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Module III – Principles behind our Moral Disposition Frameworks

Lesson 8: Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, & Utilitarianism

Learning Objectives:
At the end of this lesson, the students should be able to:
1. Discuss the moral principles of Aquinas and Kant;
2. explain the ethical theory of Utilitarianism; and
3. distinguish Aquinas’s, Kant’s and Utilitarianism’s theories.

Key Reading:
Arthur W. Public Relations Ethics. https://www.pagecentertraining.psu.edu/public-relations-
ethics/introduction-to-public-relations-ethics/lesson-1/ethical-theories/
This is only a short article which contains the comparison between three major ethical
theories, namely: Utilitarian, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics.

Introduction
The world is beset with falsified ideologies, with people who want to exploit each other in
the fields of education, business, and politics. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that in
addition to the rule of law, some guiding principles as to how we must conduct ourselves in
society and our institutions must be set.
Throughout history, from the time of Greek philosophers like Aristotle up until Thomas
Aquinas in the medieval period, mankind has genuinely wondered about the topic of ethics and
tried to derive universal moral principles governing behavior. However, later, Kant and the
Utilitarian ethicists headed by Bentham and Mill battled on the rigor of their moral principles.
Thus, we just hope that through their ethical theories, our modern understanding of ethics can
help us create a better world by becoming better and more concerned individuals.

Thomas Aquinas
The moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) involves a union of at least
two apparently disparate traditions: Aristotelian eudaimonism and Christian theology. On the
one hand, Aquinas follows Aristotle in thinking that an act is good or bad depending on whether
it contributes to or deters us from our proper human end—the telos or final goal at which all
human actions aim. That telos is eudaimonia, or happiness, where “happiness” is understood in
terms of completion, perfection, or well-being. Achieving happiness, however, requires a range
of intellectual and moral virtues that enable us to understand the nature of happiness and
motivate us to seek it in a reliable and consistent way.
There are four salient topics in Aquinas moral philosophy. They are as follows: (1) The
Nature of Human Action; (2) The Cardinal Virtues (which comprises Prudence, Temperance,
Courage, & Justice); (3) Natural Law; and (4) Charity and Beatitude

The Nature of Human Action

According to Aquinas, human goodness depends on performing acts that are in
accord with our human nature. But what sort of acts are those? In other words, what feature
or features serve to distinguish human acts from acts of a different kind? Here we must go
beyond the simple claim that an action is human just insofar as it is rational. For while, this claim
is no doubt true, the nature of rationality itself needs explanation. This section seeks to explore
more fully just what rationality or reason consists in according to Aquinas. Only then can we
understand the nature of human action and the end at which such action aims.
Aquinas explains that reason is comprised of two powers: one cognitive, the other
appetitive. The cognitive power is the intellect, which enables us to know and understand. The
intellect also enables us to apprehend the goodness a thing has. The appetitive power of reason
is called the will. Aquinas describes the will as a native desire for the understood good. That is,
it is an appetite that is responsive to the intellect’s estimations of what is good or choice-
worthy. On this view, all acts of will are dependent on antecedent acts of intellect; the intellect
must supply the will with the object to which the latter inclines. In turn, that object moves the will
as a final cause “because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.”
From the abbreviated account of intellect and will provided thus far, it may appear that
the intellect necessitates the will’s acts by its own evaluative portrayals of goodness. Yet
Aquinas insists that no single account of the good can necessitate the will’s movement. Most
goods do not have a necessary connection to happiness. That is, we do not need them in
order to be happy; thus the will does not incline to them of necessity. But what of those goods
that do have a necessary connection to happiness? What about the goodness of God or those
virtues that lead us to God “in whom alone true happiness consists?” According to Aquinas, the
will does not incline necessarily to these goods, either. For in this life we cannot see God in all
his goodness, and thus the connection between God, virtue, final happiness will always appear
opaque. Aquinas writes: “until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such
connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which
are of God.”
Now we are prepared to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section:
what actions are those we can designate as human? The answer is this: human actions are
those over which one has voluntary control. Unlike non-rational animals, human beings
choose their actions according to a reasoned account of what they think is good. Seen this way,
human actions are not products of deterministic causal forces. They are products of our own
free judgment (liberum arbitrium), the exercise of which is a function of both intellect and will.
When discussing what it is that makes an action “human,” then, Aquinas has in mind those
capacities whereby one judges and chooses what is good. For it is through one’s ability to
deliberate and judge in this way that one exercises mastery over one’s actions.

The Cardinal Virtues

Aquinas offers several definitions of virtue. According to one very general account, a
virtue is a habit that “disposes an agent to perform its proper operation or movement.”
Because we know that reason is the proper operation of human beings, it follows that a virtue is
a habit that disposes us to reason well. This account is too broad for our present purposes.
While all virtues contribute in some way to our rational perfection, not every virtue disposes us
to live morally good lives. Some virtues are strictly intellectual perfections, such as the ability to
grasp universals or the causes underlying the world’s origin and operation. For the purposes of
this essay, our concern will be with those virtues that are related to moral decision and action.
That is, we will consider those virtues which Aquinas (following Augustine) describes as “good
[qualities] of mind whereby we live righteously.”

A cursory glance at the second part of the Summa Theologiae would reveal a host of virtues
that are indicative of human goodness. But there are essentially four virtues from which
Aquinas’s more extensive list flows. These virtues are prudence, justice, temperance, and
courage.

a) Prudence
In order to act well, we need to make good judgments about how we should behave.
This is precisely the sort of habit associated with prudence, which Aquinas defines as
“wisdom concerning human affairs” or “right reason with respect to action.” In order to
make good moral judgments, a twofold knowledge is required: one must know (1) the general
moral principles that guide actions and (2) the particular circumstances in which a decision is
required. For “actions are about singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to
know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are
concerned.” This passage may appear to suggest that prudence involves a fairly simple and
straightforward process of applying moral rules to specific situations. But this is somewhat
misleading since the activity of prudence involves a fairly developed ability to evaluate situations
themselves. As Thomas Hobbes explains, “prudence involves not simply the subordination of
particulars to appropriate universals, but the appraisal of concrete, contingent circumstances.”
From this perspective, good decisions will always be responsive to what our situation
requires. Thus, we cannot simply consult a list of moral prescriptions in determining what we
should do. We must also “grasp what is pertinent and to assess what ought to be done in
complex circumstances.”
According to Aquinas, prudence illuminates for us the course of action deemed most
appropriate for achieving our antecedently established telos. It does this through three acts: (1)
counsel, whereby we inquire about the available means of achieving the end; (2) judgment,
whereby we determine the proper means for achieving the end; and finally (3) command,
whereby we apply that judgment. While we need a range of appetitive excellences in order to
make good choices, we also need certain intellectual excellences as well. That is, we must be
able to deliberate and choose well with respect to what is ultimately good for us.

b) Temperance
Temperance has a twofold meaning. In a general sense, the term denotes a kind of
moderation common to every moral virtue. In its more restricted sense, temperance concerns
the moderation of physical pleasures, especially those associated with eating, drinking, and
sex. We display a common propensity to sacrifice our well-being for the sake of these transient
goods. Thus we need some virtue that serves to restrain what Aquinas calls “concupiscible
passion” – the appetite whereby we desire what is pleasing and avoid what is harmful.
Temperance is that virtue, as it denotes a restrained desire for physical gratification.
Like prudence, temperance is a cardinal virtue. There are a host of subsidiary virtues
that fall under temperance because they serve to modify the most insatiable human passions.
For example, chastity, sobriety, and abstinence—which denote a retrenchment of sex, drink,
and food, respectively—are (predictably) all parts of temperance.

c) Courage
Temperance and its subsidiary virtues restrain the strong appetite, such as the sexual
appetite. But courage and its subsidiary virtues modify what Aquinas calls the irascible
appetite. By “irascible appetite” Aquinas means the desire for that which is difficult to attain or
avoid. Occasionally, the difficulty in achieving or avoiding certain objects can give rise to various
degrees of fear and, in turn, discourage us from adhering to reason’s instruction. In these cases
we may refuse to endure the pain or discomfort required for achieving our proper human good.
Note here that fear is not innately contrary to reason. After all, there are some things that we
should fear, like an untimely death or a bad reputation. Only when fear prevents us from
facing what we ought to endure does it become inimical to reason. In these cases, we
need a virtue that moderates those appetites that prevent from undertaking more daunting
tasks. According to Aquinas, courage is that virtue.
We need courage to restrain our fears so that we might endure harrowing
circumstances. Yet courage not only mollifies our fears, it also combats the unreasonable zeal
to overcome them. An excessive desire to face fearful circumstances constitutes a kind of
recklessness that can easily hasten one’s death. Thus, we need courage in order to both curb
excessive fear and modify unreasonable daring. Without courage, we will be either governed by
irrational fear or a recklessness that eschews good counsel, making us vulnerable to harm
unnecessarily.

d) Justice
The virtues we have considered thus far concern our own state. The virtue of justice,
however, governs our relationships with others. Specifically, it denotes a sustained or constant
willingness to extend to each person what he or she deserves. Beyond this, Aquinas’s account
of justice exhibits considerable breadth, complexity, and admits of various distinctions.
Constraints of space, however, force me to mention only two sets of distinctions: (1) legal (or
general) and particular justice, and (2) commutative and distributive justice.
 The purpose of legal justice is to govern our actions according to the common good.
Construed this way, justice is a general virtue which concerns not individual benefits but
community welfare. According to Aquinas, everyone who is a member of a community stands
to that community as a part to a whole. Whatever affects the part also affects the whole. And so
whatever is good (or harmful) for oneself will also be good (or harmful) for the community of
which one is a part. For this reason, we should expect the good community to enact laws that
will govern its members in ways that are beneficial to everyone. This focus (the welfare of the
community) is what falls under the purview of legal justice.
Now, we cannot fulfill the demands of justice only by considering what legal (or general)
justice requires. We also need particular justice—the virtue which governs our interactions
with individual citizens. Unlike general justice, particular justice directs us not to the good of
the community but to the good of individual neighbors, colleagues, and other people with whom
we interact regularly. For Aquinas, general justice can direct us to the good of others, but only
indirectly. It does this by providing us with very general precepts (do not steal, do not murder,
etc) the point of which is to help us preserve the common good in our actions. Yet no situation
requiring justice is the same, and thus our considerations of what is just must extend beyond
what these general precepts dictate. We must be mindful of individual needs and judicious when
applying these precepts. This is why Aquinas insists that the proximate concern of particular
justice cannot be the common good but the good of individuals. In fulfilling its purpose, however,
particular justice is a means of preserving community welfare.
Following Aristotle, Aquinas identifies two species of particular justice that deserve
attention: commutative and distributive justice. Both seek to preserve equality between persons
by giving to each person what is due. Yet Aquinas notes that there are “different kinds of due,”
and this fact necessitates the current distinction. Commutative justice concerns the “mutual
dealings” between individual citizens. Specifically, it seeks to ensure that those who are buying
and selling conduct their business fairly. In this context “what is due” is a kind of equality
whereby “one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of
that which belonged to the other”. In other words, the value of a product should be equal to what
one pays for that product. Similarly, a person should be paid an amount that is comparable to
the value of what he sells. In short, the kind of equality commutative justice seeks to preserve is
a matter of quantity.
Distributive justice concerns the way in which collective goods and responsibilities “are
[fairly] apportioned among people who stand in a social community.” Yet with respect to
distributive justice, what a person receives is not a matter of equal quantity but “due proportion.”
After all, it would be unjust if “laborers are paid equal wages for doing an unequal amount of
work, or are paid unequal wages for doing an equal amount of work.” Aquinas also thinks that a
person of higher social position will require a greater proportion of goods. In matters of
distributive justice, then, “what is due” will be relative to what one deserves (or needs, since
Aquinas also thinks that there is a moral obligation to provide for the poor) depending on his
efforts or position in life.

Natural Law
What is the natural law? We might attempt to answer this question by considering both
the meaning of the term “law” as well as the law’s origin. On Aquinas’s view, a law is “a rule or
measure of human acts, whereby a person is induced to act or restrained from acting.”
Elsewhere, he describes a law as a “dictate of practical reason emanating from a ruler.” At a
very general level, then, a law is a precept that serves as a guide to and measure of human
action. Thus whether an action is good will depend on whether it conforms to or abides by the
relevant law. Here we should recall from an earlier section that, for Aquinas, a human action is
good or bad depending on whether it conforms to reason. In other words, reason is the measure
by which we evaluate human acts. Thus Aquinas thinks that the laws that govern human action
are expressive of reason itself.
Now we will address the law’s origin. According to Aquinas, every law is ultimately
derived from what he calls the eternal law. The “eternal law” refers to God’s providential
ordering of all created things to their proper end. We participate in that divine order in virtue of
the fact that God creates in us both a desire for and an ability to discern what is good (he calls
this ability the “light of natural reason”). According to Aquinas, “it is this participation in the
eternal law by the rational creature that is called the natural law.” On this view, natural law is
but an extension of the eternal law. For by it God ordains us to final happiness by implanting
in us both a general knowledge of and inclination for goodness. Note here that the natural law is
not an external source of authority. Nor is it a general deontic norm from which more specific
precepts are inferred. As Aquinas understands it, the natural law is a fundamental principle that
is weaved into the fabric of our nature. As such, it illuminates and gives us a desire for those
goods that facilitate the kind of flourishing proper to human beings.
According to Aquinas, all human actions are governed by a general principle or precept
that is foundational to and necessary for all practical reasoning: good is to be done and evil is
to be avoided. This principle is not something we can ignore or defy. Rather, it is an expression
of how practical thought and action proceed in creatures such as ourselves. Whenever we
deliberate about how we should act, we do so by virtue of a natural inclination to pursue (or
avoid) those goods (or evils) that contribute to (or deter us from) our perfection as human
beings. The goods for which we have a natural inclination include life, the procreation and
education of offspring, knowledge, and a civil social order. Whether there are additional goods
that are emblematic of the natural law will depend on whether they in fact contribute to our
rational perfection.

Charity and Beatitude

The teleological framework that circumscribes Aquinas’s moral philosophy has been
evident throughout this essay. Indeed, Aquinas takes Aristotle’s eudaimonism to be amenable
to his own theological purposes. Not only does Aquinas agree that human beings seek their
own happiness, he agrees that the virtues are necessary for achieving it. Yet there are
important differences between Aquinas’s depiction of final happiness and Aristotle’s. While
Aquinas thinks that moral perfection is synonymous with achieving our final end, he construes
that end in terms of beatitude, or supernatural union with God. In keeping with Christian
teaching, he also acknowledges that we cannot achieve beatitude solely by means of our own
virtuous efforts. Aquinas’s argument for this claim is as follows: the happiness to which we
incline is of two sorts—incomplete happiness and complete happiness. Incomplete happiness
is a state we achieve by means of our natural human aptitudes. Through them, we can cultivate
some measure of virtue and, in turn, be happier than we would be otherwise. Perfect or
complete happiness, however, lies beyond what we are able to achieve on our own. Thus
Aquinas insists that “it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional [habits],
whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness.” According to Aquinas, the habits to
which he refers here are “infused” or theological virtues. They are given to us graciously by
God and direct us to our “final and perfect good” in the same way that the moral virtues direct
us to a kind of happiness made possible by the exercise of our natural capacities.
The theological virtues that facilitate perfect happiness are those listed by St. Paul in the
second letter to the Corinthians: faith, hope, and charity. Faith is the virtue whereby we assent
to the truth of supernaturally revealed principles (Aquinas calls them “articles of faith”). These
articles are contained (at least implicitly) in Scripture and serve as the basis of sacred doctrine.
The kind of assent Aquinas has in mind here is not a matter of the intellect alone. It also
involves the will. For the will is naturally drawn to God’s goodness and commands the intellect
to assent to those articles wherein that goodness is described. Thus Aquinas describes the
assent of faith as “an act of intellect which assents to the divine truth at the command of the will,
[which is] moved by God’s grace.” Hope is the virtue whereby we trust God in obtaining final
happiness. But because God is the one in whom final happiness consists (and not simply the
one who assists us in achieving it), we must look to God as the good we desire to obtain.
Finally, charity is the virtue whereby we love God for his own sake. He amplifies this idea when
he (echoing Augustine) says that charity is an appetitive state whereby our appetites are
uniformly ordered to God. We should also note here that Aquinas thinks that love of neighbor
is included in the love of God. For our neighbor is the natural image of God; thus we cannot
love God unless we also love our neighbor.
Moreover, charity affords a supernatural benefit—or gift—that the cardinal virtues
could never provide. That benefit is the gift of wisdom. The gift of wisdom should not be
confused with the intellectual virtue of the same name. The virtue of wisdom is an intellectual
excellence whereby one grasps the fundamental causes of the world’s origin and operation.
Knowledge of those causes may include knowledge of God, who is the highest cause of
things. Yet the virtue of wisdom cannot disclose some of the more important aspects of God’s
character. By contrast, the gift of wisdom enables us to see that God is the “sovereign good,
which is the last end…” Those who are wise (in the second sense) have a more
comprehensive grasp of God’s goodness and can therefore judge and govern human actions
according to divine principles. Understood this way, the gift of wisdom consists not only in a
theoretical grasp of divine things, but it also provides one with the normative guidance
necessary for ordering one’s life according to Goodness itself.
Charity, then, inclines one to love God, whose goodness is perfect, unchanging, and
eternal. Those who seek happiness in God will be more fulfilled than if they sought happiness in
some lesser, transient good. That is, they will experience spiritual joy. They will also experience
supernatural concord in the sense that their wills will be in harmony with God’s will. What
makes this account especially interesting for our purposes is that it provides us with a more
explicit understanding of the sort of fulfillment in which beatitude consists.
What connection, if any, is there between the infused virtue of charity and the moral
virtues we’ve previously discussed? This is an important question. Constraints of space,
however, permit us to highlight only two such connections. First, charity transforms the virtues
themselves. To employ Aquinas’s parlance, charity provides the form of the virtues. It does this
by determining the end at which the virtues aim. For, “in morals, the form of an act is taken
chiefly from the end.” Under the auspices of charity, the moral virtues still have the task of
moderating our appetites. The purpose for which they do so, however, is for the sake of God.
For if, as Aristotle insists “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” then
even the moral virtues must in some way direct us to supernatural happiness. The second
connection is a natural extension of the first, and it helps explain why—even with charity—we
need the moral virtues. According to Aquinas, it is possible for those who love God to sin
against charity, especially when moved by desires or fears of an inordinate nature. For this
reason we must practice those virtues that curtail sinful inclinations and enable us to yield to
charity more easily. In conjunction with charity, the moral virtues actually aid in our journey to
final happiness and thus play an important role in our redemption.
Lastly, Aquinas believes that final happiness consists in beatitude, or supernatural
union with God. Such an end lies far beyond what we through our natural human capacities can
attain. For this reason, we not only need the virtues, we also need God to transform our nature
—to perfect or “deify” it—so that we might be suited to participate in divine beatitude. Moreover,
Aquinas believes that we inherited a propensity to sin from our first parent, Adam. While our
nature is not wholly corrupted by sin, it is nevertheless diminished by sin’s stain, as evidenced
by the fact that our wills are at enmity with God’s. Thus we need God’s help in order to restore
the good of our nature and bring us into conformity with his will. To this end, God imbues us with
his grace which comes in the form of divinely instantiated virtues and gifts.

Immanuel Kant
Duty-based or deontological ethics solves a number of problems associated with
consequentialist ethical theories such as utilitarianism. According to deontology, all persons
have certain obligations. These obligations are non-negotiable: they cannot be bought off or
disposed of. Different kinds of inalienable rights form the basis of these obligations.
Rights, obligations and justice are concepts that utilitarianism has no answer to. In a
duty-based ethic, however, this is the focal point. According to this theory, an action is morally
good if it honors a given obligation (which does not depend on the consequence of the
action). Such a theory entitles certain people or groups to rights or a claim to justice.
Deontological theories stipulate duties that must be observed irrespective of their
consequences: legitimate rights must be respected and unjust action is prohibited. The word
“deontological” comes from the Greek deon, “one must.” The essential difference between
deontological and teleological theories lies in the role that is attributed to the consequences of
the action under review.
Kant developed a powerful theory in which moral rules are based in pure reasoning
instead of intuition, our conscience, or the consequences of action. His theory can be
characterized as a monistic, rule-deontological theory. That is to say, Kant does not subject
incidental actions but rather types of actions (such as lying, keeping promises) to moral
judgment. All moral rules can be traced back to a general rule: the categorical imperative.
Kant (1724-1804) is without doubt one of the greatest philosophers in the history of
Western philosophical thinking. He was a true representative of Enlightenment thinking and
active in various fields. His writings covered physics, gnoseology, ethics, and peace issues. He
was able to resolve – or at least shine a new light on - many of the problems Enlightenment
philosophers contended with.
In the field of epistemology, for example, he was able bridge the gap between
empiricism and rationalism. Radical empiricists such as Hume hold that all knowledge comes
from sense experience. On the other hand, exponents of rationalism such as Descartes,
Spinoza, and Leibniz argue that truth, as opposed to appearance, is arrived at through reason.
Thus, true knowledge depends on reason. Since Kant, speaking of the way knowledge is
acquired purely in terms of either rationalism or empiricism is no longer possible. He
argues that our observation of the world is more than the passive function of the mind; there is
always an aspect of reason involved. This is first of all because experience is located in space
and time. These are not properties of the things themselves but of the intellect. He calls these
“forms of observation.” Second, the intellect presides over a number of categories – such as
“unity,” “denial,” and “causality” - which make knowledge of experience possible. The nature of
reality itself, the Ding an sich (“the thing-in-itself”) cannot be known. All knowledge of experience
relies on our forms of observation and the categories.
Kant’s ethic is similar to his epistemology on several points. Moral law is not
something that can be deduced from reality, or that is imposed from the outside. Instead,
morality is part of human nature. People are human precisely because they know and
acknowledge moral law. For Kant, humans are distinct from the material world because apart
from being biological beings, we are also spiritual beings. As natural beings, people are
heteronomous. That is, they are subject to the physical laws of nature. As moral beings, they
are autonomous: they are rational and free and can thus be held responsible for their
actions. As Kant presupposes the existence of true knowledge in his epistemology (which
would include Newton’s laws, for example), he also presupposes the existence of a moral
conscience. What he seeks to achieve in his normative ethics is simply to identify those
suppositions that reinforce existing moral rules.
Kant maintains that there is one principle at the root of all moral rules. As such, Kant’s
normative ethic can be classified as a monistic deontological theory. Instead of judging the
actions themselves, this general principle is used to evaluate the underlying concrete rules of
action (maxims). This is therefore a clear case of rule-deontology.
According to Kant, every action, no matter how trivial it may be, falls under a certain rule
of action or maxim. No action is without a maxim. For example, “If I have to work tomorrow, I’d
better not stay up too late tonight” and “I don’t usually eat breakfast because I’m never hungry
that early.” A maxim is morally neutral. It is a rule that categorizes an action into a group of
actions. The fact that every action is driven by a maxim is the crucial difference between
behavior and action. Beings that are not able to act are not able to develop guidelines for their
actions and cannot be judged in moral terms. This applies to animals and the mentally disabled.
A maxim describes actions and they are formulated on a descriptive level. The aim is to find the
right criterion on the basis of which it can be asserted which maxims should or should not be
followed. The term “should” suggests the normative nature of this endeavor.
Kant formulates a moral principle as a kind of “moral litmus test” for determining whether
or not a maxim is to have moral status. The general principle at the root of all moral rules
according to Kant, is “the categorical imperative.” This is an imperative - a command that is
unconditional or categorical. Kant sets “categorical” off against “hypothetical.” An imperative is
hypothetical if its validity were tied up with specific conditions. For instance, “If you want to
achieve this or that goal (e.g. succeed in your job), then you need to do such and such (e.g.,
work hard).” These rules of behavior are not unconditional in nature; they only apply if the
relevant conditions are established, in this example, the desire to succeed in one’s job.
The categorical imperative applies to everyone in all situations. A categorical imperative
often takes the form of “Thou shalt . . .” for example, “Thou shalt not tell a lie.” Commandments
like these are unconditional. What exactly is the categorical imperative? Kant formulates this
general moral law in several different ways. The most formal variant reads: “Act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes
a universal law.” Another formulation of the categorical imperative is: “Act as if the maxim of
your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” To act morally, the
agent must determine whether it is reasonable to expect others in a similar situation to follow
the maxim that he is about to follow. What if an immoral maxim is considered as a law of
nature? In this regard, Kant points out that to elevate an immoral maxim to a universal law
would be contradictory. Promoting immoral maxims to universal laws should be refrained from,
as it is logically inconsistent.

Utilitarianism
Adam Smith advocated the pursuit of individual self-interest in the belief that this would
indirectly serve the common good. According to utilitarianism, the criterion for evaluating actions
is the welfare of society. Utilitarianism is the general term for all ethical theories that hold that
actions should be judged on the basis of their total costs and benefits for society. The action
that produces the greatest benefits at the lowest costs for society is the action we are morally
obliged to follow.
Jeremy Bentham
J. Bentham (1748-1832) is widely considered the father of utilitarianism. Just as in the
case of most other theorists Bentham, too, relied on a number of pioneers such as Francis
Hutcheson (1694-1746), David Hume (1711-1776), and Adam Smith. Bentham was a true
revolutionary of his times. His theory of utilitarianism constitutes a break with ideas on social
status common at the time. His criterion is the “greatest pleasure for the greatest number” on
the basis of which all actions must be judged. In this regard, he considers the pleasure of a
vagabond just as important as that of a well-to-do citizen. Everyone counts as one and no one
counts for more than one. The core of his universalistic hedonism is articulated in several
passages in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation published in 1789.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we
shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think:
every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it
. . . The principle of utility seeks to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law .
. . By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing)
or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general,
then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that
individual . . . The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then, what
is it? The sum of the interests of the several members who compose it . . . Of an action that is
conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be
done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done.
For Bentham it is possible to formulate the utilitarian criterion in quantitative terms.
Ethics in his opinion is simply a matter of counting. The meaning of the “greatest pleasure” can
be explained in quantitative terms. Happiness lies in the greatest possible amount of pleasure
and the absence of pain. To achieve the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, he devises
a hedonistic calculus to weigh pleasure and pain. To Bentham’s mind, pain and pleasure are
quantifiable units. He sets this out as follows:
To take an exact account of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a
community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose
interests seem most immediately affected by it:
1. Take account of the value of each distinguishable pleasure that appears to be produced
by it in the first instance.
2. Take account of the value of each pain that appears to be produced by it in the first
instance (…).
3. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on
the other. The balance, if it is on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the
act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side
of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.
4. Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and
repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of the
degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard
to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again
with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the
whole. Take the balance, which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good
tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same
community.
The significance of this empirical theory of ethics is that it was formulated primarily to
serve state policy and legislation, especially criminal law. The way in which Bentham argues
about the function and the severity of punishment, is characteristic of the classical utilitarians.
The aim of legislation is to promote the well-being of citizens. Care must be taken that laws are
not used to other ends, such as to enforce divine or natural rights. Punishment is, in and of
itself, suffering. Accordingly, the punishment should fit the crime: it may not cause more
suffering than that caused by the crime. Nor is punishment justified if no one has suffered any
damage caused by the crime. In this, Bentham turns against punishment for sexual “offences”
committed by consenting minors, a position rather progressive for those times.
 Another significant feature of his theory is that punishment is not justified if it is not
effective in preventing the same offence from being committed again. This also applies if other
(cheaper) means are available for achieving the same effect, such as corrective instruction.
Most importantly, there must always be a relation between the gravity of the crime and the
severity of punishment. The gravity of the crime is determined by the harm caused by the crime.
With respect to the severity of punishment, Bentham applies the fundamental rule that
punishment must be severe enough to counteract any benefits that the perpetrator may have
gained from committing the crime. At the same time, it must not be harsher than necessary to
keep the offender from committing the crime again.

John Stuart Mills’ criticism

It is probably because of John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873) criticism of Bentham that he was
forgotten and Mill came to be seen as the key exponent of utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism (first
published in 1861), Mill argues that it is not only intensity and duration that have to be taken into
account in measuring pleasure. The nature of the pleasure itself is also relevant. Pleasure,
according to Mill, is largely qualitative. The pleasure of Socrates cannot be compared with that
of a pig. Pleasure can be divided into higher and lower pleasures.
The intrinsic good
Utilitarianism is a term that covers many theories. The different strands of utilitarianism
share a number of features. All utilitarian theories depart from the assumption that an intrinsic
good exists that can serve as a criterion for evaluating actions. Monistic utilitarianism holds that
there is only one value that should be used as a criterion: pleasure or enjoyment. Pluralistic
utilitarians reject the idea that all values can be reduced to one value, holding instead that there
are several values that are intrinsically good. According to preferential utilitarianism, a value is
that which people find valuable.
Bentham and Mill are known as hedonistic utilitarians. They hold that there is only one
intrinsic good: pleasure or enjoyment. Pleasure is a good unto itself. Pleasure and enjoyment
are synonymous to them. Pluralistic utilitarians disagree with the assumption that all values are
a means to pleasure.
Aesthetic values and knowledge (e.g., a researcher who examines something out of scientific
curiosity) can be pursued for their own sake as well. An exponent of pluralistic utilitarianism is
(1873-1958). His Principia Ethica (1903) gives an account of the intrinsic good and the actions
that should be promoted to further these intrinsic goods.
Besides the hedonistic and pluralistic variants of utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism
is another dominant strand in utilitarian thinking. Preference utilitarianism has its origins in neo-
classical economics and game theory. Instead of using certain desired states or situations (such
as pleasure) as the criterion for moral action, this variant of utilitarianism is based on the
satisfaction of individual needs. People’s actions are a reflection of their needs and the value or
utility of a good can be inferred from the price that someone is willing to pay for it. If the buyer
pays a given price for something instead of using the money for something else, the product
apparently represents so much utility that he or she is willing to pay the price. Preference
utilitarianism holds that people strive to achieve the greatest satisfaction of their individual
needs with as little means possible (the principle of efficiency).
 There are several problems with this perspective. Preference utilitarianism fits in well
with the market system. However, not all needs can or may be expressed in this system. The
need for love, friendship, recognition, health, and a clean environment can only be factored into
this system to a limited extent - or perhaps not at all. Consequently, they run a high risk of falling
by the wayside.
The second problem with preference utilitarianism is the question of whether all needs
are fit to be satisfied. What about the needs of a perverse sadist? In one way or another, a
distinction needs to be drawn between preferences that are acceptable and those that are not.
This calls for a moral criterion that can be used for selecting the “right” preferences.

Kant’s Deontology and Utilitarianism

A fundamental shortcoming of utilitarianism concerns the problem of measurement.
Others include the assumptions that all consequences of an action can be measured against
one criterion (the problem of comparison) and that the effects of a given action are easy to
predict. Utilitarianism also fails to take the historical context in account and neglects issues of
rights and justice. Deontological ethics overcomes most of these problems. The measuring
problem and the uncertainty of an action’s consequences have nothing to do with deontological
ethics. An action either does or does not honor a given principle. In addition, deontological
ethics allows for a whole range of obligations in special relationships. For example, the
relationship between employer/employee, buyer/seller, lessor/lessee, and parent/child all imply
special obligations. Utilitarianism recognizes only the relationship between the agent and the
recipient of the benefit or disadvantage. Deontological ethics also takes the past into
consideration. Actions in the past can engender obligations in the present. Finally, a
deontological ethical approach also makes possible an evaluation of the intentions behind an
action. For the utilitarian, only the anticipated results count. Rule-utilitarianism is incidentally a
response to the criticism advanced by deontologists. In concrete situations, rule-utilitarianism
and deontological ethics often lead to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, the ultimate criterion
remains of a fundamentally different nature.

Online Activity:

1. Please watch these YouTube videos to have a further understanding about the nature of human
acts:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_u3EwK4sy-E; https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=uGQBVkcM42Y; and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LniC_C8bTqo

2. Choose one among the 3 videos. Then make a summary of the video you have chosen.