Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Report Part Title: INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Report Title: COMPETING WITHOUT FIGHTING

Report Subtitle: CHINA’S STRATEGY OF POLITICAL WARFARE
Report Author(s): Seth G. Jones, Emily Harding, Catrina Doxsee, Jake Harrington and
Riley McCabe
Published by: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep52615.6

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 The ability of foreign affairs,
news, military, security, and
other departments to collect
information and intelligence has
been significantly improved, and
the ability of relevant leading
departments to comprehensively
eva l u ate i n fo r m at i o n a n d
intelligence has continuously
strengthened.
–Zhang Tuosheng1

INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS

㱧⪓璡鼨ꠅ䮣꥘⟔䕜䗯䥊氳耇ⱱ
伺侁䬠냖僗⪩겅㵗鼨ꠅ簧⺭陁⮮
⟔䕜䗯䥊氳耇ⱱ┘亇ⱶ䍠ն
ˑ䌫媛榟

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 3
This chapter examines Chinese
intelligence operations as part of
political warfare, particularly Chinese
actions against the United States.
:KLOHHVSLRQDJHLVDQRUPDOSDUWRIVWDWHFUDIWWKLV
report focuses on the political warfare aspects of
intelligence operations. Intelligence operations
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VWDWHVȃLQWKLVFDVH&KLQDȃREWDLQSROLWLFDOPLOLWDU\
economic, and other information to coerce or
otherwise gain a competitive advantage over
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an important role in informing and supporting
other components of political warfare, such as
information and disinformation campaigns,
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/LQGD5RELQVRQFRQFOXGHVLQKHUVWXG\RISROLWLFDO
warfare, “Political warfare places a high demand
RQLQWHOOLJHQFHȋ3 As another assessment concludes,
Ȋ&RQGXFWLQJSROLWLFDOZDUIDUHE\WU\LQJWREXLOG
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about those groups’ motivations as well as about
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PHOTO: ED JONES/GETTY IMAGES
Few characterizations better describe the modern
Chinese intelligence apparatus than a passage from
WKH\HDUROGPLOLWDU\WUHDWLVHThe Methods of
the SimaȊ,QJHQHUDOWRZDJHZDUHPSOR\VSLHV
DJDLQVWWKHGLVWDQWREVHUYHWKHQHDUȋ5 Along these
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DQGFLYLOLDQLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHVHPSOR\VSLHV
DVSDUWRISROLWLFDOZDUIDUHZLWKWKHSULPDU\LQ-
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tent of illuminating Chinese human intelligence
+80,17 WUDGHFUDIWDQGFROOHFWLRQSULRULWLHV
Overall, Chinese overseas intelligence activities
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LQWHOOLJHQFHSULRULWLHVWKDQLVW\SLFDOO\DFNQRZO-
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positions to collect small pieces of information
that together form a more complete intelligence
picture.66XFKDVWUDWHJ\LVPXFKKDUGHUWRGLVUXSW
As this chapter shows, the empirical, open-source
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DUHPHWKRGLFDOUHVRXUFHLQWHQVLYHDQGGULYHQE\
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This chapter diverges from most existing literature
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+80,17DJHQWDFTXLVLWLRQF\FOHWKHȴYHSKDVH
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develop, recruit, and handle human sources.7 This
process is important in understanding Chinese
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cases of known or suspected Chinese intelligence
activities, with a particular focus on cases dating
from 2015 to present. It includes an evaluation of
court records from more than 100 U.S. indictments
of individuals accused of conducting activities on
EHKDOIRI&KLQDDVZHOODVDQDO\VLVRIVLPLODUFDVHV
overseas where that data is available.
17
COMPETING WITHOUT FIGHTING
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scribing the structure and operations of the coun-
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scarce, recent Chinese counterintelligence inves-
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enforcement agencies worldwide are generating
an increasing volume of data that illuminates the
operational tradecraft of China’s intelligence ser-
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commonalities across cases during each phase
of China’s efforts to recruit sources and to shape
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DQDO\]HGLQVXSSRUWRIWKLVFKDSWHUZHUHGHULYHG
from U.S. federal court documents, there is ample
evidence that the Chinese intelligence tradecraft and
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$VVXFKWKHVHȴQGLQJVȃDOWKRXJKODUJHO\IRFXVHGRQ
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detect and disrupt Chinese intelligence operations.
The remainder of this chapter begins with a brief
overview of China’s intelligence services. It then
SURFHHGVLQWRIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVRIKRZWKH&KLQHVH
intelligence services execute overseas operations
across the spotting, assessing, developing, recruit-
ing, and handling phases, which are critical for
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Chinese intelligence and law enforcement efforts
to intimidate and harass members of the Chinese
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6WDWHVȃE\VXFKRUJDQL]DWLRQVDVWKH0LQLVWU\RI
3XEOLF6HFXULW\
CHINA’S
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
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SULPDULO\FRQGXFWHGXQGHUWKH1DWLRQDO,Q-
WHOOLJHQFH/DZ7KHODZGRHVQRWH[SOLFLWO\GHȴQH
the roles and responsibilities of the civilian and
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gence services’ broader authorities. For example,
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citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with
national intelligence efforts in accordance with the
law, and shall protect national intelligence work
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China’s intelligence services to “establish cooper-
ative relationships with relevant individuals and
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ZRUNȋ8 Both of these provisions establish the legal
basis for some of the Chinese intelligence services’
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reliance on various cut-outs and proxies.
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Intelligence serves a central role in broader Chi-
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1931, three CCP spies who had penetrated the
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had defected to the Kuomintang. Mao Zedong later
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WKHUHYROXWLRQE\ZDUQLQJNH\XQGHUJURXQGFDGUH
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who were saved was China’s future premier Zhou
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DQGVHFXULW\DIIDLUVXQWLOKLVGHDWKLQ9
The Chinese intelligence apparatus has been reor-
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tional structure have changed, the one constant
is that the CCP and China have maintained for-
malized, professional intelligence services since
WKHSDUW\ȇVIRXQGLQJLQ10 This structure has
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elements, as outlined in Figure 3.1.
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066 KDVEHHQ%HLMLQJȇVSUHPLHUIRUHLJQLQWHOOL-
gence service since it was established in 1983. The
MSS is often described as combining the foreign
intelligence collection responsibilities of the Central
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terintelligence and counterespionage authorities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This
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combines these foreign and domestic authorities
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This results in several hallmark characteristics
of Chinese intelligence operations. Perhaps most
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and coordination but for the actual business of
recruiting and handling foreign sources.
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Each of these subordinate bureaus is assigned a
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or regional portfolio. For example, as of 2018,
the Sixth Bureau was responsible for overseas
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so that the JSSD, for example, has its own Sixth
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structure, roles, and responsibilities of the MSS.
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that the Chinese intelligence services share with
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organize, including the MSS’s rearrangement of
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in a U.S. court case revealed that the overseas
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renumbered from the Fourth Bureau to the Sixth
Bureau in December 2013.12
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tied to overseas operations. These activities are
less focused on collecting political, economic, or
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are an extension of a decades-long role for the
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to exert pressure on overseas dissidents and
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undertaken domestic activities to send messages
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LO\PHPEHUVLQ&KLQD13 The MPS continues this
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harass, intimidate, and repatriate overseas Chi-
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ȴQDQFLDOFRUUXSWLRQ147KHVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHOLNHO\
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political dissidents who live outside of China.15
For the United States and its partners, the MPS’s
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activities. This is because the MPS is engaged in
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VS\LQJRQRWKHUQDWLRQVWRJOHDQLQVLJKWVDERXW
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telligence agencies in the arena of geopolitics.
MPS operations, however, are often something
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manifest in egregious violations of another na-
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
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to accept international law. These operations
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DQ\RILWVSHUFHLYHGHQHPLHVDQ\ZKHUHLQWKH
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and laws of the democratic nations where the
MPS conducts these activities. Examples include
uncoordinated law enforcement activities on a
global scale, with recent reports indicating that
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established more than 50 “overseas police service
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:LWKLQWKH3HRSOHȇV/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\ 3/$ WZR
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duties. The Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff
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WKH3/$ȇVSULPDU\+80,17DUPURXJKO\HTXLY-
DOHQWWRWKH86'HIHQVH,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\
(DIA).17 Prior to the large-scale reorganization
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Intelligence Bureau was known as the Second
Department of the General Staff Department of
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EXUHDXZDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\FRPSOHPHQWHGE\VLJQDOV
intelligence, electronic warfare, information op-
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WKH7KLUG'HSDUWPHQW 3/$ DQG)RXUWK'HSDUW-
PHQW 3/$ 182IWKHVHJURXSV3/$PDLQWDLQV
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the economic espionage activities of one of the
organization’s components (Unit 61398) were ex-
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3/$DQG3/$ZHUHUHQDPHGDQGUHRUJDQL]HG
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Support Force (SSF), which is also subordinate
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CHINA’S INTELLIGENCE
DOCTRINE AND THE
AGENT ACQUISITION CYCLE
This chapter’s focus on examining Chinese intel-
ligence operations through the lens of the agent
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purpose is to illuminate how China’s national-level
intelligence collection priorities are operational-
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describing how the MSS and its counterparts
19
COMPETING WITHOUT FIGHTING
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handle these sources, and how the services work
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QHHGVDQGUHTXLUHPHQWV7KHVHFRQGSXUSRVH
is to examine how the various elements of the
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institutions, private companies, and the technical,
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VHUYLFHVȃFRQWULEXWHWR&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHRS-
erations. The goal is to provide a more coherent
alternative to the common characterization of
the Chinese intelligence threat as “one thousand
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impression that China’s activities are decentral-
ized and opportunistic, while also opening the
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DUHLQGLVFULPLQDWHO\WDUJHWLQJ&KLQHVHDFDGHP-
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labeling them all as suspected agents of the CCP.
The intent is to use fact-based, empirical evidence
to illuminate Chinese intelligence tradecraft,
which includes the activities of the state organs,
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and various cut-outs, co-optees, and nontradi-
tional collectors.21
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and operations are less abundant compared to
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%HLMLQJȇVYLHZVRQPLOLWDU\PRGHUQL]DWLRQDQG
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WKHVSHFWUXPRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\VWUDWHJ\DQG
GRFWULQHUHȵHFWWKHDELGLQJLPSRUWDQFHRILQWHO-
ligence in statecraft and warfare. Information is
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efforts, which emphasize the pursuit of “infor-
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WRPRGHUQ&KLQDPXFKRIZKDW:HVWHUQVFKRODUV
NQRZDERXWWKHVSHFLȴFVRIKRZ&KLQDȇVFODQGHV-
WLQHVHUYLFHVDGYDQFH%HLMLQJȇVLQWHUHVWVFRPH
IURPWKH86SURVHFXWLRQRI&KLQHVHRɚFHUVDQG
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One of the few Chinese-language documents
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proach to intelligence work is a book published in
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=KRQJZHQDQG:DQJ=RQJ[LDRȃWLWOHGSources
and Techniques of Obtaining National Defense
Science and Technology Intelligence. It describes
a broader Chinese intelligence apparatus that
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commercial interests. The book examines how
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UHVSRQVLELOLW\DFURVVWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHV
research and academic institutions, and state-
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QRFOHDUOLQHVEHWZHHQPLOLWDU\PRGHUQL]DWLRQ
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:DQJFRQFOXGHȊ,QWHOOLJHQFHZRUNZLOOEHFRPH
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This perspective on intelligence can be observed
in cases where China’s professional intelligence
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LQVWLWXWLRQVWRLGHQWLI\FROOHFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
that advance China’s commercial interests.
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historical reliance on open-source information,
which in their estimation accounted for 80 percent
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China recognized the intelligence value of various
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sources of technical insights that were of partic-
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that the remaining 20 percent of China’s intelli-
gence needs “must come through the collection
of information using special means, such as re-
connaissance satellites, electronic eavesdropping,
and the activities of special agents (purchasing
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commercial interests in China’s approach to intel-
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FDOO\WKHLQWHOOLJHQFHF\FOH7KH\HPSKDVL]HWKH
LPSRUWDQFHRIGHYHORSLQJFROOHFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
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been received from the information consumer and
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WKXVLPSURYLQJWKHZRUNRIFROOHFWLRQȋ25 Although
WKHUHLVQRGHȴQLWLYHRSHQVRXUFH&KLQHVHLQWHO-
ligence doctrine available, the cases reviewed
LQVXSSRUWRIWKLVFKDSWHUVWURQJO\VXJJHVWWKDW
WKH066DQGLWVFRXQWHUSDUWVDGKHUHWRPDQ\RI
the same fundamentals of the traditional intelli-
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UHFUXLWPHQWRIKXPDQDJHQWVXVLQJWHFKQLTXHV
WKDWDUHVKDUHGKLVWRULFDOO\ZLWK&KLQDȇVIRUHLJQ
FRXQWHUSDUWVLQFOXGLQJWKH&,$0,DQG5XVVLDQ
intelligence agencies.

SPOTTING AND ASSESSING
The overall agent recruiting process can be thought
RIDVDȴOWHUDVLOOXVWUDWHGLQ)LJXUH$WWKHWRS
are the two broadest phases: spotting and assess-
LQJ$FWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKHVHWZRSKDVHVDUHKLJKO\
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGDVWKH\DUHERWKODUJHO\DQDO\WLF
and, in most circumstances, passive. It is also in
these two phases where there is ample evidence
demonstrating how the Chinese intelligence services
integrate all-source capabilities into their efforts
WRLGHQWLI\DQGHYDOXDWHSRWHQWLDOKXPDQVRXUFHV
6SHFLȴFDOO\&KLQDȇVLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHVHPSOR\
DQGRIWHQEOHQGWKUHHSULPDU\WHFKQLTXHVGXULQJ
the spotting and assessing phase: open-source in-
WHOOLJHQFHDQDO\VLVGRPHVWLFDQGRYHUVHDVFXWRXWV
FRRSWHHVDQGSUR[LHVDQGWHFKQLFDORSHUDWLRQV
including computer network intrusions.
,WLVGXULQJWKHVSRWDQGDVVHVVSKDVHVWKDW+80,17
collectors begin the process of transforming custom-
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'HSHQGLQJRQWKHVSHFLȴFLW\RIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
QHHGWKHSRWHQWLDOSRRORIVRXUFHVWKDWDUHLQLWLDOO\
VSRWWHGDQGDVVHVVHGFDQUDQJHIURPH[FHSWLRQDOO\
ODUJHWRH[FHSWLRQDOO\VPDOO)RUH[DPSOHRQH86
EDVHGVSRWWHUIRUWKH066VLPSO\VRXJKWFRQWDFW
ZLWKLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKFXUUHQWRUSULRUPLOLWDU\RU
intelligence experience. Initial contacts would be
URXWHGEDFNWR066RɚFHUVLQ&KLQDIRUIXUWKHU
assessment of the individual’s potential access to
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would be responsive to China’s information needs.
In other circumstances, the spotting and assessing
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RQLQGLYLGXDOVZKRPD\KDYHDFFHVVWRKLJKO\
specialized technologies that would contribute
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CUT-OUTS, CO-OPTEES, AND PROXIES
One important trademark of Chinese intelligence
operations is the use of various cut-outs, co-optees,
DQGSUR[LHV7KHXVHRIVXFKLQGLYLGXDOVȃZKRRIWHQ
present themselves as businesspeople, students,
RUDFDGHPLFVȃFUHDWHVDEXIIHURISODXVLEOHGHQL-
DELOLW\EHWZHHQ&KLQDȇVLQWHOOLJHQFHDSSDUDWXVDQG
its potential human sources. China’s clandestine
VHUYLFHVKDYHQRWWUDGLWLRQDOO\DGRSWHGWKHVDPH
RSHUDWLQJPRGHOVDVWKHLU868.5XVVLDQRU
other counterparts. In these countries, intelligence
RɚFHUVDUHRIWHQFHOHEUDWHGIRUWKHLUDELOLW\WR
QDYLJDWHKRVWLOHRUGHQLHGHQYLURQPHQWV/HYHU-
DJLQJYDULRXVW\SHVRIRɚFLDORUQRQRɚFLDOFRYHU
&,$0,DQG.*%RɚFHUVGXULQJWKH&ROG:DU
developed innovative and sophisticated tradecraft
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Figure 3.1
The Agent Acquisition Cycle26
SPOT
individuals who have the potential to
ŅƓŜǚŜŜ
ŌŢƎĴŜŜŌņĴŢīĴ
ƃĴƂƓŌƃĴšĴŢƎƇ
ĒƇ

ŌİĴŢƎŌǚĴİ
ĪƱ
ĒŢĒŜƱƇƎƇ
Ũƃ
ƀŨŜŌīƱšĒŚĴƃƇɳ
ASSESS
the placement and access of these
individuals to determine if they can
provide the desired information and
initiate an evaluation of their
motivations, vulnerabilities,
and suitability.
DEVELOP
relationships with these individuals to
further assess their motivations,
vulnerabilities, and suitability and to
explore their receptiveness to initial
tasking for intelligence.
RECRUIT
agents and formalize the relationship
with an overt recruitment pitch or by
paying them for information they
provide.
HANDLE
agents by relaying collection
requirements, receiving reporting
information, and conducting continued
assessments of their placement
and access.
SOURCE: CSIS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS; AND BURKETT, “AN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR AGENT RECRUITMENT.”
WKDWWKH\XVHGWRUHFUXLWDQGKDQGOHKLJKOHYHO
VRXUFHVZLWKLQDQDGYHUVDU\ȇVJRYHUQPHQW
&KLQDȇVLVRODWLRQGXULQJPRVWRIWKH&ROG:DUIRV-
WHUHGDYHU\GLIIHUHQW+80,17FXOWXUHRQHWKDW
involved a much less prominent overseas role for
the intelligence cadre. Compounding this isola-
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ZKHUHWKHUHOHQWOHVVIRFXVRQLGHRORJLFDOSXULW\
DQGZLGHVSUHDGVXVSLFLRQVRIIRUHLJQLQȵXHQFH
resulted in purges within the intelligence and
VHFXULW\DSSDUDWXV277KH066GLGGHSOR\VRPH
SHUVRQQHODEURDGȃIRUH[DPSOHXQGHUMRXUQDOLVWLF
21
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FRYHUȃGXULQJWKH&ROG:DUEXWWKHLUSULPDU\
PLVVLRQZDVXQFOHDU7KH\OLNHO\DVVLVWHGEURDGHU
efforts to spot and assess potential sources while
also collecting insights and non-public information
IURPLQGLYLGXDOVZKREHOLHYHGWKH\ZHUHVSHDNLQJ
with Chinese state media.28+RZHYHUQRQHZHUH
GHȴQLWLYHO\WLHGWRVHQVLWLYHUHFUXLWPHQWVZLWKLQ
the U.S. government.
In addition, Chinese intelligence services have
WUDGLWLRQDOO\SUHIHUUHGWKDWUHFUXLWPHQWVDQGVXE-
VHTXHQWVRXUFHPHHWLQJVRFFXULQVLGHRI&KLQDRU
DWKLUGFRXQWU\297KHFRPSDUDWLYHO\OLPLWHGRYHU-
VHDVIRRWSULQWRI&KLQDȇV+80,17RɚFHUVOLNHO\
nurtured the culture of using proxies and cut-outs
DVNH\FRPSRQHQWVLQWKHVSRWWLQJDQGDVVHVVLQJ
phase. In the current era, social media and the
LQWHUQHWDUHLQFUHDVLQJO\XVHGIRUWKHVSRWWLQJDQG
assessing phases, though recent cases reinforce that
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WRHDUO\VWDJHUHFUXLWLQJHIIRUWV
7KLVLQFOXGHVWKHFDVHRI-XQ:HL<HRD6LQJDSRUHDQ
national who was convicted in the United States
on charges that he was serving as a spotter and
assessor for the MSS.30 Yeo received intelligence
UHTXLUHPHQWVIURP&KLQDEDVHG066RɚFHUVZKR
relied on Yeo to spot and assess potential U.S.-based
sources. Yeo’s MSS handlers had a wide range of
intelligence interests, with a particular focus on
non-public U.S. government information. These
WDVNLQJVLQFOXGHGUHTXHVWVIRU<HRWRLGHQWLI\VRXUF-
es who could report on Southeast Asia, the U.S.
'HSDUWPHQWRI&RPPHUFHDUWLȴFLDOLQWHOOLJHQFH
and the trade war between the United States and
&KLQD2QPXOWLSOHRFFDVLRQV<HRPHWVHSDUDWHO\
ZLWKGLIIHUHQW066RɚFHUVLQ&KLQDDOORIZKRP
issued identical tasking.31 These incidents further
reinforce this chapter’s broader contention that
&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHFROOHFWLRQLVPRUHFHQWUDOO\
directed and organized than is often appreciated.32
THE ROLE OF OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
AND SOCIAL MEDIA
:LWKLQWKHVSRWWLQJDQGDVVHVVLQJSKDVHVUHFHQW
investigations and global intelligence service
VWDWHPHQWVUHȵHFWWKDWRSHQVRXUFHLQWHOOLJHQFH
DQDO\VLVȃSDUWLFXODUO\WKHH[SORLWDWLRQRIVRFLDO
PHGLDȃKDVEHFRPHDSUHIHUUHGWHFKQLTXHIRU
China’s intelligence services. According to U.S.,
8.DQG*HUPDQLQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFLDOV&KLQHVH
LQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFHUVDQGSUR[LHVKDYHFRQGXFWHG
WKRXVDQGVRIVRIWDSSURDFKHVRQ/LQNHG,QLQUHFHQW
\HDUV33 More than 10,000 such incidents have oc-
curred in the United Kingdom alone, according to
MI5 chief Ken McCallum.34$VWXG\FRQGXFWHG
22 This content downloaded from 111.95.102.253 on Thu, 23 May 2024 08:20:42 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
E\*HUPDQ\ȇVGRPHVWLFLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHWKH
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), found
&KLQDȇVLQWHOOLJHQFHDSSURDFKHVRQ/LQNHG,QWR
PDWFKWKHVFDOHREVHUYHGE\0,,QLWVUHSRUW
the BfV disclosed several inauthentic profiles
and front organizations, posting as headhunters,
consultants, think tanks, and scholars, who the
service assessed were working for Chinese in-
telligence.35 This shift toward social media in the
HDUO\SKDVHVRIWKHUHFUXLWPHQWSURFHVVRIIHUVWKH
Chinese intelligence services a platform to conduct
ORZFRVWORZULVNDFWLYLWLHVLQWKHHDUO\SKDVHVRI
WKHUHFUXLWPHQWF\FOH
Several notable investigations in the United States
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XVH/LQNHG,QWRLGHQWLI\DQGHYDOXDWHSRWHQWLDO
VRXUFHVRIFODVVLȴHGLQIRUPDWLRQWUDGHVHFUHWVDQG
RWKHUQRQSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ,QPDQ\LQVWDQFHV
&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHXVHV/LQNHG,QWRLGHQWLI\DQG
contact current and former cleared government em-
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DQGHPSOR\PHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWPD\LQWHUHVW
IRUPHUPHPEHUVRIWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHFRPPXQLW\
or U.S. Department of Defense.36-XQ:HL<HRXVHG
VRFLDOPHGLDSDUWLFXODUO\/LQNHG,QH[WHQVLYHO\LQ
his activities on behalf of the MSS. Yeo created a fake
FRQVXOWLQJFRPSDQ\DQGSRVWHGMRERSSRUWXQLWLHV
RQ/LQNHG,Q+HODWHUFODLPHGKHUHFHLYHGRYHU
400 resumes, 90 percent of which were submitted
E\FXUUHQWDQGIRUPHU86JRYHUQPHQWDQGPLOL-
WDU\SHUVRQQHOZLWKVHFXULW\FOHDUDQFHV<HRWKHQ
IRUZDUGHGWKHUHVXPHVWR066RɚFHUVLQ&KLQD
for further evaluation and guidance on potential
recruitment options.37 Yeo augmented his efforts
RQ/LQNHG,QE\DWWHQGLQJSXEOLFHYHQWVWRFRQWDFW
LQGLYLGXDOVIURPOREE\LQJȴUPVRUGHIHQVHFRQ-
tracting companies who could be possible targets.38
COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS
&KLQDȇVEXONGDWDWKHIWFDPSDLJQVȃLQFOXGLQJ
RSHUDWLRQVWDUJHWLQJWKH862ɚFHRI3HUVRQQHO
0DQDJHPHQW 230 (TXLID[$QWKHP0DUULRWWDQG
RWKHUVȃDUHH[DPLQHGLQWKLVUHSRUWȇVFKDSWHURQ
&KLQHVHF\EHURSHUDWLRQV &KDSWHU 39 Nevertheless,
it is important to acknowledge the extent to which
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WR+80,17RSHUDWLRQV:KLOHWKHVHRSHUDWLRQV
have been attributed to various elements of the
&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHVȃSULPDULO\UHJLRQDO
FRPSRQHQWVRIWKH066DQGWKH3/$ȃWKHUHLV
OLWWOHGHȴQLWLYHHYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHGHWDLOLQJKRZ
&KLQDPD\EHZHDSRQL]LQJWKLVGDWD40
+RZHYHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHVHRSHUDWLRQV
FRXOGKHOS+80,17RɚFHUVDVVHVVSRWHQWLDODYH-

nues to recruit a source. Examples might include
YHULI\LQJDQLQGLYLGXDOȇVFXUUHQWRUSULRUUHOD-
WLRQVKLSZLWKWKH86JRYHUQPHQWLGHQWLI\LQJ
ZKHWKHUWKDWLQGLYLGXDOLVLQȴQDQFLDOGLVWUHVVRU
SRRUKHDOWKVFUXWLQL]LQJWKHLUWUDYHOKLVWRU\RU
VKDSLQJZD\VWRGHYHORSDQLQLWLDODSSURDFKDQG
DVRXUFHGHYHORSPHQWSODQ)RXUIDFWRUVW\SLFDO-
O\LQȵXHQFHDQLQGLYLGXDOȇVGHFLVLRQWRVS\IRUD
IRUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWPRQH\LGHRORJ\FRPSUR-
PLVHRUHJRRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVȊ0,&(ȋ41:KDW
is known about the personal data that China has
H[ȴOWUDWHGVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRXOGEH
KLJKO\YDOXDEOHIRU&KLQHVH+80,17UHFUXLWHUV
ZHLJKLQJZKHWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDOPD\EHYXOQHUDEOH
to certain recruitment approaches. The U.S.-based
066VSRWWHU-XQ:HL<HRDWWHVWHGWKDWWKHVHW\SHV
RIYXOQHUDELOLWLHVLQFOXGLQJȴQDQFLDOWURXEOHVMRE
dissatisfaction, or familial issues, were what he
ZDVWUDLQHGE\WKH066WRHYDOXDWHZKHQDVVHVVLQJ
source candidates.42
DEVELOPING AND RECRUITING
Spotting and assessing are intended to narrow a
pool of potential source candidates. It is against
WKLVVPDOOHUJURXSWKDWLQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFHUVLQL-
tiate the process of building a relationship with
SURVSHFWLYHVRXUFHV.H\PDUNHUVRIWKLVSKDVHIRU
Chinese intelligence operations include increased
face-to-face contact, often in China during the
VRXUFHGHYHORSPHQWSKDVH2YHUDOOWKHPDMRULW\
RIGHYHORSPHQWDSSURDFKHVDQDO\]HGLQVXSSRUW
RIWKLVUHVHDUFKLQYROYHGRIIHUVRIHPSOR\PHQW
EXVLQHVVFRQVXOWLQJRURWKHUȴQDQFLDORSSRUWX-
nities, with a smaller set of individuals driven
E\LGHRORJLFDOVXSSRUWIRU&KLQDDQGWKH&&3
8OWLPDWHO\SRVWPRUWHPVRIKLVWRULF$PHULFDQ
HVSLRQDJHFDVHVȴQGWKDWPRVWVSLHVDUHPRWLYDWHG
E\DFRPELQDWLRQRIWKH0,&(IDFWRUVUDWKHUWKDQ
E\RQHIDFWRUDORQH43
The developing and recruiting phases of the agent
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of risk that a recruiting organization incurs. The
VSRWWLQJDQGDVVHVVLQJSKDVHVDUHODUJHO\SDVVLYH
while the developing and recruiting phases are ac-
WLYHDQGLQFUHDVLQJO\H[SRVHUHFUXLWHUVWRSRWHQWLDO
GLVFRYHU\&KLQDSDUWLDOO\FRPSHQVDWHVIRUWKLVULVN
during the development and recruitment phases
E\FRQWLQXLQJLWVUHOLDQFHRQFXWRXWVSUR[LHVDQG
RWKHUIRUPVRIFRYHU&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFHUV
DQGWKHLUSUR[LHVSULPDULO\DSSURDFKGHYHORSPHQ-
tal sources under commercial or academic cover.
There is a dual logic in this approach, providing
SODXVLEOHGHQLDELOLW\WRERWKUHFUXLWHUDQGWDUJHW
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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
5HFUXLWHUVSUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHVDVUHSUHVHQWLQJSUL-
vate or academic interests rather than China and
WKH&&37KLVDSSURDFKPD\DSSHDOWRSURVSHFWLYH
recruits interested in rationalizing their openness
WRSURYLGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQWRDIRUHLJQHQWLW\,Q
WKHFDVHRI.HYLQ0DOORU\KLVUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWR
LQLWLDOFRQWDFWYLD/LQNHG,QWUDQVODWHGLQWRDQ
introduction to an individual who represented
himself as working for a Chinese think tank, the
6KDQJKDL$FDGHP\RI6RFLDO6FLHQFHV'HVSLWH
these efforts to operate under the nominal cover
RIWKHDFDGHP\ZKLFKLVNQRZQWRKDYHFORVH
WLHVWRWKH0660DOORU\ȃDVDIRUPHU&,$DQG
',$RɚFHUȃDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQDZDUHWKDWWKH
individuals he met with were representatives of
Chinese intelligence.44
7KHVHW\SHVRIDSSURDFKHVDQGLQLWLDOWDVNLQJV
HSLWRPL]HWKHGHYHORSPHQWDOSKDVHVRI+80,17
operations. Developmental recruits are often asked
WRVKDUHLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWPD\EHVRPHZKDWVHQVL-
WLYHȃWKRXJKQRWFODVVLȴHGȃDVDPHDQVWRJDXJH
the source’s responsiveness to tasking, as well as
WROD\WKHJURXQGZRUNIRUJUDGXDOO\H[SDQGLQJ
the information-sharing relationship into more
sensitive areas.457KHDGGHGH[FKDQJHRIPRQH\DW
WKLVSKDVHȃHYHQEHIRUHDQ\IRUPDOUHFUXLWPHQW
SLWFKȃDOVRHVWDEOLVKHVWKHWHUPVRIZKDWZLOO
XOWLPDWHO\EHFRPHDWUDQVDFWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLS
In cases where the source is a U.S. government
HPSOR\HHRUFOHDUHGGHIHQVHFRQWUDFWRUWKLVLQ-
IRUPDWLRQH[SRVHVWKHUHFUXLWWROHJDOMHRSDUG\
China’s development and recruitment of Shapour
Moinian followed a similar pattern. After an initial
DSSURDFKRQ/LQNHG,Q0RLQLDQWUDYHOHGWR+RQJ
Kong to meet with an individual who claimed to
UHSUHVHQWDWHFKQLFDOUHFUXLWLQJFRPSDQ\VHHNLQJ
RXWDYLDWLRQLQGXVWU\FRQVXOWDQWV7KH&KLQHVH
recruiter claimed she was seeking Moinian’s “rich
H[SHULHQFHVDQGVNLOOVȋIRUDFOLHQWZKRZDVZRUN-
ing on aircraft design. Moinian agreed to provide
information and materials regarding various
aircraft designed or manufactured in the United
6WDWHVIRUZKLFKKHZDVȴQDQFLDOO\FRPSHQVDWHG
$QXQQDPHG8.DYLDWLRQH[SHUWPHQWLRQHGE\0,
LQ-XO\DOVRWUDYHOHGUHSHDWHGO\WR&KLQDWR
EHȊZLQHGDQGGLQHGȋ7KH&KLQHVHLQWHUORFXWRUV
then asked and paid him for detailed technical
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the UK government intervened.46
&RPPHUFLDOFRYHUZDVDOVRDNH\IHDWXUHRI&KLQDȇV
recruitment of former FBI electronics technician
.XQ6KDQȊ-RH\ȋ&KXQ+RZHYHUXQOLNHWKH0DOORU\
and Moinian cases, where the developmental phase
UHTXLUHGRQO\RIDKDQGIXORIPHHWLQJV&KXQȇV
23
COMPETING WITHOUT FIGHTING
relationship with Chinese intelligence took several
\HDUVWRUHDFKWKHVWDJHZKHUHKHEHJDQPHHWLQJ
GLUHFWO\ZLWK&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWRɚFLDOVDQG
providing them with sensitive FBI information.
Chun’s relationship originated in 2005, when a
&KLQDEDVHGSULQWHUFRPSDQ\VROLFLWHGDQLQYHVW-
ment from one of Chun’s relatives. Over the next
ȴYH\HDUVWKH&KLQHVHFRPSDQ\SDLGIRU&KXQWR
WUDYHORQDQDQQXDOEDVLVWUDYHOWKDWKHDFWLYHO\
FRQFHDOHGIURPWKH)%,,QWKHFRPSDQ\SDLG
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knew he worked for the FBI. At this stage, Chun
began reporting information about FBI personnel,
structure, technological capabilities, surveillance
practices, and surveillance targets.47
One variation of China’s efforts to appeal to com-
mercial and economic interests of potential sources
is the manner in which the intelligence services
work through research institutes and universities.
This includes recruitment into China’s so-called
ȊWDOHQWSODQVȋVXFKDVWKH7KRXVDQG7DOHQWV3ODQ
DQGWKH+XQGUHG7DOHQWV3ODQ'LVDJJUHJDWLQJWKH
numerous licit and illicit mechanisms that China
UHOLHVXSRQWRDFTXLUHDGYDQFHGWHFKQRORJ\IURP
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLVEH\RQGWKHVFRSHRIWKLVFKDSWHU
Nevertheless, several recent cases reveal how China’s
VWDWHDɚOLDWHGUHVHDUFKLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKHWDOHQW
plans have served as critical platforms for China to
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IURP86EDVHGVRXUFHV$OWKRXJKPDQ\FDVHVGR
not involve a direct connection between China’s
research institutions and the intelligence services,
there are some striking exceptions.
0RVWQRWDEOHLVWKHWULDORI<DQMXQ;XDQ066RI-
ȴFHUZKRZDVWKHGHSXW\GLYLVLRQGLUHFWRURIWKH
Sixth Bureau in the JSSD. In that case, the United
States disclosed how the Sixth Bureau, which is
responsible for overseas collection of science and
WHFKQRORJ\LQIRUPDWLRQZRUNHGGLUHFWO\ZLWK
organizations such as the Jiangsu Science and
7HFKQRORJ\3URPRWLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQWKH$YLDWLRQ
,QGXVWU\RI&KLQD $9,& DQGWKH1DQMLQJ8QLYHUVLW\
of Aeronautics and Astronomics (NUAA) to arrange
presentations and exchanges with overseas experts
known to be working on technologies that were
Chinese collection priorities.487KLVLQFOXGHG;XLQ
KLVFDSDFLW\DVDQ066RɚFHUGLUHFWO\DUUDQJLQJ
a set of discussions in China with experts from
DFURVVWKHJOREDODYLDWLRQLQGXVWU\LQFOXGLQJ
representatives of at least six of the world’s lead-
ing aerospace companies.49$VUHȵHFWHGLQ;XȇV
communications with his intelligence customers
ZLWKLQWKH&KLQHVHVFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\DSSD-
ratus, the purpose of these exchanges was to elicit
24 This content downloaded from 111.95.102.253 on Thu, 23 May 2024 08:20:42 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
sensitive IP and trade secrets, including items
such as design manuals, design and simulation
VRIWZDUHFRPSRVLWHVSRZHUV\VWHPVDQGRWKHU
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWFLYLOLDQDQGPLOLWDU\DLUFUDIW50
The MSS often augments its human source de-
YHORSPHQWHIIRUWVGXULQJȊH[FKDQJHVȋLQ&KLQD
E\FRQGXFWLQJWHFKQLFDORSHUDWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHLU
visitors’ devices.51
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VSRWDVVHVVGHYHORSDQGUHFUXLWVRXUFHVWKHȴQDO
HOHPHQWLQYROYHVWKHVSHFLȴFWUDGHFUDIWWKDW&KLQD
uses to handle its human sources.
HANDLING SOURCES:
OPERATIONALIZING
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
&KLQDȇVJOREDOLQWHOOLJHQFHDFWLYLWLHVDUHPHUHO\
one element of broader political warfare. Nev-
HUWKHOHVVWKH\DUHDFULWLFDOHOHPHQWRI%HLMLQJȇV
DSSURDFKWRVHFXULW\FRPSHWLWLRQ&KLQDȇVSXUVXLW
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intelligence information contributes to broader
efforts to secure an information advantage over
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learn information about the United States that
:DVKLQJWRQEHOLHYHVWREHSURWHFWHG7KLVORJLF
H[WHQGVLQWRWKHVFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\VSKHUH
where Chinese intelligence operations are de-
VLJQHGWRIXOȴOONH\NQRZOHGJHJDSVIRU&KLQDȇV
FRPPHUFLDODQGPLOLWDU\WHFKQRORJ\UHVHDUFKDQG
development efforts. China’s intelligence services
SOD\DFUXFLDOUROHLQUHFUXLWLQJKXPDQVRXUFHV
WRIXOȴOOVSHFLȴFFXVWRPHUVFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\
UHTXLUHPHQWVIRU&KLQDȇVHFRQRPLFDQGPLOLWDU\
advantage. It is in this area that the case of MSS
RɚFHU<DQMXQ;XLVVRVWULNLQJ
$VSUHYLRXVO\QRWHG;XZDVDVHQLRU066Rɚ-
cer assigned to the JSSD Sixth Bureau, where he
was responsible for collecting overseas science
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;XZRUNHGFORVHO\ZLWKRɚFLDOVLQYDULRXVVWDWH
HQWLWLHVLQFOXGLQJ$9,&DQGWKH18$$WRUHȴQH
DYLDWLRQUHODWHGFROOHFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV)RUH[-
DPSOHLQ;XH[FKDQJHGPHVVDJHVZLWKDQ
RɚFLDODW$9,&ZKRUHOD\HGVSHFLȴFLQIRUPDWLRQ
WKDWWKH$9,&RɚFLDOZDVVHHNLQJIURP%RHLQJ
LQFOXGLQJDQDO\WLFDOWRROVIRU%RHLQJȇVSURSULHWDU\
DLUIUDPHDQGVSHFLȴFSRUWLRQVRIWKHBoeing Design
Manual.527KHVHW\SHVRIH[FKDQJHVDUHFULWLFDOLQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHVSHFLȴFLW\RI&KLQHVHVFLHQFH
DQGWHFKQRORJ\FROOHFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWZHUH

GLUHFWO\SDVVHGIURPVWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHVDQG
research institutions to China’s foreign intelligence
service. Separate communications revealed how
;XDQGWKH066ZRXOGUHSRUWEDFNLQIRUPDWLRQ
WKDWKDGEHHQFROOHFWHG,QRQHLQVWDQFH;XVHQW
detailed technical information about various aspects
RIWKH.&DHULDOUHIXHOLQJDLUFUDIWUHTXHVWLQJ
that the recipient review the information and
provide feedback on the MSS’s report.
7KHVHW\SHVRILQVLJKWVLQWRWKHLQQHUZRUNLQJVRI
WKH066DQGLWVFXVWRPHUVPDQLIHVWLQWKHZD\VWKDW
&KLQDKDQGOHVLWVKXPDQVRXUFHV,Q;XȇVFDVHWKH
066DQGWKH18$$GLUHFWO\FROODERUDWHGWRVKDSH
WKHVSHFLȴFWRSLFVWKDWYLVLWRUVZRXOGEULHIGXULQJ
WKHLUSUHVHQWDWLRQVLQ&KLQD,QRQHFDVH;XDQG
WKH18$$RɚFLDOZRUNHGLQWDQGHPWRHQFRXUDJH
a U.S.-based aerospace engineer to provide a pre-
VHQWDWLRQRQKLJKO\WHFKQLFDOWRSLFVUHODWHGWR*(
Aviation’s trade secrets and IP. As the relationship
EHWZHHQ;XDQGWKHHQJLQHHUSURJUHVVHG;XZDV
FOHDUDERXWKRZLQIRUPDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVZHUH
being developed, writing to the engineer: “I will
WRXFKEDVHZLWKWKHVFLHQWLȴFUHVHDUFKGHSDUWPHQW
KHUHWRVHHZKDWWHFKQRORJ\LVGHVLUHGDQG,ZLOO
OHW\RXNQRZZKDWWRSUHSDUHȋ;XODWHUUHȴQHG
the specific areas of interest for the engineer,
expressing that there was particular interest
LQVRIWZDUHV\VWHPVSHFLILFDWLRQVDQGGHVLJQ
SURFHVVHV/DWHUZKHQWKHHQJLQHHUH[SUHVVHG
concern about sending certain information from
KLV*($YLDWLRQHPDLODGGUHVV;XUHVSRQGHGȊ,W
PLJKWEHLQDSSURSULDWHWRVHQGGLUHFWO\IURPWKH
FRPSDQ\ULJKW"ȋ53
OVERSEAS HARASSMENT
AND REPRESSION
Chinese intelligence agencies have also been in-
FUHDVLQJO\DFWLYHLQLQWLPLGDWLQJPHPEHUVRIWKH
Chinese diaspora overseas and in conducting
LQȵXHQFHRSHUDWLRQV0DQ\RIWKHVHLQVWDQFHVDUH
SDUWRI2SHUDWLRQ)R[+XQWDJOREDODQGH[WUDOHJDO
35&HIIRUWWRPRQLWRUKDUDVVDQGLQVRPHFDVHV
repatriate Chinese diaspora living abroad. In June
IRUH[DPSOHDIHGHUDOMXU\LQ1HZ<RUNFRQ-
victed three individuals of stalking and coercing
several residents of the United States.54 In April
WKH)%,DUUHVWHGWZRLQGLYLGXDOVȊ+DUU\ȋ/X
Jianwang and Chen Jinping, in connection with
opening and operating an illegal police station
LQ0DQKDWWDQ1HZ<RUN&LW\$FFRUGLQJWRWKH
FBI and DOJ, the two individuals were working
for the Fuzhou branch of the MPS to locate and
conduct coercive activities against Chinese dissi-
This content downloaded from 111.95.102.253 on Thu, 23 May 2024 08:20:42 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
dents living in the United States.55/X-LDQZDQJȇV
RɚFLDOUROHZDVSUHVLGHQWRIWKH$PHULFD&KDQJOH
$VVRFLDWLRQ1<DQRQSURȴWRUJDQL]DWLRQZKRVH
RɚFHVKRXVHGWKHSROLFHRXWSRVW56 In its response
WRWKHDUUHVWVWKH&KLQHVHHPEDVV\LQ:DVKLQJWRQ
GHVFULEHGWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDVEHLQJȊSURYLGHGE\
local overseas Chinese communities who would
OLNHWREHKHOSIXOȋDQGWKDWȊWKH\DUHQRWSROLFH
SHUVRQQHOIURP&KLQDȋ57
,QDVHSDUDWHFDVHWKH'2-FKDUJHG036RɚFHUV
in April 2023 with conducting an intimidation
campaign against Chinese nationals residing in
the United States whose political views and actions
were critical of China.58 The DOJ has referred to
WKLVW\SHRIDFWLYLW\DVȊUHSUHVVLRQVFKHPHVȋ59
$OVRLQ$SULODIHGHUDOMXU\FRQYLFWHG3UDV
0LFKHOD*UDPP\ZLQQLQJDUWLVWDQGIRUPHU
member of the hip-hop group Fugees, of working
with the MPS to conduct a clandestine campaign to
LQȵXHQFHVHQLRU86RɚFLDOV600RUHEURDGO\WKH
Chinese government has conducted widespread
harassment of Chinese critics of China abroad,
WKRXJKLWLVQRWDOZD\VFOHDULIȃDQGWRZKDWGH-
JUHHȃ&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGODZHQIRUFHPHQW
organizations are involved. Beginning in October
IRUH[DPSOH&KLQDZDVDOOHJHGO\LQYROYHG
in making more than a dozen false bomb threats
DWOX[XU\KRWHOVDQGHPEDVVLHVLQ(XURSHWKH
United States, the Middle East, and Asia using
the names of Chinese dissidents.61
,QDGGLWLRQWR2SHUDWLRQ)R[+XQW&KLQDKDVDOVR
HQJDJHGLQ2SHUDWLRQ6N\QHWDSDUDOOHOSURJUDP
WRWDUJHWWKHȴQDQFHVRI&KLQHVHFLWL]HQVLQFOXG-
ing dissidents, residing overseas. According to
WKH)%,2SHUDWLRQ6N\QHWLQFOXGHV35&HIIRUWVWR
UHSDWULDWHPRQH\E\VRPH&KLQHVHOLYLQJDEURDG
ȊE\ERWKUHVWULFWLQJDQGVHL]LQJDVVHWVVWLOOORFDWHG
LQWKH35&ȋ62 In 2022, for example, DOJ charged
6XQ+RL<LQJZLWKFRQGXFWLQJLOOHJDODFWLYLWLHV
DVSDUWRI2SHUDWLRQ6N\QHW63
&KLQHVHGLSORPDWLFRɚFLDOVDUJXHGWKDWWKHVH
RUJDQL]DWLRQVȃLQFOXGLQJWKHVRFDOOHGSROLFH
VWDWLRQVȃZHUHQRWDFWXDOO\HQJDJHGLQSROLFHDQG
LQWHOOLJHQFHZRUNDQGWKDWWKH\ZHUHVWDIIHGE\
ȊYROXQWHHUVȋZKRZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUDVVLVWLQJ
Chinese nationals with routine tasks, such as
renewing drivers’ licenses.64 In some cases, re-
VHDUFKHUVLGHQWLȴHGFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQYDULRXV
RYHUVHDVSROLFHRXWSRVWVDQGVSHFLȴFUHJLRQDO
FRPSRQHQWVRIWKH036W\LQJVXFKVWDWLRQVGLUHFWO\
back to Chinese intelligence and law enforcement.
2QHVWXG\RIWKHVH036VWDWLRQVDVVHVVHGWKDW
there are at least 104 of these outposts across 53
countries.65 As an FBI investigation into a Chi-
25
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036ZDVXQDPELJXRXVO\LQYROYHGLQKDUDVVLQJ
members of the Chinese diaspora in the United
States. According to the lead FBI agent involved
in the investigation:
$OWKRXJKWKH036LVJHQHUDOO\LGHQWLȴHGDV
WKH35&ȇVSULPDU\GRPHVWLFODZHQIRUFHPHQW
DJHQF\ȃUHVSRQVLEOHIRUSXEOLFVDIHW\JHQ-
HUDOFULPLQDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
DQGLQWHUQHWVHFXULW\ȃLWVPLVVLRQH[WHQGV
EH\RQGODZHQIRUFHPHQWDQGLQWRIXQFWLRQV
more associated with an intelligence service.
7KH036URXWLQHO\PRQLWRUVDPRQJRWKHUV
Chinese political dissidents who live in the
United States and in other locations outside the
35&7KH036KDVXVHGFRRSHUDWLYHFRQWDFWV
ERWKLQVLGHWKH35&DQGDURXQGWKHZRUOGWR
LQȵXHQFHWKUHDWHQDQGFRHUFHSROLWLFDOGLV-
sidents abroad. Indeed, I am aware that the
35&JRYHUQPHQWKDVWKUHDWHQHGDQGFRHUFHG
Chinese political dissidents living in the United
States in an effort to silence them.66
CONCLUSION
Measuring the impact of Chinese intelligence
operations as part of political warfare is chal-
OHQJLQJRQVHYHUDOOHYHOV7KHȴUVWFKDOOHQJHLV
GHȴQLQJZKDWFRXQWVDVLQWHOOLJHQFHRSHUDWLRQV
LQWKHPRGHUQHUD&KLQDHPSOR\VDZLGHUDQJH
RIOLFLWDQGTXDVLOLFLWPHDQVWRDFTXLUHVHQVLWLYH
and critical information. This includes investing
LQIRUHLJQȴUPVWKDWSRVVHVVYDOXDEOH,3WKDWFDQ
VXSSRUW&KLQDȇVPLOLWDU\RUFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWV
,WLQFOXGHVWKHXVHRIȊWDOHQWSURJUDPVȋDQGRWKHU
MRLQWUHVHDUFKLQLWLDWLYHVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHWUDQVIHU
of valuable technical knowledge back to Chinese
institutions. As the U.S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence acknowledged in a comprehensive
VWXG\RIWKH86FRXQWHULQWHOOLJHQFHHQWHUSULVH
FRPSHWLWRUVQHHGQRWEUHDN86ODZVWRIXOȴOO
NH\LQWHOOLJHQFHFROOHFWLRQQHHGV,QRQHQRWH-
ZRUWK\UHFHQWVWXG\D86SULYDWHLQWHOOLJHQFH
ȴUPLGHQWLȴHGLQGLYLGXDOVFRQQHFWHGWR/RV
$ODPRV1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\ZKRKDGUHWXUQHG
WR&KLQDWRZRUNLQDUHDVFULWLFDOWRWKH3/$ȇV
PLOLWDU\PRGHUQL]DWLRQLQFOXGLQJK\SHUVRQLF
weapons, deep-penetrating munitions, and un-
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Washington PostIRXQGWKDW&KLQHVHK\SHUVRQLF
UHVHDUFKHUVDUHVLPSO\SXUFKDVLQJIURP86
suppliers software that aids in designing and
PRGHOLQJK\SHUVRQLFV\VWHPV68
26 This content downloaded from 111.95.102.253 on Thu, 23 May 2024 08:20:42 +00:00
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,QDGGLWLRQWKHUHDUHFRQFHUQVDERXWF\EHUHQDEOHG
HFRQRPLFLQWHOOLJHQFHHIIRUWVZKLFKDUHDQDO\]HG
LQWKLVUHSRUWȇVFKDSWHURQ&KLQHVHF\EHURSHUDWLRQV
&KDSWHU 7KHHFRQRPLFDQGVWUDWHJLFEHQHȴWV
RIWKHVHDFWLYLWLHVDUHYDVWSDUWLFXODUO\LQWHUPV
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U.S. government information stolen. In 2012,
WKHQKHDGRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\$JHQF\ 16$ 
*HQHUDO.HLWK$OH[DQGHUGHVFULEHGF\EHUHQDEOHG
economic espionage as “the greatest transfer of
ZHDOWKLQKLVWRU\ȋ69 The economic loss to the
United States alone is often estimated at $30–600
ELOOLRQDQQXDOO\70
86HFRQRPLFORVVHVDOVRWUDQVODWHGLUHFWO\LQWR
&KLQHVHPLOLWDU\DGYDQFHV6X%LQD&KLQHVH&D-
QDGLDQEXVLQHVVPDQDVVLVWHG&KLQHVH3/$F\-
EHURɚFHUVLQWKHLUHIIRUWVWRVWHDOWUDGHVHFUHWV
regarding the C-17, F-22, and F-35 aircraft. This
LQFOXGHGPRUHWKDQȴOHVȃWRWDOLQJPRUH
WKDQJLJDE\WHVȃRQWKH&DLUFUDIW6XFKWKHIW
allows China to evade the costs, both in time and
PRQH\WRPRGHUQL]HLWVV\VWHPV)RUDVHQVHRIWKH
scale of the investments that went into the three
aircraft targeted during the Su Bin case, the U.S.
government spent more than $100 billion over a
period of more than three decades to modernize
WKHVHDLUOLIWDQGȴJKWHUV\VWHPV71
7KHRYHUDOOHFRQRPLFGDPDJHFDXVHGE\&KL-
QHVHOLFLWTXDVLOLFLWDQGF\EHUFROOHFWLRQOLNHO\
far outpaces that which can be attributed to the
FRXQWU\ȇV+80,17VHUYLFHV+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWWR
XQGHUVHOOWKHHFRQRPLFGDPDJHFDXVHGE\+80,17
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connected to the MSS, one recent U.S. conviction
involved a scientist stealing trade secrets valued
DWELOOLRQIURPD86SHWUROHXPFRPSDQ\72
066RɚFHU;X<DQMXQZRUNHGWRWDUJHW*($YL-
ation’s processes for manufacturing composite
MHWHQJLQHIDQEODGHVDWHFKQRORJ\WKDWQRRWKHU
JOREDOFRPSDQ\KDVGXSOLFDWHGLQWKHPRUHWKDQ
\HDUVVLQFHLWZDVȴUVWFHUWLȴHGE\WKH)HGHUDO
Aviation Administration.73
,WLVDOVRGLɚFXOWWRPHDVXUHWKHLPSDFWRI&KLQHVH
HIIRUWVWRDFTXLUHSULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW86
DQGDOOLHGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGSROLF\WKRXJKLW
LVFULWLFDOWRDVVHVVWKHWRWDOLW\RI&KLQHVHFDVHV
rather than isolated incidents. The reason is that
&KLQHVHLQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFHUVKDYHORQJUHFRJQL]HG
the value of what is often referred to as the “mo-
VDLFWKHRU\ȋRIVHFUHF\LQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOIDFWV
FDQLOOXPLQDWHDQRWKHUZLVHRSDTXHSLFWXUHZKHQ
LQWHJUDWHGLQWRDEURDGHUERG\RINQRZOHGJH74 As
+XRDQG:DQJZURWHȊ%\SLFNLQJKHUHDQGWKHUH
among the vast amount of public materials and

accumulating information a drop at a time, often
LWLVSRVVLEOHWREDVLFDOO\UHYHDOWKHRXWOLQHVRI
VRPHVHFUHWLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGWKLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\
WUXHLQWKHFDVHRIWKH:HVWHUQFRXQWULHVȋ75 Cor-
UHVSRQGLQJO\FDVHVVXFKDV&KLQDȇVVXFFHVVIXO
UHFUXLWPHQWRI&DQGDFH&ODLERUQHDFRPSDUDWLYHO\
ORZUDQNLQJ866WDWH'HSDUWPHQWRɚFLDOVKRXOG
EHYLHZHGPHUHO\DVRQHSLHFHZLWKLQDEURDGHU
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within the inner circles of U.S. decisionmaking,
KHUUHSRUWLQJRQWKHSHULSKHU\RIWKHVHFLUFOHV
XQGRXEWHGO\FRQWULEXWHGWR%HLMLQJȇVEURDGHU
HIIRUWVWRSHQHWUDWH86SROLF\GHOLEHUDWLRQVZLWK
respect to China.
There is also a subset of cases that have undermined
86DQGDOOLHGQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LQZD\VWKDWDUH
GLɚFXOWWRPHDVXUHȃEXWDUHOLNHO\VLJQLȴFDQW
Consider the damage associated with the 2015
230EUHDFKGXULQJZKLFK&KLQHVHF\EHUDFWRUV
stole detailed background investigation informa-
WLRQIRUQHDUO\PLOOLRQ86FLWL]HQV7KLVGDWD
LQFOXGHGȊ6RFLDO6HFXULW\1XPEHUVUHVLGHQF\
DQGHGXFDWLRQDOKLVWRU\HPSOR\PHQWKLVWRU\
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWLPPHGLDWHIDPLO\DQGRWKHU
SHUVRQDODQGEXVLQHVVDFTXDLQWDQFHVKHDOWK
FULPLQDODQGȴQDQFLDOKLVWRU\DQGRWKHUGHWDLOVȋ
DVZHOODVȊȴQGLQJVIURPLQWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHG
E\EDFNJURXQGLQYHVWLJDWRUVDQGȴQJHUSULQWVȋ
for some individuals.76)URPD+80,17WDUJHWLQJ
SHUVSHFWLYHWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWȃDWDPLQ-
LPXPȃLVLQSRVVHVVLRQRIGHWDLOHGGRVVLHUVRQ
QHDUO\PLOOLRQ$PHULFDQVZKRKDYHDSSOLHG
IRUDFFHVVWRFODVVLȴHGLQIRUPDWLRQ
)LQDOO\WKHUHDUHWKHLQVWDQFHVZKHUH&KLQHVH
DJHQWVKDYHVXFFHVVIXOO\SHQHWUDWHG86LQWHOOL-
gence agencies and gained access to government
secrets, details of overseas intelligence operations,
DQGWKHLGHQWLWLHVRI86VRXUFHVLQ&KLQD7KHȴUVW
$PHULFDQLQWHOOLJHQFHRɚFHUFKDUJHGZLWKVS\LQJ
IRU&KLQDZDV/DUU\:X7DL&KLQDUHWLUHGFDUHHU
linguist for the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Informa-
WLRQ6HUYLFHZKRSDVVHGFODVVLȴHGLQIRUPDWLRQ
WR%HLMLQJIRUGHFDGHVEHIRUHKLVFRQYLFWLRQLQ
1986. Prosecutors said of Chin at his trial, “For 30
\HDUVKHZDVDGLUHFWIXQQHOIURPWKH$PHULFDQ
LQWHOOLJHQFHFRPPXQLW\WRWKH3HRSOHȇV5HSXEOLFRI
&KLQDȋ777ZRPRUHUHFHQWFDVHVDUHWKRVHRI-HUU\
&KXQ6KLQJ/HHDQG$OH[DQGHU<XN&KLQJ0DERWK
IRUPHU&,$FDVHRɚFHUV0DȇVFDVHZKLFKLVVWLOO
pending, includes the submission into evidence
of a 2001 video recording of Ma and a colleague
PHHWLQJZLWK066RɚFHUVDQGUHYHDOLQJ&,$Rɚ-
cer identities, human asset identities, operational
WUDGHFUDIWDQGVHFXULW\FRPPXQLFDWLRQSUDFWLFHV78
/HHZDVFRQYLFWHGLQDFDVHZKHUHKHZDV
This content downloaded from 111.95.102.253 on Thu, 23 May 2024 08:20:42 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
discovered traveling with a notebook that included
“CIA-related operational notes from asset meetings,
operational meeting locations, operational phone
numbers, true names of assets, and information
DERXWFRYHUWIDFLOLWLHVȋ790RUHEURDGO\&KLQDKDV
expanded its signals intelligence collection capa-
ELOLWLHVDJDLQVWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVE\HVWDEOLVKLQJ
LQWHOOLJHQFHFROOHFWLRQIDFLOLWLHVLQ&XEDURXJKO\
100 miles from Florida, and other locations.80
As China’s U.S. counterparts can attest, the public
RIWHQRQO\KHDUVDERXWLQWHOOLJHQFHIDLOXUHVQRW
VXFFHVVHV1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHFDVHVDQDO\]HGLQ
connection to this chapter all included notable
tradecraft failures on the part of the Chinese intel-
ligence services. One of the more amusing is that,
LQWKHFORVLQJDUJXPHQWVDW<DQMXQ;XȇVWULDOKLV
GHIHQVHDWWRUQH\VSRLQWHGWRKLVSRRUWUDGHFUDIW
skills as a reason to doubt the U.S. government’s
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWKHZDVDVHQLRU066RɚFHU
Some historians of Chinese intelligence have cited
WKHFRXQWU\ȇVODFNRIDVWURQJH[WHUQDO+80,17
WUDGLWLRQDVRQHRIWKHUHDVRQVZK\%HLMLQJKDV
FRPSHQVDWHGE\EXLOGLQJDPDVVLYHF\EHURSHUD-
WLRQVFDSDELOLW\+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHVRPHW\SHVRI
information critical to China’s broader strategic
LQWHUHVWVWKDWFDQRQO\EHSXUVXHGZLWKKXPDQ
VRXUFHV0DQ\RIWKHFDVHVFLWHGLQWKLVFKDSWHU
LQYROYHGWUDGHFUDIWWKDWLVOLNHO\XQZRUNDEOHLQ
an era of heightened technical surveillance. This
REVHUYDWLRQLVGRXEO\LURQLFJLYHQWKDW&KLQDLWVHOI
has built the world’s most advanced surveillance
VWDWH%XW&KLQDȇVVXUYHLOODQFHVWDWHRQO\UHVROYHV
KDOIRIWKHJXLGDQFHIURPWKH\HDUROGMeth-
ods of the Sima noted at the beginning of this
FKDSWHU:KLOH%HLMLQJKDVQHDUO\SHUIHFWHGLWV
DELOLW\WRȊREVHUYHWKHQHDUȋWKHFXUUHQWHUDRI
+80,17ZLOOUHTXLUH&KLQDȇVVSLHVWRPRGHUQL]H
KRZWKH\ȊHPSOR\VSLHVDJDLQVWWKHGLVWDQWȋ$QG
the success of Chinese political warfare will hinge,
to some degree, on how well China can improve
LWV+80,17FDSDELOLWLHV
27