HAZOP

The Hazard and Operability Analysis technique is developed to identify and evaluate
safety hazards in a process plant, and to identify operability problems which, although
not hazardous, could compromise the plants ability to achieve design productivity.
Although originally developed to anticipate hazards and operability problems for
Technology.

HAZOP analysis ,an interdisciplinary team uses a creative , systematic

approach to identify hazard and operability problems resulting from deviations from the
process design intent that could lead to undesirable consequences.

1.1 Definitions
When describing the HAZOP methodology, the following definitions1 are useful:

Hazard - Potential source of harm. Deviations from design or operational intent may
constitute or produce a hazard. Hazards are the focus of HAZOP studies, and it should be
noted that a single hazard could potentially lead to multiple forms of harm.

Harm - Physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the
environment. Harm is the consequence of a hazard occurring and may take many forms:
patient or user safety, employee safety, business risks, regulatory risks, environmental
risks, etc.

Risk - Combination of probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm. In
a strict sense, “risk” is not always explicitly identified in HAZOP studies since the core
methodology does not require identification (also referred to as rating) of the probability
or severity of harm. However, risk assessment teams may choose to rate these factors in
order to further quantify and prioritize risks if needed.

1.2 Usage
HAZOP is best suited for assessing hazards in facilities, equipment, and processes and is
capable of assessing systems from multiple perspectives:

Design
➢ Assessing system design capability to meet user specifications and safety
standards
➢ Identifying weaknesses in systems Physical and operational environments
➢ Assessing environment to ensure system is appropriately situated, supported,
serviced, contained, etc.

Operational and procedural controls

➢ Assessing engineered controls (ex: automation), sequences of operations,
procedural controls (ex: human interactions) etc.
➢ Assessing different operational modes – start-up, standby, normal
➢ operation, steady & unsteady states, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown,
etc.
 Advantages
Helpful when confronting hazards that
are difficult to quantify
Hazards rooted in human performance and
behaviors
Hazards that are difficult to detect,
analyze, isolate, count, predict, etc.
Methodology doesn’t force you to
explicitly rate or measure deviation
probability of occurrence, severity of
impact, or ability to detect
+ Built-in brainstorming methodology
+ Systematic & comprehensive
methodology
+ More simple and intuitive than other
commonly used risk management tools
2 HAZOP Methodology1
The HAZOP analysis process is executed in four phases as illustrated below:
Necessary steps in Hazop study;
❖ Objective of study
❖ Formation of multi disciplinary team
Disadvantages
No
means to assess hazards involving
interactions between different parts of a
system or process
No
risk ranking or prioritization
capability
Teams may optionally build-in such
capability as required
No
means to assess effectiveness of
existing or proposed controls (safeguards)
May need to interface HAZOP with
other risk management tools (ex:
HACCP) for this purpose
❖ Preparative work:
• Collection of data- using Line diagram, flow diagram,
P&I diagram., etc
• Study of the plant- arranging necessary visits and
through study
• Sequence for the study

The process will be divided into different parts and each part comprising
of pipe lines, vessels, and instruments will be studied in sequence derived
from the floe diagram

• Meetings of the examination

• Examinations in pro active and applying the guide
words
• Record the results arrived

Guide word Deviation

No No forward flow/ reverse flow

More of More of any relevant physical property there than should

be
Eg; higher flow , higher temperature, higher viscosity

Less of less of any relevant physical property there than should be

Eg; lower flow , lower temperature, lower viscosity

Part of Composition of system different from what it should be

Eg; change in ratio of component or component missing
etc

As well as A transfer of some component in addition to the intended

component

Eg: transfer of water with benzene in the transfer line

More than More component present in the system

Not If some thing is not operating

Eg:control valve

Other than What else can apart from normal operation Eg; static
electricity
 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY REPORT

Hazard and operability study is conducted with the team members for the rectification
unit of Batch 4&5 at 1MT Benzol plant

Findings of the study are reported in the fore coming pages. The report should read
together with P &I diagram

Sequence of study:

For the purposes of study, the rectification process of Benzol pant is divided into
different parts and the study is proceeded on order that is given below.

INTENTION:

I. Feed Circuit To Rectification Column Still:

a. Transfer /charging of washed Benzol from storage tank to the reboiler as

batch
b. Put up of I.P stem to Reboiler
c. Transfer of Benzol vapour from reboiler to column bottom

II. Distillate Circuit

a. Transfer of distillate from column top to Ragger box

b. Transfer of reflux from ragger box to the column top
c. Transfer of pure product from ragger box to storage tank

HAZOP STUDY DOCUMENTATION

I. FEED CIRCUIT TO RECTIFICATION COLUMN(Batch 4&5)

Intention: Charging / transfer of washed benzol from storage tank to reboiler still
GUIDE DEVIATIO CAUSES
WORD N
NO No flow 1. storage tank empty
2.Pump failure ,Power failure ,
Gap between the impeller and
casing is more , Bearing failure,
impeller blade bend or corroded
and improper motor coupling etc.,
CONSEQUENCE ACTION REQUIRED
S
Delay in production 1, operator should check
the tank level before
charging still
As for (1) 2. Institute plant periodic
maintenance of motor,
impeller blade, coupling,
bearing, etc
 3. Line blockage isolation valves Rise in temperature 3.Install no flow interlock
closed or jammed with pump of the liquid inside for feed pump
running the casing of the 4. operator should check
pump leads to fire the isolation valve before
and explosion starting the pump
4.Line fracture Leakage lead to fire 5. Institute regular
and Explosion inspection of transfer line
More Over change 5. operator failure Reboiler over fills 6. Install high level alarm
and drain out leads on re boiler
to fire and 7. Drain out safely the
explosion excess liquid to the
required level
8. check& maintain the
Gauge glass level
More Over change 6. Delivery valve closed with Batch charging 8. operator should check
pump running pump will the valve before starting
subjected to churn the pump
of liquid and 9. replace gland seal of the
leakage fro the pump with Mechanical
pump gland seal or Seal
flange lead to fire
and explosion

INTENTION: B, Putting of I.P steam to Reboiler

Guide Deviation causes Consequences Action required
word
No No flow 7. Isolation valves As for (1) 10.operator should ensure the flow of
closed are jammed steam inside the reboiler coil during the
process
Less Less 8. Supply pressure from As for(1) 11. operator should check the pressure
pressure Exhauster is less indicator of the steam line and inform
immediately to Exhauster house
More More 9. Malfunctioning of Generation of 12. As for (1)
pressure bleeder Benzol vapor 13. Operator should regulate the steam
from re boiler flow by the isolation valves
will be more
INTENTION: C, Transfer of Benzol vapour from reboiler to column bottom
Guide Deviation causes Consequences Action required
word
As well Water 10. Water content along Equilibrium of 14.before charging check the reboiler
as vapour wit the material column will get by opening the drain out
presents 11. Reboiler steam coil disturbed
leakage 15. operator should check steam
condenser from the reboiler
16. periodic inspection and
maintenance of reboiler steam coil is
required
Reverse Reverse 12. pressure relief valve Increase in 17. periodic maintenance of safety
flow on column failure and pressure of the valve s and PRC
malfunctioning of PRC system
Not Malfunction 13. Pressure transmitter As for(11&12) 18. Periodic maintenance and
of PRC impulse line chocked calibration of PRC is Required
14. Tapping point
isolation valve closed
15. control valve getting
struck at extreme
positions
16.Air supply pressure
is less or contaminated

5.0 Findings and recommendations

The following findings and recommendations have been given based upon the
result of hazop stud undertaken.
1. It was found that the feed pump and reflux pump gland seals were leaking, which
is considered as most hazardous and unsafe.

To avoid leakage from the pump, it is recommended that the present gland packing seal
of the pumps should be replaced by mechanical seal or better b magnetically driven seal
pumps.
 2. In general, it was observed that the most of the equipment earthing was not
proper. In order to generated static electricity to the ground, it is necessary that all
the equipment, storage tanks and pipelines should be properly grounded at
number of points and it should be maintained periodically.

3. The vents, which are provided are not screened with fine wire mesh, hence it is
recommended to screened the vents will fine wire mesh. Otherwise, the content of
a tank or still will get ignited in of a flash back from escaping vapors.

4. The instrument control systems must be maintained in good working conditions.

Periodic maintenance of such systems is necessary to prevent an risk arising due
to the deviations of such systems (refer hazop stud documentation.)

5. Regular inspection should be varied out to ensure the integrity of flange joints.
Use of unreinforced joints should be avoided.

Intention: F, Transfer of distillate form Ragger Box to the storage tank.

Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Action required

No No flow 26. as for (3) Receiver over ff, Operator
fills should ensure
the valves are
opened and
there is flow
into the storage
tank.
27.as for (4) Lead to fire and gg, As for (e).
explosion.
More More 28, inefficiency Gas locking in ii, ensure and
temperature of cooler pipe maintain the
cooling water
temperature of
the cooler.
Over charge 29,opoerator Over flow of jj, Install high
failure materials from level alarm on
storage tank storage tank.
leads explosion
Other than Static electricity 30, not Ignition of kk, ensure the
electrically vapour leads to proper earthing
grounded. fire and to all the
 31. escape of explosion. equipment,
material pipelines and
through cracks storage tanks.
of flange joints. ll, ensure the
integrity of
joints and
earthing
continuity
across flange
joints.

Intention: E, Transfer of distillate form Ragger Box to the column top as Reflux.

GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION

WORD REQUIRED
No No flow 22. No Delay in Z, Start the
material in production Reflux pump
Reflux Pot only when the
distillate comes
to Reflux Pot.
23. As for (3). As for (3) aa. Install no
flow meter
Interlock for
the Reflux
pump.
24. As for (2). As for (11) bb, As for (b).
25..As for (4). Lead to fire and cc, Institute
explosion. regular
patrolling an
inspection of
transfer line.
Not LRC As for Reflux pot overfills dd, Install High
malfunctioning (13,14,15& Level Alarm
16) on Reflux Pot.
ee, Periodic
maintenance
and calibration
of LRC is
required.

11 DISTILLATE CIRCUIT FFOM RECTIFICATION COLUMN TOP.

Intention: D, Transfer of distillate form Column top to Ragger Box..
GUIDE DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES ACTION
WORD REQUIRED
No No flow 17, As for (4), Line fracture in t, As for (e).
between column
top and Condenser
will lead to fire and
UVCE
18. Gas Over flow from u, Check the
locking due to separator leads to Vent Hole
blockage in fire and explosion. periodically
line and Vent and it should
Hole. be wire
Meshed.
As well as Water vapour 19, Condenser Contamination of v, Before
presents and cooler product. starting the still
water line the condenser
leakage. and cooler line
should be
checked.
No No flow of 20, Valves are More escaper of w, Ensure flow
water in closed or Uncondensed of water before
condenser. jammed or no vapour through starting the
water form Vent Hole leads to still.
Header. fire and UVCE. x, Install No
Flow Alarm in
Condenser and
Cooler water
line.
No flow of 31. As for (20) Gas locking in line y, Install high
water in coller. result in over flow level alarm on
of material from separator.
separator leads to
fire and explosion.