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Leibniz on Time, Space, and Relativity
Richard T. W. Arthur
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849076.001.0001
Published: 2021 Online ISBN: 9780191944345 Print ISBN: 9780192849076
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¹ For the impossibility of such compositions, we have the authority of Leibniz himself. As he wrote
to Johann Bernoulli (September 30, 1698): “You were afraid that matter would be composed of non-
quanta. I respond that it is no more composed of souls than of points”; and to Michelangelo Fardella in
1690: “it should not be said that indivisible substance enters into the composition of a body as a part,
but rather as an essential internal requisite” (A VI 4, 1669/AG 103), and “a soul is not a part of matter,
but a body in which there is a soul is such a part” (AG 105).
viii
Puzzlement about the way bodies and their changes result from monads is, of
course, par for the course. But at least as perplexing for me was the general
consensus that Leibniz excluded relations from his fundamental ontology.
Following Russell, it is widely believed that, appearances to the contrary, Leibniz
denied relations at the deepest level of his metaphysics. Since it is incontestable
that he regarded space and time as relational, this would (it is thought) account for
his regarding them as ideal. Monads, on this interpretation, could have no location
in space and time, and would exist timelessly, like Kant’s noumena, only in the
intelligible realm. But such an interpretation, it seemed to me, was directly
contradicted by Leibniz himself in many places. In 1703 he assured his corres-
pondent De Volder, for example, that there is a place for all changes of both
spiritual and material things both “in the order of coexistents, that is, in space,”
and “in the order of successives, that is, in time” (LDV 266/267). Even though they
are not themselves extended, simple substances cannot exist without a body, “and
to that extent they do not lack situation or order with respect to other coexisting
things in the universe” (LDV 266–269). It was on this foundation—namely, on the
mutual situations of coexisting substances through their extended bodies—that
Leibniz built his theory of space, as he explained (all too briefly) to Clarke. Here, it
is true, one may argue that since monads are only situated through their bodies,
and bodies are phenomena, then these relations are only among the phenomena
and not among monads themselves. It is different with time, however, since there
(as I have long argued) Leibniz bases temporal relations directly on relations
among monadic states. This calls into question the idea that the ideality of
relations precludes the existence of monads in time, or that temporal succession
applies only to the states of phenomena. But if monadic states are ordered in time,
and each state expresses the situations of the bodies of coexisting monads,
providing the basis for their spatial ordering, this suggests that space and time
are not mere mental constructions, but also have some basis in reality. How this
could be so, and in what sense, has motivated the line of research I have pursued
that has culminated in this book.
It began as three chapters of a projected volume on Leibniz’s Labyrinth of the
Continuum, which I had originally titled Ariadnean Threads. The idea was to have
each chapter corresponding to one of the topics Leibniz himself had included
under the rubric of a book project he had conceived in 1676 ‘de Compositione
continui, tempore, loco, motu, atomis, indivisibili et infinito’ (A VI 3, 77/DSR 90)—
that is, on the composition of the continuum, time, place, motion, atoms, the
indivisible, and the infinite. That project, however, became too big and unwieldy,
so I separated off what was pertinent to the theory of substance as a solution to
the labyrinth of the continuum, and published that in 2018 as Monads,
Composition, and Force, postponing the treatment of time, space, and the more
mathematical topics for another volume. Now that remainder has undergone a
further fission, as I recognize that a treatment of time, space, and motion—all of
ix
through space and time, and what kind of ‘spacetime’ is implicit in this. I doubt if
this is the last word on Leibniz’s views on the relativity of motion, but I believe
I have at least made it seem far more coherent than it is generally portrayed to be.
Since the status of relations in Leibniz’s thought is both crucial to the inter-
pretation I give in the chapters, and yet too involved for inclusion in the main text,
I present an essay treating this question in the second appendix. In the third, I give
translations of extracts from Leibniz’s writing on analysis situs over the years,
since there is very little available in English translation. In the fourth, I give
translations of three drafts Leibniz wrote in Rome in 1689 on the question of
the relativity of motion, Copernicanism and the Censure. Finally, in the glossary
I explain some of the technical terms Leibniz used, particularly in connection with
the infinite.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the generous feedback I have received from
colleagues on drafts of this work. Preeminent among these has been Vincenzo De
Risi, with whom I have been discussing and corresponding about Leibniz’s
metaphysics of space (and learning from him) ever since I was an examiner for
his PhD thesis at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa in 2005. In response to
material I had asked him to look over (the penultimate versions of chapter 2 and
section 3.5), he sent me an exquisite 13-page essay, which was hugely helpful for
me in clarifying my own views as well as his; he also provided emendations for the
glossary. Osvaldo Ottaviani also read through the whole manuscript and provided
me with extremely valuable responses, sources, links, and corrections. Many
thanks, too, to the OUP readers, for their feedback on the draft manuscript
I submitted in September 2020, and suggestions for its improvement. That helped
me to clarify my thought and my expositions of several points, and also prompted
me to provide the introductory chapter and glossary of technical terms. I am also
very grateful to David Rabouin, Lucia Oliveri, Laurynas Adomaitis, Jeffrey
Elawani, and Angela Axworthy for their substantial critical responses to samples
I sent them; to Filippo Costantini for welcome advice and commentary, especially
on the mereology in Appendix 1; to Paul Lodge, Jeffrey McDonough, and Mattia
Brancato for their suggestions and comments on some of the material; and to
Massimo Mugnai, Samuel Levey, Ed Slowik, Nico Bertoloni Meli, Pauline
Phemister, Daniel Garber, Tzuchien Tho, Jan Cover, Stefano Di Bella, Ohad
Nachtomy, Ursula Goldenbaum, Don Rutherford, Doug Jesseph, Jean-Pascal
Anfray, Enrico Pasini, Stephen Puryear, Martha Bolton, Mic Detlefsen, Marco
Panza, Laurence Bouquiaux, Arnaud Pelletier, and Gianfranco Mormino for
fruitful exchanges of views over the years on various aspects of what is discussed
here. Thanks, also, to David Rabouin for drawing my attention to texts on analysis
situs recently prepared from manuscript sources by his team in the ANR
MATHESIS project in collaboration with the Leibniz Research Centre in
Hanover (Leibniz-Archiv), and to him, Siegmund Probst, Vincenzo De Risi, and
Michael Kempe for permission to publish translations of three of them here (they
xi
All the translations from the Latin, French, and German are my own.
I translate the Latin seu or sive by ‘ôr’ when this denotes an ‘or of equivalence’,
in order to discriminate it visually from ‘or’ denoting an alternative.
I cite Leibnizian texts by the original language source first, followed by a readily
available English translation after a backslash, thus (GP VII 400/LC 70). If the
same sources are repeated consecutively, I abbreviate thus: (401/70).
Calendars: the dates indicated for these writings are keyed to the calendar in use
at the source. The Catholic countries in this period had already adopted the
Gregorian calendar, or New Style (NS) of dating, which was only adopted in the
Protestant states in Germany and in the provinces of the Dutch Republic in 1700,
and was not adopted in Great Britain and its Dominions until 1752. Until those
times they still used the Julian calendar (Old Style, OS), whose dates are 10 days
behind NS until March 1700, and 11 days behind thereafter.
Introduction
Since the arguments in this book are premised on the general line of interpretation
of Leibniz’s metaphysics that I proposed in Monads, Composition, and Force,
I should briefly describe that at the outset. First, though, I need to provide a sketch
of the main elements of Leibniz’s metaphysics of substance and force, and some of
the problems of interpretation they present to commentators.
As is well known, Leibniz claimed in his mature philosophy that all that exist in
the created universe are substances, the true unities that (from the mid-1690s
onwards) he called monads, together with everything that results from them.¹
These unities are simple, that is, partless, although they have internal qualities and
actions, namely perceptions (defined as representations of the composite or
external in the simple) and appetitions (principles of change by the action of
which one perception passes continually into another). As substances, they are
essentially active; this activity consists in a primitive active force, Leibniz’s reinter-
pretation of Aristotle’s first entelechy or the Scholastics’ substantial form,² which
needs to be completed by a primitive passive force, his reinterpretation of the
Aristotelian primary matter. These primitive forces are manifested in bodies as the
derivative forces treated by Leibniz in his new science of dynamics: the active ones
being, for instance, vis viva, and quantity of progress (momentum), the passive
ones being forces of resistance to penetration and to new motion (inertia).
Composites, such as bodies, are strictly speaking not substances, but aggregates
of simple substances, the monads; they are many not one, and are therefore
phenomena. The monads, being partless, cannot be material; they are not parts
of bodies, but are presupposed by them.³ In fact, monads are presupposed in every
actual part of a body, rendering a body an infinite aggregate of monads. Each
monad, moreover, has an organic body belonging to it, and of which it forms the
first entelechy or substantial form; and the monad together with its organic body
make up a corporeal substance, that is, a living thing or animal. Consequently,
¹ The exposition in this paragraph largely follows that given in Leibniz’s two essays of 1714, the
so-called Monadology, and the Principles of Nature and Grace, supplemented by passages in the
Theodicy of 1710. As he explains in the second of those essays, “Monas is a Greek word which
means unity, or that which is one.” (GP vi 598/WFT 259).
² “The active substantial principle is usually called substantial form in the Schools, and primary
Entelechy by Aristotle.” Draft of a letter to Rudolf Wagner, June 4, 1710; LBr. 973, Bl. 326; transcription
sent to me by Osvaldo Ottaviani.
³ In this respect, Leibniz is contesting the Cartesian view of corporeal substance as consisting in an
extended body whose parts are themselves extended substances.
Leibniz on Time, Space, and Relativity. Richard T. W. Arthur, Oxford University Press. © Richard T. W. Arthur 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849076.003.0001
2
⁴ The essentials of this reading can be traced all the way back to Baumgarten’s 1739 Metaphysica
(Baumgarten 2013, §§198-199). But the most recent (and very erudite) interpretation along these lines
is that of Robert M. Adams (1994).
⁵ This reading also makes problematic Leibniz’s claims about the harmony between two realms—
that of souls governed by the laws of final causes, and that of bodies by the laws of efficient causes.
Donald Rutherford (1995) attempts an explanation, ceding that “to talk of ‘bodies’ at all in this scheme
must be regarded as a type of shorthand” (217).
⁶ The claim that corporeal substances are “heteronomous” to Leibniz’s own metaphysics is made by
Robert Adams, who classes them as “an accommodation to traditionalist concerns of others, especially
3
like Daniel Garber (2009), have presented Leibniz as an Aristotelian realist in his
middle period, have portrayed him as gradually, although not always consistently,
adopting such an idealistic metaphysics in his final years.
In opposition to these readings I have tried to show in my recent books, (2014)
and (2018), how Leibniz’s metaphysics appears in a different light when it is
viewed genetically, rather than as anticipating aspects of Kantian philosophy. His
commitment to the mechanical philosophy was early and lasting, but it was
overlaid on certain principles, both Platonic and Scholastic, that privileged
minds as sources of activity in the world. On the one hand, Leibniz was as
convinced a mechanist as Pierre Gassendi and Robert Boyle, holding that all
natural phenomena are explicable in principle, without appeal to substantial
forms, by efficient causal explanations involving the motions of bodies; on the
other, he subscribed to a view emanating from the Scholastic doctrine of
the plurality of forms, whereby the seeds of all living things were created at the
beginning of the world, each seed consisting in an immaterial form or active
principle dominating the organic body containing it, with the body containing
within itself other bodies activated by their own subordinate forms. This view was
popular among Lutheran philosophers, who held that God’s providential plan for
his creation would naturally unfold from within by the activity of these forms.
Seen in this light Leibniz’s famous doctrine of pre-established harmony was
intended as a solution not just to the mind–body problem bequeathed by
Descartes, but to the deeper problem of how the teleological activity of forms,
leading to the increased perfection of the world, could be reconciled with the
impossibility of the action of immaterial forms on matter.
His commitment to active principles within matter led Leibniz to find fault with
the foundations of the mechanical philosophy. At the forefront of his thought
were problems about the composition of matter and motion, which his contem-
poraries had taken as continua requiring a foundation in elements from which
they are composed. The key thing to understand in this connection, I maintain, is
Leibniz’s sharp division between the continuous and the discrete. The continuum
is not an existing thing, but rather an order according to which existing things are
arranged; it is divisible, but has no actual parts. Matter, on the other hand, is
actually divided to infinity by its internal motions, leaving it an aggregate of actual
parts in contrast to the merely possible parts into which a continuum can be
divided. As something perpetually divided, a body cannot constitute a unified
whole, a true unity, but is only perceived as one. If it is not to be a mere aggregate
Roman Catholics” (Adams 1994, 307). A subtler form of idealism is attributed to Leibniz by Donald
Rutherford (1995, 218), who recognizes that for Leibniz “matter is essentially a multitude of monads”
(221) external to the perceiver, which “happen to give the appearance of being an extended object when
apprehended by other finite monads” (218). With that much I agree; but see chapter 2 of my (2018) for
an analysis and criticism of Rutherford’s further claim that monads are not actually in bodies, but are
only essential requisites of the concept of body.
4
⁷ Also, in agreement with the criticisms of such as Robert Boyle, Leibniz found the idea of forms
being created or annihilated unintelligible; so for him all forms are coeval with the created universe. See
chapter 4 of my (2018).
⁸ See my (2018, ch. 7). This analysis derives support from what Leibniz wrote in a preliminary study
for his letter to Rudolph C. Wagner of June 4, 1710: “And in every living thing the substance is
conceived to be like that which I understand in myself when I say: I; for, even if the mass of my body is
in a continuous flux (so that in my old age I will probably not retain anything of the mass I received
5
perceptions as passing from one to another, even while our bodies undergo
changes and do not remain the same. On this model, Leibniz takes a substance
to be a primary entelechy like the soul, with perception and appetition as its
defining attributes.⁹ This characterizes a substance in essence: an entelechy
always perceives and always has appetition (albeit, not necessarily consciously).
In order to exist, however, a substance must constitute a subject; that is, it must
include a principle of individuation, a basis for distinguishing itself from other
substances. This will depend on the particular content of its perceptions and
appetitions, which will depend on the situation of its own body at different
times. Thus although a monad must have perception and appetition as permanent
attributes, it will only constitute a principle of individuation by virtue of the
concrete perceptions and appetitions which give it its point of view in the world,
situating it spatially in relation to other substances through its body at each time.
Thus having a body is another essential characteristic of any concrete created
substance, along with perception and appetition.¹⁰
Furthermore, it is only through its body that a substance is capable of being
acted upon. Primary matter is the principium passionis, the principle of being
acted upon; “it is related to the whole mass of the organic body.”¹¹ That is, the
primitive passive force of a monad stands in an essential relation to the organic
body of that monad. This force is only manifested in its body, however, as a
derivative passive force: it is the power of resisting the (derivative) active forces of
other substances external to the body, responsible for its resistance to being
penetrated or taking on new motion. In this way the extension of the body is a
result of the diffusion of this passive force, and this in turn requires a body
consisting in a multiplicity of monads as sources of the active and passive forces
in it—what Leibniz calls secondary matter. There is, then, no created monad that
does not have associated with it an organic body of which it is the entelechy, and
when I was born), nonetheless I do remain the same, and the same holds in the case of all living, sensing
and reasoning beings, that they persist even though their mass flows” (LBr 973, Bl. 327r; again, thanks
to Osvaldo Ottaviani for the transcription).
⁹ Indeed, one can argue (as was done in a paper I recently refereed) that the experience of self
establishes the possibility of such a definition of substance, in keeping with Leibniz’s requirement for a
real definition, as opposed to a merely nominal one (as something that acts, for example, or something
that can be distinctly conceived).
¹⁰ Anne-Lise Rey makes much the same point in her introduction, “L’ambivalence de l’action,” to
her edition of the Leibniz-De Volder correspondence: “Si la Machine est bien le situs de la monade qui
exprime la relation d’ordre, il faut indiquer que le situs est la manière dont le point métaphysique donne
son point de vue à la substance et lui permet de s’exprimer par l’entremise des corps. Le situs fonctionne
comme un principe d’individuation de la substance simple dans les corps, qui atteste, par la, de la
présence des substances simples dans les corps” (Leibniz and De Volder 2016, 76).
¹¹ This phrase occurs in the immediate preamble to Leibniz’s famous five-part schema of the
composition of corporeal substance in his letter to Burchard De Volder of June 20, 1703 (GP II 252/
LDV 265). See Pauline Phemister’s illuminating discussion of this schema (Phemister 2005, 50), and of
the whole question of primary matter in chapter 2 of that book.
6
through which it exists in relation to the other monads in the world. And the
monad together with this organic body is a corporeal substance.¹²
Such an analysis provides the basis for my answers to the problems of inter-
pretation sketched above (namely: how can a material body be constituted by an
aggregate of monads if the latter are immaterial? How can it be a phenomenon if
its constituents are real? And how does a mere aggregate differ from an organic
body?) Even though monads are essentially constituted by immaterial principles, a
created monad is never purely immaterial: its material aspect, the primitive
passive force, can only be manifested in reality through the derivative passive
and active forces of the other monads making up its organic body. All secondary
matter consists in aggregates of monads with their organic bodies. A body that is a
mere aggregate, such as a woodpile, is “semi-mental,” in that its unity is provided
through being perceived as one thing. An organic body, by contrast, is the body
associated with a principle of unity; it is called the same organic body despite its
constituents constantly changing, by virtue of its contributing to the actions and
purposes of its principle of unity, the dominant monad.
What this means, I have suggested, is that there is no neat separation into
separate monadic and phenomenal levels, as is supposed by most modern
interpreters.¹³ It is certainly true that substances are more fundamental than
phenomena. But among the phenomena are the derivative forces in bodies that
give rise to their extension and motion. These forces are phenomenal in a sense
that would be accepted by all Leibniz’s contemporaries: they are perceptible,
accessible to the senses. But they are not mere appearances in the mind, and
neither are bodies: centrifugal force, for example, is produced in a rotating body
independently of anyone perceiving it, even if for Leibniz it is not independent of
the possibility of being perceived. At the same time, however, these derivative
forces are phenomenal according to Leibniz because they are transitory modifi-
cations of the powers of the substances from which they arise, rather than being
enduring existents, like the primitive forces that are enduring attributes of the
substances from which the bodies are aggregated.¹⁴ Thus, as Leibniz pointed out to
¹² As Leibniz writes in one drafted passage of his letter to Rudolph Wagner, “Corporeal substance is a
being in itself, for instance, a living being, a man, an animal. For it consists of the primary Entelechy and
the organic body” (LBr. 973, Bl. 326). This is hard to square with some of the things Leibniz says to Des
Bosses in their correspondence concerning substantial bonds; for an attempt, see my (2018), ch. 6, §3.
¹³ A chief proponent of this levels view is Glenn Hartz, who describes it as follows: “after 1695
Leibniz endorsed a fundamental level where the monads and their states reside; just above that he has
bodies, derivative force, motion, extension, and duration at the phenomenal level; and finally at the top
he has the items that are furthest from being taken seriously ontologically. These include space, time,
and "mathematical bodies," which are consigned to the ideal level” (Hartz 1992, 518).
¹⁴ “Therefore, in secondary matter there arise derivative powers, through the modification of primitive
ones; and from this it happens that matter acts in different ways and resists in different ways. . . . Primitive
powers are something substantial, whereas derivative powers are only qualities. Hence, primitive power is
perpetual, and it cannot be naturally destroyed; but derivative power can naturally begin and cease, and
usually does. Substance persists, quality changes” (from the draft of the letter to R. C. Wagner of 1710
referenced in fn. 2 above). He says much the same thing in the Theodicy, §87 (H 170).
7
To be sure, substances are more fundamental than the phenomena resulting from
them, such as bodies, their derivative forces, and their motions; but created
substances can no more exist without their organic bodies than can an extended
figure without a shape. So there is no ontic level on which there are just created
monads, distinct from the phenomenal bodies and motions that are their imme-
diate results, nor does Leibniz ever write of such distinct levels. The ontic level
framework, I contend, is a facet of a Kantian interpretation of Leibniz, where
monads are conceived as denizens of a “noumenal world,” in contrast to the
“phenomenal world” in which bodies are pure appearances in the experiences of
individual subjects.
These considerations are of direct relevance for the correct interpretation of
Leibniz’s views on time, space and motion. For example, as we shall see in
chapter 3, most interpreters of Leibniz’s views on the relativity of motion take
for granted that primitive force must exist “at the metaphysical or monadic level,”
while motions occur “at the phenomenal level.” Motions, on such a view, are mere
appearances of bodies moving in the perceptions of monads; indeed, nothing
really moves, since the monads are not in space (which is ideal). Instead, it is held,
all we have is the appearances of motions, these being the changing relations of
bodies to one another, with these relations constituting phenomenal space (whose
relation to mathematical space, incidentally, is thereby rendered problematic, as
we shall see in chapter 2). Such a construal leaves out of account the derivative
forces of Leibniz’s physics, so these have been held to occur at an intermediate
level of reality (at least during the 1680s and 90s when Leibniz was actively
¹⁵ “And indeed derivative forces are nothing but modifications and results of primitive forces. . . .
Every modification presupposes something lasting” (to De Volder, June 20, 1703; LDV 262–3).
8
formulating and defending his dynamics). So on the latter reading, defended for
instance by Garber (2009) and Anja Jauernig (2008), derivative forces are qualities
of corporeal substances existing on this intermediate level of reality, so that if we
suppose that Leibniz came to reject the existence of corporeal substances in his
maturity, then he would have had to abandon his dynamics too. Yet Leibniz
continues to uphold his dynamics in his maturity, linking it with his metaphysics
of monads consisting in primitive active and passive forces, manifesting them-
selves in the created world as the derivative forces of his physics, as explained
above. It is through the derivative forces that bodies are constituted as extended,
and derive their cohesion and inertia, and it is through the laws governing the
derivative forces (such as the laws of conservation of active force and quantity of
progress) that motions through space are estimated. Just as there could be no
transient modifications without the permanent attributes of the substances they
modify, so there could be no primitive forces in created substances if they could
not manifest themselves externally to any subject as derivative forces acting on
bodies and producing their motions.¹⁶
The transient and momentaneous status of derivative forces has important
implications for Leibniz’s theory of time, which I shall be exploring in detail in
chapter 1 below. Monadic states have been thought to exist on a separate level
from phenomenal states, so that with time pertaining only to the phenomenal
level, relations among the states of monads would have to be atemporal and ideal.
But there is passage within a monad: Leibniz defines the state of a simple
substance or monad as “the transitory state which incorporates and represents a
multitude within a unity” (Monadology, §14). That is his definition of a perception,
while appetition is the principle that “brings about change, or the passage of one
perception to another” (Monadology, §15). Moreover, notably, there is no dis-
tinction to be found here between monadic and perceptual states. A monad,
rather, “cannot continue to exist without being in some state, and that state is
nothing other than its perception,” each such perception containing “a great
multiplicity of smaller perceptions” (Monadology, §21). So the picture we have
is of a monad passing through a sequence of transitory states or perceptions, each
containing smaller ones, and tending by appetition towards future ones in the
same series. The appetition or tendency to pass from one perception to another is
identified by Leibniz with the primitive force of a substance,¹⁷ whereas “derivative
¹⁶ Appetitions do, of course, still manifest themselves internally as desires and other affects, but even
these must correlate (perfectly) with external phenomena, the pain with the thorn in the flesh, and so
forth: “anyone who has some perception in his soul can be certain he has received some effect of that in
his body” (“Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason” §4, C 12/MW 173).
¹⁷ “It believe it is evident that primitive forces can be nothing other than the internal tendencies of
simple substances, by which they pass from perception to perception by an internal law, and that they
agree [conspirant] with one another at the same time, relating the same phenomena of the universe in a
different arrangement, something which necessarily originates from a common cause” (to De Volder,
January 1705 (?); LDV 319).
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È un vero tipo della specie. S’Historia de Juseppe Hebreu, Dramma
Sard, in due atti; ognuno dei quali ha dodici scene. Noi non daremo
che la scena fra Giuseppe e la moglie di Putifarre. Udite la poco
casta signora:
Eccovi un altro lamento poetico del cieco Cherchi sulla sua vita
infelice:
La vicchiaia è vinuta
Candu mi figurava più piccinnu:
Drummitu era, e mi sciuta,
Gridendi: già se’ vecchiu, e senza sinnu,
Mallugratu haï l’anni
In middi pregiudizi, in midd’inganni
Vedete, quanta vera poesia vi sia in questi altri suoi versi Lu Tempu:
Possa questa rapida corsa fatta nel campo della poesia sarda
averne segnato il profilo saliente; possa destare in alcuno la voglia di
tradurne alcuna fra le più belle; onde gli Italiani possano tutti gustare
le bellezze poetiche di una italianissima fra le nostre provincie.
CAPITOLO V.
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