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Chapter 6 - Unemployment
Chapter 6: Unemployment
Solutions Manual
Learning Objectives for Chapter 6
After reading this chapter, you should know

LO 06-01. How unemployment is measured.
LO 06-02. The socioeconomic costs of unemployment.
LO 06-03. The major types of unemployment.
LO 06-04. The meaning of “full employment.”
Topics Covered in Chapter 6

LO 06-01. The Labor Force
LO 06-01. Measuring Unemployment
LO 06-02. The Human Costs
LO 06-03. Defining Full Employment
LO 06-04. Defining Full Employment
Questions for Discussion
1. Is it possible for unemployment rates to increase at the same time that the number of
employed persons is increasing? How?
Answer: Yes, it is possible and it has happened. If people enter the labor force at a rate
faster than the rate of job growth, the unemployment rate will increase at the same time that
more people are employed.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Reflective Thinking
Blooms: Analyze
2. If more teenagers stay in school longer, what happens to (a) production possibilities? (b)
unemployment rates?
Answer:
(a) The production possibilities decline as students take longer to enter the labor force.
(b) The unemployment rates may actually appear to fall since students are not part of the
labor force until they leave school.
LO 06-01
Blooms: Apply
6-1
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manner. This document may not be copied, scanned, duplicated, forwarded, distributed, or posted on a website, in whole or part.
3. Where and when will those Las Vegas carpenters (see News, p. 122) find jobs?
Answer: Many workers who lose jobs in one industry can’t fill job openings in other
industries because they don’t have the right skills. They are victims of structural
unemployment. To become employed, these workers might have to train for a different
occupation, or move to a different location where construction workers are being hired.
LO 06-03
Blooms: Understand
4. Why might job market (re)entrants have a harder time finding a job than job losers?
Answer: People who take an extended period of absence from their jobs may find that their
skills are obsolete, they have few job contacts, and they need new training. Job losers might
have modern skills, have developed job contacts, and therefore be readily employable.
LO 06-03
Blooms: Analyze
5. Should the government replace the wages of anyone who is unemployed? How might this
affect output and unemployment?
Answer: Unintended consequences of this policy could be more people staying on

unemployment or becoming unemployed to look for a better job, causing the rate to rise.
Because of these incentives, many states limit benefits to 26 weeks and provide benefits only
to those who worked a substantial length of time and had a “good” reason for losing their
jobs.
LO 06-03
Blooms: Evaluate
6. When the GE lightbulb plant in Virginia closed (p. 113), how was the local economy
affected?
Answer: The laid-off employees were out of a job with reduced incomes. The incomes of
family and community members also were impacted. Others harmed might be employees at
firms who relied on the spending of the GE employees (restaurants, grocery stores, car
dealerships, etc.). New entrants into the labor force (students just graduating) would also
have a more difficult time finding work at reasonable salaries.
6-2
LO 06-02
Blooms: Apply
7. Why is frictional unemployment deemed desirable?
Answer: As the economy moves out of some industries and into others through economic
growth, it is necessary for people to switch their jobs out of the declining industries and into
the new industries. Frictional unemployment reflects such job switching. Furthermore,
when job switching leads to better or more productive employment, both from the point of
view of the individual and from the point of view of the employing organization, society may
be better off.
LO 06-03
Blooms: Understand
8. Why do people expect inflation to heat up when the unemployment rate approaches 4
percent?
Answer: Some economists estimate that the amount of frictional unemployment existing in
the economy is about 4 percent. At this level of unemployment, it becomes very difficult for
businesses to find qualified people to hire. To encourage workers to accept employment
offers, they must pay more than the workers are currently earning with other employers. This
causes upward pressure on wages and costs, leading to inflation.
LO 06-04
Blooms: Analyze
9. Identify (a) two jobs at your school that could be outsourced and (b) two jobs that would be
hard to outsource.
Answer: Answers could include (a) teaching online courses; online registration; (b)
janitorial services; food services.
LO 06-04
Blooms: Apply
6-3
10. How can the outsourcing of U.S. computer jobs generate new U.S. jobs in construction or
retail trade? (See News, page 127.)
Answer: Outsourcing increases U.S. productivity and profits while reducing U.S. production
costs and prices. These outcomes may increase demand for U.S. jobs by more than the
immediate job loss.
LO 06-04
Blooms: Apply
Problems
1. According to Figure 6.1 (p. 114),

(a) What percentage of the civilian labor force was employed?
(b) What percentage of the civilian labor force was unemployed?
(c) What percentage of the population was employed in civilian jobs?
Answers:
(a) 90.3%.
(b) 9.6%.
(c) 44.8%.
Feedback:
(a) 139 million/154 million = 0.90259, or about 90.3%.
(b) 14.8 million/154 million = 0.09610, or about 9.6%.
(c) 139 million/310 million = 0.44838, or about 44.8%.
LO 06-01
Topic: The Labor Force
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 2 Understand
2. If the unemployment rate in 2010 had not risen since 2008, how many more workers would
have been employed in 2010? (Use Figure 6.1 and this book’s endpapers).
Answer: 5.9 million.
Feedback: Multiplying the unemployment rate in 2008 of 5.8% by the labor force of 154
million equals 8,932,000 people unemployed, compared to 14.8 million in 2010. 5,868,000
more people would have been employed in 2010 given the lower unemployment rate.
6-4
LO 06-01
Topic: Measuring Unemployment
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 5 Evaluate
3. Between 2000 and 2010, by how much did

(a) The labor force increase?
(b) Total employment increase?
(c) Total unemployment increase?
(d) Total output (real GDP) increase?
(Note: Data on inside covers of the text.)
Answers:
(a) 11.3 million increase in the labor force.
(b) 2.2 million increase in employment.
(c) 9.1 million increase in unemployment.
(d) $1.9 trillion increase in real GDP.
Feedback:
(a) 11.3 million = Labor force year2 - Labor force year1.
(b) 2.2 million = (Labor force - Unemployment) Year2 - (Labor force - Unemployment)
Year1.
(c) 9.1 million = Unemployment year2 – Unemployment year1.
(d) 1.9 trillion = Real GDP year2 - Real GDP year1.
In thousands 2000 2010 Change

Labor force 142,583 153,889 11,306
Employment* 136,891 139,064 2,173
in millions
Unemployment 5,692 14,825 9,133
Real GDP 11,216 13,088 1,872
* Employment = LF minus UE
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
6-5
4. If the labor force of 150 million people is growing by 1.5 percent per year, how many new
jobs have to be created each month to keep unemployment from increasing?
Web query: By how much did U.S. employment actually increase last month
(www.bls.gov)?
Answer: 187,500 jobs each month.
Feedback: 187,500 jobs each month. 1.5% of 150 million = 2.25 million jobs/year; 2.25
million/12 = 187,500 jobs/month.
Web query answer: Depends on current data at website www.bls.gov.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
5. Between 1980 and 2010, by how much did the labor force participation rate (Figure 6.2) of
(a) Men fall?
(b) Women rise?
Answers:
(a) 6.2%.
(b) 7.1%.
Feedback:
(a) 2010 Participation rate – 2008 Participation rate: 71.2% - 77.4% = 6.2%.
(b) 2010 Participation rate – 2008 Participation rate: 58.6% - 51.5% = 7.1%.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 1 Remember
6. According to Okun’s Law, how much output (real GDP) was lost in 2010 when the nation’s
unemployment rate increased from 9.3 percent to 9.6 percent?
Answer: $78.53 billion.
Feedback: Okun’s Law suggests that 1 percentage point more unemployment is equivalent
to a 2 percent decline in output. Subtracting 9.3 percent from 9.6 percent equals 0.3 percent.
Multiplying 0.3 percent by 2 percent equals 0.6 percent. GDP falls by 0.6 percent or $78.53
billion. (2010 real GDP = $13,088 trillion × .006).
6-6
LO 06-02
Topic: The Human Costs
AACSB: Analytic
7. Suppose the following data describe a nation’s population:
Year 1 Year 2
Population 200 million 204 million
Labor force 120 million 123 million
Unemployment rate 6 percent 6 percent
(a) How many people are unemployed in each year?

(b) How many people are employed in each year?
(c) Compute the employment rate (i.e., number employed ÷ population) in each year.
Answers:
(a) Year 1: 7.20 million.
Year 2: 7.38 million.
(b) Year 1: 112.80 million.
Year 2: 115.62 million.
(c) Year 1: 56%.
Year 2: 57%.
Feedback:
(a) Year 1: Unemployed = Labor force × Unemployment rate; 120 million × 0.06 = 7.2
million.
Year 2: Unemployed = Labor force × Unemployment rate; 123 million × 0.06 = 7.38
million.
(b) Year 1: Employed = Labor force – Unemployed; 120 – 7.2 million = 112.8 million.
Year 2: Employed = Labor force – Unemployed; 123 – 7.38 million = 115.62 million.
(c) Year: Employment rate = Employed/Population; (112.8 / 200) × 100 = 56%.
Year: Employment rate = Employed/Population; (115.62 / 204) × 100 = 57%.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 3 Apply
8. Based on the data in the previous problem, what happens (“up” or “down”) to each of the
following numbers in Year 2 when 1 million jobseekers become “discouraged workers”?
(a) Number of unemployed persons.
(b) Unemployment rate.
6-7
(c) Employment rate.
Answers:
(a) Down.
(b) Down.
(c) No change.
Feedback:
(a) Down: When the jobseekers stop looking for work, they will no longer be classified as
unemployed.
(b) Down: Given fewer “unemployed” people, the unemployment rate will drop.
(c) No change: Even though the unemployment rate declines, there will not be an increase in
the employment rate.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 3 Apply
9. According to the News on page 126, in October 2009

(a) How many people were in the labor force?
(b) How many people were employed?
Answers:
(a) 154 million
(b) 138 million
Feedback:
(a) 10.2% × Labor force = 15.7 million. 15.7 million/10.2% = 153,921,569.
(b) Employed = Labor force minus Unemployed. 153,921,569 – 15,700,000 = 138,221,569.
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
10. In 2010, how many of the 800,000 black teenagers who participated in the labor market
(a) Were unemployed?
(b) Were employed?
(c) Would have been employed if they had the same unemployment rate as white teenagers?
(See Figure 6.4 for needed info.)
6-8
Answers:
(a) 344,000.
(b) 456,000.
(c) 614,400.
Feedback:
(a) 344,000: Number of black teenagers multiplied by the unemployment rate (800,000 ×
43% = 344,000).
(b) 456,000: Subtract the number of black teenagers unemployed from those in the labor
force (800,000 – 344,000 = 456,000).
(c) If black teenagers had the same unemployment rate as their white peers then 185,600
would be unemployed: (800,000 x .232= 185,600). Next, subtract this number of
unemployed from the black teenage labor force (800,000-185,600=614,400)
LO 06-01
AACSB: Analytic
11. On the accompanying graph, illustrate both the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth
rate for each year. (The data required for this exercise are on the inside cover of this book.)
(a) In how many years was “full employment” achieved? (Use the current benchmark.)
(b) Unemployment and growth rates tend to move in opposite directions. Which appears to
change direction first?
(c) In how many years does the unemployment rate increase even when output is expanding?
Answers:
Unemployment GDP Growth
Year Rate Rate
2000 4.00 3.70
2001 4.70 0.80
2002 5.80 1.60
2003 6.00 2.50
2004 5.50 3.60
2005 5.10 2.90
2006 4.60 2.80
2007 4.60 2.00
2008 5.80 -0.30
2009 9.30 -3.50
2010 9.60 3.00
6-9
(a) 8 years (using the 2011 threshold level of 6%).

(b) GDP falls first.
(c) 3 years: The unemployment rate was increasing despite rising GDP in 2002, 2003,
and 2010.
Feedback:
(a) There were 8 years (every year except 2003, 2009, and 2010) in this period when
unemployment was below 6%, which was the 2011 benchmark.
(b) GDP falls first, and unemployment follows when employers lay off employees.
(c) 3 years: The unemployment rate was increasing despite rising GDP in 2002, 2003, and
2010.
LO 06-04
Topic: Defining Full Employment
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 6 Create
12. For each situation described here determine the type of unemployment:
(a) Steelworkers losing their jobs due to decreased demand for steel.
(b) A college graduate waiting to accept a job that allows her to utilize her level of education.
(c) The Great Recession of 2008–2010.
Answers:
(a) Structural.
(b) Frictional.
(c) Cyclical.
6-10
Feedback:
(a) Structural: mismatch of skills.
(b) Frictional: people moving into the labor market.
(c) Cyclical: lack of job vacancies.
LO 06-03
Topic: Defining Full Employment
AACSB: Analytic
Blooms: Level 1 Remember
13. (a) What was the unemployment rate in 2010?

(b) How many jobs were needed to bring the unemployment rate down to the 5 percent full-
employment threshold?
(c) Using Okun’s Law, how more much would total output (GDP) have had to grow to create
that many jobs?
Answers:
(a) 9.6%.
(b) 7.131 million.
(c) 9.2%.
Feedback:
(a) 9.6% from endpaper data.
(b) 7,079,000 jobs. Multiplying the labor force of 153,889,000 by a 5% unemployment rate
equals 7,694,450 unemployed workers. Subtracting 7,694,450 from the 2010 number of
people unemployed 14,773,000 (9.6% X 153,889,000) equals the number of jobs needed
to reach full employment, 7,079,000, or 7.1 million
(c) The difference between 5% and 9.6% is 4.6%. Okun’s Law states that it takes 2% GDP
growth to attain 1% gain in employment. Therefore, double 4.6% and the result is 9.2%
GDP growth rate.
LO 06-04
Topic: Defining Full Unemployment
AACSB: Analytic
6-11
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Elizondo and cross the upper Bidassoa. It is scarcely credible that the
men who had fought for ten hours under such conditions on such
rough ground, retained strength to move another furlong—but the
order was obeyed, though many badly wounded men had to be
abandoned, and though the chaussée was strewn for miles by dead-
beat stragglers, who dropped out and slept till daylight. They were not
disturbed—for D’Erlon made no move till the sun was well up—he
had won the pass and was expecting to have to fight again at dawn,
for the right to emerge from it.
The losses in a fight so honourable to the British battalions, if so
discreditable to British generalship, had been immense in Cameron’s
brigade, heavy in Pringle’s, appreciable among Barnes’s men, who
only struck in at the eleventh hour. The first-named had lost 800 men
out of 1,900 present, of whom 343 belonged to the gallant and
unlucky 1/92nd. Pringle’s three battalions had 530 casualties out of
2,000 present, including 140 unwounded prisoners taken on the
Gorospil knoll from its light companies. Barnes and the 7th Division
troops had won a glorious success with a loss of only 140 men. The
total list gives just under 1,500 casualties out of 6,000 men engaged
—of whom 349 were prisoners (200 of them wounded). These are
very different figures from the 3,500 total at which D’Erlon stated
Stewart’s loss—but sufficiently distressing. The enemy had suffered
still more, but from infinitely greater numbers—their commander
reported 1,400 casualties in Darmagnac’s division out of 7,000
present, 600 in Maransin’s. Abbé was barely engaged at the eleventh
hour: one of his brigadiers (Rignoux) was hit and only four other
officers, with perhaps 100 men. The total reported is therefore about
2,100—no very formidable proportion out of 20,000 men present. But
some battalions had been badly cut up—the 103rd of Maransin’s
division, which bore the first fury of Barnes’s attack, had 15 officers
killed and wounded out of 20 present; and the 28th of Darmagnac’s
division lost a similar number in sustaining the attack of the right wing
of the 1/92nd and the British 28th. But this was a two-battalion
regiment with 40 officers present. Nevertheless, D’Erlon’s report to
Soult sings victory in very modest terms—he has captured the
enemy’s position and holds it at the end of the day—the affair had
been one of the most desperate that he has ever seen—the enemy’s
loss has been far greater than his own—but there is no blowing of
trumpets.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER IV
SORAUREN. JULY 26-28
The first day’s fighting in the Pyrenean passes could not be called
satisfactory either to Wellington or to Soult. The former had lost both
the defiles in which he had intended to make his first stand, and had
lost them in a very tiresome fashion—he thought that Maya might
have been held at least for twenty-four hours, if there had been a
divisional general on the spot to direct the defence: while
Roncesvalles had not been forced, but abandoned by Cole, who
could certainly have made a longer resistance, if only the orders sent
to him had been obeyed. It was, above all things, necessary to gain
time for the concentration of the army, and a precious day had been
lost—and need not have been lost.
But Soult can have been no better pleased: time, to him also,
meant everything; and the orders which he had issued to his
lieutenants had presupposed an easy triumph by surprise in the early
morning, with a forward march in the afternoon. Instead of this he had
won by nightfall a bare foothold on the summit of each pass, after
much fighting of an unsatisfactory sort. He, too, had lost a day; and it
was only on the morrow that he discovered that both at Maya and at
Roncesvalles the enemy had slipped away in the dark, leaving to him
the power to debouch from the defiles.
BATTLE OF SORAUREN
July 28th 1813 Showing the General Situation at 1.15 PM.
Nevertheless, the Marshal sent on the morning of the 26th a very
flamboyant message of victory to his master the Emperor, who then
lay at Mayence. Both Maya and Roncesvalles had been forced,
D’Erlon had captured five guns and many hundreds of prisoners at
the former pass: he himself hoped to be at Pampeluna, and to have
raised its siege, by the 27th. These news were sent on from Bayonne
by semaphore to Paris and the Rhine, and reached Napoleon on
August 1st. At the same time, and by the same rapid method of
transmission, arrived General Rey’s report of his successful repulse
of the assault of July 25th. It is worth while to turn away from solid
history for a moment, in order to see how the Imperial editor of the
Moniteur utilized this useful material for propaganda. He first wrote to
Clarke the Minister of War: ‘We can now give the public some
account of affairs in Spain. The Vittoria business and the King must
not be mentioned. The first note which you must put in the Moniteur
should run as follows—“His Majesty has named the Duke of Dalmatia
as his lieutenant-general commanding his armies in Spain. The
Marshal took up the command on July 12, and made immediate
dispositions for marching against the besiegers of Pampeluna and St.
Sebastian.” After that put in General Rey’s first letter about the events
of the 25th-27th. You had better make some small additions to the
number of prisoners and of guns captured, not for French
consumption but to influence European opinion. As I am printing
General Rey’s dispatch in the Frankfort Journal, and have made
some changes of this sort in it, I send you a corrected copy so that it
may appear in the Moniteur in identical terms.’
The Emperor’s second letter to his Foreign Minister, the Duke of
Bassano, sent from Dresden three days later, is even more amusing.
‘You had better circulate the news that in consequence of Marshal
Soult’s victory over the English on July 25, the siege of St. Sebastian
has been raised, and 30 siege-guns and 200 waggons taken. The
blockade of Pampeluna was raised on the 27th: General Hill, who
was in command at that siege, could not carry off his wounded, and
was obliged to burn part of his baggage. Twelve siege-guns (24-
pounders) were captured there. Send this to Prague, Leipzig, and
Frankfort[897].’
This ‘intelligent anticipation of the future,’ for utilization in the
armistice-negotiations going on with Austria, could not have been
bettered. Unfortunately there arrived next day another semaphore
message from Soult of the night of the 26th-27th. The Emperor has to
warn Caulaincourt that yesterday’s propaganda will not stand
criticism. ‘I have just got another “telegraphic dispatch” sent on by the
Empress from Mayence, giving another communication from Soult,
written 24 hours after the last, in which he said he would be at
Pampeluna on the 27th. The enemy lost many men and seven guns.
But nothing decisive seems to have happened. I am impatient for
more news, in order to be able to understand in detail Soult’s
dispositions, and to form from them a general idea of the
situation[898].’
Alas for human ingenuity! Soult’s next dispatch, of July 29, was
not to be of the sort that craved for publicity in the Moniteur, even with
the most judicious editing.
But to return from Dresden to Biscay, and from the head-quarters
of the Emperor to those of the ‘Sepoy General’ whom he had at last
begun to recognize as capable of ‘des projets très sensés.’
If only Wellington had been at his head-quarters at Lesaca at 11
o’clock on the morning of July 25th, and if William Stewart had been
on the spot at Maya, and had sent early news of D’Erlon’s attack,
many things might have happened differently. Wellington would have
had a long afternoon before him to concert operations, and would
have possessed information to guide him in drawing up his scheme.
Unfortunately he was absent—as we have seen—and only received
at 6 o’clock a second-hand report from Lord Dalhousie at Echalar, to
the effect that fighting was going on at Maya, with the unfortunate
addition that D’Erlon had been repulsed—a most inaccurate summary
of what had happened. Later on in the evening, not before 10 p.m.,
came Cole’s first dispatch from Roncesvalles, to say that he and
Byng were heavily engaged at 1 o’clock with a large French force,
and were holding their own. On these scanty data Wellington felt that
no conclusions could be drawn—he wrote to Graham that there must
be a great mass of French troops not yet discovered, which would
come into action on some other point on the 26th, and that his policy
would depend on where that force appeared—he could only account
for 30,000 of Soult’s men so far. He did not commit himself to any
definite guess as to the undiscovered part of the Marshal’s plan, but
from his other correspondence it is clear that he suspected an
attempt to relieve St. Sebastian by an attack on the lower Bidassoa—
a very possible solution of the problem, but not the correct one[899].
Awaiting further developments, Wellington issued no more orders
on the night of the 25th, save one to the Conde de Abispal, directing
him to send one of his two infantry divisions from in front of
Pampeluna to join Picton and Cole, and to keep the fortress
blockaded by the other. The force thus taken away would be replaced
by Carlos de España’s division, which was marching up from Burgos,
and due to arrive on the 26th. In this dispatch Wellington asked the
Conde to direct Mina to send up his infantry from Saragossa, and told
him that he was intending to order to the front the British heavy
cavalry brigades, now cantoned along the Ebro. No other movements
were settled that night; but Wellington was aware that during his
absence his Quartermaster-General, George Murray, had directed
Lord Dalhousie to have the 7th Division massed at Echalar, prepared
to move at an hour’s notice, and Charles Alten at Vera to have the
Light Division got into a similar readiness. Either would be able to
march off at dawn.
Somewhere late in the night[900] Wellington received more news,
which made the situation clearer but more unsatisfactory. The true
story of the Maya fighting came in from two sources: Hill sent a
dispatch dated from Elizondo at some hour after 6 p.m., to say that
on getting back from the Alduides he had found Stewart unable to
hold the Pass, and had bidden him to retire. Stewart, who was
wounded and unable to write, sent a verbal message, which came in
about the same time, reporting that Hill had directed him to fall back
on Elizondo and Berueta. The officers who brought this information
stated that the French were in great force, and that the 2nd Division
had been much cut up. No more reports arrived from Cole, so that the
result of the Roncesvalles fighting remained unknown.
After what must have been a very short and disturbed night’s rest,
Wellington was in the saddle by 4 a.m. on the 26th, and preparing to
ride up the Bastan to visit Hill, and to ascertain the exact measure of
the mishap at Maya. Before departing from Lesaca he gave his first
definite orders in view of the events of the previous day[901]. Maya
being lost, the 7th Division must fall back from Echalar to Sumbilla,
on the road to Santesteban: the Light Division must retire from Vera
to the west bank of the Bidassoa, and be ready to march either
towards Yanzi or towards Santesteban, as might be necessary.
Longa’s Cantabrians were to block the hill road from the Bidassoa to
Oyarzun. Graham was told to hurry on the embarkation of the siege-
train from St. Sebastian. Hill was to hold on as long as he could to the
position at Irurita, in order to keep touch with the 6th Division, which
was directed to feel towards him, and to be ready to join him if
necessary. It was to push two of its three brigades to Legasa, on the
road from Santesteban along the upper Bidassoa, which would bring
them within eight miles of Hill’s proposed line of defence at Irurita.
The third brigade of the 6th Division was to stand fast at Santesteban,
where it would be in touch with Dalhousie, when the latter should
have reached Sumbilla.
All these orders, as is obvious, are concerned only with the
measures necessary to stop D’Erlon’s advance. None of them have
any reference to the action of the other French force at Roncesvalles.
Till news should come up from Cole and Picton, it was impossible to
realize what was going on at that front, or whether the enemy was
making his main attack in that direction. There might be still (as
Wellington had guessed three days back) a violent demonstration
towards Pampeluna, intended to distract a real attempt to relieve St.
Sebastian.
And this state of ignorance with regard to the southern theatre of
operations was destined to last till late in the afternoon. Either Cole
and Picton themselves, or the officers to whom they entrusted their
dispatches, were sadly lacking in a sense of the value of the prompt
delivery of news. Wellington rode along the Bidassoa for many a mile,
till he came on Hill still holding the position of Irurita, and entirely
unmolested by the French. There were now in line the sadly reduced
remnant of the British brigades which had fought at Maya, and da
Costa’s and Ashworth’s Portuguese, with the three 7th-Division
battalions which had saved Stewart from disaster. The total made up
about 9,000 bayonets. Hill estimated[902] D’Erlon’s force at 14,000
men—a miscalculation, for even after the losses at Maya there were
still 18,000 French in line. The immediate result of the error, however,
was beneficial rather than otherwise, for Wellington considered that
Hill was in no particular danger, and let him stand, while he himself
rode southward towards the lofty Col de Velate, to seek for
intelligence from the Pampeluna front in person, since his lieutenants
had vouchsafed him none. He reached Almandoz, near the crest of
the Pass, in the afternoon, and resolved to establish his head-
quarters there for the night, as it was conveniently central between
the two halves of his army.
Soon after his arrival Wellington, being much vexed at receiving
no news whatever from the south, resolved to send the 6th Division
toward Pampeluna by the Col de Velate as a matter of precaution—
they were to march to Olague in the valley of the Lanz. The 7th
Division was to close in, to take up the ground where the 6th had
been placed, and cover Hill’s left flank[903]. That haste in these
movements was not considered a primary necessity, is shown by the
fact that Pack and Dalhousie were told that they need not march till
the morning of the 27th. For the enemy’s surprising quiescence at the
head of the Maya pass had reassured Wellington as to any danger on
this side. If D’Erlon, indeed, possessed no more than 14,000 men,
Hill with the aid of the 7th Division could easily take care of him. And
the Light Division might still be left near Lesaca, as a reserve for
Graham in case any new mass of French troops should take the
offensive on the Bidassoa.
D’Erlon’s conduct on the morning of the 26th was explicable to
himself, though inexplicable to his enemy. He had been engaged in a
most bitter fight, in which he had lost 2,000 men and more. Two
British divisions, so he wrote to Soult, were in front of him—the 2nd
and the 7th. For he had taken Barnes’s brigade for the whole of
Dalhousie’s unit—the effect of its desperate charge almost justified
him in the hypothesis. These troops had been forced to a strategic
retreat, but by no means put out of action. They must have been
joined, ere now, by the Portuguese column which Darmagnac had
sighted on its approach to Ariscun. But there were also troops on his
right, of whom he must beware: he knew that Vera and Echalar had
been held in strength, and Graham might send reinforcements in that
direction, and assemble a heavy force on his flank. Hence he
resolved to discover how matters lay by reconnaissances, before
committing himself to the march down into the Bastan and then up
the Col de Velate which his orders prescribed.
‘In my position on the pass of Maya,’ he wrote, ‘I had on my right
all the forces which the enemy had in line as far as St. Sebastian. I
had to be prudent, in order not to expose myself to a check in the
Bastan, in which the enemy was holding the strongest position. I
therefore determined to leave Abbé and Maransin in the pass, with
orders to send out reconnaissances towards Santesteban, Echalar,
and Mount Atchiola. They would profit by the halt to distribute the
half-ration of food which had just come up from Ainhoue. I sent
Darmagnac down the road to Ariscun, with orders to push a vanguard
to Elizondo, and to explore towards the passes of Ispegui and
Berderis, to see if there were any hostile force still on my left.’
An advance of six miles to Elizondo, and that by a mere advanced
guard, was all the movement that D’Erlon made this day. It was not till
the afternoon that he learnt, by Abbé’s reconnaissances, that there
were still allied troops on his right—apparently the Light Division
opposite Vera, and the 7th at Sumbilla—while Darmagnac reported
that the eastern passes were clear, but that Hill was lying across the
road beyond Elizondo in great strength. In the evening D’Erlon heard
that Soult had forced the pass of Roncesvalles, and was about to
advance: this success, he deduced, would make the enemy in front of
him give way, in fear that his positions might be taken from behind.
So he thought himself justified in ordering a general advance for the
morning of the 27th—though Maransin was still to remain for a day at
Maya, lest any allied force might move up from the west against the
pass. Thus it came that for the whole of July 26th Hill was
unmolested, and Soult’s plan for a rapid concentration round
Pampeluna became almost impossible to carry out. A whole day had
been wasted by D’Erlon, though he was not without his extenuating
circumstances.
Wellington meanwhile received at Almandoz, probably at about 8
p.m., the long-expected news from the South. They were, as we
know, most unsatisfactory: Cole reported from Linzoain, on the
Roncesvalles-Pampeluna road, that he had been driven out of the
pass by an army of 35,000 men or more, that he had not yet been
joined by the 3rd Division, and was still retreating towards Zubiri,
where he understood that Picton would meet him and take over the
command. His view of the situation was shown by a remark that if he
had not been superseded, and had been compelled to retreat past
Pampeluna, he supposed that the road towards Vittoria would have
been the right one to take[904]. This most exasperating dispatch only
reached Wellington that night by mere chance. The officer bearing it
was going to Lesaca, having no knowledge that Army Head-Quarters
had left that place: at Lanz he happened to meet the cavalry brigadier
Long, whose squadrons were keeping up the line of communication
between the two halves of the Army. Hearing from the aide-de-camp
of the sort of news that the letter contained, Long opened it and made
a copy of it, which he sent to Sir Rowland Hill, before permitting the
bearer to go on. Hill received the transcript at Berueta at 6 p.m., and
very wisely forwarded it to Wellington at Almandoz. The original was
carried on by Cole’s messenger to Santesteban, and did not reach
Wellington that night.
Thanks to Long’s and Hill’s intelligent action, the Commander-in-
Chief could grasp the whole unpleasant situation at 8 p.m. on the
26th. He sent orders to Picton at once, telling him that the enemy
must at all costs be detained: that considering the force at his
disposal, he ought to be able to check Soult for some time in front of
Zubiri: that he would be joined at once by one of O’Donnell’s divisions
from the Pampeluna blockading force, and shortly by reinforcements
coming from the Bastan (the 6th Division). Wellington himself was
intending to ride over to the right wing by the next afternoon. Till he
should arrive, Picton must send reports every few hours[905].
Unfortunately, Cole and Picton had got things into an even worse
state than could have been expected. Just as Wellington was drafting
these orders for an obstinate rearguard action, they were at 8.30 p.m.
preparing to evacuate the Zubiri position, and setting out on a night
march for Pampeluna[906].
To explain this move we must go back to the state of affairs at
Roncesvalles on the very foggy morning of July 26th. Cole, Byng, and
Morillo had abandoned, as we have already seen[907], their position on
Altobiscar and the Linduz under cover of the night, and had all fallen
into the Pampeluna road, Ross’s brigade descending from the
heights by the Mendichuri pass, the other three brigades and Morillo
moving by the chaussée past the Abbey and Burguete. Anson’s
brigade formed the rearguard, not having been engaged on the
previous day. Morillo’s outlying battalion at the Foundry of Orbaiceta
safely joined in by a hill path. Campbell’s Portuguese retired by the
way that they had come, along the Path of Atalosti, but instead of
returning to the Alduides followed a mule track to Eugui in the upper
valley of the Arga.
Cole’s long column, after completing its night march, took a much-
needed rest for many hours along the high road near Viscarret. It saw
nothing of the French till the early afternoon, when an exploring party
of chasseurs ran into the rearguard of Anson’s brigade.
What had Soult been doing between early dawn, when his
outposts ascertained that there was no enemy in front of them, and
three o’clock in the afternoon, when his cavalry rediscovered Cole?
To our surprise we find that he had been attempting to repeat his
error of the preceding day—that of sending a whole army corps along
a rugged mule track, similar to the one on which Reille’s column had
been blocked by Ross’s brigade. His original order on the 25th had
been that Reille, after seizing the Linduz, should turn along the ‘crest
of the mountains’, occupy the Atalosti defile, and push ever westward
till he could threaten the Col de Velate, the main line of
communication between the two sections of Wellington’s army. One
would have supposed that the events of the 25th on the Linduz,
where one British brigade had checked for a whole day Reille’s
column of 17,000 men in Indian file, would have taught him the
impracticability of such plans. But (as Soult’s malevolent critic, quoted
already above, observed) when the Marshal had once got his plan
drawn up on paper it was like the laws of the Medes and Persians,
and must not be altered[908].
While Clausel was directed to use the chaussée and pursue Cole
along the Pampeluna road past Roncesvalles, Burguete, and Espinal,
Reille was once more ordered[909] ‘to follow the crest of the mountains
to the right, and to try to take in the rear the hostile corps which has
been holding the pass of Maya against Count D’Erlon.’ The itinerary
seems insane: there was a mule track and no more, and Soult
proposed to engage upon it a column of 17,000 men, with a front of
one file and a depth of at least six miles, allowing for the battalion-
and brigade-intervals. The crest was not a flat plateau, but an
interminable series of ups and downs, often steep and stony,
occasionally wooded. Campbell’s brigade had traversed part of it on
the 25th, but to move a brigade on a fine day is a different thing from
moving an army corps in a fog.
Reille obeyed orders, though the fog was lying as densely upon
the mountains as on the preceding night. Apparently Soult had
supposed that it would lift at dawn—but it did not till midday.
Lamartinière’s division was left to guard the Linduz and the debouch
of the Atalosti path: Foy’s, followed by Maucune’s, tried to keep to the
crest, with the most absurd results. It was supposed to be guided by
French-Basque peasants (smugglers, no doubt) who were reputed to
know the ground. After going no more than a mile or two in the fog,
the guides, at a confusion of tracks in the middle of a wood, came to
a standstill, and talked volubly to Foy in unintelligible Basque.
Whether they had lost their way, or were giving advice, the General
could not quite discover. In despair he allowed the leading battalion to
take the most obvious track. They had got completely off the Atalosti
path, and after two miles of downhill marching found themselves on
the chaussée not far from Espinal, with the rear of Clausel’s corps
defiling past them[910]. It would still have been possible to stop the
column, for only one brigade had reached the foot of the mountain,
and Maucune and Lamartinière were still on the crest. But Reille took
upon himself the responsibility of overriding his commander’s
impracticable directions, and ordered Foy to go on, and the rest to
follow, and to fall in to the rear of Clausel’s impedimenta. ‘Il est fort
dangereux dans les hautes montagnes de s’engager sans guides et
en brouillard,’ as he very truly observed. Justifying himself in a letter
of that night to Soult, he wrote that if it were absolutely necessary to
get on the crest-path again, it could be done by turning up the Arga
valley at Zubiri, and following it to Eugui, from which there were
tracks both to the Col de Velate and to Irurita.[911]
Thus ended Soult’s impracticable scheme for seizing the Col de
Velate by marching three divisions along a precipitous mule track.
Even if there had been no fog, it is hard to believe that anything could
have come of it, as Campbell’s Portuguese would have been found at
Eugui well on in the day, and after Reille’s column would have been
much fatigued. Any show of resistance, even by one brigade, would
have checked Foy, and compelled Reille to deploy—an interminable
affair, as the fight on the Linduz upon the preceding afternoon had
sufficiently demonstrated. But to try this manœuvre in a dense fog
was insane, and Reille was quite right to throw it up.
The whole interest, therefore, of the French operation on July 26th
turns on the doing of Clausel’s column. It advanced very cautiously
down the slopes to the Abbey of Roncesvalles, discovering no trace
of the enemy save a few abandoned wounded. Having reached the
upland valley of Burguete, Clausel sent out cavalry patrols, and
found, after much searching in the fog, that Cole had gone off with his
whole force towards Espinal. His rearguard was discovered
bivouacking along the road beyond that village. When it sighted the
French it retired towards Viscarret. Clausel then ordered his infantry
to pursue, but they were far to the rear and it was only about 3 p.m.
when Taupin’s division came into touch with the light companies of
Anson’s brigade, just as they were falling back on the whole 4th
Division, drawn up in a favourable position on heights behind the Erro
river, near the village of Linzoain. The day had at last become clear
and fine. The 31st Léger, leading the French column, exchanged a
lively fusillade with the light companies, while a squadron of
chasseurs tried a charge on their flank. But both were driven off, and
Clausel halted when he saw Cole waiting for him in order of battle. It
was not till he had brought up and deployed two divisions that he
ventured to press the Allied front, and nothing serious happened till
after 4 o’clock.
Meanwhile Picton had come up from the rear, and joined Cole at
Linzoain: the head of his troops had reached Zubiri only three miles
behind. The arrival of the truculent general, looking even more
eccentric than usual, for he was wearing a tall round civilian hat
above a blue undress frock-coat, and was using a furled umbrella by
way of riding whip, was taken by the 4th-Division soldiers as a sign of
battle[912]. ‘Here comes old Tommy: now, boys, make up your minds
for a fight’ passed down the ranks[913]. But, oddly enough, this was
about the only day in Sir Thomas’s military career when he did not
take a fair risk. He certainly came up in a bellicose mood, for he
ordered Ross’s brigade to be ready to move forward when the 3rd
Division should have come up to support it. But after riding to the
front, and holding a long talk with Cole, he agreed with the latter that
it would be dangerous to fight on ground which could be turned on
both flanks, with an enemy who was known to have 35,000 men in
hand. Only part of the French were up—Reille’s divisions after their
stroll in the fog were far to the rear behind Clausel—so it would be
possible to hold on till night, and slip away in the dark. Picton wrote to
Wellington to report his decision, and does not seem in his dispatch
to have realized in the least that he was contravening the whole spirit
of his commander’s instructions of July 23rd with reference to the
‘stopping of the enemy’s progress towards Pampeluna in the event of
the passes being given up[914].’ He merely stated that he had received
these instructions too late to make it possible for him to reach
Roncesvalles, or to join Cole before the latter had evacuated his
positions[915]. As there was no favourable ground between the Erro
river and the immediate vicinity of Pampeluna, on which a smaller
force could make an effectual stand against a much larger one, he
had determined to retire at once, and proposed to ‘take up a position
at as short a distance as practicable from Pampeluna’—by which he
meant the heights of San Cristobal, only two or three miles out from
that fortress. He was thus intending to give up without further fighting
ten miles of most difficult hilly country, where the enemy could be
checked for a time at every successive ridge—though, no doubt, all
the positions could be turned one after the other by long flank
détours. But the net result was that Picton gave Soult a clear road on
the 27th, and allowed him to arrive in front of Pampeluna on that day,
whereas the least show of resistance between Zubiri and the
debouch into the plains at Huarte, would have forced the French to
deploy and waste time, and they could not have reached the open
country till the 28th. This is sufficiently proved by the extreme difficulty
which Soult found in conducting his march, even when he was not
opposed.
So determined was Picton not to fight on the Erro river, or on the
Arga, that he did not bring up his own division from Zubiri, but let it
stand, only three miles behind the line on which Cole kept up a mild
detaining action during the late afternoon hours of the 26th. Soult
attacked with great caution, and more by way of flank movements
than by frontal pressure. By evening Cole had drawn back one mile,
and had 168 casualties, all but four of them in Anson’s brigade[916].
Those of the French can hardly have been more numerous: they
seem all to have been in Taupin’s division[917].
On the afternoon of the 26th Picton had nearly 19,000 men at his
disposition[918], Soult had somewhat less, since Reille’s column was
so far to the rear that it could not get up before dark. There was no
wonder, therefore, that the enemy made no resolute attack; and it can
only be said that the Marshal was acting very wisely, for the French
force on the ground was not sufficient to move the opposing body,
until Reille should have come up; and Cole and Picton had resolved
not to give way before dark. But when the fires of the French, shining
for many miles on each side of the road, showed that they had settled
down for the night, Cole drew off his division, and retired on Zubiri,
where he passed through Picton’s troops, who were to take over the
rearguard duty, as they were fresh and well rested. Campbell’s
Portuguese dropped into the line of march from Eugui, by orders
issued to them that afternoon, and by 11 p.m. the whole corps was in
march for Pampeluna. Its departure had passed wholly unnoticed by
the enemy. Meanwhile, Wellington’s aide-de-camp, riding through the
night from Almandoz, with orders to Picton to maintain the ground
which he was abandoning, can only have met the column when it was
drawing near its destination.
It was quite early in the morning, though the sun was well up,
when the head of the retreating column reached the village of
Zabaldica, where the valley of the Arga begins to open out into the
plain of Pampeluna, between the last flanking heights which constrict
it. In front was the very ill-chosen position which Picton intended to
hold, along a line of hills which are quite separate from the main block
of the mountains, and stretch isolated in the lowland for some five
miles north-west and south-east. These are the hill of Huarte on the
right, parted from the mountains by the valley of the Egues river; the
hill of San Miguel in the centre, on the other side of the high road and
of the Arga river, and on the left the very long ridge of San Cristobal,
separated from San Miguel by the Ulzama river, which flows all along
its front.
Now these hills are strong posts in themselves, each with a good
glacis of slope in its front; the gaps between them are stopped by the
large villages of Villaba and Huarte, both susceptible of obstinate
defence; and the two flanking hills are covered in front by river-beds
—though fordable ones. But they are far too close to Pampeluna,
which is but one single mile from San Cristobal: the guns of the
fortress actually commanded at a range of only 1,200 yards, the sole
road of communication along the rear of the position. Cassan’s
garrison of 3,000 men was not large enough to furnish men for any
large sortie—though he made a vigorous sally against O’Donnell’s
blockading division on the 27th, and destroyed some of its
trenches[919]. But no army should fight with a hostile fortress less than
two miles in its rear, and commanding its line of retreat: it is surprising
that such an old soldier as Picton chose this ground—presumably he
was seduced by the fine position for both infantry and guns which it
shows looking towards the enemy’s road of arrival.
Apparently Cole had a better eye for ground than Picton, for as
they were riding together between Zabaldica and Huarte, he pointed
out to his senior the advantage that would be gained by throwing
forward the left wing of the army to a position much more remote from
Pampeluna, the hill of Oricain or Sorauren, which faces the San
Cristobal ridge from the other side of the Ulzama river[920]. This height
is the last roll of the mountains, but almost separated from their main
massif: it is only joined to the next summit by a high col at its right
centre. For the rest of its length it is separated from its neighbour-
height by a well-marked ravine. Its flanks are guarded by the beds of
the Arga to the right and the Ulzama to the left. It is well under two
miles long, about 1,000 feet high, and except at the Col has a very
formidable front of steep slopes, covered with gorse and scattered
bushes. The whole formed a strong and self-contained position,
whose weak point was that it was rather too much in advance of the
Huarte-San Miguel heights, which trend away southward, so that
when the army was drawn out its right was much ‘refused,’ and its left
very much thrown forward. It was also inconvenient that the access to
the crest from the rear was bad, a steep climb by sheep-tracks from
Oricain or Arre, up which all food or munitions would have to be
brought. From the north there was a slightly better path to the summit
from Sorauren, leading up to the small pilgrimage chapel of San
Salvador on the left end of the crest. But this would be of more use to
the assailants than to the defenders of the heights. Between the Col
and the river Arga, and close above the village of Zabaldica, there
was a spur or under-feature of the main position, which formed a sort
of outwork or flank protection to it. At the moment when the retreating
army was passing on towards Huarte, this spur was being held by
two Spanish battalions, part of the division which O’Donnell, by
Wellington’s orders, had detached to reinforce Picton. It was perhaps
the sight of this small force in a very good position which suggested
to Cole that the right policy was to prolong his line in continuation of
it, across the Col and as far as the chapel above Sorauren.
Having allowed Cole to take up his new advanced position, Picton
drew out the 3rd Division on the hill to the right of Huarte, with its
flank eastwards covered by four brigades of cavalry, which had come
up by Wellington’s orders from their cantonments on the Ebro[921].
Morillo’s Spaniards continued the line westward along the Cerro de
San Miguel, as far as Villaba: from thence the San Cristobal ridge
was occupied by the greater part of the division which O’Donnell had
drawn from the blockading lines—all, in fact, save the two battalions
in advance on the hill by Zabaldica. Later in the day two battalions
more were added from the besieging force, for Carlos de España’s
division from Castile had arrived, and relieved part of the troops
which had hitherto been observing Pampeluna. Byng’s brigade was
told off to support the 4th Division, and took post on the rear of the
summit of the Oricain hill, half a mile behind Cole. The actual fighting
line on the left was composed of Anson’s brigade on the Col, next to
the Spaniards on the lower spur, of Campbell’s Portuguese upon the
central stretch of the heights (except one battalion which was sent to
support the Spaniards below)[922], and of Ross’s brigade holding the
left. Stubbs’s Portuguese were in rear of Campbell’s, except the 7th
Caçadores, which was detached to the front and held the ground
about the chapel of San Salvador. The divisional battery (Sympher’s
of the K.G.L.) was placed far down the right side of the hill, below and
behind Byng’s brigade, in a position from which it could sweep the
high road from Zabaldica to Arleta. Cole’s tactical dispositions were in
the complete Wellingtonian style, with the light companies and
caçadores thrown out some way down the slope, far in advance of
the main force, whose battalions were drawn back well behind the
sky-line, so as to be invisible till the last moment to enemies storming
the hill. Soult followed up the retreating Allies at such a slow pace
that the whole of Picton’s troops were settling into their ground before
the enemy came in sight[923].
The slow advance of the French was due to the accumulation of
such a large force in a narrow valley provided with only one road. The
Marshal made an attempt to relieve the congestion, by ordering that
the chaussée should be left to Clausel and to the cavalry and
impedimenta in his rear, while Reille’s divisions should move on the
east bank of the Arga by local paths between the villages. The
excellent intention of securing room for both columns to move freely
had no good result. Clausel arrived in front of Zabaldica by 9 a.m.[924]
But Reille was nowhere in sight. His report fully explains his absence:
he had obeyed orders by turning up into the hills a mile and a half
beyond the village of Erro. ‘This direction rendered the march of the
three divisions extremely slow and difficult. They found no road, and
had to tramp through brushwood, climb steep slopes, or to follow
tracks obliterated by recent rain. At last Count Reille took the decision
to abandon the high ground. The 1st Division (Foy) dropped down to
the village of Alzuza on the extreme left. The 7th Division (Maucune)
re-descended into the valley of the Arga, a little above Iroz, where it
bivouacked. The 9th Division (Lamartinière) also came down into the
valley opposite Larrasoana, and kept along the high road to Iroz,’
where it fell in with the rear of Clausel’s column late in the day. The
only result of Soult’s precaution had been to put Reille out of the
game on the 27th, just as on the 26th.
For the whole of the morning hours, therefore, Soult had only
Clausel’s corps at his disposition, a fact which accounts for the
unenterprising character of his action. But that the 27th was a very
slack day on the French side was not Clausel’s fault. On arriving at
Zabaldica, and discovering that the heights of Oricain were held in
strength, he did not wait for the Marshal’s orders, but began to form a
line of battle parallel to Cole’s front, along the mountain opposite.
Halting Conroux’s division on the high road in face of the hill held by
the Spaniards, he pushed Taupin’s and Vandermaesen’s divisions up
the slopes, with cavalry detachments feeling the way in front of them,
till they had lined the whole ridge, and their right was overlooking
Sorauren and the valley of the Ulzama. He then sent down to ask the
Marshal’s leave to attack, saying that he could see from the summit
behind his line large baggage trains moving away along the Vittoria
road in the plain of Pampeluna, and bodies of troops in motion
northward[925]—the enemy was about to raise the siege, and was only
offering a rearguard action in order to cover the retreat of his
impedimenta. If pressed he would give way at once[926].
Soult did not believe this, and very rightly; but being pressed by
repeated messages he mounted up to the heights behind Clausel’s
front at 11 a.m.: if he had chanced to notice it, he was just in time to
see a solitary horseman ride up the north-western slope of the hill of
Oricain, and to hear the whole of the Allied troops aligned opposite
him burst out into a storm of tempestuous cheering. Wellington had
come upon the ground. Soult heard the noise, but (as his dispatches
show) did not guess its precise cause. He thought that
reinforcements had just come up for Cole.
The story of Wellington’s eventful ride from Almandoz to Sorauren
is a very interesting one. Much irritated at receiving no further news
from Picton, he had mounted at sunrise and ridden over the Col de
Velate, taking with him only George Murray, his Quartermaster-
General, his Military Secretary Fitzroy Somerset, and three or four
other officers: the bulk of the head-quarters staff was to follow at
leisure. On arriving at Lanz, the first village on the south side of the
pass, they heard rumours of Picton’s continued retreat, though they
do not seem to have met the aide-de-camp whom he had sent off on
the preceding night to report it. This news was so unexpected and
vexatious that Wellington halted for a moment, to send back orders to
Hill to the effect that it was conceivable that affairs might go badly on
the Pampeluna front. If so, the whole right or southern wing of the
army might have to swing back to the line Yrurzun-Tolosa, and Hill
would have to direct his own two divisions, and also Dalhousie, and
Pack, with all the artillery and baggage, to fall back westward on
Lizaso and Lecumberri, instead of coming over the Col de Velate
towards Pampeluna. The Light Division, too, might have to leave the
neighbourhood of the Bastan, and to retire to Zubieta on the
Oyarzun-Lecumberri road, in order to keep up the touch between the
main army and Graham’s force in front of St. Sebastian. The latter
general, however, was not to move, unless matters went very badly
indeed, as the blockade of St. Sebastian must be kept up till the last
possible minute. But previous orders were to stand, unless and until
the Commander-in-Chief should send new ones: in particular Pack
and the 6th Division were expected at Olague, and the batteries of

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Learning Objectives for Chapter 6

After reading this chapter, you should know

Topics Covered in Chapter 6

Questions for Discussion

Answer: Unintended consequences of this policy could be more people staying on

7. Why is frictional unemployment deemed desirable?

1. According to Figure 6.1 (p. 114),

Answer: 5.9 million.

3. Between 2000 and 2010, by how much did

In thousands 2000 2010 Change

Answer: 187,500 jobs each month.

Web query answer: Depends on current data at website www.bls.gov.

Answer: $78.53 billion.

7. Suppose the following data describe a nation’s population:

(a) How many people are unemployed in each year?

(c) Employment rate.

9. According to the News on page 126, in October 2009

(a) 8 years (using the 2011 threshold level of 6%).

13. (a) What was the unemployment rate in 2010?

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