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Critics of
Enlightenment
Rationalism
Edited by
Gene Callahan · Kenneth B. McIntyre
Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism
“This volume could not have arrived at a better time. McIntyre and Callahan have
given us an excellent set of essays that speaks directly to the fetishization of human
reason. Each of the thinkers examined reminds us of the fallibility of human
beings—a lesson we sorely need to revisit every generation or so.”
—Richard Avramenko, Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
“The variety of topics considered, the range of thinkers included, the striking and
ultimately illuminating juxtaposition of approaches combine to cast, not a spot-
light, but indeed multiple of points of light on a rich selection of important think-
ers from the later-modern period. Scholars and students interested in modern
critics of modernity will benefit from the range of figures treated here and the
depth of the commentaries on them.”
—Alexander S. Duff, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of North Texas, USA
Gene Callahan • Kenneth B. McIntyre
Editors
Critics of
Enlightenment
Rationalism
Editors
Gene Callahan Kenneth B. McIntyre
New York University Sam Houston State University
Brooklyn, NY, USA Huntsville, TX, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
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The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
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institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Sam Houston State University for its financial sup-
port and for granting me a sabbatical in which to complete the project. I
would also like to thank The Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy
at The University of Wisconsin for inviting me to spend the 2019–2020
academic year as a Visiting Scholar at the Center, and providing financial
support for the year. Thanks to my mother and father for all of the support
over the years. I want to thank my two daughters, Flannery and Julie, who
rarely agree with me, but, at least, find me occasionally humorous. Finally,
thanks to Maria for taking care of things.
Kenneth B. McIntyre
4 September 2019
Madison, WI
Many thanks to the patience of my wife, Elen, to the support of my
children, Eamon, Emma, and Adam, to Leslie Marsh for encouraging us
in this project, and to David Boucher for his mentorship. Selah.
Eugene Callahan
5 September 2019
Brooklyn, NY
v
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Gene Callahan and Kenneth B. McIntyre
7 Wittgenstein on Rationalism 95
Daniel John Sportiello
vii
viii Contents
Index295
Notes on Contributors
ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Introduction
G. Callahan (*)
New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USA
K. B. McIntyre
Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA
e-mail: kbm014@SHSU.EDU
“reasons” such-and-such should occur can take the place of true, ethical
commitment to an ideal of life.
Justin Garrison offers an account of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844–1900)
critique of Enlightenment rationalism which is unique in this volume in
that, according to Garrison, Nietzsche rejects not only Enlightenment
rationalism, but even the idea of rational discourse itself. Garrison offers us
Thomas Jefferson, rather than the French philosophes, as his primary foil.
Of course, Jefferson was a great admirer of the philosophes specifically and
the Enlightenment generally. As Garrison notes, Jefferson consistently
proclaimed the innate goodness and rationality of human beings, and
believed that governments propped up by irrational claims of authority,
particularly the “monkish ignorance” of religious authority, had subverted
these qualities too often. For Jefferson, a new science of politics, one
grounded in reason rather than superstition, offered hope because it
allowed for the discovery of a rational foundation for government worthy
of the people it would serve.
Per Garrison, Nietzsche would find Jefferson’s political thought naïve
and unphilosophical. Nietzsche argued instead that Enlightenment ratio-
nalism did not inaugurate a break from the religious past so much as it
re-packaged pre-existing ethical and political beliefs in verbiage stripped of
many pre-existing theological and metaphysical associations. Thus, mod-
ern rationalism was not a new thing under the sun, but was instead an
example of a serious problem Nietzsche believed he had already identified
in Christianity: nihilism. Garrison explores Nietzsche’s understanding of
reason, morality, equality, Christianity, and democracy, and applies
Nietzsche’s analysis to those elements in Jefferson’s political thought. By
borrowing Nietzsche’s hammer to “sound out” Jefferson’s mind, Garrison
suggests that Jefferson’s oft-celebrated democracy of reason is tinged with
misanthropy and world hatred. In other words, such a vision is a manifes-
tation of the ascetic ideal and thus is ultimately nihilistic. Because many see
Jefferson as a paradigmatic figure in the American Founding, even as an
incarnation of the American spirit, the chapter has broad implications for
interpreting a fundamental dimension of the American political tradition.
Corey Abel grapples with the conundrum of how T.S. Eliot
(1888–1965), one of the paradigmatic “modernist” writers, could also
have been a staunch defender of tradition. Abel quotes Eliot arguing,
“The sound tree will put forth new leaves, and the dry tree should be put
to the axe,” and describes the quote as “a vivid image of Eliot’s modernism”.
6 G. CALLAHAN AND K. B. MCINTYRE
So, for this paradigmatic modernist, what, exactly, is the value of tradi-
tion? Abel argues that Eliot actually had a nuanced view of culture and art
grounded in a robust conception of tradition. He interprets Eliot as believ-
ing that, “from the poet’s standpoint, a tradition provides buoyancy…
Tradition, for the artist, is the gift of form”. When poets are writing within
a tradition, each poet has less work to do to express themselves than does
any poet who attempts to abandon all traditions. (Of course, as Oakeshott
demonstrated, such an abandonment is never really possible.) Abel sug-
gests that Eliot’s sensibility provides a view of tradition that powerfully
challenges modern ideological habits of thinking.
Daniel Sportiello, in his chapter on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951),
examines how Wittgenstein’s later philosophy brings into question many
of the assumptions of Enlightenment rationalism, especially its focus on
quasi-mathematical reasoning. According to Sportiello, the focus of
Wittgenstein’s critique of rationalism was his rejection of the thesis that
there is a single right way to do whatever it is that we do, and that way can
be discovered by the use of an abstract faculty called reason.
Sportiello observes that, for Wittgenstein, our words and deeds are
justified only by the rules of particular language games, but these language
games are themselves justified only insofar as they meet our needs; cer-
tainly none of them need be justified by reference to any of the others. In
claiming this, Wittgenstein is something more than a pragmatist since he
believes that the rectitude of all of our discourse is a matter of its use (for
whatever ends we happen to have). Taken together, our language games
constitute our form of life, though this form of life is not entirely arbitrary,
as some of its features can be explained by reference to our nature.
Nonetheless, per Sportiello, Wittgenstein claims that our form or forms of
life could be different in many ways. Indeed, the forms of life that have
characterized human communities have been and will continue to be
marked by significant differences. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the failure of
Enlightenment rationalism lies in its attempt to reduce the variety of lan-
guage games and forms of life to a single, abstract, rational unity. Sportiello
suggests that Wittgenstein reminds us that, on some level, we all know
this. Philosophy at its worst is the attempt to forget it; philosophy at its
best is, therefore, the attempt to remember it.
The work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Jack Simmons says, can
be understood largely as a critique of scientism. As he writes, “Science sees
the world scientifically and Heidegger contends that this method of reveal-
ing the natural world conceals non-scientific ways in which the world
1 INTRODUCTION 7
might appear to us, ways that might represent a more authentic encounter
with the world”. As Simmons notes, the supposedly timeless “natural sci-
entific reasoning” is itself an historical phenomenon, and has no valid
claim to resist being evaluated as such. And, in fact, “The reductionist
approach of modern, scientific reasoning makes it well-suited to a utilitar-
ian worldview Heidegger calls technological thinking”. Here we might
note the similarity to both Marcel’s and Oakeshott’s attacks on “the tyr-
anny of technique.”
According to Simmons, the relevance of Heidegger‘s critique of tech-
nological thinking is demonstrated by “Our current affinity for STEM
education, wedding science to technology, engineering and mathematics,
in order to satisfy the needs of the community as determined by a reduc-
tionist, economic theory, and reducing the student to an economic
resource”.
Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), notes Steven Knepper, hosted one of
the most important salons in Paris both before and after the Second World
War, attended by Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Maritain,
Emmanuel Levinas, and others. As such, he influenced several major intel-
lectual movements, such as Catholic personalism and existentialism. He
would doubtlessly be better known today if he had chosen to align himself
with some such movement, and adopt a “doctrine” which could have
yielded him “followers.”
However, Knepper argues, “Marcel worried that such labels distort or
lead to assumptions”. Philosophy should be an open inquiry that did not
imprison him in a “sort of shell”. Nevertheless, an attack on “technocratic
rationalism” is a continuing theme in Marcel’s work.
Marcel’s concern with the “tyranny of technique,” which “drowns the
deeper human in a conspiracy of efficiency and a frenzy of industry” closely
echo Oakeshott’s criticism of the “sovereignty of technique,” and
Heidegger’s attack on “technological thinking.” The focus on technique
tended to turn life into a technological problem to be solved, and other
human beings into resources to be possessed for the assistance they might
provide in solving life‘s problems. (As evidenced by the ubiquity of
“human resource” departments.) Mystery is drained out of existence:
death becomes a tricky biomedical challenge to be handled as discreetly as
possible, and love is a matter of achieving as high a “relationship rating”
as possible in some romance “app.”
This solution to this problem, for Marcel, was not to abandon tech-
nique, or reject technological progress. Instead, he argued, “What I think
8 G. CALLAHAN AND K. B. MCINTYRE
we need today is to react with our whole strength against that disassocia-
tion of life from spirit which a bloodless rationalism has brought about”.
Charles Lowney’s essay on Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) argues that
Polanyi’s work demonstrates that the Enlightenment’s standards defining
knowledge contain distortions that often have destructive effects, and in a
variety of ways. According to Lowney, Polanyi was a sympathetic critic of
the Enlightenment, which makes sense given Polanyi’s own success as a
natural scientist. Polanyi admired the Enlightenment’s political ideals, but
its rationalism led to a misunderstanding of the character of science, a
misunderstanding that Polanyi called “scientism.” Lowny notes that, for
Polanyi, this ideological “scientism” tended to reject the objectivity of
anything not based on physics and chemistry, thus relegating human val-
ues to the realm of the purely subjective.
Lowney claims that Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy revises
Enlightenment standards to more accurately reflect the limits of knowl-
edge and how science actually proceeds. This involves critiquing (1) the
viability of complete objectivity, (2) the adequacy of Cartesian explicit
analysis to simple self-evident truths, (3) the concomitant reductive analy-
sis of reality to smallest physical components, and (4) reductive dichoto-
mies between mind and matter, and between fact and value. Polanyi
accomplishes this with his conceptions of (1) personal knowledge, (2) tacit
knowing, (3) emergent being, and (4) discovery and indwelling. For
Lowney, Polanyi’s work undermines the traditional conception of scien-
tific knowledge, and shows that, instead, science moves toward truth, and
better contact with reality, by using the same tools of practical knowing
that produce understanding in those cultural and religious traditions that
are open to dialogue and discovery. Values, and not just physical facts, can
be real discoveries about the world. Polanyi’s post-critical epistemology
thus provides a non-skeptical fallibilism that goes beyond simple dualisms
and reductionism, forestalls a regression into nihilism, and renews hope in
human progress.
C.S. Lewis (1898–1963), notes Luke Sheahan, may seem an unlikely
candidate for inclusion in a book on anti-rationalists. After all, in a series
of books, he used reasoned arguments to defend the Christian faith. But
he believed that the effectiveness of such arguments “depended upon a
deeper mode of knowing”. Lewis is considered one of the most prominent
Christian apologists of the twentieth century. But he held a deep distrust
of the work of the rational faculty that was not properly oriented by the
imagination, which explains in large part his turn to writing imaginative
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