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Financial Reporting and Analysis (6th Ed.)
Chapter 7 Solutions
The Role of Financial Information in Contracting
Exercises
Exercises
E7-1. Understanding debt covenants
Debt covenants are restrictive provisions written into loan agreements by the
lender. Covenants are designed to reduce potential conflicts of interest
between the lender and borrower. Typical restrictions include limits on
additional debt, dividend payments, mergers, asset sales, as well as the
various accounting-based covenants described in the chapter. Lenders
include covenants as a form of protection against managerial actions that
might unfairly reduce the likelihood of debt repayment. Borrowers agree to
these restrictions because it reduces the cost of borrowing. Without
covenants, lenders would charge more for the loan (a higher interest rate) as
compensation for the added risks of lending. Debt covenants make both
borrowers and lenders better off.
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
There are several reasons lenders may not want to require borrowers to use
specific accounting methods. One important consideration is just the cost
associated with keeping multiple sets of accounting records. Suppose a
company had five loans, each from a different bank, and each bank required
the company to prepare financial statements using a “fixed” set of accounting
methods. Five loans, five banks, and five sets of books! This could prove to
be very costly, especially if the loans required attestation by an independent
accounting firm (five audits?).
Allowing some discretion also benefits lenders because managers can then
adapt their accounting methods to the company’s changing economic
circumstances. Example: changing to LIFO inventory accounting when raw
material price increases are expected. LIFO accounting can save tax dollars,
and this cash flow improvement makes the debt less risky.
Another reason lenders may not want to require “fixed” accounting methods is
that GAAP has a built-in tendency for conservatism (i.e., to understate assets
and income, and to overstate liabilities).
There are two different ways to grow sales at Sunshine Groceries: (i) grow
sales at existing stores by increasing customer traffic and/or the amount each
customer spends per visit; and (ii) grow sales by opening new stores. The
first approach—typically referred to as “organic” growth—yields increased
earnings as long as each new sales dollar more than covers incremental
costs (e.g., the cost of the item sold plus sales commissions, etc.). The
second approach, on the other hand, will not yield increased earnings unless
the sales dollars generated from the new store exceed all of the operating
costs associated with that store (including store rental, utilities, taxes, etc.).
It makes sense for the company to award bonuses based on sales growth
because increased sales can lead to increased profits at the company.
However, this compensation policy can also lead to poor business decisions.
For example, managers may boost sales (and their bonuses) through the use
of extreme price discounts where each sales dollar falls short of covering the
7-2
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cost of the item sold. Or, managers may boost sales by opening new stores
in unprofitable locations. Notice too that this sales bonus approach provides
no incentive for managers to reduce expenses.
Taxes and regulations can transfer wealth from companies and their
stockholders to other groups or individuals. Consider, for example, local
property taxes paid by a company. These taxes represent a wealth transfer
from the company (and its stockholders) to various beneficiaries—often local
school districts, their employees, students, and their parents.
7-3
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E7-7. Regulatory accounting principles
1Thisis the amount of revenue needed to cover all operating expenses and still earn net
income equal to the “allowed” amount.
In this case, including CIP in the rate base allows the company to set
electricity prices so that it receives $1,416 million in revenue rather than only
$1,376 million. What’s the source of the added revenue? Customers pay
10.11 cents per KWH instead of 9.83 cents per KWH. Once the project has
been completed, however, the CIP costs are transferred to “operating assets”
and the allowed revenue number then becomes the same.
Notice also that including CIP costs in the rate base may actually benefit
customers if it results in earlier construction of additional and more efficient
generating facilities, transmission systems, and distribution systems. That’s
because the new facilities and systems might well result in lower future
customer costs per KWH.
The answer depends on when rates will be adjusted as well as how the
tornado loss is classified for rate-making purposes. Let’s compare two
different situations: rates set in the year of the loss versus rates set one year
later.
7-4
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Rates Set in Loss Year Rates Set One Year Later
($ in millions) Expense Capitalize Expense Capitalize
Allowed operating costs (before loss) $600.00 $600.00 $600.00 $601.00
Tornado damage 5.00 – – –
$605.00 $600.00 $600.00 $601.00
1Therevenue requirement is the sum of allowed operating costs (with or without tornado
damage) and the allowed returns.
If electricity rates are set in the loss year, it is better for shareholders to have
the company treat the repairs as an expense. That’s because doing so
produces the highest allowed revenue—$733 million. But this also means that
customers pay the full cost of the tornado repairs (through higher rates) in
the first year and in each year thereafter until rates are set again.
If electricity rates are set in the loss year and the repairs are capitalized,
customers may still pay the full cost of the repairs—but over an extended
period of time. The exact amount paid and the timing depends on when rates
are set again.
If rates are to be set one year after the tornado loss (but not the loss year), it
is better for customers (but worse for shareholders) if the repairs are
expensed in the loss year. That is because the repairs will then not be
recovered in higher electricity rates—shareholders, not customers, bear the
cost of the tornado.
If the repairs are capitalized, and rates are set in the year after the loss,
customers pay for some (but not all) of the tornado damage. Notice that
allowed operating costs in the example are $601 million—the extra $1 million
represents depreciation of the capitalized repair costs (over a 5-year period).
Capitalization produces the highest allowed revenue—$729.32 million.
Notice too that if rates are set both years, it is still better for shareholders (but
worse for customers) to expense the repairs immediately because the entire
cost of the repairs is recovered the first year. As a practical matter, some
state utility commissions allow unusual losses such as this to qualify for
special rate relief.
7-5
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E7-9. Maintaining capital adequacy
Requirement:
Banks and insurance companies are required to maintain minimum levels of
investor capital for two reasons. First, it provides a cushion to ensure that
funds are available to pay depositors and beneficiaries. Second, investors
who are also managers will make less risky business decisions when some of
their own money is at stake. See the discussion in E7-10.
In the oil and gas drilling partnership, the general partner—Huge Gamble—
makes all the operating decisions. Huge Gamble is the agent for the investor
group (you and your friend). Is there any agency conflict here? Yes,
because Huge Gamble gets paid regardless of whether oil and gas are
discovered or not, but investors win only if petroleum deposits are uncovered.
According to the management contract, Huge Gamble is reimbursed for all
“operating costs” and receives a share of the profits if oil and gas are found.
This contract structure encourages Huge Gamble to overspend by taking
risky bets on exploration. After all, Huge Gamble has little downside risk (all
costs are reimbursed) and big upside potential if oil and gas are discovered.
This tendency to overspend is a cost of the agency relationship.
7-6
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See: M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial
Economics (October 1976), pp. 305–360; and M.A. Wolfson “Empirical
Evidence of Incentive Problems and Their Mitigation in Oil and Gas Tax
Shelter Programs,” in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1985), pp. 101–125.
7-7
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Financial Reporting and Analysis (6th Ed.)
Chapter 7 Solutions
The Role of Financial Information in Contracting
Problems
Problems
P7-1. Krispy Kreme’s bonus plan
Requirement 1:
Shareholders benefit when Krispy Kreme opens new doughnut shops that
earn a rate of return on invested capital (ROIC) that exceeds the company’s
cost of capital. Only then is the new doughnut shop a positive net present
value project.
Requirement 2:
Using the same profit performance definition (EBITDA) in the company’s loan
covenants as the profit performance definition in the bonus plan helps ensure
that managers pay incentives are aligned with the company’s debt covenant
compliance incentives. This approach reduces potential incentive conflicts;
i.e., situations where managers take actions that increase the pay metric but
simultaneously decrease the covenant metric.
Requirement 3:
A variety of accounting gimmicks can be used to enhance managers’
bonuses when those bonuses are based on accrual earnings (EBITDA) or
accounting revenues. These include changes in accounting methods,
changes in accounting estimates, and other accrual manipulations discussed
throughout the book. These abuses also include real transaction possibilities
such as forcing franchisees to buy doughnut mix and supplies before they are
really needed (channel stuffing).
7-8
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P7-2. Krispy Kreme’s compensation recovery plan
Requirement 1:
Annual and long-term compensation plans can contribute to agency problems
by encouraging managers to take actions that enhance their pay (and thus
personal wealth) to the detriment of shareholders. These actions may involve
real transactions such as opening new stores in unprofitable locations or
channel stuffing (see P7-1). The actions may also involve financial
accounting decisions such as premature revenue recognition or delayed
expense recognition. Krispy Kreme’s compensation recovery plan, which is
similar to the recovery plans adopted recently by a number of U.S.
companies, is focused on actions detrimental to shareholders that later
trigger an accounting restatement.
Requirement 2:
Here are two examples:
Both examples are taken from the company’s description of the accounting
abuses that led to its restatement.
Requirement 3:
The pay recovery plan is aimed at reducing managers’ incentives to inflate
reported financial statement results and thus their annual and/or long-term
compensation awards. This formal requirement to repay “ill-gotten gains”
should discourage accounting abuses.
When doctors own the hospitals where they work, they may be tempted to
overprescribe or overdiagnose medical treatments and procedures. That’s
because hospital profits flow to the doctors who make decisions about the
scope and level of treatment and diagnosis. Third-party reimbursement and
trusting patients may not be effective impediments to this behavior.
7-9
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P7-4. Foot Locker, Inc.: Anticipating covenant violation
Requirement 1:
A minimum fixed charge coverage ratio covenant limits the company’s ability
to pay dividends or make capital expenditures by requiring that fixed
charges—current maturities on debt, dividends, and capital expenditures—
not exceed a specified multiple of net income, adjusted net income, or
operating cash flow. Using the example from the chapter for instance, we
find that a minimum fixed-charge coverage ratio of 1.0 limits dividend to no
more than $15. The purpose served by this covenant is to restrict the
company’s ability to spend cash in ways that may be disadvantageous to the
lender.
Requirement 2:
By agreeing to this restriction, Foot Locker promises to keep more cash in the
company for possible use in paying down its loans. This reduces Foot
Locker’s credit risk when viewed from the perspective of the lender, and thus
should reduce the company’s cost of obtaining borrowed capital.
Requirement 3:
Consider the minimum fixed charge coverage ratio mentioned in Requirement
1 and described in the chapter. Suppose the ratio numerator is defined by
the loan agreement to be net income plus depreciation and amortization.
Management has an incentive to make the numerator as large as possible
because this creates slack in the covenant and permits greater cash dividend
distributions and capital expenditures. Accounting gimmicks that increase net
income (e.g., LIFO inventory liquidation, understating bad debt expense,
aggressive revenue recognition) also increase the ratio numerator and
reduce the likelihood of covenant violation.
Requirement 4:
Lenders have a several options available to them when a loan covenant is
violated by the borrower. These options range from agreeing to waive the
violation, amending the terms of the loan agreement, or requiring the debt to
be paid immediately. Requiring immediate payment is the action of last resort
and often precipitates bankruptcy by the borrower.
Requirement 1:
A minimum tangible net worth covenant requires the company to maintain a
balance of, in Frisby’s case, at least $1.250 million of contractually defined
“tangible net worth”—stockholders’ equity minus the book value of any
intangible assets. There are two related purposes served by this covenant.
First, it provides a contractual incentive for management to profitably operate
7-10
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the company because stockholders’ equity is increased by any profits earned.
Second, it restricts managements’ ability to pay cash dividends or buy back
stock because both of these actions reduce stockholders’ equity. Of course,
the more profitable the company and the less cash spent on dividends and
stock buy backs, the more cash that is available to pay down debt. Thus, the
ultimate purpose served by the covenant is to reduce the lender’s exposure
to credit risk.
Requirement 2:
Lenders are reluctant to simply waive a covenant violation when the
circumstances of the violation indicate a true deterioration in borrower credit
worthiness. If credit risk has increased, lenders will instead take advantage
of the violation to favorably alter the loan terms or demand immediate
repayment of the loan. That seems to be what is happening at Frisby.
Requirement 3:
Lenders often prefer to avoid foreclosure because the cash proceeds
obtained from liquidating a company are often quite small in comparison to
loan amounts. Lenders often structure a “work out” that allows the company
to remain in business—thereby generating future cash to payback the loan—
but with greater restrictions on the use of cash and additional personal loan
guarantees by company owners
Requirement 1:
According to the bonus formula, Mr. Brincat would receive a bonus of
$500,000 if the company reports net after-tax earnings of $50 million and the
EPS increase is 10 percent.
Requirement 2:
According to the bonus formula, Mr. Brincat would receive a bonus of
$846,140 if the company reports net after-tax earnings of $50 million and the
EPS increase is 30 percent.
Assuming the company has not issued or repurchased stock during the
year, a 30% increase in EPS must also mean that net after-tax earnings
increased 30%. In other words $50 million = (1 + .30) x earnings last year.
7-11
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So, earnings last year must equal $50 / (1.30) or $38.462 million.
The increase in net after-tax earnings would then be $11.538 million
($50.000 million - $38.462 million).
Requirement 3:
Most shareholders would not feel very comfortable if managers had this type
of compensation package. Consider, for example, the incentive bonus. It is
based on annual increases in EPS, and the larger the EPS increase, the
larger the bonus payment. But there are ways of increasing EPS that do not
increase the value of the company’s common shares. LIFO liquidations and
stock buybacks are just two examples. Notice also that Mr. Bincat’s stock
options vest only if EPS grows by 20% or more in each of the next five years.
The combination of annual bonuses and stock options tied to EPS growth
sends a clear signal to management: EPS is all that matters. Shareholders,
on the other hand, want to make certain that EPS growth translates into
higher dividends or greater share price appreciation.
Requirement 1:
The first thing to note about the suggested adjustments is that there is no
mention of the nonoperating income items and gains. The list provided by
company managers is one-sided: It identifies nonoperating items that
decreased reported earnings for the year, but it does not point to any items
that increased earnings. Of course, without access to the complete financial
statements, the compensation committee would not be aware of this
intentional oversight.
The compensation committee could agree that the bonus should be paid
solely on the basis of reported net income and that no adjustment is
necessary. One justification for this view is that income-reducing items such
as these are offset by income-increasing items not contained on the
adjustment list.
On the other hand, a reasonable argument can be made for excluding (a)
from the bonus calculation. Here, changes in the company’s optimal financial
structure (best mix of debt and equity) may have prompted the early debt
retirement. Don’t penalize managers for making good business decisions.
7-12
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A similar argument can be made to exclude (b) and (c) from the bonus
calculation. Changes in the company’s economic environment may have
contributed to the need for a restructuring and the discontinued operations.
Managers should not be penalized for making good business decisions. And,
if annual bonuses are influenced by such nonrecurring items, managers will
be less inclined to make these tough decisions in the future.
Requirement 2:
Three possibilities for the appropriate net income figure come to mind:
Requirement 1:
For most companies, the fixed charges ratio is just a variation of the interest
coverage ratio. With only two weeks until the books are closed, the company
needs to “find some income” that can increase the numerator of this ratio.
Possible sources of income are:
• Accelerate the recognition of revenue from the first few days of next year
into the last few days of this year (i.e., leave the books open past the fiscal
year end).
• Delay the recognition of expenses from the last few days of this year until
the first few days of next year (i.e., close the books early for expenses).
• Postpone discretionary expenses like maintenance, research and
development, or advertising.
• Sell assets that have market values substantially in excess of their book
values.
7-13
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• Change one or more accounting methods to increase reported earnings.
For instance: expand straight-line depreciation to all long-lived assets,
eliminate LIFO accounting.
• Change one or more accounting estimates. For instance, increase the
estimated useful lives of long-term assets, decrease salvage value
estimates or bad debt allowances.
Requirements 2 and 3:
Some actions that could be taken to avoid violating the tangible net worth
ratio are:
Requirement 4:
Answers to this question will vary from student to student. The dilemma
confronting the banker involves a trade-off between (a) using covenants to
restrict management’s action and thereby reduce credit risk and (b) inhibiting
management from taking prudent actions that enhance cash flows and the
likelihood of debt repayment. Students should be encouraged to see both
sides of this situation.
Requirement 1:
Duke Energy is altering readers of its published GAAP financial statements
that certain reported asset and liability items are unique to the rate-making
process, and thus do not appear in the GAAP financial statement s of non-
regulated businesses. Readers should therefore not be surprised when they
come across potentially unfamiliar asset and liability items such as the
Allowance for Funds Used During Construction.
7-14
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Requirement 2:
In this particular instance, Duke Energy is reminding readers that some debt
interest costs are assigned to the balance sheet, and thus are not included in
Interest expense. Readers who overlook this reminder may mistakenly
conclude that debt interest costs (as shown on the income statement) are
lower than the company’s true cost of debt borrowing (interest expense plus
capitalized interest costs for the period).
Duke Energy is also reminding readers that certain (implicit) equity costs are
also assigned to the balance sheet as part of AFDUC even though GAAP for
non-regulated companies does not permit the capitalization of equity costs.
This accounting practice is unique to rate-regulated utility companies and
arises from the rate regulation process.
Requirement 3:
The chapter provides several examples of regulatory expense shifting where
firms have incentives to classify a cost (e.g., corporate advertising) as an
allowed operating cost rather than a cost not allowed for rate determination.
Other examples include GAAP postponement of storm damage costs if
management believes that those costs will be recovered through allowed
future rate increases. Management also has an incentive to artificially inflate
the reported asset base because utility rates (and thus revenues) are tied to
an approved accounting rate of return earned on the asset base.
Requirement 1:
The following table shows the impact of the proposed accounting changes on
2014’s revenue requirement and rate per kilowatt hour:
7-15
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Proposed accounting changes
Base Extend Increase Amortize Write-Up
($ in millions) Case Plant Life Bad Debts Takeover Costs Inventories
Allowed operating costs $1,120.0 $1,120.0 $1,120.0 $1,120.0 $1,120.0
Accounting change adjustment – (5.0) 7.0 1.5 –
$1,120.0 $1,115.0 $1,127.0 $1,121.5 $1,120.0
Requirement 2:
The bad debt increase seems quite plausible as long as the revised
estimate (1.5% of sales) conforms to the company’s actual experience. This
change would probably be allowed.
The inventory write-up to current replacement value makes good economic
sense. Investors should be allowed to earn a fair return (8.75%) on their
current investment in the company, not on an outdated historical measure of
that investment. If LIFO inventory accounting were used, for example, the
inventory cost numbers could be several decades old. Unfortunately,
7-16
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regulators have so far rejected this line of argument and required utilities to
maintain their balance sheet at historical cost.
The plant life extension would be allowed, but not the $175 million increase
in asset book value. Instead, the company would be required to just extend
existing depreciable cost over the longer depreciation life.
Regulators would disallow amortization of the hostile takeover cost
incurred last year. This is nothing more than a bold attempt to get one of last
year’s expenditures into this year’s rate base. The company may initiate a
request for a special rate surcharge to cover this unusual expenditure, but
that too is likely to be rejected because the outlay was of little benefit to
customers.
Requirement 1:
U.S. companies are not required to obtain shareholder approval of the
compensation packages paid to top executives. Proposed pay packages are
assembled by the company’s compensation committee which is comprised of
outside (non-officer) members of the Board of Directors. These outside
directors are presumed to formulate pay packages consistent with the
interests of shareholders.
Shareholders can, and some do, put forth proposals aimed at curbing
“abusive” compensation practices such as golden parachutes, and overly
generous executive pay levels. Management can, under certain
circumstances, refuse to place the proposal on the annual meeting agenda,
and management is not obligated to implement proposed changes in pay
practices even if the garner a majority vote of shareholders.
During the 2008 proxy season, shareholders filed resolutions seeking
nonbinding (advisory) votes on pay practices at nearly 100 U.S. companies.
AFLAC Inc,, known for the quacking duck that appears in its TV commercials,
is the first public U.S. company to give investors an advisory vote on top
officers compensation. See: J. Lublin, “Say on the Boss’s Pay,” Wall Street
Journal (March 7, 2008).
Requirement 2:
One argument favoring continued use of golden parachutes is that they help
shareholders by reducing incumbent management’s tendency to fight hostile
takeover attempts. Takeovers can benefit shareholders in several ways.
First, takeover premiums are often 20% or more above the prevailing stock
price and these premiums are captured by shareholders of the target firm.
Second, takeovers are a mechanism for achieving changes in the company’s
leadership team particularly when top executives are well entrenched and
report to a “friendly” board of directors. Golden parachutes provide a type of
severance package that presumably reduces executive resistance to
7-17
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takeover offers. Of course, golden parachutes also may just be one more
way of delivering overly generous compensation to top executives, and that
seems to be the view held by Mr. Minder.
Requirement 3:
It would seem that in companies with approximately $500 million in world-
wide annual sales, CEO pay in the U.S. is about 78 times the typical U.S.
worker ($2.2 million / $11.6 million x 411 = 78 rounded). A similar pay
multiple applies to European countries.
Among the reasons for supporting shareholders’ right to approve CEO pay
packages are: (1) achieve greater pay equity with workers; (2) hold CEO
more accountable for company performance; (3) ensure that CEO pay is
reduced when employees are dismissed in a company downsizing; (4) block
the actions of an overly generous compensation committee and board; and
(5) allow shareholders to determine whether executive pay practices are
effective.
Among the reasons for not supporting the right of shareholders to approve
CEO pay packages are: (1) labor market forces dictate top executive pay
levels and subjecting pay packages to shareholder approval would introduce
disruptive political forces into the pay process; (2) the costs of shareholder
approval far outweigh any economic benefits to be gained; (3) shareholders
already “vote” on corporate pay practices because the chose each day which
stocks to own and which to not own; (4) the average stockholder lacks the
skills, knowledge, or experience to properly evaluate top executive pay
practices in a modern corporation; and (5) corporate compensation
committees and the board of directors are effective mechanisms for ensuring
that executive pay practices are aligned with shareholder interests.
Requirement 4:
The distinction to consider here is the difference between allowing
shareholders the right to approve CEO pay (see Requirement 3) and allowing
non-shareholder citizens the same right. Notice that shareholders have a
direct, economic interest in the outcome but non-shareholder citizens do not
have that same economic interest. Arguments for or against a national vote
could be built around the points raised in Requirement 3. In addition, you
might consider whether national votes should be held on other corporate
matters such as election of directors, approval of corporate acquisitions and
investment decisions, or approval of dividends. Given citizens the right to
vote on such matters would dilute the rights of stockholders and make owning
shares in the company less worthwhile. This would increase the company’s
cost of obtaining external financial resources through debt or equity markets.
7-18
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Financial Reporting and Analysis (6th Ed.)
Chapter 7 Solutions
The Role of Financial Information in Contracting
Cases
Cases
C7-1. Microsoft’s “unearned revenue” account
Requirement 1:
Microsoft cannot recognize all of the revenue from software sales until it is
fully “earned.” Microsoft sets aside some software sales revenue as
“unearned” because, at the time of sale, the company still has an obligation to
provide the customer with substantial services (upgrades, support, and bug
fixes) in the future. By postponing the recognition of this “unearned” revenue
until later when the services are performed, Microsoft is just following GAAP
revenue recognition principles.
Requirement 2:
Determining how much software sales revenue to set aside as unearned
each quarter is a challenge because it requires an estimate of the future cost
of providing the promised services to customers. Developing reliable cost
estimates is no easy matter, particularly in an industry where technologies
change rapidly and software released early is often error prone.
Once a cost estimate is determined, there are two ways Microsoft could then
determine how much revenue to set aside as unearned. One approach would
set aside just enough revenue to cover the estimated future costs of
promised services. For example, suppose Microsoft expects to incur $5 in
future expenses for each $100 software package it sells. The company would
then recognize $95 of software sales revenue immediately and include this in
current earnings. The remaining $5 would be recorded as unearned revenue,
to be “earned” when the future services are performed.
A second approach would set aside enough revenue to not only cover the
estimated future costs of the promised services, but to also earn a “normal”
gross profit in the period when the services are performed. For example,
suppose Microsoft again expects to incur $5 in future expenses for each $100
software package it sells and that it’s “normal” gross profit on software sales
is 50%. In this case, the company would set aside $10 (the $5 of expected
future cost plus a $5 gross profit) of software sales as unearned.
7-19
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Requirement 3:
When the “unearned revenue” account is reduced by $100 million the dollars
go to the “revenue” account and are included in net income. That’s because
they are then considered earned revenue.
Requirement 4:
Contracting incentives (compensation and debt covenants) can exert a large
influence on management’s decisions about the unearned revenue account.
Consider a situation where management bonuses are based on achieving
predetermined earnings (or earnings per share) targets. If management
believes the company will exceed its profit goal this year, they have an
incentive to increase the amount of software sales revenue set aside as
unearned. Doing so will not jeopardize the bonus payment this year and it
creates a cushion than can be used next year if the company appears to be
falling short of its profit goal. Debt covenants can also provide incentives to
“manage” the unearned revenue account, although they are unimportant for
Microsoft because the company has very little debt outstanding.
Requirement 5:
Analysts and investors focus on changes in Microsoft’s unearned revenue
account for several reasons. First, the unearned revenue account is a lead
indicator of future profitability since today’s “unearned” revenues become
tomorrow’s “earned” revenues. Less obvious, but undoubtedly more
important, is the fact that changes in the unearned revenue account also is
an indicator of the quality of Microsoft’s earnings. Analysts and investors look
at this account to determine if Microsoft is “managing” its earnings each
quarter—stockpiling unearned revenue in good quarters and drawing down
the account in bad quarters.
Requirement:
There are several reasons why Ms. Magee should feel uneasy about
Maxcor’s computation of 2014 operating profits:
• Some research and development (R&D) expenses are shown above the
operating profit line (in cost of goods sold) and some are below the line (as
research and development expense). The classification decision may allow
considerable discretion. For example, about 72% of total research and
engineering expense was charged to cost of goods sold in 2013 when
operating profits were still
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subjoin in this, and other subsequent notes, the various alterations
made by this judicious editor, together with the original passages: the
lines he has introduced are beautifully written, and a close imitation
of the style of Terence: I cannot doubt but they will be considered
worthy of a perusal: they are a proof of a laudable delicacy, which
was but too rarely to be met with in many of the poets of both
England and France, in the 17th century.
The original passage runs thus:—
“At first she lived chastely, and penuriously, and laboured hard,
managing with difficulty to gain a livelihood with the distaff and the
loom: but soon after several lovers made their addresses to her, and
as we are all naturally prone to idleness, and averse to labour, and
as they made her promises of marriage, she was too negligent of her
reputation, and admitted their visits oftener than was prudent.”
NOTE 73.
NOTE 74.
NOTE 75.
NOTE 76.
I contracted my son.
The Athenian youth were not allowed to dispose of themselves in
marriage without consulting their parents, who had almost unlimited
authority over them: if they had no parents, guardians, called
ἐπίτροποι, were appointed to control them.
But it does not appear that any particular ceremonies were used
in Athens, in contracting a bride and bridegroom, previous to the day
of marriage; and I rather imagine, Terence, in order to make the
subject clear to his Roman auditors, alluded, by the word despondi,
to the Roman custom of betrothing, called sponsalia, which they
performed as follows:—
Some days before the wedding, the intended bride and
bridegroom, with their friends, met together at the lady’s residence,
and the parent or guardian of each (as I imagine) asked each other,
Spondes? Do you betroth her or him? Then the other party
answered, Spondeo, I do betroth, &c. Then the deeds were signed,
the dowry agreed on, and the day appointed for the marriage.
NOTE 77.
Among the women who were there I saw one young girl.
Women were frequently hired on these occasions, to appear in
the funeral procession as mourners, of whom Horace says,
NOTE 78.
She appeared more afflicted than the others who were there, and so
pre-eminently beautiful, and of so noble a carriage, I approach.
To understand the full force of Simo’s remark, when he says how
much he was struck with the contrast between Glycera and the rest
of the mourners, it is necessary that the reader should be informed,
that, in Athens, no woman under sixty years of age was allowed to
appear at a funeral; except the relations of the deceased. Solon
imposed this law upon the Athenians.
NOTE 79.
NOTE 80.
NOTE 81.
The corpse is placed on the pile, and quickly enveloped in flames;
they weep; while the sister I was speaking of, rushed forward, in
an agony of grief, toward the fire; and her imprudence exposed her
to great danger.
An eminent English poet, Sir Richard Steele, has endeavoured to
adapt Terence’s Andrian to the taste of an English audience, and has
succeeded in that attempt, in his play, called The Conscious Lovers,
as well as circumstances would permit. A French poet of equal
eminence, Monsieur Baron, has made a similar attempt in French
verse, and has met with equal success in his Andrienne: he has kept
much closer to the original than has Sir Richard Steele; indeed,
many scenes of the Andrienne are a literal version of Terence. I
purpose to point out the most material changes which the two
modern poets have made in the incidents: the bent of the dramatic
taste of the nation of each, may be discovered, in some measure,
from a comparison between the English, the French, and the Roman
dramatist. M. Baron has not made any alteration in the scene at
Chrysis’ funeral, where Simo discovers his son’s attachment to
Glycera; but Sir R. Steele, has altered the mode of discovery to a
quarrel at a masquerade; and his scene, though it may want the
pathos of the original, yet displays the filial affection of Bevil, the
English Pamphilus, in a very amiable light. Sir Richard has
modernized the characters of Simo and Sosia in Sir John Bevil and
Humphrey.
“Sir J. You know I was, last Thursday, at the masquerade:
my son, you may remember, soon found us out. He knew his
grandfather’s habit, which I then wore, and though it was in
the mode of the last age, yet the maskers followed us, as if we
had been the most monstrous figures in the whole assembly.
“Humph. I remember a young man of quality, in the habit of
a clown, was particularly troublesome.
“Sir J. Right: he was too much what he seemed to be: he
followed us, till the gentleman, who led the lady in the Indian
mantle, presented that gay creature to the rustic, and bid him
(like Cymon in the fable) grow polite, by falling in love, and let
that worthy gentleman alone, meaning me. The clown was not
reformed, but rudely offered to force off my mask; with that the
gentleman, throwing off his own, appeared to be my son; and,
in his concern for me, tore off that of the nobleman. At this,
they seized each other, the company called the guards, and,
in the surprise, the lady swooned away; upon which my son
quitted his adversary, and had now no care but of the lady;
when, raising her in his arms, ‘Art thou gone,’ cried he, ‘for
ever?—Forbid it, Heaven!’—She revives at his known voice,
and, with the most familiar, though modest gesture, hangs in
safety over his shoulders weeping; but wept as in the arms of
one before whom she could give herself a loose, were she not
under observation. While she hides her face in his neck, he
carefully conveys her from the company.”—Conscious
Lovers.
Sir John Bevil makes the same trial of his son, as Simo of his: and
young Bevil makes the same reply with Pamphilus. The only
difference in the conduct of the plot in that part is, that Bevil is not
apprized of his father’s stratagem by his own servant; but by
Humphrey, which, as it shews a sort of half-treachery in him, is an
inferior arrangement to that of the Latin poet.
NOTE 82.
NOTE 84.
Exit Sosia.
“Here we take our last leave of Sosia, who is, in the language of
the commentators, a protatick personage, that is, as Donatus
explains it, one who appears only once in the beginning (the
protasis) of the piece, for the sake of unfolding the argument, and is
never seen again in any part of the play. The narration being ended,
says Donatus, the character of Sosia is no longer necessary. He
therefore departs, and leaves Simo alone to carry on the action. With
all due deference to the ancients, I cannot help thinking this method,
if too constantly practised, as I think it is in our author, rather
inartificial. Narration, however beautiful, is certainly the deadest part
of theatrical compositions: it is, indeed, strictly speaking, scarce
dramatic, and strikes the least in the representation: and the too
frequent introduction of a character, to whom a principal person in
the fable is to relate in confidence the circumstances, previous to the
opening of the play, is surely too direct a manner of conveying that
information to the audience. Every thing of this nature should come
obliquely, fall in a manner by accident, or be drawn as it were
perforce, from the parties concerned, in the course of the action: a
practice, which, if reckoned highly beautiful in epic, may be almost
set down as absolutely necessary in dramatic poetry. It is, however,
more adviseable, even to seem tedious, than to hazard being
obscure. Terence certainly opens his plays with great address, and
assigns a probable reason for one of the parties being so
communicative to the other; and yet it is too plain that this narration
is made merely for the sake of the audience, since there never was a
duller hearer than Master Sosia, and it never appears, in the sequel
of the play, that Simo’s instructions to him are of the least use to
frighten Davus, or work upon Pamphilus. Yet even this protatick
personage is one of the instances of Terence’s art, since it was often
used in the Roman comedy, as may be seen even in Plautus, to
make the relation of the argument the express office of the
prologue.”—Colman.
Monsieur Baron does not dismiss Sosia here, but brings him on
the stage again; once in the third act, and once in the fourth. Sir R.
Steele introduces Humphrey again in the first act, and also in the
fifth. We are told by Donatus, that in the Andrian and Perinthian of
Menander, which are similar in the plot, the first scene is the same as
in Terence, but that in the Perinthian, the old man consults with his
wife instead of Sosia; and, in the Andrian he opens with a soliloquy.
NOTE 85.
NOTE 86.
NOTE 87.
NOTE 88.
The grinding-house.
Terence has rendered by the word pistrinum, the Greek
σωφρονιστήριον, or house of correction, whither criminals were sent
for the various terms of imprisonment proportioned to their offences.
Slaves, while in this prison, were employed chiefly in grinding corn,
which, from a deficiency of mechanical knowledge, was, in those
times, a very laborious employment. The Athenians, who were
universally celebrated for their kind and gentle treatment of slaves,
were very reluctant to proceed to severer punishments than whipping
or imprisonment: but when a flagrant delinquency rendered it
necessary to make an example, they either burned the criminal with
a hot iron, in the offending member, if possible; or put on his feet a
torturing instrument, called χοῖνιξ. If the law required the criminal to
suffer death, which happened in very few cases, he was either hung,
beaten to death with clubs, or cast into a deep pit, called βάραθρον,
filled at the bottom with sharp spikes. They sometimes had recourse
to other extraordinary modes of punishment: but the before-
mentioned were the most common.
NOTE 89.
NOTE 90.
NOTE 91.
NOTE 92.
I think their intentions savour more of madness than of any thing
else.
Terence plays upon the words in the original of this passage,
which is as follows,
“Nam inceptio est amentium, haud amantium.”
Literally, For they act like mad people, not like lovers. This pun
cannot be preserved in an English translation, till two words can be
found alike in sound, one meaning “mad people,” and the other
“lovers.” The only attempt in English is the following: but the author
has rather altered the sense.
NOTE 93.
NOTE 94.
NOTE 96.
NOTE 97.
I. From Terence.