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This passive or defensive policy did not suit the Spaniards, while
it encouraged the Aztecs. Therefore two corps were formed, each of
two hundred men, besides allies, under Cortés and Ordaz. Clearing
a path with a volley of artillery, they sallied in different directions to
drive back the assailants, who hurried for safety into lanes and
houses, and behind barricades. This comparative freedom of
advance appears to have been permitted to entice the Spaniards
into a disadvantageous position, for soon the natives reappeared in
swarms in the rear and along the flanks, showering arrows and
stones, and coming to close quarters with spears and swords. The
heaviest attack was from the roofs, on which large supplies of
missiles had been collected, and from which commanding position
the enemy was able to direct the discharges with terrible effect,
particularly upon the naked Tlascaltecs. Several Spaniards also fell,
and the greater number were wounded. Ordaz received three cuts,
and Cortés a wound which maimed two fingers of the left hand.[767]
The assailants were comparatively safe, for those on the roofs could
be picked off only by archers and musketeers, and those below took
refuge when pressed, only to return to fresh attack. Efforts were
made to fire the houses, but this was slow work, since they were
constructed almost wholly of adobe or stone, and were filled with
defenders. Nor would the fire spread, owing to the detached form of
the buildings, separated by alleys or canals, so that the torch had to
be applied to each.
Thus matters continued until Ordaz, who was engaged on the
street to the west of the fort, sent word to Cortés, who was pressing
forward in the direction of the Iztapalapan causeway, that he was
losing ground. Leaving his own forces, the general hurried to the
scene with a few horsemen, and heading the charge, drove back the
warriors at the most exposed point, so as to relieve the infantry in the
retreat which was now found necessary. Returning to his men he
found them also retreating, those who headed the column, including
Andrés Duero, the Cuban secretary, having been cut down. “Shame
upon you!” exclaimed Cortés to the corps, as he led the horsemen to
the rescue of the fallen cavaliers. He was just in time to save them,
for a moment more and Duero, at least, would have been slain. The
elated warriors fell back before the charge of the terrible Malinche,
although they soon recovered. Cortés then concluded to retreat, but
this proved no less dangerous than the advance, and among others
Lezcano was dragged from his horse and killed, after having
distinguished himself for bravery and execution. The fort had
meanwhile sustained an active siege, and when the retreating corps
approached it they found more enemies in waiting, who, fearful of
losing their prey, rushed forward with greater fury than ever. An
entrance was finally effected, the forces in the temple being at the
same time withdrawn for the greater safety of themselves and the
fort.[768]
Swelling with triumph the Aztecs now directed all their efforts
against the Spanish quarters. Burning arrows and whirling brands
began to mingle with their missiles. Although the building itself was
of stone, the roof and portions of the outwork, and the Tlascaltec
camp in the yards, were of inflammable material, and more than
once the flames burst forth, filling the whole place with suffocating
smoke, and calling for the greatest exertions to subdue them. The
little water at hand could not be spared, and so earth was cast up,
and portions of the wall were torn down to check the fire and to stop
the gaps. The assault continued all day, till darkness sent most of the
warriors to their homes.[769]
FOOTNOTES
[744] Which speaks little to the credit of either Mary or Santiago. Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 102. ‘Otro miraglo ... é fué muy notorio.’ ‘Ya sé que los incrédulos ... dirán
que mi ocupaçion en esto de miraglos, pues no los ví, es supérflua ... é yo hablo
que esto é más se puede é debe creer;’ for did the Indians have mysteries and
miracles, surely God, the virgin, and the saints could effect greater deeds. Oviedo,
iii. 511. He quotes from Livy and others concerning the reliable miracles of Roman
times. Prescott and others transfer the miracles to the siege under Cortés for
greater effect. Bustamante, the modern champion of the shrines of Mexico, who is
ready to uphold any deed attributed to these images, is rather incredulous about
miracles recorded in favor of Spanish cutthroats. See Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., i.
283 et seq. ‘Si no oviéssemos miedo de esse del caballo blanco, ya vosotros
estaríedes coçidos,’ cried some, Oviedo, iii. 511, while the more valiant added that
‘con todo esto si no soltays a Motecçumacin, y os vays luego, presto sereys
muertos.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 152.
[745] Cortés, Cartas, 127. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101-2, says seven, two
having been taken alive. ‘Mataron a Peña, el querido de Motezuma,... Valdibia, y
Juan Martin Narizes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii.
[746] ‘Tuvieron guerra con los yndios en esta Cibdad dos medios dias que fueron
jueves e viernes.’ ‘Guerra casy dos dias.’ Lopes and Flores, in Ramirez, Proceso
contra Alvarado, 131, 134. ‘Dieron bateria los Mexicanos á los Españoles siete
dias, y los tuvieron cercados veinte y tres dias.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 29.
‘Cercados los españoles ocho dias.’ Id. (ed. 1840), 105. ‘Pelearõ y combatieron la
casa diez dias arreo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. Torquemada explains this by
assuming two days of fighting and eight days of close siege, with attacks upon all
who sallied, i. 490. Sahagun states that Itzquauhtzin, governor of Tlatelulco,
accompanied Montezuma to the roof and spoke to the people, representing that
the Spaniards, as the mightier race, would inflict great injury on them unless they
ceased to fight, and that the emperor would be murdered. The Mexicans
responded with insults and missiles, but as the soldiers interposed their shields no
harm was done. They appear to have stopped active operations, however. Hist.
Conq., 28-9. The insults and missiles belong no doubt to the later siege under
Cortés. Duran states, however, that Montezuma was henceforth looked on as an
accomplice of the Spaniards, and discarded as a ruler, it being resolved to kill him
and his family. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 463. According to Oviedo the news came at this
time of the victory over Narvaez, ‘é Monteçuma mandó á los indios que dexassen
de pelear é dexassen venir los otros chripstianos, porque á todos juntos
matassen; é aquesto se cree que fué su intento.’ iii. 512. That he may have urged
this with intent or as a bait is not unlikely, but it should apply equally to Narvaez’
men, since it appears that their defeat could not yet have been known. When
known, however, it must have had its effect. ‘Quando supieron nuestra vitoria,
cessarõ de dalle guerra.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101. Yet Gomara writes that
on learning of the large forces coming against them, the besiegers resumed the
attack at one time. Hist. Mex., 151.
[747] This spring was rediscovered during the reign of Viceroy Revilla Gigedo.
Bustamante, Mem. Piedad Mex., 7. A pool of sweet water was the chief
inducement for founding the city on this site in 1325. Native Races, ii. 559-61; v.
345 et seq.
[748] Cortés, Cartas, 126. The Spanish messenger from Mexico returned
wounded. Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v. With him, or about the same time, arrived
four chiefs sent by Montezuma to complain that Alvarado had attacked the nobles
without cause. While defending themselves six soldiers had fallen. Cortés told the
chiefs with stern countenance that he was returning to investigate the matter. A
letter was sent to Alvarado enjoining him to guard the emperor closely. Bernal
Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 101.
[749] And the zealous aid of Velazquez de Leon, who did so much toward
securing the Goazacoalco command for Cortés when Narvaez sent letters to win it
over. Cortés, Residencia, i. 409; ii. 6, 31, 165-6. He is accused by his enemies of
impiety and licentiousness, and as one whom the general favored above more
worthy men. Solis assumes that Sandoval nominally retained the command of the
coast province, Rangel being merely his lieutenant. Hist. Mex., ii. 108.
[750] ‘Llegò aquel dia [the first] à la Rinconada, el segundo caminò siete Leguas
... llegò à Tlaxcalla à diez y siete de Junio.’ Torquemada, i. 492. Herrera tells a
long story of suffering from hunger and thirst during the march through the desert.
Marquez and Ojeda were sent ahead to Tlascala for supplies, and came back with
1200 carriers laden with fowl, bread, fruit, and other refreshments. Cortés, among
others, was found starving, and a number were discovered on the road almost
dead. All, it seems, were rescued. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. vii. There are several reasons
for believing that Herrera, who is somewhat confused about this period, has
confounded the present march with the flight from Mexico to Tlascala of a month
later, when the people were really starving. This seems confirmed by the
erroneous statement that the troops arrived at Tlascala July 17th, the time,
according to Herrera’s own later statement, when they reached that place after the
flight. The account also intimates that the starving army was met among the Otomí
settlements, where food could readily be obtained, without the necessity for
Marquez and Ojeda to go ten leagues farther, to the capital, to obtain it. These and
other discrepancies are overlooked by all who refer to the march. Prescott dwells
in particular on the suffering from thirst, forgetful of the statement on a previous
page that the rainy season had begun about three weeks before, and that water
must have been abundant along the whole route. Solis finds that the effeminate
followers of Narvaez endured the suffering remarkably well. Hist. Mex., ii. 109.
[751] ‘Embiò a fray Bartolome de Olmedo ... a Motezuma.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. vii. It is unlikely that so valuable a man would have been sent while affairs
were threatening.
[752] Narvaez landed with about 900 soldiers, including 80 horsemen, 120 with
bows, and 80 with fire-arms. A number had been picked up at Cozumel, but an
equal proportion perished by shipwreck. Cortés had about 250 men, and 200 were
probably left on the coast, of garrison, guards, and invalids. To the 950 soldiers
thus taken may be added at least 150 from the crews of the dismantled or
destroyed vessels. Prescott manages to mysteriously increase the horses and
projectile arms beyond what he previously assigns to Narvaez and Cortés. One
thousand infantry, 100 horsemen, and many allies, say Gomara and Herrera. The
Probanza de Lejalde, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 425, indicates 80 horses. Bernal
Diaz places the figures as high as 1300 soldiers, including 96 or 97 horsemen, 80
archers, 80 musketeers, and 2000 Tlascaltec warriors; while Cortés, with a
prudent desire to cover the subsequent losses at Mexico, reduces them to 500
infantry and 70 cavalry. Solis gives the reason of the profound historian for the
small number of allies taken to Mexico: ‘Por no escandalizar á Motezuma, ó poner
en desesperacion á los rebeldes.’ Hist. Mex., ii. 111.
[753] The arrival at Tezcuco is evidence enough that a more northern road was
taken than the one previous. The middle route by Telapon appears somewhat
more direct for Mexico, but requires a detour to reach the Acolhua capital, and it is
not likely that an army in hurried march could afford to go out of its way. Hence the
Calpulalpan road must have been followed.
[754] See Native Races, ii. 162-3, 168-73, 569; v., passim; Motolinia, Hist. Ind.,
181-3.
[755] Cortés writes that he was on the point of sending a Spaniard to Mexico with
Tezcucan rowers, a chief being taken as hostage, but just then came this canoe.
Cartas, 127.
[756] Two, named Santa Clara and Pedro Hernandez, says Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x.
cap. vii.
[757] ‘Parò en Tepeaquilla, lugar a legua de Mexico.’ Id. Now the shrine of
Guadalupe. Prescott assumes that the Iztapalapan road was taken, as before, but
it was avoided probably because Cortés feared the fort Xoloc, which guarded the
centre. It was also longer, and had more movable bridges than the other
causeways.
[758] ‘Riñas por San Iuan pazes para todo el año.’ Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii.
139. The following day a dress was found hanging from a beam, and in a square a
pile of bread, with over 500 fowl, without a guard. This Cortés considered less
favorable, and said ‘que serian riñas de por San Iuan.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
vii.-viii.
[759] ‘Para dar á entender con esto que ellos estaban de guerra y muy ofendidos
de los españoles que él habia dejado.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 108. His
account of deserted streets, applied to Cortés’ first arrival in Mexico, belongs no
doubt to this occasion. Duran argues that had the massacre taken place before
Cortés’ arrival he would not have been allowed to enter. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 470.
Equally in the dark is Acosta, who assumes that the Indians were openly at war,
but the custom being to rest every fourth day, Cortés managed to enter during the
cessation of hostilities. Hist. Ind., 522. Oviedo looks on the non-resistance of the
Indians as a wile to entrap all the Spaniards. iii. 510.
[760] Herrera writes amusingly that Cortés shouted before the closed gates,
‘Open!’ ‘Who is there?’ demanded Alvarado. ‘I,’ replied Cortés. ‘Do you come with
full liberty, and power to command, as before?’ ‘Yes, and with victory, and greater
forces.’ Alvarado thereupon opened, kissed his hand, and surrendered the keys!
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
[761] ‘Con que aventuró la mayor parte de sus fuerzas.’ Solis, Hist. Mex., ii. 120.
Or perhaps because he had not had recourse to some safer measure, such as
arresting the leaders of the proposed plot, for hostages. ‘Le dixo muy enojado, q̄
era muy mal hecho, y grande desatino, y poca verdad ... no le hablò mas en ello.’
Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102. Cortés would hardly have told him that he lied,
since his statements were confirmed by so many; they certainly were years after.
Vetancurt supposes that Cortés told him he should have allowed the emperor to
attend the festival, and should have awaited the attack rather than opened the
war. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 140. ‘Dissimulo por no enojar a los que lo hizieron.’
Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151.
[762] Solis supposes, however, that the two met in friendly intercourse, and takes
Bernal Diaz and Herrera to task for asserting the contrary. Hist. Mex., ii. 112-14.
He refers to Cortés’ friendly message from Tezcuco, which is doubtful, and to
Gomara, who certainly allows Cortés to refer to Montezuma and his courtiers as
‘dogs.’ Hist. Mex., 153. In the testimony during Cortés’ residencia the discourtesy
is asserted. Cortés, Residencia, i. 42 etc. Clavigero suggests ‘ch’era d’uopo il far
sembianza di credere il Re colpevole dell’inquietudine.’ Storia Mess., iii. 121.
[763] Native Races, ii. 134-6; v. 462-4; ‘Il y joignait, comme de coutume, la charge
du grand prêtre de Huitzilopochtli.’ Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 309.
Gomara assumes that Cortés orders a chief to open the market. He, offended at
the insults used, goes only to rouse the people. Hist. Mex., 153. Ixtlilxochitl
supposes that the chief is offended at the reprimand administered for delaying to
open the market. Hist. Chich., 301. ‘Mandò Hernando Cortes llamar a los mas
principales caualleros, hizoles vna larga platica diziẽdo, que les perdonaua lo
passado, con que para adelãte fuessen ... amigos: ... sin responder ... se fueron.’
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.
[765] Cortés describes first a brief attack, then a sally, succeeded by a fresh
assault on the fort, while Bernal Diaz and Herrera let a force advance against the
Indians before they reached the palace. I follow Cortés as the chief guide,
because his account of all this period was written while quite fresh in his mind, and
appears the most sensible and correct, while the other versions depend more or
less on faint recollection and hearsay. Cortés as a rule did not wait till the enemy
approached, but he may not have been prepared for the sudden attack. Yet it is
probable that he wished in his report to lay the responsibility of the attack upon the
enemy. I do not think Cortés inclined to misrepresent in general or without an
object.
[767] ‘Sinistræ manus digitis duobus mutilis.’ Peter Martyr, De Insvlis, 5. Cortés
also says ‘quedé manco,’ Cartas, 142, 131, yet Cano ridicules the statement, and
declares ‘nunca fué manco dellos ni le faltan.’ Oviedo, iii. 551-2.
[768] Cortés, Cartas, 128-9. Bernal Diaz speaks of a sally by Ordaz, with 400
men, before the natives reach the fort. He is sorely beset, as related, and retires
with a loss of 23 soldiers. Hist. Verdad., 102-3. Herrera’s account, as usual, is
confused. After Rio returns wounded to report the uprising of warriors, five
horsemen rally to reconnoitre. The following day Ojeda and Marquez set out to
forage, and come to announce the approach of assailants. Two hundred men now
make a sortie and kill a multitude without losing a man. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii. It is
useless to follow this author here except for incidents.
[769] Bernal Diaz places the dead at 35 soldiers, besides a large number of allies.
Eight fell during the first discharge upon Ordaz’ party and fifteen more before he
regained the fort, while of the 46 wounded among the garrison twelve died. Hist.
Verdad., 103. Cortés, with his usual prudent suppression of evil news, allows four
deaths and over 80 wounded. He never refers to those who die of wounds.
Gomara follows him. Hist. Mex., 153.
CHAPTER XXIV.
FIGHT UPON THE TEMPLE SUMMIT.
June, 1520.
FOOTNOTES
[770] Bernal Diaz mentions the death of ten or twelve, but Cortés acknowledges
only three score of wounded. On this occasion, apparently, Herrera allows Cortés
to gain Tacuba, whither he might have retreated in safety with all his forces and
wealth; yet he states that the return fight proved most severe, the fort being
regained with difficulty, after the loss of two guns and several soldiers, one taken
alive. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ix. Solis manages to transform the operation into a victory,
wherein Cortés stays the slaughter out of mercy. Prescott is quite arbitrary in the
use of the chronicles. He combines the incidents of several days into one and
transposes them at pleasure, with the sole aim apparently of presenting an
exciting description of what the siege might have been. A few facts are elaborated,
and the rest sacrificed to style.
[771] Marina asked Montezuma if a new king had been chosen, but he did not
think they would elect one while he lived. Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 141.
[772] ‘Fue acordado de demandalles pazes para salir de Mexico, ... acordò
Cortes, que el gran Monteçuma les hablasse.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 104.
‘Muteczuma ... dijo que le sacasen ... y que él hablaria á los capitanes.’ Cortés,
Cartas, 129-30. The latter statement may be Herrera’s authority for saying that
Montezuma was the first to propose speaking to the Mexicans. dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
x. Observing Cuitlahuatzin’s regal authority over the besieging forces, Montezuma
was seized with a fit of jealous alarm for throne and life. ‘Chiamò Cortès, ...
pregandolo instantemente di non differir più la sua partenza.’ Clavigero, Storia
Mess., iii. 124. This implies that the emperor was not aware of the vain efforts
made to open communication with the mainland, or even to approach it. Cortés
had to urge him in any case to speak to his subjects, an unwelcome task in view of
his declining influence and of the merely partial success of the former appeal.
[773] Among other reasons it was represented that Cortés was not to blame for
the late massacre. ‘Que si la indignacion de los mexicanos podia templarse con el
castigo de los culpados ... le prometia castigar.’ So says the native version of
Tezozomoc, Recop. tradiciones, MS., cap. vi.; Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., 287-8.
[774] He felt no eagerness to plead in behalf of those who had caused all his
misfortunes, and he was only too conscious that his pusillanimity must have
degraded him in the eyes of his subjects, while the elevation of his brother to the
leadership must have diminished the influence which till then may have remained
with him. He could hardly avoid a feeling of jealousy at the thought of this
elevation; and if he, during an impulse of anger against Cortés, had counselled the
proceedings of Cuitlahuatzin, he now felt probably both grieved and terrified at the
storm he had raised. He also harbored a wholesome fear of Malinche, and the
prospect of his speedy departure helped to stir anew the embers of hope. All might
yet be well: the capital might be spared further desolation, and he again resume
his former grandeur.
[775] See description of his first meeting with Cortés, Native Races, ii. This
appearance of the emperor took place on the 27th of June, as Cortés states, but
Bernal Diaz, Herrera, and Ixtlilxochitl place it respectively on the 5th, 6th, and 7th
day of the siege.
[776] Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. x.; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 104. ‘No
molestàsen à los estrangeros y fuésen sus amigos, pues su persona corria
riesgo.’ Tezozomoc, Recop. tradiciones, MS., cap. vi. Cortés, followed by Gomara,
gives him no time to speak ere the people assault.
[777] They would no longer recognize him as emperor, etc. Saying this, a chief
threw a stone which struck Montezuma on the forehead. Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii.
468. Acosta attributes this first throw to ‘Quicuxtemoc,’ the later king of Mexico.
Hist. Ind., 523. ‘Ma io nol credo,’ says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 126. ‘Aunque vn
Castellano tenia cuydado de arrodelar a Motezuma ... le acertò vna piedra en las
sienes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. x. Had not the Spaniards held up a shield
before Montezuma the people would have known it was he and not thrown the
stone which killed him, says Cano, his later son-in-law. Oviedo, iii. 550. Gomara is
inclined to believe this, for his people ‘no lo quisieran hazer mas que sacarse los
ojos.’ Hist. Mex., 154. ‘Una saéta alcanzó al emperador en el estòmago que lo
atravezó por el baso, y una piedra le dió en la sien izquierda.’ The people would
never have thrown missiles, for they pitied him, and were prepared to obey his
injunctions, but Cacama, who stood behind the emperor, made signs that they
should continue the attack without regard for him or for the monarch. Tezozomoc,
Recop. tradiciones, MS., cap. vi. According to Bernal Diaz, the four chiefs who had
approached to confer with him expressed their sympathy for his misfortunes. They
had now chosen as leader ‘Coadlabacan, señor de Iztapalapa,’ and had sworn to
the gods to continue the war till all Spaniards were exterminated. Yet they prayed
daily to the gods for his safety, and if all went well he would more than ever be
their lord. They had hardly finished when showers of missiles fell, of which three
stones and an arrow hit him, on the head, arm, and leg. Hist. Verdad., 104.
‘Remorse succeeded to insult,’ and they fled, says Robertson, Hist. Am., 90, a
statement which Prescott improves by stating that the square before the fort was
left empty. But remorse must have been brief, for the main authorities, Cortés,
Gomara, Bernal Diaz, and Torquemada, either declare or intimate that the assault
never stopped. ‘No por eso cesó la guerra y muy mas recia y muy cruda de cada
dia.’ Cortés, Cartas, 130.
[778] ‘Esta Fortaleza casi no tiene exemplar,’ exclaims Lorenzana, forgetting that
Cortés’ firmness was due to the justifiable fear that a trap was intended. Cortés,
Hist. N. España, 136-7. Cortés concludes the sentence about Montezuma’s being
wounded by saying that he died within three days. He thereupon resumes the
account of parleys and siege operations, leaving the impression that these took
place after his death, while such was not the case. Nevertheless, Gomara,
Herrera, and others, Bernal Diaz not excluded, are misled, by this vagueness
evidently, into extending the siege and confounding the events, so that modern
historians have all more or less remained mystified. Solis assumes that during
Montezuma’s illness the siege was conducted only by straggling parties, the main
forces being occupied with crowning the new emperor. Hist. Mex., ii. 155-6. This is
probably due to a misconstruction of Bernal Diaz.
[779] ‘En esta auia tres no mas, y en la de Yztapalapà, siete.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib.
x. cap. xi.; Native Races, ii. 561 et seq.
[780] Cortés, Cartas, 130, 133. ‘Quatro ingenios ... en que pudiessen yr veynte y
cinco hombres,’ says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 103. ‘Tres mantas ... cõ sus
ruedas; leuauan treynta hombres a cada vna, cubierta con tablas gruessas de tres
dedos.’ Herrera, loc. cit. Drawn by men within, adds Peter Martyr, dec. v. cap. v.
‘Cabia cada vno veynte hombres, con picas escopetas y ballestas y vn tiro.’
Gomara, Hist. Mex., 154.
[781] Herrera unwisely assumes that the three towers with their forces were
respectively directed against the three causeway approaches.
[782] ‘De tres y quatro arrouas, que maltrataron a los que yuan en los ingenios, y
rompieron las tablas.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.