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 BUSINESS LAW

Chapter 10

Free Will, Knowledge, and Capacity

(Real Assent)
1. Duress and Undue Influence
• Recognize that if a person makes an agreement under duress (being forced to enter a con-
tract against his or her will), the agreement is void.
• Understand what undue influence is and what the typical circumstances are when it arises to
make a contract voidable.

Section Outline

• Duress: When a person is forced to do something against his or her will, that person is said
to have been the victim of duress—compulsion.
o There are two types of duress: physical duress and duress by improper threat.
o A contract induced by physical violence is void.
o If a person is forced into entering a contract on threat of physical bodily harm, he or
she is the victim of physical duress.
o It is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in Section 174.
o In duress by threat, the perpetrator threatens the victim, who feels there is no rea-
sonable alternative but to assent to the contract.
▪ It renders the contract voidable.
▪ This rule contains a number of elements:
a. First, the threat must be improper.
b. Second, there must be no reasonable alternative.
c. Third, the test for inducement is subjective.
▪ There are many types of improper threats that might induce a party to enter
into a contract: threats to commit a crime or a tort, to instigate criminal pros-

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ecution, to instigate civil proceedings when a threat is made in bad faith, to

breach a “duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with the recipi-
ent,” or to disclose embarrassing details about a person’s private life.
▪ A threat to breach a contract that induces the victim to sign a new contract
could be improper. It depends on whether the new contract is fair and equita-
ble because of unanticipated circumstances.
• Undue Influence: The Restatement characterizes undue influence as “unfair persua-
sion.”
o It is a milder form of duress than physical harm or threats.
o The unfairness does not lie in any misrepresentation. It occurs when the victim is
under the domination of the persuader or is one who, in view of the relationship be-
tween them, is warranted in believing that the persuader will act in a manner detri-
mental to the victim’s welfare if the victim fails to assent.
o It is the improper use of trust or power to deprive a person of free will and substitute
instead another’s objective. involved.
o Examples: a child takes advantage of an infirm parent, a doctor takes advantage of
an ill patient, or a lawyer takes advantage of an unknowledgeable client.
o If there has been undue influence, the contract is voidable by the party who has been
unfairly persuaded.

Key Takeaway
A contract induced by physical duress—threat of bodily harm—is void; a contract induced by im-
proper threats—another type of duress—is voidable. Voidable also are contracts induced by undue
influence, where a weak will is overborne by a stronger one.

Exercises
Section 1 – Duress and Undue Influence
1. What are the two types of duress?
Answer: The two types of duress are physical duress and duress by threat.

2. What are the elements necessary to support a claim of undue influence?

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Answer: Undue influence is improper use of power or trust in a way that deprives a
person of free will and substitutes another’s objective. It is the improper use of trust or power to
deprive a person of free will and substitute instead another’s objective, “the unfairness of the result-
ing bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and the susceptibility of the person persuaded.
If there has been undue influence, the contract is voidable by the party who has been unfairly per-
suaded. Whether the relationship is one of domination and the persuasion is unfair is a factual ques-
tion. The answer hinges on a host of variables, including “the unfairness of the resulting bargain,
the unavailability of independent advice, and the susceptibility of the person persuaded”.

Teaching Suggestions
1. The instructor could give relevant examples of duress and undue influence.

Suggested Activities
1. The instructor could ask students to read the facts and judgment of Barton v. Armstrong (du-
ress) and Lloyd’s Bank v. Bundy (undue influence).

2. Misrepresentation
• Understand the two types of misrepresentation: fraudulent and nonfradulent.
• Distinguish between fraudulent misrepresentation in the execution and fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in the inducement.
• Know the elements necessary to prove fraudulent and nonfradulent misrepresentation.
• Recognize the remedies for misrepresentation.

Section Outline

• The two types of misrepresentation are fraudulent and nonfraudulent.

• Within fraudulent representation are fraud in the execution and fraud in the inducement.
• Within nonfradulent representation are negligent misrepresentation and innocent misrep-
resentation.
• Misrepresentation is a statement of fact that is not consistent with the truth.

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• If misrepresentation is intentional, it is fraudulent misrepresentation; if it is not intention-

al, it is nonfraudulent misrepresentation, which can be either negligent or innocent.
• Fraud in the execution (not very common) is defined by the Restatement as follows: “If a
misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms of a proposed contract induces con-
duct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one who neither knows nor has reasona-
ble opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract, his
conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.”
• Fraud in the inducement involves some misrepresentation about the subject of the contract
that induces assent.
• Necessary to proving fraudulent misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that is inten-
tionally made and justifiably relied upon.
• Generally, any statement not in accord with the facts is a misrepresentation.
• Another type of misrepresentation is concealment.
▪ It is an act that is equivalent to a statement that the facts are to the contrary
and that serves to prevent the other party from learning the true statement of
affairs; it is hiding the truth.
• A more passive type of concealment is nondisclosure.
o Nondisclosure of a fact can operate as a misrepresentation whenever the other party
has erroneous information, or, where the nondisclosure amounts to a failure to act in
good faith, or where the party who conceals knows or should know that the other
side cannot, with reasonable diligence, discover the truth.
• If a statement of fact is made false by later events, it must be disclosed as false process.
• An opinion is not a fact; neither is sales puffery.
o Reliance on opinion is hazardous and generally not considered justifiable.
o Despite the general rule, there are certain exceptions that justify reliance on opinions
and effectively make them into facts.
• Incorrect assertions of law usually do not give rise to any relief, but sometimes they do.
o Assertions about foreign laws are generally held to be statements of fact, not opin-
ion.
• Usually, assertions of intention are not considered facts.
o The law allows considerable leeway in the honesty of assertions of intention.

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• The second element necessary to prove fraud is that the misrepresentation was intentionally
made.
o A misrepresentation is intentionally made “if the maker intends his assertion to in-
duce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that the as-
sertion is not in accord with the facts, or (b) does not have the confidence that he
states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or (c) knows that he does not have the
basis that he states or implies for the assertion.”
o If the misrepresentation is fraudulent, the plaintiff may, as an alternative to avoiding
the contract, recover damages.
o If the misrepresentation is not intentional, common law allows the plaintiff only the
remedy of rescission.
o The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Section 2-721, allows both remedies in
contracts for the sale of goods, whether the misrepresentation is fraudulent or not,
and does not require election of remedies.
• The final element necessary to prove fraud is reliance by the victim.
o He or she must show that the misrepresentation induced assent—that is, he or she re-
lied on it.
o Ordinarily, the person relying on a statement need not verify it independently.
▪ However, if verification is relatively easy, or if the statement is one that con-
cerns matters peculiarly within the person’s purview, he or she may not be
held to have justifiably relied on the other party’s false assertion.
• Nonfraudulent misrepresentation may also be grounds for some relief.
o There are two types: negligent misrepresentation and innocent misrepresenta-
tion.
• Where representation is caused by carelessness, it is negligent misrepresentation.
o To prove it, a plaintiff must show a negligent misstatement of fact that is material
and justifiably relied upon.
o As an element of misrepresentation, “negligent” means the party who makes the
representation was careless.
o Whether a thing is a fact may be subject to the same general analysis used in discuss-
ing fraudulent misrepresentation.

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o A material misrepresentation is one that “would be likely to induce a reasonable per-

son to manifest his assent” or that “the maker knows…would be likely to induce the
recipient to do so.”
o If the misrepresentation is fraudulent, the victim can avoid the contract, no matter
the significance of the misrepresentation.
o The issues here for negligent misrepresentation are the same as those set out for
fraudulent misrepresentation.
o Negligent misrepresentation implies culpability and is usually treated the same as
fraudulent misrepresentation; if the representation is not fraudulent, however, it can-
not be the basis for rescission unless it is also material.
• The elements necessary to prove innocent misrepresentation are an innocent misstatement of
fact that is material and justifiably relied upon.
• Fraudulent misrepresentation has traditionally given the victim the right to rescind the con-
tract promptly (return the parties to the before-contract status) or affirm it and bring an ac-
tion for damages caused by the fraud, but not both.
o The UCC (Section 2-721) has rejected the “election of remedies” doctrine; it allows
cumulative damages, such that the victim can both return the goods and sue for dam-
ages.
o This is the modern trend for fraudulent misrepresentation: victims may first seek
damages, and if that does not make them whole, they may seek rescission.
o In egregious cases of fraud where the defendant has undertaken a pattern of such de-
ceit, the rare civil remedy of punitive damages may be awarded against the defend-
ant.
• The burden of proof for fraudulent misrepresentation is that it must be proved not just “by a
preponderance of the evidence,” as in the typical civil case, but rather “by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence”; the fact finder must believe the claim of fraud is very probably true.

Key Takeaway
Misrepresentation may be of two types: fraudulent (in the execution or in the inducement) and non-
fraudulent (negligent or innocent). Each type has different elements that must be proved, but in

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general there must be a misstatement of fact by some means that is intentionally made (for fraud),
material (for nonfraudulent), and justifiably relied upon.

Exercises
Section 2 - Misrepresentation
1. Distinguish between fraudulent misrepresentation and nonfraudulent misrepresentation, between
fraud in the execution and fraud in the inducement, and between negligent and innocent misrepre-
sentation.
Answer: If misrepresentation is intentional, it is fraudulent misrepresentation; if it is not intention-
al, it is nonfraudulent misrepresentation, which can be either negligent or innocent.
Causing a person to sign a legal document while that person believes he or she is signing some oth-
er type of document is known as fraud in the execution. Fraud in the inducement involves some
misrepresentation about the subject of the contract that induces assent.
Where representation is caused by carelessness, it is negligent misrepresentation. When misrepre-
sentation is made by one who believes it is true, it is innocent misrepresentation.

2. List the elements that must be shown to prove the four different types of misrepresentation noted
in Exercise 1.
Answer: For fraud in execution, the misrepresentation has to be so made that the person signing the
legal document thinks that he is signing some other type of document.
Fraud in the inducement involves misrepresentation about the subject of the contract.
For fraudulent misrepresentation it is necessary to prove a misstatement of fact that is intentionally
made and justifiably relied upon.
To prove negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show a negligent misstatement of fact that is
material and justifiably relied upon.
The element necessary to prove innocent misrepresentation is an innocent misstatement of fact that
is material and justifiably relied upon.

3. What is the difference between the traditional common-law approach to remedies for fraud and
the UCC’s approach?

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Answer: Fraudulent misrepresentation has traditionally given the victim the right to rescind the
contract promptly (return the parties to the before-contract status) or affirm it and bring an action
for damages caused by the fraud, but not both. The UCC (Section 2-721) has rejected the “election
of remedies” doctrine; it allows cumulative damages, such that the victim can both return the goods
and sue for damages. The modern trend for fraudulent misrepresentation is that victims may first
seek damages, and if that does not make them whole, they may seek rescission. In egregious cases
of fraud where the defendant has undertaken a pattern of such deceit, the rare civil remedy of puni-
tive damages may be awarded against the defendant. The burden of proof for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation is that it must be proved not just “by a preponderance of the evidence,” as in civil case,
but rather “by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”; the fact finder must believe the claim of
fraud is very probably true.

Teaching Suggestions
1. The instructor could discuss the facts and judgment of Ikeda v. Curtis (misstatement of fact),
Stambovsky v. Ackley (nondisclosure), Lesher v. Strid (innocent misrepresentation), Merritt v.
Craig (remedies), Ehrman v. Mann (remedies), and Kirkham v. Smith (remedies).

Suggested Activities
The instructor could ask students to argue the cases of Ikeda v. Curtis (misstatement of fact),
Stambovsky v. Ackley (nondisclosure), Lesher v. Strid (innocent misrepresentation), Merritt v.
Craig (remedies), Ehrman v. Mann (remedies), and Kirkham v. Smith (remedies).

3. Mistake
• Recognize under what circumstances a person may be relieved of a unilateral mistake.
• Recognize when a mutual mistake will be grounds for relief, and the types of mutual mis-
takes.

Section Outline

• Where one party makes a mistake, it is a unilateral mistake.

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o The rule: ordinarily, a contract is not voidable because one party has made a mistake
about the subject matter.
▪ If one side knows or should know that the other has made a mistake, he or
she may not take advantage of it. (Exception)
• In the case of mutual mistake—both parties are wrong about the subject of the contract—
relief may be granted.
o According to the Restatement, the party seeking to avoid the contract must prove
that:
▪ the mistake relates to a “basic assumption on which the contract was made,”
▪ the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances,
▪ the party seeking relief does not bear the risk of the mistake.
o Because of a mutual mistake, there is a significant difference between the value the
parties thought they were exchanging compared with what they would exchange if
the contract were performed, given the standing facts.

Key Takeaway
A mistake may be unilateral, in which case no relief will be granted unless the other side knows of
the mistake and takes advantage of it. A mistake may be mutual, in which case relief may be grant-
ed if it is about a basic assumption on which the contract was made, if the mistake has a material
effect on the agreed-to exchange, and if the person adversely affected did not bear the risk of the
mistake.

Exercises
1. Why is relief usually not granted for unilateral mistakes? When is relief granted for them?
Answer: It is a mistake made by one party to a contract; relief is not usually granted.
If one side knows or should know that the other has made a mistake, he or she may not take ad-
vantage of it. A person who makes the mistake of not reading a written document will usually get
no relief, nor will relief be afforded to one whose mistake is caused by negligence (a contractor for-
gets to add in the cost of insulation) unless the negligent party would suffer unconscionable hard-
ship if the mistake were not corrected.

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2. If there is a mutual mistake, what does the party seeking relief have to show to avoid the con-
tract?
Answer: The party seeking to avoid the contract must prove that the: (a) mistake relates to a “basic
assumption on which the contract was made”; (b) mistake has a material effect on the agreed ex-
change of performances; and (c) party seeking relief does not bear the risk of the mistake.

Teaching Suggestions
1. The instructor could discuss the facts and judgments of Sikora v. Vanderploeg (exceptions to
unilateral mistake) and Sherwood v. Walker—the famous “cow case” (mutual mistake).

Suggested Activities
The instructor could ask students to argue the cases of Sikora v. Vanderploeg (exceptions to uni-
lateral mistake) and Sherwood v. Walker (mutual mistake).

4. Capacity
• Understand that infants may avoid their contracts with limitations.
• Understand that insane or intoxicated people may avoid their contracts with limitations.
• Understand the extent to which contracts made by mentally ill persons are voidable, void, or
effectively enforceable.
• Recognize that contracts made by intoxicated persons may be voidable.

Section Outline
• A contract is a meeting of minds.
o If someone lacks mental capacity to understand what he is assenting to—or that he is
assenting to anything—it is unreasonable to hold him to the consequences of his act.
• At common law there are various classes of people who are presumed to lack the requisite
capacity.
o These include infants (minors), the mentally ill, and the intoxicated.
• Minors: The general rule is that minors (or more legalistically “infants”) are in most states
persons younger than eighteen years old; they can avoid their contracts, up to and within a
reasonable time after reaching majority, subject to some exceptions and limitations.

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o The age of majority (when a person is no longer an infant or a minor) was lowered in
most states during the 1970s (to correspond to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, rati-
fied in 1971, guaranteeing the right to vote at eighteen). Therefore, not what used to
be a troublesome problem (kid graduated from high school and was still and “infant”
for three years, making contract) is not so common now.
o An infant’s contract is voidable, not void, by the infant (not the adult).
o The exceptions to the general rule: Infants are generally liable for the reasonable
cost of necessities.
▪ State statutes variously prohibit disaffirmation for such contracts as insur-
ance, education or medical care, bonding agreements, stocks, or bank ac-
counts. (Nonvoidable Contracts)
▪ Misrepresentation of age. Estoppel is a refusal by the courts on equitable
grounds to allow a person to escape liability on an otherwise valid defense;
unless the infant can return the consideration, the contract will be enforced.
▪ When the infant becomes an adult, she has two choices: she may ratify the
contract or disaffirm it. She may ratify explicitly; no further consideration is
necessary. She may also do so by implication—for instance, by continuing
to make payments or retaining goods for an unreasonable period of time. If
the child has not disaffirmed the contract while still an infant, she may do so
within a reasonable time after reaching majority; what is a “reasonable time”
depends on the circumstances. Ratification affects the entire contract: the
young person cannot ratify parts and avoid parts.
▪ In most cases of disavowal, the infant’s only obligation is to return the goods
or repay the consideration; he does not have to account for what he wasted,
consumed, or damaged during the contract. (Not so in Tennessee, though: in
1992, Dodson v. Shrader, the state high court overruled the prevailing com-
mon-law doctrine and held that infants must pay for the reasonable value of
what they consumed, wasted, or spent, if the contract they made was fair and
there was no over-reaching by the adult).
▪ Infants are liable for their torts unless the tort suit is only an indirect method
of enforcing a contract.

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• Mentally Ill Persons: A contract made by person who is mentally ill is voidable by the per-
son when she regains her sanity, or, as appropriate, by a guardian.
o If, though, a guardian has been legally appointed for a person who is mentally ill,
any contract made by the latter is void, but may nevertheless be ratified by the ward
upon regaining sanity or by the guardian.
• Intoxicated Persons: If a person is so drunk that he has no awareness of his acts, and if the
other person knows this, there is no contract.
o The intoxicated person is obligated to refund the consideration to the other party un-
less he dissipated it during his drunkenness.
o If the other person is unaware of his intoxicated state, however, an offer or ac-
ceptance of fair terms manifesting assent is binding.
o If a person is only partially inebriated and has some understanding of his actions,
“avoidance depends on a showing that the other party induced the drunkenness or
that the consideration was inadequate or that the transaction departed from the nor-
mal pattern of similar transactions; if the particular transaction is one which a rea-
sonably competent person might have made, it cannot be avoided even though en-
tirely executor.”
o A person who was intoxicated at the time he made the contract may nevertheless
subsequently ratify it. Intoxicated is a disfavored defense on public policy grounds.

Key Takeaway
Infants may generally disaffirm their contracts up to majority and within a reasonable time after-
ward, but the rule is subject to some exceptions and complications: necessities, contracts made non-
voidable by statute, misrepresentation of age, extent of duty to return consideration, ratification, and
a tort connected with the contract are among these exceptions.
Contracts made by insane or intoxicated people are voidable when the person regains competency.
A contract made by a person under guardianship is void, but the estate will be liable for necessities.
A contract made while insane or intoxicated may be ratified.

Exercises
1. Ivar, an infant, bought a used car—not a necessity—for $9,500. The seller took advantage of

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 BUSINESS LAW

Ivar’s infancy: the car was really worth only $5,500. Can Ivar keep the car but disclaim liability for
the $4,000 difference?

2. If Ivar bought the car and it was a necessity, could he disclaim liability for the $4,000?
Answer: If the car is a necessity, Ivar cannot disclaim liability for the $4,000.

3. Alice Ace found her adult son’s Christmas stocking; Mrs. Ace herself had made it fifty years be-
fore. It was considerably deteriorated. Isabel, sixteen, handy with knitting, agreed to reknit it for
$100, which Mrs. Ace paid in advance. Isabel, regrettably, lost the stocking. She returned the $100
to Mrs. Ace, who was very upset. May Mrs. Ace now sue Isabel for the loss of the stocking (con-
version) and emotional distress?
Answer: Mrs. Ace cannot sue Isabel for the tort--loss of the stocking (conversion) and emotional
distress—because that would effectively be enforcing the damages from Isabel’s breach of contract.

4. Why is voluntary intoxication a disfavored defense?

Answer: If a person voluntarily consumes alcohol, it can be assumed that he knows his limits. So,
practically he must be aware of his acts and thus, cannot claim a defense.

Teaching Suggestions
1. The instructor could discuss the facts and judgments of Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers
(necessities), Dodson v. Shrader (duty to return consideration received), and First State Bank of
Sinai v. Hyland (intoxicated persons).

Suggested Activities
1. The instructor could ask students to argue the cases of Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers
(necessities), Dodson v. Shrader (duty to return consideration received), and First State Bank of
Sinai v. Hyland (intoxicated persons).

5. Cases

Undue Influence

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Hodge v. Shea
168 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1969)
Facts: The defendant had been plaintiff’s (Dr. Hodge’s) patient for a number of years. He
was 75, an inebriate of long standing, and was afflicted by grievous chronic illnesses, including ar-
teriosclerosis, cirrhosis of the liver, and arthritis which required constant medication and frequent
medical attention, and rendered him infirm of body and mind, although not to the point of incompe-
tency to contract. Mr. Shea was separated from his wife and lived alone. He was dependent upon
Dr. Hodge for house calls, which were needed from time to time. His relationship with his physi-
cian, who sometimes visited him as a friend and occasionally performed non-professional services
for him, was closer than ordinarily arises from that of patient and physician. A 125 acre tract of
land near Mr. Shea’s home, adjacent to land which was being developed as residential property,
was one of his most valuable and readily salable assets. In 1962, the developer of this contiguous
land offered to buy it at $1000.00 per acre, but Mr. Shea, on the advice of his son-in-law Ransdell,
refused to sell, asserting that the property was worth at least $1500.00 per acre. Negotiations be-
tween the developer and Mr. Ransdell were in progress when Mr. Shea, at the instance of Dr.
Hodge and without consulting Mr. Ransdell or anyone else, the defendant, in the plaintiff’s medical
office, signed the contract of August 19, 1965. Under this contract Dr. Hodge claims the right to
purchase twenty choice acres of the 125 acre tract for a consideration calculated by the circuit court
to be $361.72 per acre. The consideration was expressed in the contract between Dr. Hodge and
Mr. Shea as follows:
The purchase price being (Cadillac Coupe DeVille 6600) & $4000.00 Dollars, on the fol-
lowing terms: Dr. Joseph Hodge to give to Mr. George Shea a new $6600 coupe DeVille
Cadillac which is to be registered in name of Mr. George A. Shea at absolutely no cost to
him. In return, Mr. Shea will give to Dr. Joe Hodge his 1964 Cadillac coupe DeVille and
shall transfer title of this vehicle to Dr. Hodge. Further, Dr. Joseph Hodge will pay to Mr.
George A. Shea the balance of $4000.00 for the 20 acres of land described above subject to
survey, title check, less taxes on purchase of vehicle.

Dr. Hodge was fully aware of Mr. Shea’s financial troubles, the liens on his property and his son-in-
law’s efforts in his behalf. He was also aware of his patient’s predilection for new Cadillacs. Dr.
Hodge hastened to purchase the 1965 Cadillac Coupe DeVille and delivered it to Mr. Shea on the
day after his discharge from the hospital on August 25, 1965.
Procedure: Plaintiff sued defendant for specific performance. Judgment for plaintiff, de-
fendant appeals.

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Issue: Should the old man be bound by the terms of his contract with Dr. Hodge?
Held: No.
Reason: Mr. Shea was the victim of undue influence. Four elements are typically required
to establish undue influence. First, that the victim was susceptible to overreaching. Such conditions
as mental, psychological, or physical disability or dependency may be used to show susceptibility.
Second, there must be an opportunity for exercising undue influence. Typically, this opportunity
arises through a confidential relationship (the doctor-patient relationship here). Third, there must
be evidence that the defendant was inclined to exercise undue influence over the victim. Defend-
ants who aggressively initiate a transaction, insulate a relationship from outside supervision, or dis-
courage a weaker party from seeking independent advice may be attempting to exercise undue in-
fluence. Fourth, the record must reveal an unnatural or suspicious transaction—inadequate consid-
eration. All those elements are present here. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Case Questions
1. Why is it relevant that Mr. Shea was separated from his wife and lived alone?
2. Why is it relevant that it was his doctor who convinced him to sell the real estate?
3. Why did the doctor offer the old man a Cadillac as part of the deal?
4. Generally speaking, if you agree to sell your real estate for less than its real value, that’s just a
unilateral mistake and the courts will grant no relief. What’s different here?

Misrepresentation by Concealment
Reed v. King
193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Calif. Ct. App., 1983)
Facts: Dorris Reed purchased a house from Robert King. Neither King nor his real estate
agents (the other named defendants) told Reed that a woman and her four children were murdered
there ten years earlier. However, Reed learned of the gruesome episode from a neighbor after the
sale.
Procedure: Reed sued seeking rescission and damages. King and the real estate agent de-
fendants successfully demurred to her first amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Reed appealed the ensuing judgment of dismissal.
Issue: Was the failure of the defendants a material misrepresentation by concealment?

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 BUSINESS LAW

Held: Yes.
Reason: Misrepresentation arises where there is a material misstatement of fact; a “mis-
statement” may include concealment. Although there was nothing physically wrong with the
house, its bad reputation as the site of a grisly mass murder might well be so disturbing as to make
it worth less than it was advertised and sold for; its reputation should not have been concealed. If
the plaintiff can show on remand that the house was overpriced by misrepresentation she will pre-
vail. Reversed and remanded.
Case Questions
1. Why is it relevant that the plaintiff was “an elderly lady living alone”?
2. How did Mrs. Reed find out about the gruesome fact here?
3. Why did the defendants conceal the facts?
4. What is the concern about opening “floodgates to rescission on subjective and idiosyncratic
grounds”?
5. Why did George Washington sleep in so many places during the Revolutionary War?
6. Did Mrs. Reed get to rescind her contract and get out of the house as a result of this case?

Misrepresentation by Assertions of Opinion

Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc.
212 S.2d. 906 (Fla. 1968)
Defendant Arthur Murray, Inc., a corporation, authorizes the operation throughout the nation of
dancing schools under the name of “Arthur Murray School of Dancing” through local franchised
operators, one of whom was defendant J. P. Davenport whose dancing establishment was in Clear-
water.
Plaintiff Mrs. Audrey E. Vokes, a widow of 51 years and without family, had a yen to be “an ac-
complished dancer” with the hopes of finding “new interest in life.” So, on February 10, 1961, a
dubious fate, with the assist of a motivated acquaintance, procured her to attend a “dance party” at
Davenport’s “School of Dancing” where she whiled away the pleasant hours, sometimes in a pri-
vate room, absorbing his accomplished sales technique, during which her grace and poise were
elaborated upon and her rosy future as “an excellent dancer” was painted for her in vivid and glow-
ing colors. As an incident to this interlude, he sold her eight 1/2-hour dance lessons to be utilized

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 BUSINESS LAW

within one calendar month therefrom, for the sum of $14.50 cash in hand paid, obviously a baited
“come-on.”
Thus she embarked upon an almost endless pursuit of the terpsichorean art during which, over a
period of less than sixteen months, she was sold fourteen “dance courses” totaling in the aggregate
2302 hours of dancing lessons for a total cash outlay of $31,090.45 [about $220,000 in 2010 dol-
lars] all at Davenport’s dance emporium. All of these fourteen courses were evidenced by execution
of a written “Enrollment Agreement-Arthur Murray’s School of Dancing” with the addendum in
heavy black print, “No one will be informed that you are taking dancing lessons. Your relations
with us are held in strict confidence”, setting forth the number of “dancing lessons” and the “les-
sons in rhythm sessions” currently sold to her from time to time, and always of course accompanied
by payment of cash of the realm.
These dance lesson contracts and the monetary consideration therefore of over $31,000 were pro-
cured from her by means and methods of Davenport and his associates which went beyond the un-
savory, yet legally permissible, perimeter of “sales puffing” and intruded well into the forbidden
area of undue influence, the suggestion of falsehood, the suppression of truth, and the free Exercise
of rational judgment. From the time of her first contact with the dancing school in February, 1961,
she was influenced unwittingly by a constant and continuous barrage of flattery, false praise, exces-
sive compliments, and panegyric encomiums.
She was incessantly subjected to overreaching blandishment and cajolery. She was assured she had
“grace and poise”; that she was “rapidly improving and developing in her dancing skill”; that the
additional lessons would “make her a beautiful dancer, capable of dancing with the most accom-
plished dancers”; that she was “rapidly progressing in the development of her dancing skill and
gracefulness”, etc., etc. She was given “dance aptitude tests” for the ostensible purpose of “deter-
mining” the number of remaining hours of instructions needed by her from time to time.
At one point she was sold 545 additional hours of dancing lessons to be entitled to award of the
“Bronze Medal” signifying that she had reached “the Bronze Standard”, a supposed designation of
dance achievement by students of Arthur Murray, Inc.…At another point, while she still had over
1,000 unused hours of instruction she was induced to buy 151 additional hours at a cost of
$2,049.00 to be eligible for a “Student Trip to Trinidad”, at her own expense as she later learned.…

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 BUSINESS LAW

Finally, sandwiched in between other lesser sales promotions, she was influenced to buy an addi-
tional 481 hours of instruction at a cost of $6,523.81 in order to “be classified as a Gold Bar Mem-
ber, the ultimate achievement of the dancing studio.”
All the foregoing sales promotions, illustrative of the entire fourteen separate contracts, were pro-
cured by defendant Davenport and Arthur Murray, Inc., by false representations to her that she was
improving in her dancing ability, that she had excellent potential, that she was responding to in-
structions in dancing grace, and that they were developing her into a beautiful dancer, whereas in
truth and in fact she did not develop in her dancing ability, she had no “dance aptitude,” and in fact
had difficulty in “hearing that musical beat.” The complaint alleged that such representations to her
“were in fact false and known by the defendant to be false and contrary to the plaintiff’s true ability,
the truth of plaintiff’s ability being fully known to the defendants, but withheld from the plaintiff
for the sole and specific intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff and to induce her in the purchas-
ing of additional hours of dance lessons.”
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

Case Questions
1. What was the motivation of the “motivated acquaintance” in this case?

2. Why is it relevant that Mrs. Vokes was a “widow of 51 years and without family”?

3. How did the defendant J. P. Davenport entice her into spending a lot of money on dance lessons?

4. What was the defendants’ defense as to why they should not be liable for misrepresentation, and
why was that defense not good?

5. Would you say the court here is rather condescending to Mrs. Vokes, all things considered?

Mutual Mistake
Konic International Corporation, v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc.,
708 P.2d 932 (Idaho, 1985)

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 BUSINESS LAW

David Young, an employee of Spokane Computer, was instructed by his employer to investigate the
possibility of purchasing a surge protector, a device which protects computers from damaging surg-
es of electrical current. Young’s investigation turned up several units priced from $50 to $200, none
of which, however, were appropriate for his employer’s needs. Young then contacted Konic. After
discussing Spokane Computer’s needs with a Konic engineer, Young was referred to one of Kon-
ic’s salesmen. Later, after deciding on a certain unit, Young inquired as to the price of the selected
item. The salesman responded, “fifty-six twenty.” The salesman meant $5,620. Young in turn
thought $56.20.
The salesman for Konic asked about Young’s authority to order the equipment and was told that
Young would have to get approval from one of his superiors. Young in turn prepared a purchase
order for $56.20 and had it approved by the appropriate authority. Young telephoned the order and
purchase order number to Konic who then shipped the equipment to Spokane Computer. However,
because of internal processing procedures of both parties the discrepancy in prices was not discov-
ered immediately. Spokane Computer received the surge protector and installed it in its office. The
receipt and installation of the equipment occurred while the president of Spokane Computer was on
vacation. Although the president’s father, who was also chairman of the board of Spokane Comput-
er, knew of the installation, he only inquired as to what the item was and who had ordered it. The
president came back from vacation the day after the surge protector had been installed and placed in
operation and was told of the purchase. He immediately ordered that power to the equipment be
turned off because he realized that the equipment contained parts which alone were worth more
than $56 in value. Although the president then told Young to verify the price of the surge protector,
Young failed to do so. Two weeks later, when Spokane Computer was processing its purchase order
and Konic’s invoice, the discrepancy between the amount on the invoice and the amount on the
purchase order was discovered. The president of Spokane Computer then contacted Konic, told
Konic that Young had no authority to order such equipment, that Spokane Computer did not want
the equipment, and that Konic should remove it. Konic responded that Spokane Computer now
owned the equipment and if the equipment was not paid for, Konic would sue for the price. Spo-
kane Computer refused to pay and this litigation ensued.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment and ruled in favor of Spokane Computer
Services, Inc.

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 BUSINESS LAW

Case Questions
1. Why is it reasonable to say that no contract was made in this case?

2. A discrepancy in price of one hundred times is, of course, enormous. How could such an egre-
gious mistake have occurred by both parties? In terms of running a sensible business, how could
this kind of mistake be avoided before it resulted in expensive litigation?

Teaching Suggestions
1. The instructor could discuss the facts and judgment of Raffles v. Wichelhaus (mutual mistake).

Suggested Activities
1. The instructor could ask students to argue Hodge v. Shea, Reed v. King, Vokes v. Arthur
Murray, Inc., Konic International Corporation v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc., and Raf-
fles v. Wichelhaus.

Exercises
1. Eulrich, an auto body mechanic who had never operated a business, entered into a Snap-On
Tools franchise agreement. For $22,000 invested from his savings and the promise of another
$22,000 from the sale of inventory, he was provided a truck full of tools. His job was to drive
around his territory and sell them. The agreement allowed termination by either party; if Eulrich
terminated, he was entitled to resell to
Snap-On any new tools he had remaining. When he complained that his territory was not profitable,
his supervisors told him to work it harder, that anybody could make money with Snap-On’s market-
ing system. (In fact, the evidence was the system made money for the supervisors and little for
dealers; dealers quickly failed and were replaced by new recruits.) Within several months Eulrich
was out of money and desperate.
He tried to “check in” his truck to get money to pay his household bills and uninsured medical bills
for his wife; the supervisors put him off for weeks. On the check-in day, the exhausted Eulrich’s
supervisors berated him for being a bad businessman, told him no check would be forthcoming until
all the returned inventory was sold, and presented him with a number of papers to sign, including a
“Termination Agreement” whereby he agreed to waive any claims against Snap-On; he was not

© 2011 Flat World Knowledge 20

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
[Inhoud]
 DERDE HOOFDSTUK.

Zonnezang daverde over de gouden akkers!

Zomer- en werkroes in Wiereland en Duinkijk, steeg,

stéég.

Aardbeihaal werd op z’n hevigst. Alles in huis lag

vergeten, verwaarloosd, vertrapt.—Elke lèvende hand
moest graaien, elke rug moèst bukken, elk hoofd
verzengen in zon. Nergens was volk genoeg. Geld
van ontvangst kwam instroomen, verhitte de
tuindersbazen, beduizelde hen, als ademden ze in
tooverland. Kindertjes van twee, drie jaar, liepen
tusschen wat ouderen, verwaarloosd als morsige
honden, verstrooid in de laantjes rond; schooierden op
zon-doorzengde erfjes, die rookten van hitte.
Huishoudleven bleef in stàrende verwoesting, in de
stille smoorheete krotjes achter.—Vrouw en kinders,
die éven maar wat beseften, knielden en zwoegden in
zonnegang van ochtend tot nacht, gelijk òp met
volwassenen. Midden tusschen den aardbeibrand
zwollen de doppers, de suikerraspers, zoetig en teer
lichtgroen.

Tusschen den aardbeipluk kwam de erwtenhaal

indringen. ’t Joeg, ’t joeg. Als ze nòu niet gehaald
wierden, groeiden ze te dik, zwollen of verrotten ze in
verpestenden honingdauw, die neerviel op de erwten
en heele regels in gelig-kleverig vocht verschroeide.—
’t Brandde ze in de handen de werkdrift, en zoo kwam
nù, tusschen den zwoeg van den aardbeipluk, de
erwtenhaal.—

Zonnezang daverde rondom, elken dag heeter,

schroeiender, uitdrogend de akkers, waar ’t zand op
blakerde als heet paarsgruis, bij ander grondbrok
soms, gelijk wit vuur, blink-hevig in stillen damp
kokend. [62]

De eerste gouden zomerjubel van wei en boom was

weggelicht; gras en blad verstoofden al zachtelijk in
moordenden broeidag en overal langs zeeweg en
lanen, wolkte zand, verstikkend terugzuigend op
hagen en gebladerte, de nerven begravend onder
dorre grauwe asch.

Barnende hitte in grijsblauwen hemel, grijs van

warmte, wijd uitstralend in fellen zeng, trilde over de
werklijven, stom in hun arbeid, nu zomer ging rondom
branden en moorden.—

Hun koppen, vroeg al doorlanst van vuur, dat

neerlaaide uit verblindend fellen zonnekring, in witte
gloeiing,—vlekten en gromden verwoest van wrok en
zweet, sjouw en inspanning. Hun lijven, doorkleft van
zurig nat, voelden verlamd, verweekt onder den
brandheeten lichtval, die dreunde en bazuinde om hen
héén, in roostering van leven.—

In stil-sidderende Julihitte, stapte Kees om drie uur al

z’n erf op. Wimpie had er om gesmeekt buiten te
zitten, elken dag nu. In ’n krakend, gebarsten
 wagentje, dat Ant van ’n Wierelandsch notabele
gekregen had, zat Wim lang buiten de dampige
kamerbenauwing. Heel voorzichtig, terwijl Ant wat
hompen brood sneed en de kinders, ontbloot en
vervuild, nog snurkten in de stikkend-broeiende
bedsteetjes, droeg Kees Wimpie naar ’t erfje, schoof
ie ’t kapotte kinderwagentje met z’n lammen kap,
tegen ’t goud-okerende muurtje van z’n huis. Groenig-
grauw dorde Wim’s doodskopje, tegen de goud-
paarse weerschijnen van wandkleurig vochtspel; lag
ook z’n lijfje pal in de zon, schuin onder ’t hooge raam,
waarvan de vuil-bruine postrand, den heelen dag
doorzoemd kookte van groote, dikke razende vliegen,
die kringden op ’t heete ruit, dat gloeide als smidse.
Fijn, boven z’n steen-bleeke ooren, rankte lichtgroen,
ciergebogen, de wilde wingerd.

Den heelen dag maar staarde ’t ventje voor zich uit,

op den zandigen zeeweg, in ’t verre prachtgroene
duister van diepe kastanjelaan, in tuin van Jonkheer
van Ouwenaar, of bijzij, naar sparreboschjes en ’n
paar angstig krom-gewrongen knotwilgen vòòr aan
den weg, groeiend hoog in de lucht, met [63]wortel-
klauwen bloot, in kramp-greep tusschen ’t duinzand
uitvingerend.

Nou lachte ie, ’t zachtzinnige vrome kereltje, met z’n

groote droomvrome, groenblauwe oogen, wijd open;
nog altijd in allerlei variatietjes bepeinzend, uitroep
van pastoor, dat ie gauw maar den geluksstaat moest
ingaan.—
 En vredig in z’n eigen zieltjes-rust, zat ie in de zon te
blakeren, lekker en te kijken maar, roerloos, soms de
vracht van z’n uitgemagerd lijfje, onder z’n zweetende
handjes voelend als ie stil krampte van dijpijn.—Hij
lachte tegen Kees, zachte, vreemd-ontroerende
glimlach van smartmenschje, heel zacht en vroeg-wijs.
Vóór ’m had Kees ’n bak met melk gezet, op ’n krukje,
waar ie goed bij kon met z’n stok-magere armpjes.

Stiller iederen ochtend, ’n zoen drukkend op z’n kopje,

ging Kees weg, voelend diep, dat ’t gedaan was met
z’n Wimpie, z’n zoon, dat ie er èlken dag grauwer,
zwakker en beroerder ging uitzien. Wild kwam er weer
verzet tegen alles in ’m stormen, ’n woest blinde gift,
’n heete wrok zonder dat ie zich uitte. En Wimpie
glimlachte maar. Als ie niet te vermoeid was neuriede
z’n stemmetje uit ’t wagentje voor den zonnigen oker-
gouden muur; kringden boven z’n steenbleeke ooren
glansen en vochten op ’t prachtgeveltje, oud
roodgoud, in groen-paarsen weerschijn, gesmoorde
jubel van kleurtonen, er ingestreeld, door wond’re
ragge stift van teedersten penseeler.—

Tegen vijf uur elken ochtend, ging Ant weg ná Kees, ’n

uur den zeekant òp naar verre akkers, waar ’n tuinder
’r gehuurd had voor den erwtenpluk. Vóór ze vertrok,
knuffelde ze Wimpie nog wat, bad ze koortsig in haast,
vloekte en schold ze in driftige geprikkeldheid onder ’t
wakkerschudden en opstooten tegen de andere
kooters. Al de kleintjes, van één tot vijf, bleven
ongewasschen den heelen dag rondluieren,
schooierig en verklierd op ’t erf, of in de laantjes. Hun
gezichtjes, korsterig, pukkelden, klierden en ’n paar,
 van drie en vier, met vuurrood haar, waren zóó
bestrooid met groote sproeten, onder oogen en neus,
dat ze bruin leken. Bedilzuchtig Grietje van zes jaar,
kinderlijk miniatuur-moedertje, en vrouw Rams,
[64]pasten op de kooters. Maar vuiler daardoor
dwaalden ze rond, met bloote lijfjes en voetjes, in
gescheurde vodderokjes, die hevig stonken naar vuil
zand, scharlucht en poonen.—

Van negen ’s morgens tot ’s middags drie was Dientje

aan ’t venten met visch. Dan dadelijk kwam ze
plukken bij ’n tuinder tot zeven uur ’s avonds. Op
marktavonden joeg grootmoeder ’r nà zeven weer
naar de Haven, wéér met ’r stinkende poontjes en nog
stinkender scharren. Dan had vrouw Rams de handen
vrijer, bleef zij alleen met de kinderen over. Schooierig
zwalkten die dan nog rond, kijvend, vechtend en
grienend. Soms ’n uurtje, paste Jans op de kleinste,
pàs van de flesch.—

Vermorst met zwart-modderig grientronietje zat ’t

notendopje in gebroken mestkar op ’t erf, naast
Wimpie, uren achtereen te krijschen, huilstootend in
stuipende zuigelingsdrift, als spoog ’t d’r longetjes uit,
—meestal niet gehoord, en verwaarloosd door half
blinde grootmoeder.

Ouë Rams bleef den ganschen dag roerloos, achter ’t

bij plekken fel-doorzonde cellige raam neergeblokt, in
den kamerhoek waar zomers de poonen en
scharrebosjes tegen den vuilen muur vastgehaakt,
hun schrikkelijk rotten stank uithijgden. Bedorven
vischlucht zoog door ’t lage groen-duistere vertrek.—
 Rams rook niets, zag niets, vervlijmde hoest-
scheuren, slikte rochelslijm in, bleef na elke vlaag die
z’n bovenlijf overeindkromde, in sidder éven
vergrauwd-rood, nakrampen z’n armen en beenen.—
Uitgerocheld, zakte ie weer wat lager terug in z’n
stoel, schoven z’n oogen net onder raamrichel dat ie
niets meer van ’t tuin-buiten zien kon, de koperen
knoopen van z’n vuil rood jekkerkraagje alleen bleven
zon-fonkelen, als twee gloei-gouden oogen.

Zoo hitten, kleurden of regenstroomden de dagen vóór

’m wèg zonder dat ’r iets anders in ’m bewoog, dan de
zuigende pruim in z’n mond, met smakkende tongpunt
van één naar anderen hoek overgewerkt.—Stil
staarde ie, verloren in loomen leefgang van ’n koe,
half bewust, versuft z’n tanigen kop na elke hoestbui
dichter tegen venstermuurtje drukkend; muurtje [65]dat
ziedde in zonnegloei; zoo vermummiede z’n
neergeblokt krommig lijf in groenachtig kamerduister,
doorschept reflexlicht van boomen; walmde de rotvuile
vischstank van verterende scharren in de zomerhitte
rond ’m heen, als lag in de schuwe donkere balkkamer
’n lijk te ontbinden.

Zóó, elken dag bleef Wimpie moederziel alleen, huilde

hij soms als ie zonnetje zag wegduisteren en de
groene sparrenboschjes, onder zwaardreigende,
angstige onweerslucht, vóór ’m versomberden. Bij
iedere regenbui kwam, tastend en stootend, vrouw
Rams ’m wegrollen op z’n wagentje ’t achterend in, bij
’t pleehok, waar ie bleef tot de regen had uitgeruischt.
Door smeek en huil verteederd, reed ze’m dan weer
ruw en brommerig, onzeker en waggelend terug,
 tegen ’t muurtje buiten. Maar niets, op zulke dagen,
zei hij ’s avonds van z’n leed tegen Ant of Kees. ’t
Kereltje giste wèl, begreep goed, maar hield ’t stil-in-
zichzelf, dat moeder weg moèst, om wat bij te
verdienen, misschien ’n paar centen over te leggen
voor de eerste wintermaanden, als vader niets om
handen had.

’s Avonds, tegen half negen kwam Ant thuis. Nog

morsiger dan in den ochtend, kringden de kinderen
om ’r heen, doken ze allemaal een voor een òp, van
allen kant, uit laantjes of erfje, alsof ze roken dat ’r wat
te bikken viel. Maar Ant, half vermoord en doodelijk
uitgeput van hette, ’t zwangere lijf als ’n zware vracht
voor d’r buik, zakte op ’n stoel neer naast Wimpie,
kleine hijgjes uitstootend uit dor vertrokken, heet-
murvenden mond, zonder ’n woord te kunnen
uitbrengen.—Ze keek niet om naar d’r kooters, had
alleen oog voor Wimpie, dien ze stil toeknikte soms.
Vrouw Rams, nijdig en duwerig in ’r kwaadaardige
halfblindheid, kippigde om ’r dochter heen, nu en dan
’n donker kindergestaltetje van Ant afstootend, als ze
’t zag schaduwen of honger-stemmetjes hoorde
drensen. Telkens stopte ze ’r éen ’n bonk brood in de
hand, tastend met d’r zoek-vingers langs gezichtje en
lijfje of ze soms al hadden gekregen. Voor d’r man, op
raamrand, zette ze ’n bord waterige pap neer, zonder
’n woord te zeggen.—Jans had ze gepakt en
toegeschreeuwd dat ze op de kleintjes moest loeren
met bidden. [66]Eindelijk in armkrommigen tast, pasjes-
schuifelend kamer in en uit, bracht ze ook d’r dochter
’n bord eten, warm groentekliekje van middagmaal.
Maar geen hap kon Ant doen van uitputting. Eerst ’n
 uurtje rustig bleef ze zitten, kwam ze van zelf ’n
handje bij, keek ze vrindlijker naar Wimpie, streelde ze
’m ’n paar maal over z’n doodskopje, dat ie weer
neuriede uit z’n vereenzaming; vroeg ze’m, moe en
kort, of ie erge pijn had gevoeld vandaag, of alles
goed gegaan was. Soms, plots in woeste
driftprikkeling, gaf ze ’n woedenden snauw naar ’n
wurm dat ’r bezanikte, of barstte ze uit tegen
krijschend dreumesje.—Dan vroeg ze weer, stil in
onrustigen ademhaal, en zacht op-en-neer-beweeg
van ’r hangbuik, d’r ventje wat. Om negen uur, soms
tien, kwam Dientje thuis van de Haven, met ’r ventgeld
warm gekneusd in d’r zweethandje; bracht ze terug
overgebleven poonen en scharren. Walgelijke lucht,
als van vuile bokkingen en rottend, zoet bloedstankig
vleesch, wasemde van ’r lijfje de kamer in. Hevig
stonk ’t kind-karkasje, d’r vunze kleertjes, en wat ze
aanraakte luchtte mee. Maar niet éen van de Hassels
die ’t rook, alleen werd Kees er nu en dan misselijk
van. Soms als lekkernij, mocht Wimpie ’n poontje
zuigen, waar ie meestal geen trek in had. Maar àt ie ’r
één, dan hongerden de kleine zusjes, met sluwe
Jansie mee, in ’n stil rijtje voor z’n bedje; loerden alle
oogjes gretig naar z’n langzame eetbewegingen òp,
als vuile hondjes die te wachten zitten, geduldig-
roerloos op afval; tot ze plots ruw weggeranseld
werden door Ant of vrouw Rams. Dan langzaam, na
eersten schok, rijden ze weer áán, stonden ze met
kleine schuine hoofdgebaartjes loenschig en gulzig
voor ’t zieke broertje, stiller nog dan éérst;
smakkerend op de lipjes, vechtend en trappend in
worsteling op den steengrond, als Wimpie dan hier,
dan daar, speelsch ’n stukje visch of vel tusschen hen
ingooide. Zacht schaterde ’t ventje dan van pret, om
hun driftige grimassen, grijp-woedetjes, zoek-stooten
en wilde hebzucht.

Dientje alleen bleef zitten bij ’t raam, doodop, achter

ouë Rams, met ’r mand half open op den vloer, tot
moeder ’r roepen zou om af te rekenen. Maar versuft
bleef Ant zitten, als [67]lamgeranseld in ’r stoel, niet
opkùnnend met d’r zacht zwabberenden hangbuik.

Schemering duisterde de kamer in, waar duffe

benauwing van versmoorde zomerlucht in rondrookte,
tusschen vunzigen scharstank en poonenbroeisel.
Telkens sulde Dientje met ’r slaaphoofdje tegen muur,
zacht-ronkend in ’t zware kamerduister. Even voor
Kees’ komst stak moeder Rams, beverig en tastend, ’t
lampje op, begon Ant àf te tellen, stond klein-versmald
’t bleeke slaaptronietje van Dientje naast ’r moeder.
Angstig-ingekneld had ze de centjes nog in ’r hand
kleven; lei ze alles in treuzelige rijtjes op de tafel, dat
Ant maar te tellen had, dadelijk kon zien wat ’r
verkocht was. En al wist ze dat ’t uitkwam, al had ze ’t
honderdmaal zelf over gerekend, toch ieder keer weer
beefde kindeke van angst, dat ’r wat te min zou zijn.

Kindertjes rondom in de bedsteeën lagen al te

snorken, hun lijfjes tegen elkaar verbroeiend.

Doodop nog, knielde Dientje met ’r bleek uitgeputte

gezichtje naar den schoorsteen, òpstarend naar ’t
krucifix, klonk dofmummelend ’r gebed, teemige
gewoontewoordjes, half in slaapwegsullend van de
heete dorstige lipjes. In dommel slingerde ze ’r
handjes ’t wijwaterbakje in, boven Wimpie’s
 ledekantje, stapte naar ’t bedsteetje, waar ze ’n
plaatsje opendrong tusschen drie naaktgewoelde,
stinkende kleintjes.

Ouë Rams en grootmoeder waren naar bed gestapt in

hun vuns gangetje. Daar broeide de hitte nog na,
verduft als dampte er ’n warme bron open. Tegen half
elf kwam Kees van de Haven. Z’n gezicht stond grauw
van vermoeienis en verdroogd zweet. Hij beet zich op
z’n dunne lippen, uit stillen wrevel. Geen woord dan
werd gesproken. Alleen Wimpie, uit z’n donker hokje
staarde levendig-angstig, van vader naar moeder, stil,
met schraperig neusgeluidje van z’n zwakke korte
ademhaaltjes. Op tafel lag ’n half tarfje met
roggebrood voor Kees. Loom greep ie ’r naar, en
loomer nog hapte ie ’r in, met breede sperring van
stille kaken, lijzig kauwend, te vermoeid om te malen.
Ingeslonken, z’n lijf gebroken van hitte en uitputting,
bleef ie zitten, zonder klacht, stom. [68]

Geen woord klonk tusschen man en vrouw òp. Z’n

brood-slikkingen en kauwgeluid alleen, ver-zuchtte in
’t krot.—Ant bleef hijgend-ademen, met ’r handen
aemechtig op ’r gezwollen buik gekruist, in zacht
duimgeschuif. Dientje lag in ’t bedje wakker, als was
met ’r instappen de slaap plots verdwenen. Ze voelde
zich naar in ’r hoofdje, maar durfde niets zeggen, blij
toch dat ze eindelijk lag.—Heete handjes van zusje, in
blind gewoel op haar neergezakt, brandden op d’r
lijfje. Maar stil liet ze de pootjes liggen, te òp en te
stikwarm om zich te bewegen. Stom rekte Kees zich
van z’n stoel overeind, in arm-rengelenden gaap
gooide ie z’n jekker en kiel in ’n hoek, dat z’n
schouders in kale zeemanstrui uitschonkten, drukte ie
z’n handrug nog even zacht op ’t klamme kopje van
Wim.—In één sprong òver ’t kleintje heen, dat
tusschen hen in sliep lag ie in z’n smoorheet
slaapholletje, te beroerd, te gekookt en gestriemd van
pijn, om z’n broek uit te trekken.—

Langzaam, met paffe gebaren, wrong Ant zich hijgend,

zuchtend van ’r stoel. Zacht, bij elken pas wiegde ’r
buik mee, holden ’r lendenen en telkens met ’r handen
veegde ze tranen van ’t goor-mager gezicht. Altijd in ’r
zwangerschap, voelde ze zich weeker en angstiger,
zag ze altijd vizioen van ’n ongeluk boven ’r hoofd
hangen. Zacht zoende ze Wimpie, nog eens, en nog
eens, lei ze ’t kleintje, dat tegen Kees’ stinkende
pilowbroek was afgezakt met z’n snuitje wat recht, en
stapte na knielgebed voor krucifix, en in verplechtiging
van wijwaterkruisje, geradbraakt van pijngevoel in ’r
doorstoofd slaapkrotje.

Ze had trui van Kees nog moeten uitspoelen, zijn en

haar hemd, en van Wimpie nog wat goed, maar ze
vòelde dat ’t niet ging, dat ze ’r achter bezwijmen zou.
Uitstellen maar, uitstellen en nou slapen, als ’t kind dat
doorbrand was van zuur, d’r tenminste niet de ooren
kwam volkrijschen van nacht.—

[Inhoud]

II.
 Naast den aardbei- en erwtenpluk ging rond op de
akkers [69]woeste rooidrift van bollenkweekers. Van
alle kanten, in diepe voren ingekneld met hun knieën,
schoven ze voort, de rooiers, ’t gloeiend akkerzand in
klauwigen wroet opengravend, den heeten zandstuif
naar zich toewaaiend, de longen in. Hun verschroeide
bronzen koppen, strak en gebukt van ernst, dampten
en zweetten in gloeistof, hun heele lijf ingehurkt,
verteerde in drogen schroei van zand en lucht. De zon
in z’n vroege Juliglorie daverde hoog in ’t eindloos
blauw, ingeschroeid in kringen van roodviolet licht en
gouden kransen, woelend de lichtende hemelzee
rond.—En de lichtlansen harpoenden neer over de
gloeiende akkers, die in dorre, schorre hette
smachtten naar regen.—

Lèvende hitte trilde en golfde op de rooiershanden in

den grond, als groeven ze in lava, en ’t zengende licht
koortste en kookte zóó, dat de akkernevelen in ’t verre
blauw wit en fijngrijzig vervloeiden van warmtewaas.
De zandgrond, hoogpaars blinkend en heet, lag naakt
in woestijnige zonnemarteling, met den opengegraven
grond al heeter uitdampend onder hun knieën en
gezichten. Van alle kanten uit breede hurkrij van
rooiers, fonkelden schaalranden in ’t licht, rooibakken
éven opschitterend fèl als scherven zonbeketst glas of
schilferend metaal in brandgloed. Tusschen de
bollenbedden bochelden in gedrochtelijke standen
rooizakken, half of heel gevuld, als onthalsde kerels,
enkele buiken en rompen, zonder armen, potsierlijke
dans van wittig-bepoeierde karikaturen, die keken en
lachten uit hun komische plooien. Kerels, in
zweetzwoeg, sjouwden van en naar ’t pad, ladend de
zakken op karren. Rijen rooiers, in brons, pracht-warm
rood en blauw gekiel, ingehurkt verzakt in de
zandvoren, knielden naast elkaar, in woesten grabbel
rukkend met hun vingers ’t zand open, wroetend
dieper den grond in, tot ze de bollen met heel ’t
wortelennet, beklonterd fijn gevezel, er uitgegraven
hadden. Telkens één uit de knielende rooiersrij, gooide
de rooibakken en schalen, opgestapeld met bollen,
leeg in ’n groote zeef. Van vijf, zes hoeken tegelijk
soms, ging er schurend sis-scherp zeefgeluid over de
akkers, rond kerels in zonnevuur, met de groote zeven
[70]in de handen, waar bronzige stofwolken onderuit
stormden, òver gekromde ruggen en ingebukte
koppen van rooiers héenwarrelend in wilden stuif, dat
àl de werkers, momenten weggedampt vernevelden in
’t bronzige stofgoud, langzaam weer bijtrokken als
gestalten van ènkel licht.—

Het licht, in koortsige wellustgamma’s van kleurhitte,

sloeg, schroeide, bazuin-dreunde om hen heen, tegen
ze áán.—De laaiende zomerbrand regende z’n
zonnevuur neer, rond en op de werkers, die groefden,
groèfden en woèlden in den akkergrond; in de gloei-
heete aarde die hen teisterde en martelde. Als bij
rooversstoet in oostersche sprook, ging er ’n graafdrift
onder de stomme werkers, kampend tegen ’t
zonnevuur, om schatten te vinden, schatten op te
delven, in koorts en jacht van arbeid, bàng betrapt te
worden door anderen. Knieën stramden en pijnden als
in zweer, polsen en handen kreunden stil. Gezwollen
kronkelden klauw-pezen, in bange paarse benauwing,
en kreten van werkersgramschap stootten òp dat
zwollen kop-aderen en slapen. Hun longenhijg trilde
 door de lucht als zachte zuchten van machienzuiger.
Maar alles toch van hùn ploeter smoorde tegen den
grond, die uitbraakte brand van zand. Dieper graaiden
hun pijnvingers, feller gloeiden hun polsen in de
blakerende aarde, de aarde die zelf kreunde en
kermde onder den zwarten zwoeg der mannen; onder
de orgieënde voluptueuse lichtrazernij, den heerlijken,
goddelijken almacht-brand van zon.

Doffer in den grond smakten hun klonterende bollen in

de bakken en fonkelschalen en stiller schoven hun
knieën vóórt door de heete voren, natrillend nog van
hun lijfsvracht.—

Zóó, elken dag rondom den pluk van aardbei en erwt,

lag het bollenland in den gloeienden zwijmel van
zomerbrand.

Elken nieuwen dag om hen heen, met z’n

uitzwijmelend bloemenvuur, gloeide in kleuren en
glansen, bloedde in rood, goudde in warm geel als
een reuzig goud-dampend kerkraam, vàn de aarde
geheven, hoog en oneindig, tot in ’t hel-lichtende
azuur. Elken dag in den brand van zijn eigen
kleurengloed, verrees als ’n reuzig kathedraal-venster,
met z’n scharlaken [71]bloeding van vitrails en rosetten,
in ’t laaiende licht. Zóó zaligde de hemel in godlijk
kobaltblauw, ’t azuur van middeleeuwsche vitrails, in
den azuren droom van heilige figuren. Zoo kleurde de
aarde in het zingende brons en extatische geel van z’n
gloeiende glas-verven, omdampt in den aureolenden
goudglans van altaarlicht.—
 Zoò, in ’t bloedrood van ruitenbrand, als ontzàglijk
kerkraam met z’n bogen en gierlànden, vlamden de
bloemende zonnedagen in ’t azuur, gloeiend,
kleurdampend en jubelend in de oneindige glorie van
zomerleven.

En daaronder stom, de werkers, de geloovers van den

arbeid, de zwijgende devoten van den machtigen
zwoeg op ’t land.—Stommer en gekneusder elken dag
weer, schoven hun knieën door de voren, ’t
schitterheete zand. Dieper groeven hun klauwen den
hitte-adem van de aarde naar hun longen. En
geweldiger in de zonnelaai ging het schuurgeluid van
hun zeven over de akkers, de wolkenstuif van het
bronzen zand òver hun gekromde ruggen. Alsof de
aarde, de stille rooiers nòg eens wou overstroomen
met den trillenden zeng van haar zonne-lava.—

Verder op ’t land, naar den zeeweg, stonden de

werkers onder de eindlooze hemelblauwing, met
zware armhalen rottend loof van hyacinten en
krokussen weg te schoffelen, hun lichtgestalten
uitlijnend in de trillende hittelucht. Hoeken, in
prachtigen kleurenschimmel, teer pastel, toonfijn, als
tinten van doffe poeier, lagen tusschen gerooide
bronzen akkers; loof dat zingend stierf in laatste
kleurenkoorts. In donzig groen-dòf en goudlila,—als er
op oud hekwerk uitvocht,—pastelden de akkers met
rottend loof, verneuriënd ’n doodenzang van tinten
tusschen ’t fel-jubelende zomergroen van boomen,
hagen en pluimgras.—
 Duffe lucht van rot geblaar, als vunze stank van
aardappelenkelder, verstoofde in de zonnehitte,
vervloeide tusschen de glansen van ’t oud goudleer-
rood en bronsgroen, dat zacht golfde en moireerde
soms in windwuif. Midden in den doodenzang van ’t
bolblad, stonden de rooiers, wegsliertend in [72]woeste
onverschilligheid de stervende bladeren, met
harkende, breede halen van hun blinkscherpe
schoffels, ’t loof als vuil ophoopend in de greppels.
Van allen kant over de akkers, wiekten ààn, in
droomerige zwiertjes, kleur-teere vlinders, in lichtcier
bemanteld, fluweelen scheepkens van glansen,
droomerig zeilend in luchteblauw, zonder richting
wiekvleugelend door het hittewaas, plots rustend op
zonnevonkend boomgroen van hagen, of verdwijnend
tusschen getemperden pastelgloed van ’t stervend
loof.—Van allen kant kwam aanfladdering van
pauwoogjes, stralend prachtkoloriet van atalanta en
goudvosjes, als toef sidderschoone kleurenveeren
uiteengewaaid over de akkers.—Gloeinaakt schroeide
’t land, in wit-violette hette naar horizon vernevelend,
waar vèr, vlinderwiekjes met hun kleurgloed loomer
verzwijmelden in zoet rooksel van geurenden,
zonnigen bloemendamp.—

Tegen half vier, op derde schoft, zakten de rooiers in

hagenluwte neer. Even rustten de gebroken polsen,
gekneusde handen, zeere toppen. Schuw van pijn,
gingen de zwartgroene vermartelde klauwen, in
gretigen hap, naar ’t brood. Groepjes rengelden
slaperig van uitputting, in mat-zoet ledengerek. ’n Paar
werkers wreven hard hun verstijfde knieën. Anderen
weer, nog stiller en strammer in hun kort schoft,
schooierden plat op den buik, in de half-schaduwende
koelte van singelhoek, handen onder de kin gehaakt,
kop éven op, als bezwijmden starend zonder te zien,
naar akkers die vóór hen verblakerden.

—Daa’s ook ’n klus, kaik sàin te goàpe legge noà

oàsem! schreeuwde er één, spottend wijzend op ’n
kerel, die ’t zòò martelend benauwd had, dat ie van z’n
rug telkens op z’n buik draaide, uit de schaduwreep
wegwoelde, en eindelijk pal onder gloeisteken van
zonnevuur, op den rug, met oogendicht gezicht naar
den hemel, voor dood bleef liggen. ’n Ouë vent naast
’m zat recht òp, met z’n schouers tegen ’n haag, lijzig
te happen uit stukkenzak.

Sarrende bromvliegen gonsden om hun

zweethoofden, loerend op warmtewasem van nat vel.
Drie kruiken gingen rond, en zwaar-gretig klokten
slokken verkookt water de heet-droge [73]kelen in.
Maar roerloos de kerel op z’n rug, ùit de luwte gerold,
met z’n kop naar den hemel, armen boven z’n hoofd
gerekt, lag daar dwars in moeë bezwijming. Hij kòn
niet drinken, niet één verkoelingsslok. Hij kòn niet
spreken, te machteloos zelfs om vliegendans op z’n
dichtgeschroeide oogen en bezweet gezicht af te
slaan. Stom liet hij zich maar bekletsen van
lolwerkers, omzoemen van insektenwarrel. Stom bleef
ie hijgen als half vermoord werkbeest, stom en
uitzinnig van hitte.—

Van verre tuinen, de gouden vlierboomen vlamden als

hooggele boeketten laaiend goud, hoog tegen
hemelblauw geheven. Magere popels, wilgen in lichte
zilvergrauwe ritseling naar duinkant, rankten star in de
strakke hitte. Rietbergen op bollenakkers grauwden
aschblondig. Naar den zeewegkant, achteruit op
Duinkijk, groenden zware boomen, dichtgegroeide
laantjes met eiken, beuken en wilgen, dooréén.—
Soms poortten verschietjes òpen, als violette nisjes,
ingediept onder ’t akkerbouwsel; lag er paarse nevel
tusschen de kruipende halve boomschaduw te
dommelen, loom van hitte.

Langzaam, wat laantjes achteruit, door dalenden

zonnegang in brand gezet, ópenden zich als zonne-
hofjes, dartelend en spartelend in schuinen
zonnedamp, die overal onder zwaarhooge struiken
dòòrvonkte. Langzaam week wazigviolette purpering
van schaduw achter muren van licht, in
sprookjesschemer.—Teergrijs en blauwpaars zengden
òp de akkers wat schuurdaken.—Hel-roode stolpjes
kleurschaterden fel in de gloeiakkers, vèr van elkaar.
Eén leien schuurdak stond in zòò fellen zonschitter,
zòò verblindend in uitstraling en fonkeling over de
naakt-lage bollenakkers, dat ’t was, of dààr ’n
aardebrok begon weg te gloeien, in ’t vonk-hevigste
zilvervuur van licht. In helstrak hemelblauw vlamde ’t
daar, straal-sterrelend; ’n uitbarsting, of de zon ’n stuk
lawa-leven van háár leven, zengender en trillender, in
helle fonkelsliert als woest goden-altaar van zilvervuur,
op de verbaasde aarde had neergestort. [74]

En telkens uit de zijlanen, die in reuzekring van groen

en schaduw om de akkers dromden, stroomde zoete
reuk áán van waggelende hooiwagens, en meidoorn
zwangerde z’n hartstochtaroom uit, als om Wiereland
te verzwelgen in geuren.

Soms, van de akkers àf te hooren, bonkerde in

loomen waggel, ’n hooiwagen langs de landhaag, nu
en dan bij open plek, achter boomstammen te zien, in
’t goudgestroom van z’n haren, zoetste hooirook in
den zonzwijmel van akkerbrand uitstortend.—Van
boschkant uit, ergens diep verborgen, verklonk
koekoekzang, eentonig, toch vreemd-verhalend van
minne-romantiek. Eentonig ontroerend zong koekoek
dóór, in de gloeiende middaghitte, vreemd-lokkend
geluid; optooverend visioen van koel-groen
boomendonker, waar, op dàtzelfde middaguur, nimfen
gevaarlijk-angstig stoeiden met van-zinnen-
geschroeide faunen.—Geluid dat òpriep, fantoom van
koelend bladerenlommer, waarònder de nimfjes en
satyrs speelsch plasten in waterzilver; met
schaterjubel kringdansten, doorholden onder
zilverende ruischfonteintjes, die kleurvonken
rondspoten, koel, in hun druppels-plengende
kristallenspartel; en waar al verder, al vèrder de
nimfjes verzwierven, tusschen het lokkende
schemergroen, verloren in jagenden zinne-zwijm.—

Hooger weer nà schaft, steeg werkroes, ging er

sneller schalenfonkel over akkers.—Zwaar stonden de
verbuilde karikatuur-zakken met bollenvracht, op den
paarsen grond, sterker rookten de voren van hitte,
sjouwden de kerels op en af de greppels naar de
karren op ’t pad, in stommen zwoeg met al geweldiger
lasten op rug en hoofd. Nergens meer ging één lang
uitgehaalde ademhaal.—