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The Philosophy of Science
OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

General Editor:
Paul Humphreys, University of Virginia

Advisory Board
Anouk Barberousse (European Editor)
Robert W. Batterman
Jeremy Butterfield
Peter Galison
Philip Kitcher
Margaret Morrison
James Woodward

The Book of Evidence Making Things Happen: A Theory of

Peter Achinstein Causal Explanation
Science, Truth, and Democracy James Woodward
Philip Kitcher Mathematics and Scientific
Inconsistency, Asymmetery, and Non-​ Representation
Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Christopher Pincock
Classical Electrodynamics Simulation and Similarity: Using
Mathias Frisch Models to Understand the World
The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Michael Weisberg
Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Systemacity: The Nature of Science
Emergence Paul Hoyningen-​Huene
Robert W. Batterman Causation and Its Basis in
Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Fundamental Physics
Approach to Models and Scientific Douglas Kutach
Reasoning Reconstructing Reality: Models,
Newton C. A. da Costa and Mathematics, and Simulations
Steven French Margaret Morrison
Inventing Temperature: Measurement The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the
and Scientific Progress Foundations of the Social Sciences
Hasok Chang Brian Epstein
The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Understanding Scientific
Physics 1915–​1925 Understanding
Thomas Ryckman Henk de Regt
The Philosophy of Science

A C O M PA N I O N

Edited by
Anouk Barberousse, Denis Bonnay, and Mikaël Cozic

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Editions Vuibert-Paris 2011 as Précis de Philosophie des Sciences

© English translation Oxford University Press 2018
© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​069064–​9

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Contents

Preface vii
Acknowledgments xiii
About the Contributors xv

Part I | General Philosophy of Science

1. Scientific Explanation—​Denis Bonnay 3

2. Confirmation and Induction—​Mikaël Cozic 53

3. Causality—​Max Kistler 95

4. Metaphysics of Science as Naturalized Metaphysics—​Michael Esfeld 142

5. Theories and Models—​Marion Vorms 171

6. Scientific Change—​Anouk Barberousse and Marion Vorms 225

7. Philosophy of Science and Science Studies—​Anouk Barberousse 259

8. Reduction and Emergence—​Pascal Ludwig 285

Part II | Philosophy of the Special Sciences

9. Philosophy of Logic—​Philippe de Rouilhan 319

10. Philosophy of Mathematics—​Denis Bonnay and Jacques Dubucs 349

11. Philosophy of Physics—​Anouk Barberousse 405

 hilosophy of Biology—​Thomas Pradeu 430

12. P

 hilosophy of Medicine—​Élodie Giroux and Maël Lemoine 464

13. P

14. Philosophy of Social Sciences—​Jon Elster and Hélène Landemore 510

15. Philosophy of Economics—​Mikaël Cozic 542

v
vi Contents
16. Philosophy of Cognitive Science—​Daniel Andler 595

17. Philosophy of Linguistics—​Paul Égré 654

Index 727
Preface

General Introduction

Philosophy of science has the aim of answering those questions raised by scientific ac-
tivity that are not directly addressed by science itself. Among such questions, we can
mention: What are the overall goals of science, as well as the specific goals of its var-
ious branches? By what means are these goals pursued? What basic principles does it
put into practice? Philosophy of science also tries to understand the relationships that
exist between the scientific disciplines. To what extent, and in what sense, are they,
and should they be, unified? Also belonging to its domain is the relationship between
science and reality. What, if anything, does science tell us about reality? And to what
extent is it justified in making the claims it does?
Just like the sciences themselves, current philosophy of science is multifaceted and
specialized. A philosopher of science may embark on projects as diverse as the develop-
ment of a formal analysis of the concept of confirmation using probability theory and
the study of the potential contribution neuroscience may bring to our understanding
of consciousness. Thus, it becomes difficult for both students and researchers within
a given domain to be aware of the advances and challenges arising in any specific area
in philosophy of science.
The aim of the present book is to expose the main questions, as well as some of the
answers, being discussed in today’s philosophy of science. We view it as the “missing
link” between introductions and research, and our own goals will have been met if this
book successfully bridges the gap between introductions to the philosophy of science
meant for a general audience on the one hand, and research articles and monographs
vii
viii Preface
on the other. It is therefore primarily intended for the use of advanced undergrad-
uate or graduate students who, after a first introduction to the area, may now wish to
deepen their knowledge. We also hope that The Philosophy of Science: A Companion will
be useful to both junior and senior researchers in philosophy of science wishing to fa-
miliarize themselves with areas outside of their own.
Philosophy of science has become too specialized for this goal to be achieved by any
one person. Thus, our book is a collective effort. We have nevertheless endeavored to
present the basic problems that shape contemporary philosophy of science in a co-
herent way. In contrast with encyclopedias, where contributions tend to simply coexist
and thus lack organic unity, we have tried to maximize complementarity and cross-​
referencing between the chapters. Our hope is that this has favored a strong sense of
unity, something that is always hard to attain in such collective undertakings.

Part I: General Philosophy of Science

The two parts of The Philosophy of Science mirror the traditional distinction between
general philosophy of science and philosophy of the special sciences. General Philosophy
of Science (Part I) deals with generic issues raised by scientific activity, independent
of specific disciplines. General philosophy of science was the very core of philosophy
of science up to the middle of the twentieth century. Philosophy of science itself has
dramatically evolved over the last several decades, becoming increasingly devoted to
issues raised by specific scientific disciplines. The study of general problems never-
theless remains a highly active element of philosophy of science. Moreover, it is our
opinion that the study of these general problems is indispensable to those who focus
on the philosophy of some particular scientific discipline or area, since they represent
a set of tools invaluable to understanding their own, specific objects of study.
The objective of the first part of the book is twofold. We intend to both take stock
of the traditional questions which have shaped analytic philosophy of science and to
introduce certain problems that have been raised more recently. Thus the first two
chapters, bearing upon explanation and confirmation, respectively, tackle issues that
were the subject of intense debate in the middle of the twentieth century—​notably
among philosophers of science influenced by logical empiricism—​and which, as we
shall see, are still much studied today. With causality, c­ hapter 3 also focuses on a tra-
ditional concept, though one to which logical empiricism has been rather hostile.
Causality is now at the epicenter of a very vibrant area, straddling the borders of phi-
losophy of science and metaphysics. Metaphysics is also at the heart of c­ hapter 4, which
deals with scientific realism (an issue that underwent a thorough overhaul during the
1980s) and the metaphysics of science, constituting a topic that is much discussed
today. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of knowing how best to analyze some of science’s
primary products, namely theories and models. Starting from the “received view” of
scientific theories, inherited from logical empiricism, it discusses the objections that
have been raised against this view while also looking at alternative conceptions. Lastly,
­chapter 8 deals with issues surrounding the reduction and emergence of properties
 Preface ix
and/​or theories coming from distinct scientific disciplines. Logical empiricism also
contributed greatly to this research area. We shall see that current reflection on the
matter is closely related to metaphysics, philosophy of knowledge, and sometimes also
to the philosophy of the special sciences (particularly the philosophy of mind).
In our view, these six topics—​explanation, confirmation, causality, scientific re-
alism, the nature of theories and models, and reduction—​constitute the core of gen­
eral philosophy of science, even if they do not exhaust it. This latter consideration
in mind, two further issues are also touched on in Part I. Chapter 6 studies the di-
achronic dimensions of scientific activity, a topic made famous by Kuhn’s much cel-
ebrated book (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962/​1970). Chapter 7 is more
meta-​philosophical in character: it reviews the relations between philosophy of science
and other approaches (notably historical and sociological) which share in the aim of
analyzing scientific activity and which are currently referred to as sciences studies.
Although comprehensive, this does not cover all topics having a justifiable claim to the
label of general philosophy of science. For instance, the growing literature on statistics
and statistical reasoning is not represented. But it is our contention that Part I of The
Philosophy of Science will provide the reader with a satisfyingly complete survey of con-
temporary general philosophy of science.

Part II: Philosophy of the Special Sciences

For several decades, philosophers of science have increasingly directed their attention
toward the finer details of scientific activity, in particular to issues exclusive to specific
disciplines. These issues are the object of the philosophy of the special sciences, to
which the second part of The Philosophy of Science is devoted.
Compared with general philosophy of science, philosophy of the special sciences
appears two-​sided. Certain problems are essentially instances or applications of
issues belonging to general philosophy of science. In this case, more often than not,
the targeted area of knowledge requires some reconsideration of the issue on the
part of the philosopher. For instance, the issue of justification or confirmation of
theories raises specific problems when one studies, let’s say, economic or mathemat-
ical theories, as opposed to theories from physics, which often serve to illustrate con-
firmation theories. By contrast, certain other issues in the philosophy of the special
sciences are entirely generated by the specific concepts and methods of a given field.
The discussions on the concept of function (in biology) or on the nature of linguistic
universals (in linguistics) are two cases in point. The main objective of the second part
of this volume is to introduce the reader to a representative sample of the issues that
currently structure the philosophy of the special sciences. We have done our best to
respect this two-​sided character, i.e., to show how some of the issues are very closely
linked to the “big” issues in general philosophy of science while others are specific to
certain specialized domains of science.
The first two chapters of Part II are devoted to the philosophy of the formal sciences.
More precisely, ­chapter 9 is concerned with logic and ­chapter 10 with mathematics. The
x Preface
philosophy of the formal sciences has often been left out of handbooks or textbooks
on the philosophy of science. One of the reasons that implicitly underpins this state of
affairs is that the issues raised by these formal sciences can seem remote from those
raised by bona fide empirical sciences. But there are other reasons that speak in favor
of integrating philosophical discussion on these disciplines. First, there is some inter-
esting convergence between certain issues in the philosophy of the formal sciences
and other issues in general philosophy of science, for example, those related to the
nature of explanation. Second, there are certain other issues which call for a unified
and coordinated answer from both the philosophy of the formal sciences and other
branches within philosophy of science. For example, understanding why mathematics
fits into the physical world so well—​an issue that lies at the border between the philos-
ophy of mathematics and the philosophy of physics. Or the problem of understanding
mathematical cognition, which is of interest to both philosophy of mathematics and
cognitive science.
Chapters 11 and 12 are devoted to the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of
biology, respectively. These two areas have a special status in philosophy of science.
Philosophy of physics is considered basic because physics is viewed as the fundamental
scientific discipline. This means at least two things. First, that physics is an area where
scientific reasoning is supposed to reach its zenith, and thus, in particular, that it is
indispensable to be at least minimally familiar with it if one wishes to gain an under-
standing of scientific reasoning in general. And, second, that it is crucial to clarify the
picture of the world as it is depicted by the physical sciences. Philosophy of biology
has become an extremely active field, such that there is probably no other area in the
philosophy of the special sciences whose importance has grown more over the last two
decades.
An entire chapter is devoted to the philosophy of medicine. Our main reason for this
is that philosophy of medicine is an area where philosophy of science overlaps with
normative and practical philosophy. This reveals itself with respect to the question of
whether the concepts of health and illness have an essential normative dimension,
and also as regards the study of clinical reasoning. In both cases, the discussion goes
beyond the purely epistemic point of view dominant in the philosophy of the natural
sciences.
Another particular feature of Part II is the space we have devoted to philosophy
of the human and social sciences (­chapters 14 to 17). Interestingly, in these areas
the philosopher’s stance and corresponding expectations may differ from those that
are generally endorsed in the philosophy of the natural sciences. In the former area,
philosophers often assume that there is nothing wrong with the way science is done
and thus refrain from making recommendations to scientists or from criticizing their
methods. Not so in the latter case, and this is to be expected, since there are far more
methodological uncertainties, debates, and disagreements involved in the human and
social sciences.
Chapters 14 and 15 broach the social sciences. Chapter 14 deals with general issues
in the philosophy of the social sciences, for example, methodological individualism
 Preface xi
and the relations between social sciences and cognitive sciences. Chapter 15 focuses
on one specific social science, economics. This emphasis is to be welcomed, in light
of the scientific and social impact of economics, and all the more so since it currently
constitutes a particularly active field of study for philosophers.
The last two chapters are organized in a similar way. Both are devoted to disciplines
that study human cognition. Chapter 16 is a general presentation of the issues raised
by cognitive science from the point of view of philosophy of science. Chapter 17, on the
other hand, bears on one specific discipline—​linguistics. While philosophy of language
is a well-​structured and well-​known area in philosophy, there are relatively few phil-
osophical discussions on linguistics as a science. Both for this reason and for the fact
that the philosophy of cognitive science focuses more on disciplines like psychology
and neuroscience, we deemed it fitting to devote a whole chapter to linguistics.
Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the contributors to this volume, to Thierry Martin (the editor of
the series in which an earlier version of The Philosophy of Science was published, under
the title “Précis de Philosophie des Sciences” in 2011), to Daniel Andler who brought
financial support to this initial version through his Senior Fellowship of the Institut
Universitaire de France and to Christopher Robertson, who translated many of the
chapters’ earlier versions. The current version has benefited from the comments of two
anonymous referees. It was notably supported by the Institute of Cognitive Studies at
Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris) under grant ANR-​10-​L ABEX-​0087 IEC and by Mikaël
Cozic’s Junior Fellowship of the Institut Universitaire de France. Lastly, we wish to
thank the Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences et des techniques (UMR
8590, Paris I—​ENS Ulm—​CNRS), which has provided us with a highly stimulating sci-
entific environment for 15 years.
Anouk Barberousse, Denis Bonnay, and Mikaël Cozic, Paris, January 2018.

xiii
About the Contributors

Daniel Andler is a philosopher of science focusing on cognitive science. His interests

include the philosophical issue of naturalism, the impact of cognitive science on the
social sciences and their relevance for societal issues like education and public policy,
and artificial intelligence. He is professor emeritus at the Sorbonne and a member of
the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques.
Anouk Barberousse is a professor of philosophy of science at Sorbonne Université,
Paris, where she teaches general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and
philosophy of scientific expertise. She has recently written on the epistemology of
computer simulation, the philosophy of probability, and the role of databanks in our
knowledge of biodiversity.
Denis Bonnay is an assistant professor in philosophy at Université Paris Nanterre,
working in logic, philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive science. His re-
search ranges from works on the nature of logic and the boundaries between logic and
mathematics to studies on judgment aggregation and group beliefs.
Mikaël Cozic (Paris-​Sorbonne University, PhD, 2005) is an assistant professor at the
Paris-​Est University, a researcher and head of the group “Decision, rationality and in-
teraction” at the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
and a member of the Institut d’Universitaire de France. He studied philosophy (Ecole
Normale Supérieure de Paris, 1997–​2002), logic (University Paris-​Diderot, MSc, 2002),
and cognitive science (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, MA, 2001) in
Paris. Professor Cozic’s research focuses primarily on philosophy of economics and

xv
xvi About the Contributors
formal theories of rationality. His current research concerns the relationship between
cognitive science and positive and normative economics, as well as several issues
in Bayesian epistemology, including the revision of one’s beliefs upon learning the
opinion of others.
Jacques Dubucs is a senior scientist at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
and the head of the Social Sciences and Humanities Department at the French Ministry
of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation. His scientific work deals with logic
and philosophy of science.
Paul Égré (born 1975; PhD, 2004) is directeur de recherche at Institut Jean-​Nicod
(CNRS) and an associate professor in the Philosophy Department of Ecole Normale
Supérieure in Paris. Besides work in formal semantics and on the epistemology of lin-
guistic theory, a large part of Paul Egré’s work over the last decade has been on the
topic of vagueness in language and in perception, dealing with semantic, logical, and
psychological aspects of the phenomenon. Since 2012, Egré is also the editor-​in-​chief
of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Jon Elster is the Robert K. Merton Professor of Social Science at Columbia University.
He is the author or editor of more than thirty-​five books translated into more than
seventeen languages on the philosophy of social sciences, the theory of rational choice,
political psychology, deliberative democracy, and the history of political thought (Marx
and Tocqueville), to name a few of their subjects. He is currently working on a compar-
ative study of the Federal Convention (1787) and the first French constituent assembly
(1789–​1791).
Michael Esfeld is full professor of science at the University of Lausanne. His research
is in the metaphysics of science, the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of
mind. His latest book publication is A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World, with
Dirk-​André Deckert (New York: Routledge, 2017).
Élodie Giroux is an assistant professor at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University, where
she teaches philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine. She is director of the
master’s in “Culture and Health.” Her main research interests are the history and
epistemology of “risk factor epidemiology”; causation in medicine and public health;
and risk, health, and disease concepts. She is currently working on precision medi-
cine. Besides several papers on modern epidemiology, she published Après Canguilhem,
définir la santé et la maladie (Paris: PUF, 2010) and Naturalism in the Philosophy of Health
(Cham: Springer, 2016), and she edited a special issue on the history of risk factor ep-
idemiology in Revue d’Histoire des Sciences (2011) and on precision medicine in Lato
Sensu (2018).
Max Kistler is professor at the Department of Philosophy at University Paris 1
Panthéon–Sorbonne and head of IHPST (Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des
Sciences et des Techniques). His research topics include causation, powers and
dispositions, laws of nature, natural kinds, and reduction. He is the author of Causation
 About the Contributors xvii
and Laws of Nature (Routledge, 2006), L’esprit matériel. Réduction et émergence (Ithaque,
2016), and coeditor (with B. Gnassounou) of Dispositions and Causal Powers (Ashgate,
2007).
Hélène Landemore is an associate professor of political science at Yale University. She
is a political theorist interested in democratic theory, theories of justice, Enlightenment
thinkers, and the philosophy of social sciences. Her book Democratic Reason (Princteon,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013) was awarded the 2015 David and Elaine Spitz
Prize for best book in liberal and/​or democratic theory published two years earlier. She
is currently writing a new book on postrepresentative or “open” democracy.
Maël Lemoine is a professor at the University of Bordeaux, France, where he teaches
philosophy of medical science. He published an introductory essay in the philosophy
of medical science in 2017 and has recently published various articles on biological re-
search in psychiatry, animal models, and precision medicine.
Pascal Ludwig is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne
Université, Paris. He has coauthered several books on the philosophy of science and
the philosophy of the mind.
Thomas Pradeu is a CNRS senior investigator in philosophy of science (permanent
position) at ImmunoConcept (CNRS and University of Bordeaux), and associated
member at the Institut d’Histoire et des Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
(CNRS and University Pantheon–​Sorbonne). His research focuses on biological indi-
viduality, immunology, the microbiota, and the interactions between philosophy and
science.
Philippe de Rouilhan is a senior researcher emeritus at the CNRS and a member of
the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS and
Université Panthéon–​Sorbonne), of which he was the director for a long time. His work
pertains to logic lato sensu or, more specifically, to formal ontology, formal semantics,
philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. He is cur-
rently preparing a book on truth, logical consequence, and logical universalism.
Marion Vorms is a lecturer (maître de conférences) in philosophy at University Paris 1
Panthéon–​Sorbonne and a Marie Curie fellow at Birkbeck College, London, psychology
department. Her past work in philosophy of science concerns the nature of scientific
theories and representations. Her new project, which is at the crossroads of episte-
mology and the psychology of reasoning, bears on the notion of reasonable doubt; she
is particularly interested in judicial reasoning and decision-​making.
 1

General Philosophy of Science

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Suomen Kansan
Vanhoja Runoja ynnä myös Nykyisempiä Lauluja
3
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Suomen Kansan Vanhoja Runoja ynnä myös Nykyisempiä

Lauluja 3

Compiler: Zacharias Topelius

Release date: January 31, 2024 [eBook #72841]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Turku: J. C. Frenckell ja Poika, 1826

Credits: Jari Koivisto

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUOMEN

KANSAN VANHOJA RUNOJA YNNÄ MYÖS NYKYISEMPIÄ
LAULUJA 3 ***
SUOMEN KANSAN VANHOJA RUNOJA YNNÄ MYÖS NYKYISEMPIÄ LAULUJA III

Koonnut ja pränttiin antanut

Z. TOPELIUS

Läänin Lääkäri ja Ritari

Turussa, Präntätty J. C. Frenckellin ja Pojan tykönä, 1826.

Ei sanat sanoista puutu,

Virret veisaten vähene.

SISÄLLYS:

Lukioille.

Vanhoja Runoja.
 Loihtiminen.
Lemmingäinen.
Rauan Sanat.
Tulen Synty.
Tulen Synty. (toisin)
Tulen Sanat.
Väinämöisen toimituksia.
Kalman Sanat.
Ummen Sanat.
Kanteleen Synty. (toisin)
Rukous, jolla Tapio (metän haltia) kutsuttiin.

Nykyisempiä Lauluja.

Orjaväestä.
Kellon kylän Mariasta.
Juttu Juomareista.
Laula Tupakan puutteesta.
Talonpojan muistutus Herrasmiehelle.

Lukioille.

Tiedoksi annetaan, että täsä Kolmannesa Osasa olevista

vanhoista runoista ovat Tulen Sanat Kemin pitäjästä, Ummen (tai
Lapsen Saajaisen) Sanat Oulun tienoilta kotosin ja kaikki muut,
nimittäin Loihtiminen (josta täsä myös mainittakoon että se
veisatettiin sairahilta, jotka luultiin kirouksen kautta tullehen kivun
alaisiksi), Lemmingäinen, Rauan Sanat, Tulen Synnyt, Väinämöisen
toimitukset, Kalman Sanat, Kanteleen Synty ja Rukous jolla Tapio
kutsuttiin Arkkangelin läänistä ja Vuokkiniemen pitäjästä.

Vanhoja Runoja.

Loihtiminen.

Minä laulan Lappalaisen,

Sala-syöjäni sanelen,
Laulan halki hartionsa,
Puhki leukansa paheten,
Paijan kauluksen kaheksi,
Rikki rintalastasesta.
Siihen laulan lakin päähän,
Siit' on laulan alle lakin
Vihkon Viipurin matoja,
Jonkun jouhi-kärmehiä,
Joll' on syötän syöjiäni,
Puretan purijatani.
Ompa mulla musta koira,
Rakki rauan karvallinen,
Suolet vaskiset vatassa,
Kuparista kuuraeltu,
Jok' on luinehen puroovi,
Ruotinehen roohoaavi.
Siit’ on laulan Lappalaisen,
Turjan koskehen kovahan,
Alla kopron korkeimman,
Keskellä kosen kiveksi, [kosen eli kosken]
Tulena palelomahan,
Säkähinä säihkymähän.
On mulla orit punanen,
Hevonen hyvän näkönen,
Joll' on rautaiset kaviat.
Teräksiset temmottimet,
Joll' on lampi lautasilla,
Vesi selvä selkä-luilla,
Lähet länkien sialla, [eli ränkien]
Jost' on noijat vettä juovat,
Lappavat kylän katehet,
Tuli kurkut kuihuavat.
Siihen kuivu noijan kulkku,
Lakahtu Lapilta kieli.

Lemminkäinen.

Savu saarella palaavi,

Tuli niemen tutkamessa.
Suur' olis paimosen paloksi.
Pien' olis soan savuksi.
Kesä vettä keitettihin,
Salo-puita poltettihin,
Salo-puita, saari-maita,
Ei ottanut olut hapata,
Eikä kalja käyäksehen.
Pani kuusesta käpyjä,
Petäjästä helpehejä,
Saipa olut valmihiksi.
Päivilä tuo Ilman Ukko,
Hän tuon sanoiksi virkki:
"Kutsu rujot, kutsu rammat,
Elä kutsu Lemmingäistä,
Lemmingäin on lieto poika,
Se on kaikitsi torasa".

Sano Lieto Lemmingäinen:

"Oi emoni kantajani!
Tuo sie soti-sopani,
Kanna vaino-vaatteheni".
"Kunne lähet poikuoni,
Metsällekö vai merelle,
Vain on hirven hiihtohon"?
"Oi emoni kantajani!
Enkä metsälle, enkä merelle;
Lähen Päivilän pitohin,
Hyvän joukon juominkihin".
"Äläs lähe poikuoni,
Kolm' on surmoa matalla" [eli matkalla]
"Oi emoni kantajani!
Sano surma ensimmäinen".
"Menet matkoja vähäsen,
Astut teitä pikkaraisen,
Tuloovi tulinen koski,
Koskes' on tulinen luoto,
Luuos' on tulinen koivu,
Koivus' on tuliset oksat,
Oksill' on tulinen kokko,
Kokoll' on tuliset kynnet.
Sen kynnet tulin palaavi.
Kita kieli lämpiöövi.
Se on syönyt sata'in miestä,
Tuhonnut tuhan urosta".
"Oi emoni kantajani!
Ei ole siinä miehen surma,
Eikä kuolema Urohon.
Oi emoni kantajani!"
Sano surma keskimmäinen.
"Menet matkoja vähäsen,
Astut teitä pikkaraisen,
Tuloo tulinen hauta,
Täysi kuumia kiviä,
Palavoja paateroja".
"Oi emoni, kantajani!
Ei ole siinä miehen surma,
Eikä kuolema Urohon.
Oi emoni, kantajani!
Sano surma jälkimmäinen".
"Menet Päivilän pihoille,
Hyvän joukon juominkihin,
Karhut on rauta kahleissa,
Ait' on tehty taivahaseen,
Matoloill' on vitsatsettu,
Kärmehill' on käännelletty,
Hännät heitty häilymähän,
Päät keikut kehisemään".
"Oi emoni, kantajani!
Ei ole siellä miehen surma,
Eikä kuolema Urohon.
Tuoppas soti-sopani,
Kanna vaino-vaatteheni".
Toipa soti-sopansa,
Kanto vaino-vaattehensa.
Läksi Päivilän pitohin,
Hyvän joukon juominkihin.
Tempi teiriä lehosta,
Koppeloita koivikosta.
"Kokkoseni Ilman lintu!
Lase eelläs matkamiestä, [eli laske]
Lemmingäistä liiatenkin".
Laski eellä matkamiehen.
Meni matkoja vähäsen,
Astu teitä pikkaraisen,
Tuloo tulinen hauta,
Täys' on kuumia kiviä,
Palavoja paateroja.
"Oi Ukko, yli Jumala,
Tahi Taata taivahainen!
Nossas pilvi luotehelta,
Toinen suurelta suvelta,
Kolmas kohti koilisesta:
Nepä yhtehen yhytä,
Lommakkohon loukahutti,
Sa-a lunta sauvan varsi.
Kiehitteli keihäs varsi,
Nuille kuumille kiville,
Palavoille Paateroille".
Nosti pilven luotehelta,
Toisen suurelta suvelta,
Kolmannen koilisesta:
Nepä yhtehen yhytti,
Lommakkohon loukahutti.
Sato lunta sauvan varsi,
Kiehitteli keihäs varsi,
Nuille kuumille kiville,
Palavoille paateroille.
"Lase eelläs matkamiestä,
Lemmingäistä liiatenkin".
Laski eellä matkamiehen.
Meni Päivilän pihoille,
Ait' on tehty taivahaseen,
Matoloill' on vitsatsettu,
Käärmehill' on käännelletty,
Hännät heitty häilymähän.
Päät keikut kehisemähän.
"Mato musta maan alanen,
Toukka Tuonen karvallinen,
Kulkia kulon alanen,
Läpi mättähen meniä,
Puun juuren puettelia,
Haavan juuren halkasia!
Pistä pääsi mättähäseen,
Lases eellä matkamiestä,
Lemmingäistä liiatenkin".
Meni Päivilän pitohin,
Hyvän joukon juominkihin.
Tuotiin olutta tuoppi,
Kannettiin kaksi-korvasella:
Käärme sinn' on käänneltynnä.
Hän tuon sanoiksi virkki:
"Ruoka suuhun syötänehen,
Ruhka maahan tuotanehen [taikka rikka]
Vasemmalla peukalolla,
Sormella nimittömällä,
Kannun alle pantaneekin".
Päivilä tuo Ilman Ukko,
Laulo lammen laattialle.
Lemmingäinen lieto poika,
Laulo härän laattialle;
Härkä veen siitä joi.
Päiviläinen Ilman Ukko
Laulo jäneksen laattialle,
Lemmingäinen lieto poika,
Laulo revon laattialle.
Päiviläinen Ilman Ukko,
Laulo oravan orren päälle,
Orren päitä juoksemahan,
Lemmingäinen lieto poika,
Laulo neän laattialle.
Päiviläinen Ilman Ukko,
Hän tuon sanoiksi virtti:
"Lemmingäinen lieto poika!
Katselkommas kalpojamme,
Mitelkomma miekkojamme,
Kumman kalpa kaunihimpi,
 Kumman miekka miehusampi".
Lemmingäisen on kalpa kaunihimpi,
Hänen miekka miehusampi,
Oljen kortta korkeampi.
"Lemmingäinen lieto poika!
Ruvetkommas tappelohon,
Pihall' on veret paremmat,
Kakaroill' on kaunihimmat".
***
Menisin männyksi vielä,
Lautta-puiksi hakattaisiin;
Koivuksi kovalla maalla,
Suksi-puiksi hakattaisiin;
Menisin meren kalaksi.

Tästä on Runo vaillinainen; vaan Runo-niekka jutteli että Päivilä löi

Lemmingäistä niin että miekka meni paloiksi; sitten Lemmingäinen
löi Päivilää ja jako hänen kolmeen osaan. Tätä katuessansa aikoi
Lemmingäinen piilomaan, vaan pelkäs joka piilossa surmaa. —
Tästä tappeluksesta kertoo myös Runo Oluen teosta, ensimäisesä
osasa.

Rauan Sanat.

Rauta, poika Vuolahainen,

Vuolaisen pojan poika!
Etsäs sillon suuri ollut —
Etkä suuri, etkä varma,
Et kovin koriakana, [toisin: et kovin kipusakana]
Kuinsas maitona makasit,
Nuoren neitosen nisissä,
Kasvavaisen kainaloissa.
Siitäkös suureksi rupeisit,
Kasvot aivan kauhiaksi,
Koskas vestit veikkoasi,
Lastusit emonsi lasta,
Sukuansi suin pitelit?
Tule työsi tuntemahan,
Pahasi parantamahan
Ennen kuin sanon emolle,
Virkon valta vanhemmalle.
Enämpi emolle työtä,
Vaiva suuri vanhemmalle,
Kuin poika pahon teköövi,
Lapsi ankein asuuvi.
Sulakohon sun vihansi
Kuin suola suli meressä;
Painukohon sun pahansi
Kuin santa vaju merehen;
Katokohon karvahansi
Niinkuin terva tehtäissä,
Rasva räyvyteltäissä
Ihosta imehnon raukan,
Karvasta kavon tekemän,
Emon tuoman ruumihista,
Immin antaman ihosta.
Nouse kaste kalliosta,
Rasva rauan suumalosta,
Teräksestä tehko voijet, [tekosa]
Kipehille voitehiksi,
Mammoille valantehiksi.
Siteheksi Luojan silkki,
Herran pelsi peitteheksi,
Marian kalvo katteheksi,
Veäp päälle lemmen lehti,
Kulta ummisko kuleta,
Kulta lummet luikahuta,
Ettei maito maahan juokse,
Puna peltohon putoa,
Ylitte Jumalan luonnon,
Yli aivan autuvaan.
Lempi Jesuksen lihaa,
Pala Herran palliosta,
Tukkeheksi tuiman reijän,
Paikaksi pahan veräjän.
Ei oo löylyn löytämistä,
Lämpösen lähenemistä,
Pakkasen palelemista,
Kovan ilman koskemista, l
Veen viljan viertämistä,
Minun silmin nähtyäni,
Käsin päällä käytyäni,
Suin pyhin puheltuani,
Kourin kuomueltuani.

Tulen Synty.
 Mis on tulta tuuviteltu,
Valkiata vaaputeltu?
Ylisessä taivosessa,
Alasessa maa-emässä.
Siell' on tulta tuviteltu.
Vaskisessa kätkyessä
Hopiaiset hihnat helkky.
Kokko kultanen kolasi,
Kirpposi tuli kipinä,
Poltti maan, poltti Manolan,
Poltti kuuen kirkkokunnan,
Poltti kuuen kuokan silmän,
Kahen kirvehen hamaran;
Meni reppänä retusen,
Rikko rinnat neitoselta,
Poltti lapsen kätkyestä;
Meni Aluenjärveen,
Nielipä Sini keräsen,
Huiksenteli, käyksenteli,
Tuossa tuskissa tulen,
Palavoissa valkioissa.
Tulipa sikiä siika,
Nielipä sini keräsen,
Huiksenteli, käyksenteli
Tuossa tuskissa tulen,
Palavoissa valkioissa.
Siika saarien sivutte,
Lohi luotoin lomahti.
Tulipa lohi punanen,
Nielipä silian siian,
Huiksenteli, käyksenteli
Tuossa tuskissa tulen,
Palavoissa valkioissa.
Lohi luotoin lomahti,
Siika saarien sivutte,
Tuossa tuskissa tulen,
Palavoissa valkioissa.
***
Sisarekset sotkottaret,
Veljet verkkoa kutovat,
Yhtenä kesäissä yönä.
Saipa nuotan valmihiksi.
Veettiin kerran myötä vettä,
Ihveniä, Ahvenia,
Kaikkia veen kaloja.
Ei saatu sitä kaloa,
Mitä vasten nuotta tehty.
Toisen kerran vasta vettä,
Ihveniä, Ahvenia,
Kaikkia meren kaloja.
Ei saatu sitä kaloa,
Mitä vasten nuotta tehty.
Laski kolmannenkin kerran,
Puuttu nuotta puutoksehen;
Kivellenkö vai haolle,
Vaiko hauvin hartiolle,
Veen koiran koukku-luille?
Sano vanha Väinämöinen,
Tämä on hauvoin hartiolla.
Veen koiran koukku-luilla,
Ei ole käsin koskemista,
Ilman rauta rukkaisitta.
***
Saipa hauvin veneeseensä,
Saipa hän halian hauvin,
Puhkasi halian hauvin,
Siin oli lohi punanen,
Puhkasi lohen punasen,
Siin' oli siliä siika,
Puhkasi silian siian,
Siin' oli sini keränen,
Puhkasi sini keräsen,
Siin' oli tuli kipunen.

Tulen Synty.

(Toisin.)

Iski tulta Ilmarinen,

Välkytteli Väinämöinen,
Elävällä ennuksella,
Kirjavalla kärmehellä.
Iski tulta kyntehensä,
Jälkytti jäsenihinsä,
Rahin rautasen nenässä,
Kultasen kammin päässä.
Kirposi tuli kipuna,
Läpi maan, läpi manalan,
Läpi reppäsen retusen, [lakeen reijän]
Läpi lasten kätkyestä,
Poltti parmaat emolta [rintapäät]
Poltti nännit neitoselta.
Niin emo enämmän tiesi:
Se tunsi tulen tumun,
Kekälehen kierätellen,
Kirposi tuli kipuna,
Pääll' lankes' aloen järven,
Niin tuli silia siika,
Nieli tuon tuli-kipunan.
Siitä uipi silia siika,
Niemen nientä, saaren saarta.
Joka niemi neuvon pisti,
Joka saari sai sanoman.
Sano siitä uituansa,
Ei ole veessä tässä,
Minun nielon nieliätä.
Niin tuli kumia kuuja [lohi]
Joll' on syönty sata syltä, [eli syöntö]
Kita kuuen kosken verta.
Niin nieli silian siian.
Niin uipi kumia kuuja,
Niemen nientä, saaren saarta.
Joka niemi neuvon pisti,
Joka saari sai sanoman.
Sano siitä uituansa:
Ei ole veessa tässä,
Minun nielon nieliätä.
***