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Full download Honesty : The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue Christian B. Miller file pdf all chapter on 2024
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Honesty
Honesty
The Philosophy and Psychology of a
Neglected Virtue
C H R I S T IA N B. M I L L E R
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197567494.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
To Lillian Joyous Miller
For all the joy and laughter you bring to our lives
Contents
I . T H E P H I L O S O P H Y O F HO N E S T Y
I N T E R LU D E
I I . T H E E M P I R IC A L DATA
If you ask people today to name some of the virtues, honesty will often
show up on their list. It is a perfectly familiar virtue. It is also widely
accepted as a virtue. Unlike some other character traits, such as chas-
tity or humility, there is little controversy about whether honesty is a
moral excellence that is worth cultivating.1 It seems clear enough, too,
that honesty is a tremendously important virtue. Parents want to de-
velop it in their children. Close relationships typically depend upon it.
Employers value it in their employees.
Yet, despite these observations, philosophers have—stunningly, in
my view—almost completely omitted the virtue of honesty from their
professional writing. This is one of the only books to discuss the virtue
of honesty in detail since at least the 1970s.2 Furthermore, at the time
I was writing these words, there had been almost no articles in main-
stream journals in analytic philosophy on the virtue of honesty in at
1 As Linda Zagzebski (1996: 158) writes, “honesty is on all accounts a moral virtue.”
Similarly Tara Smith (2006: 75) claims that honesty “is probably the single most widely
endorsed virtue by people of divergent views on many other aspects of morality’s
substantive instruction.” And Howard Curzer (2012: 195) remarks, “Honesty is on
everyone’s list of virtues.”
2 Sissela Bok’s 1978 book, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life is the book
most comparable to this one that I am aware of, but it was focused narrowly on lying,
which is only one kind of dishonest behavior. Tom Carson’s 2010 book, Lying and
Deception: Theory and Practice has just one chapter on honesty as a virtue. He also notes
that “philosophers have written very little about the concept of honesty and the idea of
honesty as a virtue” (257). See also Michaelson and Stokke (2018), which is an edited
volume focused more narrowly on lying with little discussion of the virtue of honesty,
as well as chapter 5 of Karen Stohr’s (2012) On Manners. Also noteworthy is Bernard
Williams’s 2002 book, Truth and Truthfulness, and Andreas Stokke’s 2018 book, Lying
and Insincerity.
Interestingly, Bok herself was making the same observation back in 1978 about the
lack of work in this area: “The striking fact is that, though no moral choices are more
common or more troubling than those which have to do with deception in its many
guises, they have received extraordinarily little contemporary analysis. The major works
of moral philosophy of this century, so illuminating in other respects, are silent on this
subject” (xix).
x Preface: A Neglected Virtue
least fifty years.3 Edited volumes and monographs have snippets of dis-
cussion here and there,4 but even the leading collections on the virtues
and vices tend to omit honesty and dishonesty altogether.5 To make
matters worse, major Western philosophers such as Aristotle have had
little to say about honesty.6
What explains this neglect, especially when there has been a huge
resurgence of interest in virtue and virtue ethics dating back at least to
the 1970s? I do not have a good answer to this question.7 In the case of
the virtue of modesty, for instance, Julia Driver wrote an important and
controversial article, which helped to launch a small research industry
on this virtue.8 However, until just recently, no one has taken that first
step with respect to honesty, which might in turn spark responses and
refinements.9
It could be that philosophers have felt that there just is not much
of philosophical interest to say about honesty. Or perhaps they have
tended to assume that, at the end of the day, honesty is not really a dis-
tinct virtue in its own right and can be reduced to other virtues, like
justice and truthfulness. Or what is most likely the case is that since no
one is saying much about honesty, philosophers haven’t formed many
assumptions about it one way or the other. Their attention has been
elsewhere, and it has simply been overlooked.
3 The closest journal article in the neighborhood might be Louis Guenin’s 2005 paper,
“Intellectual Honesty.” Martin (1993) has some discussion of honesty, although much
of its focus is on love. In her 2003 paper, Tara Smith spends two paragraphs on what the
virtue of honesty is and devotes the rest of the paper to why honesty is valuable. Also rel-
evant is Carr (2014), although it did not appear in a philosophy journal.
Slowly our team here at Wake Forest University has been trying to change this trend.
See, for instance, important papers by two of my former postdoctoral fellows (Wilson
2018; Roberts and West 2020), as well as not so important papers by Miller (2015, 2017a,
2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and the papers in our edited
volume on honesty, integrity, and truth seeking (Miller and West 2020).
4 For an exception, see Baier (1990).
5 See, e.g., Timpe and Boyd (2014).
6 The closest Aristotle gets is the virtue that pertains to truthfully talking about one-
self (1127a114–1127b33), although he does at one point note in passing that there are
other issues pertaining to being truthful, and that on his view they should fall under
the heading of justice (1127a33–1127b1). For related discussion, see Carson (2010: 257–
258) and especially Curzer (2012: chapter 10).
7 For Bok’s speculations, see her 1978: xx, 10–12.
8 See Driver (1989).
9 For my attempt, see Miller (2017a).
Preface: A Neglected Virtue xi
For the past decade, my interest in the topic of character has combined
more conceptual work in philosophy with the results of empirical
studies in psychology. This book will be no exception. Part I is on the
conceptual side and will offer a new account of the virtue of honesty.
In the process it will take up themes such as the scope of the virtue, the
motivational dimension of honesty, the role of practical wisdom, and
what the corresponding vices are to honesty.
Chapter 7 will serve as a bridge chapter or interlude between the
conceptual and the empirical parts of the book. Its focus is on tax-
onomy, and it will raise several conceptual issues about how to cate-
gorize people’s character in this moral domain. But it will also draw on
empirical work being done in positive psychology with the Values-in-
Action classification.
Part II turns to questions about whether most people as a matter of
fact do have the virtue of honesty and, if not, what their character looks
like instead. Here I dive into the latest research literature on stealing,
promise-breaking, lying, and cheating. The last chapter in this section
tries to put all the pieces together by offering an explanatory account
of the data, followed by a moral assessment of how good most people
would turn out to be if the explanatory account is correct.
The book ends with an afterword on how to close what I have called
the “character gap.”10 In this case it is the gap between how our char-
acter should be (deeply honest) and how it tends to actually be. I sug-
gest, at least in a preliminary way, that the ideas offered in the book
can provide some guidance as we start to think about strategies for be-
coming better.
Let me be up front about two topics I will not be exploring in the
book, especially since some readers might be expecting a discussion
10 Miller (2017d).
xii Preface: A Neglected Virtue
of them. The first topic is the definition of lying. There is a small but
growing literature on how exactly to define lying, given that the tra-
ditional definition, which dates back at least to Augustine, has been
widely rejected.11 This literature has quickly become complex and
technical, and for my purposes I do not need to delve into it. My focus
will be on uncontroversial cases of lying.
Second, I do not consider whether lying is ever morally permissible.
Here too we find a long-standing view which in recent years has faced
steadfast resistance. While there are a few defenders of the strict posi-
tion that lying is always morally wrong,12 most ethicists today allow for
exceptions, say in emergency rescue cases where a family of Jews can
be protected from the Nazis. Although my own sympathies rest with
the majority, I will try as much as possible to remain neutral on this
debate.
Intended Audience
My most recent book, The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, was a
trade book written for a nonacademic audience and did not presup-
pose any background in philosophy or psychology. In this book, I have
returned to more academic writing, although down the road I hope to
use the ideas here in a book for a wider audience. But for now, this is a
book aimed mainly at academics in philosophy, psychology, and reli-
gion, as well as others who are interested in the virtue of honesty. It will
use some of the machinery of contemporary analytic philosophy, but
hopefully the writing will be accessible to graduate students and un-
dergraduate majors in these fields. Many of the chapters should also be
accessible to a well-informed nonacademic audience.
The central ideas in this book were first developed for a conference
on character that we organized at Wake Forest University, whose pa-
pers were subsequently published by MIT Press as Moral Psychology,
volume 5. I am grateful for all the support of my coeditor of that
volume, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, as well as his very helpful feed-
back. The next big step was the opportunity to be on leave for an
academic year to expand the discussion from a paper to a book manu-
script. Thanks so much to the Wake Forest University Reynolds leave
program and the Thomas J. Lynch Fund for so generously supporting
me during this year. Win-Chiat Lee and Ralph Kennedy were my de-
partment chairs during the writing of this book, and I couldn’t have
asked for better. They are extraordinary.
Work on this book has spanned two major grant projects I have been
fortunate to be a part of at Wake Forest: the Beacon Project, funded
by the Templeton Religion Trust, and the Honesty Project, funded by
the John Templeton Foundation. Naturally the opinions expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of either Templeton foundation. Special thanks to Chris Stewart, John
Churchill, Alex Arnold, Sarah Clement, Michael Murray, and Richard
Bollinger.
Peter Ohlin at Oxford University Press has once again been a joy
to work with, and I am very appreciative of his support of my work.
Many thanks as well to Meridith Murray for preparing the index so
carefully. The two reviewers for Oxford, one of whom subsequently
identified himself as Paul Bloomfield, sent along tremendously
helpful comments that substantially improved the book. I am greatly
in their debt. The same is true of the Honesty Project reading group,
which workshopped the conceptual chapters and caught a number
of problems. Thanks so much for helpful comments to Emily Austin,
William Fleeson, R. Michael Furr, Eranda Jayawickreme, Kathleen
Stimely, Gregory Robson, Logan Martin, Cameron Silverglate, and
xvi Acknowledgments
1 For an earlier version of the ideas in this chapter, see Miller (2017a).
Honesty. Christian B. Miller, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197567494.003.0001
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similar places. The two latter occur in chains formed by fission; but
the sexual individuals (which are of distinct sexes, contrary to the
usual hermaphrodite condition of Flat Worms) only appear at stated
times and are not well known. A large number of genera are purely
marine, and one family, the Proboscidae (distinguished by having the
anterior end invaginated by special muscles and converted into a
sensory organ), is entirely so. The most cursory examination of
littoral weeds reveals species of Macrorhynchus, Acrorhynchus,
Promesostoma, Byrsophlebs, and Proxenetes, the character of
which may be gathered from von Graffs great monograph, or from
Gamble's paper on the "British Marine Turbellaria."[65] Much,
however, still remains to be done before we possess an adequate
idea of the occurrence of this group on our coasts.
Classification of Rhabdocoelida.
ACOELA.
Family. Genus and British species.
Proporidae Proporus venenosus O. Sch. Plymouth.
Monoporus rubropunctatus O. Sch.
Plymouth.
Haplodiscus.
Aphanostomatidae Aphanostoma diversicolor Oe. Common.
A. elegans Jen. Plymouth.
Convoluta saliens Grff. Plymouth,
Millport.
C. paradoxa Oe. (Fig. 19, B). Common.
C. flavibacillum Jen. Plymouth, Port
Erin, Millport.
Amphicoerus.
Polychoerus.
RHABDOCOELA.
Macrostomatidae Mecynostoma.
Macrostoma hystrix Oe. Stagnant water.
Omalostoma.
Microstomatidae Microstoma lineare Oe. Fresh water.
M. groelandicum Lev. Plymouth, among
Ulva.
Stenostoma (Catenula) lemnae Dug.
Near Cork.
S. leucops O. Sch. Common in fresh
water.
Alaurina claparedii Grff. Skye.
Prorhynchidae Prorhynchus stagnalis M. Sch. In
Devonshire rivers.
Promesostoma marmoratum M. Sch.
Common.
P. ovoideum O. Sch., P. agile Lev.
Plymouth. P. solea O. Sch. Plymouth,
Port Erin. P. lenticulatum O. Sch. Port
Erin.
Mesostomatidae Byrsophlebs graffii Jen. Plymouth,
Millport.
B. intermedia Grff. Millport, Port Erin.
Proxenetes flabellifer Jen. Millport,
Plymouth, Port Erin.
P. cochlear Grff. Millport.
Otomesostoma.
Mesostoma productum Leuck., M. lingua
O. Sch., M. ehrenbergii O. Sch., M.
tetragonum O. F. M. (Fig. 19, A). All at
Cambridge.
M. rostratum Ehr. Widely distributed. M.
viridatum M. Sch. Manchester. M.
robertsonii Grff., M. flavidum Grff. Both
at Millport.
Bothromesostoma personatum O. Sch.
Preston.
Castrada.
Proboscidae Pseudorhynchus bifidus M‘Int. Millport,
St. Andrews, Port Erin.
Acrorhynchus caledonicus Clap.
Generally distributed.
Macrorhynchus naegelii Köll., M. croceus
Fabr. Plymouth, Millport.
M. helgolandicus Metsch. West coast.
Gyrator hermaphroditus Ehrbg. St.
Andrews. Also common in fresh water.
Hyporhynchus armatus Jen. Plymouth,
Port Erin.
H. penicillatus O. Sch. Plymouth.
Vorticidae Schultzia. Provortex balticus M. Sch.
Generally distributed.
P. affinis Jen., P. rubrobacillus Gamb.
Plymouth.
Vortex truncatus Ehrbg. Abundant in
fresh water.
V. armiger O. Sch. Millport (fresh water).
V. schmidtii Grff., V. millportianus Grff.
Millport. V. viridis M. Sch. Generally
distributed.
Jensenia.
Opistoma.
Derostoma unipunctatum Oe. Edinburgh.
Graffilla.
Anoplodium.
Fecampia erythrocephala Giard.
Plymouth, Port Erin.
Solenopharyngidae Solenopharynx.
ALLOEOCOELA.
Plagiostomatidae Acmostoma. Plagiostoma dioicum
Metsch., P. elongatum Gamb., P.
pseudomaculatum Gamb., P. sagitta
Ulj., P. caudatum Lev., P.
siphonophorum O. Sch., P.
ochroleucum Grff. All at Plymouth.
P. sulphureum Grff. Port Erin. P. vittatum
F. and Leuck. Millport, Plymouth, Port
Erin. P. koreni Jen. Plymouth, Millport.
P. girardi O. Sch. Plymouth, Port Erin,
Valencia.
Vorticeros auriculatum O. F. M. (Fig. 19,
C). Port Erin, Plymouth.
V. luteum Grff. Plymouth.
Enterostoma austriacum Grff. Plymouth,
Port Erin.
E. fingalianum Clap. Skye, Plymouth. E.
coecum Grff. Millport.
Allostoma pallidum van Ben. Millport.
Cylindrostoma 4-oculatum Leuck. Skye,
Millport, Plymouth.
C. inerme Hall, C. elongatum Lev.
Plymouth.
Monoophorum striatum Grff. Plymouth.
Bothrioplanidae Bothrioplana.
Bothrioplana sp.? Manchester.
Otoplana.
Monotidae Monotus lineatus O. F. M., M. fuscus Oe.
(Fig. 19, D). Both common littoral
forms.
M. albus Lev. Plymouth.
Automolos unipunctatus Oe. Skye, St.
Andrews, Plymouth.
A. horridus Gamb., A. ophiocephalus O.
Sch. Plymouth.
CHAPTER II
TREMATODA
The mouth is invariably present just beneath the anterior end of the
body. It leads into a muscular, pumping pharynx (Fig. 24, ph), and
this into a bifurcated intestine which ends blindly. The two openings
of the excretory system lie on the dorsal surface (as in
Temnocephala), and the excretory canals branch through the
substance of the body, ending usually in "flame-cells." The nervous
system is highly developed, and resembles that of Temnocephala
(Fig. 21) in detail. Upon the brain one or even two pairs of eye-spots
are present in the larvae, and may persist throughout life. Tactile
setae occur in Sphyranura, a parasite of the North American
Amphibian Necturus, but a cellular epidermis is apparently rendered
impossible, perhaps from the nature of the mucus in which the body
is bathed, or to the attempts of the host to free itself from these
parasites; and hence an investing membrane is present, which
morphologically is either a modified epithelium, or a cuticle formed
by the glandular secretion of the parenchyma.
Diplozoon paradoxum lays its eggs on the gills of the Minnow, which
it frequently infests in great numbers. The ovum divides rapidly at the
expense of the yolk-cells, and in a fortnight a larva (.2 mm. long) of
the shape and complexity shown in Fig. 27, B, hatches out, which,
however, succumbs if it does not meet with a Minnow in five or six
hours. Should it survive, a dorsal papilla, a median ventral sucker,
and a second pair of posterior suckers develop. Thus the Diporpa
stage is attained. These Diporpa may acquire a third and even a
fourth pair of suckers, and continue to live three months, but they
only develop and mature their reproductive organs, if each
conjugates with another Diporpa (Fig. 27, C, D), and this only occurs
in a small percentage of instances. Each grasps the dorsal papilla of
the other by its own ventral sucker, thus undergoing a certain
amount of torsion. Where the two bodies touch, complete fusion
occurs, and, as shown in Fig. 28, the united Diporpa (or Diplozoon,
as the product is now called) decussate, each forming one limb of
the X-shaped Diplozoon, within which the two sets of complex
genitalia develop (Fig. 28).