Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643

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Electoral Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore

Netina Tan*
Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Kenneth Taylor Hall, RM 541, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4M4

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The literature on electoral authoritarianism has drawn attention to the use of democratic
Received 3 July 2013 electoral institutions for undemocratic gains. This paper adds to this body of work by
Accepted 10 July 2013 showing how a sophisticated hegemonic party in Singapore manipulated its majoritarian
electoral system to “manufacture” its legislative supermajority. By measuring the psy-
Keywords: chological and mechanical effects of the altered electoral system in Singapore, it shows
Electoral manipulation
how changes in the rules of the game boosted the incumbent’s legislative dominance
Electoral laws
despite its declining vote shares in the late 1980s. It also offers new evidence to show how
Electoral authoritarianism
Hegemonic party
electoral manipulation create an uneven playing field with institutional constraints that
Mechanical and psychological effects penalize smaller parties and benefit the ruling, larger party.
Singapore Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction reforms in Asia Pacific has found semi-democracies such as

Today, many countries have undertaken electoral re-
forms in convergence with the global trend towards more
proportionate representative electoral system (Grofman
and Lijphart, 2003; Norris, 2004; Colomer, 2004). Similar
to some democracies in Western Europe and the industri-
alized world, the wave of electoral reforms in Asia was also
driven by demands to improve governability, representa-
tion and party system stability. But unlike the rest of the
world, countries in Asia seldom totally abandon their
majoritarian electoral systems and adopt proportionate
ones. Instead, reforms are confined to changes to electoral
rules, district magnitude or voting structure within the
original institutional arrangement (Hicken, 2004). As we
know, electoral systems are the most important mecha-
nism shaping electoral competition and “the most specif-
ically manipulable instrument” of the political system
(Sartori, 1968: 273). Electoral rules have multiple conse-
quences, both intended and unintended (Norris, 2004;
Pierson, 2004). For example, Reilly’s study of electoral
* Tel.: þ1 905 525 9140x21271.
E-mail addresses: netina@mcmaster.ca, netina@shaw.ca.
URL: http://www.politicalscience.mcmaster.ca/people/netina
Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore to have less propor-
tionate elections after reforms (Reilly, 2007). Likewise,
studies on democracies and newly transited regimes in
Latin America also show when rules change, they tend to
reflect the preferences of those in power (Diaz-Cayeros and
Magaloni, 2001; McElwain, 2008; Remmer, 2008).
As North warned: “institutions are not necessarily or
even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or
at least the formal rules are created to serve the interests of
those with bargaining power to device new rules”(1990:
16). This paper builds on the literature on “electoral
authoritarianism” – a hybrid regime that has proliferated in
recent years to show how democratic institutions could
bring about undemocratic outcomes (Howard and Roessler,
2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010a,b; Van de Walle, 2006). The
focus is on Singapore, a sophisticated hybrid regime under
the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) rule, to show how elec-
toral manipulation or the selective tweaking of electoral
rules could strengthen the incumbent and reduce legisla-
tive representativeness.
The PAP is one of the most durable parties in the world
today. With more than 27 registered parties in the country, it
has governed uninterruptedly for over five decades. In the
age of democracy, the PAP’s exceptional durability deserves

0261-3794/$ – see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.014
 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
attention. Existing explanations of its success have high-
lighted the importance of party-state strength (Ho, 2010;
Slater, 2012); performance legitimacy (Chua, 1995; Huff,
1994; Khong, 1995); strongman leadership (Milne and
Mauzy, 1990) and reliance on coercion and draconian laws
to repress opposition challenge (Gomez, 2006; Rodan, 2008;
Tremewan, 1994; Worthington, 2001). While these struc-
tural, socio-economic or personalist-based explanations
offer important insights to the sources of mass acquiescence,
they do not tell us how the PAP could produce a large legis-
lative supermajority despite its declining vote shares in the
last two decades. This paper addresses this gap by focusing
on electoral manipulation as one of the strategies in the
“menu” to achieve this end (Schedler, 2002).
The PAP’s popular votes more or less declined since full
general elections began in 1968. The three elections
following the relatively successful 1980 contest saw its
persistent declines, most evident in the 2011 election
where the PAP recorded its worst electoral performance.
Despite this, the PAP is still able to maintain an average of
98 percent seat shares for all the elections – an exceptional
feat compared to other majoritarian electoral systems
designed to manufacture a majority for the winning party
(Norris, 1997). This paper contends that without the Group
Representative Constituency scheme that changed the
electoral system to include multi-member seats based on
party bloc vote plurality system and subsequent enlarge-
ment to its district magnitude, it is unlikely that the PAP
could have secured such a large legislative supermajority.
To explain why hegemonic parties manipulate electoral
laws and to what effects, Section 2 begins by introducing
the origins of Singapore’s hegemonic party system and the
motivations behind initiating electoral reforms. Section 3
then explores the form of electoral authoritarianism in
the country and the types of legitimate or illegitimate
techniques used. Section 4 examines the series of changes
to the electoral rules in the 1980s, while Section 5 assesses
its mechanical and psychological effects, focusing on the
party bloc vote plurality system by comparing the electoral
disproportionality, the effective number of parties, and the
distribution of vote shares of the parties in two collective
phases, before and after multi-member districts were
introduced. Section 6 concludes and explores the implica-
tions of the findings for Singapore’s electoral competition
and the broader literature on authoritarian elections.
2. Rise of Singapore’s hegemonic party
Singapore inherited a unicameral, Westminster parlia-
mentary system from its British colonial government. When
it attained self-rule in 1959, it instituted a compulsory
voting system and held its first full Legislative assembly
election. Unlike the elections seen today, early electoral
politics in the country were competitive and rambunctious.
The contests for the limited seats in the Legislative Assembly
were fierce. Indeed, after the British introduced the Rendel
Constitution in 1953 to extend the franchise of Singaporeans
and allow self-government, party politics flourished (Yeo,
1973). It was during this tumultuous period that the PAP
was formed. In 1954, a group of pro-independence, Cam-
bridge-trained, middle-class men made its foray into
633
politics as an opposition force and won three out of 25 seats,
a year later (Yap et al., 2010).
In the pre-independent years, the island was plagued by
anti-colonial agitation, communist subversion and racial
unrests. Low wages and unfair worker’s treatment led to
labor strikes and civil unrests. Then, 70 percent of the
electorate were immigrant Chinese from impoverished
South China while the rest were Malays and Indians from
Malaysia and South India. Chinese nationalism polarized
the multi-racial population of immigrant stock and elite-
politics gave way to mass politics. Ideologically, the PAP
pitched itself as a radical, left-winged party that was
backed by the labor and student movement. After a three-
year short merger with the Federation of Malaya, Singapore
gained independence in 1965 and the Legislative Assembly
renamed Parliament. In the Republic’s first general election
in 1968, the Barisan Socialis, a breakaway faction of the PAP
staged a mass boycott that led to the PAP sweeping all the
seats (Pang, 1971). This was a critical juncture that led to
the PAP’s hegemony as the party went on to win all seats in
every election until 1981.
Origins of single or hegemonic parties such as the PAP can
usually be traced to their early political experiences that
brought them into power (Huntington and Moore, 1970;
Slater, 2010). Aside from the PAP’s historical struggle to
electoral dominance, what is remarkable about this party is
its ability to impose a series of legal and measures to
dismantle the early socio-ethnic cleavages after assuming
power (Brown, 1994; Seah, 1985). Aside from the use of legal
constraints to quell labour strikes and unrest, the govern-
ment also actively “de-pluralize” and create “broker in-
stitutions” such as the People’s Association (PA), a statutory
board to build a network of grassroots, para-political orga-
nizations to foster national identity. In addition, the gov-
ernment also fostered social-ethnic integration through
legislating compulsory national conscription, making En-
glish the lingua franca and imposing an ethnic housing quota
to prevent the rise of ethnic enclaves.1 Ethnic minorities
were dispersed across 27 electoral constituencies so to pre-
vent ethnic politics or recurrence of racial riots. In the elec-
toral arena, efforts to manage ethnic relations led to creation
of the Group Representative Constituency (GRC) – another
ethnic quota to ensure the legislative representation of mi-
norities through a multi-member district party bloc vote
plurality system. As this paper will show, this latter inno-
vation came at a high cost for the opposition parties.
3. Electoral authoritarianism and reasons for
manipulation
Singapore has had 11 general elections since 1968.
Despite having an average of seven contesting parties in
each election, the country remains governed by one party
after five decades. While the PAP facilitates regular
elections, it also rejects the idea of multipartyism. For
example, former Prime Minister (PM) Lee Kuan Yew
1
Introduced in 1989, an ethnic housing quota was imposed to ensure
that the total Malay, Indian and other minorities do not exceed 30 percent
in each housing estate. See (Fetzer, 2008; Tey, 2008).
634 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
warned: “Singapore cannot afford revolving door style of
government where leaders change every five years”
(Popathal, 2007). Likewise, his son, the current PM Lee
Hsien Loong contends that change has to come from within
the PAP and party alternation “seldom works because
having two or more parties has not guaranteed good
governance or progress” (Li, 2008; Yen and Zakir, 2011). As
a hybrid regime with both democratic and authoritarian
traits, classifying Singapore is thus tricky. Indeed, labels
from both ends of the regime spectrum have been used.
While some consider it fully authoritarian and a “façade
electoral regime” (Levitsky and Way, 2010a,b), others have
added adjectives to labels such as “soft authoritarianism”
(Means, 1996); “competitive, authoritarian hybrid regime”
(Mauzy, 2006), “semi-democracy” (Case, 1996; Diamond,
1999) “communitarian democracy” (Chua, 1995) or “illib-
eral democracy” (Zakaria, 2004).
The lack of consensus in classifying Singapore reflects
the divisions in the democratization literature on the
criteria to measure the quality of democracy in interme-
diate categories (Bogaards, 2009; Morlino, 2009). To over-
come the methodological challenge, it is useful to adopt
Munck’s suggestion to move away from the futile dichot-
omous versus continuous measures of political regimes and
focus instead on degrees of participation and contestation
(1971; 2006). Indeed, understanding why hybrid regimes
satisfy the participation dimension but differ on contesta-
tion is important as emerging studies are showing that the
degree of electoral competition could have decisive con-
sequences on when and whether authoritarian elections
bring about liberalizing outcomes (Brownlee, 2009;
Howard and Roessler, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2006).
Singapore is best conceived as a hegemonic party
regime that falls within the umbrella of electoral authori-
tarianism that is “minimally pluralistic”, “minimally
competitive” and “minimally open” (Van de Walle, 2006:
3). Unlike closed authoritarianism, elections are the central
arena of struggle and the PAP maintains its legitimacy at
the ballot box. Singapore may look like a liberal democracy
as it has the representative institutions such as the judi-
ciary, legislature, elections, parties and civil society. How-
ever, despite this, electoral manipulation, constraints in
media freedom2 and civil-political liberties that deter op-
position co-ordination disqualify it as a liberal democracy
(Freedom House, 2011; IBA Report, 2008). Clearly, electoral
manipulation also occurs in “uncommon democracies”
such as in Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party rule or
Italy under the Christian Democracy (Pempel, 1990). But in
practice, the distinction between hegemonic parties in
authoritarian regimes and dominant parties in democracies
is blurred as the meaningfulness and fairness of elections in
the latter may be overstated (Greene, 2007; Scheiner,
2006). That being said, in cases such as Singapore, party
alternation can but still does not occur.3 The myriad of legal
2
All mainstream media in Singapore is owned by the Singapore Press
Holdings, which is in turned, controlled by the Ministry of Information
and the Arts (George, 2006).
3
See Przeworski and colleagues for ways to operationalize the alter-
nation rule (2000: 23–8).
rules constrained and handicapped the opposition such
that they could only operate as licensed, “second class”
parties that are unable to compete with the incumbent on
equal terms (Sartori, 2005: 205).
Given the PAP’s hegemonic position, why does it still
need to manipulate electoral rules? The PAP does not
resort to ballot rigging or fraud. These strategies are
costly and would severely cripple their legitimacy
(Lehoucq, 2003). In fact, the PAP enjoys such “hyper in-
cumbency advantage” that it has already secured gov-
erning majority on nomination day and won the election
even before polling day as seen in 1988, 1991, 1997 and
2001 general elections (see Greene, 2007: 259). Yet,
hegemonic parties such as the PAP remained dissatisfied
with simple majorities because their legitimacy to
govern depends on the size of their electoral success.
They strive for oversized governing majority to control
institutional change and project an “image of invinci-
bility” to deter challengers (Magaloni, 2006: 15). For
example, unhappy with the rising support for the op-
position parties and the large turnouts in opposition
rallies, the government imposed a “cooling-off” day
campaign ban on the eve of polling day, ostensibly to
prevent “emotional voting” and “risk of public dis-
order”(AsiaOne, 2011). And in the 2011 election, the PAP
leaders were also visibly upset with their drop in popu-
larity vote to 60 percent. The PAP’s loss of a group con-
stituency for the first time led to chastising by the former
PM Lee Kuan Yew who warned voters of the dire con-
sequences of voting against the PAP and that they have
the next “five years to live and repent”(Economist, 2011).
Elections in Singapore are not a façade as Levitsky and
Way suggest (2010a). In fact, elections are important for
legitimacy renewal, distributing patronage and informa-
tion gathering to maintain mass support. The margin of
electoral victories is critical for the PAP as it strengthens
their mandate to rule and disempower the opposition.
Hence, the rules of the game are most likely to change
when ruling elites face rising electoral uncertainty
(Remmer, 2008). For example, in 1963, the Singapore’s
Constitution was amended to prevent party switching – a
practice that was endemic then, as dissenting PAP legis-
lators would defect and form opposition parties to chal-
lenge the PAP (Thio and Tan, 2009). Later in the 1980s,
the government tweaked its single-member district
plurality electoral system when the PAP’s vote shares
were at its lowest ebb, hitting 61 percent in 1991. See
Graph 1.
Consequently, new schemes such as the Non-
Constituency Members of Parliament, Group Representa-
tive Constituencies and the Nominated Members of
Parliament were introduced to alter the electoral system
to a mixture of single and multi-member district based on
plurality party block voting system and unelected MPs
were brought into Parliament. Singapore’s 12th Parlia-
ment now consists of 87 elected seats representing 27
constituencies: 12 single-member and 15 multi-member
constituencies (each consisting of four to six seats). See
Table 1. The strategic timing of the reforms suggests a
concerted effort on the part of the incumbent to change
the rules to rescue its declining vote shares. Consequently
 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
Graph 1. Timing of Electoral Reforms and PAP’s Vote and Seats Shares. Source: Data from Singapore Parliament website.
or coincidentally, the PAP’s vote shares improved in the
following 1991 and 2001 elections.
Electoral manipulation can manifests itself in many
ways.4 Birch’s typology distinguishes between legitimate
and illegitimate manipulation and shows how it could
occur in three spheres such as in the manipulation: 1) of
rules governing elections; 2) of voters through biased
campaigns or deceptive political communication and of
votes such as ballot box stuffing (2012: 27 and 69).
Broadly, in Singapore, the manipulation of rules is legiti-
mate and aimed at altering behavior as Birch suggested in
this issue. The proposals to change electoral rules are
formally introduced as bills and passed in Parliament.
However, with more than two-thirds legislative majority,
even controversial bills have little difficulties being pushed
through. What is less legitimate is the absence of an in-
dependent electoral commission to manage elections.
Singapore Elections Department is a branch under the
PM’s office and it appoints the Electoral Boundaries Re-
view Committee that redraws electoral boundaries before
every election, without the need for Parliamentary
approval. The arbitrary changes in the district sizes, mal-
apportionment (producing constituencies of different
sizes), strict fund raising requirements, high electoral de-
posits5 and restrictions in organizing political rallies
reinforce the view that elections are free but not fair (US
Department of State, 2011). Indeed, Singapore’s electoral
rules may be what Norris calls “cartel regulations” that
limit competition through a variety of practices designed
to benefit the incumbent (2009: 152–3).
4. Changing the rules of the game
With a dominant Chinese population, the PAP leaders
were concerned that Singaporeans were voting along
4
For other tools and typologies of election malpractice, see (Calingaert,
2006; Elklit and Reynolds, 2005).
5
Unlike the PAP, opposition candidates have to personally fork out the
electoral deposits to contest (Goh, 2010; Jeyaretnam, 2010). Presently,
only independent or opposition candidates have forfeited deposits, a
precedence that could discourage qualified candidates to join the oppo-
sition cause.
635
racial lines and not returning ethnic minority MPs,
especially the Malays, to the House.6 In 1988, the
Group Representative Constituency (GRC) scheme was
introduced to ensure a multiracial representation in
Parliament that reflects the national social-ethnic
composition that consists of 74 percent Chinese, 13
percent Malays, 9 percent Indians and 4 percent other
races (Singapore Statistics, 2011). The multi-member,
party bloc vote system was designed such that a voter
casts his vote for the entire team of four to six candi-
dates with at least one ethnic minority member in the
slate. The winning party with a plurality of votes then
takes all the seats in the group constituency. Designed to
minimize candidate-based voting where ethnicity,
gender or other traits could become salient, a voter now
chooses between parties rather than candidates under
this group scheme. In effect, this prevents the politici-
zation of local or ethnic issues. To be electable, parties
have to be inclusive, focus on crosscutting issues to ap-
peal to the wide-spectrum of voters in the multi-
member constituencies.
Despite the formal guarantees for the legislative repre-
sentation ethnic minorities, the GRC scheme was unwel-
comed by the ethnic minorities and opposition leaders.
Primarily, critics were unconvinced that Singaporeans were
voting along racial lines (Mutalib, 2012; Rodan, 2005). Be-
sides, the legislative representation of ethnic minorities was
not severely imbalanced to begin with. The representation of
ethnic MPs in the pre-GRC period was between 19 and 27.6
percent, approximating the national ethnic composition. In
fact, the representation of minority MPs dropped from 19
percent in 1984 to 16.1 percent after the GRC scheme was
introduced in 1988. The intended effect of boosting minority
representation was only achieved after 1991. Now, there are
about 27.6 percent minority MPs in the House, exceeding the
national minority population of 25.1 percent. See Graph 2.
Despite having attained the intended outcome of
boosting minority representation, the GRC scheme has
6
To ensure Malay representation, three-fifths of the total GRCs were
designated to have at least one Malay candidate in the team, while the
rest are to be filled by an Indian or other minority candidate.
636 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643

Table 1 2010). Without an independent Election Commission, the

Former and new electoral systems in Singapore. arbitrary enlargement of the constituency sizes and opaque
Former electoral New electoral redrawing of electoral boundaries are thus viewed as
system (1968–1984) system (1988–2011) gerrymandering to the PAP’s favor. As opposition leader
SMD plurality SMD and MMD party Sylvia Lim complained in Parliament:
block vote plurality
“The entire electoral boundary re-drawing process is
Size of legislature Average 70 87
Number of Average 70 27 (12 SMD þ 15 MMD) completely shrouded in secrecy, chaired by the Secre-
constituencies tary to the Cabinet. There are no public hearings, no
Non-elected legislators No Yes (from 1984) minutes of meeting published. The revised boundaries
Gender quota No No
are released weeks or even days before Nomination
Ethnic quota No Yes (1 Ethnic Minority
per MM District) Day. The report makes no attempt to explain why
Overseas voting No Yes (from 2001) certain single seats are retained while others are dis-
Campaign restriction No Yes (Campaign Ban on solved, nor why new GRCs are created or old ones re-
Eve of Polling Day) shaped.” (Lim, 2010a)
Number of 1
individual votes In addition, interviews with the opposition Reform Party
Party list No leader also indicate that restrictions on party donations and
Citizen requirement Yes
Minimum voting age 21 years old
high electoral deposit required for the multiple candidates
Independent candidates Allowed in the larger constituencies were disadvantageous to
Election administration Elections Department under the PM’s Office. resource poor opposition parties (Jeyaretnam, 2010).
Notes: SMD ¼ Single-Member District; MMD ¼ Multi-Member District Indeed, the rise in electoral deposit from S$500 in 1968 to
(Group Representative Constituencies).Source: Compiled by author. S$16,000 in 2011 for a single candidate makes it tough for
small parties to compete in the larger six-member districts
that would require a total of S$96,000 (US$78,000).
posed enormous challenges for the opposition to contest
In addition to the group constituency scheme, the PAP
effectively (Tan, 2005). Interviews with opposition leaders
also introduced non-elected MPs into Parliament through
from the Workers’ Party (WP) and Reform Party (RP) indi-
the Non-Constituency (NCMP, 1984) and Nominated
cate that they found it challenging to find Malay candidates,
Member of Parliament (NMP, 1991) schemes to encourage
cultivating ties and raise electoral deposits for the larger
diversity in the House.7 Both initiatives were designed to
multi-member constituencies (Lim, 2007; Jeyaretnam,
attract non-partisan individuals into politics. However, the
2010). These challenges could explain in part why no op-
two initiatives were criticized for undermining the op-
position party was able to win a multi-member constitu-
position’s credibility, co-opting dissent and dissuading
ency for more than two decades until the 2011 election.
Singaporeans from joining the opposition cause (Chua,
While the group constituencies posed a high barrier for
1995; Hussin, 2002; Tremewan, 1994). While seven op-
the opposition, they offered more opportunities for the
position leaders have served as NCMPs, two have rejected
government to change the electoral boundaries and sizes of
the offer. On the other hand, the NMP scheme was
constituencies before every election. The group constitu-
unwelcomed for undermining the candidate selection role
ency that first began with teams of three grew to four in
of parties and for fostering elitist politics8 (Thio, 1997). In
1991 and to five and six by 1997. Over the years, a few hotly
sum, these non-elected MPs do not represent any con-
contested constituencies such as Eunos GRC (1997), Cheng
stituency and are unaccountable to anyone. More impor-
San GRC (1997) and Tiong Bahru (1988) with more than 40
tantly, they also cannot vote on important issues such as
percent opposition vote shares were mysteriously dis-
budgetary bills, constitutional amendments or cast a “no
solved or subsumed under other constituencies. With no
confidence” vote against the government. Hence, their
advance notice whether the constituencies will be around
presence could foster the impression that it is unnecessary
in the next election, opposition leaders find it challenging
to vote for the opposition as the initiatives already assure
to strategize and identify areas to cultivate support (Lim,
the House of dissenting voice, regardless of their vote.

5. Mechanical effects

The earlier sections reviewed the motivations and cri-

tiques of Singapore’s electoral reforms. However, to have a

Graph 2. Total National and Elected Ethnic MPs in Singapore (%), 1968–2011.
Source: Based on data from Singapore Parliament and Singapore Statistics
Department.
7
A NCMP is the “best opposition loser” who has obtained at least 15
percent of the constituency’s votes. If all the opposition parties win a total
of nine or more seats, then the scheme ceases. On the other hand, a NMP
is non-partisan, distinguished citizen appointed by the President for two
and a half years on the recommendation of a Parliamentary Special Select
Committee.
8
Despite criticisms, applications for NMP positions rose from 11 in
1996 to 50 in 2011. Supporters argue that some check on the PAP is better
than no check at all (Toh, 2011; Woon, 1994).
 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
better assessment of the impact of the electoral rules, the
following sections will study the “mechanical” and “psy-
chological” effects of the Group Representative Constitu-
ency scheme on parties and voters (Blais and Carty, 1991;
Duverger, 1951). While the mechanical effects describe
how electoral rules constrain seat shares based on the
distribution of votes; the psychological effects pertain to
how parties and voters change their strategies in response
to the mechanical effects of the GRC scheme – the most
significant change that had altered how legislators are
selected and represented in Singapore.
To assess the mechanical effects, two different measures
will be used and averages will be provided before and after
the scheme is introduced. First, the reductive effects will be
measured by comparing the effective number of electoral
and parliamentary parties in the pre and post-GRC periods.
While the number of electoral parties indicates the degree
of party competitiveness, the number of parliamentary
parties intend to show the extent of party fragmentation
and tendency of the system to produce a one-party gov-
ernment (Sartori, 2005). Second, changes in electoral dis-
proportionality between the two periods will be used to
indicate the disparity between parties’ votes and seat
shares (Blais and Maiscotte, 1996; Lijphart, 1994). While the
index of disproportionality shows how effectively the
electoral system translates votes to seat shares, the mea-
sure of “bonus seats” will be used to indicate how the
electoral system rewards the largest party and penalizes
the smaller one (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 65).
To evaluate the “illusive” psychological effects on party
elites and voters, this study will compare the: 1) number of
contesting parties and candidates; 2) number of uncon-
tested seats and 3) changes in the distribution of vote
shares for the opposition parties in the pre and post GRC
periods (Blais and Carty, 1991). If the new electoral system
asserts a strong psychological, deterrent effect, then the
number of contesting parties and candidates is expected to
decline. Here, the number of “uncontested seats” will be
used to show whether the new scheme deters opposition
contestation. Finally, voters are expected to avoid wasting
their votes on small parties that are deemed less likely to
Table 2
Effective number of parties based on vote and seat shares in Singapore.
GE Effective no. of electoral
parties (vote shares)
1968 1.33
1972 1.96
1976 1.78
1980 1.65
1984 2.29
Pre-GRC average 1.8
(1968–1984)
1988 2.33
1991 2.45
1997 2.2
2001 1.7
2006 2.05
2011 2.51
Post-GRC average 2.21
(1988–2011)
Average (1968–2011) 2.01
Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections Department.
637
gain any seats. If the post-GRC electoral formula asserts a
strong psychological effect on the voters, then, the vote
shares of the minor parties ought to decline after reform.
5.1. Lower effective number of parties
Following Laakso and Taagepera, the effective number
of parties in Singapore is calculated based on following
P
formula: N ¼ 1= ni¼1 p2i where n is the number of all
parties and the square of each parties proportion of all
votes (or seats) (1979). A comparison of the effective
number of parties (based on vote shares) and the effective
number of parties in parliament (based on seats shares)
would show the degree of fractionalization or how the
electoral system concentrates the party system (Croissant
et al., 2002; Norris, 2004: 88–9). As Table 2 shows, before
the GRCs were introduced (1968–1984), the effective
number of electoral parties was 1.8. After the GRCs were
introduced (1988–2011), the number of electoral parties
increased to 2.1, indicating an increase in opposition elec-
toral strength. However, the rise in opposition’s strength
did not translate to seat shares. In fact, the post-GRC elec-
toral system under-represents the opposition and represses
the effective number of parliamentary parties at 1.07. Sin-
gapore’s post-GRC system in fact manufactured a super-
majority government by producing a smaller effective
number of parliamentary parties than electoral parties. As
Table 2 shows, the difference between the electoral and
parliamentary parties increased from 0.7 to 1.1 suggesting a
strong reductive effect on the number of parliamentary
parties. See Table 2 here.
It is well-known that majoritarian systems are
designed to manufacture a majority government and
penalize smaller parties, especially those with spatially
dispersed support (Lijphart, 1994). Yet, this effect is
especially pronounced in Singapore than other First-Past-
the-Post (FPTP) or plurality systems. For example, the
mean number of effective parties is 2.0 in the U.S., 2.1 in
the U.K. and 3.0 in Canada (Norris, 2004: 86). In Asian
countries that adopted the plurality rule for SMDs
and mixed-member majoritarian systems (MMM), the
Effective no. of parliamentary Difference between electoral
parties (seat shares) and parliamentary parties
1 0.33
1 0.96
1 0.78
1 0.65
1.05 1.24
1.0 0.79
1.02 1.25
1.1 1.36
1.05 1.15
1.05 0.65
1.05 1
1.15 1.36
1.07 1.13
1.04 0.98
638 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643

Table 3
Comparative effects of selected plurality systems in Asia.

Countries Elections Electoral system Effective number Disproportionality

of parties
Singapore 1968–1984 4 SMD þ Plurality 1.0 16.7
Singapore 1988–2011 6 SMD þ MMD Party Bloc Vote þ Plurality 1.07 22.3
Malaysia 1959–2004 11 SMD þ Plurality 2.6 15.8
Philippines 1946–1969 7 SMD þ plurality 2.3 9
Philippines 1992–8 3 MMM 3.6 10.4
Thailand 1986–1996 5 Bloc Vote 7.2 2.7
Thailand 2001–5 2 MMM 3.1 11.1
Bangladesh 1991–6 2 SMD þ plurality 2.79 8.4
Nepal 1991–9 3 SMD þ Plurality 2.48 9

Notes: MMM ¼ Mixed-Member Majoritarian System; SMD ¼ Single-Member District Source: Data on Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines (Hicken, 2008),
Bangladesh and Nepal (Croissant et al., 2002) and Singapore, author’s calculations.

effective number of parties is: 2.6 for Malaysia (1959–
2004), 3.01 in Thailand (2001–5), 2.79 in Bangladesh
(1991–6) and 2.48 in Nepal (Croissant et al., 2002; Hicken,
2008). See Table 3. In contrast, Singapore’s effective
number of parliamentary party is at the low of 1.08 in the
post-GRC period (1988–2011).
5.2. Higher disproportionality
Another measure of the mechanical effect of the multi-
member constituencies is to consider how proportionately
it converts vote to seat shares. Perfect proportionality is a
situation in which each party receives exactly the same share
of seats as the share of votes it receives. Here, Lijphart’s index
(1994) is used to assess the deviation of the party’s seat
shares from its vote shares. The degree of disproportionality
is derived by the absolute difference between the total per-
centage of votes for the most over-represented party and the
total percentage of seats obtained by the most over-
represented party. And “bonus seats” is obtained from the
difference between the percentages of vote and seat shares –
an indicator to show how the electoral rules reward the
largest party or penalize the minor ones.
As mentioned, majoritarian systems tend to generate
higher disproportionality for the largest party and penalize
the small parties more than in proportionate representative
systems (Norris, 2004: 88–9). Small parties also have
more difficulties gaining representation (unless they are
geographically concentrated) as they need pluralities in the
district and those with district magnitudes larger than one
tend to reinforce the disproportionality effect. This is also the
case in Singapore. One reason, as mentioned, is that ethnic
minority voters are spatially dispersed across the constitu-
encies due to housing ethnic quota. Hence, opposition ethnic
parties with shallow support across the constituencies will
not perform as well as parties such as the Workers’ Party
(WP) with more concentrated support in North-eastern re-
gion of the country. Besides, regular boundary realignment
of constituencies and the lack of data on the demography of
the constituencies also prevent small opposition parties
from identifying potential constituencies to build support. In
addition, the multi-member constituencies that facilitated
the increase of district magnitude over time could also have
also exaggerated the disproportionality. As Table 4 shows,
the index of disproportionality worsened from an average of
16.7–22.2 after 1988.
The higher disproportionality shows that the post-GRC
electoral formula is less representative as the largest
party or the PAP is over-represented in Parliament. As it
stands, Singapore has the highest disproportionality in the
region, with an average of 22.3 for the six elections after
GRC (1988–2011). Comparatively, the disproportionality of
other countries with SMD and MMD plurality systems in
Asia are much lower. For example, Malaysia is at 15.8

Table 4
Electoral disproportionality based on vote and seat shares (%) (1968–2011).

GE Largest party (PAP) Second party (opposition parties) Average disproportionality

Vote (%) Seat (%) Bonus Vote (%) Seat (%) Bonus
1968 86.7 100.0 13.3 4.0 0.0 4.0 8.7
1972 70.4 100.0 29.6 12.0 0.0 12.0 20.8
1976 74.1 100.0 25.9 11.3 0.0 11.3 18.6
1980 77.7 100.0 22.3 6.2 0.0 6.2 14.3
1984 64.8 97.5 32.7 12.6 2.5 10.1 21.4
Pre-GRC average (1968–84) 74.7 99.5 24.8 9.2 0.5 L8.7 16.8
1988 63.2 98.8 35.6 16.7 1.2 15.5 25.6
1991 61.0 95.1 34.1 14.3 4.9 9.4 26.8
1997 65.0 97.6 32.6 14.2 2.4 11.8 22.5
2001 75.3 97.6 22.3 12.0 1.2 10.8 16.6
2006 66.6 97.6 31.0 16.3 2.4 14.0 22.5
2011 60.1 93.1 33.0 12.8 6.9 5.9 19.5
Post-GRC average (1988–2011) 65.2 96.6 31.4 14.4 3.2 L11.2 22.3
Average (1968–2011) 69.5 97.9 28.4 12 2 L11 19.7

Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections Department.

 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643 639

(1959–2004); Thailand at 11.1 (2001–5); the Philippines
with 10.4 (1992–8) and Nepal with 9 (1991–9) (Croissant
et al., 2002; Hicken, 2008). See Table 3. In addition, the
calculations in Table 4 show that the PAP enjoyed a boost in
its “bonus seats” from 22.8 to 31.6 percent despite its
declining average vote share from 77.2 to 65.1 percent in
the pre and post-GRC elections. On the other hand, the
second largest party in Singapore or the WP was penalized
as its “bonus seats” reduced from 8.7 to 11.2 percent.
Despite the overall increase in opposition’s vote shares
from 9.2 to 14.4 percent in the post-GRC period, this did not
translate to seat shares.
6. Psychological effects
Unlike the study of mechanical effects, it is more chal-
lenging to demonstrate the psychological effects of the
electoral system. However, following Blais and Carty’s
suggestion, one way to assess the “illusive” psychological
effects is to investigate the polarization of the vote itself
(1991: 83). Instead of looking at vote-seat share relation-
ship, we can assess the effects of the electoral rules on party
elites and voters by comparing the: 1) number of contesting
parties and candidates and 2) effects on voters by the dis-
tribution of vote shares for the opposition parties in the pre
and post-GRC elections. While the number of contesting
parties and candidates reflect the changing strategies of the
party elites, the distribution of vote shares between the
parties could tell us whether voters are shying away from
the smaller parties.
6.1. Fewer contesting parties and candidates
If we only compare the average total number of contest-
ing parties pre and post-GRC elections, it would appear that
the GRC scheme did not deter the opposition parties from
contesting. In fact, the average total number of contesting
parties increased from 5.8 in the pre-GRC period to 6.6 in the
post-GRC period. See Table 5. However, if we examine the
number of opposition elites and independents after 1988, a
more interesting variation emerges. For example, the num-
ber of contesting opposition parties shrunk from eight in
1984 to a low of three by 2006 election. Significantly, the
percentage of total opposition candidates also declined
dramatically from 88 percent in 1988 to a low of 33 percent
by 2001 election. It was only in 2011 that the participation of
opposition candidates reverted to a healthier level of 95.4
percent.
The declining number of opposition parties from 1991 to
2006 elections suggests an initial deterrent effect. How-
ever, after that, the opposition parties appeared to have
learnt that they could be competitive by pooling together
resources and co-operating in larger districts. This was in
fact the aim expressed by the long time opposition leader
Chiam See Tong when he brought four opposition parties
together to form the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA).
In 2001 election, the SDA sent 13 candidates to two multi-
member districts and three single-member districts. The
motivation for an opposition alliance could have stemmed
from the anticipation of the voters’ avoidance of small
parties or efforts to mitigate the “wasted vote” syndrome.
However, the alliance did not last. By 2010, leadership
struggles and disagreements led to its disintegration. In the
recent 2011 election, all six opposition parties contested
independently, horse-traded to carve out the battleground
and avoided three-cornered fights (except for one constit-
uency). For the first time in Singapore’s electoral history, an
opposition party won a group constituency and brought
five-elected opposition MPs to the House. Learning how to
overcome institutional barriers and co-ordinate takes time.
While talks of merger between opposition parties are now
underway, whether they will work successfully together in
future remains to be seen (Ong, 2012).
6.2. Higher uncontested seats
In the post-GRC period, the percentage of total opposi-
tion candidates contested in elections dropped from 88 in
1988 to 56 by 2006 election. In contrast, the PAP continues
to field all the seats in all elections. The decline in the
percentage of opposition candidates shows that the GRC
scheme had an initial deterrent effect on the opposition,
which led to a rise in uncontested seats. As Graph 3 shows,
the percentage of uncontested seats rose dramatically from

Table 5
Contesting parties and candidates (1968–2006).

GE Total Opposition Total PAP PAP Opposition Opposition

parties parties candidates candidates candidates (%) candidates candidates (%)
1968 2 1 65 58 100 2 3
1972 6 5 146 65 100 79 122
1976 7 7 124 69 100 53 77
1980 8 7 118 75 100 43 57
1984 9 8 130 79 100 48 61
Pre-GRC average (1968–1984) 6.4 5.6 116.6 69.2 100 45 64
1988 8 7 156 81 100 71 88
1991 6 5 126 81 100 38 47
1997 6 5 122 83 100 38 46
2001 6 4 114 84 100 28 33
2006 4 3 131 84 100 47 56
2011 7 6 170 87 100 83 95.4
Post-GRC average (1988–2011) 6.2 5.0 136.5 83.3 100.0 50.8 60.9
Average (1968–2011) 6.3 5.3 127.5 76.9 100.0 48.2 62.3

Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections Department.

640 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
Graph 3. Uncontested Seats (%). Source: Data from Singapore Elections
Department.
14 in 1988 to a high of 66 by 2001 election. The high levels
of uncontested seats in 1991, 1997 and 2001 elections
meant that more than half of the electorate did not get the
chance to exercise their right to vote. In fact, the number of
voters who could not vote because of the lack of contesting
candidates was as high as 66.9 percent in 2001. The per-
centage of uncontested seats only eased in 2006, returning
to a more normal level in the recent 2011 election.
2011 general election was a watershed event that saw
an unprecedented 83 opposition candidates, doubling the
average number of 40. Out of this new crop, 62 were first-
timers – the biggest number of new opposition candidates
in two decades. More significantly, this election also saw
an unusual rise in the percentage of minority opposition
candidates (31.4 percent), exceeding the PAP (26.4
percent). Thus far, three reasons have been suggested to
account for the rise in political participation. One, the
Graph 4. Distribution of Total Vote Share of Key Opposition Parties (%) (1968–2011). Notes: SDP: Singapore Democratic Party, SDA: Singapore Democratic
Alliance, WP: Workers’ Party, NSP: National Solidarity Party, SPP: Singapore People’s Party. Source: Based on data from Singapore Elections Department.
reduction in the sizes of some multi-member constitu-
encies could have lowered the hurdles for the opposition
candidates and explain the surge of candidates. Two, the
increased use of new media and more relaxed Internet
controls could have offered the opposition more alterna-
tive channels to raise funds to contest in larger constitu-
encies. However, post-election surveys also show that
2011 election was not an Internet election and the masses
still relied on mainstream media for electoral news. The
impact of Internet on opposition mobilization remains
unclear (Tan, 2011). Three, a series of policy blunders by
the government in mishandling immigration, housing
policies and social inequality could have contributed to
mass disaffection and increased opposition support. It is
still unclear how these socio-political factors work to raise
political participation and how opposition parties over-
come the institutional barriers. More work is needed to
disentangle the effects of electoral institutions and socio-
political factors to explain the vote swing against the PAP
and higher opposition support.
6.3. Distribution of opposition vote shares
There are 27 registered parties in Singapore, on average,
only about five or six parties are active and participate in
the elections. See Graph 4. Apart from the WP, most op-
position parties are small, underfunded and lacks organi-
zational strength (Tan, 2013). In contrast, the PAP’s hyper-
incumbency advantage, performance legitimacy and
hardball tactics dwarfed the opposition. While the political
fortunes of the opposition WP and Singapore Democratic
Party (SDP) were on an upswing in 1980s, especially after
the WP leader, J.B. Jeyaretnam won the Anson by-election
in 1980, their support declined significantly after the
 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
multi-member constituencies were introduced. See Graph
4. Their declining vote shares in the 1990s suggest that
they were facing difficulties contesting in the larger dis-
tricts. Besides, the series of defamation and libel suits that
dogged the opposition leaders had also damaged their
reputation and prevented them from campaigning effec-
tively (Mauzy and Milne, 2002: 134–6).
The distribution of opposition vote shares shows that
voters shy away from smaller parties. This is evident in
2001 election as the vote shares of the WP and the SDP
plummeted after four opposition parties formed the
Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA). The increased vote
share of the SDA suggests that voters prefer bigger parties
as pooled resources and more manpower meant a better
campaign and higher chance of winning. However, the
alliance failed to clinch any group constituency. Internal
bickering, incompetence and blunders in filling incomplete
registration papers resulted in the disqualification of an
entire team and the opposition contesting in less than one-
third of the seats in 2001 election. More recently, more
credible candidates and clearer policy alternatives offered
by the National Solidarity Party (NSP) and SDP in 2011
election suggest that while rules affect voting behavior,
other factors such as party leadership, quality of candidates
and campaign issues also matter to voters. Overall, the
distribution of opposition support indicates that Singa-
porean voters are drawn to bigger parties with credible
candidates and clear policy alternatives. Hence, better op-
position co-ordination in fielding candidates and more
competent leadership could boost voter confidence and
help overcome some of the institutional barriers posed by
the larger multi-member constituencies.
7. Implications and conclusions
This study on Singapore’s electoral rules supports three
observations of majoritarian electoral systems. First, Sin-
gapore’s case reaffirms the tendency of the FPTP system to
reward larger, established parties. This is reflected in the
country’s low effective number of parties and high electoral
disproportionality. This finding is unsurprising given that
the FPTP system in Westminster elections is designed to
manufacture a majority government to improve govern-
ability and reduce party system fragmentation (Lijphart,
1994; Rae, 1967). However, what is significant about
Singapore is the extent to which the multi-member district
party bloc vote system exaggerated the disproportionality
and over-represented the largest party, even compared to
other majoritarian systems in the region. Singapore’s
electoral formula that uses the multi-member, party bloc
vote plurality system for 85 percent of the seats is thus
regressive, considering countries such as the U.K. after
1945, India after 1957 and Canada after 1968 have all
abolished multi-member districts to avoid too much
disproportionality.
Second, Singapore’s group representative scheme also
offers support to the hypothesis that majority system with
district magnitude of more than one tends to reinforce the
disproportional effects and more likely to produce majority
governments than single-member majority systems (Blais
and Carty, 1987: 216; Lijphart, 1994: 20). In Singapore,
641
gerrymandering coupled with increases in the sizes of the
multi-member districts from three in 1988 to a high of six
by 2001 exacerbated the disproportionality. Interviews
with opposition leaders have also revealed difficulties
contesting in larger five and six-member districts due to
shortage in candidates and funding (Lim, 2007; Jeyaretnam,
2010; Goh, 2010). The unhealthy phenomenon was only
reversed after the sizes of some of the larger districts were
reduced and the opposition parties were better organized
in the 2011 GE.
Third, the multi-member constituencies also offer the
government more opportunities to redraw electoral
boundaries, change the district magnitude and complicate
the spatial basis of representation in FPTP systems. As
Norris reminds us, the geographical distribution of votes
is critical to the outcome of votes in FPTP systems (2004:
44). The arbitrary changes in electoral boundaries that
dispersed constituencies with stronger opposition sup-
port and ethnic enclaves presents a higher threshold for
smaller parties to mobilize and win plurality in any con-
stituency. Overall, the GRC scheme rewards larger parties
and concentrates the party system.
In sum, the manipulation of electoral rules boosted the
PAP’s legislative dominance in the last two decades. Singa-
pore’s cartel electoral rules have repressed competition and
resulted in a less representative electoral system. The find-
ings show that the multi-member district based on party
block bloc system have a strong reductive effect producing a
smaller effective number of parties and a higher dis-
proportionality. As it stands, Singapore has the highest dis-
proportionality in the region. The creation of multi-member
districts had dampened contestation and led to a higher
number of uncontested seats, especially in the 1990s. In the
“winner-takes-all” elections, the ethos of majority rule used
in the group constituencies means that the strongest party
stands to gain. As former PM Goh Chok Tong said, “Singapore
is, therefore, like one big constituency. Hence, in a first-past-
the-post Westminster system of democracy, it must be that
any party that wins, wins big” (2008).
In 2011 election, the reduction in the sizes of some
larger districts and more relaxed media control lowered the
hurdles for the opposition parties and allowed them to
capture a group constituency (Ramesh, 2011). This
achievement was a psychological breakthrough as it
assured both the opposition leaders and voters that the
institutional barriers are not insurmountable. Clearly, there
are limits to electoral institutions as is it is only one of many
factors that affects the degree of competition. Schedler, for
example, has argued that electoral manipulation does not
affect competition, rather, opposition participation, espe-
cially in terms of protests will have “magical” effects in
making elections tools of democratization (2009). Howev-
er, given Singapore’s strict laws governing political pro-
tests, civil disobedience might not be the best route for the
opposition parties to move ahead.
Opposition parties in Singapore are not in the position
to change the rules of the game. It is more expedient for
them to take elections seriously, pool resources together,
co-ordinate and work as an alliance. As this study shows,
size matters. Singapore’s electorate tends to avoid small
parties, as the electoral system penalizes the small parties
642 N. Tan / Electoral Studies 32 (2013) 632–643
and rewards the larger one. Hence, working together will
help the opposition project an image of strength and
improve their chances against the Goliath. Besides, given
the spatial distribution of minority voters across all the
constituencies, it is imperative that the opposition identify
more opposition-friendly constituencies in the North-
eastern region of the country, concentrate their resources
and target the constituencies, one at the time. Singapore’s
demography is changing. Constituencies with younger
electorate are more likely to support political pluralism and
the opposition cause. It is thus important for the opposition
to be strategic in cultivating its supporters and fielding
better-quality candidates in the younger constituencies,
rather than over-stretch to contest in as many constitu-
encies as possible. The opposition can build on the mo-
mentum from the 2011 elections. With seven elected seats
in the House, the opposition can capitalize on its limited
media exposure and fight on.
Studies on authoritarian elections show that apart from
electoral manipulation, other institutional arrangements
governing the opposition’s access to state funds, media,
law, ability to co-ordinate and organize protests also have
decisive consequences on competition and democratiza-
tion (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Levitsky and Way,
2010a,b). Hence, in order for Singapore to liberalize, the
opposition must agitate to dismantle the party-state fusion
and level the playing field. As Mainwaring and Scully re-
minds us, for hegemonic party systems to democratize, de-
institutionalization must first occur (1995: 20). And
without which, the PAP is likely to dominate Singapore
politics for some time more to come.
Acknowledgments
I acknowledge the funding of Social Sciences and Hu-
manities Research Council (SSHRC) for the research and
writing of this paper. I am also grateful to Bernie Grofman
and Daniel Stokemer for their suggestions in an earlier
version of this paper presented at “The Effects of District
Magnitude” Conference in Lisbon, May 2012. This paper has
also benefitted from the comments of an anonymous
reviewer of this journal and also Pippa Norris, Jørgen Elklit
and Sarah Birch at the “Challenges of Electoral Integrity”
Pre-IPSA Workshop in Madrid, July 2012.
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