership, likely through
internal democratic processes such as the annual election of board mem-
bers. The bulk of interest group resources are often derived from the
membership, which is partly how their ownership over the organisation
is derived.8
Diaspora interest groups retain some of the above criteria, but others do
not necessarily apply. Firstly, diaspora interest groups are not normally
impermanent bodies driven solely by one issue. Diaspora interest groups
might be associated with one issue area, such as Jewish diaspora group
activism in regard to Israel or the Tamil diaspora’s for Tamil Eelam, but
these groups often petition government on a range of issues, including set-
tlement and immigration issues.9 Secondly, diaspora interest groups are
non-governmental bodies seeking to influence the policies of host country
governments and are not attempting to become government. However,
as in the case of Tamils for Labour or Labour Friends of Israel, dias-
pora interest groups may adopt the strategy of gaining influence through
involvement in the selection of candidates (Protected source, British
Tamil Conservatives, 2015). Thirdly, membership is drawn principally
if not exclusively from members of the diaspora community itself and is
done on a largely voluntary basis, such that financial contributions are
not necessary and certificates of membership or other formal conferences
of membership are not issued. Rather than being legitimised through
their stand on specific issues of policy, as an environmental interest group
may be, diaspora interest groups are viewed as being representative of
their specific set of ethno-cultural or religious constituents (Protected
source, Member of Parliament, UK Labour, 2015). This legitimacy is
often achieved through an apparatus that connects interest groups to the
“grassroots,” such as the British Tamil Forum’s network of councils or
the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs’ connection to Canada’s Jewish
federations (The Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, 2017).10
Diaspora interest groups can thusly be defined as permanent, rep-
resentative, non-governmental entities which are not seeking to form
government, have no fixed agenda of issues, derive legitimacy from infra-
structure set-up to connect with diaspora grassroots and have no for-
mal mechanisms for conferring membership, but are based on a sense
of ethno-cultural belonging. Broadly speaking, diaspora interest group
objectives normally comprise efforts to improve the lot of diaspora mem-
bers in the host country and/or to work towards goals in the imagined or
existing homeland.
Having conceptualised government elites as foreign policy decision-
makers and diaspora interest groups as non-government elite actors,
returning to the theoretical discussion introduced earlier: Can diaspora
interest group elites be considered elites in foreign policy decision-making?
I argue in this book that diaspora interest group elites are never elites
in role contestation because they are never vested with decision-making
authority and are not permanently empowered to influence these author-
ities. However, I assert that they may become influential “temporary
entrants” in decision-making processes and therefore can be consid-
ered “role-makers.” Ultimately, it is within the gift of government elites,
such as Cabinet Ministers and advisors, to include non-elite agents such
as diasporas in policymaking and therefore determine their status as
role-makers.
The argument that diaspora interest groups may be considered “tem-
porary entrants” in the policymaking process is illustrated in my explo-
ration of Tamil diaspora interest groups, where I trace their history from
poorly networked agents lacking political credibility, to credible interest
groups interacting with government elites in foreign policy decision-making
representing a marginalised minority. To accomplish this methodolog-
ically, I introduce a range of agency-oriented factors that the existing
literature on diaspora influence in foreign affairs argues impact whether
or not they achieve influence.
Diaspora agency characteristics are determinants which the literature
argues explain why, or why not, interest groups are able to impact foreign
policy as a function of those factors inherent to the diaspora and/or their
interest groups (Landolt, 2008; Ogelman et al., 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen,
2003). Agency characteristics I investigate include: Diaspora mobilisa-
tion, size, numerical significance in parliamentary constituencies, politi-
cal salience, diaspora interest group financial and institutional resources,
group homogeneity and learning as determinants which are inherent to
diaspora interest groups.
Diasporic mobilisation is the extent to which interest groups are able
to draw on the support of their grassroots more broadly (Koinova, 2011;
Redd and Rubenzer, 2010; Saideman, 2001; Shain and Aharon, 2003). The
Tamil diaspora may have as many as 400,000 members in Canada, but if
the diaspora population cannot be mobilised to support collective prefer-
ences, decision-makers are less likely to respond positively to articulated
preferences. An illustrative distinction is between the Jewish community,
which has demonstrated its ability to mobilise around specific issues, and
the Chinese diaspora which traditionally mobilises less around diaspora
issues. Related to diaspora mobilisation is the size of the diaspora, and the
role of this factor is still in contention. Scholars have argued that being
a proportionally small minority allows for greater group cohesion and
limits the potential for rival constituencies to emerge and oppose elite
preferences (Olson, 1993, 24; Ogelman et al., 2002). However, other schol-
ars (Uslaner, 2012) have advanced that larger diasporas are more influ-
ential because they are viewed politically as more potent constituencies.
Ultimately, this is a relative, context-dependent question as it depends on
how large the country population is and how relatively large the diaspora
in question is in comparison to others. Nevertheless, the diaspora has to
be large enough to form a coherent organisational apparatus and to com-
municate its preferences (Protected source, former Canadian Member
of Parliament, 2016); for this reason, I contend that a “large” diaspora is
advantageous to diaspora interest groups.
Related to size and mobilisation is numerical significance within par-
liamentary constituencies. Scholars overwhelmingly agree that diaspora
interest groups are at a significant advantage when they can call upon the
grassroots to vote based on policies towards homeland issues and that,
further, those members have enough clout to influence the outcome of a
particular electoral contest (Geislerova, 2007; Mathias, 1981; Redd and
Rubenzer, 2010; Saideman, 2001). In a First-Past-the-Post system, having
a large but dispersed diaspora may not be viewed by government as stra-
tegically consequential because their numbers are too small in individual
constituencies where each electoral contest is fought, while regionally
concentrated diasporas are expected to have more leverage at the politi-
cal level. As Ogelman et al. (2002) note with regard to the Cuban diaspora
in Florida, the constituencies in which diasporas are concentrated must
be considered strategically significant by decision-makers. If the govern-
ment does not believe it can garner support from a specific diaspora, it
will be less likely to respond sympathetically to its demands.
In reference to capacity, the literature argues that the extent of dias-
pora group resources, i.e. capacity to donate, community infrastructure
and community networks, amongst other factors are important con-
siderations in explaining possible influence (Fair, 2005; Landolt, 2008;
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Diaspora mobilisation with respect to grass-
roots engagement is one element of capacity, but another element is the
extent to which diaspora interest groups have requisite knowledge of
political systems and political capital; have financial resources to print
literature; distribute letters to Parliamentarians and spend time at the
seat of government; and organise political events. All of these consid-
erations are bound up in whether or not diaspora interest groups are
well-resourced. Building on political concentration, but less often refer-
enced, is the degree to which diasporas themselves are viewed as politi-
cally salient by decision-makers. Dewitt and Kirton (2015, 70) discuss the
societal determinants of domestic actors in foreign policy and note the
importance of how salient a particular group is for the political interests
of parties. The analysis considers whether or not the Tamil diaspora was
viewed as politically salient for the political interests of governments.
The literature argues that diaspora group homogeneity is critical in
providing a united front to government (Ogelman et al., 2002). If there
is ideological or organisational discord within the diaspora in the same
host country, especially when the diaspora has multiple interest groups
claiming to represent it and working at cross-purposes, this can greatly
reduce the strength of the diaspora to have its preferences represented
in government policy. Related to group homogeneity, and not thus far
articulated in the literature is whether or not diasporas are viewed as
credible by decision-makers. If diaspora interest groups are not seen as
legitimate, representative voices of the diaspora decision-makers are less
likely to consider their demands. Previous scholarship has noted that
learning within interest groups impacts the capacity to influence pol-
icy (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Given that this book considers diaspora
interest groups over time in both contexts, I discuss whether they learned
from previous experiences and whether they have learned from more
established diasporas.
The above analytical framework as partially set out in the existing lit-
erature on diasporas and foreign policy influence forms the criteria by
which I discuss Tamil diaspora interest groups as role-makers in domes-
tic role contestation. As articulated in the methodological section of
Chapter 1, I argue that the presence or absence of these agency deter-
minants impacts whether or not diaspora interest group elites become
“temporary entrants” in foreign policymaking and by extension exert
influence on role conception and performance. The below discusses the
intersection between the above mass movements, government elites and
diaspora interest group elites.
Role theory and agency: Interaction at the intersection of mass

movements, government elites and diaspora interest groups
In the existing literature on horizontal and vertical role contestation,
what has been less discussed is the interaction of mass movements, gov-
ernment elites and non-government elites in domestic role contestation.
At the nexus of agency and structure, Harnisch (2012) discusses “demo-
cratic role contestation” and points to the liberal approach whereby both
majorities and minorities in society may be able to hoist their preferred
role conception onto the elite agenda.11 What I am interested in is the inter-
action of marginalised diaspora mass movements, diaspora interest group
elites and government elites in democratic role contestation. However, it
remains unclear how mass movements interact with diaspora interest
group elites and further, with elites in government. In order to shed light
on interaction, I adopt two approaches, one derived from the social move-
ments literature and another from the interest group literature.
Firstly, it is necessary to explore the nexus between mass movement
claims-makers and governments as targets of claims. Tilly’s focus on
social interaction, which is the interplay between claims-makers and tar-
gets, notes there are shared meanings and expected repertoires between
demonstrators making claims and the targets of claims (Passy, 2009).
These shared meanings between the two influence the dynamics of con-
tentious politics. As targets of claims, governments determine the role
played by both diaspora mass movements and diaspora interest groups,
as either becoming credible, temporary entrants as role-makers or are
excluded from decision-making. If governments refuse to acknowledge
the role of and engage with diaspora mass movements and elites, they
are not role-makers in processes of role contestation. I argue further that
diaspora mass movements are only ever granted entry into the policymak-
ing process if they are channelled by diaspora interest group elites; mass
movements are then leveraged by them in interactions with government
elites. Indeed, when this interactive relationship between mass move-
ments and diaspora interest group elites is not present, contentious mass
movements can have a deleterious effect on policy outcomes for diasporas.
In essence, I assert that if interest group elites are not granted temporary
entrance into policymaking, neither they nor any mass movement advo-
cating similar aims are likely to have influence in role contestation.
Secondly, the analysis of this interaction also raises the question:
How do diaspora elites gain access to policymaking in the first place,
especially when they belong to marginalised communities? In order to
accurately capture the interplay within the mass movement > govern-
ment elite > non-government elite nexus, I adopt the concept of “inside
advocate,” which describes a member of the policymaking elite from
government, or with access to decision-makers, who champion the cause
of claims-makers (Baumgartner et al., 2009). “Inside advocates” serve
as credible conduits to champion the preferences of non-elite interests
amongst elite decision-makers. Classic exemplars of foreign policy inside
advocates are US Senators John McCain and John Kerry who worked
on behalf of Vietnamese diaspora interest groups in the US through the
1970s to 1990s to change US government policy to admit more Vietnamese
re-education camp detainees into the US (Godwin, 2021). Their advocacy
played a pivotal role in changing the US’s bilateral foreign policy towards
Vietnam. I argue that inside advocates in most of the below cases ele-
vated Tamil diaspora interest group elites into the foreign policy process
as temporary entrants; those elites were then able to leverage mass move-
ments in role contestation.
The analysis of Tamil diaspora mass movements, government elites
and interest group elites at the intersection of role contestation does not
take place in a vacuum. As will be discussed below, role theorists have
long accepted that understanding institutional constraints are essential
to discussing role contestation domestically and role performance inter-
nationally. The next section sets out the institutional theoretical impli-
cations of this inquiry for Role Theory, as well as offering the analytical
framework employed to discuss the institutional environment for Tamil
diaspora mobilisation.
Disaggregating institutions in foreign policy analysis:

Domestic institutions, diaspora influence
and international role performance
The above discussion of diasporas and their interaction in vertical role
contestation outlines the agents involved in domestic role contestation.
While opening up analysis on agents in foreign policy, Role Theory is of
course equally concerned with structures and institutions. There are sev-
eral institutional loci of interest in this inquiry and exploring them is crit-
ical to explaining whether the Tamil diaspora had influence in Canadian
and British role contestation and, furthermore, if these states acted in
their interest internationally.
Firstly, this inquiry is primarily interested in agents interacting at the
domestic level. The below section therefore offers an analytical frame-
work that identifies a number of domestic institutional factors which may
augment or hinder diasporas from achieving influence over national role
conception and performance; these include factors such as the presence
of rival constituencies, alignment with existing national role conception
and institutional permeability. Taken in tandem with the agency charac-
teristics outlined in the former section, this analytical framework offers a
comprehensive picture of diaspora agents in domestic role contestation.
Secondly, this section argues that analysing the influence of diasporas
in role contestation involves observing influence in both domestic role
conception as well as international role performance. For this reason, I
discuss how this inquiry conceptualises influence with a view to observ-
ing both of these processes and concluding whether influence is achieved
despite the institutional constraints placed on both diasporas as well as
the role performance of host countries. These international role con-
straints are ascertained through ascribing the international role position
of states, a process that I argue requires a more systematic approach,
and this section therefore offers such a framework. Finally, I conclude
by arguing that this line of thinking requires the conceptualisation of a
hitherto unaddressed role in foreign affairs: Indispensable states.
Role theory and institutions: Institutional factors

and diaspora decision-making access
I argue that the agency characteristics outlined above determine a domes-
tic group’s capacity to influence foreign policy. Role Theory asserts that
the institutional framework in which domestic forces operate are also
consequential as they determine the possible points of access through
which they are able to exert pressure (Giugni, 2004, 21). Dür (2008)
argues that domestic political institutions are an essential structural con-
sideration in the analysis of interest group advocacy and this remains
true for those contesting roles in foreign policy. The literature argues that
a number of institutional factors are possible determinants of diaspora
interest group access, including host country inclusivity, the presence of
rival constituencies, alignment with host country role conception and
institutional permeability. I introduce these factors below.
Host country inclusivity refers to the capacity for members of the dias-
pora to participate in the political process, such as their eligibility to
gain citizenship, to have the right to vote or to join a political party (Fair,
2005; Lahneman, 2005; Ogelman et al. 2002; Saideman, 2001). Although
less tangible, enveloped within this factor is the extent to which diaspora
members are able to participate in the partisan political process, such
as joining political parties and being able to organise members of the
diaspora within political parties, for instance, to vote in leadership and
constituency nominations. Relatedly, I consider the unique features of
parliament and those distinctions between Canada and the UK by con-
sidering institutional permeability (Redd and Rubenzer, 2010). I take an
expanded view of this factor and disaggregate parliament and Cabinet.
As I advance in Chapter 4, parliament is institutionally less involved in
foreign policymaking (although individual parliamentarians may be),
and the primary concern for diasporas is to permeate Cabinet-level
decision-making. The presence or absence of rival constituencies, nor-
mally in the form of a rival diaspora from the same, often contested
home country may blunt the ability of diaspora interest groups to have
their preferences reflected in host country foreign policy as they may have
countervailing interests (Saideman, 2001).
In the last decade, scholars have tended to include the degree to which
diaspora interest group preferences align with existing host country for-
eign policy goals as a possible institutional factor which might determine
their success (Ambrosio, 2002; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Redd and
Rubenzer, 2010, 79). Given that this book is interested in explaining
influence over role conception and role performance, I alter this factor
somewhat with a focus on whether the Tamil diaspora’s preferences align
with the country’s role conception and its subsequent role performance.
However, the logic is the same: If diaspora role conception and perfor-
mance preferences align with those of the government, the likelihood of
their access is enhanced.
The above institutional factors offer robust structural criteria by which
to discuss why marginalised diasporas may or may not be granted tem-
porary entrance into foreign policymaking and by extension become
role-makers. Table 2.1 summarises the analytical framework I use to dis-
cuss the empirical cases, where a simple “Y” indicates the presence of a
factor and “N” its absence.
Finally, the analytical framework considers the strategies employed by
Tamil diaspora agents aimed at becoming role-makers in domestic role con-
tention. Dur (2008) notes four types of lobbying: direct lobbying (Hansen,
1991, 12); outside lobbying, such as campaigns (Kollman, 1998, 4); selec-
tion of decision-makers, such as engaging in elections and nominations
(Saideman, 2001); or through exercising structural power. The analysis of
Tamil diaspora group strategies turns up evidence of activism which can
be interpreted through the first three strands Dur puts forward. Firstly,
direct lobbying is demonstrated by meetings held between elite members
of Tamil diaspora interest groups and elected officials or bureaucrats,
and this strategy features throughout the empirical cases. Direct lob-
bying affords interest groups the opportunity to provide information to
decision-makers as well as to make emotional appeals (Hansen, 1991, 12).
Table 2.1 Factor comparison framework
Factors Case Case
Agency Factors
Diaspora mobilisation Y/N Y/N
Diaspora size Y/N Y/N
Numerical significance in Y/N Y/N
parliamentary constituencies
Diaspora group resources Y/N Y/N
Political salience Y/N Y/N
Group homogeneity Y/N Y/N
Credibility Y/N Y/N
Learning Y/N Y/N
Institutional Factors
Host country inclusivity Y/N Y/N
Institutional permeability Y/N Y/N
Presence of rival Constituencies Y/N Y/N
Role conception alignment Y/N Y/N
International role performance Y/N Y/N
Diaspora Strategies
Direct lobbying Y/N Y/N
Mass movement protests Y/N Y/N
Secondly, strategies to influence the selection of decision-makers refer
to the efforts of Tamil diaspora interest groups to either support can-
didates for office whose preferences align with theirs, or efforts against
those standing in opposition. Instances of this type of strategy will also
be discussed in the empirical sections. Additionally, “outside lobbying”
is defined above as mass movements and will be analysed as a diaspora
group strategy.
As will be argued in the empirical chapters, the Tamil diaspora was
motivated to alter role performance, as well as role conception, and the
below continues to discuss the analytical framework by which to assess
their success in this aspect of their advocacy, firstly by defining “influ-
ence” for this inquiry.
Role theory and institutions: Diaspora influence on

domestic role conception and role performance
The analysis of agents and institutions in vertical role contestation is con-
cerned with how states conceive of their international roles and whether
or not domestic forces influence these processes. Assessing the success
of this influence can be captured in a number of ways, such as analys-
ing speeches by Ministers, government policy statements and legislation
or votes in Parliament. However, role performance internationally is the
ultimate indication of whether non-elite agents have influenced roles and
it is the outcome of greatest consequence for mobilised diaspora. The
below discusses “influence” for the purposes of this inquiry and disag-
gregates between role conception and role performance as elements of
diaspora goal achievement.
Influence is often conflated with power, with the latter concept having
been the subject of debate in political scholarship for centuries. Arts and
Verschuren (1999) address this debate by borrowing the following from
Cox and Jacobson (1973, 3): “Influence is to be distinguished from power.
Power means capability; it is the aggregate of political resources that are
available to an actor … Power may be converted into influence, but it
is not necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent.” In essence, a
decision has to be made for influence to be demonstrated and I support
this view. For my purposes, influence is an outcome, rather than an inde-
pendent variable possessed by domestic agents or states and this has been
the case for the role theoretical scholarship canvassed earlier.
Dür and De Bièvre (2007) further define influence as “control over
outcomes.” The closer an agent is able to influence a process, the more
influential they are. Dür (2008) borrows from Nagel (1975, 29) to tie influ-
ence to causation: “a causal relation between the preferences of an actor
regarding an outcome and the outcome itself.” Despite numerous anal-
yses into non-government interest group influence on role contestation,
few existing studies precisely conceptualise outcome measures. Dür and
De Bièvre (2007) more precisely consider two types of policy outcome:
An official position taken by public authorities and policy implementa-
tion. These latter concepts in the interest group literature mirror the role
theoretical concepts of “role conception” and “role performance” – one
is principally a domestic indication of foreign policy while the other is an
action in an international context.
For this inquiry, marginalised diasporas either achieve influence, such
as compelling a government to retain an existing policy, or they do not,
such as a government taking a decision against the stated preferences
of the mobilised diaspora. In the below cases, decisions are the point
of influence assessment. Without looking at decision-points, it might
be possible to sufficiently argue that these agents possess “power,” but
“influence” can only be demonstrated when a specific decision-making
process and its outcome are considered against preferences. I look at
the decisions taken by Canada and the UK with regard to Sri Lanka to
ascertain whether influence was exerted by Tamil diaspora agents.
In summary, within the realm of Role theoretical foreign policy out-
comes, there are two types of policy outcomes as concern diaspora
agents. Firstly, diasporas are interested in securing a role conception that
is aligned with their preferences. Role conceptions can be articulated in
the domestic and international sphere in any number of ways, including
through policy statements via speeches or press releases by members
of Cabinet, delegated junior Ministers or through official statements
by foreign Ministries; they can take the form of votes in parliament;
or, they can be conveyed interpersonally by Cabinet decision-makers to
diaspora interest group elites. I consider such decisions in comparative
context to assess whether or not Canadian and British role conceptions
aligned with the preferences of marginalised diasporas. Secondly, influ-
ence can also be observed through foreign policy decisions that involve
actions in the international sphere in the form of role performance. Role
performance outcomes include actions such as the provision of inter-
national aid; the use of instruments to apply pressure on another state,
such as sanctions; the deployment of armed forces abroad and other
measures of “hard” power projection; or actions within international
institutions such as efforts to banish a rogue member, to boycott inter-
national summits or other means of conveying displeasure with another
state. Temporary entrants in foreign policymaking such as diasporas
ultimately want to see states behave in a certain way. The identification
of influence in role performance requires further explication and is con-
sidered in the below section.
Role Theory and constraints on international role performance

Observing influence in foreign policy involves considering state behav-
iour in the context of role performance options, which is to say the extent
to which states have the capacity to act within international institutions
or within the international system, whether in response to domestic
forces or other factors. As noted in the introductory section, Role Theory
offers descriptors for the roles states play as well as defining role position.
Holsti (1970) set out a range of role performance repertoires which states
may perform: Bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional pro-
tector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist, defender
of the faith, mediator-integrator, regional subsystem collaborator, devel-
oper, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development,
isolate, protectee, amongst others. Scholarship has been adding to
these repertoires since his initial foray, while some have become less
applicable. I draw from these repertoires in my analysis of Canadian
and UK role performance with reference to the Sri Lankan civil war
and its aftermath, especially within the Commonwealth institutional
environment.
In addition to setting out role performance repertoires, Role Theory
assumes that states exist in stratified hierarchies of power that both
socialise actors and constrain performance options (Grossman, 2005).
Furthermore, it argues that states can exist in multiple hierarchies of
power and as a consequence can have expanding and diminishing perfor-
mance options depending on the theatre in which the actor is operating.
Wish (1980) sets out role positions hierarchically, by discussing a state’s
“status” as “a location in the social structure defined by expectations for
performance by an incumbent.” She scales positioning depending on the
theatre of performance. Her theatres of institutional role performance
include: Domestic, which concerns only a state’s internal affairs; bilat-
eral, which refers to a state’s relations solely with one other state that is
not a superpower; dominant bilateral, which is a bilateral relationship in
which one of the actors is a superpower; subordinate, which is a regional
collection of contiguous states such as “Latin America” or “the Middle
East”; subordinate other, which is a non-global organisation which can
be either contiguous or not contiguous such as the Commonwealth or
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the international sys-
tem as a whole which can refer to superpower blocs or an international
organisation such as the UN.
Through the above stratified lens, Wish is able to explore a state’s exist-
ence in multiple milieus. Equally important, this level of analysis denotes
where states occupy a unique status within each of their theatres of per-
formance. For instance, Thies and Wehner (2019) consider Mexico’s role
performance in respect of its positioning in the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) club, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and US-Mexico bilateral relations and its role fluctuations
between passive actor, bridge-builder and faithful ally, amongst others,
within these different spheres. In addition to describing Mexico’s role
performance within these theatres, the authors note that Mexico also
holds a different status in these forums. For instance, in NAFTA it is a
pivotal actor as one of only three members of a powerful trading bloc,
whereas in APEC its role was historically far less pivotal and initially
occupied a passive actor role. I similarly compare Canada’s and the UK’s
role position within the social structures of the bilateral relationship each
has with Sri Lanka, their international roles as well as their roles within
the Commonwealth.
As states may perform a wide repertoire of roles, they also occupy
a range of status roles such as “dominant,” “equal” or “cooperative
power” within theatres of performance. With status, or “role posi-
tion,” being an outcome of power hierarchies within the theatre of per-
formance, ascertaining the role position of a state allows for analysts
to observe the limitations on a state’s behaviour within the theatre
and consequently, the extent to which states can respond to domes-
tic sources of role contestation. These boundaries can be perceived
through role performance as states are required to make decisions on
specific issues. The below hypothetical vignette considers Canada and
France as actors in the membership-based La Francophonie interna-
tional institution:
Canada and France are both members of La Francophonie sub-system

association of French-speaking states. The former is a pivotal actor
while the latter is the sub-system’s dominant actor. A fellow member
of La Francophonie, a smaller state in sub-Saharan Africa, is in vio-
lation of the sub-system’s values and member states are faced with
the decision to suspend the member and/or take additional action
outside the sub-system.
In this context, the differing role positions of Canada and France lead
to different foreign policy options. Internationally, Canada is able to
exert little to no influence, whereas France can seek to bring the mat-
ter forward to the UN Security Council or intervene militarily in the
country. At La Francophonie, Canada can be expected to have some
leverage with fellow members to encourage suspension, but France is
likely to have much more. Finally, with far deeper bilateral ties with
the sub-Saharan African state, France will likely have considerably
more leverage on the state’s government than will Canada, but this
also leads to economic concerns for France.
Within France and Canada, members of the sub-Saharan African
state’s diaspora are demanding these governments take action
against the government of their homeland. Canada responds by
voting to suspend at La Francophonie, but takes no other action,
while France similarly votes for suspension and, it also seeks to take
the matter to the UN Security Council where it is vetoed from the
agenda by Russia and China.
As observers determine whether or not the diaspora influenced Canada
and France in their respective role performances within the institution,
they also have to take into account the extent to which each state was
capable of acting within the three spheres of interest: The international
system, the sub-system and bilaterally. If Canada only responds by vot-
ing for sanctions at La Francophonie, and France responds similarly but
also raises the matter at the UN Security Council, it cannot be concluded,
based solely on these decisions, that the diaspora was more influential in
France than in Canada. Uncovering role position unveils performance
constraints in various spheres. This is of utility to this analysis because
Canada and the UK occupy a different role position in international
spheres as well as in their bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka – it is only
through understanding their position within these theatres that we can
conclude if the Tamil diaspora had influence over state role performance.
From a spatial perspective, Wish (1980) discusses “domains of influ-
ence,” which may be as limited as the domestic affairs of a state, or as
expansive as one state’s capacity for role performance throughout the
international system and, by extension, within subordinate theatres.
Ascertaining these domains of influence through ascribing a state’s role
position has not been thoroughly systematised up to this point in Role
Theory. For instance, when comparing state role position, what uniform
framework is being applied to Australia to determine its role position
as Middle Power vis-à-vis France as a Major Power? The following is an
effort to systematise these analyses for the purposes of ascribing role
position, and therefore the performance constraints of Canada and the
UK discussed in this book’s cases.
Role Theory and role position ascription

Much is made of the UK “punching above its weight” internationally,
but what exactly is the UK’s “weight”? Scholars have long asserted that
Canada is the archetypical “Middle Power,” but what is Canada in the
middle of? Foreign policy analysis in general and Role Theory in par-
ticular have argued that the capabilities of countries in part determine
how a state behaves (Grossman, 2005). However, what has been less dis-
cussed is how role positions are ascribed. This discussion is of relevance
to this inquiry as the role position Canada and the UK hold internation-
ally, within the Commonwealth and in respect of their bilateral relation-
ship with Sri Lanka, determines the extent to which they can perform
in response to non-elite diasporas. By extension, uncovering these role
positions sheds light on whether or not the Tamil diaspora was able to
influence role performance.
As illustrated in the discussion above, Role Theory has often focused
on analysing role ego formation, or the role conception of states, rather
than on role position. However, as both Holsti (1970) and Wish (1980)
have argued, understanding the role position or “status” of states within
various spheres of interaction is also a critical part of understanding a
state’s role. While some role theorists have discussed the role position of
states, there remains no systematic way of ascribing a country’s role posi-
tion in the literature for the purpose of comparative analysis.
Ascribing role position firstly begins with acknowledging a principle
of relativity.
Ascribing roles within the international system as well as subsystem
communities of states is about ascertaining capabilities relative to other
states. References such as “superpower,” “Great Power,” “Major Power”
and “Middle Power” are all relative descriptors, such that their utility
is about describing the influence states have in relation to other states
within a given society of states. Existing scholarship often relies on
assumptions, such as the US being a superpower, France a Major Power
or Spain a Middle Power. However, these assumptions are not always
based on a systematic comparison of largely stable factors between
states, but are taken as given. The role position of states within hierar-
chies matters as it says something about role expectations vis-à-vis the
extent to which one state actor can influence others. What is required is
a working framework for analysing a state’s capabilities within societies
of states and this requires identifying a range of factors that shed light on
the influence a state has within a given society.
Foreign policy scholars have gone some way to setting out a frame-
work to ascribe status, or role position through capabilities. Discussing
Canada, Gecelovsky (2009) points to Wood (1988) who identifies Gross
National Product (GNP) as the prime indicator of position while Holbraad
(1984) combines GNP, population and regional considerations in his
ranking index. Neack (1992, 10) examines five national attributes: GNP
per capita, military expenditures per capita, population, infant mortality
rate and adult literacy rate.12 Gecelovsky (2009) suggests a framework
that includes military capacity or expeditionary force capabilities, the
extent and breadth of a state’s diplomatic network, a state’s interconnect-
edness to international civil society and its membership in and position
in international institutions. Hill (2015, 154) refines state capabilities into
military, economic, diplomatic and cultural “instruments,” which is a
systematic approach largely reflected below.
There are a range of factors which offer some indication of the capa-
bilities states possess relative to one another and therefore allow us to
systematically ascribe role position. Firstly, state military capacity and
power of international projection remain a factor in assessing role posi-
tion despite the highly institutionalised nature of international affairs.
The ability to act militarily to assert power independently, such as
Russia’s intervention in the Crimea is an important indication of capa-
bility. Additionally, recent history suggests that actors which instigate
and lead coalitions of states pursuing military action also demonstrates
militaristic influence, such as the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan, Iraq
and against Daesh. As demonstrated by Europe’s inability to retain a
military presence in Afghanistan following the US’s withdrawal in 2021,
military capabilities matter with regard to influence. There are a number
of ways to capture military capabilities, and this inquiry consults the
Global Firepower Index and the Credit Suisse ranking to compare the
military capabilities of the two country actors.
Secondly, national wealth and economic capabilities are an indication
of a state’s role position in societies of states. Wealthy states are able to
wield significant influence over other states through trade, as evidenced
by China’s Belt and Road strategy which has earned the Chinese influ-
ence over “partner” states such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Germany’s
insistence on reforms in Greece in exchange for financial support during
the credit crunch financial crisis is another example of economic influ-
ence. Wealthy states are able to influence the behaviour of other states
through punitive sanctions, as demonstrated by the US’s use of sanctions
to compel Iran to engage in negotiations over its nuclear programme.
The primary measure of a state’s financial pre-eminence is to measure its
Gross National Product (GNP), which is used below to ascribe Canadian
and British role position. However, overall GNP does not tell the whole
story from a bilateral standpoint as it does not capture how consequen-
tial a relationship is in respect of trade flows. For this reason, I consider
the bilateral trade relationship between Canada and Sri Lanka and sim-
ilarly for the UK.
Thirdly, development assistance is another lever of state influence and
therefore of role position. Major contributors to other states through
overseas development aid (ODA) have influence over the shape of state
behaviour, as seen in the influence of France in Lebanon. ODA contribu-
tions also give states influence over debates in international institutions,
as suggested by observers who have argued Britain’s influence has dimin-
ished since its decision to curtail ODA below the historic level of 0.7% of
GNP (BBC News, 2020). However, as in respect of GDP there are impor-
tant bilateral considerations at work. In addition to considering overall
ODA, this inquiry also considers bilateral development assistance.
Fourthly, in the highly institutionalised environment of interna-
tional relations today a state’s diplomatic network and position within
international institutions is a measure of its capabilities. Decisions that
influence the behaviour of other states are taken in the world’s major
international institutions, such as at the UN, the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), security alliances
such as NATO and cultural organisations such as the Commonwealth.
Influence is often exemplified at these bodies through the agenda-setting
power of states, as well as the ability to suspend or otherwise penalise
members, as exemplified in the cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe in
the Commonwealth. Additionally, a robust diplomatic network offering
substantive information and intelligence through in-country networks
remains consequential. The building of organic relationships offers chan-
nels of influence, as demonstrated through the increasing desire to utilise
diplomats to expand trade networks. International institution member-
ship and diplomatic networks are therefore considered in ascribing role
position.
Finally, much has been made of state soft power since the emergence
of the concept in the 1990s (Hill, 2015, 143; Nye, 1990). Despite being
more amorphous and more difficult to capture than the forgoing factors,
soft power is a compelling measure of states’ ability to “attract” as much
as to project power. Whether it be through organising states to convene
on matters of global importance, or through media platforms, person-
alities and cultural outputs with global reach, soft power has influence
over the role position of states. This inquiry uses BrandFinance’s Global
Softpower index to assess this factor in role position ascription.
The five factors discussed above are not exhaustive, but offer a measure
of descriptive utility with a view to ascribing state role position relative
to other states. Ascribing the role position of a state within a particu-
lar society of states establishes boundaries within which they can be
expected to act and therefore defines their range of options for role per-
formance. Having established these limitations, it is possible to deter-
mine whether or not they acted in line with the preference of diasporas or
other domestic interests. Through analysing decision-making processes,
it is then possible to determine if these domestic forces exerted influence.
The below section concludes this chapter by returning to the discussion
on influence.
Role Theory and “indispensable” states

Some role theorists consider “influence” as an independent variable, one
that sits amongst the large constellation of other variables Role Theory
is able to incorporate into discussions around role conception and role
conflict, such as territory, wealth, leader psychology and historical roles
(Grossman, 2005). Influence undoubtedly factors independently into
how states conceive their roles. However, what has been discussed less is
how Role Theory can also capture influence as a “dependent,” outcome
variable.
As argued in the foregoing sections, I am interested in uncovering
whether or not marginalised diasporas influence not only role concep-
tion as conceived of at the domestic level, but also whether states perform
internationally in alignment with diaspora preferences. For this reason, I
both determine the role occupied in each of the decision-making processes
as well as within international institutional boundaries, in particular in
international forums, the Commonwealth and in bilateral relations with
the government of Sri Lanka. By situating Canada and the UK within
these contexts, I determine which state performed in line with diaspora
preferences and which did not. However, it is possible that these per-
formance indicators do not tell the whole story. As argued below, some
states may indeed seek to respond to diaspora influence, but are ulti-
mately constrained by their institutional roles.
The above discussed the need to ascertain role performance options
through ascribing role position with a view to observing whether domes-
tic sources of role contestation influence performance. This line of think-
ing uncovers a gap in the existing range of role theoretical positions: The
possibility of an actor being an “indispensable” state, which is to say
an institution’s dominant actor with “fabric-holding” responsibilities.
While dominant states may have more power and thusly appear to have
greater liberty to act within institutions, I argue that being a dominant
actor within a non-global, sub-system theatre may also render the actor
“indispensable,” such that certain types of performance or role deviation
may result in the collapse of the institution. Consequently, this perversely
constrains the actor’s role performance options and thusly the capacity
for them to respond favourably to domestic role preferences.
An example of an indispensable role played by a state actor in a sub-
system, non-contiguous international organisation is the US in the
short-lived International Trade Organisation (ITO). Following the end
of the Second World War, global powers convened to re-establish the
international world order and as a consequence established a number of
organisations and mechanisms at the famous Bretton Woods summit.
Amongst those organisations were the trade and development bodies, the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). However, it has largely been forgotten that a third international
organisation was meant to emerge as another pillar of the new system,
the ITO. The aim of the ITO was to govern trade, employment and devel-
opment as set out in the Havana Charter, which fifty states signed onto in
1948. However, the ITO proved stillborn, as US President Truman failed
to introduce the ITO for ratification by the US Congress where members
balked at its potential intrusion into US sovereignty (Drache, 2000).
In this institution, the US should not only be considered a dominant actor,
but also an indispensable state. Given America’s post-war pre-eminence,
particularly with regard to economic issues in the capitalist world, the
absence of the US, despite a large number of other states belonging to the
organisation, rendered it moribund. The outcome of the domestic role
conflict within this short-lived sphere resulted in the institution’s collapse.
This inquiry advances that dominant actors should in some cases be con-
sidered indispensable actors and, further, that being an indispensable
state can at times prove perversely constraining to role performance as
certain performance decisions can prove destructive to the point of dis-
solution. By extension, I further apply this logic to non-dominant actors,
arguing that they have more liberty with regard to role performance, and
thusly to respond to domestic sources of role contestation as their actions
are much less likely to prove existentially destructive to the theatre.
Conclusion
The analysis of Tamil diaspora mass movements, government elites
and Tamil interest group elites in role contestation contributes to both
the agency and institutional debates in Role Theory and foreign policy
analysis. The first empirical chapter describes massive demonstrations
organised by the Tamil diaspora, the lobbying efforts of Tamil diaspora
interest groups and the interaction at the nexus of mass and elite actors.
To do this, I disaggregate the concept of “masses” to better understand
the difference between public opinion and mass movements. In like
manner, I also disaggregate “elite,” with a view to understanding when
Tamil diaspora interest group elites are granted temporary entrance to
the policymaking process as role-makers. I set out a range of factors
which I use to explore diaspora advocacy to help explain why they did
or did not achieve influence. Finally, I employ the concept of “inside
advocate,” which is a policymaking elite sympathetic to the preferences
of non-governmental groups to explain how, in part, mass movements
and non-elite agents become temporary entrants in policymaking and
role-makers in role contestation. Broadly speaking, role theorists will be
able to employ these approaches in many other empirical cases to bet-
ter understand the role of mass movements and non-government interest
groups in vertical role contestation.
This inquiry also has institutional implications for Role Theory.
Firstly, I introduce a similar analytical framework with a range of insti-
tutional factors through which to assess the actions of diaspora agents
in role contestation and to what extent they were abetted or constrained
by domestic structures. Secondly, I consider how influence within struc-
tures is defined and argue that assessing diaspora influence involves
overcoming constraints domestically to achieve preferable role concep-
tions, as well as observing the extent to which states perform interna-
tionally in alignment with these preferences. Determining whether states
performed internationally in response to non-elite diaspora pressure
requires ascribing the role position of states within international theatres
of performance and to do this I set out a more systemised approach to
ascribing role position. Finally, I advance that the limitations set on state
performance within international theatres also points to the need for an
additional concept: “Indispensable state.” While Role Theory often dis-
cusses dominant actors with considerable role performance liberties, it is
also important to consider how actors whose presence in an institution is
necessary for its existence determine its performance limits.
This analytical and theoretical framework offers the lenses through
which the below cases are compared. Before turning to the 2009 and 2013
cases, in the next chapter I explore the Tamil diaspora and its marginal-
isation in Canada and the UK through colonial, migratory and securiti-
sation processes.
Notes
1. See Wehner and Thies’ (2014) application of Role Theory to discuss role
contestation on the part of Chile and Mexico in their navigation of regional
roles as well as their membership in trading blocs.
2. See Ovah’s (2013) use of Role Theory to similarly chronical recent changes
in national role conceptions in Turkey.
3. Porta and Tarrow (2005, 2) refer to “domestificiation,” “the playing out
on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally.” The
impetus for Tamil diaspora mass movements is derived externally, from
events in Sri Lanka such as the violent end to the conflict in 2009. However,
the application of this term to the cases explored needs to be caveated as
there was no counter-protest of note on the part of Singhalese interests and
no significant antagonistic confrontations between Singhalese or Tamil
groups.
4. See Lopez (2013) for these sources in comparative context.
5. Scholars have rightly explored the recent turn towards legislative influence
over foreign policy in Westminster-style democracies, as illustrated by the
constraining role played by parliament in the 2013 decision by the UK not
to intervene militarily in Syria. This disaggregation will be explored fur-
ther in later chapters.
6. For instance, arms-length government boards or other levels of govern-
ment within the state such as municipalities, despite seeking to extract
concessions from government, are not interest groups; the resources, legiti-
macy and membership of these state actors are not divorced from the appa-
ratus of government.
7. For instance, Green parties which emphasise environmental issues are
not interest groups as their raison d’être is to advance their issues through
electing members, rather than to petition government.
8. In exchange for membership, voting rights are often conferred and mem-
bers have the right to influence the policy direction and objectives of the
group. Labour groups are examples of interest groups which operate in this
way.
9. Issues are given priority through consultation with members of the dias-
pora, sometimes through local bodies in a federated model, as is the case
with the British Tamil Forum (Protected source, British Tamil Forum,
2015).
10. This distinction is of great consequence, as one of the key strengths of
diaspora interest groups are their ability to mobilise very large numbers of
their membership to take action, including through voting, on issues which
are deeply important to its membership (Protected source, British Tamil
Conservatives, 2015). Whereas more conventional, issues-based interest
groups have members who may prioritise other issues over those advanced
by the interest group when voting or taking action. For instance, while
human rights may be a primary concern for Amnesty International mem-
bers, they may prioritise issues more pertinent to their immediate concerns
such as tax reform or health insurance. However, members of a diaspora
may consider the issues facing it as a collective of equal or greater weight
than those immediate concerns facing all voters.
11. Scholars have discussed the impact of the perception of public opinion by
foreign policy elites and decision-making, see Knecht and Weatherford
(2006).
12. Neack’s approach has explanatory power, but indicators such as a state’s
literacy rate and child mortality rate are better suited to comparing invest-
ment in education or health services. France and Denmark, for instance
share many parallels on such scores, but these measures offer little explan-
atory power as to why the former has a different global role position than
the latter.
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3 A marginalised minority
The Sri Lankan civil war, the
Tamil diaspora and transnational
regimes of marginalisation
Foreign policymaking is often considered from the perspective of gov-

ernment elites. This book instead explores the roles played by marginal-
ised diasporas in foreign policy and whether or not such agents influence
domestic role contestation, with a focus on the Tamil diaspora in Canada
and the UK. Two events are explored later at a micro-level to demon-
strate that they do have influence: The end stages of the Sri Lankan civil
war in 2009 and the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
in Sri Lanka. The above chapter made the case theoretically for dias-
poras as non-elite actors in policymaking, both as organised interest
groups as well as mobilised mass movements. This chapter explores this
agency perspective in greater detail through providing background on
the Tamil diaspora and their traumatic journey from colonised minority
in Sri Lanka to marginalised diaspora in Canada and the UK. I argue
that colonial oppression in the homeland, exclusionary migratory pro-
cesses and securitisation in the host countries deleteriously impacted
mobilisation.
This chapter begins with a conceptual discussion of the much-con-
tended term “diaspora,” situating the Tamils in Canada and the UK as a
far diaspora dispersed and mobilised by conflict, victimised, and having
a mostly antagonistic relationship with the homeland. I then compare the
diaspora in the host states, arguing that both demonstrate relatively sim-
ilar migratory patterns, are made up of a range of socio-economic back-
grounds and are concentrated in large numbers in the countries’ largest
cities. Having set out the necessary empirical background of the Tamil
diaspora, the chapter then turns to its principal argument: That Tamils
in Canada and the UK were marginalised through colonial, migratory
and securitisation processes in the homeland and then the host state.
I begin by discussing “marginalisation,” which I take to mean insti-
tutional exclusion from social, economic or educational benefits due to
characteristics such as economic status, linguistic, racial and visible iden-
tity stigmatisation. Of particular consequence to this inquiry, marginal-
ised communities can also be excluded from political participation, such
that there are institutional barriers to full participation where access is
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-3
limited and the benefits of participation enjoyed by the majority popula-
tion cannot be fully realised. This chapter then unpacks Tamil diaspora
marginalisation through looking at processes of decolonisation, migra-
tion and securitisation.
Firstly, violent colonial oppression through regimes of economic,
social and linguistic exclusion significantly disempowers the colonised,
and these processes are often continued by nationalist governments
in the postcolonial context. Sri Lankan Tamils were marginalised as
a colonised people, first under British rule and then under nationalist
Singhalese governments, processes which precipitated the country’s civil
war. Secondly, host country regimes of integration and settlement can
either empower or marginalise diasporas. Refugee migrants, which are
already marginalised by linguistic and access barriers to participation,
are sometimes still further excluded through integration processes plac-
ing accommodation expectations solely on the diaspora and by limiting
the capacity for diaspora organisations to support settlement. I argue
that Canada’s integration and settlement regimes are more accommo-
dating to diaspora mobilisation than is the case in the UK. Finally, I
detail the history of the transnational Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Canada and the UK, its embeddedness within the diaspora,
diaspora organisations and how its proscription detrimentally impacted
diaspora mobilisation. I argue further that post-9/11 regimes of securiti-
sation stigmatised the Tamil diaspora, leading to further marginalisation
and mobilisation challenges. I conclude by advancing that both diaspo-
ras were marginalised foreign policy actors in Canada and the UK, fac-
ing significant mobilisation barriers in the 2000s leading up to the two
cases I explore later.
Defining the “Tamil diaspora”

Semantic ambiguity has long surrounded the concept of “diaspora” and
scholars have sought to bring clarity to the concept by imposing condi-
tions on what immigrant communities should be included under the dias-
pora umbrella term, with most using the Jewish and sometimes Greek
and Armenian diasporas as the “classical” or archetypical diaspora
cases (Braziel, 2008, 38; Cohen, 2008, 6). There have also been attempts
to categorise diasporas, usually developed on the basis of their method
of migration from home country to host country.1 These categorizations
range from a dichotomous taxonomy like victim and non-victim diaspo-
ras, while others are considerably more multifarious.
Along with the Jewish diaspora, the literature’s focus on the Sikh dias-
pora provides a relevant parallel with the Tamil diaspora, which crit-
ically shares with the Jewish and Sikh diaspora a geographically and
spiritually situated idealised homeland (Cohen, 2008, 114; Fair, 2005).
Dufoix (2003; 2008, 66), distinguishes diasporas in their relations with
A marginalised minority 53
the homeland, including those having an “antagonistic” relationship,
whereby the diaspora seeks to “liberate” their existing or imagined
homeland, and additionally points to the important distinction between
stateless and state-linked diasporas. State-linked diasporas are generally
larger, less cohesive and are not likely to have an antagonistic relation-
ship with the home country, such as the German or Italian diasporas in
North America. On the other hand, stateless diasporas like the Tamil
diaspora are likely to be more unified and assertive in their collective
activities. Lyons (2007, 10) identifies conflict-generated diasporas such as
the Palestinians from the Middle East, the Kurdish diaspora or the Sikhs
from the Indian subcontinent. Given that the vast majority of Tamil emi-
gres arrived in the UK and Canada as refugees fleeing Sri Lanka’s civil
war, they are an exemplar of this type. Furthermore, the Tamil diaspora
in the context of this book should also be considered a “far” diaspora,
meaning members are largely geographically distant from the homeland,
rather than a “near” diaspora.2
According to Cohen’s (2008, 17) nine “common features of diaspora”
the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK can confidently be situated
into the diaspora literature as a stateless, mostly conflict-generated,
victim diaspora whose members originated largely as refugees, are dis-
persed far from the homeland and who can be said to have an antag-
onistic relationship with their home-state. The Tamil diaspora in both
Canada and the UK meet the basic conditions set out by scholars in the
literature to be defined as an “archetypal” or “classical” diaspora, sum-
marised by Cohen (2008, 177) as a diaspora which has been traumatically
dispersed from an original homeland, a homeland which remains salient
and embedded in collective memories.
However, as Amarasingam (2013) and Wayland (2003; 2004) have
noted, a Tamil diaspora did exist in Canada and the UK prior to the
beginning of the civil war. Many Tamils arriving since the 1950s were
economic migrants from the higher economic strata of Tamil society in
Sri Lanka, entering the learned professions such as law, medicine, aca-
demia and others (Zulfika, 2013, 110). As will be described in greater
detail below, the organisation within the Tamil community in response
to the conflict began at a nascent stage in both countries with these ear-
lier waves, but interest groups quickly came to be dominated by refugee
migrants following 1983.
It is not intellectually expedient for this project to separate the British
and Canadian Tamil diaspora into “two diasporas”: Conflict-generated
and non-conflict generated, for two reasons. Firstly, as demonstrated in
later chapters, early mobilisation and mobilisation which continued well
after many refugees began arriving in Canada and the UK were led by or
certainly supported by members of the Tamil diaspora who had arrived
before the war in Sri Lanka began. This separate migratory experience
caused tension, but for the purposes of this inquiry, which is focused
on mobilisation on homeland issues, these strands of the diaspora can be
taken together given their common objectives of campaigning for Tamil
rights, for an independent homeland and for the alleviation of Tamil hard-
ship both in Sri Lanka and in the host countries. Secondly, it is not useful
to sub-divide the Tamil diaspora into “mobilised” and “non-mobilised”
for the purposes of this inquiry. Undoubtedly, at various periods there
were members of the Tamil community who did not engage in activism
for a variety of reasons, including preoccupation with settlement and
integration issues, fear of reprisal from host country governments or for
a desire to separate themselves from the conflict both physically and later
while in the host country.3 The agency emphasis is on mass movements
and diaspora interest groups, which assumes that those engaged as pro-
fessional members, volunteers or as grassroots protesters (i.e. those writing
letters or signing petitions) are to some extent mobilised.4
For the purposes of this inquiry, the Tamil diaspora in Canada and
the UK is a largely conflict-driven, stateless, far, victim diaspora having
an antagonistic relationship with the home-state. I focus on members of
the diaspora who are mobilised and have become activists, either at the
elite level of Tamil diaspora interest groups or grassroots members who
become part of mass movements.
The Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK

The worldwide Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is believed to number any-
where from half a million to over a million members, with the larg-
est populations in Canada, the UK and Australia.5 Beginning with
the Tamil diaspora in Canada, before 1983 there were roughly 2000
Sri Lankan Tamils living in Canada. These Sri Lankan Tamils were
generally professionals from higher economic strata families, many
of whom had resided first in the UK and arrived in Canada through
Commonwealth ties (Zunzer, 2004). Following violent riots in 1983
and the beginning of the civil war in earnest, Tamils began to arrive in
Canada en masse as conflict-generated refugees. Despite not having been
a favoured destination for Tamils in the past, emigres viewed Canada
as an auspicious destination due to fewer restrictions on immigration as
compared to countries such as Britain and Germany. As will be outlined
below, Canada’s generous system of social benefits and its policy of mul-
ticulturalism made it a compelling destination.
For the purposes of the cases explored here, there were between 250,000
and as many as 400,000 Sri Lankan Tamils living in Canada (La, 2004;
Lahneman, 2005). Some estimate that as many as 200,000 Tamils are
living in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) alone, with this population
of Sri Lankan Tamils being larger than any other in the diaspora and
larger than any concentration of Tamils now living in Sri Lanka (Mendis,
2014).6 With respect to their places of settlement in Canada, the majority
of first generation Sri Lankan Tamils settled in the region of Toronto in
the northeast referred to as Scarborough; a very culturally diverse region
of Toronto, Scarborough has included at least five federal electoral con-
stituencies or “ridings” which segment the region politically.7
Estimates on the size of the Tamil diaspora in the UK are less accurate
than the Canadian context due to the UK census only capturing individ-
uals identifying as “Other Asian.” However, it has been estimated that
prior to 1983 the Sri Lankan population was roughly 30,000 and in 2002
it was close to 110,000; 60,000 of whom are refugees. The UK Labour
Forces Survey estimates there are 102,950 Sri Lankan-born workers
and that Sri Lankans are the fourth largest Asian diaspora in the UK.
Numbers range anywhere from 100,000 to as high as 250,000 (Fair, 2005).
Sri Lankan Tamils are concentrated in London and Greater London,
with large, identifiable communities in areas of London such as Rayner’s
Lane, East Ham, Southall, Wembley, Harrow and Ilford (Deegale, 2014).
Fifty thousand Tamils are believed to call London home, and 90 per cent
of Tamils reside in the southeast of England. Outside of London, Sri
Lankan Tamils also reside in Leeds, Bradford and Lancashire (Cowley-
Sathiakumar, 2008).
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the UK is formed of at least three
distinct streams of migration. The first was a post-independence wave
composed largely of Tamil professionals with high English proficiency
and a high level of education. Many Sri Lankan Tamils left as opportu-
nities in higher education began to be restricted on the basis of nation-
alist policies aimed at reducing the number of Tamils in university
and in the civil service (Deegale, 2014).8 A second wave arrived in the
1970s made up of slightly “lower caste” migrants with less formal edu-
cation. Many belonging to this wave were young men who did not inte-
grate quickly into the UK (Cowley-Sathiakumar, 2008). A third wave
of migration was composed almost entirely of asylum-seekers fleeing
violence in Sri Lanka following the 1983 riots and the eruption of hos-
tilities between the government in Colombo and Tamil separatists, as
well as between the various factions of Tamil separatist groups fighting
amongst one another. This final wave of migration has been by far the
largest (Orjuela, 2008).9
Broadly speaking the Tamil diaspora in Canada and UK have followed
similar migratory patterns and are heavily concentrated in the largest
urban centres of Toronto and London. Now, with an empirical under-
standing of the Tamil diaspora in the host countries, the next section dis-
cusses why Sri Lankan Tamils emigrated in such large numbers and what
influence their migratory journey had on mobilisation. The following
sections investigates these questions by arguing that the Tamil diaspora
in both countries were marginalised as a consequence of colonial oppres-
sion, exclusionary integration and settlement policies and securitization
policies during the 2000s.
The marginalization of the Tamil diaspora: Decolonisation
and regimes of migration and securitisation
Having discussed the Tamil diaspora above conceptually and empiri-
cally, the remainder of this chapter provides background on the Tamil
diaspora as a marginalised foreign policy agent, through tracing the
diaspora’s journey from post-colonial Sri Lanka to Canada and the
UK. From an agency perspective, the foregoing theoretical chapter dis-
tinguishes between elite actors in foreign policy and non-elite actors,
arguing that diaspora mass movements and interest groups like the ones
discussed in this book are non-elite actors. Further to these conceptual
discourses, I argue that diaspora agents such as the Tamil diaspora may
also be marginalised minorities within the host state; a status which
impacts their capacity to influence foreign policymaking. Specifically,
the Tamil diaspora has been marginalised for three reasons: Firstly, the
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was subjected to oppressive colonial policies
both before Sri Lankan independence as well as in the post-independence
era. Secondly, this chapter looks at regimes of integration and settlement
in Canada and the UK, arguing that the Tamil diaspora is a marginal-
ised migrant community which was not empowered by integration and
settlement processes in the UK to the same extent as it was in Canada.
Finally, the chapter concludes by turning to the transnational, discussing
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s co-optation of the Tamil diaspora
in Canada and the UK and its subsequent proscription by the Canadian
and British governments. I argue that proscription, coupled with broader
securitisation policies further marginalised the Tamil diaspora. I begin
by outlining what I take to mean “marginalisation,” which is not often
referenced in the politics literature and features even less so in literature
on foreign policy analysis.
Theories of marginalisation
What does it mean to be marginalised? Sociological perspectives with
an emphasis on inclusion and education have conceptually interrogated
this subject for more than three decades as succinctly outlined by Mowat
(2015). To be marginalised is to some extent to be socially excluded from
accessing the same opportunities and channels of participation, and by
extension the same benefits, as mainstream society (Razer et al., 2013).
This can mean for instance exclusion from education due to disabili-
ties, exclusion from full economic participation due to racial barriers or
exclusion from political participation as a function of language (Messiou,
2012; Petrou et al., 2009). There remains debate as to whether or not spe-
cific demographic groups should be viewed as being “statically” mar-
ginalised (Mowat, 2015). However, for the purposes of this book there
are identifiable groups within polities who experience specific forms
of structural exclusion and stigmatisation on the basis of their identity
and which further does not depend on relatively non-static factors, for
instance economic status (Bottrell, 2007; Petrou et al., 2009). Drawing on
this debate, scholarship advances a pertinent distinction between identi-
fiable demographic groups which authorities designate as marginalised,
such as children and seniors living in poverty, and those groups which
are marginalised by society’s institutions but are not always recognised
as being so in policy, such as many migrant and ethnic communities
(Bottrell, 2007; Deuchar, 2009). This distinction is important in a racial
context, as marginalisation may be both a conscious or unconscious pro-
cess resulting effectively in the same outcome (Hills, 2002, 2).
Finally, a marginalised group within a polity is one which is unable
to effectively participate such that it fully benefits from society and its
institutions (Razer et al., 2013). Participation in this context is not only
in reference to educational or economic opportunities, but can also refer
to participation in political processes or what has been termed “main-
stream power” which may be used to alter the status of the group and/
or to advance policy preferences which are seen by the group as being
in their interest (Messiou, 2012). For the purposes of this inquiry, this
definition therefore includes and pays specific attention to political insti-
tutions, arguing that identifiable groups which are not able to collectively
participate to the same extent in political processes as the majority pop-
ulation should be considered marginalised.
Considered through the conceptual lens discussed above, the Tamil
diaspora in Canada and the UK is a marginalised group, including in
respect of participating in foreign policymaking. Specifically, the Tamil
diaspora has been marginalised through three interrelated processes:
As a colonised population deprived of their rights in the homeland, as
a migrant population in their host countries and finally as a securitised
diaspora. Firstly, processes of “colonial marginalisation” are perhaps
best described by discourses emerging from the work of the 20th-century
psychiatrist, Franz Fanon (Burke, 1976). Fanon notes that colonial
oppression is inherently violent as the colonised are denied opportunities
for education, segregated geographically and limited in their freedom
to apply their labour as they choose and are similarly limited in profes-
sional advancement (Fairchild, 1994). In postcolonial contexts, Fanon
points to the continued oppression of the “masses” by a nationalist elite
that were in part complicit in colonial oppression and continue to imple-
ment oppressive policies following the end of colonial rule from abroad
(Fairchild, 1994). Said (2003) argues that these processes are disempow-
ering, where agency on the part of the colonised, including those living
in a post-colonial environment in the homeland continue to experience
structural exclusion.
Secondly, marginalisation is experienced by refugee migrants from
conflict and post-conflict settings upon arrival in host country societies
(Mowat, 2015). Predominately refugee migrants such as the Tamil com-
munity face acute challenges to participation like linguistic barriers,
unfamiliarity with political processes and are limited in their access to
decision-makers. These agency challenges are in some cases exacerbated
by structural features of host country integration and settlement pro-
cesses through limiting opportunities to mobilise and give voice demo-
cratically to collective grievances (Flynn and Olad, 2015, 145). In respect
of integration, state policies which provide integration support, encour-
age the maintenance of identity and place an integration onus on soci-
ety as well as migrants are more inclusive and opportune for diaspora
mobilisation.10 In respect of settlement, the migrants’ rights perspective
advances that mobilisation is critical both to achieving policy prefer-
ences as well as to mitigating marginalisation. However, settlement pro-
cesses which remove agency from migrants are likely to inhibit proactive
political participation (Flynn and Olad, 2015, 159). While being in receipt
of host state benefits affords diasporas the opportunity to mobilise more
on homeland issues, the manner in which these benefits are provided also
influences mobilisation. In their comparison of the Sudanese diaspora
in Australia and the US, Allerdice (2011) argues that the latter are bet-
ter-placed advocates for homeland issues as the US settlement system
empowers diaspora groups as settlement providers. A similar compara-
tive lens is offered for the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK below.
Finally, I argue that diaspora groups such as the Tamil diaspora are
marginalised through securitisation processes. Discourses on the secu-
ritisation of primarily racialised ethnic groups in Canada and the UK
emerged in earnest following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, but as I
argue below these securitisation processes began for the Tamil diaspora
even earlier. Stonebanks (2019) adopts a Critical Race Theory approach
to advance that non-majority populations are subjected to institutional
security policies to a far greater extent than the majority population. He
draws on the work of Bramadat and Dawson (2014, 7–8) who refer to
securitisation as “… the growing emphasis on national security is under-
stood both narrowly (e.g. increased border controls for particular states)
and broadly (e.g. increased international cooperation in the ‘war on ter-
ror’ and the pursuit of groups such as al-Qaeda).” In practice, securitiza-
tion is apparent when certain ethnic groups are targeted by surveillance
and increased attention from law enforcement, establishing a climate of
suspicion and stigma. In addition to surveillance, counter-terrorism leg-
islation and policies (advertently or inadvertently) led to the profiling of
ethnic communities, increased stop-and-search, disruptions to travel and
aggressive policing (McDonald, 2015); this stigma effectively “criminal-
ises” the target group whereby ethnic identity itself is enough to elicit
suspicion (Flynn and Olad, 2015, 148). As will be demonstrated in the
cases below, securitised groups are impeded in their collective action and
political participation as a consequence of these institutional approaches,
as decision-makers are less inclined to engage openly and actively with
groups for fear of being tainted with stigma. Furthermore, ethnic group
leadership are less likely to advocate on behalf of the community for fear
of being personally besmirched by their association (Flynn and Olad,
2015, 156).
Having discussed the above colonial, migratory and securitisation
processes of marginalisation, the below offers empirical background on
the transnational journey of the Tamil diaspora to Canada and the UK,
arguing that these processes led to the marginalisation of the diaspora
in both countries. It begins with the colonial and conflict history of Sri
Lanka and the marginalisation of Tamils through these processes.
Colonial regimes of marginalisation

and the Sri Lankan civil war11
Historically, both the Singhalese and Tamils trace their ancestry back to
India and developed autonomous kingdoms, independent of one another
having experienced periods of cooperation and conflict for roughly
two thousand years (Manogaran, 1987, 2). Sri Lanka was colonised by
Europeans in the 16th century and the Portuguese, who first conquered
the island, left the demographic status quo intact and allowed the two
peoples to continue to exist independently of one another. The island was
later taken over by the British, who imposed their own governance struc-
ture and dismantled the existing system in favour of five, and later 22,
arbitrarily defined districts. The Tamil-speaking people resided mostly
in the Northern and Eastern districts, but it was during this time that
internal forced migration began to disrupt the traditional demographic
geography of the island.
Throughout the British colonial period, the Singhalese maintained
economic superiority over the Tamil minority through their control over
most of the arable land in Sri Lanka. As a result, many Tamils entered
the learned professions, such as medicine, law and academia. To improve
their lot, many learned English under British occupation and joined the
existing administrative service (Manogaran, 1987, 7). It was in the 1920s,
as the British began to delegate more authority to Sri Lankans that ten-
sions began to rise between the two ethnic groups. Universal suffrage
was instituted in 1931, but despite this, the early electoral structure of Sri
Lanka was regionally distributed, which disadvantaged the Tamils given
their smaller numbers. Sri Lanka peacefully declared independence from
Britain in 1948, and the new state structure quickly began to reflect the
wishes of the Singhalese majority.
The conflict in Sri Lanka has its roots largely in this process of decolo-
nisation. Following 1948, the Singhalese dominated Sri Lankan govern-
ment instituted a series of nationalist policies and laws to the detriment
of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. These policies included the
deprivation of citizenship for roughly 900,000 Tamils in the new state; the
closure of public service jobs to Tamils, along with the implementation of
entry quotas in universities aimed at reducing Tamil students; Sinhalese
was adopted as the official language of the new state, and Buddhism was
given predominance in the new constitution; and the neglect and disre-
gard of Tamil majority areas for new infrastructure projects began and
would become a hallmark of government policy for decades following
independence (Gopal, 2000, 153).
Given these exclusionist policies and the explicit nationalism exhibited
by the Singhalese leadership, calls for an independent Tamil state began
being made openly as early as 1950 (Manogaran, 1987, 12). However, the
majority of Tamils sought a semi-autonomous Tamil state in a larger
federal framework. Two agreements, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam
pact of 1957 and the Senanayake-Chevanayakam pact of 1965 were
negotiated to address Tamil concerns, but neither were implemented as
a result of hard-line opposition among Singhalese elites (Manogaran,
1987, 12). Non-violent protests among the Tamils, as well as anti-Tamil
rhetoric and violent opposition from the Singhalese, characterised this
post-independence period. In 1972 a new constitution, which established
Sri Lanka as a republic within the British Commonwealth, was drafted
by the Sri Lankan government. As had been the case almost 25 years ear-
lier, Singhalese was again enshrined as the official language of Sri Lanka,
and Buddhism was given a special place, virtually as the state religion
(Manogaran, 1987, 13). It was in the early 1970s that disaffected Tamil
youth, excluded from jobs and places in the country’s universities began
to form nascent radical groups beyond the control of Tamil political elites
(Gopal, 2000, 152; Ratnatunga, 1988, 388). One of the most powerful of
these groups was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), whose
first violent attack was against the Mayor of Jaffna in 1975. Between their
creation and 1983, the LTTE are believed to have been responsible for
more than 265 acts of aggression, ranging from bombings to robberies
and vandalism.12
In July 1983, intermittent attacks by Tamil separatist groups rapidly
led to an escalation in violence and ultimately precipitated the civil war.
The killing of 13 Singhalese soldiers led to massive, violent anti-Tamil
riots leaving dozens dead. The government was accused of doing nothing
to stop the unrest and was further believed to have abetted attacks on
Tamil civilians (Gopal, 2000, 156). After the deaths of some 400 Tamil
civilians, and the mass exodus to India of 150,000 others, the first World
Tamil Eelam Conference was held in New York to strategize for the
establishment of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Following
the expulsion from the Sri Lankan parliament of the mainstream Tamil
political leadership, the TULF, radical separatist groups gained new
legitimacy among the Tamil community and effectively assumed the lead-
ership of the separatist struggle. The rest of the 1980s was characterised
by international attempts to end the conflict, mainly through Indian
influence. The presence of an Indian peace-keeping force failed to create
conditions necessary for a lasting peace. Despite American involvement
as well, attempted settlements in 1987 and 1988 did not produce peace
and, with pressure from all sides, the Indian force left in 1990. Aggressive
warfare resumed between the LTTE-led separatists and Sri Lankan gov-
ernment forces well into the mid-1990s (Gopal, 2000, 159–171).13
Uyangoda (2005, 22) suggests that the most successful attempt at a
political solution for the conflict came in 2002. With extensive interna-
tional involvement in a Norwegian-led negotiation process, and sup-
plemental incentives (US$4.5 billion), the process produced a ceasefire
between the hostile parties, six rounds of talks and a proposal for a feder-
ated state. Despite Western promises of economic aid and other commit-
ments as incentives for sticking to the ceasefire, the LTTE again reneged,
citing their exclusion from the talks taking place in Washington, DC,
and the failure of the Sri Lankan government to adequately meet the
terms of the agreement. In 2005, the political climate changed with the
election to the Sri Lankan presidency of hard-line nationalist Mahinda
Rajapaksa (Bandarage, 2009). Following the election, the President con-
solidated considerable executive powers, including a significant amount
of control over the legislative and judicial branches of the government
and he assumed the roles of Minister of Finance and Minister of Defence
(Large, 2016, 48). The first major offensive by either side following the
2002 ceasefire was a successful land-grab by the Sri Lankan government
in September 2006 (BBC News, 2017). The LTTE responded with sev-
eral assassination attempts and violent retaliatory attacks, leading to
further incursions and land seizures by the Sri Lankan government. In
May 2008, the government formally broke from the 2002 ceasefire and
captured large tracts of land in the north formally held by the Tigers. The
final throes of the conflict began in the fall of 2008, with a Sri Lankan
offensive that made deep gains in Tiger-held territory. Victory was even-
tually declared by the president on May 19th, 2009, over the LTTE (BBC
News, 2017).
While there were salient territorial, economic and political consider-
ations, the 26-year conflict in Sri Lanka is defined in the literature as an
ethnic conflict, in which ethnic identities were constructed, reinforced,
foiled against the other, and most importantly, mobilised by political
elites to obtain specific outcomes (Bush, 2003, 6). For Singhalese polit-
ical elites, particularly the nationalist elements of the leadership, the
post-colonial vision for the country was one in which the majority could
feel secure and in control of state institutions and not exposed to threats
from minorities (Uyangoda, 2005, 11). Their historical frame told of the
oppression of the Singhalese by the Tamils and created a mentality that
they were in fact the threatened minority in the larger regional picture of
Southeast Asia. For their part, the Tamils actively pursued a federalist
state through peaceful means, before turning to violence in pursuit of a
fully autonomous, sovereign state: Tamil Eelam (Bush, 2003, 12).
As evidenced by the above colonial and post-colonial history of Sri
Lanka, the Tamil diaspora was subjected to colonial oppression dur-
ing both British imperial rule up to the 1940s and these mechanisms of
oppression were continued in other forms following independence as
nationalist Singhalese elites continued to marginalise Tamils through
regimes of linguistic, social and economic oppression. As advanced by
Fangan (Burke, 1976), the roots of Tamil marginalisation in Canada and
the UK are in these colonial and postcolonial regimes. As discussed in
the upcoming section, institutionalised marginalisation of the Tamil
diaspora through regimes of integration and settlement further disad-
vantaged Tamil diaspora mobilisation in the UK.
Regimes of integration, settlement

and disempowering diasporas
The following discussion of regimes of integration and settlement in
Canada and the UK reveals systems which diverged during the period
of rapid Tamil asylum-seeking from the early 1980s when the former
espoused a liberal intake of refugees, an inclusive integration policy
and offered diasporas the opportunity to provide services to newcom-
ers. The British context was rather less receptive and less supportive of
empowering diaspora organisations, leading to a degree of further mar-
ginalisation for a diaspora that was already in unfamiliar institutional
surroundings.
Immigration, integration and settlement in Canada

Canada’s immigration system prior to 1962 favoured white Europeans on
the basis of racial preference, making it difficult for potential migrants
from countries such as Sri Lanka to gain entry. Following 1962, a new
system was put in place which emphasised family reunification, poten-
tial professional contributions and humanitarian assistance, culminating
in the 1966 Trudeau White Paper which cemented a non-discriminatory
points system (Zulfika, 2013). In 1976, Canada ratified the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and adopted the Immigration
Act in the same year, which codified Canada’s “about-face” from a policy
of racial exclusion to one of openness. Canada went further during this
period, adopting a system admitting refugees without a cap (La, 2004).14
The 1970s also witnessed Canada become the first country in the world to
adopt multiculturalism as state policy through the 1971 Multiculturalism
Policy of Canada (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The policy ensures new-
comers can maintain their cultural identity while seeking to integrate
into Canadian society.
From the beginning of the civil war, immigration from Sri Lanka
to Canada rose dramatically and acceptance rates for Tamil refugees
was very high.15 Even after the creation of the Canadian Immigration
and Refugee Board in 1989, which brought more rigour to admittance
processes, Tamil refugee claimants had an 80 per cent success rate until
1998.16 Added to the favourable acceptance rate, many Tamil migrants
bypassed conventional assessment procedures. Between 1986 and
1989 some 26,500 refugees were admitted to Canada (Zulfika, 2013).17
Despite having a population of less than 20 million, between 1991 and
2001 Sri Lanka was the fifth largest source country for immigrants to
Canada. Between 1992 and 1999, Sri Lanka was Canada’s largest source
country for refugees, with 80 per cent of claims heard approved in 1999 and
77 per cent in 2000.18
With regard to integration and settlement, Canada has a long tradi-
tion of providing services to newcomers through a decentralised fund-
ing and programme provision apparatus where the federal government
funds hundreds of immigrant-serving organisations across the country;
many of them run by diasporas.19 Between 2005 and 2006, for instance,
the federal government spent CAN$445 million on integration services
(Elrick, 2007). One example of this is the Tamil Eelam Society of Canada
(TESOC) which provided integration and settlement services for the
Tamil community. Additionally, Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(CIC), which is the federal government’s immigration and settlement
delivery department supports seven different programme areas, with the
overall goal of ensuring “newcomers contribute to the economic, social
and cultural development needs of Canada.” Programme spending in
this area alone exceeded CAN$1 billion in 2010–2011.
With regard to naturalisation, the Canadian government encourages
new migrants to seek citizenship and Canada has one of the highest nat-
uralisation rates, with 70 per cent of migrants being naturalised as of
2001. Along with China and India, Sri Lankan migrants are in the top ten
source countries with the highest rates of naturalisation (Elrick, 2007).20
Since 1977, Canada has allowed Canadians to hold more than one type
of citizenship.21
Immigration, integration and settlement in the UK

In contrast to Canada, the UK was for much of the 20th century a rel-
ative net exporter rather than importer of migrants (Somerville et al.,
2009). Following the Second World War, Britain’s colonial legacy defined
its immigration policy via the British Nationality Act of 1948, which per-
mitted access to the country for citizens from Commonwealth countries
without hindrance. Motivated by a desire to cement Britain’s position
at the head of the post-Imperial Commonwealth of Nations, these poli-
cies led to a large intake of migrants from former colonies such as India,
Pakistan and Jamaica. However, unlike Canada which ended a system
giving preference to whites in the 1960s, Britain’s immigration system was
heading in the opposite direction. Following the “South Asian Surge” in
the late 1950s, popular anxieties over the entrance of non-whites led to
a series of legislative reforms to “close the door” and make it harder for
new migrants, including refugees, to settle in the UK (Spencer, 1997, 147).
Legislative reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the 1971
Immigration Act all worked to limit immigration to at least “net-zero”
and empowered the Home Secretary with considerable discretionary
powers.22 These legislative changes formed the backbone of UK immi-
gration policy during the early stages of Tamil refugee migration to the
West. The period was defined by an emphasis on limitation, including
the passage of the British Nationality Act, 1981 which removed the auto-
matic right to receive British citizenship despite being born on British
soil. Further administrative hurdles were put up, including those limiting
students and those visiting the country from claiming permanent resi-
dency (Spencer, 1997, 149).23
Despite the fact that the UK’s policy framework was not as receptive
as Canada’s, it has nevertheless been a popular destination for refugees,
including Tamils. Along with Somalia and Turkey, Sri Lanka featured reg-
ularly in the late 1980s and 1990s as a top source country for asylum-seekers
arriving in the UK (The Stationary Office and the Secretary of State for
the Home Department presented to Parliament, 1998). In 2001, they were
6 per cent of the total, making it the fifth highest source country for that
year. Of those who made an application, four in ten were granted asylum.
By the 1990s and the coming to office of Prime Minister Tony Blair, a new
immigration policy was put in place which saw a discernible rise in the
number of new migrants, including those from Sri Lanka.
Conceptually, the term “integration” began to be used in the mid-1990s
and appeared in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which enhanced
the role of NGOs and the voluntary sector and created a minor role
for refugee community associations. The Refugee Integration Strategy
(2000) emphasised the need for refugees to fully exercise their rights and
responsibilities. Finally, it was only in 2000 when a refugee integration
policy was put into place, making finance available for integration ser-
vices and making community organisations eligible to provide integra-
tion services (Somerville et al., 2009). Regarding settlement, prior to
1999, refugees arriving in Britain were admitted to the same welfare pro-
vision as permanent British residents. The 1990s witnessed the enactment
of refugee application-making and provision of social services, includ-
ing the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act which removed conventional
benefits from refugees and created the National Asylum service (BBC
News, 2013).24 While social benefits may have been retrenched during this
period, the UK began to move away from looking at refugees as individ-
uals to be “settled,” but as members of society where integration should
be supported (Allwood and Wadia, 2010, 32). A separate asylum-seekers
support system was eventually established providing 70 per cent income
support.25 The UK Gateway Protection Resettlement Programme, which
works in partnership with the United Nations Refugee Agency, is one
of the programmes supporting resettlement for asylum seekers. The
programme provides refugees with a 12-month package of housing and
integration support by both local authorities and NGOs. The Mandate
scheme provides support to refugees through the Home Office and assists
refugees from all over the world who are housed and supported by a close
family member in the UK (Home Office, 2017).26
Considered in parallel, while both countries admitted the largest num-
bers of Tamil refugees during the civil war years there were significant
institutional divergences in the two countries which the literature sug-
gests should make the Canadian Tamil diaspora “less” marginalised and
better positioned as mobilised agents. Firstly, Canada’s immigration
reforms opened up the country to many more asylum-seeking claim-
ants with far more liberal policies and legislation in comparison with
the UK, which at that time was actively seeking to “close the door” on
migrants following earlier immigration from largely non-white countries.
Secondly, Canada institutionalised integration support for decades and
takes multiculturalism as a guiding principle where the host country is
expected to work to include newcomers and accept their cultural contri-
butions. In contrast, integration was not a programme priority for British
governments until well into the arrival of large-scale Tamil migration,
with migrants historically expected to shed former national attachments.
Finally, Canada’s empowering settlement approach provided resources
to diaspora organisations to support new arrivals directly, whereas in the
UK most arrivals were supported through universal social services and
did not offer resources to diaspora organisations for settlement through-
out much of the Tamil migration period. While in both contexts migrants
were not left wanting for the basic necessities of life, the Canadian con-
text’s empowerment of diaspora organisations early on led to the crea-
tion of robust Tamil diaspora organisations familiar with government
policymaking and operations.
When taken together, Canada’s more receptive immigration and inte-
gration policies, as well as its generous, diaspora-led approach to set-
tlement created a system more favourable for Tamil diaspora interest
groups to form, whereas contrasting approaches adopted in the UK did
not ameliorate the marginalisation of Tamil emigres, which were sub-
jected to more exclusionist and assimilationist policies. While the Tamil
diaspora should have been better placed institutionally to mobilise in
role contestation in Canada, the final section below argues that regimes
of securitisation in both countries marginalised the Tamil diaspora and
stymied advocacy for years leading up to the 2009 cases analysed by this
book.
Securitization: The taint of terror and the
marginalisation of the Tamil diaspora
The corresponding emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Canada and the UK, alongside the growth of the Tamil dias-
pora is an extension of the Sri Lankan conflict to the transnational sphere
beyond South Asia. Scholars have considered at length the influence of
the LTTE abroad on the endurance of the civil war in Sri Lanka diaspora
(Adamson, 2005; Cochrane, 2009; Fair, 2005; Orjuela, 2008). What has
been less often discussed is the effect of the LTTE on the perception of
the Tamil diaspora in their host countries and how its proscription led to
the further securitisation and marginalisation of the Tamil community.
Through discussing the transnational nature of the Sri Lankan conflict,
this section turns its attention to regimes of securitisation emerging in
the 2000s in Canada and the UK which paralleled the proscription of
the LTTE. These twin processes securitised and marginalised the Tamil
diaspora, leading to a “chilling effect” on diaspora mobilisation which
was to have lasting, adverse effects in the years leading up to 2009, with
particularly debilitating consequences for the Tamil diaspora in Canada.
The LTTE abroad: Transnational conflict and the Tamil

diaspora in Canada and the UK
As the dominant militant Tamil organisation, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) enhanced its operations abroad beginning in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, following dramatic changes in the geopolitics
of the conflict. The end of political support for the LTTE by India and its
increasingly hostile scrutiny of its operations in Tamil Nadu caused the
LTTE to seek resources and support elsewhere. Located in affluent, influ-
ential Western countries, the growing Tamil diaspora became an integral
part of the LTTE’s support network (Venugopal, 2006).27 With the aim of
creating a Tamil national homeland governed by the LTTE, the LTTE’s
sophisticated international publicity efforts were directed principally
towards the Tamil diaspora (Zunzer, 2004). The diaspora was to serve
the LTTE as an “interlocutor” with host country governments, aiming to
build international political support for Tamil self-determination as well
as for the collection of resources.
Through the LTTE’s International Secretariat and the Tiger
Organisation of Service Intelligence Services (TOSIS), the LTTE man-
aged quasi-diplomatic offices in as many as 54 countries, with a greater
presence in major Western states with large Tamil diasporas.28 One of the
most important operational arms of the LTTE abroad was the publicity
and propaganda wing, the Eelam Political Administration, which was
managed until 2006 by Anton Balasingham from London. The LTTE’s
sophisticated publicity and propaganda efforts exported the narrative
of Tamil liberation abroad and through the diaspora, with the aim of
enhancing a sense of proximity to the conflict, encouraging interna-
tional support and discrediting the Sri Lankan government.29 The LTTE
framed itself to Western governments as a peace movement which more
deeply legitimised the Tamil struggle and the desire for an independent
Tamil homeland (Chalk, 2008 8). Consequently, most Western govern-
ments throughout the 1990s viewed the LTTE as a liberation struggle
rather than a terrorist organisation.
With respect to the LTTE’s resource extraction operations, some esti-
mates suggest that diaspora contributions to the LTTE may have com-
prised as much as 80–90 per cent of the secessionist movement’s budget
by the mid-1990s. Through donations directly from the diaspora, funds
skimmed off of contributions to NGOs and contributions from Tamil
businesses, the LTTE is believed to have received as much as US$200
to US$300 million annually from abroad (Chalk, 2008). From individ-
ual Tamil donors in the diaspora, annual contributions ranged from
US$240.00 to US$646.00 per year per household, with households in
the UK contributing on average US$600.00 per year. Front organisa-
tions were essential to this fundraising network. For example, FACT in
Canada raised between CAN$12 million and CAN$22 million annually
before being proscribed a terrorist organisation (La, 2004).30
As a means of propagating its messages and collecting funds, the LTTE
exercised control over community institutions, such as temples, churches
and community centres.31
Amongst the organisations the LTTE sought to control were organisa-
tions oriented towards settlement and integration.32 The first non-cultural
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora organisation founded in Canada was the
Tamil Eelam Society of Canada (TESOC) in 1978, which was founded
by members of the diaspora who were not conflict-generated emigres
(Amarasingam, 2015, 71). The organisation rapidly gained legitimacy in
the view of policymakers and was an integral force in advocating for the
“Special Measures Program,” which was implemented by the federal gov-
ernment to support the arrival of refugees (MacDonald, 1984).33 It suc-
ceeded in its petition to the Canadian government in the 1980s to become
the official provider of settlement services for the Tamil community and
began receiving government funding for disbursement in 1990 to support
settlement and integration services for Tamil newcomers (Amarasingam,
2015, 83).34
Founded somewhat later in 1986, the World Tamil Movement (WTM)
became the most hard-line diaspora organisation with respect to its
views on the Tamil independence movement and was perceived to be
the diaspora group closest to the LTTE in Canada (Amarasingam, 2015,
83). As the number of diaspora groups continued to grow, the TESOC,
WTM and Society for the Aid of Ceylon Minorities (SACEM) united
in 1992 with seven other groups to form an umbrella organisation, the
Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) (Amarasingam,
2015, 85). Efforts such as this, however, motivated the LTTE-aligned
WTM to seek greater influence over the internal affairs of other groups.
The WTM became the most dominant force in the umbrella group as it
sought to gain control over TESOC, which was then in receipt of funds
from the Canadian government for settlement purposes.35
The mobilisation of the Tamil diaspora in the UK in the 1980s and
1990s resembled to some extent the same trajectory as that in Canada.
Tamil elites active in the 1980s noted that mobilisation was led most often
by emigres to the UK who had arrived prior to 1983 as economic migrants
or as students (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015). These Tamil
activists, who demonstrated and campaigned at universities for the Tamil
right to self-determination, were generally well-educated, integrated
and middle class. The earliest example of Tamil diaspora mobilisation
in the UK was the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students by
Elayathambi Ratnasabapathy. The group organised protests beginning
in 1975 in London and Manchester (Amarasingam, 2015, 26). Protests
continued throughout the 1980s, but mobilisation was not sophisticated.
Unlike the Tamils in Canada who became involved and influential in the
Liberal Party, the UK diaspora was not as active in organised party poli-
tics or connected to elite members of either major party despite being able
to vote on arrival. Their tactics were rudimentary, such as sending letters
to MPs written sometimes in Tamil and organising demonstrations which
had little impact on government views with respect to the civil war in Sri
Lanka (Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015). Despite a
relative lack of engagement at the political level in the early years, the
LTTE headquartered its international apparatus from London.
As was the case in Canada, the LTTE’s web of front organisations
and infiltration into non-LTTE diaspora organisations deepened their
control over diaspora activism and entrenched the view in the minds of
elites that Tamil diaspora organisations were a thoroughly LTTE affair.
As the 1990s progressed, suspicion about the activities of the LTTE in
Canada and the UK grew. The following section details the proscription
of the LTTE in Canada and the UK and subsequent state securitisation
policies.
The proscription of the LTTE and securitisation

of the Tamil diaspora
Over the course of the 1990s, two events in South Asia contributed to
a reframing of the LTTE and its affiliates contributing to its eventual
proscription in Canada and the UK. The first occurred in 1991 with
the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi. The Indian
government had evolved from actively supporting the LTTE and other
secessionist groups, to being engaged in an outright conflict with the
LTTE in the late 1980s as its peacekeepers ended operations in the north.
The dramatic assassination on Indian soil soured the view of Western
governments towards the LTTE and brought into focus its ruthless tac-
tics (Bandarage, 2009). Secondly, following a period of negotiation and
peace processes in the early 1990s, the LTTE withdrew from peace talks
with the Sri Lankan government in 1995, stoking the conflict’s escalation.
These developments amongst others led the US government to proscribe
the LTTE a terrorist organisation in 1997.36
In Canada, organisations associated with the LTTE such as FACT
and the WTM increasingly became politically corrosive.37 Shortly after
Canada became a signatory to the United Nations convention against
terrorism in February 2000, Canadian media erupted with critical
reports that Canadian Finance Minister (and future Prime Minister)
Liberal MP Paul Martin and Maria Minna, International Development
Minister, had attended a fundraiser in Toronto organised by FACT for
the Tamil Relief Organization (TRO).38 This event highlighted suspi-
cion about the activities of FACT that had grown throughout the 1990s.
The organisation was eventually shuttered in 2000 following advice by
Liberal Members of Parliament that it was too closely aligned with the
LTTE (Amarasingam, 2015, 89).39 Despite pressure, successive Liberal
governments refused to proscribe the LTTE, arguing that to do so would
hinder the Norwegian-backed peace process (Protected source, Tamils
for Labour, 2015), while others have argued that it was deep links forged
between the Tamil diaspora and the Liberal Party that influenced the
government regarding its proscription (Collacott, 2013; Geislerova,
2007).40 While the operations of the LTTE and its sympathisers were
greatly reduced in Canada, it was not formally proscribed until the com-
ing to office of the Conservatives in 2006. The WTM was subsequently
proscribed in 2008 (Amarasingam, 2015, 89).41
In the UK, the process to render the LTTE an illegal terrorist organi-
sation began in the late 1990s, before the September 11th, 2001, terrorist
attacks. Then Labour Party Home Secretary Jack Straw was pressured
by both the LTTE and its UK sympathisers to allow the LTTE to con-
tinue to operate, as it continued to frame itself as a liberation movement
and its front organisations in the UK as charities engaged in relief efforts
(Orjuela, 2008). On the other side, the Sri Lankan High Commission
applied intense diplomatic pressure to convince the UK to do the oppo-
site.42 They worked to reframe the LTTE as a terrorist group, taking
advantage of increasing global attention to terrorism and the operations
of terrorists in Western countries. Some commentators have also argued
that the Indian government was quietly pressuring the Home Office to
do the same through its renewed channels of communication with the
British government (Orjuela, 2008). In 2001 the British government
added the LTTE to its list of terrorist organisations and thereby made it
illegal for it to operate in the UK.
The UK’s decision to proscribe the LTTE had profound implications
for the conflict, leading to a material weakening of its position in Sri
Lanka (Fair, 2005). In the host countries, the impact of proscription on
the Tamil diaspora was the long-term stigmatisation of the Tamil dias-
pora, which continued to be associated with the LTTE and terrorism.
In Canada, much of the public discourse leading up to proscription and
continuing throughout the 2000s led to connotations where the public
associated “Tamil” with “Tiger” (Jeyapal, 2013). The same explicit asso-
ciation was apparent in the UK, where before proscription Tamils in the
UK were often questioned about their association with the Tamil Tigers,
whereas afterwards it was assumed that all Tamils were Tigers. In the
minds of non-Tamils, both elites and non-elites, Tamils were heavily
stigmatized by the LTTE and by extension became associated with ter-
rorism (Protected source, British Tamil Forum, 2015; Vimalarajah and
Cheran, 2010). Following the proscription, the Tamil diaspora became
further conflated with terrorism by virtue of its perceived domination by
the LTTE (Jeyapal, 2013).
Playing an active role in the marginalisation of Tamil diaspora
organisations was the Sri Lankan High Commission, which under this
climate was able to suppress Tamil diaspora events including cultural
and philanthropic activities; law enforcement froze bank accounts and
questioned and arrested Tamil activists in some cases without explana-
tion (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). The Government of Sri Lanka via
the Sri Lankan High Commissions worked aggressively to delegitimise
Tamil diaspora organisations and representatives, arguing to political
elites that these organisations were “poison” and not to be trusted as they
were still being influenced by the LTTE. As a consequence, Tamil dias-
pora elites were viewed as a threat to national security by foreign office
officials and Cabinet (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
New regimes of securitisation implemented after 2001 further exacer-
bated the marginalisation of the Tamil diaspora. Following the September
11th, 2001, terror attacks in the US a wider discourse on international
security crystallised the view that conflict-driven diasporas were a poten-
tial security threat in host countries through being potential incubators
of extremism and radicalization as well as being distant conflict actors
in the homeland (Féron and Lefort, 2019). Canadian security agencies
broadly speaking developed a policy of monitoring the behaviour of
conflict-generated diasporas in Canada, including the Sri Lankan Tamil
diaspora for a range of reasons including the potential for activists in the
host country to launch violent attacks in response to events in the home-
land as well as fundraising to support terrorism abroad (Amarasingam,
2014). Following the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000 and other terror-
ism prevention and investigation measures, a similar, security-oriented
perspective prevailed in the UK. Research into the perceptions of other
conflict-generated diaspora activists indicated a hesitation during this
period to express political identity in the UK, including the use of poten-
tially illegal symbols, such as the LTTE flag, and the organisation of
events as a consequence of their securitization (Vimalarajah and Cheran,
2010). Leading to increased stop-and-search and heavy-handed policing
amongst diasporas, there was a palpable sense of fear and confusion
during this period for Sri Lankan Tamil activists who were unsure as
to what was permissible and what was illegal. The Tamil diaspora was
hardly alone, with many non-white diaspora communities in Canada and
the UK feeling criminalised by securitisation policies (Féron and Lefort,
2019; McDonald, 2015).
In addition to the impact on diaspora communities, securitisation
policies also significantly stymied mobilisation and collective action.
Decades of the LTTE’s entanglement into the affairs of Tamil organisa-
tions now inhibited their ability to organise following the LTTE’s pro-
scription. This was especially true for Tamil activists seeking to engage
officials in politics and government. The proscription of the LTTE and
securitisation policies left members of the diaspora feeling “criminal-
ised”; there was a view that not only was the LTTE itself proscribed as
a terrorist organisation, but that the diaspora as a whole felt it had been
put “on notice” (Protected source, British Tamil Forum, 2015). These
processes in the early 2000s in both countries led to a “chilling effect”
on mobilisation between 2001 when the proscription took effect in the
UK and the late 2000s, as it was not clear on the part of diaspora activ-
ists what types of advocacy were permissible and which were not; par-
ticularly whether or not the LTTE flag could be displayed. In Canada,
from the perspective of political and foreign affairs elites, there was a
need in the 2000s to utilize interlocutors between the Tamil diaspora and
political decision-makers.43 Similarly, it wasn’t until 2010 that British
Conservative politicians began to interact with representatives from the
Tamil diaspora in any respect. Before 2010, there was nearly a complete
“freeze” on engagement due to the perceived association of the Tamil
diaspora with the LTTE and by extension with terrorism (Protected
source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
The melding of ethnic and political associations, along with the
proscription of the LTTE and active efforts by the Sri Lankan High
Commission to delegitimise Tamil activists, served to greatly undermine
the ability for Tamil activists to engage with political and bureaucratic
elites, in particular the latter. Suspicion was fuelled amongst political
elites in both countries and within mainstream parties, especially within
conservative parties, that Tamil representatives had dubious associations
and backgrounds, including with terrorism (Protected source, British
Tamil Conservatives, 2015; Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
The risk was so high that some in sensitive political positions believed
they might become tainted through their association with Tamil activists
(Protected source, former Canadian political staff, 2016).
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the Tamil diaspora as marginalised agents in for-
eign policymaking, defining them as a largely conflict-driven, victimised
diaspora having an antagonistic relationship with the home state. Unlike
earlier analyses into agents involved in foreign policymaking, this chap-
ter also conceptualised the Tamil diaspora as a marginalised community.
I theorised marginalisation to mean communities which are institution-
ally excluded and do not have the same opportunities for participation as
the majority population. In addition to exclusion from social, economic
and educational benefits, communities can also be excluded from full
participation in political processes. I argue that the Tamil diaspora has
been marginalised in at least three particular ways.
Firstly, Tamils were marginalised in Sri Lanka during the colonial
period by British administrators, a process that continued following Sri
Lanka’s independence as the nationalist Singhalese leadership excluded
Tamils from education and public offices, as well as marginalised them
on linguistic and religious grounds. Secondly, regimes of integration and
settlement in the UK disadvantaged the empowerment of Tamil diaspora
organisations through a lack of integration support and a disinclination
towards allotting resources to the diaspora itself to provide settlement
services. The diaspora was better positioned in Canada based on its more
inclusive migratory processes. Finally, the diaspora in both countries
was marginalised through their perceived association with the LTTE and
its activities, a process exacerbated by the eventual proscription of the
LTTE and through securitisation policies and legislation.
The cumulative effect of the marginalisation of the Tamil diaspora
through these processes was a chilling effect on mobilisation and advo-
cacy, leading to significant barriers to political participation which effec-
tively excluded the diaspora from engagement with senior officials in
government. Their marginalisation from political institutions continued
throughout the 2000s and, as will be demonstrated in the first compara-
tive cases in 2009, had an impact on their capacity to influence role con-
testation and foreign policymaking. But first, the next chapter takes an
institutional approach and analyses foreign policymaking in Canada and
the UK to present the “field of play” for Tamil diaspora mass movements
and interest groups.
Notes
1. This inquiry will continue to apply the term “home country” or “home-
land” to refer to the diaspora country of origin and “host country” to
refer to the country in which the diaspora currently resides. As argued by
authors in Smith and Stares’ volume (2007, 11), there are convincing argu-
ments for rejecting these terms from a transnational standpoint. However,
its utility in the political context is inescapable.
2. Many Sri Lankan Tamils fled to nearby Tamil Nadu, on the southern tip of
India, where Tamil is the majority language and Indians of Tamil extrac-
tion have lived for centuries (Venugopal, 2006). As the focus of this inquiry
is on Tamils in the British and Canadian contexts, the experience of the
Tamil diaspora located in Tamil Nadu will not be considered by the pro-
ject. See Destradi (2010) for further information on the role of Tamil Nadu
in respect of the Sri Lankan civil war.
3. Throughout the investigation, the term “Tamil community” will be
used interchangeably with “Tamil diaspora” as activists and those being
engaged by interest groups similarly refer to the “Tamil community” as
often as “Tamil diaspora.”
4. For a comprehensive discussion on diaspora mobilisation, see Koinova (2011).
5. Sizeable Sri Lankan Tamil populations are found in the US, Switzerland,
Germany and Norway (Orjuela, 2008). As noted above, the largest number
of Tamil diaspora members are located in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu
on the southern tip of India, but are often considered a distinct diaspora
from those Tamils who have settled in the West.
6. The Canadian census in 2006 lists 103,000 Tamil-speaking Canadians
while the Sri Lankan High Commission believes there were as many as
300,000 Tamils in Canada as of 2012 and roughly 75,000 Sri Lankans of
Singhalese origin. Tamil is one of the top 25 languages spoken in Canada.
The Canadian census takes into account linguistic factors such as what
language is most often spoken in the home. However, data on ethnicity is
not collected.
7. As in the UK, Sri Lankan Tamils are now moving out of the downtown of
Toronto to more affluent, residential areas like the suburbs of Pickering,
Ajax, Markham and Whitby (Udugampola, 2010). Despite this trend, the
vast majority of Tamils still live in the Scarborough area of Toronto.
8. The National Health Service (NHS) accepted the qualifications of Sri Lan-
kan medical doctors and many Sri Lankan Tamils availed themselves of
this opportunity.
9. With respect to the migration of Sri Lanka’s Singhalese majority, the bulk of
out-migration from the Singhalese community are labour migrants, many
of which arrived in the Middle East to work as domestic staff. The West
is home to over 100,000 Singhalese migrants, mostly living in the UK and
Australia (Orjuela, 2008). These migrants to the West are generally middle
class and educated; they are less concentrated than the Tamil diaspora.
10. Looking specifically at four refugee groups in the Netherlands, Fennema
and Tillie (2001) argue integration processes, in particular political inclu-
sion, correlate strongly with political participation by diasporas. Integra-
tion programmes have the potential to instil trust in the political process
on the part of the diaspora and they provide the structural space for dias-
pora elites to network and gain access to host-country policymakers.
11. The island of Sri Lanka is 26 miles off the southern tip of India, previously
known as Ceylon. Totalling 61,610 square kilometres, in the late 2000s it
had a population of over twenty-one million people (CIA World Factbook,
2009). Of these, 73.8 per cent identify with the Singhalese ethnic group;
7.5 per cent are Sri Lankan Moors (Muslim), 4.6 per cent are Indian Tamils,
and 3.9 per cent are Sri Lankan Tamils. In 1981, 74 per cent of Sri Lanka’s
inhabitants identified as Singhalese, while 18.2 per cent identified as Tamil
(Manogaran, 1987, 4). While distinct, the Tamil and Singhalese languages
are related in both syntax and grammar. With respect to religion, a major-
ity of Tamils have traditionally identified as Hindus, while the Singhalese
principally identify as members of the Buddhist faith.
12. During this time, the Sri Lankan government took a number of steps to
address the concerns of Tamil groups: Tamil was instituted as a national
language in 1977; the Tamil community was granted constitutional rights
as of 1978; the standardization of education was lifted, and regional auton-
omy was advanced through the creation of District Councils (Ratnatunga,
394). Despite these commitments, the Tamil political leadership under the
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), criticized the government for its
failure to fully or effectively implement these concessions. The frustration
of the Tamil community was only reinforced by the results of continued
exclusionist policies, which had adverse effects, including an unemploy-
ment rate for Tamil youth of 41 per cent, as compared to 29 per cent for
Sinhalese youth; the degradation of Tamil-area infrastructure due to state
neglect, particularly agricultural infrastructure; and a number of concerns
related to the supposed devolution of powers to District Development
Councils, which in effect gave Tamils very limited control over their own
affairs (Committee for National Development, 1984).
13. The agreements in the 1980s failed to produce a settlement due to the exclu-
sion of the LTTE in the negotiating process, which would further charac-
terise the peace-process in the 1990s. The Sri Lankan government sought
to devolve further power through the constitution to regional governments
in the hope of placating the separatists, but again the exclusion of the
Tigers from the process degraded the legitimacy of any unilateral solution
(Uyangoda, 2005, 22).
14. The legislation adopted in 1976 obliged the government to accept all ref-
ugee claimants arriving in Canada. No refugee could be deported with-
out an adjudication process and claimants were given two opportunities
to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution as defined in the 1951
Refugee Convention. While waiting for the right to work in the country,
provincial authorities ensured asylum seekers the receipt of social and wel-
fare benefits until being granted the right to work.
15. The first refugee boat full of Tamils was rescued by fisherman off the
eastern coastal province of Newfoundland and Labrador in November
1986. The refugees were resettled in Toronto, as the vast majority of asy-
lum seekers from Sri Lanka would be. Immigration officials accepted the
migrants with the support of the existing Tamil diaspora. Throughout the
1980s, 85 per cent of Sri Lankan claimant applications were approved;
much higher than the average acceptance rate.
16 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees began applying for asylum in Canada at one of the
country’s most receptive admittance periods. The largest number of immi-
grants received in any decade was the 1990s, when 2.2 million immigrants
were admitted during a particularly violent period of the Sri Lankan civil
war. Between 1980 and 2005, the rough breakdown of Canada’s migrant
acceptance by category was: Economic class (60%), family class (25%) and
refugees or protected persons (15%) (Elrick, 2007).
17. Sri Lankan Tamil refugees also benefitted from a refugee regime in Can-
ada which was greatly in flux in the 1980s, with legal battles over claimant
processes leading to a massive, unmanageable backlog of claimants. The
government eventually permitted express entry to many without them hav-
ing to go through oral testimony (Amarasingam, 2015, 76).
18. Also of importance with regard to choosing Canada as a migration des-
tination was the 1997 decision by the United States to render illegal the
LTTE in the US as a terrorist organisation. Following this decision, no
Tamils entering the US under suspicion of membership in the LTTE were
granted asylum (Mendis, 2014).
19. There are a number of designations within the refugee class: Government
Assisted Refugee, Privately Sponsored Refugees and Joint Assistance
Sponsorship. In the first category, refugees receive income assistance from
the federal government for one year. Afterwards they are able to receive
social assistance if they are not able to find employment. Privately Spon-
sored Refugees are expected to receive support from the sponsoring agency,
such as a church or mosque. Jointly sponsored refugees can receive govern-
ment support for as much as 24 months, while the co-sponsoring private
entity provides emotional and social support for up to 36 months. Govern-
ment assisted refugees receive support from 23 designated locations across
English Canada through the Resettlement Assistance Program.
20. To gain Canadian citizenship, applicants must have lived in Canada for
three of the last four years prior to application; speak English or French;
be a permanent resident and pass a citizenship test.
21. According to statistics Canada, as many as 1.8 per cent of the Canadian
population hold dual citizenship. Both a relatively liberal system of natu-
ralisation and the ability to hold dual citizenship are low barriers to entry
for migrants to become integrated and exercise the right to vote.
22. With regard to other factors, such as the issuance of work permits, the
policy of limitation can be seen throughout the 1980s and until 1997, when
permits issued fell to as low as 15,000 in 1982. Furthermore, the Immigra-
tion Carriers’ Liability Act, 1987 placed the onus of refugee authenticity on
the emigres. The introduction of “transit visas” which prevented possible
claimants from making refugee claims on UK soil while stopping over or
changing between flights was another measure meant to “close the door”
(Chakrabarti, 2005).
23. While Britain was attempting to close the door to migration, it must be said
it was taking steps to make the country less hostile to diverse communities.
During the same period, a number of anti-discriminatory laws were also
passed to support integration processes, leading ultimately to the passage
of the 1976 Race Relations Act.
24. The National Asylum Support Service (NASS), which administers the new
system, also instituted a policy of “dispersion” which works to settle refu-
gees in parts of the country outside London and the South East (Allwood
and Wadia, 2010, 28).
25. The Labour Party’s 1998 attempt to reform Britain’s piecemeal system of
immigration and integration continued an attempt to balance, on the one
hand, ensuring refugees received the support required to meet basic needs,
but on the other hand to stymie the view that the UK is an easy place for
false claimants to gain access to generous benefits schemes (Chakrabarti,
2005). These duelling objectives continue to distinguish the UK’s policy
from Canada’s, which has not been motivated by a desire to curb support
as deterrence to fraudulent applications.
26. Asylum support is also provided by the Home Office to those awaiting a
decision on their asylum application. Under Section 95 of the Immigra-
tion and Asylum Act 1999, refugees can either receive accommodation-only
support where they receive accommodation but must support themselves
otherwise; subsistence-only support where they receive cash to support
themselves, or both subsistence and accommodation support. After an
asylum-seeker receives refugee status, they are taken off these provisional
schemes and then required to apply for mainstream benefits.
27. The LTTE recognised early on the inherent value of the Tamil diaspora,
which gained access to resources through its dispersion to wealthier West-
ern countries. The LTTE’s external affairs were managed by the Interna-
tional Secretariat, which consisted of publicity and propaganda wings;
extensive fundraising infrastructure; and arms procurement and shipping
(Chalk, 8). It is this international secretariat that ultimately managed the
LTTE’s much-vaunted transnational networks, in particular its perceived
control over the Tamil diaspora in countries such as Canada and the UK.
In addition to the Secretariat, a more clandestine office known as the Tiger
Organisation of Service Intelligence Service’s (TOSIS) was involved in
managing operations within the diaspora (Chalk, 2008).
28. Propaganda was conducted through international front organisations,
such as the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations, the Swiss
Federation of Tamil Associations, the French Federation of Tamil Asso-
ciations, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the
Ilankai Tamil Sangam in the US, the Tamil Coordinating Committee in
Norway; and the International Federation of Tamils in the UK. Based in
Canada, the World Tamil Movement (WTM) was founded on 17 October
1990 and became one of the most effective front organisations of its kind,
organising political gatherings, cultural programmes and distributing
LTTE publications (Zunzer, 2004). The UK’s British Tamil Organisation
performed a similar function.
29. The Administration advanced three key narrative pillars: Tamils are
the innocent victims of Singhalese discrimination and repression; the
LTTE is the only organisation capable of representing the aspirations of
the Tamil people; and Sri Lanka cannot be at peace until the creation of
Tamil Eelam, an independent state governed by the LTTE (Chalk, 2008).
Through the use of hotlines, videos of large-scale military operations, and
the broadcast of speeches and major rallies, the LTTE was able to polit-
icise the diaspora and shape how it viewed the conflict in Sri Lanka and,
indeed to some extent, how it viewed itself and its role in the conflict while
abroad (Sriskandarajah, 2005).
30. Evidence indicates that the LTTE operated a system of business loans,
whereby newly arrived Tamils seeking to set up in business would receive
loans from the LTTE in exchange for a portion of their profits. Many Tamil
businesses were compelled to contribute financially, both through direct
coercion and for fear of losing business if they were seen not to be sympa-
thetic to the Tamil struggle. It is estimated that between 1998 and 1999 in
Canada, US$6.5 million was raised through LTTE business activity (La,
2004).
31. Temples were also a common point of request for individual donations
and community hubs where LTTE propaganda was often disseminated.
Its dominance of social, religious and cultural institutions and organisa-
tions reinforced the association between Tamil identity and support for the
organisation (Human Rights Watch, 2006).
32. Even after the organisation was made illegal in Canada and the UK, it
was still able to control the conflict narrative received by the diaspora and
collect funds through front organisations. While threatening intransigent
families unwilling to contribute to the organisation was not uncommon,
outright dissension against the LTTE within the diaspora was dealt with
far more harshly. Vandalism, arson and death threats were often levied
against dissenting groups and individuals. The LTTE’s ruthlessness as
exemplified in its destruction of rival groups was also meted out against
detractors, including violence against family members in Sri Lanka, forced
detention and abuse for returnees accused of dissension abroad as well as
beatings and reports of murder against dissenters (Human Rights Watch,
2006).
33. The programme was a scheme applied to a specific set of persecuted
applicants which allowed Canadian residents to make family sponsorship
claims for first and second degree relatives while placing less relevance
on the established points system. However successful this effort may have
been, the government instituted a visa regime in 1983 in response to the cri-
sis where no visa for entry to Canada from Sri Lanka had been previously
required, ostensibly to prevent those not facing persecution from taking
advantage of the system.
34. The founding of TESOC was paralleled by the founding of the Society for
the Aid of Ceylon Minorities (SACEM). Unlike TESOC, SACEM took
an apolitical approach from the outset, focusing largely on the provision
of settlement services for new arrivals. The Canadian Tamil Chamber of
Commerce is an outgrowth of the founding of SACEM (Amarasingam,
2015, 81; International Crisis Group, 2010).
35. During the 1990s, FACT organised conferences, protests and other actions
to support the struggle for Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. However, as the
1990s progressed, the view that the LTTE was an organisation committed
to liberation and self-determination began to shift.
36. While not leading immediately to a domino effect in other Western coun-
tries, the US’s listing of the LTTE as a terrorist group further eroded the
LTTE’s favourable narrative in the West and forced it to retreat further
behind front organisations such as the World Tamil Movement.
37. In addition to security reports published by Canada’s intelligence agency,
CSIS, FACT had been linked to terrorism through WTM leadership, in
particular Manickavasagam Suresh. Suresh arrived in Canada in 1990,
ostensibly as a refugee to head the WTM after having been involved previ-
ously in the leadership of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Following an investiga-
tion by CSIS, Suresh was arrested in 1995 and deemed a threat to national
security. Tamil diaspora organisations engaged in advocacy efforts to
free Suresh and the case became a landmark against terrorism in Canada
(Suresh v. Canada, 2000).
38. Their controversial attendance was raised repeatedly in House of Com-
mons debates as the opposition Canadian Alliance party admonished the
government for attending the dinner given the perceived association of
FACT with the LTTE (Hansard, 2001).
39. The Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) was founded in 2000, which contin-
ues to act as the principal voice of the Tamil community. Some argue the
CTC was founded as an outgrowth of the collapse of FACT. Many other
members of the community assert that the CTC was founded as a rights-
based organisation and an outgrowth principally of the anti-violent gang
youth movement, the Canadian Tamil Youth Development Centre (Can-
TYD). As will be articulated in Chapter 5, the CTC took years to become
active in public engagement with political leaders, principally because it
did not have the knowledge to do so and because of the securitisation of the
diaspora.
40. Evidence for the internal influence of the Tamil diaspora inside the Liberal
Party rarely surfaces (Personal communications, former Canadian politi-
cal staff, 2016). However, one instance in 2006 demonstrates the continued
influence of Tamil diaspora mobilisation at this time. Following the defeat
of the Liberal government in 2006, a leadership race to replace the former
Prime Minister got underway. One prominent leadership candidate for the
Party was Toronto Member of Parliament Bob Rae. Rae was asked to com-
mit to Tamil diaspora activist leader Father Francis Xavier that he would
delist the LTTE if he were elected leader and subsequently Prime Minister
in exchange for 45 Tamil delegate votes. Rae refused to make the commit-
ment and those 45 delegates were committed to another candidate (Fatah,
2006).
41. However, interviewees and other sources active during this period argue
that the Canadian government viewed the LTTE from the early 2000s
onward as effectively a terrorist organisation (Personal communications,
former Canadian political staff, 2016).
42. The Sri Lankan government also lobbied host country governments to pro-
scribe the LTTE as an illegal terrorist organisation (Corley, 2012). Unlike
the episodes discussed in upcoming chapters, the Government of Sri Lanka
was successful in its efforts to take advantage of the changed perception of
the LTTE in the 1990s.
43. Indeed, one Conservative Cabinet Minister relied on trusted Tamil Con-
servative professionals located in Ottawa to make introductions to Tamil
diaspora interest group activists rather than simply engaging directly due
to the continued taint of the LTTE’s legacy (Protected source, former
Canadian Member of Parliament, 2015).
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4 From human security to
enlightened self-interest?
Canadian and British foreign
policymaking permeability
and international roles
In keeping with the dual focus of role theoretical approaches on both

agency and institutions in foreign policy analysis, this chapter turns
from the Tamil diaspora as an agent in foreign policymaking to some
of the structural factors relevant to marginalised diasporas seeking to
become role-makers in vertical role contestation. This chapter begins
by discussing “who gets in” in foreign policymaking, firstly by consid-
ering conventional processes of foreign policymaking in parliamen-
tary systems with a focus on the two country cases of interest: Canada
and the UK. I outline several decision-making models the literature
has offered and adopt a nimble model that incorporates the inputs of
non-governmental role-makers such as diasporas. I then introduce the
primary cast of actors normally involved in foreign policy decision-making,
particularly the Prime Minister and the foreign secretary and focus on
their most intimate advisors: Partisan and bureaucratic elite advisors.
Often relegated in analyses on foreign policymaking, I include the role
of parliament and argue that while the legislative branch indeed rarely
decides foreign policy, individual parliamentarians can play a role sup-
porting diasporas in influencing decision-making through acting as
“inside advocates.” Outside of government and parliament, I then dis-
cuss non-governmental and multicultural actors in foreign policy, argu-
ing that there is a distinction between passive diaspora actors sometimes
consulted by governments as a matter of course and proactive diaspora
mass movements and interest groups working to assert their issues onto
the foreign policy agenda.
In comparative context, I then look at the foreign policymaking
dynamics of recent Canadian and British governments. In Canada,
the apparent openness of earlier Liberal governments to engaging the
public and non-governmental actors in foreign policy was replaced by
a Conservative government in 2006 less inclined to outside input, view-
ing conventional foreign policy NGOs such as human rights groups with
particular scepticism. Having a greater distrust for non-partisan officials,
Harper government decision-making was dominated by Cabinet and its
partisan special advisors. However, interactions with the bureaucracy
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-4
84 From human security to enlightened self-interest?
were more cooperative than is often portrayed and, with respect to
non-governmental inputs there is evidence that the Harper government
was porous to interventions from diasporas. At the same time, the UK
was moving in the opposite direction where the Brown and then Cameron
governments worked to make foreign policymaking more transparent
and open to advice outside of special advisors and Cabinet, enhancing
the role of Foreign Office officials and opening up the policymaking pro-
cess to outside actors. Given these dynamics, the conditions for diaspora
mobilisation in role contestation appear more favourable in the UK in
respect of openness to outside influences, but that the empowerment of
non-partisan officials could create barriers.
The second half of this chapter moves from the sphere of domestic
decision-making institutions and foreign policymaking to international
institutions. The literature on Role Theory asserts a distinction between
how states conceive of their role internationally, how they perform (foreign
policy outcomes) and where states “sit” within international hierarchies
of power. Beginning with Canada, it has historically conceived of itself as
an exemplar Middle Power. The Harper government rejected this liberal
institutionalist, “policy entrepreneur” approach and shifted Canada’s role
conception to a more assertive, less multilateralist role. However, Canada’s
role at international institutions under Harper was not only driven by a
seeming disinclination towards liberal institutionalism, but also motivated
to compel more powerful actors to take firmer action through expanding
the poles of policy options. In the UK, the Brown and Cameron govern-
ments both shifted the UK’s role conception from the moralistic role con-
ception of the Blair government to a more pragmatic approach. The Brown
government prioritised strengthening rather than circumventing interna-
tional institutions and conceived of the UK as a convening hub for inter-
national affairs. This role was taken up by the Conservatives after 2010, but
through a type of “liberal conservatism” there was a stronger emphasis on
aligning foreign policy with the national interest.
The final section discusses Canadian and British role positioning inter-
nationally, with an emphasis on roles in the Commonwealth and bilat-
erally with Sri Lanka. I argue that the long-held view that Canada is
archetypically role positioned as a Middle Power is largely accurate, but
that it plays a more influential role within the Commonwealth and has a
strong bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka. The UK’s international role
position has been more ambiguously categorised recently. However, it is
more influential than a Middle Power and for the purposes of this book
will be considered a “major power” where it is “below” Great Powers
such as the US and China but has the capacity to project power and
possesses significant “power of attraction” capabilities. The UK is the
Commonwealth’s dominant actor. Regionally, the UK has strong inter-
ests in South Asia and has a particularly significant bilateral relationship
with Sri Lanka.
From human security to enlightened self-interest? 85
The porousness of foreign policymaking: Who’s
“in” in Canadian and British role contestation
Disaggregating institutions in vertical role contestation is inherently
a discussion of which domestic agents gain temporary entrance as
role-makers. In comparative context, I advance that while policymak-
ing structures such as the Cabinet and parliament largely do not change
form between governments and between Canada and the UK, what can
change are the agents admitted to elite foreign policymaking. For the
most part, elite actor role-makers such as Cabinet members and senior
bureaucrats do not alter dramatically over time, but what can change is
the extent to which governments admit non-governmental sources such
as diasporas. Furthermore, I argue that while parliaments may not often
be institutionally influential, parliamentarians may become influential
intermediaries as “inside advocates” and that diasporas are as often pro-
active agents in policymaking, rather than simply reactive ones.
Models and means in foreign policy analysis

Explaining micro-level decision-making has led to the construction of a
number of foreign policy analysis models. Rhodes (1990, 15) conceived
of six types of foreign policy decision-making: Prime ministerial govern-
ment, prime ministerial cliques, cabinet government, ministerial govern-
ment, segmented decision making and bureaucratic coordination. This
typology captures a variety of power dynamics between Prime Ministers,
Cabinet Ministers and the bureaucracy, but there is little room left for
the involvement of non-governmental actors. Even with a turn to net-
work models that include local governments and NGOs, these actors are
largely considered policy delivery mechanisms rather than influential
agents in the policy process.
In a fine-grained, case-based comparative investigation of foreign
policymaking, Hill (2010, 32) notes that foreign policymaking is not fea-
tureless, but an outcome of dynamic interaction between many different
actors. He takes issue with the classic dichotomy of decision-making con-
ceptualised as the “Presidential” and “chairmanship” schools (2020, 244).
In the former, the Prime Minister “dominates” Cabinet and in the latter
“orchestrates” decision-making. He argues that this binary fails to rec-
ognise the full range of variables influencing Cabinet and advances that
there are three models when it comes to decision-making: The “equal-
ity” model is one where there is trust and matching ability between the
Prime Minister and foreign minister; the “subordinate foreign minister”
is where the Prime Minister is the principal actor and the foreign minis-
ter plays a largely functionary role; and the “assertive foreign minister”
arrangement is where the foreign minister is given significant scope for
decision-making (Hill, 2015, 68).
Another flexible and pluralistic model is one advanced by Gaskarth
(2013), who summarises three types of foreign policymaking models:
The “Westminster Model” features concentrated Cabinet government
with policy set by the executive, where access to external actors is lim-
ited and contestation is often between bureaucratic interests. In the
“Differentiated Policy Model,” the policy process is somewhat more
porous as it is crafted through networks and may feature the creation
of policy communities, which include external actors such as think tank
experts and interest groups. The “Asymmetric Policy Model” is a dia-
lectical process reflecting a shift from government to governance where
institutions and ideas combine to influence policy. I adopt Gaskarth’s
approach with slight variation borrowing from Hill and apply these
lenses to the Harper, Brown and Cameron governments which are the
primary loci of foreign policy decision-making in the cases explored later
in the book.
Beginning by outlining the common actors involved in foreign poli-
cymaking in Westminster systems, authority primarily resides with the
Cabinet (Chapnick, 2008; Houghton and Sanders, 1989, 15). The “core
executive” as described by Rhodes (1990, 12) is the “heart of the machine,”
involving central government actors vested with final decision-making
authority. The Prime Minister appoints a member of Cabinet as minister
or secretary for foreign affairs and their influence over the foreign affairs
process is ultimately at the Prime Minister’s discretion (Gecelovsky, 2011,
214). The “foreign policy executive” is normally dominated by the Prime
Minister and the foreign minister who together represent the centre of
authority which arbitrates conflict between competing interests and sets
the foreign policy agenda (Hill, 2015, 63; Rhodes, 1990, 12). The executive
often extends to include elites from other coordinating offices such as the
Cabinet office, foreign ministry, the defence and security establishment
as well as the development office.
The immediate orbits of the Prime Minister and foreign minister
are comprised of two principal actors: Partisan and bureaucratic elite
advisors. In the case of the former, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
in Canada and “Number 10” in the UK are offices of political staff
appointed for demonstrated loyalty to the party and/or its leadership,
having often been involved in general election campaigns or otherwise
appointed for a background in political strategy and usually less on sub-
ject-matter expertise (Blick, 2018; Wilson, 2016).1 These staff are directly
accountable to Cabinet Ministers, rather than to the Deputy Minister
in Canada or the Permanent Secretary in the UK, and are responsible
for providing politically oriented strategic advice and managing more
junior political staff. Despite being considered in the UK temporary
civil servants, “Spads” are exempt from codes of impartiality and objec-
tivity and are unable to authorise the spending of government funds or
to direct permanent civil servants (House of Commons, 2012). Exempt
“political staffers” in Canada are similarly unconstrained by civil service
codes based on partisanship and do not sit within formal implementa-
tion processes between the Minister and the Deputy Minister (Wilson,
2016). However, these positions are influential and have been a part of
government in both countries for decades. In addition to providing a
partisan lens through which to view issues, elite partisan advisors also
act to cultivate networks of expertise outside of the bureaucracy and are
mandated to interact with external interest groups (House of Commons,
2012; Wilson, 2016). Given the close proximity to the Prime Minister and
the foreign minister, special advisors are viewed as powerful, trusted
conduits to the decision-making process.
On the other hand, the Prime Minister, foreign minister and the rest
of the Cabinet are supported by career public servants or “officials,” who
are mandated to provide objective, non-partisan advice to Cabinet mem-
bers and to implement policy. The Privy Council Office in Canada and
the Cabinet Office in the UK serve this role for the Prime Minister, in a
fashion similar to that provided by departments of foreign affairs for the
foreign minister (Riddell-Dixon, 2008).2 In the realm of foreign affairs, it
is sometimes argued that officials are driven solely by the “national interest”
primarily concerned with providing expert advice and to implement deci-
sions made by politicians (Hill, 2015, 88). In practice, foreign offices provide
information and analysis, particularly regional and country-specific infor-
mation; formulate policy recommendations on the basis of this knowl-
edge and offer a reserve of institutional memory (Protected elite source,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015; Hill, 2015).
The “bureaucratic politics model” problematises rivalries between
various departments in the creation of government policies and in many
respects the set-match between the above partisan and bureaucratic elites
in foreign affairs decision-making reflects this dichotomy (Beach, 2012,
71). However, unlike in traditional conceptions of the bureaucratic pol-
itics model, disputes between partisan and official elites are less about
the expansion of the influence of departmental territory and more about
a clash of interests where the political concerns of the Minister and the
government may conflict with the perceived non-partisan interests of the
bureaucratic state. As enticing as it would be to leave this binary model
in place and move onto the discussion of specific administrations, there
remain other influential inputs into foreign policy, particularly parlia-
ment and interest groups.
Few challenge the dominance of the executive as described above, in
particular the Prime Minister and foreign minister in possessing the ulti-
mate authority to establish and pursue foreign policy.3 Parliament as a
separate institutional actor rarely asserts itself over foreign policy. As
noted above, foreign policymaking is normally the exclusive domain of
the executive branch of government and it is under no constitutional obli-
gation to bring foreign policy matters to parliament as they rarely require
legislative approval. However, Cabinets have on occasion brought foreign
affairs issues to parliament for a confirmatory vote to gain confidence on
a controversial issue (Schmitz, 2007, 225). This was the case when Prime
Minister Harper put the extension of the Canadian military mission in
Afghanistan to a vote in the House of Commons in 2006, which was suc-
cessful, and when Prime Minister Cameron in 2013 lost a vote on whether
to intervene in the conflict in Syria (CBC News, 2006; Honeyman, 2017;
Moens, 2008).4 Beyond these rare decision-making opportunities, parlia-
mentary debates and questions for Minsters are a regular fixture of the
parliamentary agenda aimed at holding the government to account on
international matters.5
While the institutional powers of parliament to influence foreign pol-
icymaking is often formally limited to the above rare occasions where
votes are held on international interventions, as noted in the theoretical
chapter parliamentarians themselves may act as informal, interlocutors
or “inside advocates” on foreign affairs issues (Baumgartner, 2009). The
involvement of Senators McCain and Kerry in support of the Vietnamese
diaspora to liberate political prisoners abroad in the 1980s and 1990s
and the efforts on behalf of imprisoned Soviet Jewry in the 1970s by US
Senator Henry Jackson are relevant parallels for processes outlined in the
empirical chapters of this book (Godwin, 2021). In these cases, Senators
acted as interlocutors for Vietnamese and Jewish diaspora movements
and interest group elites in the US with a view to influencing government
policy and legislation. The empirical cases involving the Tamil diaspora in
Canada and the UK demonstrate similar processes and thusly it is worth
considering the role of parliamentarians as influential agents in role con-
testation, even if the institution itself is less relevant for these matters.
Multicultural foreign policy and diasporas as “active”

agents in role contestation
In addition to Cabinet, its advisors and parliament, exogenous actors
have also been widely theorised and explored as actors in foreign policy-
making, including diasporas as discussed earlier. However, foreign pol-
icymaking elites have rarely considered diaspora actors as “proactive”
agents in role contestation, but have interacted with diasporas rather as
passive agents engaged for the purposes of public security, as provid-
ers of information or for policy legitimisation. To contest this view in
scholarship, Hill (1999) argues for the inclusion of “voices from below”
in international relations, arguing that the literature often focuses only
on elites and rarely affords attention to the preferences or actions of the
masses, which are usually observed as objects rather than subjects.
From a practitioner standpoint, multicultural foreign policy is often
observed as a form of domestic public diplomacy (Gamlen, 2014; Hill,
2013; Jaine and Curtis, 2012). Public diplomacy in practice are occasions,
programmes or opportunities, normally offered by government agents,
where there is interaction with diasporas, sometimes on matters per-
taining to homeland issues. Schmitz (2014) has discussed public diplo-
macy in foreign policy as a process of democratising foreign policy. In
the Canadian context, he points to broad, public consultative processes
established to gather the views of the public to inform policymaking.6
The UK also has a history of engaging in foreign policy consultation,
particularly following New Labour’s coming to office and beginning
with Foreign Secretary Cook’s efforts to open up foreign policymaking
to make processes more democratic, including through the creation of
the Foreign Policy Centre.
Public diplomacy with a specific focus on diasporas and ethnocultural
communities has also been subject to scholarly attention. From the per-
spective of sending countries, Gamlen (2014) has argued that states have
institutionalised and are “governing” diasporas through the creation of
specific ministries dedicated to interacting with their diasporas living
abroad, or through sub-departments often located in labour ministries
or foreign ministries. Diaspora engagement in this respect is transna-
tional, such as the government of the Philippines institutionalising its
relationship with the Filipino diaspora emphasising remittances and the
rights of workers, or the Indian government galvanising diaspora links
abroad to lubricate trade ties.
The converse is where host-country governments interact with dias-
pora groups located within their countries on matters pertaining to the
homeland. Organised diaspora organisations in the UK, such as Labour
Friends of Israel and British Tamil Conservatives report meeting on a
regular basis with officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) to discuss their perspectives with regard to politics within the
“homeland” region (Protected source, Labour Friends of Israel, 2015).
Official channels have also been used in Canada to proactively canvass
the views of diaspora organisations with regard to Canadian foreign pol-
icy, as was the case with the Harper government’s engagement with the
Indian diaspora to lubricate Canada’s trade and diplomatic relationship
with India and similarly its interaction with the Canadian Jewish dias-
pora to support strengthening ties with Israel (Singh, 2009; Protected
source, The Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, 2017).
While being observably inclusive and having a positive bearing on
strengthening diplomatic and trade ties, this approach has nevertheless
been criticised for two reasons.7 Firstly, this type of public diplomacy
has been described as a surreptitious means of surveilling the activities
of diasporas from a security and counter-terrorism perspective, as noted
in the foregoing chapter. The FCO developed a public diplomacy agenda
following the 7th July, 2005 terrorist attacks in London focused on the
Muslim community and similar processes took place in Canada where
the government engaged in dialogues with Arab community leadership
in respect to terrorism in the early 2000s (Jaine and Curtis, 2012; Riddell-
Dixon, 2008, 37).
Secondly, in addition to potentially creating a securitised relationship,
public diplomacy towards diaspora communities has been criticised as
being mostly superficial and one-way, whereby interactions involving
officials are either efforts at information-gathering to fulfil a consultation
mandate or, processes of policy legitimisation whereby officials and poli-
ticians are essentially explaining foreign policy decisions which have been
already made (Jaine and Curtis, 2012). In these instances, public diplomacy
is seen as a “monologue rather than a dialogue” and largely an exercise in
advancing the interests of government, rather than being receptive to the
preferences of diasporas or ethnocultural communities (Gaskarth, 2013,
56; Jaine and Curtis, 2012). However, I argue that this “one-way track”
does not fully capture the micro-level, diaspora-government dynamic.
Diaspora role contestation as mass movements or elite interest group
actors, as discussed in this book’s cases, are not passive agents in public
diplomacy processes. Instead, proactive diaspora agents seek to hoist their
foreign policy issues, and preferred role conceptions and performances,
onto the host country’s international agenda. The distinction between
these approaches is one of agency. Rather than analysing marginalised
diasporas as relatively passive agents who are either invited to interact at
the behest of government representatives or are seen as a means of comple-
menting existing government policy aims, the cases described in this book
suggest that diaspora domestic actors can act with greater independent
agency. This chapter continues by discussing recent Canadian and British
foreign policymaking milieus, into which diasporas have sought entry.
Processes of Canadian foreign policymaking

When the Harper government assumed office in 2006 after thirteen years
of Liberal Party rule, there was little foreign policy experience or demon-
strable interest in this policy field amongst members of the Conservative
government and like other areas of policy, foreign policymaking was
heavily concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office (Black, 2009; Bratt,
2018; Schmitz, 2014). Despite this relative lack of expertise, scholars argue
that the government actively sought to exclude the influence of public
servants from foreign policymaking (Black, 2009; Gecelovsky, 2013). Not
unlike the overriding perspective of the Blair government in the UK, the
Harper government was believed to distrust career officials (Bratt, 2018).8
In practice, during the Harper years the interplay between partisan
elites and the non-partisan civil service was more often a functional
process, rather than one characterised by conflict and pitched battles
(Protected source, former Canadian political staff a, 2016; Wilson, 2016).
Former elites in the foreign Minister’s office described a relatively con-
sistent, routinised interaction between diplomats, departmental civil
Figure 4.1 Foreign policy processes
servants and politically appointed staff. In some cases, statements on

issues were prepared by civil servants, reviewed by political staff and sent
to the Minister’s Director of Communications to be approved and then
implemented by the ministry. In other cases, the Minister directed that
a statement be drafted by officials, the draft of which is then reviewed by
political staff and finally sent to the Minister to be given final approval
(Figure 4.1) (Protected source, Canadian Political Staff b, 2016).
The above interaction reflects a conventional bureaucratic politics
model of decision-making which does not always account for informal
inputs into the foreign policy process. These inputs often take place unof-
ficially between advocacy groups, such as diaspora groups, and politi-
cally appointed staff. This is a significant gap given the expansive role for
partisan elites, which has afforded enhanced opportunities for access to
non-governmental organisations to contribute to the foreign policymak-
ing process (Protected Source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016).
As a consequence, staff at non-governmental interest groups in Canada
prioritise network-building with partisan elites who have the ability to
influence the private decision-making discourses of political leadership.
An instructive vignette offered by one interviewee demonstrates the
power of informal inputs via partisan discourses in foreign policy deci-
sion-making (Protected source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016):
A group of young, Conservative members of Asian descent

approached the Foreign Minister at the time at a Conservative Party
gathering to discuss the issue of Comfort Women during World War
II and asked him to raise this with his Japanese counterpart on an
upcoming official visit. Despite this issue not being formally agreed
as being part of the bilateral meeting agenda, the Minister neverthe-
less raised the issue.
BK-TandF-GODWIN_9780367544904-220335-Chp04.indd 91 04/07/22 3:36 PM

These interactions are far harder to capture given the informal, and often
casual nature in which dialogue transpires. However, data collected from
Tamil diaspora elites and foreign policy elites explored in later chapters
sheds similar light on the importance of these interactions.
In Ottawa, interest groups representing diaspora stakeholders such as the
Canadian Tamil Congress, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs and the
Ukrainian Canadian Congress engage in the foreign policymaking process
often through partisan elites. Diaspora agents are amongst the most active
external actors in foreign policy discourses and became increasingly more
active during the Harper government (Carment and Landry, 2011). However,
during the tenure of the Harper government not all non-governmental actors
were accorded the same level of access. The Harper government sought to
limit the influence of traditional non-governmental organisations, such as
the human rights groups given prominence in the 1990s, as reflected in the
government’s defunding of KAIROs.9
With respect to engaging the public directly, Canada’s foreign policymak-
ers have approached the public for input to varying degrees. During the ten-
ure of Lloyd Axworthy as Foreign Minister, many viewed the process as
being more porous to external expertise and input than has traditionally been
the case, allowing civil society groups access to the foreign policy making
process (Carment and Landry, 2011, 281). In contrast, some have viewed the
brief premiership of Paul Martin (2004–2006) as a “one-man-show” where
the executive limited external influence (Chapnick, 2008). Parliamentary
inquiries on issues related to foreign affairs, which were characteristic of
the Mulroney government and the early years of the Liberal Government,
were not revitalised by the Harper Tories nor were there proactive efforts to
engage the public as a whole on matters of foreign policy.
Canada’s foreign policy decision-making under the Harper govern-
ment was dominated by Cabinet and in particular the Prime Minister,
resembling to a large extent the concentrated “Westminster model” of
policymaking described above. The bureaucracy does influence foreign
policy in their advisory capacity and maintain control over the mechan-
ics of policymaking. However, politically appointed staff also have infor-
mal authority over the policy process. Parliament had a very limited role
in policymaking and the public were not often consulted on these mat-
ters. However, despite the exclusion of some traditional NGOs such as
those active in human rights, there were nevertheless informal channels
through which interest groups were able to influence decision-making,
which reflects the “differentiated model,” albeit only for temporary for-
eign policy elites as defined in Chapter 2.
Processes of British foreign policymaking

Since the 1990s, a number of models have characterised foreign policy
decision-making in the UK, from a centralised, Westminster-model of
decision-making dominated by the Prime Minister in the later years of
the Blair government, to a more differentiated model apparent during the
Cameron-led coalition government. As in Canada, the process consist-
ently involves political leaders and special advisors, Whitehall officials
and external sources.10 Variation between administrations can be seen in
the degree of influence enjoyed by actors at points within the foreign pol-
icymaking process, with specific reference for this book to the involve-
ment of non-government groups. New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair
became progressively more directly engaged in foreign policymaking.
Like former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher before him, Blair con-
centrated ever more foreign policy decision-making inside Number 10
Downing St. In what has been variously labelled “denocracy,” “sofa gov-
ernment” or a “kitchen cabinet,” both the FCO and Blair’s Cabinet were
increasingly excluded from decision-making in favour of a small coterie
of politically appointed senior advisors (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013).11
During the tenure of Tony Blair’s successor Gordon Brown, former
Chancellor of the Exchequer, much foreign policy decision-making was
devolved to his Foreign Secretary, David Miliband (Gaskarth, 2013, 15).
Despite his youth, he was given significant leeway and independence,
being viewed as an influential statesman in his own right. Importantly
for this analysis, he was given virtually a “free hand” to address interna-
tional crises such as those in Georgia in 2008 and in Sri Lanka in 2009.
Given this return of authority and agency to the Foreign Secretary and
criticism of the decision-making approach in foreign affairs by the Blair
government, a greater effort was made to involve both Whitehall officials
as well as exogenous influence in policymaking.
Foreign Secretary William Hague, who held office during the Cameron-
led coalition government from 2010 was similarly given a wide berth to
engage in foreign policy matters without the intervention of the Prime
Minister, reflecting a “level playing field” whereby William Hague was
given a significant amount of control over the foreign policy process
(Daddow, 2015; Honeyman, 2012).12 Hague’s agenda at the FCO was to
further open up policymaking, including by establishing the Diplomatic
Excellence Initiative (Daddow, 2015). His ministerial tenure further
sought to reform the machinery of foreign policymaking, particularly by
enhancing the role of the FCO through formalising decision-making and
taking advice from a range of sources (Honeyman, 2012, 124). The gov-
ernment was keen to demonstrate its policies were informed by experts
and away from the “sofa government” of the Blair years. Hague estab-
lished a National Security Council as a Cabinet committee, not unlike a
similar organ established by the Harper Cabinet (Gaskarth, 2013, 17).13
Officially operating as a conduit of information and expertise as
well as an implementation body, the FCO is directed by the Permanent
Under Secretary and is sometimes characterised as an “informal source
of opposition” to government preferences. The Under Secretary of
the FCO manages Britain’s vast diplomatic network of embassies and
High Commissions around the world as well as the corresponding
“Desk Offices” which receive, collate and analyse information from
diplomatic missions and other sources (Protected source, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, 2015).14 The FCO identifies and reports on devel-
opments in other countries, offers consular services and advice to busi-
ness and is a key component to setting the UK’s country-specific foreign
affairs agenda.15
Alongside these more formal actors in the foreign policy process, less
formal actors participate in policy networks which inform, to varying
degrees, these principal elements during the foreign policy making pro-
cess. The Prime Minister’s Office or the Foreign Secretary engage elite
networks of foreign policymaking, such as those located at world-class
universities in London and the surrounding area, think tanks such as
Chatham House and the Royal College of Defence Studies, as well as
one of the many other established centres of expertise in foreign affairs.
With regard to engagement with the public, the New Labour government
began opening up the policymaking process, including through Foreign
Secretary Cook’s creation of the Foreign Policy Centre aimed at engag-
ing non-government influences on policy. Later foreign Secretary Jack
Straw continued to view public engagement and legitimisation as an
important component of foreign policy. Gordon Brown asserted that the
UK is a multicultural society and there was a view that diaspora commu-
nities should have input into foreign policy, as argued above (Gaskarth,
2011, 87). The foreign policy process was opened up to greater consulta-
tion to members of the public under the leadership of Foreign Secretary
David Miliband who spearheaded the “Bringing Policy Home” initia-
tive in 2009 (Jaine and Curtis, 2012). During the Cameron years, Foreign
Secretary Hague’s first speech as Foreign Secretary noted the networked
processes of international policymaking, including through multilateral
institutions, but also domestic forces, such as pressure groups and chari-
ties which are part of the process.
While the more concentrated, Westminster model of foreign policy-
making emerged in Canada following the coming to office of the Harper
government, the UK first under Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown
and then David Cameron appeared to be moving in the opposite direc-
tion. The Brown government sought to open up policymaking and make
it more transparent, an approach continued and expanded on by the
Cameron government which also worked to restore the influence of
the formerly excluded FCO. The more differentiated model reflected by
the Brown and Cameron governments is likely to produce a more porous
process favourable to forces external to government such as diasporas
when compared to the centralised model of the Harper government.
However, the enhanced role for the FCO is unlikely to advantage exter-
nal, diaspora interests.
Having discussed the institutions of domestic foreign policymaking
into which non-elite agents seek to gain temporary entry and role-makers,
the second section of this chapter discusses how Canada and the UK
conceive of their international roles and ascribes their role positions.
From Liberal interventionism to enlightened self-interest?

Changing role conceptions for Canada and the UK
As argued in Chapter 2, Role Theory is ideally suited to bridging the
gap between the influence of domestic agents on elite decision-makers
and analysing the international structures that constrain the behaviour
of states and their ability to respond to the preferences of these domestic
actors. What is especially useful about Role Theory for the purposes of
this inquiry is that it posits two, distinct aspects of international roles:
That of how a state itself conceives of its role as well as its role position
internationally. In this vein, the book explores the influence of Tamil
diaspora mass movements and interest groups in respect of both role
conception and role performance.
In the first section below, I discuss the former which refers to how
states, particularly those foreign policy elites described above, conceive
of the role of Canada and the UK internationally. While these role con-
ceptions are necessarily informed by signals from other international
actors and international institutions, role conception is inherently a pro-
cess dominated by domestic forces. Explicating on these international
roles is important, as understanding the influence of diasporas on role
contestation processes in the context of events in Sri Lanka necessarily
involves identifying preferred international roles in the first instance.
Secondly, this section looks at role ascription and where Canada and
the UK are positioned within formal and informal structures of interna-
tional power. As discussed in Chapter 2, in order to explain whether or
not a diaspora is able to influence role contestation, it is critical to under-
stand to what extent each country was able to act within the confines
of international power hierarchies and in alignment with diaspora pref-
erences. The capacity to perform internationally in line with domestic
interests is constrained by a state’s ability to influence other actors within
the system as well as by its dominance within international institutions,
as this may also constrain state behaviour.
From Middle Power to disruptor? Recent changes

in Canadian role conception
Within the international system, Canada has historically conceived of
its role as a “Middle Power” (Bow and Lennox, 2008; Gecelovsky, 2009;
Ravenhill, 1998). The literature on Middle Powers summarises the char-
acteristics of Middle Power role performance as the “five Cs”: Capacity,
such as states’ diplomatic and communications infrastructure; concen-
tration, referring to Middle Powers being restricted to exerting influence
only in issue-specific areas; creativity, in that Middle Powers must act
as policy entrepreneurs through the force of ideas; coalition-building, as
Middle Powers can only pursue change in partnership with other states
or within institutions; and credibility, with Middle Powers being viewed
as less parochial (Ravenhill, 1998). However, while I broadly agree
that the “Middle Power” role has utility in respect of a state’s position
within the international hierarchy and will be revisited, it is less useful
as a descriptor with respect to how a state conceives of and performs its
role. As Stairs (1998, 275) has argued, “Middle Power” better describes
what a state can do, rather than what it will do. Scholars have sometimes
preferred the term “norm or policy entrepreneur” rather than Middle
Power to discuss Canada’s traditional role conception and I support this
approach to better illustrate role conception.
The idea of Canada as a Middle Power was institutionalised following
the Second World War by Prime Minister Louis St Laurent and later
epitomised by the foreign policy of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson.
The creation and adoption of the Middle Power role by Canada was a
way of elevating Canada above many emerging, smaller and less influen-
tial states, but acknowledging that Canada does not wield the influence
of Great Powers (Gecelovsky, 2009). Some scholars point to this emer-
gent Middle Power role as giving way to a “Pearsonian” foreign policy
which has come to be seen as a “golden era” for Canadian diplomacy,
particularly its role in helping resolve the Suez Crisis and its expansion of
the UN Security Council’s influence for non-permanent members.
Canada viewed its Middle Power role as a way of distinguishing
Canada from the two Cold War superpowers as a liberal, multilateral-
ist state working through international institutions as a policy entrepre-
neur, advancing “niche” interests (Gecelovsky, 2009; Ravenhill, 1998).
Canada’s role performance in the latter half of the twentieth century
appears consistent with this role paradigm. During the Tory premier-
ship of Brian Mulroney through much of the 1980s, Canada played a
now lauded role in the Commonwealth putting pressure on the Apartheid
regime in South Africa in opposition to the preferences of British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher (Ravenhill, 1998). Bilaterally, Mulroney lev-
eraged his warm personal relationship with US President Ronald Reagan
to petition the US government to join Canada in taking action to end
acid rain. This campaign resulted in the 1991 signing of the US-Canada
Air Quality Agreement or the “Acid Rain Accord” (Mulroney, 2012).
Albeit bilateral rather than multilateral, this is in keeping with the policy
entrepreneur role of taking a “functional” approach that changes inter-
national affairs in niche areas.
These facets of Canada as policy entrepreneur were much in evidence
during the tenure of Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Foreign Minister during
the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in the 1990s. In
common with the New Labour agenda in the UK, Axworthy favoured a
human security approach to international affairs, wherein the post-Cold
War world required a privileging of the individual welfare of human
beings rather than the paramountcy of sovereign states (Bain, 1999; Moens,
2008). Grounded in human rights, Axworthy’s human security agenda led
to a number of international policy outcomes, including the “Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997,” or
the “Ottawa Treaty.” The treaty was the culmination of nearly two dec-
ades of diplomacy involving many actors, including other Middle Power
states such as Austria and Belgium, to ban landmines (International
Committee of the Red Cross, 2020). With regard to international law,
Axworthy championed a coalition of like-minded states that resulted in
the landmark Rome Statute in 1998 and ultimately the creation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), (Oosterveld, 2018). During this
period, Canada also advanced through international institutions initia-
tives to tackle AIDS and to define the rights of the child (Bain, 1999).
Following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US,
Canada’s role conception and foreign policy priorities shifted from
an emphasis on human security and human rights, to “hard” security
concerns and military operations abroad, particularly in Afghanistan
(Moens, 2008). An affirmative parliamentary vote committed Canada
to providing troops and military resources to the UN Security Council-
mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in what would
become Canada’s largest and costliest deployment since the Cold War. It
was in the midst of Canada’s Afghanistan commitment that Conservative
Prime Minister Stephen Harper took office in 2006.
Canada’s role in the conflict in Afghanistan continued under the
Harper administration without interruption, but Canada did experience
a discernible change in role conception during his premiership. The new
Conservative government sought to distinguish itself from the preceding
thirteen years under the Liberal Party. Rather than conceiving of Canada
in the more Middle Power, policy entrepreneur role, the Harper govern-
ment actively appealed to Canada’s “warrior heritage.” For instance, he
insisted on referring to the Afghanistan mission as being part of the “War
on Terror” and prioritised a “hard security,” defence orientation in for-
eign policy with less emphasis on diplomacy and development (Moens,
2008; Paris, 2014). Harper did not espouse Canada’s long-held concep-
tion of itself as “Middle Power,” instead preferring to conceive of Canada
as a more assertive power less constrained by international structures,
including often referring to Canada as an “energy superpower.” Scholars
have argued that the Harper government was more given to forceful
positions in international affairs rather than pursuing traditional “quiet
diplomacy” (Bratt, 2018).
Not unlike the premiership of Tony Blair, Harper saw international
affairs in stark terms between good and bad actors and that it was
Canada’s role to unambiguously align itself in formative conflicts on the
“right side of history” (Bratt, 2018; Keating, 2011, 60). This more moral-
istic approach to foreign affairs led to the Harper government’s disincli-
nation towards engagement with authoritarian governments, such as in
China and Russia, instead promoting the values of “freedom, dignity and
security” (Keating, 2011, 60). This conception was made more assertive
with the coming to office of powerful foreign minister John Baird in 2011.
The Conservative government was determined to follow a “principled”
foreign policy, with a role conception undergirded by the mantra of “not
going along to get along” (Protected source, former Canadian political
staff c, 2016; protected source, former Canadian Member of Parliament,
2016). What this meant in practice is that the government would not shy
away from disrupting international institutions in efforts to call attention
to repressive regimes.
Change in role conception was also followed by changes in role per-
formance. The Harper government sought to distance itself from the
multilateral institutions prized by the foregoing Liberal government, as
exemplified by Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol as well as
UN agreements such as the international treaty on desertification (Bratt,
2018). Prime Minister Harper demonstrated his disinclination towards the
UN by often spurning the opportunity to speak at the General Assembly
(Ottawa Citizen, 2014). Canada’s role behaviour within other interna-
tional institutions, including the Commonwealth and La Francophonie,
also evinced a more disruptive approach. Not unlike the Conservatives
under David Cameron, the Canadian Conservative government viewed
the Commonwealth as a constructive institution that retained and pro-
moted long-standing cultural ties (Black, 2009; Protected source, former
Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016). However, despite being initially
enthusiastic about participation, the Harper government quickly became
disillusioned with the organisation and its unwillingness to admonish
states abusing the rights of their own citizens. In the case of the Maldives,
Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka, Canada undertook hitherto uncharacteristi-
cally disruptive behaviour. This approach was aimed, in part, at influ-
encing international affairs through signalling to larger powers to both
take more substantive action against unruly states, but also to expand the
scope of possible punitive measures with a view to changing the behav-
iour of such states.
Finally, and in a similar approach to that elucidated under the
Conservative government led by David Cameron, the Harper govern-
ment more clearly defined Canadian foreign policy as one in pursuit of
the country’s national interests (Moens, 2008). National interest in their
view was principally economic, as diplomats were instructed in a fashion
similar to the UK to serve as economic as well as diplomatic envoys,
opening up additional trade opportunities and supporting Canadian
businesses (Black, 2009). The Harper government announced a Global
Markets Action Plan mandated with achieving the above leveraging of
development support for economic benefit. Through the conclusion of
a large number of bilateral trade agreements, the Harper government
asserted Canada’s role as a “trading nation” (Asa and Sarson, 2016).
Some of the above scholarship has argued that Canada’s behaviour
under Stephen Harper in international institutions in respect of human
rights was driven largely by its inherent disinclination for multilateral-
ism and/or by influence from domestic pressure groups. Furthermore,
that these policies exhibited a disregard for Canada’s traditional role as
a policy entrepreneurial, Middle Power. The empirical chapters I ana-
lyse suggest there is indeed merit in the first two arguments. However,
what is emphasised less is that the Harper government was as aware as
previous Canadian governments of Canada’s limited ability to influence
international affairs and the behaviour of other states. Canadian foreign
policymakers under the Harper government were conscious of Canada’s
limited influence over global affairs. For instance, prior to 2010 state-
ments from the foreign affairs department had been relatively “bland,”
but after 2010 the government sought to contextualise statements and
to take positions which were viewed to be “unequivocal” and “strong”
on a range of foreign policy issues. The motivation for this was to help
“move the needle” in relation to more influential countries’ policies on
the same issues. In this way, Canada could be viewed as a pole on a par-
ticular issue, opening up the space for other countries to move their posi-
tion closer to Canada’s, but retaining nuance (Protected source, former
Canadian political staff c, 2016).
There was a reorientation during the Harper government with regard
to role conception and performance, from the traditional Middle Power
role of a policy entrepreneur to a “disrupter” in international institutions.
A number of conclusions with bearing on role contestation can thusly be
drawn. Firstly, as exemplified by its successful effort to engender greater
support from France for the Afghanistan mission in 2008, the Harper
government recognised that strong statements and substantive commit-
ments would “raise the bar” for more powerful actors in the international
system to take stronger action themselves. With stronger signalling, the
Harper government believed it was not only putting pressure on intran-
sigent governments, but expanding the scope of action for more pow-
erful states. Secondly, that while the Harper government’s approach to
human rights action in international institutions was distinct from pre-
vious governments and did not conform to Canada’s traditional role as
a mediating Middle Power, the Conservative government was neverthe-
less motivated by a desire to protect the human rights of citizens abroad.
Finally, the Harper government was also cognisant that Canada’s more
disruptive behaviour, particularly at international institutions, did not
in any significant way put in jeopardy the existence of institutions to
which Canada was a member such as the UN, the Commonwealth or La
Francophonie. Unlike Major Power actors, Canada’s limited influence
allowed it to pursue more strident signalling that more influential actors
were not able to pursue.
From intervener to convenor? Recent changes

in British role conception
The early years of the New Labour government’s role conception was
characterised by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s transnational solidar-
ity, as exemplified by a commitment towards promoting human rights,
civil liberties and democracy, including through the FCO’s first mission
statement (Gilmore, 2014, 25). This “ethical dimension” involved sup-
porting the democratic rights of individuals in other states, emphasis-
ing human rights and potentially privileging the needs of non-British
stakeholders over UK interests (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011; McCourt,
2011). This approach was furthered by Prime Minister Blair’s “Doctrine
of the International Community” where he established an ethical lens for
Britain’s international affairs, where protecting human security could be
privileged over deference to state sovereignty (Gilmore, 2014). This more
proactive and “world-making” role definition for the UK is not dissimi-
lar to that occupied by the Chretien government during the same period.
The UK played a leading role in advancing a human security agenda
in international institutions as a leading advocate for the International
Criminal Court and for the Ottawa Treaty on landmines (Gaskarth, 2014,
58). The UK’s leadership at the G8 in the early 2000s resulted in a pro-
nounced role in bringing about international action on climate change as
well as on combating extreme poverty internationally.
However, the UK’s privileging of human security over state sover-
eignty also extended to a number of international, military interventions
which Canada was incapable of pursuing with the same independence
as the UK.16 While previous conservative governments had intervened
militarily abroad with similar motivations, as was the case with John
Major’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia earlier in the 1990s, the
Blair government’s approach was more assertive (Beech and Oliver,
2014; Edmunds, 2014). The New Labour government intervened mili-
tarily in Kosovo and Sierra Leone in the 1990s as well as in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the 2000s (Beech and Oliver, 2014). While the interven-
tions in the 1990s were of a shorter duration and did not involve the long-
term occupation of foreign territory, the interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks in the US
were of a far longer, costlier duration. The latter in particular came to
define the more interventionist role conception for the UK under Prime
Minister Blair.
Coming to office in 2007, the government of Prime Minister Gordon
Brown represented a turn away from the ideological orientation of the
preceding government and it asserted a more pragmatic approach to
international affairs. Brown viewed the world in less stark terms and
with more opportunity for cooperation within the international system,
reflecting interconnectedness rather than conflict (Dyson, 2011, 65).
Instead, the Brown government was proactive in taking a liberal interna-
tionalist approach, emphasising the strengthening of international insti-
tutions, particularly financial ones in the wake of the 2008 credit crunch
as well as on international development (Honeyman, 2009). Through
his long tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown was familiar
with major international financial institutions such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He
called for their reform to better reflect a globalised economy, inclusive of
emerging state actors. He similarly called for United Nations reform with
a view to making it and in particular the Security Council less reflective
of a long-outdated WWII global order.
While Chancellor, Brown championed the UK’s role in international
development with a particular emphasis on African countries, having
developed the International Finance Facility for Immunisation to sup-
port international vaccination and immunisation and recognised the
importance of enhancing trade opportunities for emerging countries
(Dyson, 2011, 80; Honeyman, 2009). The 0.7% of GDP commitment
to international development continued under his premiership and he
advocated internationally for more attention to the implementation of
the UN Millennium Development Goals. In addition to its focus on
reforming international institutions and international development, the
Brown government conceived of the UK’s global role as being an inter-
national “hub,” where the UK would deploy its significant convening
power to address the world’s economic and diplomatic challenges by
bringing together state and non-state international actors (Daddow and
Gaskarth, 2011, 14). In respect of interventionism, not unlike the Harper
government, Gordon Brown’s Labour government was in part focused
on the UK’s waning commitment to the Iraq and Afghanistan interven-
tions instigated by the previous government. However, the Brown gov-
ernment did not prioritise these engagements in foreign policy rhetoric
as the Harper government did.
The emphasis on strengthening international institutions continued
under the 2010 Coalition government of David Cameron, as did a focus
on international development. Similarly foregoing “sweeping gestures,”
the government also considered foreign policy “pragmatically” and less
idealistically.17 However, the Coalition government was more explicit in
following a foreign policy aligned with British national interests (Gilmore,
2014). This was described by Cameron as a “liberal conservative”
approach, where the UK would strengthen international institutions and
intervene abroad for the right reasons, but also with a view to enhancing
British economic growth and security. In practice, this meant that the
Coalition government sought to leverage the UK’s expansive diplomatic
network to lubricate trade networks for the benefit of British businesses,
in a fashion similar to the Harper Conservative government (Daddow,
2015). Additionally, the use of foreign development assistance was viewed
as a means of expanding trade networks, arguing that humanitarian sup-
port should, where possible, advantage domestic economic growth.18
Foreign policies aligned with the UK’s economic national interest
did have its limits, as demonstrated by the maintenance of restrictions
on arms sales to states where there was evidence of their use in internal
repression and in its commitment to the Arms Trade Treaty (Gilmore,
2014). When it came to balancing the economic national interests of the
UK at the expense of human rights, William Hague affirmed that the
latter would not be overlooked to advance the former. Like earlier gov-
ernments, the Cameron government pursued a humanitarian interna-
tional agenda, leading to a campaign to prevent conflict zone rape and
sexual violence which was subsequently taken up at several international
forums. The creation of a Stabilisation Unit within the FCO reflected
the Cameron government’s belief that international stability and sta-
bility within states was in Britain’s national security interest (Daddow,
2015). Administratively, the Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR) commissioned following the Coalition government’s formation
emphasised restraint in international interventions, preferring to focus
on traditional international interests of the conservative party, such as
the Commonwealth and trade.
Despite eschewing a more cavalier foreign policy, the Cameron gov-
ernment was not averse to militarised international humanitarian inter-
ventions. However, the UK’s 2011 intervention in Libya was undergirded
by an affirmative vote at the United Nations and a referral of Libya to
the International Criminal Court.19 The intervention was legitimated by
the Cameron government at least in part through its policy emphasis on
security.20 The liberal conservatism of the Cameron government viewed
working through international institutions as a means of preserving state
sovereignty, rather than eroding the dominance of the state in interna-
tional institutions in contrast to prevailing views in the 1990s. Indeed, the
Cameron government was keen to strengthen international institutions
through expansion, including the inclusion of other countries such as
India and Brazil into the United Nations Security Council (Honeyman,
2012, 127). The liberal aspect of the Cameron government’s foreign policy
was one that is proactive in supporting British values, such as democracy
and human rights through strengthening the rules-based international
order (Gilmore, 2014). Another element of their worldview was the tradi-
tional Conservative disinclination towards “appeasement” and a desire
to confront dictators.21 In part explaining the Cameron government’s
approach to the Libyan regime, this disinclination towards harsh author-
itarianism had echoes of the approach to non-democratic governments
by the Harper Conservatives.
Finally, aligning with its desire to strengthen international institutions,
unlike previous Labour governments, the Conservatives determined to
focus more closely on the Commonwealth, traditionally a strong interest
for Tory governments. Hague referenced the Commonwealth in numer-
ous speeches while in opposition and argued that the UK’s international
influence was strengthened through its leadership in the Commonwealth
(Honeyman, 2012). However, not unlike the Harper Conservatives, schol-
ars have argued that the Commonwealth was in fact not a priority for the
Cameron government, despite its warmer intentions towards the body.
As successors to Tony Blair, both the Brown and Cameron governments
were constrained by the legacy of the Iraq intervention, both in their lack
of enthusiasm for interventionism and in the means by which it was car-
ried out. Both administrations were disinclined towards grand, world-
making approaches which characterised Tony Blair’s term and favoured
a more pragmatic role. Both were liberal institutionalist in their support
for international bodies and emphasised Britain’s role as an international
“convening” power aimed at integrating states and international actors
to solve collective global challenges. However, the Cameron government
was more pronounced in pursuing a foreign policy that directly benefit-
ted the UK in a fashion similar to the Harper Government. It was keen to
use foreign policy as a tool to advance trade, as well as to ensure stability
abroad with a view to protecting British national security.
Middle Power revisited: Ascribing Canada’s role position

The foregoing section conceptualised and discussed Canada as a “Middle
Power,” describing it as a type of role conception and performance most
resembling that of norm of policy entrepreneur. However, while the term
Middle Power has less descriptive weight in respect of international role
conception, it is however a more accurate signpost in respect of Canada’s
position within international hierarchies of power. Wood and Holbraad
both characterise Canada’s position within the international system as
being a Middle Power as considered through the lens of Gross National
Product (Gecelovsky, 2009).22 Ravenhill’s (1998) comparison of Canadian
and Australian Middle Power capacity and performance also suggests
that Canada cannot be said to occupy the same strata as powers such
as the UK and France.23 However, through an expanded list of factors
including GNP per capita, population, infant mortality rate and mili-
tary expenditure per capita, Neack found that Canada was in fact more
influential than the Middle Power status to which it is usually ascribed
(Gecelovsky, 2009). Despite the efforts of the Harper government to
project Canada’s role as being something other than a Middle Power, I
broadly accept the view that Canada’s position internationally is that of
a Middle Power.
Chapter 2 discussed five factors which should be considered with a
view to ascribing the role positions of states: Military capabilities, eco-
nomic capabilities, development assistance, diplomatic network and
membership in international institutions and soft power. As noted in the
foregoing section, there has always been a recognition that in compari-
son to larger states in the international system, Canada’s ability to force
change is limited (Bain, 1999). This is especially true when it comes to
Canada’s ability to project military power.24 However, Canada can and
has often participated in a modest way in international coalitions such
as the aforementioned mission in Afghanistan (Bow and Lennox, 2008).
During the period under consideration, Canada had the tenth largest
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank, 2016), has long been a mem-
ber of the Group of 7 (G7) wealthy countries and is a powerful actor in
commodities markets and in other areas. With respect to overseas devel-
opment aid (ODA), Canada does not and has never met the UN target of
spending 0.7% of GDP on ODA.25 However, Canada managed to sustain
net Overseas Development Assistance contributions around $4 billion
annually during the Harper government’s time in office (OECD, 2020),
placing it amongst the most generous donor countries.26 Canada has a
large diplomatic network with 144 diplomatic missions abroad as of 2019.27
As it pertains to membership in international institutions, Canada did not
have one of the temporary seats on the UN Security Council during the
period covered by this book and in fact lost in its bid for a seat in 2010.28
However, Canada retains membership in many regional and sub-system
international organisations such as the aforementioned G7/G20, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum and the Organization of American States. Canada is also a leading
member of the La Francophonie cultural and linguistic international body.
Furthermore, in reference to international subsystem entities, Role
Theory pertinently asserts that a state’s role internationally does not mean
that this role is necessarily the same in all regions or subsystem organisa-
tions. The Commonwealth is one sphere in which Canada has exercised a
degree of leadership beyond its traditional role in the wider international
system.29 The first Commonwealth General Secretary Arnold Smith was
Canadian (1965–1975), the Commonwealth of Learning, an intergovern-
mental organisation, is headquartered in British Columbia and Canada
traditionally contributes as much as a third of the Commonwealth’s
operating budget. Former Canadian Senator Hugh Segal has been a
member of the “Eminent Persons” group engaged in reforming the
Commonwealth and many Canadians have benefitted from participation
in the Commonwealth Games and the Commonwealth Scholarship pro-
gramme (Commonwealth Network, 2017). While all votes are weighted
equally, Canada holds considerable influence in Commonwealth discourse
(Protected source, Commonwealth elite, 2016). However, reliable engage-
ment at the Commonwealth has not always held across Canadian gov-
ernments. As noted above, the Liberal and Conservative governments
diverged in their level of engagement at international institutions, and the
Commonwealth is no exception. Earlier Liberal governments played a
largely supportive role at the Commonwealth and often adopted an apo-
litical stance expected of states in reference to the internal affairs of other
members. However, the Conservative government was far more vocal
in its criticism of other states at Commonwealth meetings (Protected
source, former Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016).30 Finally, with
regard to Softpower Canada ranked 7th in BrandFinance’s 2020 Global
Softpower index.31
Bilateral political and economic ties between Canada and Sri Lanka
have been historically strong.32 The disintegration of the British Empire
and its evolution into the Commonwealth created natural ties between for-
mer colonies, even those with fundamentally different histories and colo-
nial experiences such as Sri Lanka and Canada. These ties were evidenced
in the earliest days of Sri Lanka’s independence, when Canada became a
member of the Colombo Plan, which was created at the Commonwealth
Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1950 (The
Colombo Plan: For Cooperation Economic and Social Development in
Asia and the Pacific, 2017).33 In addition, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) has managed a decades-old bilateral devel-
opment plan for Sri Lanka with annual assistance amounting to roughly
CAN$6 million (Consulate General of Sri Lanka, Toronto, 2009). During
the South Asian tsunami, Canada and individual Canadians pledged an
unprecedented amount of money to support relief efforts. Economically,
Canada and Sri Lanka have had a strong trading relationship. Canada is
the destination for 2.2 per cent of Sri Lanka’s exports while 1.2 per cent
of its imports arrived from Canada, with the total value of exports to
Canada standing at CAN$259 million (The Observatory of Economic
Complexity, 2017).
A major power by any other name? Ascribing Britain’s

role position
The above characterised the UK’s role conception and role performance
as having transited from a world-making, intervenor role to one in which
it occupied a role conception oriented around support for international
institutions and as a convening power. Taking on the roles of both inter-
national intervenor and integrator assumes the UK has the capacity to
project its power, in some cases militarily in a global context, as well as
has the requisite “power of attraction” needed to convene and lead other
states in accordance with its agenda preferences. In short, does the UK’s
standing reflect the characteristics of a major power?
Following the Second World War, Britain remained militarily embed-
ded in and with significant control over the affairs of colonial and post-co-
lonial states (Houghton and Sanders, 1989, 51).34 This direct influence
declined rapidly through the 1960s as Britain’s capabilities ebbed and
its colonial control diminished. Following the Cold War, some scholars
asserted that the UK could not continue to consider itself as a Great
Power (Gaskarth, 2013, 52). However, the view amongst New Labour’s
leadership was that the UK is a “global actor,” playing an influential, out-
sized role in global affairs as a “pivotal power” with particular respon-
sibilities towards the international community and the maintenance of
international institutions. Politically, both Blair and Brown believed that
the UK was an important global actor (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2011, 2;
Dyson, 2011, 65; McCourt, 2011; Ritchie, 2014). The Cameron govern-
ment viewed the UK in a similar position, but characterised the coun-
try as a Great Power through a stronger emphasis on its deep reserve of
soft-power assets as exemplified by the international “Britain is GREAT”
campaign from 2012. In the 2010s, the UK was viewed not as a super-
power, but as a “major global actor” with global interests (Daddow and
Schnapper, 2013; Gaskarth, 2013, 67). In a similar vain, Hill (2013, 142)
advances that post-imperial Britain and France have assumed positions
of responsibility in the international systems as “principal agents.”
Unlike Canada, there is a lack of uniformity on how to conceptual-
ise the UK, but there is a relative consensus that the UK sits in a space
between a Middle Power such as Canada and a superpower actor such
as the US. A range of factors serve to distinguish the UK within this
“second-tier” of state actors. The UK is part of a small number of states
able to project significant numbers of military personnel, naval and air-
craft assets anywhere in the world.35 Its economy is the fifth largest in
the world, along with Canada is a member of the Group of 7 and has
the world’s third largest financial sector (Hagino and Cavieres, n.d.). In
regard to overseas development aid, the UK had for more than a decade
met the UN’s goal of contributing 0.7 per cent of GDP to ODA, regularly
features amongst the world’s most generous ODA contributors and it is
the fourth largest financial contributor to the United Nations.36 In respect
of the UK’s diplomatic reach, the UK had the eighth most diplomatic
missions abroad.37 The UK sits at the heart of the world’s most powerful
institutions: It is one of five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, is a principal actor in the NATO alliance, a member of
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
along with a host of other institutions (Daddow, 2015). In addition to
serving as a critical actor in most significant international institutions,
much has been made of the UK’s soft power. A measure of a country’s
ability to influence the behaviour of other actors through more intangible
cultural factors, the UK is rivalled annually by only a handful of states
across metrics.38 The wide reach of the BBC, world-leading universities,
the focal point for many international sports, and the UK’s linguistic and
geographic positioning has allowed it to build vast reserves of cultural
capital.
Of particular consequence to this inquiry, the UK is a member of the
Commonwealth. Originally conceived of as an institution to preserve and
strengthen links between former member-states of the British Empire,
with a view to states pursuing common goals and establishing more
favourable trade and cultural linkages (Honeyman, 2012). In addition to
the British Head of State remaining the head of the Commonwealth, the
Secretariat for the Commonwealth is based in London, along with a half
dozen other organs of the Commonwealth and Britons retain many sen-
ior administrative positions (Commonwealth Network, 2017). While the
Commonwealth maintains consensus-based decision-making, the UK
should be considered the institution’s dominant state member.
In Southeast Asia, the UK has cast itself as a pivotal player, both in
its relationship with India, the regional power and Sri Lanka (Blair,
2002). In the case of the former, the UK’s relationship has not always
been warm, in particular during the Cold War when India’s association
with the Soviet Union strained relations and closed economic policies
prevented deep trade ties. However, in the early 1990s Britain and India
began to engage anew, culminating in the Indo-British partnership in
1993 under then Prime Minister John Major (Swire, 2012). Tony Blair
continued to build a stronger relationship with India, including champi-
oning India as a future permanent member of the UN Security Council,
committing over £300 million to its bilateral development programme
in India by 2003/04, increasing funding for Indians studying in the UK,
and the UK was India’s second largest trading partner at this time at £5
billion per year.39 The UK has expended substantial resources to remain
influential in Southeast Asia, and its relationship with Sri Lanka has
been a linchpin for this strategy.
The UK and Sri Lanka have shared diplomatic relations since Sri
Lanka gained independence, with the country’s second overseas mission
opening up in London. According to the Sri Lankan High Commission
in London, the UK is one of its most important overseas relationships.
Indeed, in the years following independence, Britain retained consider-
able influence over Sri Lankan foreign affairs through a 1947 external
affairs agreement, resulting in many of Sri Lanka’s foreign trading part-
ners in the early years being sourced by former members of the British
Empire (Kandaudahewa, 2015).40 Historically, Britain committed bilat-
eral development aid for humanitarian purposes on an annual basis, with
contributions peaking at almost £11 million in 2005/06. These regular
contributions ceased in 2006 when Sri Lanka was designated by DFID
as a middle-income country (Lunn et al., 2009). Britain has also offered
debt-relief assistance, as in 2005 at £41 million, and during the 2009–2010
period which saw a £2 million conflict prevention fund developed along
with additional aid for conflict prevention. £13.5 million was further
committed for reconstruction in the North and East under a humanitar-
ian fund.41
Sri Lanka and the UK have deeply linked economic ties and the UK
has been one of Sri Lanka’s most important trading partners. The UK
has long been Sri Lanka’s second largest export market after the US,
with 10 per cent of Sri Lanka’s exports directed to the UK at a value of
over US$1.1 billion as of 2014. British imports from Sri Lanka average
about US$290 million annually (Hansard, 2017). The UK is one of Sri
Lanka’s largest foreign direct investors and as of 2011, 110 UK companies
operated in Sri Lanka. Tourism is an extremely important component of
the Sri Lankan economy and British nationals account for 20 per cent of
foreign tourists and 30 per cent of earnings from tourism.42 Britain has
long recognised Sri Lanka’s strategic importance and historically main-
tained defence links as well as economic and cultural ties. In advance of
Sri Lankan independence in 1947, a defence agreement was signed, com-
mitting the signatories to “… give to each other such military assistance
for the security of their territories, for defence against external aggres-
sion and for the protection of essential communications as it may be in
their mutual interest to provide.” The agreement also permitted the UK
to maintain military installations and forces on Sri Lankan territory to
advance the stipulations of the agreement (Lunn et al., 2009).43
With respect to arms sales, unlike the US, the UK and EU have not
embargoed arms sales to Sri Lanka. UK arms sales are constrained by
the EU Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which prohibits
sales under certain conditions, such as in cases where exports may pro-
long internal conflict or aid in internal repression. On this basis, the UK
has for more than a decade assessed exports to Sri Lanka on a case-by-
case basis. In 2008, £4.1 million was authorised covering body armour,
communications equipment and other largely non-offensive assets (Lunn
et al., 2009).
Conclusion
To summarise this chapter, from an institutional standpoint there is little
at the surface to distinguish Canada and the UK in terms of the con-
ventional institutions involved in foreign policy decision-making, with
the focus being at the executive level. There have been limited instances
of foreign policy decision-making by parliaments, but in both cases it
is worth paying closer attention to the potential roles of parliamentar-
ians as “inside advocates” for external forces such as diasporas. As an
entrant into foreign policymaking, diasporas are often considered by
government agents as passive actors reserved for consultation, but mass
movements and interest groups representing diasporas have emerged as
proactive forces in foreign policymaking with their own agendas and
priorities. The chapter then discussed the dynamics of foreign policy-
making, advancing that as the Harper government restricted access to
decision-making and distrusted bureaucratic officials, while the Brown
and Cameron governments worked to open up policymaking and to bet-
ter integrate the FCO.
The second section raises the lens and considers the role conception
of Canada and the UK internationally. For Canada, the Harper govern-
ment shifted its role conception from a Middle Power active as a policy
entrepreneur within international institutions to a more disruptive, less
multilateralist actor. Through a “disruptor” role, Canada’s institution-
ally assertive performance sought to take strong, unambiguous posi-
tions on international issues with a view to pressuring more influential
powers to themselves take stronger positions on the same issues. In the
UK, the Brown and then Cameron government’s shifted Britain’s role
conception in the opposite direction, from being a moralistic, interven-
ing state to a more multilateralist actor with the ambition of making the
UK an international “convening” hub. The Cameron government’s “lib-
eral conservatism” emphasised foreign policy in the national interest, in
particular through economic growth in a manner similar to the Harper
government.
The chapter closed by ascribing Canadian and British international role
positions. Canada is often positioned as the signpost Middle Power and
this comparative context largely bears this role out. However, Canada is
a more influential actor in the Commonwealth and has a strong existing
relationship to Sri Lanka. There is more ambiguity in the role status of
the UK, as it is more influential than Canada, but is not a superpower in a
fashion similar to the US and China. Given the UK’s capacity to project
power internationally and in its significant power of attraction, the UK
should be considered a Major Power. Unlike Canada, the UK is a dom-
inant actor in the Commonwealth, has a stronger geopolitical interest in
South Asia and has a significant bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka.
Notes
1. “Number 10 Downing Street” or simply “Number 10” is common euphe-
mism for the Prime Minister’s Office and is a reference to the home and
working office of the Prime Minister and some of his staff. It is situated a
short walk from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office along Whitehall in
central London.
2. The PCO is led by the Clerk of the Privy Council who is the head of the
civil service in Canada. The PCO is a strictly non-partisan office where
staff are selected based on merit and policy expertise. As other members of
the Prime Minister’s cabinet liaise with the civil service through the office
of their Deputy Minister, so the Prime Minister is advised by professional
civil servants via the Clerk of the Privy Council. Non-partisan advice on
foreign policy is collected through this office and conveyed to the Prime
Minister or his or her PMO staff.
3. Smith, Marsh and Richards (Rhodes, 1990, 41) argue that the principal
unit of analysis in government decision-making should be the Department.
Quantitatively, the vast majority of decisions made by government are
micro-level and are taken often without the knowledge of the Prime Minis-
ter or the Cabinet. It is undoubtedly true that administrative decisions such
as the hiring of officials, the allocation of unit and project budgets and the
dispersal of grants are often undertaken without Cabinet attention. How-
ever, qualitatively, macro-level decision-making that impacts the govern-
ment’s relations with another state, with an international institution or has
ramifications for the domestic politics of another state, are likely to be the
preserve of Cabinet as governments. Decision-makers are not only held to
account at the domestic level in respect of macro-level foreign policy, but
also internationally.
4. The interest group literature has argued that party discipline stymies
the opportunity to influence policymaking as parliamentarians are com-
manded by party leadership to vote in line with leadership preferences
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). On this point, the Canadian parliament is a
far more rigid legislature when it comes to party discipline than is the
UK Parliament (Schmitz, 2007, 225; Galloway, 2013). Despite few inter-
national affairs issues emerging as votes as argued above, clearly party
discipline is exercised less in these cases as in the above British case where
Conservative MPs voted against the government in 2013 and in 2006 in
Canada, the Afghanistan mission extension passed with the support of
opposition Liberal Party MPs. This question is less relevant for the pur-
poses of this book as no “binding” votes on government policy towards
Sri Lanka were held.
5. Parliamentary foreign affairs committees are often a place where substan-
tive dialogue on foreign affairs occurs. Informed by expert witnesses, these
committees provide a space for meaningful discourse if not as high profile
as the House of Commons (Marlin, 2016). Despite having more freedom
for dialogue, the committee members are nevertheless selected based on
the power balance in parliament and votes in these committees largely fol-
low the same partisan lines.
6. For instance, during the Progressive Conservative government of Brian
Mulroney, the policy process was made more consultative, including
through the creation of parliamentary inquiries on foreign affairs with a
mandate to accept representations from the public and NGOs as well as
through the creation of an international affairs think tank: The Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development.
7. A number of interviewees working for organisations affiliated with other
diaspora groups in the UK noted their dissatisfaction with this process, as
they felt they were often being consulted simply for due diligence purposes
and their views were not likely to be conveyed in a meaningful way.
8. In a fashion similar to the later years of the Blair government, within the
Harper Cabinet there was a smaller body to which foreign affairs issues of
great international consequence or those directly affecting Canada were
discussed (Protected source, former Canadian Member of Parliament,
2016). Issues pertaining to Canada’s actions and approaches to interna-
tional institutions such as the Commonwealth, as well as crises with direct
implications for Canada were directed to this body which included the
Prime Minster and the foreign Minister.
9. Schmitz (2014) and public commentators at the time advanced the belief
that the Harper government was “de-democratising” foreign policy
through these actions.
10. “Whitehall” is a commonly used euphemism for the British government’s
bureaucracy. Analogous to “Foggy Bottom” in Washington DC in refer-
ence to foreign affairs, Whitehall is the name of the street leading up to the
parliament buildings in London. Alongside Whitehall Street many major
government departments are housed, including the Home Office, the Treas-
ury, the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Like the US State Department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is
considered one of the “Great Offices of State” alongside the Treasury and
the Home Office.
11. Leading to a higher level of “groupthink,” it has been argued that this form
of policymaking was in part responsible for the Blair government’s deci-
sion to militarily intervene in Iraq in 2003 (Martin, 2016).
12. On most matters of foreign policy, there is little evidence of a discernible
role for David Cameron’s coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats.
13. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee is a permanent parliamentary body
of Members of Parliament from all parties which meets regularly to discuss
foreign policy matters and engage external witnesses who provide expertise
and opinions (Gaskarth, 2013).
14. Countries which are members of the Commonwealth of Nations, such as
the UK, Britain and Sri Lanka share High Commissioners rather than
Ambassadors and High Commissions rather than embassies.
15. Despite the vast resources of the FCO, it has at times been at loggerheads
with the Prime Minister’s Office, with the former demanding influence
through its knowledge and expertise, and the latter doing so given its dem-
ocratic legitimacy. As noted earlier, Prime Minister Thatcher famously
side-lined the FCO (Powell, 2013), while Foreign Secretary William Hague
in contrast actively engaged the FCO as stakeholders through seeking sub-
missions from staff and Ambassadors.
16. Humanitarian intervention, is an assertive “hard” tool in foreign affairs
involving the threat or use of force across borders to prevent or end human
rights violations without the permission of the state entity within which
these violations are being perpetrated (Beech and Oliver, 2014).
17. Furthermore, this “return” to international institutions did not diminish
the Conservatives traditional and almost reflexive desire to strengthen and
extoll the virtues of the Special Relationship with the US (Daddow and
Schnapper, 2013). This is not dissimilar to the Brown government, who has
also been described as an Atlanticist, but the Tory orientation towards the
US included a dimmer view of the relationship with the EU (Honeyman
et al., 2012, 126).
18. The Cameron government continued the commitment to 0.7% of GDP to
aid (Gilmore, 2014).
19. Some argued that intervening in Libya was not in the UK’s national inter-
est, Cameron disagreed, advancing that if left to “fester” Libya could
devolve into a failed state and breeding ground for terrorists (Daddow and
Schnapper, 2013; Gilmore, 2014).
20. Multilateralism continued to be a cornerstone of the Cameron Coali-
tion government’s “liberal conservatism,” particularly as a necessary
component of humanitarian interventionism (Daddow, 2015; Honey-
man, 2017).
21. While not referred to in Canada in these terms, the Harper government’s
distaste for engaging with undemocratic leadership, particularly evidenced
by his cool relationship with China, reflects a similar approach to interna-
tional engagement.
22. See also Bow and Lennox (2008).
23. See Cooper’s (2015) comparison of Canada as a traditional Middle Power
with that of South Korea’s role as a Middle Power.
24. The 2020 Global Firepower ranking put Canada’s military capacity as
being 24th out of 138 countries in its index. In a similar ranking, Credit
Suisse ranked Canada 20th out of 20 in its global ranking (Global Fire-
power, 2020). While these systems are imperfect, they offer a comparative
perspective with consistent metrics based on assets and hardware (i.e.
tanks and aircraft), personnel and spending. According to Credit Suisse,
Canada’s military spend was $15.7 billion.
25. Net Official Development Assistance by Canada in 2014 was US$4.2 billion.
26. Despite having one of the most vibrant civil societies in the world (Carment
and Landry, 2011), very few international organisations have their princi-
pal headquarters in Canada nor do international media organisations base
their operations in the country.
27. The Lowy Institute has ranked Canada at 18 in its list since 2016 (National
Post, 2019).
28. At the United Nations, Canada rarely acts independently and in interviews
with Tamil activists, they viewed Canada’s involvement at this level as neg-
ligible as it generally votes along the lines of its traditional allies (Protected
source, Together Against Genocide, 2015).
29. The Commonwealth was formally inaugurated in 1949 and functionally,
the British Monarch remains the nominal head of the Commonwealth and
presides over meetings of the executive heads of member states, known as
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM) which
convene every two years. The location of the meeting changes from meet-
ing to meeting and is chosen by consensus. The Commonwealth is in
principle a consensus-based decision-making body and maintains a wide
variety of cultural, professional and athletic networks and organisations
aimed at creating ties between its 55 member states (Ugwukah, 2014). The
membership of the Commonwealth is predicated on agreement to a set of
unifying principles and values and, at times, has disciplined members for
violating this criteria, including during the Nigerian civil war in late 1960s,
early 1970s, Apartheid South Africa and Zimbabwe. The UK is the Com-
monwealth’s dominant actor.
30. The Canadian government viewed the Commonwealth as having failed to
take action against delinquent members, grew embittered with the insti-
tution and questioned its utility to support respect for human rights (Pro-
tected elite source, former Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016).
31. Brandirectory (n.d.; https://brandirectory.com/globalsoftpower/down-
load/brand-finance-global-soft-power-index-2020.pdf).
32. In the regional sphere Asian sphere, unlike the UK, Canada has a num-
ber of institutionalised ties. Canada is a member of Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), which was formed in 1989 to facilitate economic
growth in the pacific region through reducing trade barriers and improving
business conditions domestically in each of its 21 member states (Global
Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, 2017). Canada also maintains
a permanent mission at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), which is a regional intergovernmental organisation of south-
east Asian states aimed at economic growth, social progress and creating
peaceful and stable relations between states (Global Affairs Canada, Gov-
ernment of Canada, 2017). Despite Sri Lanka not being a member of either
of these organisations, Canada’s regional participation and economic
linkages demonstrate a strong interest in Sri Lanka’s immediate regional
neighbourhood.
33. An intergovernmental organisation now composed of 26 states, the plan
was conceived to further economic and social development in Asia and
the Pacific. Under this plan, Canada was heavily involved technically and
financially in developing Colombo’s international airport in the 1950s.
34. Franks predicted that Britain would continue to behave internationally
as a Great Power, regardless of the extent to which its material capacity
reflected this status internationally (Edmunds, 2014).
35. The 2020 Global firepower ranking listed the UK as 8th in its comparative
index of 138 countries, including the possession of two aircraft carriers.
Credit Suisse placed the UK 9th with a budget of US$60.5 billion and the
capacity to project power around the world.
36. In 2014, the UK’s net ODA was US$19.2 billion making it the world’s second
largest contributor after the US (OECD, 2020). In 2020, it was announced
that the UK would not meet its 0.7% of GDP ODA target. However, for the
purposes of this book’s cases the UK maintained this standing.
37. Despite having one of the most expansive diplomatic networks, the UK
was ranked 11th in 2019 in the Lowy Institute global diplomacy index.
38. BrandFinance’s Global Softpower index ranked the UK third in 2020. A
decade earlier and closer to the period investigated by this book, the Insti-
tute for Government ranked the UK second after France in its soft power
index.
39. During the Coalition government, Britain’s largest diplomatic network
in the world resided in India and British Prime Minister David Cameron
visited India three times. In recent years, the UK has been the third larg-
est source of foreign direct investment in India and, similarly, India is the
third largest foreign direct investor in the UK after France and the US.
With an Indian diaspora of 1.5 million, remittances are worth nearly US$4
billion annually and over 20,000 Indian students study in UK universities
(BBC, 2015).
40. Queen Elizabeth II has visited Sri Lanka twice since independence and for-
mer British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opened the Victoria Dam
in 1984, the construction of which was funded in large part by the UK.
More than 6000 Sri Lankans travel to the UK for higher education oppor-
tunities, more than to any other country (Jefferson, 2010).
41. Sri Lanka has received foreign aid from the Department of Foreign and
International Development (DFID) for other programmes, such as the
Global Mine Action Programme, support for diplomatic efforts, libraries,
cultural centres and language training (Jefferson, 2010). The British Coun-
cil operates a range of programmes in Sri Lanka aimed at enhancing Eng-
lish language skills in the country.
42. The Sri Lankan economy is highly liberalised, permitting 100 per cent
foreign ownership in most sectors. Until the 1970s, like most South Asian
countries, Sri Lanka was highly protectionist. However, Sri Lanka became
one of the first countries in the region to open up to trade and foreign direct
investment, with constitutional protections for foreign investment (Han-
sard, 2017). In addition to being a long-term economic interest for the UK
in South Asia with respect to trade and investment, Sri Lanka is also in the
midst of one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. Colombo has
the number one ranked port in South Asia, servicing 33 lines, is considered
the “gateway” to the Indian subcontinent and is a centre-point for east to
west lines.
43. The structure of the Sri Lankan military has been highly influenced by the
UK and British military traditions and, through the Commonwealth, Sri
Lankan nationals are permitted to serve in the UK armed forces.
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10.1007/978-1-349-24141-5.
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in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics. Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press.
Ritchie, Nick. (2014). A Citizen’s View of ‘National Interest’. In Edmunds, T.,
Gaskarth, Jamie and Porter, Robin (Eds.), British Foreign Policy and the National
Schmitz, G.J. (2014). “The Harper Government and the De-Democratization of
Canadian Foreign Policy.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20(2), 224–228.
https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934859.
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(Eds.), Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Lennox, P. (Eds.), An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and
Choices for the Future. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
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Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
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relations on 4 October. [Accessed on 24 October 2017]: https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/uk-india-relations-going-from-strength-to-strength.
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and the Pacific. (2017) History. [Accessed 17 October 2017]: http://www.colom-
bo-plan.org/index.php/about-cps/history/.
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2017]: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/lka/.
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Today’s World.” Historical Research Paper 9, pp. 18–24.
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worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table.
5 Role contestation and the end
of the Sri Lankan civil war
Protest, pressure and
role performance
As set out in Chapter 2, Role Theory was developed to help explain for-
eign policy decision-making, particularly at key policy decision points,
and has recently begun to address the perceived gap in foreign policy
analysis on non-elite agents by unpacking vertical role contestation. By
exploring the mobilisation of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK,
this book further disaggregates marginalised non-elite agents in role
contestation as well as the institutions they operate in. Given they are
not regularly a part of decision-making authority and will never become
foreign policy elites like Ministers and advisors, to become role-makers
influencing role contestation marginalised agents must become “tem-
porary entrants” in foreign policymaking. Despite being marginalised,
can diasporas temporarily influence decision-making processes and
therefore role contestation, leading to favourable role conceptions and
performance? Understanding this sheds light on a number of questions,
including whether mass movements enhance the influence of marginal-
ised communities in role contestation, whether diaspora objectives must
be aligned with the role conception of host states and finally, whether
marginalised diasporas influence role conception and role performance.
The foregoing chapters argue that the Tamil diaspora faced a number
of challenges in advance of the 2009 crisis in Sri Lanka. From an agency
perspective, diasporas in both countries were marginalised in several
respects, including through colonial and post-colonial repression, being
tainted and securitised by the legacy of the LTTE and the association
with terrorism. In respect of the integration and settlement processes in
the host countries, the literature suggests that the diaspora in Canada
should be somewhat better placed as advocates than their British coun-
terparts. From an institutional standpoint, the last chapter outlined the
domestic foreign policymaking processes in Canada and the UK, with
the Harper government admitting fewer exogenous inputs, whereas the
Brown and Cameron governments appeared more consultative with
sources outside Cabinet. In regard to international roles, the Harper
government’s turn away from liberal internationalism suggests a greater
willingness for disruptive action on behalf of diaspora interests, while
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-5
Role contestation and the end of the Sri Lankan civil war 121
the UK government’s embrace of a convening role suggests it would be
less likely take assertive action internationally.
It is under these circumstances that this chapter compares two empir-
ical cases in the form of role contestation decision-making processes.
Between January and May 2009 the Canadian government of Conservative
Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the Labour Government of Gordon
Brown in the UK were faced with how to respond to the brutally violent
conclusion to the Sri Lankan civil war. During this traumatic period,
Tamil diaspora interest groups lobbied government through intensive
direct lobbying as well as contentious pressure through mass movements
to demand host country governments act to end the Sri Lankan army’s
offensive in the north. At the heart of this narrative lies the book’s central
question: During these decision-making processes, did the Tamil dias-
pora influence role contestation in Canada and the UK?
This chapter begins with events in Sri Lanka and the slow erosion of
the peace process begun in 2002, leading to the final stages of the war in
2009. The final months of the war in the first half of 2009 were marked
by shocking brutality on both sides of the conflict and a massive human
rights crisis felt keenly by the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK. The
second section returns to the host countries and discusses the evolution
of the Tamil diaspora as role-making agents following the proscription
of the LTTE. The 2000s witnessed dramatic changes in Tamil diaspora
organisations in Canada and the UK. In Canada, the Canadian Tamil
Congress (CTC) became a credible voice for Tamil concerns with link-
ages to all parties, but it was still challenged by the associational legacy of
the LTTE, especially with the governing Conservative Party. This period
also witnessed the foundation and increasing sophistication of several
Tamil organisations in the UK, including the non-partisan British Tamil
Forum (BTF) and the Labour-affiliated, Tamils for Labour. The Tamil
diaspora in both countries took inspiration from the more established
Jewish diaspora, which explains the founding of a party-specific lobby
group in the UK and not in Canada. The third section walks through the
decision-making period in both cases from January to May 2009, when
the Canadian and British governments were faced with the decision of
how to respond to the crisis and summarises this narrative with the ana-
lytical framework introduced in Chapter 2. Following this description of
events, the analytical section compares the two cases via the theoretical
framework, which assesses agency characteristics, institutional factors
and strategies.
I conclude this chapter by arguing that the British Tamil diaspora
became temporary agents and therefore role-makers in policymaking
and role contestation for three overarching reasons. Firstly, Tamils for
Labour built critical inroads with the governing Labour Party and was
greatly advantaged by inside advocates, which led to more sympathy
for their preferences within the party and access channels to Cabinet.
122 Role contestation and the end of the Sri Lankan civil war
In contrast, Canadian Tamil diaspora interest groups struggled to build
inroads with the governing Conservatives and were still tainted by the
association with the LTTE. Secondly, the Canadian Tamil diaspora
was not viewed during this decision-making period by the Canadian
Conservative government as politically salient, whereas in the UK the
Tamil diaspora was viewed as an important constituency for the pros-
pects of the Labour government. Thirdly, contentious mass movements
in the UK added to the leverage of Tamil diaspora interest groups,
whereas in Canada demonstrations which slipped out of control greatly
hindered efforts to influence the government.
The Tamil diaspora was influential in the UK despite the fact that its
preferred role conception and performance were not aligned with the
government’s desired role conception. Since coming to office in 2007, the
Brown government was determined to forge a more consensual role as a
“convening power” in international institutions rather than as a cavalier,
world-making role. However, the UK’s direct admonishment of the Sri
Lankan government and its actions at the United Nations and elsewhere
demonstrate a willingness for the UK to bring considerable diplomatic
pressure to bear, including pressure that has the potential to damage ties
with an important regional ally. Canada, on the other hand did not feel
moved to perform its newly established role as an institutional disrupter,
taking relatively tepid action on the issue despite the even larger Tamil
diaspora presence in its country. Taken together, the British Tamil dias-
pora became temporary entrants and role makers, influencing British
role conception and role performance, whereas this was not the case in
Canada. This chapter concludes by discussing the implications of these
findings for Role Theory approaches to foreign policy analysis.
The bloody final throes of the Sri Lankan

civil war: 2002–2009
Having emerged from a decade of near continuous fighting in the 1990s,
the LTTE’s gains by 2000 placed them in a position of strength and they
declared a unilateral ceasefire at the end of 2000 (De Silva, 2012, 168).
A mutually-agreed ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka
and the LTTE was soon cemented under the auspices of the Norwegian
government (Wickremesekera, 2016, 174).1 However, in addition to the
LTTE’s surprise withdrawal from the peace talks, a number of other
factors served to scupper the process, including the exclusion of the
Muslim minority from negotiations, the LTTE’s demand for a five-
year guarantee of continued control following the agreement and dis-
agreements over the disbursement of disaster relief aid following the
December 2004 tsunami which devastated the island (Lunn et al., 2009).
The 2005 Sri Lankan presidential election proved to be a turning point
in the quiescent conflict, with the election to the presidency of hard-line
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapaksa in
2005 (De Silva, 2012, 178).2
At the same time, it was apparent the LTTE were preparing to resume
open hostilities, including through an intensified fundraising effort in
the diaspora. However, 2006 offered early signs of hope following talks
in Geneva, but by April 2006 the ceasefire was effectively over with the
deaths of at least 191 on both sides in renewed violence.3 At the beginning
of 2008, the Government of Sri Lanka formally withdrew from the cease-
fire and the power asymmetry between the LTTE and the government
became apparent as fighting went on throughout 2008, with the govern-
ment continuing to make strategic gains (Lunn et al., 2009).
In early January 2009, government forces moved rapidly into LTTE-
held territory, entering their de facto capital, Kilinochchi, on 2nd
January and by 25th January they had captured the town of Mullaithivu
(De Silva, 2012, 193). The rapidity with which government forces were
able to advance and acquire LTTE land surprised many, including those
in the diaspora (Personal communications, Global Tamil Forum, 2015).
Under considerable pressure, LTTE fighters retreated to a small strip of
land in the Vanni area along the beach, trapping tens of thousands of
civilians in the midst of intense fighting where the LTTE made their last,
desperate stand.
By February 2009, more than 250,000 civilians had been displaced
by the conflict with as many as 7000 civilian casualties (Human Rights
Watch, 2009). The Sri Lankan government rejected two internationally
mediated ceasefires (5th February and 23rd February, respectively), the
second of which the LTTE agreed to, but balked at the requirement to
disarm. Repeated gains by government forces prompted Colombo to
declare a 12 km-long zone along the Mullaitivu western coast a “no fire
zone,” resulting in the further densification of civilians and fighters along
the coast. In an act of desperation, the LTTE conducted a suicide air
attack against a government building in Colombo. The month of March
witnessed continued bombardment of Vanni by government troops and
the number of civilians inside the no-fire-zone grew unabated. Pressure
from the international community on both sides intensified, as UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accused both of war crimes
(BBC News, 2017).
In April, an increasingly weakened LTTE appealed for an end to the
violence, calling on the government to enter into negotiations on 14th April
(Lunn et al., 2009). On 26th April the LTTE leadership issued a unilat-
eral ceasefire. The government scoffed at these gestures but, bowing to
international pressure, it committed to cease using heavy weaponry and
aerial bombardment against the remaining rebels in the no-fire-zone.
Additionally, the government rejected conditions attached to a US$1.9
billion IMF emergency loan and further denied that US pressure had
caused delays to the agreement. The month also witnessed massive
civilian displacement with as many as 115,000 fleeing the battle zone in a
single week.
The war officially came to an end on 18th May, amidst celebrations
in Colombo and the televised display of the body of long-time LTTE
leader, Velupilliai Prabhakaran.4 Throughout the intensification of the
conflict in the first five months of 2009, numerous human rights organisa-
tions accused both sides of violating humanitarian laws and committing
crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The troubling list
of charges against the Sri Lankan government included: Failure to admit
observers to the battlefield and restricting data gathering on civilians;
shelling in proclaimed civilian “safe zones” and on clearly marked hos-
pitals; as well as the disproportionate use of aircraft and heavy artillery.5
Both sides have since been accused of summarily executing and mis-
treating prisoners, as well as the raping of civilians. Caught between
two belligerent parties, as many as 7000 civilians were killed and 13,000
wounded (Human Rights Watch, 2010). With little access to humani-
tarian support or international NGOs, many civilians were unlawfully
detained and prevented from accessing adequate medical treatment and
other types of assistance. The situation for tens of thousands of Tamil
civilians during these months was desperate and proved to be a powerful
impetus for family members in Canada and the UK to take action to
advance their interests (Canadian Tamil Congress, 2009).
The final months of the Sri Lankan civil war were an extremely anx-
ious and traumatic time for the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK.
Many Tamil families had relatives trapped during the intense fighting
and a lack of international monitors and restricted access for humani-
tarian organisations left many families uninformed as to the status of
relatives (Amarasingam, 2015). Tamil diaspora interest groups mobilised
grassroots Tamils to protest and intensely lobbied politicians in response
to events in Sri Lanka. These massive efforts were only possible through
diaspora groups having evolved into sophisticated, professional organi-
sations in the years preceding 2009, a process described in the following
section.
The evolution of Tamil diaspora role-making:

Overcoming the LTTE
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the LTTE’s influence within the dias-
pora in both host countries during the 1990s and the early 2000s was con-
siderable. However, the 2000s witnessed the rapid decline of the LTTE in
Canada and the UK, being rendered illegal in both by 2006. In response,
diaspora community elites looked to new ways to represent the diaspora
to decision-makers. In Canada, this led to the establishment and revital-
isation of the CTC and the creation of the BTF in the UK. What is com-
mon in both cases is the emulation of the more established institutions of
the Jewish diaspora, the challenge of making inroads with conservative
parties and ultimately the creation of credibly representative organisa-
tions. In contrast to Canada, the UK developed a party-specific interest
group: Tamils for Labour, with a view to circumventing a bureaucracy
traditionally ill-disposed to their interventions. This section argues that
the subsequent “chilling effect” discussed in Chapter 3 which followed
the proscription of the LTTE continued in 2009 despite advances on the
part of diaspora interest groups to expunge the taint of the LTTE. The
perceived association with the LTTE remained especially pronounced
amongst conservatives and diaspora activists had more success in build-
ing legitimacy with left-of-centre parties.
Tamil diaspora interest group organisation

in Canada: A centralised model
As the LTTE, the WTF and other front organisations in Canada weak-
ened and then collapsed in the early 2000s, Tamil diaspora elites founded
and vitalised the CTC to become the principal voice of the Tamil diaspora
on domestic issues facing the Tamil community, as well as the organisa-
tion tasked with representing the cause of Tamil Eelam and the inter-
ests of Tamils in Sri Lanka to the Canadian government (Amarasingam,
2015). The impetus for the CTC’s founding was the perception that exist-
ing organisations with associations to the LTTE were tainted. Many at
the political level supported the Tamil community and its aspirations
for self-determination, but their consciousness of their reputation in the
public sphere led them to express to diaspora leadership the need for a
“fresh” representative body, free of the stain of the LTTE and one that
provided a clear and credible voice for the entirety of the Tamil com-
munity in Canada (Protected source, staff member a. Canadian Tamil
Congress, 2016). The founding of the CTC in 2000 was a response to this
need. However, until 2006 the CTC was not operationally active or effec-
tive, firstly as a consequence of the lull in fighting in Sri Lanka and, more
importantly because Tamil diaspora elites did not have an understanding
of how to lobby political elites effectively.6
An organisational turning point for the CTC came in the form of
inter-diaspora emulation, in particular of the far more established and
organised Jewish diaspora. The leadership of the CTC met in 2006 with
their counterparts in the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) which became
a model for its operations.7 The leadership of the CTC believed that the
Jewish diaspora was an established and sophisticated representative
diaspora organisation and it sought to become more proficient in engag-
ing elected officials. The CTC adopted the same model of soliciting oper-
ational funds from diaspora members for both functional reasons and to
secure greater legitimacy. From this point onwards, the CTC hired pro-
fessional staff to build relationships on a fulltime basis and cultivated an
image of a professional interest group, all the while framing itself as the
sole representative and official conduit between Canada’s Tamil diaspora
and political elites (Protected source, staff member a. Canadian Tamil
Congress, 2016).
The CTC’s strictly non-partisan approach allowed it to speak credibly
to MPs from all parties and slowly build relationships of trust, in many
cases just by “being seen” in Ottawa on Parliament Hill, where Canada’s
parliament is located. The CTC organised events at Parliament and
slowly MPs from all parties and regions began to develop an awareness
of the community and its issues.8 Left-leaning parties, such as the social
democratic NDP (New Democratic Party) and the Liberal Party were
the most receptive to their overtures. As will be demonstrated in the UK,
once these early relationships were made and the CTC was viewed as
credible, politicians actively began to help the CTC unsolicited, includ-
ing through introductions to MPs from other political parties (Protected
source, staff member a. Canadian Tamil Congress, 2016).9
Along with the NDP, Liberal Party and the Quebec separatist party
the Bloc du Quebecoise, the CTC actively began to build connections
with the right-leaning Conservative Party of Canada. As in the UK, this
proved more difficult for three reasons. Firstly, the Conservative Party
held seats at this time principally in Western Canada and in rural com-
munities where the Tamil diaspora had a limited presence; as a conse-
quence, and unlike Liberal and NDP MPs, most Tory MPs did not feel as
compelled to act in response to Tamil representations. Secondly, the taint
of association with the LTTE was felt more keenly by Conservatives, who
prioritised to a greater extent security and public safety issues (Protected
source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016). Finally, the Conservative
Party had been historically less receptive to representations from minor-
ity communities and did not prioritise to the same extent reaching out to
diasporas as left-leaning parties did (Seligman, 2016).
By 2009, the CTC was a sophisticated, professional interest group.
With several fulltime staff and a permanent office in Scarborough,
Toronto, the CTC consolidated its position as the “official” voice of the
Canadian Tamil diaspora, became a regular presence on Parliament
Hill and developed close relationships with MPs. Its emulation of the
Canadian Jewish community, with its one, non-partisan lobby group led
to the development of the CTC as the official voice for Canada’s Tamil
community and for the struggle for a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka.
However, despite its success with left-of-centre parties, the CTC had
not established many strong links and access points to the Conservative
Party by this time, which continued to view the diaspora with scep-
ticism. As is argued below, the Canadian context parallels the UK in
many respects, including in the establishment of closer ties to left-of-
centre parties.
Tamil diaspora interest group organisation in the UK:
A quick line to Labour
Unlike in Canada, the UK Tamil diaspora did not have as numerous
or well-developed organisations in the 1990s and early 2000s, owing to
later waves of refugee migration and different settlement and integration
systems as outlined earlier. Following the proscription of the LTTE in
2000, UK Tamil diaspora leadership interfaced ineffectively with politi-
cians and bureaucrats on an individual, piecemeal basis and not through
representative bodies (Protected source, Together Against Genocide;
Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK Labour, 2015). However,
as in the Canadian context, political allies from the governing Labour
Party advised that without an organisation that legitimately and credibly
represented the Tamil diaspora, political and bureaucratic elites would
not accept overtures to meet, let alone respond to conveyed preferences
(Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK Labour, 2015).
In response to this need, the BTF was founded by Tamil diaspora elites
in 2006 with a view to enhancing the credibility of diaspora represent-
atives. In earlier years, those making representations on behalf of the
diaspora were not viewed as being invested with the authority to speak
for “all Tamils.” As a consequence, the BTF embraced a democratic,
grassroots model with more than two dozen local forums and monthly
general meetings.10 In addition to bringing a more legitimate, represent-
ative voice to political leadership, the BTF began to encourage politi-
cal engagement amongst Tamil members. At the municipal and national
level, the BTF remained non-partisan, but offered support and encour-
agement to Tamils getting involved in political campaigns for all major
parties (Protected source, British Tamil Forum, 2015).11
Additionally, diaspora leadership acknowledged the privileged access
to Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) bureaucrats enjoyed by the
Government of Sri Lanka through established diplomatic channels. The
Sri Lankan High Commission was distinctly partisan in that it did not
represent the perspective of the Tamil movement for self-determination;
indeed it worked to discredit UK Tamil representatives. As discussed
earlier, the FCO was motivated more by what could be described as a
statist “national interest,” whereas political elites were more amendable
to Tamil diaspora concerns due to the perceived electoral advantages in
doing so; the Labour Party, with many constituencies in London, was
especially sensitive to this (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
In an effort to circumvent the influence of the FCO, the Tamil diaspora
took the step of forming Tamils for Labour. As in the Canadian case,
Tamils were far more likely at this time to join the left-of-centre Labour
Party and to support Labour Party politicians. Thanks to deeper sym-
pathies within Labour for their cause, the BTF built strong relationships
with MPs such as Joan Ryan, Keith Vaz and Jeremy Corbyn.12 Through
meetings with the likes of Labour Lord Noon and MP Keith Vaz, the
head of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Minorities Task Force, Labour
Tamil activists built networks in the upper echelons of the party. At the
Ethnic Minorities Task Force conference in Leicester, the idea for Tamils
for Labour was conceived and it was subsequently launched in parlia-
ment shortly thereafter (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).13
As in Canada, an important model for the Tamil diaspora in respect
of its partisan lobbying strategy was the far older and more established
Labour Friends of Israel (LFI). Since the 1950s, LFI became a mainstay
in Labour circles with accepted, institutional status, allowing it to host
events and receptions at Labour Party conference, organise a booth at
the party’s conference and deploy resources from the Jewish community
of Labour supporters to advance the Labour Party and its candidates
(Protected source, Labour Friends of Israel, 2015). The success of LFI
in building a permanent base of support, along with trusted, partisan
channels of access proved a formidable model for the Tamil diaspora in
the UK (Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
In addition to building partisan networks within government, Tamils
for Labour was created to combat the prevailing perception that all
Tamils were terrorists. The Government of Sri Lanka was working
assiduously to discredit the Tamil community in the view of Cabinet
and the FCO as a threat to national security and too caustic to engage
with.14 A turning point in the changed perception of the Tamil dias-
pora was a meeting between Tamils for Labour and Foreign Secretary
David Miliband, which was convened by MP interlocutor, Keith Vaz.
Vaz and professionals from the Tamil community affiliated with Tamils
for Labour addressed Miliband with the issues impacting their commu-
nity. One attendee described Miliband as being “surprised” at the level
of professionalism of the community. Prior to this meeting, Miliband
had only ever been provided information from FCO officials in respect of
the Tamil community, which advised him to distance himself from UK
Tamil organisations (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).15
In the years preceding the 2009 role contestation comparison dis-
cussed in the next section, the Tamil diaspora in both host countries had
made great strides in overcoming the legacy of the LTTE and creating
representative, credible organisations. However, in both cases the Tamil
diaspora was still struggling at this time to make inroads into conserva-
tive parties, which would have detrimental implications for the Canadian
Tamil diaspora.
Role contestation and ending the war: Role-making

in Canada and the UK
This section presents the micro-level narratives for the period between
January and May 2009 when Tamil diaspora mobilisation was at its
height in both countries, aiming to answer whether or not the Tamil
diaspora in each context became temporary entrants in foreign policy-
making and therefore role-makers in role contestation. I argue that the
Canadian diaspora achieved some success through mass movements and
interest group lobbying in the early months of 2009, but their strategy
faltered through a lack of access to Cabinet decision-makers and inten-
sifying demonstrations. They did not become temporary entrants in
decision-making and did not influence role contestation as role-makers.
Unlike in Canada, the same mass movement and direct lobbying strate-
gies were more successful in the UK, as inside advocates helped diaspora
interest group elites gain access to Cabinet decision-making and there-
fore role contestation. Through these interventions, Tamil diaspora elites
were able to leverage mass movement demonstrations and gain tempo-
rary access as role-makers in role contestation.

Early success followed by a faltering strategy
Motivated by the catastrophic losses of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the prin-
cipal diaspora elite agent in Canada was the CTC, which engaged in
a series of meetings throughout January and into February 2009 with
Members of Parliament from all three major parties. These interventions
demanded the government of Canada to put pressure on the United States
to, by extension, pressure the Sri Lankan government to end its campaign
in the north and accept a ceasefire; to allow access for humanitarian aid
to Tamil civilians trapped by the fighting in the north; to permit access to
impartial monitors to conflict areas and to recognise the Tamil demand
for self-determination (Protected source, staff member a. Canadian
Tamil Congress, 2016, TamilNet, 2009e). The CTC expected Canada to
respond to these demands by exerting bilateral, diplomatic pressure on
Sri Lanka as well as through “diplomatic pressure, economic and trade
sanctions, and influence at the United Nations and Commonwealth of
Nations” (Canadian Tamil Congress statement, 4th February). With
regard to strategy, Tamil diaspora elites employed direct lobbying strate-
gies and the organisation of mass movement demonstrations.
Beginning with direct lobbying, a series of meetings with parlia-
mentarians culminated in a historic emergency debate in the House of
Commons on 4th February, attended by the Minister of foreign affairs
Laurence Cannon, the leader of the NDP, Jack Layton and dozens of other
Members of Parliament. Most MPs made statements which were broadly
sympathetic to the demands of Tamil diaspora interest groups and the
government responded by calling on the LTTE and the Government of
Sri Lanka to accept a ceasefire; permit the evacuation of the sick and
wounded, and allow the delivery of humanitarian aid (Hansard (Canada),
4th February, 2009). Opposition Members of Parliament demanded that
the government take further action, including a Ministerial delegation
to Sri Lanka; recall Canada’s High Commissioner to Sri Lanka and
take action through international forums such as the Commonwealth
(Hansard (Canada), 4th February, 2009).
In addition to statements reflecting the need for an immediate cease-
fire and access to the conflict zone for humanitarian workers and moni-
tors, the Harper government committed CAN$3 million in humanitarian
aid funding as announced on 3rd February by Minister of International
Cooperation, Bev Oda (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,
2009; Hansard (Canada), 2009). Statements sympathetic to Tamil con-
cerns, the additional aid commitment and the high level interventions
on the issue at the 4th February debate were viewed by political elites
as successful and a result of the direct lobbying efforts of the CTC and
MPs allied with its interests (Protected source, former Canadian political
staff b, 2016). As sympathetic statements from the Canadian government
continued with the conflict growing more intense, the most direct action
taken by the Canadian government followed on 4th May with a visit to Sri
Lanka by International Cooperation Minister Bev Oda, where CAN$3
million was committed for humanitarian aid. While there, she asked for a
ceasefire and access for monitors to the conflict zone (Marlow et al., 2009).
With regard to contentious action, mass movement demonstrations
began in the last week of January, with as many as 45,000 Tamils par-
ticipating in a “human chain” in downtown Toronto on 30th January
with the aim of raising awareness of the humanitarian situation in Sri
Lanka amongst the non-Tamil population (Taylor, 2009). The first, large
demonstration in Ottawa coincided with the parliamentary debate on 4th
February with thousands of participants, most of whom were taken by
bus from Toronto by the CTC (TamilNet, 2009c). Dozens of MPs from all
parties attended and spoke at the demonstration, further indicating the
extent to which the CTC had compelled a largely united position on the
issue by all parties. However, senior Conservative Party foreign affairs
elites indicated they were not moved greatly by these and larger demon-
strations, articulating that as conservatives they are not disposed to
respond to mass movements or contentious means of pressure (Protected
source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016; former Canadian Member
of Parliament, 2016).
As the conflict cycle escalated through March and April, demon-
strations in Toronto became a constant fixture, growing in contention
as Tamil diaspora elites ceded control to more impassioned younger,
grassroots members of the community (Personal communications,
Amarasingam, 2016;staff member a. Canadian Tamil Congress, 2016;
The Star, 2009). In addition to the appearance of the LTTE flag, which
had been banned by the CTC during earlier demonstrations due to the
association with terrorism, the demonstrations also began to inconven-
ience non-Tamil Torontonians and became a public safety issue. These
grassroots demonstrations reached their crescendo on 10th May when as
many as 8000 Tamil demonstrators blocked the Gardiner Expressway, a
major transportation artery into the city, risking public safety and greatly
increasing the level of contention (Marlow et al., 2009). Diaspora elites
admit they completely lost control of the demonstrations by this point,
with Canadian media negatively covering the event (Godwin, 2012).
The appearance of the LTTE flag in later, considerably more conten-
tious demonstrations further distanced Tamil diaspora elites from the
governing Conservatives, such that by April they refused to meet for-
mally with representatives of the CTC (The Star, 2009). In the view of
Conservative elites, the open association with the LTTE meant there was
no longer any potential for them to publicly support the demonstrators
or responding to their demands as they were no longer a legitimate voice
of grievance (Protected source, former Canadian Member of Parliament,
2016). Left-leaning parties including the NDP and Liberal parties contin-
ued to meet with the CTC, but given they were not in government there
was little opportunity for them to redirect Canada’s foreign policy.
In the early part of this decision-making period, direct lobbying and
mass movement strategies resulted in meaningful influence on the polit-
ical leadership at the federal level. The 4th February debate and paral-
lel demonstration conveyed multi-partisan unity in support of the Tamil
community and several decisions by the government, including commit-
ting further aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and the demand of an
explanation from the Sri Lankan High Commissioner for the actions of
the Sri Lankan government all reflected the CTC’s priorities. However,
as will be discussed following a description of similar events in the UK
below, the Canadian government did not go as far as the British govern-
ment in its remonstrations despite its “disrupter” role conception align-
ing with diaspora preferences. This is due largely to the diaspora’s lack
of inroads into the governing party, their loss of credibility and unity
during the demonstrations and the diaspora’s lack of political salience to
the Conservative party. The Tamil diaspora in this case did not become
role-making temporary entrants in role contestation.
The Tamil diaspora and role-making in the UK:

Labour inside advocates open the door
In the British context, Tamil elite direct lobbying and mass movement
efforts were led the BTF, Tamils for Labour, Tamils Against Genocide
(TAG) and a variety of youth organisations, such as the Tamil Youth
Organisation, which helped to mobilise mass movement protests
(Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015; TamilNet, 2009a;
2009d; Together Against Genocide, 2015). Demands conveyed by dias-
pora elites as well as those carried by demonstrators to UK political
elites mirrored to some extent those in Canada, which included the
Government of Sri Lanka agreeing to a ceasefire; access to the conflict
zone for humanitarian assistance and international monitors; and, calls
for Tamil self-determination (The Guardian, 2009). The principal devia-
tion in demands between the two country contexts reflects the UK’s more
elevated, major power role on the world’s stage: In addition to demand-
ing the UK government put direct diplomatic and economic pressure on
Sri Lanka, Tamil diaspora elites also demanded the UK put pressure
on India to host peace talks; to bring the issue to the United Nations
Security Council and to work through Britain’s Special Relationship
with the US to exert pressure on Sri Lanka (Protected source, Together
Against Genocide, 2015).
Regarding direct lobbying, Tamil diaspora elites principally from the
BTF and Tamils for Labour held ongoing meetings with senior Members
of Parliament from all three major parties but engaged for the most part
with the governing Labour Party and the Liberal Democratic Party,
which had been more receptive leading up to this period and with whom
the diaspora had built far stronger ties than with the Conservative Party
(Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).16 Like the NDP’s Jack Layton
in Canada, interest group elites worked through several interlocutors,
in particular Siobhan McDonough and Joan Ryan from, Labour.17 The
principal distinction between these two cases is the level of access Tamil
elites gained to the government and Foreign Secretary David Miliband
through these partisan interlocutors.18
Mass movement demonstrations followed a similar trajectory in the
UK as in Canada, although protests were concentrated mostly in London.
The first major demonstration took place on 18th January in the form of
a candlelight vigil outside 10 Downing Street attended by roughly 8000
activists. Shortly thereafter on 31st January a far larger demonstration
of as many as 50,000 activists protested along Whitehall to 10 Downing
Street (The Guardian, 2009). As in Canada, a constant presence of
demonstrators continued in Parliament Square outside the houses of
Parliament throughout March and April. The first two weeks of April
witnessed some of the largest demonstrations, with as many as 100,000
attending a protest on 11th April (BBC News, 2009). Levels of contention
increased as some activists were arrested, Tamil demonstrators leapt into
the Thames from Westminster Bridge and included a highly publicised
series of hunger-strikes serving to animate demonstrators.19
Despite pressure from the FCO to limit the government’s response to
the conflict so as not to damage ties with the Sri Lankan government or
with India, Tamil diaspora interest groups can claim a number of victo-
ries through their direct lobbying and mass movement efforts (Protected
source, Together Against Genocide, 2015). Firstly, unlike in Canada, the
UK was able to use its privileged relationship with the United States to
join with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a 4th February dec-
laration calling for a temporary ceasefire, access to the conflict zone for
humanitarian assistance and international monitors, and for a long-term
political settlement (Lunn et al., 2009). Secondly, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown became directly involved in the issue through his appointment of a
Special Envoy to Sri Lanka, high profile MP Des Brown, former Secretary
of Defence, demonstrating that this issue was a foreign policy priority
at the highest levels of the executive (Sparrow, 2009).20 Thirdly, Foreign
Secretary Miliband and his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner made
a widely covered visit to Sri Lanka in late April to meet with President
Rajapaksa, calling for an end to the conflict, to increase humanitarian
aid and to find a long-term settlement to the conflict meeting the aspi-
rations of all Sri Lankans (Nelson, 2009). Fourthly, two debates were
held in Westminster Hall, Parliament on the issue involving MPs at the
highest levels including the Foreign Secretary and Tory Shadow Foreign
Secretary William Hague, one on 30th April and a second on 14th May,
respectively.21 As in Canada, these debates demonstrated a broad con-
sensus empathetic of Tamil diaspora elite preferences (Hansard, 2009).
Fifthly, at the behest of the government, a multi-partisan delegation
of five MPs led by Special Envoy Des Brown visited Sri Lanka to once
again pressure President Rajapaksa to end the campaign in the North
(Sparrow, 2009). Finally, the UK deployed its clout at the United Nations
Security Council, alongside France, to bring the matter forward for dis-
cussion to the Council, but it was blocked by fellow permanent members
Russia and China (TamilNet, 2009f).
The FCO was steadfastly in opposition to a number of these efforts,
especially the visit to Sri Lanka by the Foreign Secretary as it believed
it would have a deleterious impact on UK-Sri Lanka relations. Despite
this pressure, the Brown government took a range of actions to respond
to Tamil diaspora interest group interventions, with observers noting
that Tamil diaspora interest groups were instrumental in compelling gov-
ernment action, in part due to the inroads they made with the Labour
government, the political salience of the diaspora to government and the
ability of diaspora elites and inside advocates to leverage mass movements
(Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK Labour, 2015; Tamils for
Labour, 2015). In this case, the Tamil diaspora became temporary entrants
and therefore role-makers in British role contestation. Unlike in Canada,
where several barriers ultimately barred the diaspora from becoming
role-makers, the UK Tamil diaspora was successful in gaining temporary
access to elite decision-making and were able to actively contest British
role conception and role performance, as explored in greater detail below.
Vertical role contestation and influencing

role conception and performance
Vertical role contestation involves non-elite agents seeking to gain tempo-
rary entrance into government decision-making aimed at influencing role
conception and role performance. In the above cases, the Canadian and
British Tamil diaspora mobilised for government action directed towards
ending the violence in Sri Lanka. As discussed in Chapter 2, unpacking
the interaction between agents within decision-making structures and
observing the behaviour of states in international theatres elucidates on
how marginalised diasporas either become role-makers and influence
role contestation, or do not. Having presented the micro-level narratives
above, this final section unpacks the interaction of agents in domestic
and foreign institutions through the analytical framework focused on
agents and institutions as set out in Chapter 2. Beginning with the agency
characteristics inherent to diasporas, it then discusses the institutional
context and finally their strategies. Bound up in this analysis, I discuss
whether or not diasporas were able to influence role conception and role
performance in alignment with their preferences.
Table 5.1 summarises the presence (Y), or the absence (N) of factors
the literature argues impact the influence diasporas have on host country
role contestation.
Agency factors in role contestation

Beginning with actor characteristics, diaspora mobilisation was achieved
in both country cases with tens of thousands of Tamil protesters attend-
ing rallies in Toronto, Ottawa and London indicating that Tamil diaspora
grassroots were extensively mobilised in both host countries. Both cases
also met the criteria for diaspora size. Senior Canadian Conservative
Table 5.1 2009 factor comparison
Canada UK
Agency factors
Diaspora mobilisation Y Y
Diaspora size Y Y
Numerical significance in parliamentary Y Y
constituencies
Diaspora group resources Y Y
Political salience N Y
Group homogeneity N Y
Credibility N Y
Learning Y Y
Institutional factors
Host country inclusivity Y Y
Institutional permeability N Y
Presence of rival constituencies N N
Role conception alignment N N
International role performance N Y
Diaspora strategies
Direct lobbying Y Y
Mass movement protests Y Y
elites noted that while having a large diaspora does not necessarily moti-
vate the government to take action, it does raise the profile of an issue
and it is unlikely the government would have become as engaged on the
issue as it was had it not been for the large Tamil diaspora (Protected
source, former Canadian Member Parliament, 2016; former Canadian
political staff c, 2016). Similar arguments were made by Labour parlia-
mentary elites in the UK, indicating that had it not been for interven-
tions by Tamil diaspora members at the constituency level, they would
not have become so involved (Protected source, Member of Parliament,
UK Labour, 2015; former GTF Staff Member and Current Labour Party
staff member, 2015).
Related to size is numerical significance within parliamentary constit-
uencies. The Canadian Tamil diaspora is concentrated in the north-east
quadrant of the City of Toronto, Canada’s largest city in an area called
Scarborough. Exact numbers of Tamil diaspora members living in at
least five federal constituencies in this region of Toronto is not known,
but Canadian census data reveals the largest number of Tamil-speakers
in Canada to be concentrated in this area (Toronto.com, 2022). The
same is true for the UK in London, especially in places like Rayner’s
Lane, East Ham, Southall, Wembley, Harrow and Ilford where large
communities of Tamils are located (Deegale, 2014; Orjuela, 2008).22
Regarding Tamil diaspora interest group resources, scholars such as
Wayland (2003; 2004) and Orjuela (2008) have explored the extensive
cultural, social and financial infrastructure in place within both Tamil
diasporas and other interviewees noted that by 2009 interest groups
were well-resourced (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).23
Additionally, the ability for groups such as Tamils for Labour and later
the British Tamil Conservatives to mobilise election volunteers and vot-
ers has been equally or more consequential than financial support for
politicians (British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
More recent scholarship has noted that it is not enough for diaspo-
ras to be concentrated in political districts and well-resourced, but they
must also be politically salient to the governing party. In the case of the
Conservative government in Canada in 2009, they did not view Tamil-
dominated constituencies as strategic, and thusly did not view the Tamil
diaspora as strategically significant (Protected source, former Canadian
political staff b, 2016). In contrast, the governing Labour Party did view
the Tamil diaspora as politically strategic (Protected source, British Tamil
Conservatives, 2015). Similarly, Group homogeneity is viewed as impor-
tant by the literature. Evidence from the Canadian and UK Tamil cases
indicate a considerable degree of internal division within the diaspora,
in particular in the Canadian case where elites lost control of protest-
ers, who began displaying LTTE flags in opposition to elite preferences.
This had detrimental implications for advocacy in Canada. In the UK,
there was division between diaspora and human rights organisations
also regarding the use of the LTTE flag, but in the view of political elites
they were able to present a “united front” (Protected source, Sri Lanka
Campaign for Justice, 2015; Together Against Genocide, 2015).
The difference between earlier lobbying efforts and those follow-
ing the creation and enhancement of diaspora interest groups is that
political elites began to view Tamil diaspora interest groups as credible
representatives of their diaspora. It wasn’t until political elites viewed
Tamil representatives as credible that they begin to entertain their views
(Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015; Together Against Genocide,
2015). By 2009, Tamil diaspora interest groups in both countries were
viewed as credible, but the taint of association with the LTTE still led
Conservatives to be wary of their representations (Protected source, for-
mer Canadian political staff b, 2016; British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
This was a critical disadvantage for the CTC in Canada, especially when
LTTE flags were brandished as Tamil groups were no longer viewed as
credible. UK Tamil groups remained credible representatives through-
out the decision-making period.
Finally, Learning was a consequential factor for both diasporas. The
Canadian Tamil diaspora learned how to operate as a professional
interest group from the more established CJC and, similarly, the UK
Tamil diaspora constructed its first partisan-affiliated interest group,
Tamils for Labour, through following the example of LFI (British Tamil
Conservatives, 2015; Protected source, staff member a. Canadian Tamil
Congress, 2016). The level of sophistication achieved by both groups by
2009 is at least in part a consequence of inter-diaspora emulation.
Institutional factors in role contestation

In addition to agency factors, institutional factors also determine
whether marginalised diasporas become role-makers in role contesta-
tion. Beginning with Host country inclusivity, I argued in Chapter 3 that
the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK was a marginalised diaspora,
which broadly means that this community had not been able to access
the same public benefits through political participation as the majority
population in both states. Marginalisation of the Tamils began during
British imperial rule and by subsequent nationalist governments in Sri
Lanka; marginalisation continued through disempowering integration
and settlement policies in the UK following immigration to the host
country; and both Tamil communities were detrimentally impacted by
the proscription of the LTTE and further post-9/11 securitisation policies
which produced a “chilling effect” on diaspora mobilisation in the 2000s.
However, despite these significant structural hurdles, efforts by the
British and Canadian Tamil diaspora to enhance access to decision-making
led to a sea-change. Inter-diaspora learning helped to stimulate a pro-
fessionalisation of diaspora mobilisation, but what was perhaps even
more consequential was the active support of sympathetic Members of
Parliament in both countries who mentored diaspora elites to enhance
institutional awareness. By 2009, Canadian and British political institu-
tions at the national level can be said to be inclusive insofar as the Tamil
diaspora was able to meet with and engage most parliamentarians and
to make their preferences known to decision-making elites. In respect of
formal political participation, both countries permit participation with-
out citizenship within political parties, and while British Sri Lankans
can vote in elections as Commonwealth citizens in the UK, acquisition of
Canadian citizenship is not arduous with high rates of citizenship acqui-
sition amongst recent emigres (Government of Canada, 2018). For these
reasons, I consider the host country inclusive for these cases.
Institutional permeability refers to whether or not marginalised dias-
poras are able to access foreign policy decision-making processes. As
discussed at the outset of Chapter 4, Canada and the UK have broadly
similar foreign policy decision-making structures, but with some varia-
tion in the influence of specific decision-making actors. During the ten-
ure of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, decision-making in
the Canadian context was more tightly controlled at the executive level
with fewer points of access to exogenous forces when compared to pre-
vious administrations. As noted by existing scholarship, diaspora actors
were nevertheless able to permeate decision-making and become tempo-
rary entrants into foreign policymaking. However, in respect of the Tamil
diaspora in 2009, interest group elites were unable to intervene in deci-
sion-making as temporary entrants and therefore as role makers for two
reasons. Firstly, despite the growing success of CTC elites with regard to
their interaction with political elites in Parliament, the continuing taint
of the legacy of the LTTE hampered efforts by the diaspora to convey
their preferences to Conservative government leadership. Secondly, and
as will be discussed in greater detail below, what limited interventions
had been possible in 2009 became impossible as Tamil diaspora mass
movements became more contentious.
A contrasting process of opening up foreign policy decision-making
was underway at the same time in the UK under the Brown government.
As discussed below, through the influence of Labour inside advocates
Tamil diaspora elites became temporary entrants and role-makers in for-
eign policymaking and were granted access to the highest level of the
executive where foreign policy decision-making is made. In respect to
non-partisan officials, unlike in the Canadian context where the Harper
government limited their role, in the UK the Brown government worked
to restore the influence of the FCO (Protected source, former Canadian
political staff c, 2016). The FCO had previously been more inimical to
Tamil diaspora groups, but by 2009 was actively canvassing Tamil dias-
pora elites for their perspectives on the region (Protected source, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, 2015). Despite these mostly consultative
interactions, the FCO remained largely opposed to Tamil preferences, in
particular the visit of Foreign Secretary Miliband to Sri Lanka. However,
the combined efforts of diaspora interest group elites and mass move-
ments allowed the diaspora to circumvent the FCO and petition political
decision-makers directly.
Like host country inclusivity, rival constituencies may also constrain
activism by diaspora groups. In both Canada and the UK, Singhalese
Sri Lankan interests can be viewed as being opposed to the preferences
of the Tamil diaspora (Godwin, 2012). While in both cases non-govern-
mental Singhalese groups were largely absent from lobbying, in the UK
context especially the Singhalese-dominated Sri Lankan diplomatic ser-
vice actively worked to discredit Tamil interest groups, particularly via
the FCO, impeding access in the early and mid-2000s (Protected source,
Tamils for Labour, 2015). However, by 2009 diaspora interest groups had
to some extent neutralised these efforts by the Sri Lankan government, at
least in respect of Labour government decision-making elites. Broadly,
despite their efforts to counter the preferences of the Tamil diaspora at
this time, in neither country did the efforts of the Sri Lankan government
represent a formidable obstacle for the Tamil diaspora and therefore I do
not consider these agents a significant hindrance.
Chapter 4 discussed Canada’s and the UK’s role conception and per-
formance in recent decades, noting an evolution in role conception in
Canada from the multilateralist, liberal institutionalist approach taken
by earlier Liberal governments to a “disrupter” role less inclined towards
international institutions. The Harper government viewed itself as asser-
tive, taking pronounced, unequivocal stands on international issues with
a view to pressuring other, more influential states to take stronger action
by expanding the poles of their decision-making options. There was also
a shift in role conception and performance in the UK but in the opposite
direction, where the Brown government worked to shift the UK from a
moralistic, interventionist role to a consensus-building actor, working to
strengthen international institutions with a view to serving as a conven-
ing hub for international actors.
With reference to Canada’s role conception and the demands of the
Tamil diaspora, there was alignment in one respect but divergence in
another. The Harper government’s efforts in the late 2000s to distance
itself from the previous government’s Middle Power role conception,
where Canada played a policy entrepreneur, more consensus-driven role
might have led the Harper government to take firmer action against the
Sri Lankan government, especially at international institutions. Indeed,
this role conception and subsequent role performance is very much more
in evidence later in 2013. However, the Tamil diaspora’s association with
terrorism conflicted with a key part of the Harper government’s hard
security priorities and role conception. In line with its much-vaunted
involvement in the war in Afghanistan, the Conservative government
pursued an anti-terrorism policy with fervour and the Tamil diaspo-
ra’s perceived association with the LTTE in the minds of Conservative
elites complicated the Tamil diaspora’s demands and conflicted with
the Harper government’s role conception. Despite embracing the role of
a disrupter, the fact that the government did not perform along these
lines demonstrates the extent to which the appeals of the Tamil diaspora
largely fell on deaf ears as the issue progressed. Coupled with the govern-
ment’s prioritisation of economic national interests, which may have been
impaired should remonstrations of the Sri Lankan government gone fur-
ther, there was only limited role alignment between the role conception
of the Harper government and the preferences of the Tamil diaspora.
With regard to role conception alignment in the British context, the
Tamil diaspora’s preferences were far from aligned with the preferred ori-
entation of the Brown government, which was working to position itself
as a global convening hub oriented towards strengthening institutions
and a more pragmatic approach to international affairs. The significant
interventions on the part of the UK, albeit in some cases via interna-
tional institutions, did not conform with its desire to serve as a convening
power. It remonstrated the Sri Lankan government directly as well as at
the UN, including an effort to compel a change in its behaviour at the
UN Security Council. FCO officials were opposed to these actions which
significantly strained the UK’s relations with Sri Lanka, a long-standing
trading partner and an important geopolitical ally in the region. The UK
government’s strong actions in alignment with Tamil diaspora prefer-
ences and in deviation of its preferred role conception demonstrate their
direct involvement in role contestation as role-makers.
As I argued in the final section of Chapter 2, the ability for the Tamil dias-
pora to influence Canadian and British role performance in respect of the
conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009 can only be assessed when international role
constraints and the role position of country actors are taken into account.
Canada and the UK were both constrained to some degree in their response
to the 2009 crisis by pre-set boundaries related to their role position. I
argued in Chapter 4 that Canada’s role status in the international system
as a Middle Power permits it little capacity to influence the behaviour of
other states independently. Canada was not at this time a rotating member
of the UN Security Council and thusly had no capacity to raise this issue
at that international forum. With regard to the Commonwealth, as was
the case with the UK, opposition members called on the government to
act through the consensus-driven body. However, despite Canada’s more
influential position in this body than in the wider international system the
Canadian government chose not to take more direct action such as calling
for Sri Lanka to have its membership suspended.
Finally, Canada’s robust and historic relationship with Sri Lanka per-
mitted it some bilateral leverage with the government, although only
marginally so in comparison with the UK. Regarding direct, bilateral
action, the visit in May 2009 by International Cooperation Minister Bev
Oda witnessed a much less impactful statement than was issued dur-
ing Foreign Secretary Miliband’s visit. Indeed, her tepid intervention
with low-level bureaucrats in respect of the conflict, in comparison to
Secretary Miliband’s taking directly to task of President Rajapaksa, con-
veys both Canada’s comparatively less influential role position as well
as its unwillingness to go further in condemning the government of Sri
Lanka’s actions. While Canada may not have been able to engage the UN
and the US in the way the UK did in response to the Sri Lankan conflict,
Canada could have gone further in both its language and its actions in
condemning the government. Additionally, its less consequential rela-
tionship with Sri Lanka had fewer associated risks, which is to say it had
more room to act than the UK in remonstrating the Sri Lankan govern-
ment, but it did not. Finally, the Canadian government’s “principled”
approach to foreign policy and its desire to take unambiguous positions
on issues to allow for more influential actors to take firmer action is a pre-
ferred role performance Canada did not undertake in this case. Canada
did not act to the fullest extent possible in alignment with diaspora role
preferences when the country’s international role constraints are taken
into account.
I argued in Chapter 4 that the UK occupies a Major Power role in the
international system with significant power projection capabilities as well
as power of attraction strengths; it is a permanent UN Security Council
member, privileges its Special Relationship with the US, plays the domi-
nant role in the Commonwealth, has strong interests in South Asia as well
as a robust, historic bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka. With regard to
acting in line with this Major Power role in reference to the Sri Lanka
issue, the UK worked through the United Nations in seeking to bring the
issue to the UN Security Council, failing only when blocked by fellow
members Russia and China. In this arena, the UK responded to diaspora
interest group demands to the furthest extent possible (International
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2018). The UK took action
via the Special Relationship through Secretary Miliband’s numerous
joint statements on the conflict with Secretary of State Clinton. Given
the formative stage of Miliband’s relationship with Clinton at the time,
this expended considerable capital with the US without a direct benefit
to the UK. At the Commonwealth, the UK as the dominant actor might
have exerted more pressure on Sri Lanka as had been done in the past
with Zimbabwe. However, despite a meek statement being issued by the
Commonwealth towards the end of the conflict (Human Rights Watch,
2009), the UK did not deploy its full influence here. Ultimately, the UK
might have done more in this sphere, as the Conservative opposition
argued, but did not. Finally, as presented in Chapter 4, the UK is Sri
Lanka’s second largest trading partner, with Britain as one of the coun-
try’s largest foreign direct investors. Recognising its strategic importance
in South Asia, the UK has retained close ties with Sri Lanka since inde-
pendence. Despite this, and pressure from the FCO to do the contrary,
the UK put this long-standing relationship at near existential risk in its
opprobrium of the government, culminating in Secretary Miliband’s
direct chastisement of President Rajapaksa. The UK’s response, as in
the international sphere was at the boundary of its capacity to act. The
UK in two of the three international theatres of focus expended con-
siderable capital in response to the conflict in Sri Lanka, at risk to its
own national interest. Pressure from diaspora interest groups and mass
movements at least in part explains the government’s compulsion to act
to this extent. The UK’s role performance reflected the preferences of the
Tamil diaspora.
When taken together, the UK faced greater associated risks than did
Canada in its response to the conflict in Sri Lanka and, despite pressure
from the FCO to do otherwise, the Labour government took firm action
internationally and bilaterally to the furthest extent that was likely pos-
sible. The influence of Tamil diaspora mass movements and interest
groups is part of the explanation for why the government pursued these
policies and deviated from its preferred role conception. In contrast, the
Conservative government in Canada could have done more and faced
fewer associated risks, but it chose not to, suggesting that the Tamil dias-
pora’s influence over role contestation was limited and became virtually
non-existent as contentious mass movement demonstrations discredited
the diaspora’s efforts and brought them into conflict with the Harper gov-
ernment’s preferred role conception.
Diasporas and role contestation strategies

Finally, having considered agency and institutional factors in role con-
testation, the interest group and diaspora literature referenced in earlier
chapters also discusses strategies deployed by diasporas to advance their
agenda with government and political actors. As outlined in Chapter 2,
the Tamil diaspora in both country contexts utilised two forms of mobi-
lisation to influence decision-makers: Direct lobbying by interest group
elites and mass movement contentious action. The micro-level dynamics
at the intersection of these agents and foreign policy decision-making
elites further illustrates why the Canadian diaspora was less successful in
its efforts to influence role contestation than their British counterparts.
As the focus of claims, it was up to both governments to admit dias-
poras as temporary entrants in foreign policymaking and therefore as
role-makers. As I argue below, the absence of inside advocates in the
Canadian case resulted in the Canadian Tamil diaspora’s exclusion from
this process.
With regard to direct lobbying, representatives from numerous Tamil
organisations engaged in meetings with politicians in both countries
“behind closed doors” to present diaspora community preferences
with regard to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The Canadian Tamil diaspora,
through the CTC was successful in engaging politicians in earlier weeks
of the crisis, leading to an historic emergency debate in the Canadian
House of Commons on 4th February 2009, which was a first for the com-
munity. The CTC was broadly successful in hoisting the civil war onto
the political agenda. However, the diaspora ultimately failed to become
role-makers as they did not interface directly with key foreign policy
decision-makers in Canada, in particular the Foreign Minister and sen-
ior bureaucratic and partisan advisors. In like manner, the BTF, Tamils
for Labour and other diaspora groups held meetings with senior leader-
ship of all three major parties, in particular securing several meetings
with Foreign Secretary David Miliband who met on numerous occa-
sions with Tamil representatives, including mass movement protesters.
Additionally, a number of debates were held in parliament and the Prime
Minister became involved through the appointment of a special envoy to
Sri Lanka.24 In the British context, the Tamil diaspora were able to inter-
vene directly with central foreign policy decision-makers, thereby gain-
ing temporary access to decision-makers and becoming role-makers.
With regard to mass movement mobilisation, the Tamil diaspora in
both countries engaged in contentious claims-making through consist-
ent, unconventional mass movement demonstrations throughout the
decision-making period. In addition to demonstrations, further actions
such as hunger-strikes and other self-harming actions, alongside provoca-
tive measures such as public disruption of roadways, were also employed.
Protesters converged on three main sites during the decision-making
period: Ottawa, Toronto and London in numbers which varied from doz-
ens to tens of thousands and which ranged in intensity from orderly pro-
tests attended by politicians, to demonstrations which put public safety
at risk. Where these cases diverge is in the interaction of these diaspora
agents and foreign policy decision-makers.
In the Canadian case, the interaction between mass movement protest-
ers and the Conservative government began as indifference in the view
of the foreign policy elites and culminated in May 2009 with distaste
towards the increasingly contentious demonstrations. Unlike left-of-
centre politicians who attended and spoke at CTC-organised rallies, the
Conservative government did not respond favourably to public demon-
strations. When the protests became too contentious and associated with
the LTTE, claims on the part of the diaspora became less legitimate, as
did the CTC itself on account of its lack of control over the protests.
In addition to this unsuccessful and counterproductive mass movement
strategy, the absence of any inside advocates further hindered Tamil
diaspora mobilisation. Tamil diaspora interest group elites had devel-
oped strong relationships with left-of-centre party leadership, but this
was not the case with the governing Conservatives. As a consequence,
there was very limited direct interaction between Cabinet decision-mak-
ers, partisan or bureaucratic elites and diaspora leadership and therefore
no possibility of becoming role-makers. Furthermore, the leverage which
might have been deployed by elites through mass movements proved
instead to further diminish the possibility of Tamil diaspora tempo-
rary entry into decision-making. Ultimately, the Tamil diaspora did not
become temporary entrants and achieve influence over role contestation
as role-makers.25
The interaction between mass movements, interest group elites and
government decision-makers in Canada contrasts starkly with the UK
context. Tamil diaspora interest group elites had already engaged a num-
ber of influential and sympathetic Labour Members of Parliament as
inside advocates and already interacted with the Foreign Secretary in
advance of this period, such that the taint of the LTTE had largely dis-
sipated with Labour government elites. With this channel of interaction
in place, inside advocates and Tamil diaspora elites were able to bring to
bear their petitions directly to decision-makers. As a consequence, they
were able to leverage the level of contention manifested by the demonstra-
tions through inviting demonstrators to meet directly with the Foreign
Secretary. In one instance, twelve demonstrators met for two hours with
Foreign Secretary Miliband where they made emotional appeals through
conveying harrowing stories of their own family members trapped in the
fighting in Sri Lanka (Personal communications, Member of Parliament,
UK Labour, 2015). These emotional appeals from demonstrators had a
demonstrable impact on Miliband’s response to the conflict.
Unlike in Canada, Tamil diaspora elites in the UK retained a degree
of organisational control over the demonstrations throughout, includ-
ing through liaising directly with members of the London Metropolitan
police (Personal communications, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
The maintenance of this authority resulted in diaspora interest groups
continuing to act as credible representatives of the Tamil diaspora,
which was not the case in Canada. While controversial, the contentious
level of demonstrations and the presence of the LTTE flag in the UK
did not diminish the credibility of Tamil diaspora elites or the objectives
of mass movements, allowing diaspora interest groups to retain their
credibility with government (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
Throughout the decision-making process, British Tamil elites were tem-
porary entrants in foreign policymaking and as such should be consid-
ered role-makers in role contestation.
Role theoretical implications for disaggregating

diasporas in vertical role contestation
Role theoretical approaches grounded in vertical role contestation are
aimed at observing non-elite, domestic agents which are often overlooked
in the foreign policy analysis literature (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). The
cases compared above are in keeping with Holsti’s (1970) original inten-
tion of Role Theory having particular utility for actors considered less
influential in international affairs, as well as in Hill’s (1999) call for
more attention on “voices from below.” This micro-level exploration of
the mobilisation of the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK towards
the conflict in Sri Lanka raises a number of important implications for
Role Theory scholarship.
From an agency perspective, the above findings firstly reveal the need
to expand our understanding of the “masses” as role-makers in vertical
role contestation. The masses have been discussed previously by role the-
orists, including the role of public opinion and large mass movements
in role contestation (Gaskarth, 2016, 105; Paris, 2014). This chapter’s
comparison demonstrates the need to distinguish between mobilised
mass movements, interest groups and government elites as well as the
interaction between them. Diaspora-led mass movements can become an
effective strategy to gain temporary access to elite-level role contesta-
tion when diaspora elites are able to leverage them with elite government
decision-makers, as was the case in the UK. However, when diaspora
elites lack direct access to government decision-making and additionally
are seen to lose control over contentious mass movements, protests can
become a hindrance and barrier to becoming role-makers and therefore
influence role performance preferences. Without observing these micro-
level interactions, agency factors in vertical role contestation may remain
underexplored.
Secondly, the above discussion further elucidates on the importance
of learning in role contestation as touched on in previous scholar-
ship (Harnisch, 2012; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Mirroring Beneš and
Harnisch’s (2015) discussion of state socialisation internationally, older
and more established non-elite diaspora organisations serve as models
for more emergent diaspora groups. This was particularly important
for the Tamil diaspora, which had experienced significant marginalisa-
tion from government policymaking throughout the 2000s. Emulation
of more established and active Jewish diaspora groups, which included
direct guidance in some instances between diaspora elites, played an
important role in interest groups gaining temporary entrance into role
contestation. This was especially true in the UK, where learning ulti-
mately led to direct engagement with Cabinet-level decision-makers and
their eventually becoming role-makers. The process of non-elite agents
becoming role-makers in role contestation benefits from a micro-level
focus, particularly with reference to inter-diaspora learning.
Finally, the primary aim of this book was to make the case that mar-
ginalised, non-elite diasporas are capable of becoming role-makers and
influencing role contestation. The success of the British Tamil diaspora
in gaining temporary entry into policymaking and role contestation
reveals that these processes are not solely the preserve of domestic elite
agents and that research in role contestation should take into account
the involvement of previously overlooked communities of interest such
as diasporas. Their entry as role-makers becomes a possibility especially
when they are viewed as credible by government elites, who effectively
have the power to admit or exclude non-elite actors in decision-making.
Not often considered in the existing literature on diasporas and foreign
policy, a key distinction between the Canadian and British Tamil dias-
pora was that the former was not considered credible, largely due to their
association with terrorism and contentious protests. On the other hand,
the British Tamil diaspora was considered credible and therefore gained
temporary entrance in role contestation.
The above analysis reveals Role theory’s utility with respect to observ-
ing institutional factors in vertical role contestation as well as agency
considerations. Firstly, I argued that while scholarship has previously
considered the role of parliaments in role contestation, there has been
less attention in Role Theory and in foreign policy analysis in general
on the role of parliamentarians (Kaarbo and Cantir, 2013; Kesgin and
Kaarbo, 2010). The interest group literature introduced the notion
of “inside advocates” as a vehicle to lubricate the temporary entry of
non-elite agents in policymaking (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Similar
to Vietnamese and Jewish diaspora mobilisation in the US to liberate
political prisoners, parliamentarians can become critical interlocutors
for marginalised diasporas (Godwin, 2021). In the British case discussed
above, Labour MPs helped the Tamil diaspora become temporary
entrants, such that they were able to interface directly with Cabinet lead-
ership to express role performance preferences. It was only through these
channels that emotional appeals could be conveyed by mass movement
participants. While the crisis in Sri Lanka was debated on several occa-
sions in both Canadian and British parliaments, in neither case was par-
liament as an institution afforded ultimate decision-making on the issue.
Left exclusively up to Cabinet-level elites, sympathetic MPs became the
entry point for marginalised diasporas to make their direct appeals in
the British case. The lack of inside advocates in Canada was one reason
for the absence of this opportunity and the failure of the Tamil diaspora
becoming role-making agents. As argued elsewhere, parliaments are not
always the locus of decision-making in role contestation, but individual
parliamentarians may nevertheless prove critical for non-elite agents per-
meating foreign policymaking processes.
Secondly, the existing literature on diasporas and foreign policy
analysis has identified the importance of diaspora preferences being
aligned with host country foreign policy preferences (Ambrosio, 2002;
Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008, 79; Redd and Rubenzer, 2010). However, a
role theoretical lens has not yet been applied with a view to understand-
ing the importance of non-elite policy preference alignment with host
country role conception in processes of vertical role contestation. The
above demonstrates that this institutional consideration is consequen-
tial, but that unaligned role conception preferences need not be an insur-
mountable barrier for marginalised diaspora groups. Both British role
conception and bilateral foreign policy interests were at variance with
the preferences of the Tamil diaspora, and yet their appeals led to action
on the part of government elites very much in line with diaspora views.
Role conception alignment was again an issue in Canada, but in this case
the Tamil diaspora’s association with a proscribed terrorist group sig-
nificantly conflicted with the government’s role conception and barred
the Tamil diaspora as temporary entrants in role contestation. This was
the case despite the potential for the crisis to serve as an opportunity for
Canada to pursue its preferred disrupter role, as witnessed in the next
chapter. As has been demonstrated in the existing literature on diaspo-
ras and foreign policy influence, non-elite diasporas can influence role
contestation when at variance with government interests. Understanding
role conception alignment between non-elite role-makers and govern-
ment elites greatly illuminates on the potential influence of the former.
Finally, turning to role ascription, the above demonstrates the impor-
tance of defining the role position of countries with a view to ascertaining
international role constraints on role performance. Role theorists have
hitherto focused extensively on the connection between role conception
and role performance (Gaskarth, 2016, 60; McCourt, 2011; Oppermann,
2012; Thies and Wehner, 2019). Wish (1980) argued for the distinguishing
of role conception and “status,” or role position, and the above further
reveals why unpacking role conception and role position has explana-
tory value for vertical role contestation. Through ascribing Canada’s
role position as a Middle Power, it omits the potential for it to respond
to Tamil diaspora preferences through international institutions such as
the UN Security Council or bilaterally together with the US. However,
Canada’s long-standing and substantive bilateral relationship with Sri
Lanka could have served as a platform for firmer action, as demonstrated
by the UK. With regard to the UK, it performed to the fullest possi-
ble extent through several avenues available in its position as a Major
Power, raising the issue at the UN Security Council as well as through the
Special Relationship with the US. Unlike Canada, it exerted considerable
bilateral diplomatic pressure on the Sri Lankan government, including
through high-level, direct remonstrations. Without defining these role
positions, it is less clear whether governments acted to the furthest extent
possible in alignment with diaspora group preferences. Through ascrib-
ing role position within these theatres, Role Theory is uniquely adept at
observing whether non-elite groups have influenced role performance.
Interestingly, in neither case did the Commonwealth serve as a meaning-
ful theatre for role performance. However, it became a critical institution
for Tamil diaspora interest groups in the months and years following the
end of the conflict and the continued persecution of Tamils, as discussed
in the next chapter.
Conclusion
The role vertical contestation comparison undertaken in this chapter
aimed to ascertain whether Tamil diasporas in Canada and the UK
became role-makers in role contestation as they mobilised during the
final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war.
Non-elite vertical role contestation was undertaken principally by
Tamil diaspora interest groups which had emerged or been revitalised in
the years following the proscription and collapse of the LTTE in the host
countries. In Canada, the CTC emulated more established Jewish diaspora
organisations to develop a fulltime, professional office with a presence in
the country’s capital. They developed channels of access to political elites,
in particular with left-of-centre parties. In like manner, the British Tamil
diaspora emulated Jewish diaspora groups and, with the aid of inside
advocates became a credible, representative interest group. In addition,
Tamils for Labour was founded with a specific mandate to enhance Tamil
diaspora credibility, circumvent the FCO and build trusted, partisan chan-
nels of access to the Labour government. In both cases, diaspora interest
groups made great strides to emerge from the legacy of the LTTE and the
“chilling effect” its proscription ushered in. However, in both cases they
continued to struggle to gain inroads with Conservative politicians.
Vertical role contestation analysed in this chapter details events
between January and May 2009 in both host countries. Tamil diaspora
interest groups asserted a number of demands to government, undertook
direct lobbying advocacy and contentious, mass movement demonstra-
tions to articulate these demands and to pressure governments to assume
role conceptions and to perform internationally in accordance with their
preferences. The Conservative government in Canada responded by par-
ticipating in a diaspora-instigated debate in the House of Commons,
committed further humanitarian aid and ultimately dispatched its
International Cooperation Minister to Sri Lanka. However, it did not
respond in alignment with its preferred disruptor role and take firmer
action in line with diaspora preferences. The Labour government in the
UK responded far more robustly, including with the appointment of a
Special Envoy by Prime Minister Brown, efforts to bring the issue to the
UN Security Council, in-person remonstrations of President Rajapaksa
by the Foreign Secretary and joint statements with the US. All this
despite conflicting with its preferred convening role conception.
The theoretical framework applied to the cases above discusses spe-
cific factors to explain why the UK responded more fully to the role
preferences of the Tamil diaspora than did the Canadian government.
Firstly, with respect to agency factors, both diasporas were mobilised,
large, concentrated in political districts, well-resourced and had learned
from the more established Jewish diaspora. However, the British Tamil
diaspora was viewed as politically salient by the governing party, while
the Canadian diaspora was not. Additionally, while both diasporas had
greatly enhanced their credibility in the political sphere in advance of
2009, the collapse of group homogeneity in Canada and the contin-
ued association of the Tamil diaspora with the LTTE in view of the
Conservative government contributed to Canadian Tamil diaspora inter-
est group elites no longer being viewed as credible by the government.
The institutional factors discussed above focuses on domestic foreign
policymaking processes as well as the international context in which
Canada and the UK performed. With regard to domestic institutions
and host country inclusivity, Chapter 3 discussed the marginalisation of
the Tamil diaspora through colonial and post-colonial repression, disem-
powering integration and settlement regimes in the UK and the impact
of securitisation policies. Despite the chilling effect of the early 2000s,
the Tamil diaspora in both country contexts was able to surmount these
challenges and had established professional interest groups with access
to the political process. However, when it came to permeating foreign
policy decision-making, the Canadian Tamil diaspora were unable to
become role-making temporary entrants due to a lack of inroads with the
governing Conservatives, in large part due to the continuing association
with the LTTE and contentious mass movements. Despite opposition
from the FCO, the British Tamil diaspora gained temporary entrance
as role-makers thanks to the efforts of inside advocates. In neither case
did rival constituencies in the form of the Sri Lankan government and its
diplomatic offices prove a substantial hindrance.
From the perspective of role conception alignment, in neither case
can the preferences of the Tamil diaspora be said to have fully reflected
the desired role conception of the host countries. In the Canadian con-
text, on the one hand, the Tamil diaspora was demanding the Canadian
government take assertive action internationally including through dis-
ruption of international institutions, which was in line with the Harper
government’s role conception. However, the Tamil diaspora’s perceived
association with a terrorist group conflicted with the Harper govern-
ment’s emphasis on security and the fight against terrorism. Despite this
partial alignment, the Canadian government did not take robust action
in line with diaspora preferences. Similarly, the Tamil diaspora’s desire
for the British government to take assertive action against Sri Lanka did
not conform to the Brown government’s desired convening role interna-
tionally. Despite this divergence, the UK’s response was forthright at a
number of levels, at variance with its preferred role conception.
In respect of observing role performance, the Tamil diaspora in Canada
was not successful in persuading the Canadian government to act to the
fullest extent of its international capabilities. While not being able to take
action at the United Nations, the Canadian government could have taken
more assertive steps in line with its preferred role conception such as at the
Commonwealth or in its bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka. Instead, it
did not take significant action through any international institution and
its direct reproach of the government of Sri Lanka was tepid at best. The
international role performance of the UK was much stronger, in spite of
the country having a far deeper bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka and
strategic interests in the region. At the United Nations, through its Special
Relationship with the US and in its bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka,
the UK performed in line with diaspora preferences to a significant extent.
Finally, this chapter discussed dynamics at the intersection of mass
movements, diaspora interest group elites and decision-making elites.
In both cases, diasporas undertook direct lobbying efforts and organ-
ised large, mass movement demonstrations. Two variations between
these cases help to explain divergent outcomes. Firstly, the absence of
inside advocates in Canada limited Tamil diaspora interest group elite
access to Conservative government decision-makers, whereas British
interest group elites were able to petition the Foreign Secretary directly
and consequently become role-makers. Secondly, the absence of inter-
action between diaspora and government elites in the Canadian case
meant that they were unable to leverage mass movement demonstrations.
Additionally, the lack of diaspora elite control over mass movements fur-
ther diminished their credibility with foreign policy elites. The opposite
was the case in the UK, where diaspora elites leveraged mass movements
over which they continued to have some measure of control, strength-
ening their interactions with decision-makers. Ultimately, the Canadian
Tamil diaspora did not become role-makers in domestic role contesta-
tion, whereas the British Tamil diaspora did assume this role.
The comparison of these two cases of vertical role contestation demon-
strates that it is possible for marginalised diasporas to influence domestic
role contestation, but only when certain agency and institutional factors
are in place or, on the other hand, have been overcome. The next chapter
compares the Canadian and British Tamil diasporas four years on, where
divergent agency and institutional conditions result once again in differ-
ent role performances by both countries.
Notes
1. The ceasefire was monitored by the Scandinavian-led Ceasefire Monitor-
ing Committee and negotiations for a permanent settlement began with
early signs of optimism through an LTTE declaration indicating they
would settle for less than complete sovereignty in the north.
2. Rajapaksa had campaigned with scepticism towards the faltering peace
process and, thanks to unpopular economic reforms by the previous
administration and a call by the LTTE for Tamil voters to boycott the elec-
tion, he assumed office with a strong mandate.
3. Throughout 2006 to the end of 2007, conventional fighting resumed. The
LTTE’s perceived strength appeared exaggerated and with large increases
in defence spending, the Sri Lankan army made significant gains, includ-
ing taking control of the East of the country (Wickremesekera, 2016, 186).
4. Sri Lankan president Rajapaksa attempted to allay concerns about the
treatment of Tamil civilians, but amidst widespread accusations of human
rights abuses there was considerable concern abroad with regard to the
treatment of Tamils and former combatants (Lunn Et al, 2009).
5. For their part, the LTTE’s record with respect to civilian deaths is simi-
larly disconcerting. NGOs found that the LTTE prevented civilians from
fleeing the battleground in which the LTTE made its final stand. While
attempting to cross over to the government side, civilians reported being
fired on by LTTE cadres, killing and wounding many. As had been the
case in the past, the LTTE placed civilians in combat zones with the intent
to deter Sri Lankan forces from shelling the position, which is known as
“human shielding.” Additionally, they recruited large numbers of civilians
into forced labour in battle zones and used children as combatants.
6. The CTC lacked the sophistication of an established interest group with
a continuing presence in Canada’s capitol, Ottawa and did not have the
requisite “professional” appeal. As a consequence, the CTC was unable to
frame itself convincingly as being the legitimate representative body of the
Tamil community in Canada, leading to scepticism and disinterest on the
part of decision-makers, especially Tories (Protected source, staff member
a. Canadian Tamil Congress, 2016).
7. In meetings, the CJC offered guidance on how to engage with policymakers
and insisted the CTC must become more “professional” and that it needed
to be more assertive in reaching out to Canadian politicians.
8. As one interviewee noted, when MPs from Western Canada with no con-
nection to the Tamil diaspora began attending CTC events, they knew they
had achieved a new level of sophistication.
9. For instance, it was through introductions by MPs from other parties that
the CTC was first introduced to members of the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) and
the Conservative parties, neither of which had a representative MP in
areas with large Tamil populations. In the case of the former, despite hav-
ing never met Tamils or been aware of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Bloc
Quebecois immediately became sympathetic to the Tamil cause and then
BQ leader Gilles Duceppe appointed his Deputy Leader to be the “official”
conduit between the party and the Tamil diaspora via the CTC.
10. Like the CTC, the BTF grew in the coming years into a sophisticated
lobby group with credibility at the political level. The BTF developed a
high degree of strategic awareness, including an awareness of public and
intra-community messaging. For instance, it often adopts two messaging
tracks: A harder line within the Tamil diaspora itself and a more moder-
ate tone in public and in communication with political elites. What also
became apparent to the BTF and other activists at this time was the con-
flicting operational imperatives of the FCO and the political leadership.
11. There was a pressing need at this time to provide a voice for the Tamil dias-
pora in the ongoing peace negotiations taking place at the international
level in 2006. With the peace process excluding the LTTE, there was no
international body to allow the diaspora to engage with government dur-
ing the pivotal negotiation process.
12. The gathering of support from politicians began first at the grassroots level
in 2007, but Tamil elites were unable to escalate this support to the West-
minster-level due to their lack of organisation. One MP and early supporter
noted that Tamils were “on the outside, looking in” with no understanding
of how to lobby (Personal communications, former GTF staff member and
current Labour Party staff member, 2015). Of critical importance was the
early involvement of sympathetic MPs, in particular Siobhan McDonough
and Joan Ryan. Both of whom became engaged due to representations from
the large Tamil minority in their constituencies. They became committed to
the Tamil cause and actively assisted the Tamil community in building an
effective lobby group, especially in developing an organising apparatus at
Westminster, teaching activists how to engage with Members of Parliament
and opening up new political networks. McDonough, Ryan and others were
instrumental in creating access and “bringing the Tamils into the system”
13. Interviewees suggested that the Labour Party’s more sympathetic orienta-
tion towards those perceived as victims of conflict was a likely reason for
their early support.
14. As a result of this pressure, numerous early meeting requests were turned
down and even parliamentary champions were being stained with having
“terrorist sympathies” through associations with the Tamil diaspora (Pro-
tected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
15. In addition to the founding of the BTF and Tamils for Labour, in 2006/07
supportive Members of Parliament founded the All Party Parliamentary
Group for Tamils (APPG for Tamils). APPGs are issue-specific parliamen-
tary bodies with formalised memberships of MPs and Peers having access
to facilities in the Palace of Westminster. With the British Tamil Forum
acting as secretariat, the development of the APPG for Tamils was a key
milestone in the legitimisation of the Tamil diaspora as an interest group
and signalled the growing importance of the Sri Lanka issue to Parliamen-
tarians. Through the initial backing of Tamils for Labour’s Sen Kadiah,
and MPs McDonough and Ryan, the APPG has been instrumental in lift-
ing Tamil issues onto the agenda at Westminster and ensuring questions
are asked on this issue in parliamentary committees and at Question Time.
The APPG lists members from both the Houses of Commons and Lords
and continued to act as a multi-partisan forum for supportive parliamen-
tarians (Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK Conservative Party,
2015). The APPG would serve as a permanent, multi-partisan forum of
support for the Tamil diaspora, ensuring a broad consensus on fundamen-
tal issues pertaining to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
16. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s first intervention in parliament on the
conflict’s escalation was on 14th January 2009 in response to Tamil dias-
pora inside advocate MP Keith Vaz (TamilNet, 2009b).
17. MP advocates were often involved in parliamentary debates during this period,
as on 5th February when Jeremy Corbyn MP asked if the government was
considering sanctioning Sri Lanka through the Commonwealth (TamilNet,
2009e). The BTF also made presentations in parliament, including one by
Tamils for Labour founder Sen Kandiah on 10th February 2009 (BBC, 2009).
18. On 27th March a conference in London hosted by World Tamils Forum
involving 45 delegates from 21 countries gathered to discuss the conflict,
calling for a ceasefire and a political solution. Attended by MPs Des Browne
and Siobhan McDonough, Browne noted that the British government was
doing everything it could to bring about a ceasefire (TamilNet, 2009c).
19. The Foreign Affairs select committee received a number of material inter-
ventions on the Sri Lanka matter during this time, including four petitions
submitted by MPs dated respectively 22nd April, 29th April, 29th April
and 30th April (Hansard, 2009).
20. Earlier in the conflict’s cycle, Foreign Secretary Miliband’s Ministerial state-
ment on 21st January, 2009 notes that Prime Minister Brown had already
written to President Rajapaksa regarding the crisis and advised on an upcom-
ing visit by a DFID humanitarian expert to Sri Lanka (TamilNet, 2009f).
21. During this period, the Foreign Secretary was pressed on the issue during
Foreign Secretary’s questions (Hansard, 2009).
22. These constituencies, populated by Tamils on the outskirts of central Lon-
don, were viewed as important constituencies for Labour, especially in this
period and ones which would later be viewed as strategic by the conserv-
atives. They include Harrow, East Ham, Southall Broadway, Northwick
Park, Preston, Wembley Central, Sudbury, Ilford North and Ilford South.
23. By the late 2000s, the BTF had the resources to take out a 40,000 pound, full-page
ad in a major British newspaper signed by 81 Tamil groups as an open letter to
Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
24. It is worth noting that in advance of this decision-making period, actions
had been taken by diaspora interest groups to penetrate internal party pol-
itics through candidate selection. The CTC had mustered diaspora mem-
bers to become involved in Liberal party internal politics, including the
leadership election of MP Bab Rae (Fatah, 2006). In like manner, Tamils
for Labour was in part created to support candidates for office within the
Labour Party in the UK which were seen as supportive of Tamil diaspora
preferences (Protected source, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
25. In Toronto, the degree of contentiousness reached such a peak that
many commentators have argued the demonstrators surpassed what the
public was willing to tolerate, resulting in a considerable loss of sympathy
(Godwin, 2012). Indeed, all interviewees from the Conservative government
at the time argued that the Tamil diaspora “went too far,” allowing the
Tories to reject engagement and spurn their advances (Protected source,
former Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016; Protected source, former
Canadian political staff b, 2016).
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6 Role contestation for
transitional justice
Role constraints and the
Commonwealth
Chapter 5’s comparison of the Canadian and British Tamil diaspora in

vertical role contestation and the disaggregation of agency and institu-
tional factors reveal much about the influence of non-elite actors in for-
eign policy. This chapter continues this comparison, revealing that after
the passage of time and a change in the institutional theatre of perfor-
mance Tamil diaspora non-elite agents have enhanced their influence as
role-makers with Conservative governments.
Following the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka in 2009, Tamil diaspora
interest group mobilisation focused on compelling the Rajapaksa gov-
ernment to put in place a legitimate transitional justice process and to
end the persecution of Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad. Role contestation
on this issue for the Canadian and British Tamil diaspora reached a cre-
scendo around the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
(CHOGM) hosted by Sri Lanka. The first section provides background
on the impetus for Tamil diaspora mobilisation following the end of the
conflict and leading up to the CHOGM in Sri Lanka. Firstly, in response
to obfuscation and intransigence on the part of the Rajapaksa govern-
ment, the Tamil diaspora advocated for a credible, international tran-
sitional justice process to be set up with a view to investigating alleged
war crimes on the part of the Sri Lankan government during the final
months of the war. Secondly, interest groups sought to bring attention to
the ongoing human rights violations and persecution of the Tamil minor-
ity in Sri Lanka and abroad.
Largely in response to these events in Sri Lanka and the aftermath
of the civil war, significant changes occurred to the landscape of Tamil
diaspora organisations. The second section of this chapter explores these
agency changes, focusing first on the formation of transnational Tamil
diaspora organisations such as the Transnational Government of Tamil
Eelam (TGTE) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF). Domestically, this
section addresses the considerable change in strategy on the part of the
Canadian and British Tamil diaspora where it worked harder to build
trust and credibility with conservative parties, as these parties them-
selves sought greater appeal with diaspora communities. I argue that
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-6
Role contestation for transitional justice 157
there was a “sea-change” in the relationship between the Tamil diaspora
and conservative parties leading to both diasporas becoming temporary
entrants and role-makers in role contestation.
The third section presents the micro-level narrative and role contes-
tation process where the Harper and Cameron governments were both
faced with the decision of whether to attend the 2013 CHOGM or to
boycott it. Having threatened to stay away from the summit should Sri
Lanka not improve its human rights record in 2011, Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper announced he would not attend. His British
counterpart faced intense pressure from Tamil diaspora interest groups,
in particular British Tamil Conservatives (BTC), but ultimately chose to
attend the summit. However, his visit to Sri Lanka turned a spotlight on
the country’s human rights record and a lack of a credible transitional
justice process.
The third analytical section uncovers a number of distinctions
with the 2009 cases as well as between the two cases in this instance.
Regarding agency characteristics, diaspora interest groups better
mobilised young activists to become involved in Conservative parties
and in so doing built networks and trusted channels of access. This
is distinct from 2009 when neither diaspora was able to significantly
penetrate Conservative party leadership. Regarding political salience,
by 2013 the Conservative party in Canada was much more attuned
to the interests and needs of the Tamil diaspora, while in the UK the
Conservative party also viewed the Tamil diaspora as salient. Thirdly,
diaspora interest groups were both viewed as credible by Conservative
governments, unlike in 2009 when the CTC was not viewed as such by
the Canadian government. Fourthly, in respect of institutional fac-
tors, diaspora interest group preferences were opposed by a number of
rival constituencies, especially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) in the UK which ultimately stymied pressure by the diaspora.
Fifthly, in this case diaspora preferences were aligned with Canada’s
role conception and performance preferences, in particular its “disrup-
tor” role conception, whereas the Tamil diaspora’s preferences greatly
contrasted with the UK’s desire to avoid strained relations in Southeast
Asia as well as its indispensable role in the Commonwealth. This final
point, which speaks to the role constraints faced by the UK as an indis-
pensable actor, explains why Prime Minister Cameron attended the
Commonwealth summit.
The disaggregation of agency and institutions factors in these cases
yields a number of theoretical implications for Role Theory. From an
agency perspective, these cases demonstrate that Role Theorists ben-
efit from taking a temporal approach, where learning was in evidence
in both cases and lead to distinctly different appeals to Conservative
Parties. In like manner, credibility should be considered when looking
at non-elite agents in vertical role contestation as without being seen as
158 Role contestation for transitional justice
credible by governments they are unlikely to become temporary agents
in role contestation. Political salience is another factor that scholars
should take into account when considering non-elite agents, as govern-
ments are demonstrably more responsive to their role preferences when
they are seen as politically strategic. Institutional disaggregation in this
chapter further asserts that states may perform desired role conceptions
even if this performance diverges from realist notions of national inter-
est gains, particularly when role performance aligns with the prefer-
ences of non-elite agents. It also finds that less influential states within
international institutions have more liberty to respond to domestic non-
elite agents as their actions are less likely to threaten institutional integ-
rity. Furthermore, the disruptive actions taken by less influential states
in alignment with diaspora preferences may serve to increase pressure
and expand the number of policy response options of more powerful
states. Finally, this chapter finds that is it important to ascribe state
role position to appreciate whether diasporas influence vertical role con-
testation, as “indispensable” state actors may not be able to overcome
institutional role constraints, but nevertheless be sympathetic to non-
elite preferences.
Post-civil war Sri Lanka and the pursuit of justice

In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the Rajapaksa govern-
ment secured two important political victories, firstly through a joint
statement with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon after his visit to
the island and secondly a vote at the United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHCR) which failed to call for an international investiga-
tion into alleged war crimes (Pidd and Agencies, 2009; United Nations,
2009). In the absence of international calls for a credible inquiry
into the conduct of the war, diaspora groups such as the Canadian
Tamil Congress (CTC) and the British Tamil Forum (BTF), as well
as non-Tamil diaspora international advocacy groups like Human
Rights Watch demanded an international investigation as evidence
of atrocities surfaced (Yuen, 2009). In the months to follow, the UN
Secretary General was moved under increased pressure to investigate
and appointed a “Panel of Experts” in 2010 which released a report in
2011 pointing to war crimes and crimes against humanity having been
committed by both sides.
The international campaign for justice culminated in a March 2013
resolution passed at the UNHCR which called on the Office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate
alleged violations of international law (Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace
& Justice, 2014). After years of obfuscation under the Rajapaksa gov-
ernment, the OHCHR was able to conduct an investigation following
the election of a new Sri Lankan government in January 2015 under
President Mathiripala Sirisena (Large, 2016). In summary, the findings
of the report (UNHCR, 2015):
… demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

gross violations of international human rights law, serious violations
of international humanitarian law and international crimes were
committed by all parties during the period under review.
Specifically, unlawful killings were committed by both sides, including

of Tamil civilians by Sri Lankan government forces, as well as of sur-
rendered Sri Lankan Army combatants by the LTTE. The Government
of Sri Lanka engaged in detaining Tamils, numbering in the thousands,
under arbitrary arrest.1 Despite being unable to ascertain the full extent
of the use of rape and sexual violence against males and females, the
investigation found credible evidence that this was conducted on a large
scale by or with the knowledge of the Government of Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka
Campaign for Peace & Justice, 2014).2
In its report, the OHCHR directly denounced the former Rajapaksa
government’s active inhibiting of the pursuit of justice following
the conflict. It is alleged that in the period following the conflict the
Government of Sri Lanka used infrastructure development in for-
mer conflict areas to deflect attention from its attempts to stonewall
accountability processes (Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace & Justice,
2014). The government’s own investigative mechanism, the Lessons
Learnt and Reconciliation Committee (LLRC), was set up largely in
response to international pressure from the US and Europe. Its lack of
independence, evident pro-government bias and the absence of demon-
strable follow-up left it widely panned, including by the British Prime
Minister (Human Rights Watch, 2011).3
In a post-civil war climate of restricted rights and liberties, the
Rajapaksa government continued to carry out abuses against the civilian
Tamil population as well as against Tamil leadership.4 The Sri Lanka
Campaign for Justice and Peace found in its 2014 report that a “cycle of
impunity” led to “sustained persecution” against the Tamil population,
taking the form of continued militarisation of the northern and eastern
areas of the island as well as attempts to change the demographic com-
position of these areas; impunity for human rights violations such as
enforced disappearances, sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and confine-
ment, as well as murder; a breakdown of the rule of law, no movement
towards reconciliation and an increasingly authoritarian trajectory on
the part of the government, including the intimidation and detention of
journalists.5
While denying these crimes, the government admitted to pursu-
ing a policy of land acquisition, where Tamil land was confiscated by
the government principally for military purposes. Sri Lankan military
spokesman Brigadier Wanigasuriya justified this policy on the basis that
(Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace & Justice, 2014):6
[w]e have eradicated the direct armed violence in the country by

defeating terrorism within the island. However, the separatist ideol-
ogy still has wings. It is a major threat to national security. As you
know, there are several groups amongst the vast Tamil Diaspora
active in Western countries propagating the ideology of a separate
state. They are far detached from the ground reality and act only
for their own wellbeing in those countries where they enjoy special
privileges either as refugees or powerful vote blocs. Some politicians
openly support them mainly due to the ability of those groups to
sway the votes of the Tamils in the respective areas.
This defence of a crime against humanity suggests that the Rajapaksa

government continued to advance a narrative of ongoing war in spite of
the abrupt finality of the civil war itself. It further indicates that the gov-
ernment’s aggressive anti-Western turn following the civil war, combined
with its conflation of the entire Tamil diaspora as in effect members of the
LTTE, put members of the Tamil diaspora at violent risk (Large, 2016).7
The Rajapaksa government drew a direct linkage between the Tamil
diaspora, the LTTE, international activism and activism in Sri Lanka
(Large, 2016). To discourage international activism and to prevent mobi-
lisation against it, the government targeted members of the Tamil dias-
pora returning from abroad. A 2012 report by Together Against Genocide
(TAG) called on the British government to reconsider its post-war asy-
lum policy for Tamils on the basis of twenty-seven cases demonstrating
human rights abuses against members of the Tamil diaspora returning to
Sri Lanka. Specifically, the report argues that Tamils returning “from a
country whose government or media have been critical of the Sri Lankan
government and/or have called for progress towards accountability and
reform” are at a substantially greater risk of being detained and tortured
by the government (Tamils Against Genocide, 2012).8
Further to this policy of deterrence against mobilisation, the gov-
ernment sought to de-legitimise political sympathisers with the Tamil
cause abroad. A Sri Lankan defence attaché in London alleged that, “the
LTTE has cultivated sympathisers in all three major political parties.”
The effort to delegitimise the Tamil diaspora and their allies was officially
confirmed in 2014, when the Sri Lankan government listed 15 Tamil dias-
pora organisations as registered terrorist organisations. Amongst those
listed included the CTC, the National Council of Canadian Tamils, BTF,
GTF and the Australian Tamil Congress. The listing of these organisa-
tions made it a criminal offence in Sri Lanka to maintain association with
these groups or their members and further endangered members of the
diaspora returning to Sri Lanka. The measures taken by the Sri Lankan
government to associate the Tamil diaspora and diaspora organisations
with the LTTE and with terrorism more broadly served to both deter
activism in Sri Lanka, as well as to deter mobilisation abroad given the
threat of repression and persecution in the homeland (Together Against
Genocide, 2012).
The evolution of Tamil diaspora role-making: The post-conflict

changing landscape of Tamil diaspora organisations
The Rajapaksa government’s refusal to put in place a credible transitional
justice process, a continuing climate of persecution and repression for
Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the Tamil diaspora and the realisation that the
struggle for Tamil Eelam was now a largely transnational one all served
as the mobilising impetus for role contestation by the Tamil diaspora in
Canada and the UK. With these conditions in Sri Lanka and abroad as
backdrop, the same period witnessed considerable transformations in
the landscape of Tamil diaspora organisations. The next section explores
these agency alterations, first by considering the emergence of new, trans-
national Tamil organisations such as the TGTE and the GTF. This section
then charts the evolution of Tamil diaspora interest groups as role-makers,
becoming ever more sophisticated in Canada and the UK, including
through the development of trusted channels of access with conservative
parties which had hitherto been wary of the Tamil diaspora.
Taking the fight abroad? Post-LTTE transnational

diaspora organisations
Parallel to this climate of fear and persecution in Sri Lanka, a number
of new Tamil diaspora organisations were formed including an effort
at a transnational government: The TGTE, a transnational coalition
of domestic interest groups: The GTF, a transnational referendum
organised by Tamil National Councils (TNCs) as well as several other
groups, including youth organisations first galvanised by the demon-
strations in 2009.
Transnational Tamil organisations emerged in the years following the
end of the civil war for three reasons: Firstly, as outlined in the section
above, Tamil advocacy was severely restricted in Sri Lanka through the
continuation of repressive, wartime policies of the Rajapaksa regime
which necessitated the diaspora utilising international channels through
which to pressure the government, which is a tactic entirely befitting of
Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) “boomerang effect.” Secondly, following its
catastrophic defeat in Sri Lanka, the LTTE was unable to regroup in
the diaspora. Broadly speaking, the diaspora viewed the failure of the
LTTE as the final assertion that violent means of bringing about a sep-
arate state for Tamils was no longer a viable course of action. Having
attempted ineffective strategies of non-violent resistance in Sri Lanka
up to the 1980s, this turn of events led to a “post-war consensus” that
international diplomacy via pressure from host governments was the
only remaining option for Tamil self-determination (TamilNet, 2010).
Thirdly, the events of 2009 galvanised and united the Tamil diaspora as
never before and activated a new generation of Tamil diaspora activists.
Tamil diaspora elites capitalised on this momentum and unity by found-
ing a number of transnational Tamil organisations as well as exercises in
democratic representation.
Beginning with the TGTE, the LTTE leadership which remained fol-
lowing the end of the conflict sought to shift the Tamil centre of gravity
from Sri Lanka to the transnational diaspora through the establishment
of a transnational governance body (Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010). It
understood that the only means of achieving the broader objectives of
the Tamil movement for self-determination was through international
diplomacy via pressure from the diaspora on host-country governments
(Amarasingam, 2015, 148).9 The creation of the TGTE was announced
in the weeks following the war’s end in Malaysia with a view to meeting
these two objectives (TamilNet, 2009b):
As a political structure, democratically elected Transnational

Government of Tamil Eelam is a must of the present times to inter-
nationally justify Tamil rights and to work for a separate nation
state, considering the given conditions of Eezham Tamils and the
internationalised political milieu of the island of Sri Lanka.
The TGTE held elections amongst the transnational Tamil diaspora in

2010 for its leadership where nearly 30,000 Tamils voted. A hard-line fac-
tion aligned with the LTTE and led by New York-based lawyer with LTTE
connections, Visvanathan Rudrakumaran emerged victorious, forming a
“cabinet” with Rudrakumaran as the “Prime Minister” (Amarasingam,
2015, 243). However, the TGTE quickly became fractured with in-fighting
largely between those in support of the Rudrakumaran leadership and
those against.10
During the same period, the GTF was established in July 2009 as a
transnational coalition of Tamil organisations with the aim of advo-
cating for the right to self-determination of the Tamil people and to
direct efforts towards the continuing humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka
(Personal communications, Global Tamil Forum, 2015; TamilNet,
2009a). Composed of the numerically largest and most well-resourced
diaspora groups, it included amongst its constituent members the CTC,
the BTF and 12 organisations from five continents.11 The GTF has been
described as a largely elite-driven initiative which initially had a human-
itarian focus, but through the influence of the BTF evolved to engage in
political advocacy (International Crisis Group, 2010).
Based in London, the official launch of the GTF was held in the
Gladstone Room of the House of Commons in February 2010 and attended
by Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Shadow Foreign Secretary for the
Conservative Party William Hague and Liberal Democrats’ Shadow
Foreign Secretary Ed Davey along with Tamil advocate MPs from several
parties such as Siobhan McDonough, Joan Ryan and Keith Vaz. Some of
the organisations from the fourteen countries represented met privately
with Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Personal communications, former
GTF staff member and current Labour Party staff member, 2015).12 It was
through the efforts of Labour activists outlined in the earlier chapter that
the GTF secured rapid access to British political leadership.
However, not long after its founding a bitter schism opened up between
the more established BTF and the GTF.13 The former continued to
espouse a “harder line” in the post-war landscape, with its advocacy for
the establishment of a sovereign state for Tamils as the principal and
overarching objective of activism for the Tamil diaspora. The GTF, on
the other hand, has advocated for a “softer line,” limiting itself to calls
for self-determination leading to the gradual, constitutional establish-
ment of an autonomous Tamil region with devolved rights for linguistic
and education policy (Personal communications, British Tamil Forum,
2015; Global Tamil Forum, 2015).14
In an effort to re-legitimise the Tamil movement for self-determina-
tion, the creation in 2009 and 2010 of TNCs in diaspora host countries
led to organised referenda throughout the diaspora. The referendum in
Canada was organised by the Coalition for Tamil Elections Canada and
was held on 19th December 2009 using advanced voting equipment, pro-
cedures similar to those carried out in general elections and objective
vote monitors. Voting took place in major urban centres across the coun-
try on the below ballot question (TamilNet, 2009c):
I aspire for the formation of the independent and sovereign state

of Tamil Eelam in the north and east territory of the island of Sri
Lanka on the basis that the Tamils in the island of Sri Lanka make
a distinct nation, have a traditional homeland and have the right to
self-determination.
Nearly 50,000 Tamils voted in the Canadian referendum, resulting in

more than 99 per cent voting in favour of the ballot question.
The referendum process had high levels of participation across the
diaspora with support for a Tamil national homeland receiving nearly
unanimous consent at 99 per cent (International Crisis Group, 2010). The
referendum in Britain was held on 31st January 2010, with turnout at
nearly 65,000 voters and an emphatic result of over 99 per cent voting in
favour of an independent Tamil homeland. The process was supported
by all British Tamil diaspora groups including the BTF as well as the
TYO, which was active in mobilising voters to turn out. Several British
Members of Parliament and Councillors supported the process and con-
firmed the importance of the vote as giving legitimate voice to the aspira-
tions of the Tamil diaspora.
The GTF and the TGTE emerged as the leading transnational gov-
ernance organisations, with participation from both the Canadian and
British diaspora groups. Referring to the conceptualisation of transna-
tional Tamil diaspora interest groups in Chapter 2, the TGTE, should not
be conceptualised as an interest group. Its principal aim has been to serve
as a decision-making forum, rather than to champion specific issues or to
petition domestic governments (Amarasingam, 2015, 156). However, the
second transnational organisation formed during this period, the GTF,
bears far more the hallmarks of an interest group in that it serves as a
coalition of other interest groups, seeks to petition government and inter-
national bodies to make change and does not claim to be a government in
exile (Personal communications, former GTF staff member and current
Labour Party staff member, 2015). For this reason, the latter factors into
the below analysis while the former does not.15
The period following the end of the civil war brought with it a seismic
shift in the diaspora and in the often-complicated landscape of Tamil
diaspora organisations. As new transnational organisations emerged,
domestically oriented Tamil diaspora groups in Canada and the UK con-
tinued to grow in sophistication and finally develop inroads into conserv-
ative parties. The below sections discuss these processes in Canada and
the UK with an emphasis on efforts to build leverage with Conservative-
led governments.
Tamil diaspora role-making in Canada: Aligning

with Conservative role conception16
As argued in the last chapter, an extended “chilling effect” following the
proscription of the LTTE and led to the CTC’s failure to penetrate the
foreign policy decision-making of the Conservative government in 2009.
The period between the end of the civil war in 2009 and the CHOGM
in 2013 was marked by a number of changes which decisively aided the
CTC becoming role-making agents. Diaspora interest group strategy
changed with a greater emphasis on building trusted, partisan networks
within the Conservative Party through the development of young activ-
ists. Additionally, the diaspora’s overall strategic approach became more
tailored to the Conservative government’s role conception, rather than
relying on mass movement mobilisation which had earlier failed to grant
them access to decision-making as temporary entrants.
Firstly, in regard to the CTC’s approach to building inroads within
the governing Tories, there remained a level of distrust and hesitation
amongst some in the Conservative Party given the continued perception
of a link between the diaspora and the LTTE. As a consequence, Tamil
diaspora organisation outreach to the Conservative Party met with lim-
ited success initially (Protected source, former Canadian political staff
b, 2016). What began to change this perception was more concerted and
programmatic efforts by the CTC to deepen ties with the Conservative
Party internally. This was in part motivated by the growing belief that
the Liberal Party had for too long taken for granted the support of the
Tamil diaspora and that the Middle Power role conception preferred by
Liberal governments made them unwilling to take stronger positions
as well as more tangible action in response to Tamil diaspora interest
group preferences (Amarasingam, 2013; personal communications,
Commonwealth elite, 2016). Beginning in 2011 when Prime Minister
Harper warned the Government of Sri Lanka that Canada may boycott
CHOGM if its human rights record did not improve, the CTC began to
view Conservative role conception and performance as more aligned
with its own preferences and, more importantly, it viewed the Harper
government as more willing to take a stronger stand than the Liberals
(Blanchfield, 2012).
A more sophisticated approach to direct lobbying resulted from this
changed perception, with greater investment on the part of the CTC to
building partisan channels of access through the involvement of Tamil
activists in the political process. The CTC began managing a programme
which encouraged younger members of the community to become
engaged as activists in party politics and follow them through their polit-
ical development (Protected source, Staff member b. Canadian Tamil
Congress, 2016). The programme ensured activists became involved as
party members and elites who shared sincere, personally held beliefs
which aligned with their party of choice. In much the same way as Tamils
for Labour, CTC partisan activists built networks of trust within party
circles which served to dilute the paranoia that once hampered Tamil
mobilisation, as well as create partisan access points with party lead-
ership. In the view of Conservative government insiders, CTC activists
gained greater credibility and political leverage through young Tamil
activists becoming involved at the political level (Protected source, for-
mer Canadian political staff b, 2016; Weerawardhana, 2013).
In addition to these efforts to create inside advocates, the CTC became
more sophisticated in its strategy to approach government. Rather than
relying on mass movement demonstrations proven ineffective in 2009,
CTC activists ensured they tailored their proposals to foreign policy
elites “behind the scenes” to better reflect the government’s role con-
ception. For instance, rather than simply presenting a set of demands in
meetings with cabinet ministers and MPs, Tamil conservative activists
liaised with partisan government elites in advance to probe what was pos-
sible and to frame requests accordingly. Additionally, rather than mak-
ing specific, tangible requests which might lead observers to think the
government was being influenced unduly by outside interests, activists
made more symbolic demands which allowed the government to come to
their preferred policy decisions based on the information they had pro-
vided (Protected source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016). Finally,
Ministers and staff noted the importance of bringing to bear emotional
appeals. As was the case with Foreign Secretary Miliband in the UK,
Tamil Conservative activists were now in a position to make direct emo-
tional appeals based on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and this
approach had an impact (Protected source, former Canadian Member of
Parliament, 2016).
From the perspective of the Conservative party’s political strategy,
partisan elites at the time encouraged a greater emphasis on outreach to
diaspora communities in Canada in general which they viewed as being
more salient than in the past (Protected source, former Canadian polit-
ical staff c, 2016). For decades dominated by the Liberal Party, diaspora
communities began to more seriously consider other parties as options
in Canadian elections, due partly to the increased attention paid to them
by the Conservative Party and the NDP (Singh, 2009). Tory strategists
began to look to make inroads into the Tamil community in Toronto
through messaging more specifically targeted at the community. It also
did so by recruiting Tamil candidates or those with strong ties to the
diaspora to seek election in constituencies heavily populated by Tamil
Canadians (Protected source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016).
The impact of the CTC and Conservative Tamil activists began to
reveal itself in subtle government decision-making. For instance, unlike
during the 2009 episode, the Conservative government began to refer to
what had taken place in 2009 in Sri Lanka as a “genocide,” a cornerstone
narrative for the Tamil community (Tamil CNN, 2015). Secondly, the
Tories began to more clearly and frequently refer to the “Tamil nation,”
as a way of legitimising to a greater extent the desire for self-determi-
nation and the special place of Tamil nationhood on the island of Sri
Lanka. Finally, in the 2015 federal election, the Conservative Party com-
mitted in its manifesto to opening a diplomatic mission in Jaffna, a com-
mitment UK Tamils would seek from parties in their own country (Tamil
Guardian, 2015).
Concerted efforts by the CTC to enhance its credibility and access to
the Conservative government, as well as increased interest on the part
of the Conservative Party in diaspora communities in general, created
established channels of partisan access which were non-existent only a
few years before. One MP noted that they would engage with the CTC in
advance of meetings with the Sri Lankan High Commission and accept
their briefings, remarking to the CTC, “you don’t even need to lobby
anymore” (Protected source, staff member b. Canadian Tamil Congress,
2016).17
Tamil diaspora role-making in the UK: The founding
of the British Tamil Conservatives
In the years following 2009, the Tamil diaspora agents in the UK acceler-
ated their efforts to become temporary entrants in foreign policymaking
and role-makers in the context of a Conservative-led government. The
below discusses these processes with particular emphasis on the evolu-
tion of BTC. As was the case in Canada, the British Tamil diaspora had
long-established links with left of centre politicians, owing to the parties’
inherently more sympathetic leaning to Tamil perspectives on Sri Lanka.
A more deep-seated scepticism amongst some Tories towards the Tamil
diaspora’s association with the LTTE lingered and long prevented the
creation of trusted channels of access and inside advocates within the
Conservative Party (Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).
In 2008, diaspora Tamil elites were conscious of the fact that the com-
munity was “putting all its eggs in one basket” in its formal engagement
solely with the Labour Party and as a consequence risked not becom-
ing temporary entrants in role contestation under a Conservative-led
government (Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015). As a
consequence, leading Tamil conservatives founded the BTC in October
of that year. Modelling itself on Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI)
and the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the BTC
set about building relationships between Tamil Conservative elites and
party elites, with a view to confronting stereotypes that Tamils were
associated with terrorists or always vote Labour (Protected source,
British Tamil Conservatives, 2015). Early supporters of the organisation,
including London area MPs Robert Halfon and Lee Scott, served a sim-
ilar function as early Labour inside advocates Joan Ryan and Siobhan
McDonough. These MPs opened up networks with senior MPs and
staff, created access for BTC representatives at Westminster and ensured
the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Tamils was balanced with Tory
representatives.
As was the case in Canada, the Conservative Party at virtually the
same time began to view diaspora communities as salient in an effort
to secure more support, in particular in urban constituencies (Protected
source, Member of Parliament, 2015). The Conservative Party actively
began to reach out to diverse communities, cultivate activists and can-
didates and ensure that representative diaspora bodies such as the BTC
were supported by Tory party elites (Grayling, 2015). The BTC officially
became an affiliated body within the Conservative Party in 2012 and has
held a reception at Conservative Party conference every year since then.
The reception has become one of the largest events at the annual confer-
ence, attracting senior members of the Conservative parliamentary party
(Tamil Guardian, 2016). In addition to the party conference, the BTC
organises annual fundraisers to financially support Conservative MPs
and candidates who have expressed support for the Tamil community.
However, the strength of the BTC is not in its financial support, but in its
ability to mobilise thousands of Tamil voters to support Tory candidates
aligned with Tamil community preferences, and to dispatch hundreds of
Tamil volunteers to provide services for Conservative election campaigns
(Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).18
The BTC has also never shied away from asserting its influence to block
candidates unfavourable to Tamil issues. As in the case of some Liberal
Democrat and Labour candidates, the BTC has specifically targeted
their resources against the campaigns of candidates not sympathetic
to Tamil issues. This approach also extends to within the Conservative
Party, where it has actively pressured previously unsympathetic MPs and
candidates to become more amenable to their views (Protected source,
British Tamil Conservatives, 2015).19 Like the CTC, the BTC established
an internship programme which encourages young Tamil Conservatives
to get involved in Westminster politics through interning with MPs.
Establishing trusted, partisan networks afforded a far greater degree of
access for the Tamil community to Conservative Party elites, with the
BTC acting as a known and trustworthy interlocutor.
In a fashion similar to Canada, Tamil diaspora elites noted that while
it took the Conservative Party longer to develop trust with the Tamil
diaspora and to sympathise with the Tamil cause, once they “got it,”
the Conservative government could be relied on for strident role perfor-
mance (Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015).20 As will
be argued in the upcoming section, through changing policy and taking
a hard-line against the Rajapaksa regime, there is a view that the Left
often “gets it first,” but when the Right finally begins to sympathise with
diaspora grievances, they take their support further in stronger role per-
formance (Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK Conservative
Party, 2015; Together Against Genocide, 2015).
Like Tamils for Labour, the BTC led to the British Tamil diaspora
once again becoming a credible interest group with inside advocates sup-
porting their preferences. As in Canada, the Conservative government
began to view the diaspora as more politically salient. The BTC became
a leading agent in the “sea-change” within the Tory party, from being
initially sceptical to being outspoken in its support for the Tamil commu-
nity. With these agency dynamics in place, the next section discusses role
contestation with the Tamil diaspora as role-makers focused on events
surrounding the CHOGM in 2013.
Role contestation and mobilising for boycott:

Role-making in Canada and the UK
In the previous chapter, I argued that Tamil diaspora influence in
role contestation was muted in Canada, where they did not become
role-making agents primarily due to a lack of inside advocates within the
Conservative government, its mass movement contentious strategy and
its inability to capitalise on the Harper government’s international role
conception due to the taint of the LTTE. In the UK, the Tamil diaspora
became temporary entrants in role contestation through the leveraging
of mass movements and the diaspora’s salience to Labour, resulting in a
deviation from the Brown government’s role conception and a role per-
formance that aligned with the diaspora’s preferences. The same micro-
level narrative is presented below to construct vertical role contestation
processes leading up to the 2013 CHOGM. The analytical section once
again undertakes to isolate consequential factors and identifies the key
distinctions between the Canadian and UK cases to ultimately explain
why one Prime Minister boycotted the CHOGM while the other attended.

“Raising hell” at the Commonwealth
Having positioned itself as a more credible interest group than it was in
2009, the CTC advanced as its chief political demand of the Conservative
Government that Canada boycott the 23rd CHOGM to be held in
Colombo, Sri Lanka from 15th to 17th November 2013. The central issues
of concern which led to the CTC calling for a boycott were outlined in a
September 2013 letter to Foreign Minister Baird which included compel-
ling the Commonwealth to take action against the deterioration of the
rule of law in Sri Lanka, an end to the continued persecution of Tamils in
Sri Lanka and the implementation of a credible transitional justice pro-
cess (Canadian Tamil Congress, 2013). The CTC sought to bring about a
political consensus on the issue through direct lobbying and to convey to
the Conservative government that this would be a key point of leverage
over the Rajapaksa government which Canada was well placed at the
Commonwealth to exert (Protected source, Staff member b. Canadian
Tamil Congress, 2016).
The approach to lobbying the government in Canada was very dif-
ferent in this case in comparison to 2009. The CTC now had in place
a number of trusted, Conservative inside advocates as elite party staff
who worked to convey Tamil diaspora preferences to Cabinet. Cabinet-
level meetings were not often arranged with leading, non-partisan mem-
bers of the CTC directly with the Foreign Minister, but between Tamil
Conservative inside advocates and senior foreign policy elites with close
links to the Foreign Minister. This guarded against the perception that
the government was being unduly influenced (Protected source, former
Canadian political staff b, 2016). These informal interventions were the
primary means through which the diaspora conveyed its preferences to
the Conservative government. This time, the CTC chose not to focus on
mass movement demonstrations targeted at the government, but instead
spoke through Canadian media and with a limited mass movement pres-
ence at a fraction of the scale of 2009 and discernibly less contentious.21
With regard to the government’s role performance, Canada’s approach
was an incremental one. The Harper government had previously sided
with the UK and others in 2009, explored further in the upcoming sec-
tion, to move Colombo’s hosting of the summit in 2011 to 2013 given the
political situation facing the country at that time (The Telegraph, 2009).
At the 2011 CHOGM in Australia, Prime Minister Harper became one
of the Sri Lankan government’s harshest critics, effectively putting the
Rajapaksa government “on notice,” indicating that boycotting the 2013
summit was a possibility should discernible improvements in its human
rights situation not be made (Protected source, former Canadian politi-
cal staff a, 2016; Ljunggren, 2011). As a means of assessing progress in Sri
Lanka in the interim, Foreign Minister Baird sent a fact-finding mission
of Canadian MPs and staff to Sri Lanka in 2012 led by Conservative
Member of Parliament Chris Alexander. The delegation, which had been
requested by the CTC, returned with photographic, video and testimo-
nial evidence indicating that the humanitarian situation for Tamils in
Sri Lanka had hardly improved since the end of the civil war (Clark,
2012). In addition to this delegation, the government’s special envoy for
the Commonwealth, Senator Hugh Segal also visited Sri Lanka in 2013
with the same mandate (Baird, 2013; Protected source, Commonwealth
elite, 2016).
Following from these investigations, Prime Minister Harper person-
ally announced while attending an Association of Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Indonesia on 7th October 2013 that he
would not attend the November CHOGM in Sri Lanka (National Post,
2013). He also threatened in his statement to review Canada’s financial
contributions to the Commonwealth. Instead, Parliamentary Secretary
Deepak Obri was sent by the Harper government to represent Canada
at the summit. Secretary Obri was sent with the mandate to “raise hell”
at the summit over the Rajapaksa government’s record on human rights
(Personal communications, former Canadian political staff b, 2016).22
During his visit, Obri visited the north of the country and laid a wreath
in memory of the Tamil victims of the civil war (Canadian Press, 2013).
Along with boycotting the 2013 CHOGM and condemning the govern-
ment through its modest representation, the Harper government went
one step further and held back Canada’s regular contribution to the
Commonwealth Secretariat, which amounted to as much as a third of
the Commonwealth’s operating budget (Canadian Tamil Congress, 2014;
Mackrael, 2014).23
Additionally, the CTC was successful in bringing about a consensus
position amongst all three major parties, both in respect of its preferences
regarding Sri Lanka itself and in Canada’s policy towards the Sri Lankan
government and CHOGM, including calls to boycott the summit. The
Official Opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) launched a campaign
on 23rd April 2013 demanding the Conservative government boycott the
summit through its Shadow Foreign Minister, Paul Dewer and Tamil MP
Rathika Sitsabaiesan (NDP, 2013). Similarly, then Liberal foreign affairs
critic and long-time Sri Lanka observer Bob Rae called on the Tories to
boycott the summit (TamilNet, 2013).
In respect of the decision-making process, decisions regarding foreign
affairs issues such as Sri Lanka are not conventionally discussed at the
Cabinet-level (Protected source, former Canadian political staff c, 2016).
However, given that the decision pertained to the Commonwealth, the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister did raise it at the Cabinet com-
mittee on foreign affairs in a largely advisory capacity, but the decision
to boycott had already been taken by the Prime Minister and foreign
minister. Globally, Canada engaged in conversations with the British
government in advance of the decision to boycott the summit; it also
directly alerted Buckingham Palace of its intention. In those conversa-
tions, Canada advised that it was prepared to “go it alone” and boycott
the summit without the blessing of the UK (Protected source, former
Canadian political staff a, 2016).
Canada’s Tamil diaspora, as represented at the political level by the
CTC became temporary entrants into the foreign policymaking process
as role-makers during this period and was successful in aligning its pref-
erences with the preferred role conception of the Conservative govern-
ment in 2013, unlike the decision-making case in 2009. As argued in the
analysis section, Canada’s role allowed it to perform entirely in line with
Tamil diaspora interest group preferences. This is in contrast to the UK,
where despite British Tamil diaspora interest groups similarly acting as
temporary entrants in foreign policymaking, they would not be able to
force the British government to boycott due to its indispensable role at
the Commonwealth.
The Tamil diaspora and role-making in the UK: A bridge too far
Interventions by the Tamil diaspora with British government elites aimed
at isolating Sri Lanka at the Commonwealth began years before the
2013 CHOGM during the Labour government of Gordon Brown. Prime
Minister Brown attended the CHOGM in Port of Spain, Trinidad and
Tobago in November 2009 along with leaders from 49 of the 52 mem-
ber countries of the Commonwealth. As is customary at CHOGMs,
Commonwealth members vote to award the location of the body’s next
meeting two years hence to one of its members. Following on the heels
of the civil war, an expectant Sri Lanka was eager to be awarded the
CHOGM for 2011 as validation for its anti-terror policy and as a signal it
was emerging from decades of unrest and prepared to host a summit of
this magnitude (The Telegraph, 2009).
Sri Lanka had expressed its interest in hosting the summit two years
earlier in 2007 and in the intervening two years Commonwealth heads
had agreed to award the CHOGM to Colombo for 2011, including the
British FCO. In response, British Tamil diaspora elites met with Prime
Minister Brown in advance of the 2009 summit to argue that the Sri
Lankan government was not suitable to host the CHOGM in 2011 given
the allegations of war crimes at the close of the civil war and evidence
of its continued persecution of civilians since then (Protected source,
Tamils for Labour, 2015). Following this engagement, Brown agreed to
intercede at the 2009 CHOGM and to persuade other heads of govern-
ment to reconsider this honour for Sri Lanka (The Telegraph, 2009).24
Following additional support from Canadian Prime Minister Harper
and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Gordon Brown sought to
block Sri Lanka from hosting the CHOGM in 2011. A source in the Prime
Minister’s Office (No. 10 Down St.) noted on behalf of the Prime Minister
(Watt, 2009b):
We simply cannot be in a position where Sri Lanka – whose actions

earlier this year had a huge impact on civilians, leading to thousands
of displaced people without proper humanitarian access – is seen to
be rewarded for its actions … The prime minister will continue to
talk to other leaders about this, but is clear this won’t wash.
Despite pressure from the FCO to do otherwise, the Prime Minister was
successful in his efforts with Australia’s Rudd to “block” Sri Lanka from
hosting the summit in 2011 (Personal communications, Together Against
Genocide, 2015). Instead, it was agreed that the summit would be held in
Perth, Australia (Watt, 2009a).
Tamil diaspora interest groups were instrumental role-makers in per-
suading the Brown government to muster the support necessary at the
Commonwealth to postpone Sri Lanka’s hosting of the next CHOGM
to 2013 (Carver, 2015). They held meetings with his office and with other
elites in the Labour government in advance of the 2009 CHOGM, bring-
ing to bear evidence of war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment, which were at that time only alleged, and of the evidence of
continued repression in the months after the conflict had ended. The
British and Canadian delegations were united in their opposition to
awarding the Sri Lankan government the CHOGM for 2011, with a view
to putting in place a two-year window in which the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment would be on “probation,” with the expectation that it would
take tangible steps towards reconciliation and integrating the Tamil
population.25
As the 2013 CHOGM approached, Tamil diaspora elites from GTF,
BTF, TAG, and especially the BTCs lobbied as temporary entrants in role
contestation, maintaining consistent levels of communication with the
FCO and senior Tories in the now Conservative-led coalition government,
demanding the UK boycott the summit (British Tamil Conservatives,
2015; Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015). Meetings
between Tamil diaspora elites and the government began in earnest six
months prior to the CHOGM, with senior Ministers and inside advocates
such as Hugo Swire interacting with the BTC to ensure there was a direct
line of communication between them and government decision-makers.
In addition to meeting with political representatives, diaspora elites also
interacted directly with FCO bureaucracy and met with them as many
as three times per month in advance of the CHOGM (British Tamil
Conservatives, 2015; Protected source, Together Against Genocide,
2015). While the level of engagement was a demonstration of success in
itself in comparison to only a few years earlier, the FCO was still not
amenable to their views (Protected source, Member of Parliament, UK
Labour, 2015).
Following the visit to Sri Lanka of Alistair Burt, FCO Minister for
South Asia, he noted that as of February 2013 Britain had not yet decided
whether to attend the Sri Lanka CHOGM and continued to have con-
cerns as to Sri Lanka’s progress since 2011 (Burt, 2013). As the summit
approached, there was a view amongst Tamil diaspora elites that their
interventions could not afford to be subtle, and they exerted consider-
able pressure on the Tories in private (Protected source, British Tamil
Conservatives, 2015). The BTC used its leverage and threatened to with-
draw its political and financial support should Prime Minister Cameron
attend the CHOGM. Externally, protests on the scale of 2009 were not
witnessed, but were nevertheless organised by the BTF (Protected source,
British Tamil Forum, 2015). In addition, the BTF and other diaspora
organisations mobilised the Tamil grassroots community through a let-
ter-writing campaign to ensure that political elites were aware that Tamils
in Britain were watching the government’s decision-making closely.
As in Canada, a virtual consensus across the political spectrum had
been attained on post-war issues in Sri Lanka (Tamil Guardian, 2013).
The opposition Labour Party, now led by Ed Miliband, the brother of
former Foreign Secretary David Miliband, also aligned with the prefer-
ences of the Tamil diaspora in calling for a boycott of the CHOGM right
up to the meeting itself. In spite of this unity at the political level and with
significant access to Cabinet, political pressure could not be brought to
bear on the FCO (Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015).
The FCO advocated staunchly to the Prime Minister that he attend the
CHOGM. Their perspective was born of the reality that the absence of
the UK at the highest level may jeopardise the Commonwealth itself,
could create challenges in South Asia and that the UK’s absence from the
meeting was not in the national interest. Despite pressure from the FCO,
Tamil diaspora elites had not given up on the possibility of a boycott
Ultimately, the Tamil diaspora was made aware by inside advocates
that Prime Minister Cameron was in no position to boycott the summit
following confirmation that the Prince of Wales would be attending in
the Queen’s stead (Protected source, Together Against Genocide, 2015).
Unlike Stephen Harper, as the Prime Minister of the UK and given the
UK’s indispensable role in the Commonwealth, Cameron was unable to
avoid attending the summit as it might have led to many other heads of
government withdrawing and the entire Commonwealth project unravel-
ling. Knowing the political ramifications of this decision and in a position
of conciliation, Downing Street asked Tamil diaspora elites what could
be done to use his now unavoidable presence in Sri Lanka to turn the
spotlight on their issues (Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives,
2015).
Rather than focus their energy on deriding the government for attend-
ing the summit, Tamil diaspora role-makers worked with the government
to ensure that the maximum amount of benefit could be extracted from
his visit. In the weeks before CHOGM, Tamil diaspora elites worked
directly with 10 Downing St. staff to “choreograph” his visit. With a view
to building into his schedule symbolic and literal protestations against
the Government of Sri Lanka, the Tamil diaspora was able to extract
a number of important concessions from the government, including
an overarching commitment to use his visit to highlight human rights
abuses in the country. Firstly, Cameron began his meeting with President
Rajapaksa by addressing straight on the repression of journalists, attacks
on Christians and Muslims and the unlawful seizure of land. For his part,
Rajapaksa accused Cameron of pandering to the Tamil diaspora in the
UK (Mason, 2013).26 Secondly, following this meeting Cameron travelled
north to become the first world leader to visit Jaffna since Sri Lanka was
granted independence in 1948. In doing so, he missed the opening cere-
mony for the CHOGM in Colombo. Finally, the Tamil diaspora believes
they were successful in wrangling small victories from the Tories, such
as Cameron’s refusal to accept a garland of flowers upon his arrival, his
refusal to sign a formal book of courtesy, his refusal to travel in a Sri
Lankan car and a commitment from him to raise their issues with the
Government of Sri Lanka (BBC News, 2013a).27
Vertical role contestation and influencing

role conception and performance
Vertical role contestation discusses the interaction between non-elite
agents and foreign policy elites with a view to understanding whether non-
elites influence role contestation, and therefore the role conception and
performance decisions of states. The cases in Chapter 4 observed Tamil
diaspora agents emerging from a period of redevelopment; in the UK, they
gained temporary access to role contestation, but did not in Canada. The
Table 6.1 2013 factor comparison
Canada UK
Agency factors
Diasporic mobilisation Y Y
Diaspora size Y Y
Numerical significance in Y Y
parliamentary constituencies
Diaspora group resources Y Y
Political salience Y Y
Group homogeneity Y Y
Credibility Y Y
Learning Y Y
Institutional factors
Host country inclusivity Y Y
Institutional permeability Y Y
Presence of rival constituencies N N
Role conception alignment Y N
International role performance Y N
Diaspora strategies
Direct lobbying Y Y
Mass movement protests Y Y
cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate vertical role contestation at

a wholly more sophisticated level, where the diaspora in both countries
gained temporary entrance to policymaking as role-makers and exhibited
influence over role contestation. Institutionally, the loci of international
activity shifted entirely to the theatre of the Commonwealth and role per-
formance focused on one key decision-point: Attending the 2013 CHOGM.
As before, Table 6.1 summarises the presence (Y) or the absence (N) of
factors the literature argues impact the influence diasporas have on host
country role contestation. Factors which did not change significantly
between these periods, such as diaspora size and resources, are not dis-
cussed at length again.
Agency factors in role contestation

Beginning with Diaspora mobilisation, in both cases a far larger num-
ber of Tamils, in particular youth, became involved and ingrained in the
political systems of both host countries rather than exclusively through
mass movement demonstrations. Tamil activists became more visible
and better connected into both left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties.
Indeed, the access created by trusted political activists was essential to
communicating diaspora preferences directly to political decision-making
elites, something that was not possible in the first case in Canada. The
CTC’s extensive involvement in the Conservative Party in Canada and
the creation of the BTC in the UK led to both diasporas becoming tem-
porary entrants in role contestation.
As diaspora interest groups became more sophisticated and successful
in reaching out to conservative parties, governing conservative parties
began to view the Tamil diaspora as more politically salient than in 2009.
In Canada, the Scarborough area of Toronto contained five electoral dis-
tricts which were for many years the sole preserve of the Liberal Party
of Canada, considered almost unwinnable by the Conservative Party
or the NDP (Clark, 2011). In 2011, Canada’s general election returned
a Conservative majority government in which two of these five constit-
uencies were won by the Conservative Party for the first time in recent
memory, with another two of the five constituencies won by the NDP.
The sudden shift in electoral fortunes in once predictable electoral dis-
tricts awakened a keen interest in the Conservative party to Tamil issues
(Protected source, former Canadian political staff b, 2016). To this effect,
Conservative strategists recognised that there was political capital to be
built within the Tamil community through the issue of Sri Lanka (Raj,
2013). Literature from the Conservative party being sent to these Tamil-
dominated constituencies highlighted the government’s actions on the Sri
Lanka issue, including the 2015 campaign promise to open up a Canadian
embassy in Tamil-dominated Jaffna. Efforts by the Conservative Party to
appeal to a more diverse constituency led to a stronger desire to listen
to Tamils and to internalise their preferences.28 Similar overtures were
made by British Conservative political leadership to strategic constitu-
encies with large Tamil populations in a parallel desire to wrest formerly
Labour-held seats.
Group homogeneity, which posed challenges for the Tamil diaspora in
the first case in Canada, was not an issue on this occasion as the CTC
was seen as the principal voice of the Tamil community in Canada and a
trusted interlocutor for political elites.
However, in the UK, following the defeat of the LTTE and the crea-
tion of new, transnational Tamil diaspora organisations, in particular
the GTF, differences in policy and territorial claims challenged diaspora
elite unity in the UK. A schism between the BTF and GTF over the final
status of Tamil Eelam led to a breakdown in communication between the
two (Protected source, Global Tamil Forum, 2015). However, in advance
of the CHOGM decision, diaspora elites were able to temporarily bury
their differences and unite in the call for boycott. The BTC and Tamils
for Labour disengaged themselves from disagreements between the BTF
and GTF to focus on partisan network-building. Their focus allowed
the diaspora to continue to strengthen its position in policymaking
and ensured diaspora schisms did not hamper their gaining temporary
entry as role-makers. For this reason, I consider diaspora preferences as
homogenous.
Credibility was also a factor witnessing a dramatic evolution between
the early 2000s and the above discussed cases. Since 2009, diaspora inter-
est groups interfacing with policymakers in both countries saw their
credibility enhanced as the primary voice for the Tamil diaspora. The
CTC, through its youth programme, was viewed more credibly by the
Conservative government and the BTC in the UK became a trusted, cred-
ible interlocutor between the diaspora and the Conservative-dominated
coalition government. The FCO in the UK, which had hitherto largely
shunned Tamil diaspora interest groups continued interacting with elite
leadership.
Learning continued to be an important factor as diaspora interest
groups became more credible and their political networks expanded.
Inter-diaspora emulation continued as well through the BTC una-
bashed modelling of more established Jewish organisations, such as CFI
and AIPAC in the US. The CTC also became more sophisticated in its
strategy with the Conservative government, working harder to tailor its
demands to the role conception preferred by the Tories in comparison
to 2009. Neither diaspora relied on contentious demonstrations dur-
ing this period, given the Tory disinclination to respond positively to
demonstrations.
Institutional factors in role contestation

The first institutional factor which requires mentioning in this section is
institutional permeability. In the Canadian case, there was little meaning-
ful opposition to Tamil diaspora interest group preferences by elite offi-
cials or partisan elites. Tamil diaspora elites became temporary entrants
into Canadian foreign policy decision-making in this case, representing
a significant change from 2009. In like manner, British Tamil diaspora
elites became temporary entrants in role contestation as they had in 2009,
despite the change in government in 2010. However, as in the previous
chapter the FCO in the UK was opposed to the Tamil diaspora’s role per-
formance preference of having Prime Minister Cameron boycott the 2013
CHOGM (Protected source, British Tamil Conservatives, 2015). Given
the amount of restored influence the FCO had grown to have over foreign
policymaking, the reality that it took the UK right up to the CHOGM
itself to commit to attending demonstrates the influence the Tamil dias-
pora had by then achieved. However, the FCO believed a boycott by the
UK would be a dramatic deviation from the country’s role conception
and consequently not be in the national interest as it could imperil the
Commonwealth and the UK’s influence in it.29 Additionally, concern was
expressed by the FCO that a boycott of the CHOGM would do signifi-
cant damage to the UK-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship. Ultimately, these
views and the attendance of the Prince of Wales ensured the FCO’s advice
was followed. Despite the Tamil diaspora failing to bring about a boycott
as a consequence of FCO opposition, I still consider the Tamil diaspora as
temporary entrants given the intimate level of involvement diaspora elites
had in choreographing the Prime Minister’s visit to Sri Lanka.
Tamil diaspora interest groups were challenged by rival constituencies
in the form of the Government of Sri Lanka, which undertook efforts
to reframe itself, the Tamil diaspora and the country to political deci-
sion-makers. As more and more politicians and non-Tamil campaigners
in Canada and the UK began to formally associate themselves with the
diaspora and with Tamil diaspora interest groups, the Sri Lankan High
Commission hired a professional lobby group to give the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment greater access to political decision-makers. Beginning in 2008,
the Embassy of Sri Lanka in Washington, DC, hired Patton and Boggs
LLP for US lobbying efforts and hired Bell Pottinger Group in Britain to
promote their achievements following the war and to deflect calls for a
war crimes investigation (International Crisis Group, 2010).30 In addition
to image enhancement, the Sri Lankan government also recognised that
its offensive to taint the Tamil diaspora through its association with the
LTTE was no longer successful.
Despite these costly efforts, the Government of Sri Lanka was largely
unsuccessful in distancing mainstream politicians from the Tamil dias-
pora for two reasons. Firstly, the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa was
viewed suspiciously and was indeed reviled by some members of the gov-
ernment in both Canada and the UK. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen
Harper and Foreign Minister John Baird distrusted the Sri Lankan High
Commission and their professional lobbyists from the outset. Prime
Minister Harper had referred to Rajapaksa as “odious” (Protected
source, former Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016). The Cameron
government similarly had a growing distaste for the Sri Lankan govern-
ment and no overtures, no matter how polished, were enough to convince
the Conservatives that the Sri Lankan government was free from blame
over abuses during the civil war or that its practices in the post-conflict
environment were beyond reproach. Secondly, the approach employed
by professional lobbyists was not successful. Numerous Members
of Parliament who met with representatives of the Sri Lankan High
Commission reported back to Tamil diaspora elites that they felt their
presentations were insincere, the factual pretences of the arguments did
not conform with their understanding of the reality in Sri Lanka and
that their approach was “arrogant” (Personal communications, Member
of Parliament, UK Conservative Party, 2015). For this reason, while cer-
tainly being present in both cases, the Sri Lankan government was not a
significant rival constituency and it failed to influence role contestation.
With regard to alignment with host country role conception, this changed
in the Canadian case, but not in the UK. Beginning with Canada, there
are a number of lenses through which the Harper government’s decision
to boycott the Colombo Summit can be viewed, including the Harper
government’s more assertive, moralistic approach to foreign policy, dis-
illusionment with the Commonwealth and emotional investment on the
part of Foreign Minister Baird. Firstly, following Canada’s decision to
boycott the summit, Foreign Minister Baird publicly justified the deci-
sion by indicating the efforts it had taken to pressure the Sri Lankan
government to act in line with the preferences articulated above by the
CTC. These interventions included (Baird, 2013):
… more than 30 public statements on the situation in Sri Lanka; ten

separate Parliamentary interventions; 25 interventions in multilat-
eral fora ranging from the Commonwealth to the United Nations;
89 bilateral interventions with a range of Commonwealth countries,
including Sri Lanka …
The Sri Lankan government’s intransigence and its continued perse-

cution of Tamils starkly contrasted with the moralistic role conception
of the Canadian government and boycotting the summit served as an
opportunity for it to perform as a disrupter in international institutions
motivated by human rights issues.
Secondly, Foreign Minister Baird and Prime Minister Harper, who
had initially determined to engage the Commonwealth, became disil-
lusioned with the institution in the months and years leading up to the
summit. The foreign minister in particular viewed the Sri Lanka issue
as having parallels with South Africa in the 1980s, when then Tory
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney famously led Commonwealth countries
against South Africa and ultimately to its historic expulsion from the
institution (Protected source, former Canadian Member of Parliament,
2016). However, the Commonwealth’s privileging of cultural and busi-
ness exchange rather than calling members to account for human rights
abuses led the Canadian government to believe the Commonwealth was
not living up to its own values.31 It was this unwillingness on the part of
the Commonwealth to hold its members to the standards it set for itself
that the Harper government went one step further and withdrew fund-
ing from the institution. The Harper government argued that subsidising
an organisation which failed to hold members accountable was contrary
to its moralistic approach to foreign policy. The boycott of the summit
and the withdrawal of support to the Commonwealth to protest the Sri
Lankan government conformed entirely with the Harper government’s
“disrupter” role conception internationally.
Finally, like Foreign Secretary Hague and Miliband in the UK, Foreign
Minister Baird was a trusted ally of the Prime Minister and given a great
deal of freedom in the international affairs portfolio, advancing a “we
won’t go along to get along” human rights role conception (Protected
source, former Canadian political staff c, 2016). He had taken a deep
interest in the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka and felt personally commit-
ted to seeing their situation improved. Like Foreign Secretary Miliband,
his sympathy was in part evoked by the emotional appeals made to him
directly by inside advocates, in this case Tamils. He became an advocate
for the Tamil community at the Commonwealth, raising the situation
of Tamils in Sri Lanka at Commonwealth meetings in advance of 2013
despite it not being permitted on the agenda and his personal frustration
at the lack of progress led in part to the boycott (Protected source, for-
mer Canadian Member of Parliament, 2016).
With respect to the role conception of the UK, since the 2009 case
analysed in the last chapter the UK experienced a major political shift
with the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition gov-
ernment in 2010. However, as argued in Chapter 4, there was little var-
iation in British role conception. The UK continued to view itself as
an international hub, convening power and a strong multilateralist. In
addition, the government cultivated a role conception that reflected the
British national interest which prioritised support for British economic
growth. However, and in contrast to some of these conceptions, the gov-
ernment was ill-disposed to repressive authoritarianism and was disin-
clined towards the appeasement of oppressors. In a fashion similar to
the Harper government, Foreign Secretary Hague argued that the UK
would not compromise human rights to advance its economic national
interests.
The demand of the Tamil diaspora to boycott the CHOGM summit
contrasted with this convening, multilateralist role. This is especially
true given that the institution in question was the Commonwealth, which
the Cameron government had at least in principle committed itself to
strengthening. This role contestation was directly influenced by the
Tamil diaspora, which strongly favoured the UK returning to a role in
which it would risk delegitimising international institutions in favour of
a more moralistic approach. Despite not boycotting the summit, the UK
government’s decision to admonish and embarrass the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment when host and incoming Chair of the Commonwealth suggests
a willingness on the part of the Cameron government to respond to these
petitions and to some extent depart from its preferred role conception.
As put forward in Chapter 2, considering the question of role contes-
tation through the lens of the international role performance is critical
because it helps to define the boundaries within which host states as
international actors are able to act. These cases make clear the liberty
and constraints placed on states to act internationally and, importantly
for diaspora mobilisation, the extent to which states can respond to non-
elite domestic role-makers. Beginning with Canada, its role position
had not changed internationally, within the Commonwealth or bilat-
erally with Sri Lanka in comparison to the foregoing decision-making
process. Canada’s foreign policy review in 2011 affirmed the desire of
the Conservative government to pursue policies which enhanced trade,
with a moralistic approach to some bilateral relations and a sceptical
approach to multilateral institutions. At the Commonwealth, Canada’s
influential role was visible in 2009 when it allied with the UK to move
Sri Lanka’s hosting of the CHOGM to 2013, with the caveat that it make
improvements in its treatment of the Tamil minority.
Through Canada’s review of its foreign policy approach in 2011
following the coming to office of John Baird as Foreign Minister,
Conservative foreign policy elites were aware of Canada’s limited sta-
tus and therefore its capacity to influence the behaviour of other inter-
national actors (Protected source, former Canadian political staff c,
2016). However, what foreign policy political elites sought to do was to
take principled, undiluted positions on international issues. The boy-
cott of the Commonwealth is indicative of this. While the UK was not
able to boycott the summit itself, foreign policy elites believed that
Canada’s firm position would permit a country like the UK, with less
flexibility to act, to take a firmer position than it otherwise might with
Canada as precedent. Indeed, there is some evidence that Canada’s
decision did put pressure on the UK to do the same or at least to go
further than it otherwise would to admonish the Sri Lankan govern-
ment (Blanchfield, 2012).
Despite the above rationale for the Conservative government’s deci-
sion, there were also associated risks. Firstly, civil servants and polit-
ical staff were aware that a boycott by the Prime Minister would limit
Canada’s ability to speak out with authority at the CHOGM on this and
other issues (Protected source, former Canadian political staff a, 2016).
Secondly, the government was reticent to cause embarrassment or in any
way damage the Monarchy through its boycott given that the Queen is
the Head of the Commonwealth and Canada’s Head of State (Protected
source, former Canadian political staff c, 2016).32 Finally, given Canada’s
long-standing support for and influence within the Commonwealth, there
was a view that Canada’s boycott may significantly weaken the institution
as there were already questions at this time being asked about the insti-
tution’s utility (Weerawardhana, 2013).33 However, when the Rajapaksa
government “doubled down” on its defence of its treatment of the Tamil
community, the government believed it had no other option.
Despite these risks, Canada believed it was able to perform entirely in
line with the preferences of the Tamil diaspora. The role position of the
UK, on the other hand, unavoidably constrained the country’s role per-
formance options. Firstly, as articulated in greater detail in Chapter 4,
the UK’s significant diplomatic, trade and strategic relationship with Sri
Lanka was damaged by its remonstrations in 2009. The UK’s boycott of
Sri Lanka in this case would have done nothing to improve this bilateral
relationship and indeed would have placed it under even greater strain.
Secondly and of greater importance is Britain’s indispensable role in the
Commonwealth. As evidenced by its manoeuvres at the Commonwealth
in 2009, the UK retains paramount influence in the Commonwealth
such that it was able to delay Sri Lanka’s hosting of the CHOGM, albeit
through the building of a coalition of like-minded members. In part
because of the controversy around Sri Lanka’s hosting of the summit in
2013, discourse at the time was heavily critical of the Commonwealth,
with some questioning its broader utility (Booth, 2013; Protected source,
Commonwealth elite, 2016). Such was the level of discussion that the 2013
CHOGM was a particularly sensitive summit and there was a belief that
further blows to its credibility might have destabilised it existentially.
Additionally, the decision of the Prince of Wales to attend the summit
on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II ensured that its most influential patron
desired to bolster the body.
It was on this basis that Conservative party elites communicated to
Tamil diaspora elites that Prime Minister Cameron was in no position
to boycott the summit. Had the government pursued this significant
deviation from its convening role conception, it was possible many
other Heads of Government would view this as a statement of British
non-confidence in the Commonwealth, may have led to its collapse and
resulted in international embarrassment for the Royal Family. Pursuant
to Britain’s overall role conception of strengthening international insti-
tutions and the influence it exerts through the Commonwealth, this
eventuality would have been detrimental to the UK’s national interest.
With the UK existing as an indispensable actor in the Commonwealth
institution, no amount of further pressure from the Tamil diaspora
could have compelled the UK to boycott the summit, even threats by
the BTC to withdraw support. However, elites were able to extract a
number of concessions as outlined in the above section.
Diasporas and role contestation strategies

Considering the strategies employed by Tamil diaspora interest groups
in both host countries, each developed more sophisticated direct lobby-
ing strategies tailored to interventions with Conservative governments.
Direct lobbying by the CTC in Canada was supported to a much greater
extent in this case by the presence of Tamil Conservative Party elites as
inside advocates within the Conservative party, who provided more par-
tisan channels of access than were present in the 2009 case. These advo-
cates were able to tailor diaspora preferences to align with the role
conception of the Harper government and ensure that approaches were
tempered by the expectations of what role performance outcomes might
be possible. Similarly, Tory inside advocates established by the BTC, such
as MP Hugo Swire ensured diaspora elites were privy to discussions tak-
ing place internally and could adjust their approaches accordingly. What
is perhaps distinct between Canada and the UK was the clear threat on
the part of the BTC to pull support for the Conservative Party should it
proceed to attend the CHOGM. This was not done by Tamils for Labour
in 2009 and represents the “hard edge” the BTC is willing to use to exert
influence.
In respect of mass movement collective action, demonstrations did
take place in Canada and the UK, but these were relevant only insofar
as they reminded governments of the Tamils as a voting bloc and that
they were monitoring its decision-making. The Conservative government
in Canada was not moved by grassroots demonstrations, as was clearly
seen in the 2009 case where if anything Tamil demonstrations reduced
their influence with the Conservatives. In 2013, the emphasis on direct
lobbying by the Canadian Tamil diaspora allowed for the use of emo-
tional appeals in meetings with government elites, which was far more
effective. They framed their demands to align with the Tories’ role con-
ception, characterised by a principled approach to foreign policy, and
this was more advantageous than the contentious outside activism seen
in 2009. This approach was replicated in the UK, where protests had far
less influence on Conservative governments, which by inclination are less
receptive to mass movements.
Role theoretical implications for disaggregating

diasporas in role contestation
The above compares micro-level narratives of vertical role contestation,
wherein non-elite domestic agents sought inclusion in elite-level debates
about how states should conceive of and perform their roles internation-
ally (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). Existing Role Theory scholarship has
reflected the spirit of Holsti’s (1970) desire to incorporate less observed
actors in international affairs at the domestic level through the develop-
ment of this approach and its application. The above disaggregation of
agency and institutional factors in role contestation adds to this growing
discourse and raises a number of important theoretical implications for
Role Theory scholarship.
Firstly, and from an agency perspective, these cases further convey
the importance of disaggregating agency factors when considering the
influence of marginalised, non-elite role-makers in role contestation,
particularly in respect of learning, credibility and political salience.
Scholarship has emphasised the importance of diaspora learning
(Harnisch, 2012; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The temporal approach
taken by this book demonstrates how non-elite diaspora agents con-
sciously evolve strategies over time, in these cases relying less on
mass movements to appeal to Conservative-led governments and
instead refining direct lobbying strategies with a view to permeating
decision-making and gaining temporary entrance as role-makers. In
the Canadian case, rather than relying on mass movements which had
proven a hindrance in lobbying the Harper government, the diaspora
chose to better align its preferences with the government’s preferred
disrupter role conception. Through becoming temporary entrants
in the foreign policy decision-making process, the diaspora was in a
position to strategically tailor its interests to conform to the govern-
ment’s role conception. In this way, role conception alignment is an
efficacious direct lobbying strategy for non-elite interest groups seeking
to become role-making agents. Role theory is thusly ideally suited to
observe the involvement of non-elites in role contestation and explain
how their evolving strategies lead to role-making.
In addition to temporal learning, inter-diaspora learning continued to
be of relevance, especially in the UK with the emergence of the BTC.
Mirroring organisations involved in advocacy related to Israel, the BTC
responded to the need for the diaspora to establish inside advocates
within the Conservative Party. Similarly eschewing contentious mass
movement strategies, the emergence of the BTC ensured that the Tamil
diaspora retained its position to directly lobby as role-makers, despite
the change in government in 2010. What is distinct from other cases
was the willingness of the BTC to leverage its political support for the
Conservatives to pressure the government to boycott the Commonwealth
summit. Furthermore, having established itself as a role-making agent in
this case, the diaspora was able to limit the influence of the Sri Lankan
government as a potential rival in role contestation. This demonstrates
that non-elite role-makers having gained temporary entrance in role
contestation are in a position to exert significant political pressure to
influence role conception and role performance. Role Theory scholar-
ship benefits from viewing non-elite agents in vertical role contestation
temporally, as variations in strategy over time can lead to change in per-
meability and role-making influence.
Secondly, the importance of establishing credibility for marginalised,
non-elite agents is once again underlined by the above role contestation
processes. In 2009, the Canadian Tamil diaspora was not considered a
credible agent, was excluded temporary entrance into foreign policymak-
ing and therefore did not become role-makers. The CTC undertook to
rectify this shortcoming through establishing internship programmes for
young Tamils in an effort to establish the inside advocates missing in
2009 and to expunge the taint of the LTTE’s legacy. Through gaining
temporary entrance in policymaking, they were able to convey emotional
appeals to government elites as well as policy preferences such as refer-
ences to the Tamil nation and the opening up of a diplomatic presence
in Jaffna. As in Canada, the perception of British Conservatives shifted
from its earlier wariness given the diaspora’s association with the LTTE.
The BTC established Tamil diaspora elites as Conservative Party mem-
bers, instigated similar parliamentary internship programmes, offered
support to candidates and institutionalised itself within the Conservative
party. These efforts were critical in maintaining diaspora homogeneity
as role-makers despite the schism between the GTF and the BTF, as
well as being able to pressure the government politically as noted above.
Credibility is therefore an important factor in establishing marginalised,
non-elite agents as temporary entrants in foreign policymaking as
role-makers.
Finally, the literature on diasporas and foreign policy influence has
argued that the political salience of non-elite agents in the view of gov-
ernment in pluralist democracies is a critical factor (Dewitt and Kirton,
2015, 70). As Conservative parties in both countries became more attuned
to the interests of diaspora communities in general, they became more
receptive to diaspora interest group preferences. Becoming temporary
entrants, in part by becoming more salient, led to the Canadian diaspora
having the opportunity to make direct emotional appeals to Cabinet
leadership. In the UK, the Tamil diaspora continued to enjoy temporary
access following the coming to office of the Conservative-led government
in 2010. Role Theory application to non-elite agents in role contestation
benefit from this disaggregated approach, in this case having identified
that learning, credibility and political salience are all factors which con-
tribute to marginalised, non-elite agents becoming role-makers in role
contestation.
Turning to an institutional perspective, Role Theory firstly accounts for
contestation that involves realist conceptions of national interest gains,
the state’s role conception and domestic agents advancing their own inter-
ests (Beneš and Harnisch, 2015; Grossman, 2005). In the Canadian case
this chapter explored, there was little variation between the disrupter role
conception of the Harper government and the preferences of the Tamil
diaspora, indeed they reinforced one another to a great extent. The Tamil
diaspora was able to align its preferences such that Canada’s disruptive
role performance at the Commonwealth became an opportunity for the
Harper government to demonstrate deviation from Canada’s more tra-
ditional roles under previous governments. For the Harper government,
human rights abuses in Sri Lanka represented an opportunity for a stark,
moralistic decision point to assert the change in Canada’s role concep-
tion where it would “not go along to get along.” However, it can also be
argued that role performance in this case conflicts with realist notions of
national interest gains, in that it markedly diminished Canada’s influence
in the Commonwealth as well as significantly strained Canada’s bilateral
relations with a long-standing ally and trading partner. Additionally,
this decision was also in conflict with the Harper government’s broader
efforts to strengthen Canada’s trade relations through diplomacy. The
variation in role performance and national interest gains also featured in
the role contestation in the UK case as addressed below. When consider-
ing non-elite agents in role contestation, this case demonstrates the need
to demarcate between the perceived interests of the “monolithic” state
and those of non-government forces. However, as articulated in existing
role theory literature, role conception can act as an intervening factor,
whereby interest group alignment with government role conception may
trump even its national interest priorities.
Secondly, when considering role position and international role con-
straints, this comparison demonstrates that states which are not indis-
pensable to an institution may have greater liberty to act disruptively
than more influential states and, furthermore, provide the opportunity
to expand the role performance options of more influential states. With
regard to Canada’s role performance at the Commonwealth in response
to Tamil diaspora preferences, it performed maximally. From the Prime
Minister boycotting the summit to withdrawing funding from the insti-
tution entirely, Canada’s actions met the preferences of Tamil diaspora
interests in full. The Harper government did this with the knowledge that
it would damage the Commonwealth, but not existentially. When com-
pared against Canada’s role performance in Chapter 5, its absence at the
UN Security Council and its less influential bilateral relationship with
the US limited its role performance options on behalf of Tamil diaspora
interests. However, Canada’s comparatively more influential role posi-
tion at the Commonwealth afforded it a substantive theatre of action to
perform its preferred role conception of disrupter in full alignment with
the preferences of the Tamil diaspora. Furthermore, role performance
in this case was in keeping with the Harper government’s desire to put
pressure on more influential states like the UK by expanding the poles
of possible role performance options. A role theoretical analysis demon-
strates that non-elite agents in role contestation may be able to influ-
ence the role performance of more influential states through supporting
a disrupter role performance in less influential states. More broadly, this
analysis suggests that states which may be less influential in the inter-
national system have more liberty to respond to non-elite, diaspora
interests than more dominant states. When examining the influence of
domestic, non-elite interests in vertical role contestation, considering the
role position of states in all possible theatres of role performance is of
critical importance.
Finally, the British case discussed above demonstrates the utility of
more systematically ascribing the role position of states with a view to
ascertaining whether non-elite role-makers influence role contestation.
The vignette offered in Chapter 2 of Canadian and French role perfor-
mance in La Francophonie is mirrored by the comparison in this chapter
focused on the Commonwealth, where at first glance it may look like the
Tamil diaspora had more influence in Canada given it chose to boycott
the summit. In the British case, the Cameron government was clearly
sympathetic to the preferences of the Tamil diaspora, as evidenced by its
delay in announcing its intentions before the CHOGM and especially in
the Prime Minister’s activities highlighting Tamil issues while in the Sri
Lanka. However, despite its desire to deviate from its preferred conven-
ing role in a fashion similar to the Brown government in 2009, the UK
government was unable to perform to the extent desired by the Tamil
diaspora. The UK’s indispensable role position in the Commonwealth
is the primary explanatory factor for the Cameron government’s failure
to fully perform in alignment with Tamil preferences. Boycotting the
summit and the subsequent absence of the institution’s dominant actor
had the potential to existentially imperil the Commonwealth, the utility
of which was much in question at that time. The influence of the Tamil
diaspora as role-makers is nevertheless observable, where the Cameron
government instead used the visit to Sri Lanka to highlight Tamil issues,
despite the risk of this further damaging the two country’s significant and
long-standing political and economic ties.
As advanced in Chapter 2, ascribing role position in role theoretical
analyses allows for the identification of international role constraints
that bound options for state performance. Doing so in this case makes
it possible to conclude that the Tamil diaspora had comparatively more
influence in the UK than it did in Canada despite the former not per-
forming in full alignment with diaspora preferences. This is because
Canada’s desired role conception and performance were in full align-
ment with the Tamil diaspora, whereas this was not the case with the
UK. However, the Tamil diaspora was still able to influence the UK’s
role performance within the constraints confining it as an indispensable
state. Without ascribing role position and defining international role con-
straints on state performance, scholars risk failing to capture instances
of significant influence in vertical role contestation such as those from
diaspora interest groups.
Conclusion
This book’s second comparison of vertical role contestation in Canada
and the UK once again disaggregated agency and institutional factors
aiming to explain why non-elite agents influence role conception and
performance. I began this chapter by arguing that Tamil diaspora inter-
est groups continued to seek temporary access in role contestation as
role-makers, despite the end of the civil war and the defeat of the LTTE.
Motivated by the intransigence of the Rajapaksa government to put in
place a credible transitional justice process, the continued persecution
of Sri Lankan and diaspora Tamils as well as a desire to continue the
struggle for Tamil Eelam, non-elite interest groups sought to pressure Sri
Lanka to alter its behaviour through Canadian and British role perfor-
mance. Diaspora mobilisation in Canada and the UK culminated in role
contestation processes where Tamil interest groups demanded that gov-
ernments boycott the 2013 Commonwealth Summit hosted by Sri Lanka.
The disaggregation of agency factors captured a number of changes
since the vertical role contestation comparison of the 2009 cases. Firstly,
several new transnational organisations formed in the diaspora following
the collapse of the LTTE; these included the TGTE and GTF. In the post-
civil war period, existing organisations such as the CTC and the BTF
continued to grow in sophistication, deepening their networks at the polit-
ical level and building partisan credibility with the governing Tories. The
creation of the BTC greatly assisted in the British diaspora gaining tem-
porary entrance into role contestation. In both cases, these direct lobby-
ing strategies resulted in securing inside advocates which helped to convey
diaspora role preferences. Paralleling these efforts, governing Conservative
parties in Canada and the UK viewed the Tamil diaspora, and dias-
pora communities in general as more politically salient, at the same time
becoming more attuned to their issues and role preferences. Indeed, this
period witnessed a “sea change” from a time when Tories were unlikely
to engage at all with the Tamil community to a point where they viewed
Tamil diaspora groups as credible and salient. With regard to group homo-
geneity, British Tamil diaspora elites continued to be able to put aside their
differences and mobilise as a united front in calling for a boycott. Unlike in
2009 when Tamil diaspora elites diverged in their mobilisation approach
with mass movements, the Canadian Tamil diaspora was united in its
elite-level interactions with the Harper government. Non-elite Tamil dias-
pora agents became role-makers in both cases through gaining temporary
entrance in role contestation. Finally, whereas in 2009 the Tamil diaspora
lacked inside advocates supporting their preferences in role contestation,
in 2013 Tamil diaspora interest groups permeated foreign-policymaking
and became temporary entrants through efforts of Tamils now involved
in the Conservative government. In the UK, Tamil diaspora elites once
again became temporary entrants in decision-making despite the opposi-
tion of FCO officials to their preferences and efforts by the government of
Sri Lanka to stymie Tamil diaspora mobilisation.
With respect to role conception alignment, there was an observa-
ble change in respect alignment between the Canadian Tamil diaspora
and the role conception of the Harper government. In 2009, while there
was some alignment with the government’s disrupter role, the taint of
the LTTE hindered the ability for the diaspora to align with the Harper
government’s emphasis on security and countering terrorism. By 2013,
the Tamil diaspora was no longer viewed with the same scepticism and
its role preference for Canada to disrupt the Commonwealth summit
and reproach the Sri Lankan government was entirely aligned with the
Harper government’s role conception. In the UK, Tamil diaspora role
conception preferences contrasted with that of the Cameron govern-
ment, which continued to espouse a multilateralist, convening role for
the UK. Furthermore, the UK’s role position as the indispensable actor
in the Commonwealth further restricted its ability to conceive of its role
in alignment with diaspora preferences, despite sympathising with the
impetus for the Tamil diaspora’s preferences. Role contestation in the
UK reached the Cabinet-level and, despite the UK’s failure to boycott
the summit, the Tamil diaspora was nevertheless able to influence role
performance through the visit of Prime Minister Cameron to Sri Lanka.
The Canadian government performed entirely in line with Tamil
diaspora preferences, including through boycotting the CHOGM in Sri
Lanka at the Prime Ministerial level, sending a lower-level delegation with
a mandate to disrupt the summit through raising the Sri Lankan govern-
ment’s human rights record and finally by stripping the Commonwealth
Secretariat of Canadian government funding shortly after the summit.
Unlike in 2009, the Canadian government in 2013 performed to the full-
est extent possible in line with Tamil diaspora preferences. Despite exten-
sive pressure brought to bear on the Conservative government of David
Cameron, he ultimately attended the summit. With the Commonwealth
already institutionally weak in advance of the 2013 summit and with the
Prince of Wales having committed to attend, the UK was unable to boy-
cott the summit. As the institution’s indispensable actor, no amount of
direct lobbying on the part of the Tamil diaspora could bring about a
change in its performance. However, the influence of the Tamil diaspora
could nevertheless be observed during the Prime Minister’s visit, which
featured a range of steps to call attention to the human rights situation in
Sri Lanka to the embarrassment of the Rajapaksa government.
This chapter’s comparison of two, additional cases of vertical role con-
testation by the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK further reveals
that marginalised diasporas influence foreign policy decision-making in
Canada and the UK through becoming temporary entrants as role-makers
in role contestation. However, while governments may be receptive to
these demands, international role constraints can prove insurmountable
obstacles for diaspora domestic sources of role contestation.
Notes
1. There were many credible reports of abductions at checkpoints and by
“white vans” leading to hundreds of cases of forced disappearances. There
was widespread evidence that while in custody or arbitrary arrest many
Tamils were tortured and subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment.
2. In addition to these violations, the Government of Sri Lanka was accused
of inhibiting movement in conflict zones for both civilians and civil society
aid organisations, which allowed already inhumane conditions to further
deteriorate. These limitations impeded civilian access to medical atten-
tion, the provision of the essentials for life and prevented civilians from
fleeing the conflict zone. The LTTE was accused of similar violations, in
addition to the outright killings of those civilians attempting to leave areas
under its control for use as human shields, the conscription of children as
combatants and the extrajudicial killings of Sri Lankan Army combatants.
3. Despite the end of hostilities, the Sri Lankan government retained the use
of emergency powers and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to main-
tain its control over the movement of the Tamil population in territory
formerly held by the LTTE. Throughout much of 2009, the government
continued to detain civilians in military controlled detention camps against
international law. Six months after the end of the war, as many as 280,000
individuals were confined in what were termed “welfare camps” and as
many as 129,000 remained there into 2010, 80,000 of whom were children.
In addition, as many as 10,000 were imprisoned for suspected involvement
with or for harbouring sympathies for the LTTE (Human Rights Watch,
2011).
4. Candidates for the main Tamil coalition party, the Tamil National Alli-
ance (TNA) were harassed by Sri Lankan Army officers, student activists
were beaten and subjected to arbitrary confinement and journalists faced
life threatening violence. The editor of the anti-government Uthayan pub-
lication was beaten so severely he was placed on life support (Sri Lanka
Campaign for Peace & Justice, 2014).
5. Abuses were as flagrant as military personnel assuming civilian attire,
abducting civilians believed to have an association with the LTTE and
transferring them to undisclosed detention centres where they were severely
physically and sexually abused for weeks; often until a confession was
signed on documentation written only in Singhalese. These systematic acts
of violence constituting crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute,
1998 were principally directed against those perceived to hold nationalist
or LTTE sympathies; individuals believed to be mobilising international
opinion against Sri Lanka on accountability and human rights issues, and
those perceived to be in defiance of the government. Later, maintaining
any formal or informal association with international diaspora groups
resulted in persecution (Tamils Against Genocide, 2012).
6. Further to this point, Sri Lankan Defence Minister and brother of the
President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, continued the narrative that the LTTE
remains an active threat to Sri Lanka through the activism of the interna-
tional Tamil diaspora, in his own words: “the rump of the LTTE’s global
establishment is still active.”
7. The government’s disdain for the West revealed itself even in its diplomatic
appointments, with a number of generals implicated in war crimes posted
to ambassadorial positions in major European capitals (Sri Lanka Cam-
paign for Peace & Justice, 2014).
8. Cases reported by TAG carried with them common themes: Individuals
returning from abroad, often from studies were detained at the airport
without charge, taken away in white vans to undisclosed locations, tor-
tured and in some cases raped and then were released when a ransom
was paid. With regard to activists, there is evidence suggesting that the
Sri Lankan government collected information on Tamils who had taken
part in Tamil activism abroad, including large protests against the gov-
ernment in London. Some detainees were shown photos of themselves
taking part in protests before being tortured.
9. The movement towards the establishment of a transnational government
was undertaken immediately following the end of the war by Kumaran
Pathmanathan (KP). KP had been the principal international arms pro-
curer for the LTTE and was appointed to lead the organisation following
the death of long-time LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran at the close of
the civil war. After fleeing Sri Lanka for Malaysia, KP declared the estab-
lishment of the TGTE and led the group for a few short months until his
arrest and extradition to Sri Lanka in August 2009. He passed the leader-
ship of the organisation to Visvanathan Rudrakumaran.
10. Despite these internal setbacks, the TGTE with its Secretariat in Geneva
pressed Ban Ki-Moon to refer Sri Lanka to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and in 2011 TGTE leadership were invited by the newly formed
government in South Sudan to visit the recently established country.
11. As new transnational organisations came together, such as the Global
Tamil Forum (GTF) and the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam
(TGTE) the CTC participated at varying levels. With respect to the former,
the CTC joined with other diaspora organisations worldwide to become a
founding partner, as Canada’s official representative when the GTF was
formed in 2010 (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2010). The CTC con-
tinues to be formally a member of the GTF, but its engagement is largely
symbolic and its actions in Canada are in no way directed by any interna-
tional organisations, preferring to focus on the domestic context in which
it has leverage (Personal communications, staff member a. Canadian Tamil
Congress, 2016). As will be discussed in the section focusing on the UK,
the GTF has, and indeed is perceived as having, a largely UK focus while
acting through it in some international spheres, such as in Geneva at the
UNHCR.
12. Between 2010 and 2015 while out of office, former Labour MP and early
inside advocate Joan Ryan served as the Executive Director of the GTF.
13. The bitter schism remained isolated largely to the UK where the GTF is
most active. Indeed, several parliamentarians noted that they have often
found themselves as interlocutors between these organisations, owing to
their desire to attempt to reflect the wide breadth of opinion within the
British Tamil community (Member of Parliament, UK Conservative Party,
2015; Personal communications, Member of Parliament, UK Labour,
2015). However, some parliamentarians such as Labour’s Joan Ryan did
not hesitate to associate with one over the other. The GTF remains an
active and professional lobby group in London and Tamil representative
bodies in the diaspora outside of the UK continue their membership. This
partisan leaning also led to a closer alignment between the BTF and the
Tories (Personal communications, British Tamil Forum, 2015).
14. Transnational linkages with the Tamil political establishment in Sri Lanka
developed in different trajectories for both groups. The GTF preferred a
close relationship with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Sri Lanka,
whereas the BTF opposed the willingness of the TNA to work with the
Rajapaksa government and participate in democratic processes on the
island. The TNA was largely responding to the post-war climate, in which
Tamils in Sri Lanka were desirous of cooperation rather than confronta-
tion after so many years of war (Personal communications, former GTF
staff member and current Labour Party staff member, 2015).
15. Additionally, other organisations such as the Tamil Youth Organisation
(TYO) and the Tamil Information Centre (TIC) engaged in mobilisation
and advocacy at the domestic level, while maintaining a transnational
apparatus. Organisations such as these were joined by ACT NOW in the
UK, which was composed of largely non-Tamil members seeking to raise
awareness of Tamil issues amongst the broader population (Vimalarajah
et al, 2011).
16. A number of other organisations also formed during this period, includ-
ing grassroots organisations which were founded by youth involved in
the demonstrations in 2009. The National Council for Canadian Tamils
(NCCT) and the TYO view themselves as more grassroots-oriented and
to some extent in opposition to the more established CTC; often assuming
more “hard-line” positions on Sri Lanka (Amarasingam, 2015, 172).
17. The Conservative Party in particular had gone “180 degrees” in their
engagement on Sri Lankan issues, from being distrustful of the Tamil com-
munity due to its past links to the LTTE, to appealing directly to Tamil
voters with increasingly “Tamil-friendly” policies with regard to the con-
flict in Sri Lanka (Protected source, Staff member a. Canadian Tamil Con-
gress, 2016).
18. Deploying a Tamil specific “get out the vote system,” the BTC has provided
campaign support for dozens of Conservative candidates, claiming it was
directly responsible for unseating three Liberal Democrat Cabinet Minis-
ters in the 2010 election.
19. Prominent Conservative MPs Liam Fox and James Wharton were amongst
those less sympathetic MPs, and are now counted as some of the most sup-
portive Tory politicians for the Tamil community.
20. A common refrain also heard from interviewees in Canada with the respect
to the Liberal Party, which had for too long taken the Tamil community
“for granted.” Assuming their support was assured, the Liberal Party did
not act with the same firm support for Tamils as the Tories began to do
after the 2011 election.
21. Outside lobbying through demonstrations were undertaken during this
decision-making period, but unlike in 2009 they were less numerous and
sustained, considerably less contentious and the direction of advocacy was
towards the Government of Sri Lanka rather than towards the government
of Canada which, in this case, was aligned in its actions with the prefer-
ences of the Tamil diaspora (Toronto.com, 2013).
22. While there was agreement domestically, British Tamil diaspora groups
expressed concern with the timing of Harper’s boycott (Protected source,
Together Against Genocide, 2015). Announced in October, 2013 one month
before the CHOGM was scheduled, some within UK diaspora interest
groups argue the decision to boycott was made too early and there was a
missed opportunity to potentially extract concessions from the Govern-
ment of Sri Lanka.
23. Canada’s CAN$20 million annual contribution to the Commonwealth,
CAN$5 million of which is directed towards the operation of the Com-
monwealth Secretariat, makes it the second largest financial contributor to
the organisation.
24. Additionally, leaders from Tamils for Labour engaged leaders from
non-Western countries to back moving the meeting. The British govern-
ment was sensitive to the fact that it might be seen as imperious in its advo-
cacy to move the meeting without the support of other member states, in
particular from the Global South. Tamil elites engaged a South African
Cabinet Minister who was willing to back Brown’s efforts to move the
CHOGM, which added much needed legitimacy to the effort (Personal
communications, Tamils for Labour, 2015).
25. As noted above, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper was clear in
his expectations for Sri Lanka for the intervening two years, threatening
to boycott the 2013 CHOGM if there was no perceptible improvement in
regard to human rights in Sri Lanka.
26. Cameron also raised in the discussion, which was characterised as “ani-
mated,” the release of a widely viewed Channel 4 documentary offering
evidence of the shocking and brutal treatment of Tamil civilians at the end
of the civil war.
27. While great pressure was undoubtedly brought to bear on government
through these diaspora elites, some interviewees argued that Cameron’s
concessions to the UK Tamil diaspora were as much motivated through
financial contributions to the Conservative Party by affluent Tamil
donors (Personal communications, Member of Parliament, UK Labour,
2015).
28. It must be said that the Tories were hardly alone in seeking to make inroads
into the Tamil community. The New Democratic Party early on through
the work of party leader Jack Layton also sought to better appeal to the
Tamil community. The NDP recruited Rathika Sitsabaiesan, a young
Tamil activist, to run for the party in a Tamil-dominated Toronto constit-
uency. Sitsabaiesan was a long-time NDP activist, as well as an activist for
Tamil rights in Sri Lanka and reflected the “new generation” of politically
mobilised Tamils. She served as Layton’s advisor on Tamil issues before
the 2011 election and went on to be elected in the 2011 general election as
the first member of the Tamil diaspora to be elected to office in a Western
country (Bardeesy, 2011). Layton made his final campaign stop of the 2011
election in her constituency.
29. In early November 2013, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh became
the second Commonwealth Head of Government to boycott the summit
after Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, adding pressure to the
British government to do the same (BBC News, 2013b).
30. To a greater extent in the UK than in Canada, the Sri Lankan government
via its High Commissions sought to “sanitise” its image in the view of the
public through a shift to a focus on tourism. To this effect, an advertising
campaign was developed showcasing the stunning natural beauty of the
island for the dual purposes of attracting inward investment by British hol-
idaymakers and simultaneously reframing Sri Lanka from a place synony-
mous with violence and conflict, to a place of serene tranquillity.
31. Further disillusionment with respect to Sri Lanka came when the Aus-
tralian government, with which Canada maintains a close relationship,
refused to support the condemnation of the Rajapaksa government at the
Commonwealth and elsewhere. While not directly drawing a connection,
Canadian foreign policy elites were aware of the assumption that the Sri
Lankan government had made assurances to Australia that it would pre-
vent illegal migrants from fleeing to Australian shores.
32. The Queen’s long support of the Commonwealth as its head made the
Royal Family sensitive to the Commonwealth’s strength and the boycott
of it from one of its original members may have put it and the Queen’s
prestige in jeopardy. With a view to limiting damage, the government con-
sulted with Buckingham Palace in advance of the decision and informed
the Queen of it in advance (Protected source, former Canadian political
staff c, 2016).
33. Similarly, there was concern that Canada’s prestige at the Commonwealth
could be damaged irreparably. Indeed, some have made the argument that
Canada having been “looked over” for the selection of the post of General
Secretary of the Commonwealth may have been directly linked to Canada’s
decision with respect to Sri Lanka (Protected source, Commonwealth elite,
2016).
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7 Conclusion
Diasporas are a force in role
contestation, so what’s next?
Foreign policy analysis scholarship has long focused on the role of elites
in domestic foreign policy decision-making. In recent years, scholars
have asserted that there is a need for research to better incorporate non-
elite agents in international relations, and the primary purpose of this
book is to add to this growing body of literature. Having adopted a role
theoretical perspective, this book argues that non-elite forces, even mar-
ginalised communities such as diasporas, influence role contestation in
pluralist democracies despite facing a range of agency and institutional
barriers. Through observing the mobilisation of the Tamil diaspora in
Canada and the UK in their efforts to influence host country role contes-
tation, this book has made a number of contributions. This concluding
chapter retraces the evidence and arguments advanced by this book and
points to avenues for further research.
Theories of vertical role contestation:

Disaggregating agents and institutions
Since its emergence in the 1970s to expand the tools available for the anal-
ysis of non-superpower states in international relations, Role Theory’s
scope of application has expanded considerably. It has discussed the
changing role of Great Powers at a time when the world appears headed
for greater multipolarity (Harnisch, 2012); it has looked at the roles
states play within regions and within subsystem institutions to address
economic challenges (Thies and Wehner, 2019); and it has observed the
changing roles of non-Great Power states such as the UK and Canada
(Gaskarth, 2013; McCourt, 2011; Paris, 2014). Finally, Role Theory
has recently further honed its analysis of domestic role contestation to
include agents involved in vertical and horizontal role contestation, for
instance through considering the role of ideologically motivated role con-
flicts amongst elites and vertical contestation between masses and elites
(Brummer and Thies, 2016; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016; Gaskarth, 2016).
It is in this strand of vertical role contestation that this book sought to
contribute.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003089490-7
Conclusion 199
To thoroughly interrogate vertical role contestation by marginal-
ised diasporas I disaggregated Role Theory’s agency and institutional
approaches in a number of ways.
Firstly, I expanded on Holsti’s (1970) initial introduction of the role of
“masses” in role contestation, as it has thus far received little theoreti-
cal attention. It is necessary to disaggregate between public opinion as a
domestic force in role contestation and mass movements. The former is
an aggregate of the views of the public at large on a given international
issue, while the latter is a non-elite, collective action actor often employ-
ing contentious politics to convey a strongly held preference with regard
to role conception and performance. An important reason for this dis-
tinction is that marginalised diasporas do not always mobilise on issues
which are salient to the public-at-large, but rather on issues of particular
resonance for their community, such as events in the homeland.
Secondly, it is necessary for Role Theory to disaggregate elite and
non-elite agents in foreign policymaking. Through canvassing the liter-
ature on elite theory, I argued that elites in the context of foreign policy
decision-making in Westminster systems are those legally empowered
to enact a decision, specifically members of the Cabinet, and those with
privileged access to Cabinet Ministers such as politically appointed
Special Advisors and senior bureaucrats. I also discussed the leadership
of non-governmental interest groups organised collectively to represent
marginalised diaspora communities. While these individuals may be
considered elite members of their constituencies, as they are tasked with
interfacing with government elites, they are never foreign policy elites.
However, the elites of these interest groups may nevertheless become
“temporary entrants” and therefore role-makers in role contestation. I
further defined diaspora interest groups as: Permanent, representative,
non-governmental entities which are not seeking to form government,
have no fixed agenda of issues, derive legitimacy from infrastructure set
up to connect with diaspora grassroots and have no formal mechanisms
for conferring membership, but are based on a sense of ethno-cultural
belonging.
Having theoretically unpacked the agents of interest in domestic role
contestation, I then turned to the extensive existing literature on diaspo-
ras and foreign policy influence to derive a set of agency factors by which
to analyse marginalised diaspora agents. The agency factors I included
in the analytical framework are: Diaspora mobilisation, diaspora size,
numerical significance in parliamentary constituencies, diaspora group
resources, political salience, diaspora group homogeneity, credibility
and learning.
I concluded the theoretical discussion on agency by arguing that
understanding vertical role contestation requires unpacking the inter-
action of the above discussed mass movement, government elite and
non-government elite agents. Specifically, I drew on the contentious
200 Conclusion
politics literature to argue that it is the targets of claims, usually gov-
ernments, and claims-makers which determine interaction dynamics
and that this relationship mirrors Role Theory’s “role-makers and
role-takers” dichotomy, whereby governments determine whether or not
non-government actors become role-makers. Additionally, I borrowed
from the literature on interest groups to argue that “inside advocates”
play a critical role in making non-elite, marginalised agents temporary
entrants in role contestation.
I then considered institutional perspectives, arguing that the ability
for marginalised diasporas to influence role contestation requires oper-
ating within political opportunity structures through which they attempt
to exert influence. A range of institutional factors were set out to dis-
cuss what impact structures have on diaspora influence in role contes-
tation, including: Host country inclusivity, institutional permeability,
rival constituencies, role conception alignment and international role
performance.
I theoretically expand on role conception and role performance, first
by discussing how this book considers “influence” and distinguishing it
from “power,” where the former is only captured when a decision-point
is reached. The literature on lobbying usefully distinguishes between an
official position taken by public authorities and policy implementation.
I argue that the Role Theory concepts: Role conception and role perfor-
mance mirror this perspective, where one is principally a domestic indi-
cation of foreign policy while the other is an action in an international
context. As a consequence, the book looks at how marginalised diaspo-
ras influence both role conception and role performance.
Finally, I discussed the repertoire of roles states conceive for them-
selves, such as those set out in the existing literature like “bridge-builder”
or “defender of the faith.” In addition to role conceptions, this book
sought to better systematise the ascription of roles, or “role position” of
states within hierarchies of relative power. Ascribing these roles allows
analysts to better consider the extent to which states are able to respond
to the demands of domestic forces, such as marginalised diasporas, and
helps to explain whether these forces have influence over role contesta-
tion. Furthermore, it points to structural boundaries that constrain the
role performance options of states. Specifically, I introduced the concept
of “indispensable state” to describe an institution member whose behav-
iour has the potential to unravel the entire entity.
Expanding on non-elite role-makers: Marginalised

diasporas in role contestation
From an agency standpoint, one of the main contributions this book
makes is to demonstrate that not only do elite domestic forces shape for-
eign policy, but that minorities within states which historically have had
Conclusion 201
little access to decision-making are also influential in role contestation.
To do this, I first offered background on the Tamil diaspora, arguing
that they are a largely conflict-driven, stateless, far, victim diaspora hav-
ing an antagonistic relationship with the home-state. As well as being an
archetypical diaspora, the Tamil community should also be considered
marginalised in Canada and the UK. Through exploring theories of mar-
ginalisation, I argued that being marginalised means lacking the oppor-
tunity to fully participate in the political process as a consequence of
structural exclusion, often based on distinguishing identity features. The
Tamil diaspora has been marginalised through colonial and post-colonial
repression, disempowering integration and settlement policies in one of
the host countries and through securitisation policies.
Firstly, I traced the history of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka where
British colonial oppression was followed by nationalist policies which
oppressed Tamils on the basis of their geography, religion, language and
other characteristics leading to limited opportunities in education and
employment. It was these post-colonial processes of marginalisation
which in part led to demands for Tamil self-determination and eventu-
ally to conflict. Secondly, I discussed institutions of migration, integra-
tion and settlement in Canada and the UK to which Tamil refugees were
subjected as they sought to escape the violence in Sri Lanka. I argued that
Canada’s system was relatively open to Tamil asylum-seekers from the
outset, espouses a multicultural policy encouraging newcomers to retain
their existing identities and funded integration and settlement regimes
which empower diasporas. Conversely, the UK’s regimes were more dis-
empowering for diasporas, through being less receptive to refugees, offer-
ing little support for integration during much of the period considered and
did not encourage the empowerment of diaspora organisations to support
settlement. Finally, I discussed the co-optation of the Tamil diaspora and
diaspora organisations by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
arguing that its ultimate proscription tainted the Tamil diaspora with
the association of terrorism for years. Furthermore, parallel processes of
securitisation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks stigmatised the Tamil
diaspora in Canada and the UK, leading to a “chilling effect” on mobilisation
throughout the 2000s.
Understanding marginalisation is important when considering non-
elite actors in foreign policymaking as it helps to explain why, in some
cases, minorities are unable to access decision-making regardless of the
strategies they pursue.
Diaspora role-makers and domestic

and international institutions
Marginalised diasporas, like all domestic agents in role contestation,
have to contend with domestic institutions of foreign policymaking as
202 Conclusion
well as international constraints placed on the role performance of states.
From a domestic perspective, this is a question of “who gets in” in for-
eign policy decision-making. The foreign policy executive in Westminster
systems is dominated by Cabinet, principally the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary, as well as influential non-partisan officials who have
privileged access with regard to the provision of information and parti-
san Special Advisors who are often tasked with providing information
gleaned from non-government sources. Despite Cabinet being drawn
from Parliament, as a deliberative body, parliaments very rarely decide
foreign policy and what decision-making influence it does have is at the
discretion of the Executive. However, I argue that parliamentarians act-
ing as “inside advocates” can play an important role in elevating the
concerns of diasporas to Cabinet as trusted partisan channels of access.
Finally, from a non-governmental and political elite perspective, practi-
tioners have increasingly begun to involve diasporas in the foreign policy
process, but normally only as passive agents. I advance that mobilised
diasporas such as those discussed in this book are rather proactive agents
with their own agendas.
While foreign policy decision-making structures are superficially simi-
lar in both host country cases, I argue that there were differences between
the Canada and the UK under the Harper, Brown and Cameron govern-
ments. After decades of perceived openness in Canadian foreign policy-
making, the Harper government restricted influence from some quarters,
including the non-partisan bureaucracy and conventional NGOs, par-
ticularly human rights organisations, and concentrated decision-making
at Cabinet. However, scholars have argued that the Conservative govern-
ment was porous to the influence of some diaspora interests. In the UK,
decision-making underwent the opposite trajectory, as the Brown and then
Cameron governments sought advice from a greater diversity of sources.
There was an effort to both restore the influence of the non-partisan FCO,
as well as to engage non-governmental actors including diaspora com-
munities in foreign policymaking.
In order to understand whether marginalised diasporas influence
role conception, it’s firstly important to understand what the preferred
role conceptions are for host countries. With regard to the Canadian
and British cases I discussed, the Harper government worked quickly
to turn Canada away from its traditional, Middle Power, policy entre-
preneur role and towards a more disruptive international role. Through
a moralistic lens, the Harper government worked to ensure Canada
took strong, unambiguous positions on international issues with a
view to compelling more influential actors to take stronger positions
themselves. In the UK, the Brown and then Cameron governments
worked to reorient the UK away from being a moralistic, intervention-
ist power to an international convening power and hub committed to
multilateralism.
Conclusion 203
Finally, it is also important to ascribe the role position of states within
international power hierarchies to understand the extent to which they
can act in response to the demands of marginalised diasporas contesting
roles domestically. I argue that despite the Harper government’s efforts to
conceive of Canada as being more independent than a traditional Middle
Power, Canada’s limited power projection capabilities, lack of status at
the UN Security Council and its less influential position in other thea-
tres suggests that Canada’s position remained that of a Middle Power.
However, it does have somewhat more influence in the Commonwealth
subsystem and it does have a strong bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka.
On the other hand, while some scholars have sought to cast the UK inter-
nationally in a variety of lights, I argued that the UK remains a Major
Power with the capacity to project power and with a power of attraction
few other states possess. Additionally, it is the dominant actor within the
Commonwealth subsystem and retains strategic interests in South Asia.
Mass movements and elite-level role-making: 2009

and vertical role contestation to end the war
To discuss the influence of marginalised diasporas in role contestation,
the first two cases I explored looked at the response of the Tamil dias-
pora to the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka. From January to May 2009
the Government of Sri Lanka waged a war of annihilation against the
LTTE in the north of Sri Lanka, leading to thousands of deaths and hun-
dreds of thousands displaced. From an agency standpoint, I traced the
journey of Tamil diaspora organisations in both host countries, from the
proscription of the LTTE to the founding and revitalisation of interest
groups such as the Canadian Tamil Congress, the British Tamil Forum
and Tamils for Labour. The elite leadership of these groups, along with
contentious mass movements, mobilised during this period to demand
host country governments take action to end the civil war in Sri Lanka.
However, while the UK government took significant steps to end the vio-
lence, the Canadian government was less responsive. This book asked:
Why was this the case?
From an agency perspective, I argued that the Tamil diaspora in both
host countries was mobilised, large, concentrated in electoral constituen-
cies and well resourced. However, the Canadian Tamil diaspora was less
politically salient for the Conservative government in Canada than it was
in the UK and also became less homogeneous and credible in the view of
the government. Whereas in the UK the Tamil diaspora remained united
and credible throughout this period. Finally, both diasporas learned from
the more established Jewish diaspora, leading to the creation of two dif-
ferent types of interest groups in each host country. From an institutional
standpoint, while the Tamil diaspora should be considered marginalised
in this period, it is fair to argue that Canadian and British institutions are
204 Conclusion
inclusive of outside interests. More specifically, when it came to perme-
ating foreign policy decision-making, the Tamil diaspora was successful
in gaining temporary entry into the decision-making process in the UK
through the help of inside advocates, whereas in Canada they did not
become role-making temporary entrants. In both cases rival constitu-
encies did not pose a significant barrier to Tamil diaspora mobilisation.
With regard to role conception, the preferences of the Canadian Tamil
diaspora on the one hand were aligned with the Harper government’s
willingness to disrupt international institutions. However, the perceived
association with the LTTE conflicted with the Harper government’s secu-
rity and counter-terrorism policy priorities. In the UK, the Tamil diaspo-
ra’s desire for the UK government to strongly admonish the Sri Lankan
government did not align well with its desire to be a global convening
power, however this role conception did not prevent the UK from taking
steps in line with diaspora preferences. Finally, regarding role perfor-
mance, the UK largely acted to the greatest extent possible in line with
diaspora priorities, especially through the UN, its Special Relationship
with the US and bilaterally. Canada, on the other hand, could have done
more to admonish the Sri Lankan government, but ultimately chose not
to. I conclude that marginalised diasporas do have an influence on role
contestation, but only when certain determinants are present.
Elite-level role-making and mobilisation: 2013 and

vertical role contestation for justice in Sri Lanka
Following the end of the civil war, the repression of Tamils by the
Rajapaksa government continued in Sri Lanka unbated, leading to
continued human rights abuses and no meaningful transitional jus-
tice process. As a consequence, the Tamil diaspora in Canada and the
UK continued to contest roles, in this case calling for the Canadian
and British governments to boycott the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri Lanka. By this time, Tamil mobi-
lisation took place at the transnational level, leading to the creation of a
number of new organisations including the Global Tamil Forum (GTF).
In addition, the Tamil diaspora in the UK sought to achieve greater lev-
erage over the governing Conservative Party by founding British Tamil
Conservatives. In like manner, the CTC in Canada worked harder to
establish inside advocates and trusted channels of access to the Harper
government.
These efforts proved consequential in role contestation processes to
boycott the Commonwealth summit. After putting the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment “on notice” in 2011, the Harper government took the dramatic
step to boycott the Commonwealth summit, instead sending a lower-level
delegation with the mandate of “raising hell” in order to call attention to
the Sri Lankan government’s human rights record. In the British case,
Conclusion 205
while the government sympathised with the Tamil diaspora and took
steps to admonish the Sri Lankan government, Prime Minister Cameron
ultimately attended the summit. This chapter asked the question: Why
did one Prime Minister boycott while the other attended?
Several agency factors changed in both countries from 2009 to 2013.
Firstly, both diasporas were viewed as politically salient. In each case,
Conservative governments became actively more interested in securing
the political support of diaspora communities, including the Tamil com-
munity. In parallel, the leadership of the Tamil diaspora in each country
began interacting to a greater extent with Conservative party leader-
ship. Secondly, unlike in the first case where there was division between
mass movements and diaspora elites in Canada, in this case diaspora
elites presented a united front. In the UK, while there was significant
internal division in the diaspora, it was nevertheless able to unite in view
of decision-makers. Finally, diaspora interest groups in both countries
remained consistently credible in view of government elites and in both
cases the Tamil diaspora became temporary entrants as role-makers.
A number of conclusions were also drawn from an institutional perspec-
tive. Firstly, the Sri Lankan government did work more assiduously to act
as a rival constituency to the Tamil diaspora, especially in the UK, but
these efforts largely met without success. Secondly, with regard to role con-
ception, unlike in 2009 the Canadian Tamil diaspora’s preferences aligned
entirely with the Harper government’s preferred “disrupter” role, whereas
once again their preferences in the UK were at variance with the Cameron
government’s desire to play a convening international role. Preferred role
conception in Canada was born out by the Government’s role perfor-
mance, which in this case acted entirely in line with diaspora preferences
by boycotting the CHOGM and further by withdrawing funding for the
Commonwealth itself. In the UK, the Tamil diaspora was unable to com-
pel the British government to boycott as, had it done so, it may have led to
the unravelling of the Commonwealth in which the UK is an indispensable
state. However, as temporary entrants the British Tamil diaspora was able
to extract a number of policy concessions from the government.
Disaggregating diasporas in vertical role

contestation: What now?
This book’s disaggregation of marginalised diasporas in vertical role
contestation revealed that non-elite domestic sources do influence for-
eign policy decision-making. In doing so, I pointed to a number of theo-
retical implications this research has for Role Theory. Regarding agency
factors, it is firstly important for scholarship to disaggregate the con-
cept of the “masses” in role contestation, as mass movements and dias-
pora elites are distinct agents whose interaction with one another and
with policy elites is consequential for whether they become role-makers.
206 Conclusion
Secondly, learning is a significant factor in whether marginalised diaspo-
ras become role-makers. Marginalised diasporas both learn from more
established diasporas as well as from earlier mobilisation efforts. In these
cases, they did so to surmount securitised perceptions and orient their
strategies towards the role conception and advocacy preferences of dif-
ferent governments over time. Thirdly, gaining credibility in the view of
government elites is a consequential determinant of whether marginal-
ised diasporas gain temporary entrance as role-makers, as governments
are more willing to interact with them when they are seen as credible.
Fourthly, whether or not diasporas are considered politically salient has
implications for whether or not they become role-makers in role contes-
tation, as governments are more attuned to their collective preferences
when their support offer electoral advantage.
With regard to institutional considerations, firstly, while parliaments
are not often a locus for foreign policy decision-making, parliamentar-
ians who serve as “inside advocates” play an important role in helping
marginalised diasporas gain temporary entry into role contestation as
role-makers. Secondly, being aligned with host country role conception
is not essential for diasporas to influence role performance. However,
this research strengthens the argument that states may act against realist
notions of national interest gains, particularly when non-elite and gov-
ernment role conception preferences align. Thirdly, I argued that ascrib-
ing role position is important for understanding the role constraints
within which states perform. In so doing, scholarship is better able to
understand whether a diaspora has influenced role performance given
the limits within which states can act and the decision-making options
available to them. Fourthly, this research demonstrates that Middle
Power states which may not have significant influence in the international
system may nevertheless have more weight in subsystems. Furthermore,
these states have the option of performing disruptively with a view to
putting pressure on more influential states and expanding the scope of
their performance options. Finally, role ascription also points to a hith-
erto untheorized role position, “indispensable” state, which I define as a
dominant actor in an international institution whose role performance
options are limited given that disruptive behaviour on its part could jeop-
ardise the integrity of the institution. Better ascribing state role position
allows for the identification of non-elite influence in role contestation,
even when states do not perform in alignment with role preferences.
The principle aim of this book was to argue that role contestation is not
the sole preserve of policymaking elites and that marginalised diasporas
are also influential role-makers when they are admitted as temporary
entrants by government elites. This book’s contribution to Role Theory
opens up possibilities for further research, including through considering
the above through a normative lens. Specifically: Is it right that diasporas
should influence foreign policy?
Conclusion 207
Questions of the national interest in foreign policy have been long con-
tested in the literature in both Canada and the UK. Edmunds (2014) can-
vasses foundational and recent interventions on the subject, including
Wendt’s intersubjectivity of the national interest and questions of iden-
tity, as well as Kratochwil’s argument that questions about the national
interest are meant to stimulate debate over common goods. Bow and
Lennox (2008, 44) cite Hanley in a similar discussion, who advances
the “utilitarian imperative” in foreign policy where states consider their
interests rationally, with added space for the “interests and aspirations”
of those impacted by decision-making. Ritchie (2014, 85) advances that
the national interest can be viewed through four prisms: By an individual
member of the national community; by being a modern urban industrial
state; through conceptualising a national “self” through a role concep-
tion and finally, as a global human community and society of states.
From a similar, role theoretical perspective, Gaskarth (2014, 43) points to
Jermyn’s consideration of the national interest as a process which seeks
to define national values.
Normatively, defining the national interest in democratic, pluralis-
tic countries has been discussed since foundational discourses by Haas
(1953). Like Mathias (1981), Huntington (1997) as explicated earlier in this
volume argued that the perceived divergence of interests between domes-
tic, ethnic communities and those of the state are problematic. Shain
(1995) advanced an opposing view that states pursuing diaspora interests
as a part of foreign policy can lead to benefits for host state countries
through values diffusion. Granatstein (2011, 85) argues that ethnic inter-
ests should be considered right or wrong in foreign policymaking insofar
as they conform to a state’s national interest. However, Holloway (2006,
12) takes from Krasner who points out that the national interest should
be considered what is in the “public good” and the general interest and
the community of the whole. Hill (2013, 28) takes this line of thinking
further in his discussion of what constitutes the national interest in mul-
ticultural states. He argues that foreign policy is often conceived of as an
elite enterprise where the preferences of non-elites, in this case diaspora
communities, are less often accounted for. His underlying assumption is
that studying ethnocultural groups as actors in foreign policymaking is a
worthwhile endeavour especially for pluralistic, multicultural and demo-
cratic societies because they impact decision-making. Finally, Gaskarth
argues that the formation of the national interest is a discourse about
conceiving national identities.
Within pluralistic states such as Canada and the UK, the national
interest is clearly an open subject for democratic debate within which
diasporas have played a substantive role as evidenced by this book’s find-
ings. Therefore, it is necessary for role theorists to further consider their
involvement as role-makers and implications this holds for defining the
“national interest.”
208 Conclusion
Note
1. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Sri_Lanka_
Regions_Map.png. Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection
Sri Lanka Maps, OpenStreetMap [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
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https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1609415
Appendix: Map of Sri Lanka1
Figure A.1
Index
Italicized and bold pages refer to figures and tables respectively, and page
numbers followed by “n” refer to notes.
accountability 160 conservative governments 105;

Acid Rain Accord 96 Middle Power 103
aerial bombardment 123 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
agency factors 8; Conservative (APEC) 37, 38, 104, 112n32
Party 176; credibility 176–177; Association of Southeast Asian
diaspora mobilisation 134, Nations (ASEAN) 112n32
175; diaspora size 134; group Asymmetric Policy Model 86
homogeneity 176; interest groups Australian Tamil Congress 160
136; learning 136, 177; left-of-centre authoritarianism 180
and right-of-centre parties 175; Axworthy, Lloyd 92, 96–97
LTTE 136, 176; politically salient
135, 176; scholarship 135; Tamil Baird, John 178, 181
diaspora members 135; Tamil- Balasingham, Anton 66
speakers 135 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact
AIDS 97 of 1957 60
Air Quality Agreement 96 bilateral foreign policy 146
Alexander, Chris 170 bilateral politics 105
All Party Parliamentary Group Blair, Tony 64, 93, 98, 103, 128
(APPG for Tamils) 151n15 Bloc Quebecois (BQ), 150n9
al-Qaeda 58 boomerang effect 161
Amarasingam, A. 6, 23, 53 boycott 168–174
American foreign policy 22 boycotting 187
American Israel Political Affairs bridge-builder 200
Committee (AIPAC) 167 Bringing Policy Home 94
anti-terrorism policy 138, 171 “Britain is GREAT” (campaign)
archetypical diaspora 201 106
Armenian diasporas 52 British colonial period 59
Arms Trade Treaty 102 British Conservatives 184
ascribing Britain’s role positions: British Empire 107
colonial and post-colonial states British foreign policymaking:
106; diplomatic relations 107; power decision-making 93; non-
of attraction 105; superpower actor government groups 93;
106 Westminster-model 92–94
ascribing Canadian role positions: British Head of State 107
five factors 104; international British Nationality Act: 1981, 64; of
subsystem entities 104; liberal and 1948, 63
Index 211
British Tamil Conservatives (BTC) 13, China’s Belt and Road strategy 41
89, 157, 167, 168, 173 “choreograph” 174
British Tamil diaspora 121, 122, 144, Citizenship and Immigration Canada
147, 148, 167, 171, 192n22 (CIC) 63
British Tamil Forum (BTF) 45n9, civil war 172
121, 152n23, 158, 160; political Clinton, Hillary 132
engagement 127; Tamil diaspora Coalition for Tamil Elections Canada
127 163
Brown, Gordon 1, 4, 93, 94, 101, 133, coalition government 101, 113n39
151n16, 152n23, 163, 172 Cold War 20, 22, 107
Buddhism 60 Cold War superpowers 96
bureaucratic politics model 83–85, 87 colonial marginalisation 57
Burt, Alistair 173 colonial regimes: of marginalisation
59–62
Cabinet-centric policymaking 4 Commonwealth 98, 111n14, 140;
Cabinet Ministers 86 Canada’s bilateral relations 185;
Cameron, David 2, 4, 98 CHOGMs 171; countries 179;
Canada’s Tamil diaspora 65, 122, 126, members 171; non-confidence 182
171, 205 Commonwealth Conference on
Canadian foreign policy 23 Foreign Affairs 105
Canadian foreign policymaking: Commonwealth Heads of
decision-making 91, 92; diaspora Government Meeting (CHOGM)
92; Liberal Party rule 90; non- 2, 9, 112n29, 156, 164, 165, 204, 205;
governmental organisation 91; non- Canada and UK 9; to Colombo 172;
partisan civil service 90 hosted by Sri Lanka 5
Canadian International Development Commonwealth Summit, 2013 187,
Agency (CIDA) 105 188
Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) 125 comparative case selection 7
Canadian parliament 110n4 conflict-generated refugees 54
Canadian role conception: bilateral conflict zones 189n2
trade agreements 99; five Cs 95–96; consensus-based decision-making
freedom, dignity and security 98; 107, 112n29
“functional” approach 96; human Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI)
security and human rights 97; 167
influential actors 100; international conservative government 99
hierarchy 96; issue-specific areas Conservative-Liberal Democrat
96; right side of history 98 coalition 173, 180
Canadian security agencies 70 Conservative Party 121, 130, 157,
Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) 164–165, 167, 184, 188; leadership
92, 77n39, 121, 158, 160, 169; 205
activists 165; and conservative conservative role conception 164–166
Tamil activists 166; foreign policy conservatives 103; governments 100,
elites 165; founding 125; non- 105
partisan approach 126; operational constraints: international system
funds 125; partisan channels 165; 39; repertoire of roles 38; role
professional interest group 126, fluctuations 37; role performance
160, 169; options 36; role performance
Cannon, Laurence 129 repertoires 37; role theory
The Centre for Human Rights and 37; socialise actors 37; spatial
Democratic Development 110n6 perspective 39
Centre for Israel and Jewish “convening” power 103, 122
Affairs 92 convenor 100–103
Ceylon 73n11 Cook, Robin 100
“chilling effect” 72, 125, 147, 164, 201 cooperative power 38
212 Index
Corbyn, Jeremy 127 diplomatic pressure 129
counter-terrorism legislation: and direct lobbying 141–142
policies 58 disaggregation: diasporas 183–187,
credibility 184, 199 205–207
criminalisation 58, 71 disempowering diasporas 62–65
Critical Race Theory disrupter 12, 131, 138
approach 58 disruptor 95–100, 109; in international
cross-case comparative institutions 99
method 6 District Development Councils
74n12
Davey, Ed 163 domestic “common good” 22
debt-relief assistance 107 domestic foreign policymaking
decision-makers 34, 58; in processes 148
Canada 142 domestic institutional factors 32
decision-making processes 3, 42, 171, domestic institutions 32–44, 201–203;
204; chairmanship 85; elites 21, 149; see also institutions
foreign policymaking 83; options domestic role conception 35–36
206; orchestrates 85; period 121; domestic role contestation 8, 18,
Presidential 85 19; foreign policymaking 23;
decision-points 5, 8 interaction, mass movements,
decolonisation 56–59 government elites and diaspora
defender of the faith 200 interest groups 30–32; Role theory
Department of Foreign and and agency 24–30
International Development (DFID) dual citizenship 75n21
113n41
Desk Offices 94 economic and trade sanctions 129
development assistance 104 economic capabilities 104
Dewer Paul, 171 economic migrants 68
diaspora: analytical framework 18; Eelam Political Administration 66
Chinese, 8; dichotomous taxonomy Eelam Revolutionary Organization
52; disaggregating 143–147, 183–187, of Students by: Ratnasabapathy,
205–207; domestic role contestation Elayathambi 68
23–32; elites 131; and foreign policy elite-level interaction 12
analysis (FPA) 22–23; government elite-level role contestation 144
role conception 4; grievances 168; elite-level role-making 203–204; and
group homogeneity 199; group mobilisation 204–205
resources 199; Indian 8; interest “Eminent Persons” 104
groups 45n6; masses 18; mass emulation 144
movements 3; mobilisation 52, 199; energy superpower 97
non-elite actors 5; organisations enlightened self-interest 95–108;
1, 52; role contestation 4, 141–143, international actors and
182–183; role-makers 18, 201–203; international institutions 95;
as role-makers 23–32; role- international power 95; from
making agents 4; role theoretical intervener to convenor 100–103;
implications 183–187; Role theory major power 105–108; Middle
19–21; size 199; theoretical analyses Power revisited 103–105; Middle
18; victim and non-victim 52; see Power to disruptor 95–100
also Tamil diaspora “equality” model 85
diaspora-homeland relations 7 Ethnic Minorities Task Force
diaspora interest group elites 149 conference 128
diaspora-led mass movements 144 ethnocultural communities
diaspora mobilisation 175 89, 90
Differentiated Policy Model 86 EU Consolidated Arms Export
diplomatic networks 102, 104, 113n37 Licensing Criteria 108
Index 213
Fanon, Franz 57 Group of 7 (G7) 104
Federation of Associations of groupthink 111n11
Canadian Tamils (FACT) 68, 69,
76n28, 77n35 Hague, William 93, 102, 133, 163
Filipino diaspora 89 Halfon, Robert 167
first-past-the-post systems 9 Harper, Stephen 1, 2, 4, 21, 99, 121,
The Foreign Affairs Select Committee 137, 157, 174, 178, 192n22
111n13 Holsti, K.J. 18, 19, 23–25, 37, 39, 144,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 183, 199
(FCO) 14, 89, 92, 93, 127, 157 home country 72n1
foreign minister 86, 87 homeland 72n1
Foreign Office officials 84 host country: foreign policy 33;
foreign policy: decision-making 137; governments 162; inclusivity
political elites 181; priority 133 33; policymakers 73n10; role
foreign policy agents: role-making conception 178
23–30 humanitarian 129; assistance and
foreign policy analysis (FPA) 1, 10, international monitors 133;
19, 22–23; disaggregating agency intervention 111n16; workers 130
23–30; international relations 2 human rights 83, 92, 97, 179; role
Foreign Policy Centre 89 conception 179
foreign policy decision-makers 8, 142 human security: agenda 100; foreign
foreign policy decision-making 2, policymaking 85–95; liberal
5; micro-level 6; performance interventionism 95–108
boundaries 6; structures 202 human shielding 150n5
foreign policy elites 19 hunger-strikes 132, 142
foreign policy executive 86 Huntington, Samuel P. 22, 207
foreign policy influence 199
foreign policymaking 2, 56, 57, 177; Ilankai Tamil Sangam in the US
British processes 92–95; canadian, 76n28
processes 90–92; conventional immigration 136; integration and
processes 83; decision-making settlement in Canada 62–63;
83; models and means 85–88; integration and settlement in the
multicultural 88–90 UK 63–65; from Sri Lanka to
foreign policy processes 91 Canada 63
Foreign Secretary 93 Immigration Act 62, 64
Fox, Liam 192n19 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 64,
75n26
Geneva Convention Relating to the Immigration Carriers’ Liability Act,
Status of Refugees 62 1987 75n22
German diapora 52 Indian peace-keeping 61
Ghandi, Rajiv 68 “indispensable” state 42–44, 206
Global Markets Action Plan 99 Indo-British partnership 107
Global Tamil Forum (GTF) 13, 156, influence 10, 35, 36, 42
191n11, 204 “inside advocates” 5, 83, 88, 108, 145,
government and non-government 202, 206
elites 25–30 institutional disaggregation 158
Government Assisted Refugee 75n19 institutional factors 177–182, 200;
Greater Toronto Area (GTA) 54 bilateral action 139–140; chilling
Great Powers 40, 84, 96, 106, 198 effect 136; CHOGM summit
Greek financial crisis 20 180; consensus-driven role 138;
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 104 CTC elites, 137; decision-makers
Gross National Product (GNP) 40, 35; decision-making 33, 177;
41, 103 domestic political institutions 33;
group homogeneity 135, 176 factor comparison framework
214 Index
34, 34; foreign direct investors Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) 128
140; foreign policymaking 137; labour inside advocates 131–133
host country inclusivity 33, 136; Labour Party 127–128, 132, 167
institutional permeability 33, 137, Labour Prime Minister 94
177; international role performance La Francophonie international
180; intransigence of Sri Lankan institution 38
government 179; labour government Latin America 37
141; much-vaunted involvement Layton, Jack 129, 132
138; power projection capabilities learning 199
140; “principled” approach 140; left-leaning parties 126
rival constituencies 138, 178; role left-of-centre parties 126, 127
conception 138; role performance Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
139, 181; structural criteria 33; Committee (LLRC) 159
Tamil diaspora mass movements liberal conservatism 84, 101, 102,
137–138; UK-Sri Lanka bilateral 111n20
relationship 177 Liberal Democratic Party 132
institutional permeability 13, 32, 33, liberal governments 105
137, 177 liberal institutionalism 84
institutions: diaspora decision- liberal interventionism: international
making access 33–35; domestic role actors and international institutions
conception and role performance 95; international power 95; from
35–36; institutional factors 33–35 intervener to convenor 100–103;
integration and settlement: in Canada major power 105–108; Middle
62–63; in the UK 63–65 Power revisited 103–105; Middle
interaction 30–32 Power to disruptor 95–100
inter-diaspora learning 136, 184 Liberal Party 97, 126, 131, 165, 166,
interest group organisation: in 192n20
Canada 125–126; in the UK Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
127–128 (LTTE) 6, 11, 23, 56, 60, 201;
International Criminal Court (ICC) assassination attempts 61; in
97, 190n10 Canada and UK 52; diaspora
International Federation of Tamils in in Canada and the UK 66–68;
the UK 76n28 flag 131, 136; leadership 123;
International Finance Facility 101 NGOs and contributions 67;
international institutions 201–203 perception 66; proscription 68–71;
International Monetary Fund (IMF) resource extraction operations 67;
43, 101 revitalisation of interest 203; and
international role performance 32, securitisation 66, 68–71; separatists
32–44 61; settlement and integration 67;
International Secretariat 66 Sri Lankan civil war 122–124;
International Security Assistance sympathies 190n5; terrorism 120;
Force (ISAF) 97 transnational conflict 66–68;
International Trade Organisation violent retaliatory attacks 61
(ITO) 43 Libya 102, 111n19
Interrnational Cooperation Minister lobbying 34, 129, 132, 200
Bev Oda 140 “lower caste” migrants 55
intervener 100–103
mainstream power 57
Jackson, Henry 88 Major Power 5, 39, 40, 84, 203
Jewish diaspora 52 marginalisation 11, 201; colonial
regimes 59–62; political
KAIROs 92 participation 51; refugee migrants
Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) 190n9 57–58; Tamil diaspora 56–59;
Kyoto Protocol 98 theories 56–59
Index 215
marginalised community 8 National Council for Canadian
marginalised diasporas 14, 18, 23, Tamils (NCCT) 160, 191n16
199; domestic forces 3; foreign The National Health Service (NHS)
policy outcomes 2; “host” country 73n8
governments 3; influence 36; non- national interest 14, 87, 127, 207
elite agents 1, 3; role contestation nationalism 60
1, 3; in role contestation 200–201; National Security Council 93
scholarship 3 naturalisation 63
marginalised group 57 Net Official Development Assistance
marginalised minority: in Canada 112n25
and UK 51; non-elite actors 51 New Democratic Party (NDP) 126,
Martin, Paul 69 131, 171, 193n28
mass movements 24–25, 132, 203–205; non-elite 10, 56; actors 5; agents
interaction 143; mobilisation 142 4; mass movements 4; role
Mathias, Charles 22 performance 5
McDonough, Siobhan 132, 151n18, non-elite agents 35, 95, 144, 185, 187;
163, 167 objectives 5
method of difference 7 non-elite role-makers 200–201
micro-level analysis 23 non-elite vertical role contestation 147
micro-level decision-making 85 non-governmental actors 23, 85, 92
micro-level foreign policy decision- non-partisan officials 4, 84, 202
making 6 non-state international actors 101
Middle Power 5, 12, 13, 39, 40, 84, non-violent protests 60
203; by any other name 105–108; normative great power 20
Canadian foreign policymakers North American Free Trade
95–100; to disruptor 95–100; Agreement (NAFTA) 37, 38
revisited 103–105 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
migration: and securitisation 56–59 (NATO) 37, 41, 104
Miliband, David 93, 128, 132, 142, Norwegian-led negotiation process 61
163, 173 Number 10 Downing Street 109n1
military capabilities 104
Mill, J.S. 7 Obri, Deepak 170
Minna, Maria 69 Office of the UN High Commissioner
mobilisation: and elite-level role- for Human Rights (OHCHR) 158
making 204–205; of the Tamil Organization of American States 104
diaspora 68 Organization of Economic
mobilised diaspora 8 Cooperation and Development
mobilising: for boycott 168–174 (OECD) 41, 106
“monolithic” state 185 Ottawa Treaty 97
Mulroney, Brian 96, 110n6 outside lobbying 35
multicultural foreign policy: counter- Overseas development aid (ODA), 41,
terrorism perspective 89; domestic 104
public diplomacy 88; mass
movements 90; “proactive” agents Panel of Experts 158
88; public diplomacy 89; security 89 Parliaments: foreign policy decision-
Multiculturalism Policy of Canada making 5
1971, 62 partisan elites 91
multilateralism 111n20 peace movement 67
multilateral problem-solving 12 Pearsonian 96
Muslim community 89 Pearson, Lester B. 96
pivotal power 20, 106
National Asylum service 64 pluralist democracies 185
The National Asylum Support Service policy alignment 5
(NASS) 75n24 policy legitimisation 90
216 Index
policymaking institutions 18, 44 Qualitative Comparative Analysis
political elites 130 (QCA) 5–6
political institutions 57
political salience 158, 199 Race Relations Act 1976, 75n23
political staffers 87 Rae, Bob 171
post-civil war Sri Lanka: human Rajapaksa, Gotabaya 190n6
rights violations 159; international Rajapaksa, Mahinda 61, 123, 140, 141,
activism 160; mobilisation 161; 149n2, 150n4, 174, 178
OHCHR 158, 158, 159, 159; political Ratnasabapathy, Elayathambi 68
sympathisers 160; rape and sexual refugees 53; groups 73n10; integration
violence 159; Sri Lankan Army policy 64; migrants 52, 57–58
combatants 159; Tamil leadership regimes of integration and settlement:
159; UNHCR 158 immigration, integration and
post-colonial processes 201; Sri Lanka settlement in Canada 62–63; Tamil
56; vision 61 asylum-seeking 62
post-LTTE transnational diaspora Resettlement Assistance Program
organisations: boomerang effect 75n19
161; BTF and GTF 162–163; rival constituencies 33, 138
catastrophic defeat 161; decision- role conceptions 36; alignment 148;
making forum 164; GTF and British 100–103; foreign policy elites
TGTE 164; post-war consensus 19; and performance 133–143; role
162; referendum process 163; Tamil makers 19; theoretical concepts 36;
diaspora 163; Tamil movement types of 10
163; Tamil self-determination 162; role contestation 3, 7, 23; “active”
TGTE and LTTE leadership 162; agents 88–90; agency factors
transnational government 161 134–136, 175–177; 2013 CHOGM
post-war issues in Sri Lanka 173 157; colonial and post-colonial
poverty 57 repression 120; decision-making
power 35, 36; dynamics 85 processes 121; diasporas 183–
power of attraction 84, 105 187; ending the war 128–133;
Prabhakaran, Velupillai 124, 190n9 institutional factors 136–141,
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 177–182; international 4; inter-state,
189n3 21; marginalised diasporas 200–201;
Prime Minister 85–87 masses 4; mass movements 121;
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 86 and mobilising for boycott 168–174;
Prince of Wales 182, 189 non-elite agents 120, 158; post-civil
The Privy Council Office 86, 87 war Sri Lanka 158–161; pursuit of
Production and Transfer of Anti- justice 158–161; role-makers 120;
Personnel Mines 97 and role performance 120; role
progressive conservative government theoretical lens 5; strategies 182–
110n6 183; strategies, diasporas 141–143;
proscription of the LTTE: conflict- Tamil diaspora 5–10; temporary
driven diasporas 70; FACT and agents 158; throes 122–124
WTM 69; Ghandi, Rajiv 68; role expectations 19
illegal terrorist organisation 69; role-makers 3, 5, 5, 12, 18, 21, 34,
LTTE flag 71; marginalisation 70; 142, 172, 200, 206; in domestic role
peacekeepers 69; security-oriented contention 34
perspective 70; Tamil diaspora 70; role-making: in Canada 164–166,
and terrorism 70 169–171; in Canada and the UK
public diplomacy 89; described 128–133, 168–174; decision-makers
89; diaspora communities 90; 124; LTTE’s influence 124; party-
ethnocultural communities 89 specific interest group 125; in the
“public good” 207 UK 167–168, 171–174
public safety 130–131 role-making agents 169
Index 217
role-making foreign policy agents 19; and “indispensable” states
24–30 42–44; international roles 2, 95;
role performance 35–36, 120; intervening variables 20; literature
international aid 36; repertoires 37 84; multi-level analysis 20; multi-
role position: Britain, 105–108; level nimbleness 23; role location
Canada 103–105; of states 203 20; and role position ascription
role position ascription: Canada and 39–42; toolbox 19; “vertical” and
UK 39; development assistance 41; “horizontal” nexus 21; see also role
expeditionary force capabilities theoretical approaches
40; foreign policy scholars Royal College of Defence Studies 94
40; international affairs 40; Rudd, Kevin 172
international relations 41; military Rudrakumaran, Visvanathan 162
capacity 40; national wealth and rules-based international order 102
economic capabilities 41; non-elite Ryan, Joan 127, 132, 151n12, 163, 167,
diasporas 39; principle of relativity 191n12
40; role conception of states 39; role
expectations 40; soft power 42 safe zones 124
role prescriptions 19 Said, E. 57
role socialization 20 Scandinavian-led Ceasefire
role-takers, 200 Monitoring Committee 149n1
role theoretical approaches: bilateral Scott, Lee 167
foreign policy 146; British role “sea-change” 168
conception 146; diaspora-led mass Second World War 96
movements 144; diasporas and securitisation 56–59; Liberation
foreign policy analysis 145; “inside Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 66;
advocates” 145; masses 144; micro- policies and legislation 71, 72
level exploration 144; non-elite Segal, Hugh 104, 170
diasporas 146; non-elite groups self-determination 125, 129, 162
146; role contestation 144, 146; semi-autonomous Tamil state 60
role-makers 145; role theorists 146; Senanayake-Chevanayakam pact of
terrorist group 146; utility, 145; in 1965 60
vertical role contestation 143 settlement processes 58
role theoretical implications: sexual violence 102, 159
ascribing the role position Sikh diaspora 52
186; bilateral relationship 186; Singhalese 59; community 73n9;
boycotting the summit 186; governments 52; groups 138;
boycott the Commonwealth languages 73n6; leadership 60, 72;
184; disaggregating agency 183; origin 73n6
government’s preferred disrupter Singh, Manmohan 193n29
183; non-elite agents 186; non-elite Sirisena, Mathiripala 159
domestic agents 183; non-elite Sitsabaiesan, Rathika 171
interest groups 184; non-elite role- Society for the Aid of Ceylon
makers 183, 184; parliamentary Minorities (SACEM) 67, 77n34
internship programmes 184; soft power 42, 104; assets 106
temporal approach 183; temporal Softpower Canada 105
learning 184 Somalia 64
Role theory 1, 18, 44; South Asian Surge 64
acknowledgement 2–3; agents and Spads 86
structures 2; concepts 200; and Special Measures Program 67
constraints 36–39; decision-making Sri Lanka: aftermath of the civil
21; elite and non-elite agents 199; war 156; “arrogant” approach
foreign affairs 23; foreign policy 178; case-by-case basis 108; civil
decision-making 3; FPA scholars 21; war 2; colonial and post-colonial
ideational shifts 20; indispensable history 62; conflict 59; demographic
218 Index
status 59; ethnic conflict 61; foreign Tamil demonstrators 132
trading partners 107; government 2; Tamil diaspora 1, 124, 203; British
hosting 172, 181–182; human rights and Canadian 53; in Canada,
abuses 2; independent Tamil state 8, 13; in Canada and the UK
in 60; long-standing trading partner 54–55; Canada’s disruptive role
139; map of 209; Ministerial 185; Canadian and British role
delegation 130; post-civil war 158– contestation 3, 5–10; centralised
161; post-war issues in 173; Tamil model 125–126; “choreograph”
community, discredit 128; Tamil 174; “classical” or archetypical
diaspora 1, 2; trading partners 108; diaspora 52; conflict-generated
war against Tamil separatists 4 and non-conflict generated 53;
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 123 decision-making processes 3;
Sri Lankan-born workers 55 demands 139; diaspora elites 3;
Sri Lankan civil war: battle zone 124; elites 132, 184; evolution of 124–128;
LTTE land 123; LTTE’s demand global convening hub 139; groups
122; LTTE’s gains 122; medical 8; interest group 177; interest
treatment 124; Prabhakaran, group interventions 133; interest
Velupillai 124; safe zones 124; Tamil group organization 125–129, 177;
families 124 internal influence of the 77n40;
Sri Lankan civil war 53, 59–62 marginalisation 52; marginalised
Sri Lankan High Commission 178 migrant community 56; mass
Sri Lankan Moors (Muslim) 73n11 movement actors 3, 95, 122;
Sri Lankan presidency 61 migratory and settlement patterns
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora 56 9; mobilisation 53, 54, 128–129;
Sri Lankan Tamils 54–55; diaspora “mobilised” and “non-mobilised”
55; fled to nearby Tamil Nadu 73n2; 54; organisations 161–168; and
refugees 74n14 parallel systemic features 10;
Stabilisation Unit 102 political decision-makers 71;
State-linked diasporas 52 preference 13; preferences 34;
stigmatisation 57 role-makers 174; role-making
Strategic Defence and Security 161–168; as role-making agents 121;
Review (SDSR) 102 role-making in Canada 129–131,
Straw, Jack 69, 94 164–166, 169–171; role-making in
structural exclusion 57 the UK 131–133, 167–168, 171–174;
superpower 40 semantic ambiguity 52; terror
surface-level similarities: case attacks 70; terrorist organisations
selection 7–10; decision-points 160; threat to national security
5; marginalised diasporas 5; 70; at violent risk 160; see also
overarching methods 5–6; Sri Lanka
structural factors 7; within-case Tamil donors 192n27
analyses 6 Tamil Eelam: and Tamils in Sri
surveillance 58 Lanka 125
Tamil Eelam Society of Canada
Tamil activists 68; politics and (TESOC) 63, 67, 68
government 71 Tamil Information Centre (TIC)
Tamil Canadians 166 191n15
Tamil communities 9, 53, 60, 73n3, Tamill against Genocide (TAG) 131
180, 201, 205 Tamil National Alliance (TNA)
Tamil Conservative activists 166 190n4
Tamil Conservative professionals Tamil National Councils (TNCs) 161
78n43 Tamil Relief Organization (TRO) 69
Tamil Coordinating Committee in Tamil self-determination 66, 131
Norway 76n28 Tamil separatists 4, 55, 60
Tamil demonstrations 183 Tamil-speaking people 59
Index 219
Tamil Tigers 70 United Nations Human Rights
Tamil United Liberation Front Council (UNHCR) 158
(TULF) 74n12 United Nations Refugee Agency 65
temporary entrants 3, 4, 18, 120, 185, United Nations Security Council 102,
199 104, 106
terrorism 71, 130 US-Mexico bilateral relations 37
Terrorism Act 2000 70 “utilitarian imperative” 207
terrorist attacks 97
9/11 terrorist attacks, US 58 Vandalism 76n32
Thatcher, Margaret 93, 96, 113n40 Vaz, Keith 127, 128, 163
The Refugee Integration Strategy vertical role contestation 133–143,
(2000) 64 198–200; agency factors 175–177;
Tiger Organisation of Service diasporas 182–183; disaggregating
Intelligence Services (TOSIS) 66, diasporas 205–207; to end the war
76n27 203–204; 2013 factor comparison
Together Against Genocide (TAG) 175, 175; institutional factors
160 177–182; for justice in Sri Lanka
Toronto 55, 74n15, 130, 152n25 204–205; non-elite agents 174; role
tourism 108 theoretical implications 143–147
trans-Atlantic bridge 20 victimised diaspora 72
transitional justice 187; and human Vietnamese diaspora 88
rights abuses 2, 204; legitimate 156;
see also role contestation Wanigasuriya, Brigadier 160
transit visas 75n22 war crimes investigation 178
Transnational Government of Tamil “War on Terror” 97
Eelam (TGTE) 156, 191n11 warrior heritage 97
transnational linkages 191n14 Westminster model 92
Transnational Tamil organisations Westminster-style democracies
161 45n5
Trudeau White Pape, 1966, 62 Westminster systems 86, 202
tsunami, December 2004 122 Wharton, James 192n19
Turkey 64 Whitehall 111n10
Whitehall officials 93
UK arms sales 108 “white vans” 189n1
The UK Gateway Protection World Tamil Eelam Conference 60
Resettlement Programme 65 World Tamil Movement (WTM)
UK immigration policy 63–65 67–69, 76n28, 77n36
Ukrainian Canadian Congress 92 World Tamils Forum 151n18
UK Tamil diaspora: BTF, 127; World Trade Organization (WTO)
leadership 127 43, 101
UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Navi Pillay 123 Youth Organisation (TYO) 191n15

Disaggregating Diasporas as a Force in Role Contestation_ -- Matthew K_ Godwin -- Role Theory and International Relations, 2022 -- Routledge -- 9780367544904 -- ab2315bd54e1c082510c896289689fb5 -- Anna’s Archive

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Disaggregating Diasporas as a Force in Role Contestation_ -- Matthew K_ Godwin -- Role Theory and International Relations, 2022 -- Routledge -- 9780367544904 -- ab2315bd54e1c082510c896289689fb5 -- Anna’s Archive

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Disaggregating Diasporas as a

Force in Role Contestation

13. National Role Conceptions in a New Millennium

14. Role Compatibility as Socialization

15. Role Theory and Russian Foreign Policy

16. Disaggregating Diasporas as a Force in Role Contestation

ISBN: 9780367544904 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

List of figures and tablesix

1 Marginalised diasporas: A force in role contestation? 1

2 Diaspora role contestation in Canada and the UK:

3 A marginalised minority: The Sri Lankan civil war, the

4 From human security to enlightened self-interest?: Canadian and

6 Role contestation for transitional justice: Role constraints

7 Conclusion: Diasporas are a force in role contestation,

AIPAC American Israel Political Affairs Committee

Surface-level similarities? Examining Tamil diaspora

Organisation of the book

In addition to unpacking the empirical story of how marginalised dias-

All the world’s a stage: Role theory, diasporas

Disaggregating agency in foreign policy analysis:

Role theory and agency: Mass movements as role-making

Role theory and agency: Government and non-government

Role theory and agency: Interaction at the intersection of mass

Disaggregating institutions in foreign policy analysis:

Role theory and institutions: Institutional factors

Table 2.1 Factor comparison framework

Factors Case Case

Role theory and institutions: Diaspora influence on

Role Theory and constraints on international role performance

Canada and France are both members of La Francophonie sub-system

Role Theory and role position ascription

Role Theory and “indispensable” states

Foreign policymaking is often considered from the perspective of gov-

Defining the “Tamil diaspora”

The Tamil diaspora in Canada and the UK

Colonial regimes of marginalisation

Regimes of integration, settlement

Immigration, integration and settlement in Canada

Immigration, integration and settlement in the UK

The LTTE abroad: Transnational conflict and the Tamil

The proscription of the LTTE and securitisation

In keeping with the dual focus of role theoretical approaches on both

Models and means in foreign policy analysis

Multicultural foreign policy and diasporas as “active”

Processes of Canadian foreign policymaking

Figure 4.1 Foreign policy processes

servants and politically appointed staff. In some cases, statements on

A group of young, Conservative members of Asian descent

BK-TandF-GODWIN_9780367544904-220335-Chp04.indd 91 04/07/22 3:36 PM

Processes of British foreign policymaking

From Liberal interventionism to enlightened self-interest?

From Middle Power to disruptor? Recent changes

From intervener to convenor? Recent changes

Middle Power revisited: Ascribing Canada’s role position

A major power by any other name? Ascribing Britain’s

The bloody final throes of the Sri Lankan

The evolution of Tamil diaspora role-making:

Tamil diaspora interest group organisation

Role contestation and ending the war: Role-making

The Tamil diaspora and role-making in Canada:

The Tamil diaspora and role-making in the UK:

Vertical role contestation and influencing

Agency factors in role contestation

List of figures and tablesix

1 Marginalised diasporas: A force in role contestation? 1