ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH
REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES.
BY
AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma
B.Sc (Hons.), M.S.c, University of Ibadan

MATRIC NO: PG/02/03/09/10/66998
Being a Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Postgraduate School in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy
(Ph.D) Degree in Political Science of the Delta State University, Abraka.
SUPERVISORS: DR.W. EHWARIEME
DR. E.V. CLARK
NOVEMBER, 2017.
1
DECLARATION
I, AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma declare that this thesis is an original
research work carried out by me in the Department of Political Science, Delta
State University, Abraka. Nigeria.
______________________________
_____________
AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma Date
2
CERTIFICATION
We certify that this Ph.D thesis was written by AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma
in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Delta State
University, Abraka, under our supervision.
________________________
__________________
Dr. W. Ehwarieme Dr. E.V
Clark
Supervisor
Supervisor
______________________
________________
Date Date
3
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to God Almighty who gave me the grace, strength and
wisdom to reach this height in my academic career.
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My acknowledgement is a huge account and I cannot hope to thank all
those who contributed in one way or the other in building my career in education.
First and foremost, I have to thank God, my Creator for the gift of life for me and
my entire family since birth. I appreciate Him for giving me the wisdom and the
understanding that made it possible for me to reach this height and for the
successful completion of this thesis in spite of all the odds. God, I thank you for
everything. May your Holy Name be praised forever.
I must place on record the immeasurable contributions of my supervisors,
Dr. W. Ehwarieme and Dr. E.V Clark. I appreciate the efforts of Dr. W.
Ehwarieme and his family while undertaking this study. I sincerely thank him for
his positive contributions, financial assistance and constructive criticisms, his
fatherly advice and prayers during the course of doing this work. I really
appreciate his efforts in supporting me with relevant information and data which
helped immensely in enhancing the quality of this work. I thank him and his wife
for their words of encouragement and counselling while undertaking this study.
I must also acknowledge the efforts and contributions of, Dr. E.V. Clark. I
thank him for his active role in reshaping my thoughts which made it possible for
the final production of this thesis. I really appreciate his efforts in going through
the manuscripts, making useful suggestions and corrections which greatly
contributed to the success recorded in this thesis. I thank him for his time, energy,
prayers and advice towards the successful completion of this thesis.
In addition, I must appreciate the positive contributions of all academic
and non-academic staff of the Department of Political Science, Delsu, Abraka. I
acknowledge the role played by my former Head of Department, Dr. F.A, Sanubi
who was always asking me to speed up the rate at which I was working. The same
5
goes to Prof. A Otite who was always calling me to his office for advice and
financial assistance whenever I complained. The efforts of Prof. A Ohwona, Prof
A. Mukoro, Prof. S.A Akpotor, Dr. G.C Sokoh, Dr. P. Okereka, Dr. L. Etemike,
Dr, W. Ekpekurede, Dr N. Umukoro, Dr.A.Orhero, Dr. Ogege S, and Dr. R.
Aboribo, toward the successful completion of this thesis are highly appreciated.
Also acknowledged for the successful completion of this thesis is the

Dean, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Prof. C. Ewhrudjakpor for his
encouragement, moral and financial support. I will forever be grateful to him for
his kind gesture and fatherly role in seeing me through at a difficult moment. Not
forgetting the Faculty officer of the Social Sciences, Mr, Emmanuel Umukoro for
his efforts and contributions.
At this juncture, I must thank Chief Amos Ohwe, who initiated and
sponsored my going to school in 1970 when the payment of N600.00 sent so
many school children away from attending schools. I will ever remain grateful for
his contributions in ensuring that, though, I lost my father early in life, he gave me
the benefits that a child ought to derive from a father.
I also thank my mentor, Prof. P.A. Muoboghare who made it possible for
me to be in Delta State University as a staff. I appreciate his role in my life, as my
teacher in the primary school, and as one that l always look up to in redirecting
my footsteps. I must not fail to recognize the efforts and contributions of the
following persons in the Department of Political Science, Delta State University,
Abraka, Bar. Obagbinoko Clement, Messrs, Egbadju Abraham, Ikenga Francis,
Ekiugbo Efeduado, Efebeh Vincent for their encouragements, advice and personal
assistance.
I also acknowledge all the relevant sources through which I obtained data
for this thesis. Mention must be made of the uses of the following libraries, Delta
State University library, Abraka, University of Ibadan library, the United States of
America Information Service library Ibadan, INEC library Abuja, Vanguard
library Abuja, The Pointer Newspaper library, Asaba, Internet sources, textbooks
and their authors and other printed sources. I appreciate the efforts of the
6
librarians in these libraries for their assistance in the course of gathering
information and data for this thesis.
To Eghomare Abraham, Akpoku Michael and Uche Okafor, I sincerely
thank all of you for your positive contributions toward the success of this work. I
thank you for the typing, printing, binding and for all other forms of assistance
given to me. God will abundantly reward you. I am equally grateful to the
plethora of research assistants from Oyo and Delta States whose efforts were
unquantifiable in the successful completion of this thesis. The efforts of the
following field assistants are worthy of mention. They are Messrs, Ariyo
Solomon, Babagani Alfred, Oginiza John, Igrah Jonathan, Agboala Akasa, Abel
Machine and Balogun Famous who assisted me in the gathering of data in Oyo
State. For Delta State, the efforts of the following persons are worth appreciating.
They are Messrs Bribai Clement, Eyamu Roland, Umude Mathias, Oyibo
Solomon, Obruche Stanley, Okuwere Felix and Igberadja Serumu. These field
assistants contributed immensely in the administration and collection of
questionnaires in both States. Their role in the interpretation of the questions in
the local languages to the respondents is highly appreciated.
This acknowledgement will not be complete without the mention of my
wife, Mrs. Agah Georgina, Odjuvwederhie. I sincerely appreciate her lovely care,
prayers and financial supports in all my academic pursuits. I also thank my
children for their prayers, moral supports and for not sharing the lovely presence
of a father, most of the time while I was undertaking this study. In addition, I also
thank my numerous friends and well wishers, whom I am unable to mention here.
I recognize your relevance in my life and God Almighty will reward you all.
AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma
Date…………………………….
7
ABSTRACT
The study examined electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic, using Delta and Oyo States. The Ex-Post Facto research design with the
questionnaire technique was adopted for the study to elicit information and data
from respondents from both states. Three hypotheses were formulated for the
study and tested, using the Chi-square statistical technique. From the analyses of
the responses to the questions used for the testing of the hypotheses, the study
established that, there was a significant relationship between the nature and
dynamics of the Nigerian state and electoral violence. It was also established that
there was a significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy and
thirdly, the study also discovered that there exist a positive relationship between
electoral violence and the democratization process in Nigeria. These significant
relationships were also evident from the data analysed with the distribution tables,
bar charts and pie charts. The study also established that mass unemployment,
ethnic and religious cleavages, zero-sum nature of politics and unabated
corruption are major precursors to electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic. Resulting from these findings, the study recommends that, for
democracy to thrive in Nigeria, the state should be de-emphasised as a measure of
last resort to public office holders, government at all levels in the country must
embark on aggressive creation of job opportunities for the teaming youths,
effective measures should be put in place to check corruption of public office
holders and that the citizens must be re-oriented to imbibe new values devoid of
primordial sentiments in national politics.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover Page - - - - - - -
i
Title Page - - - - - - -
ii
Declaration - - - - - - -
iii
Certification - - - - - - -
iv
Dedication - - - - - - -
v
Acknowledgments - - - - - - -
vi
Abstract - - - - - - -
vii
Lists of abbreviations - - - - - -
viii
9
Lists of Tables - - - - - -
ix
Lists of Figures - - - - -
x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study - - - -

1
1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - -
5
1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - -
7
1.4 Justification of the Study - - - -
7
1.5 Hypotheses - - - - - -
8
1.6 Research Questions - - - -
8
1.7 Significance of the Study - - - -
8
1.8 Scope of the Study - - - -
9
1.9 Limitations of the Study - - - -
10
1.10 Operational Definition of Terms - -
11
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK.
10
2.1 Literature Review - - - -
12
2.1.1 Ethnicity and Regionalism - - - -
19
2.1.2 The Nature of Electoral Process in Nigeria - - -
24
2.1.3 The Nature of the Nigerian State and its Political Elites -
25
2.1.4 Structural Imbalance and Political Violence in Nigeria -
28
2.1.5 The Nature of the Electoral Management Bodies and Political Violence in
Nigeria - - - - - - - - -
35
2.1.6 The Media and Electoral Violence - - - - -
38
2.1.7 The Nature and Dynamics of the Nigerian State and Electoral Violence-
47
2.1.8 Godfatherism and Political Violence in Nigeria - -
51
2.1.9 Voters Education and Enlightenment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria
57
2.1.10 The History of Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria - -
61
2.1.11 Empirical Cases of Electoral Violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
1999-2011- - - - - - - - -
70
2.2 Theoretical Framework - - - -
81
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Research Design - - - -
87
11
3.2 Population of the Study - - - -
87
3.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques - - - -
88
3.4 Sources of Data and the Techniques of Data Collection - - -
88
3.5 Administration of Data Collection Instrument - -
89
3.6 Test of Validity and Reliability of Instrument - -
89
3.7 Method of Data Analysis - - - -
90
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction - - - -
92
4.2 Data Presentation - - - -
92
4.3 Hypotheses Testing - - - -
107
4.4 Discussions of Findings - - - -
138
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction - - - -
150
5.2 Summary of Findings - - - - -
150
5.3 Conclusion - - - -
154
12
5.4 Recommendations - - - -
154
5.5 Contribution to Knowledge - - - - -
156
References- - - - - - - - -
157
Appendix I - - - - - - - - -
179
13
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACN Action Congress of Nigeria
AD Alliance for Democracy
AG Action Group
ALF African Leadership Forum
ANPP All Nigerians Peoples Party
APGA All Progressive Grand Alliance
APLP All Peoples Liberation Party
ARP African Renaissance Party
BCOS Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State
BNPP Better Nigeria Progressive Party
CD Campaign for Democracy
CDHR Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
CNPP Coalition of Nigeria Political Party
CPC Congress for Progressive Change
DA Democratic Alternative
ESBS Ekiti State Broadcasting Service
EVER Electoral Violence Education and Resolution
FCC Federal Character Commission
FEDECO Federal Electoral Commission
FRCN Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
GNPP Great Nigerian Peoples Party
GPN Green Party of Nigeria
GSMC Gombe State Media Corporation
IBC Imo Broadcasting Corporation
ICA Igbo Citizens Assembly
IFES International Foundation for Election System
INEC Independent National Electoral Commission
IYM Ijaw Youth Movement
JP Justice Party
KTRTV Katsina State Radio and Television Station
14
L.G.A Local Government Area
LDPN Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria
MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MDJ Movement for Democracy and Justice
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
NAC National Action Council
NAP Nigeria Advance Party
NBA Nigerian Bar Association
NBC National Broadcasting Commission
NCNC National Council of Nigeria Citizens
NCP National Conscience Party
ND New Democrats
NDC Niger Delta Congress
NDP National Democratic Party
NDVF Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NEPU Northern Elements Progressive Union
NMMN National Mass Movement of Nigeria
NNPP New Nigeria Peoples Party
NPC Northern Peoples Congress
NPN National Party of Nigeria
NPRC National Political Reform Conference
NRP National Reformation Party
NTA Nigerian Television Authority
NYM Nigerian Youth Movement
OPC Oodua Peoples Congress
PAC Progressive Action Congress
PDP Peoples Democratic Party
PLP Progressive Liberation Party
PMP Peoples Mandate Party
PRP Peoples Redemption Party
15
PSD Party for Social Democracy
PSP Peoples Salvation Party
PTF Petroleum Trust Fund
UDP United Democratic Party
UNPP United Nigeria Peoples Party
UPGA United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN Unity Party of Nigeria
16
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Party Performance and Strongholds in 1959 Elections

23
Table 2.2: Federal Officers on Grade Level 15 and Above. - -

33
Table 2.3: Major Indices of Electoral Malpractices in Nigeria, 1964 – 2011

59
Table 2.4: Ethnic Distribution of Leaders of the Major Nigerian Parties in

1959 as Percentage of the Total Vote Cast - -
- 63
Table 2.5: Number of Registered Political Parties - -

65
Table 2.6: Records of Politically Motivated Assassinations. - -

67
Table 2.7: Some Cases of Unresolved Political Assassinations in Nigeria, -

69
Table 4.1 Summary of Responses Based on Sex - -

92
Table 4.2 Summary of Responses Based on Age - -

93
Table 4.3 Summary of Responses Based on Group/Designation -

95
Table 4.4 Summary of Responses Based on Academic Qualifications -

98
17
Table 4.5 Summary of Responses to Question 18 - - -
99

100

102

103

105
Table 4.10 Observed Frequency Contingency - - -

107
Table 4.11 Computation of Chi-Square Contingency - - -

109

112
Table 4.13 Computation of Chi-Square Contingency - - -

117

120
Table 4.15 Computation of Chi-Square contingency - - -

122
Table 4.16: Computation of Chi-square Contingency - - -
125
18
Table 4.17: Observed Frequencies Contingency - - -
128
130
Table 4.19: Observed Frequencies Contingency - - -
133
136
19
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1 Sex Percentage Distributions - - -

93 Figure 4.2a Age Bracket Frequency Distribution - - -
94 Figure 4.2b Age Bracket Percentage Distribution - -
- 94 Figure 4.3a Designation Frequency Distribution
- - - 96 Figure 4.3b Designation Percentage
Distribution of respondents from Delta State 96 Figure 4.3c Designation
Percentage Distribution of respondents from Oyo State 97 Figure 4.4a
Educational Qualification Frequency Distribution - - 98
Figure 4.4b Educational Qualification of Percentage Distribution -
98 Figure 4.5a Frequency Distribution to Research Question 5
- 99 Figure 4.5b Percentage Frequency Distribution
- - - 100 Figure 4.6a Frequency Distribution to
Research Question 6 - - 101 Figure 4.6b Percentage
Frequency Distribution - - - 101 Figure 4.7a
Frequency Distribution - - - 102
Figure 4.7b Percentage Frequency Distribution - - -
103 Figure 4.8a Frequency Distribution - -
- 104 Figure 4.8b Percentage Frequency Distribution
- - - 104 Figure 4.9a Frequency Distribution
- - - 105 Figure 4.9b Percentage Frequency
Distribution - - - 106 Figure 4.10 Percentage
Frequency Distribution - - - 107 Figure 4.11
Pie Chart Distribution - - - 107
Figure 4.12 Pie Chart Distribution - - -
107
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
From the early 1960s, when most African countries got political independence,
violence during the period of elections has been a reoccurring decimal of national and
global concern because of its negative impact on the society. Indeed in many African
countries, violence during elections pre-date the era of political independence. In the
words of Hoeffler (2004), election related violence in Africa has become a burning issue
that has occupied academic discourse as well as media circles. Electoral violence creates
political instability, retards democratic reforms, growth, the hope of economic progress,
and creates human suffering and in some cases may degenerate into civil wars. African
democracies without any shadow of doubt have become associated with violence even
with the slightest provocation. Elections related violence have created avenue for groups
seeking power to truncate or manipulate what commonly is regarded as a peaceful
process of transiting power from one regime to another and groups within the political
space. Indeed, Anifowose, (1982:1), contended that many political elite see violence as a
veritable means to remain tenaciously in office. As such, elections time in African
countries is seen as war, due to the use of undemocratic means by politicians to acquire
power at all cost.
The frequency at which violence is used to gain power varies from society to
society and from situation to situation. For instance, acts of violence are infrequent and
sporadic, particularly, when the system fails to respond to the yearnings and demands of
the citizens. In some situations, violent acts have become more common and are now
seen as institutionalized features of electoral process in many parts of the developing
world. Without doubt, many independent African states are still engrossed in primordial
and informal social relations. Thus, states officials’ actions are based on non objective
rationales favouring informal relations as they perform their official functions. In order to
ensure that the situation do not change and remain in power, what obtain is violence,
patrimonialism and perverse civil society superimposed by the political elite. As Chabal
and Daloz (1999:14) pointed out, the state of disorder in Africa inevitably sustains the
21
political elite in power. The manifestations of this has been further accentuated through
ethnicity, proliferation of arms on the continent, leading to and acting as catalyst to
political violence, which repeatedly occur in alarming proportion at all stages of electoral
process throughout the continent.
Though, violence during the period of elections remained a marked feature of

electoral process in Africa, there seems to be an upsurge in the incidences of election
related violence, albeit with significant transformation in form, character and dynamics.
This has created an inherent dysfunctional nature of electoral process that often manifest
in instability, lack of respect for due process and ultimately the prospect of democratic
consolidation. As observed, many elections in contemporary times in Africa have been
characterized by violence. For instance, previous elections in Kenya, Nigeria and
Zimbabwe, resulted in massive disputes that eventually resulted in mass protests and
violence (Omotola,2008).
However, Ake (2000) cited by Omotola (2008) noted that violence during the
period of elections in Africa cannot be fully understood without a recourse to the effect of
colonialism. The colonial African States offer a useful point of entry. Ake (2000), argued
that violence during the period of elections has a strong linkage with colonial rule in
Africa. In his words, the introduction of the elective principle in the 1922 constitutional
review provided grounds for power tussle that in many instances led to violence in
Nigeria. Although the level of violence was very minimal as a result of the fact that
democratic substance was limited to individuals and certain levels of income and
residential qualifications. The limitation imposed by the income and residential
qualifications provided limited opportunities for mass participation, this however created
tension within the polity and by extension creating avenue for violence. The implication
of the pre-independent political process was that it narrows political participation and as
such made democratic process in this period essentially an elite-driven process, while the
majority of the citizens were relegated to the back water of political irrelevance(Ake
2000:33–36).
In the words of Omotola (2008), as the state began assuming a more central
position over power and resources, primordial sentiments, became appealing. Sooner than
22
later, the divisive factors assume the position of dominance within the political space.
The events of the early years of Nigeria political independence ably captured how
primordial sentiments became dominant features of the political process in the country.
Beginning from 1964–65 general elections, violence became a dominant characteristics
of the electoral process in Nigeria. The 1964 elections were largely seen as power tussle
between the Southern region dominated by National Council of Nigerian Citizens
(NCNC) and the Northern region dominated by Northern People’s Congress (NPC).As
should be noted, NPC had dominated politics at the federal level since independence in
1960 and saw the 1964 election as another chance to consolidate its position. The NPC
and NCNC were in coalition that ruled the country from 1960 – 1966. However, by 1964,
the NPC further sought to spread her influence to the south, particularly the Western
region, when it became apparent that Chief S.L. Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic
Party (NNDP) which hitherto was part of the Action Group (AG) have broken away and
was thus willing to form an alliance with the NPC. However, the1965 election was an
opportunity to prove that it was still very much on the ground in the region by regaining
its lost paradise (Omotola,2008:59). The attendant violence, including arson, looting,
killings, destruction of properties and the total collapse of public order especially in the
Western region, led in many ways to the death of the First Republic (Osaghae 1998;
Akinwumi 2004).
The Second Republic was not in any way different from that of the First Republic.
Omotola (2008:59-60) stated that electoral process during the Second Republic in Nigeria
(1979–1983) was also highly laced with violence, especially during the second election
of 1983. The features of politics, despite the modification of the federal structure from
three (later four) regions of the First Republic, to nineteen States, was still dictated by
primordial sentiments, influenced by the desire of each party to remain strong in their
various regions. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was seen as an obvious replica of
the Northern People’s Congress’s, eventually occupied the centre government between
1979 and 1983. In the 1983 elections, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) desired very
strongly to extend her tentacles to other parts of the country, this explained the vicious
predisposition of the party to win at all cost. The desire to achieve this goal could explain
the gargantuan of electoral fraud that characterized the 1983 elections, which resulted in
23
an unprecedented outbreak of violence in the South-West, where the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN), AG’S successor, held sway. The ensuing crisis perhaps led to the demise
of the Second Republic in Nigeria. Thus, the negative state of electoral process resulting
in electoral violence of course became the hydra-headed monster threatening democratic
process and partisan politics in Nigeria. Associated with the incidence of violence
pervading the political space and governance at large, violence during the period of
elections in Nigeria has not provided a measure of politics of rationality and tolerance,
which sanctifies maturity of public debates, productive dialogue, negotiations, and give-
and-take compromises based on win-win scenario.
A study by the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE,2007) found

evidence of 77 cases of elections related violence between January 13 and February 13,
2007. These cases ranged from violent clashes at political rallies and polling centres, to
kidnapping and assassinations of political opponents. Between February 14, and 28,
2007, the number of incidence of electoral violence increased to 114 incidents of which
there were cases of intra-party clashes, 20 cases of assaults, intimidation and threats to
life and physical attacks on competing prospective candidates by opponents’
groups(Amnesty International index: AFR 44/004/2007). From all indications, it
appeared that Nigeria have acquired an unenviable position, where violence during the
period of elections has become a means for attaining political power. Violence, it would
seem have become a defining characteristics of democratic process and transition from
one government to another in Nigeria, such that all elections since political freedom was
granted in 1960 to date have virtually become a cesspool of violence. From available
records, nine elections have been conducted since 1960. Unfortunately, almost all these
elections have been characterized by violence. Meanwhile, every attempts designed to
restructure the state in order to enthrone a more viable and credible elections have also
not yielded the desired results. Unfortunately politics have been mostly reduced to a zero-
sum process, where might has become right and the will of the people has been reduced
to nothing in governance, the consequences of this has also resulted in an unmitigated
struggle for control of government by various individuals and groups, hence, this study
examined the issues associated with electoral violence and their impact on democracy in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, with a focus on Delta and Oyo States.
24
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Since Nigeria’s attainment of independence in 1960, violence and myriad

irregularities have persistently marred the process of electing the country’s leaders.
Nigeria political landscape has thus been inundated by antidemocratic characteristics
defined by fraud, corruption, intimidation, and violence, as if these are the necessary
weapons of political winners. The electorate in many ways has been denied their very
basic democratic rights to vote and be voted for. Indeed, the lack of credibility in the
electoral process and the resultant violence has increased in recent elections. Local and
international electoral observers for instance described the 2003 and 2007 polls as an
undemocratic charade and the most blatant and visible rape of the people. (International
Crisis Group, 2007).
The ever increasing trend of elections related violence have continued to generate
scholarly interest, especially against the backdrop of the appreciation that only peaceful
and fraud free electoral process can ensure the improvement in Nigeria’s nascent
democracy. The country has continued to witness growing disappointments and
apprehension about free and fair elections whose results are generally acceptable to be
credible enough (Igbuzor, 2010; Osumah & Aghemelo, 2010, Ekweremadu, 2011). It is a
truism that almost all previous electoral process from 1960 till date have generated
increasingly bitter controversies and violence (Gberie, 2011). Although there were
relative improvement in the conduct of the 2011 and 2015 elections, the process was not
totally free from malpractices and violence (Bekoe, 2011;Gberie, 2011; National
Democratic Institute, 2012). Thus, with unprecedented political thuggery and
uncontrolled violence during the period of elections, Nigeria is best described as warfare
state. Incidences of violence are further accentuated by flagrant and official rigging of
election results. Further violations of established process have invariably transformed
election periods in Nigeria as a-matter-of-do-or-die or a-matter-of-life-and-death
(Rawlence and Albin-Lackey, 2007). In fact, elections, remained notable sources of
conflict which often result to confrontations that continued to threaten national unity and
development. It would appear that since the enthronement of democratic governance in
Nigeria in 1999, violence of varying degrees have been an unfortunate staple of Nigeria
25
elections. Evidently in Nigeria, elections have been about power; controlling it,
undermining it and distributing it. This explains why Nigeria elections have not been
issue based nor about providing for the most pressing yearnings of the people. The failure
to respond to the yearnings of the people in terms of provision of basic needs, services
and development have made governance a worrisome trend that has become a precursor
for violence during the period of elections.
Whether sponsored or spontaneous, election-related conflicts are destructive,
signifying discontent around highly interwoven social and economic concerns. In
Nigeria, these concerns include the rent seeking behaviour of government officials
including citizens, resulting in little or no respect for due process. The lack of respect for
due process have resulted in the collision of personal and public interest in determining
what is socially and economically relevant. The absence of means to mitigate the hopes,
fears and expectations of individuals, groups and elites often raised tensions during
election period and violent competition.
In 1999, violence occurred but between 2003 and 2007 general elections, the
violence was more blatant, intense, sophisticated and widespread. Intra-party clashes,
political assassinations, and community unrests in already volatile areas such as Nigeria’s
oil producing Niger Delta characterized these elections. In all elections, similar pattern
were on display. Merely signaling intention to seek for political office was enough to put
one’s life at risk. In fact, in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, electoral violence had become
such a credible risk despite Nigeria’s return to democracy, that the mere threat of it sends
chivers into the spine of large swaths of voters on election days (Omwudime and Chloe
2010).
In the words of Orji (2003:10), one common trend during elections in Nigeria is
that violence has assumes higher sophistication with time. In today’s politics in Nigeria,
many actors do not see ability to deliver as a credible means for seeking for office or
getting elected, rather, violence and other unorthodox means are employed. This situation
has made it difficult to enthrone stable democracy in Nigeria. Most scholarly works on
elections have tried to identify the causes of electoral violence without looking at their
impact on democracy in Nigeria. Thus, the thrust of this thesis was to examine the issues
26
associated with increasing electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999-2011
and their impact on democracy, using Delta and Oyo states as study states.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this thesis was to examine the issues associated with
electoral violence and their impact on democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The
specific objectives are to:
i. Examine the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and how these had
contributed to electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
ii. Highlight the nature and character of electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic.
iii. Examine the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria’s democratization process.
iv. Examine the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria’s democracy in the Fourth
Republic.
1.4 Justification of the Study
i. In this age of global democracy, Nigeria, being an active member of the comity of
nations, cannot fail to democratize its political institutions, hence the need for this
study.
ii. Secondly, democracy is premised on sound electoral principles which have eluded
this country since its independence. The need to account for the increasing
intensity and the sophisticated nature of electoral violence which had
continuously hampered stable democracy requires urgent attention in this country.
iii. The study is also designed to create a reasonable platform for ensuring scholarly
discussions on how to ensure peaceful process of political succession through
elections in Nigeria.
iv. Another justification for the study lies on the ground that electoral violence is
now publicly seen as a critical issue of national and international proportion that
has made it impossible for the country to develop because of its longstanding
effects, this, therefore requires a careful study.
27
1.5 Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were stated and tested in the study.
Ho1: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and
dynamics of the Nigerian state.
Ho2: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Ho3: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and

democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
1.6 Research Questions
The following research questions were carefully examined in this thesis so that
solutions provided will go a long way in alleviating the chronic problems associated with
the conduct of elections in Nigeria. These include:
i. What is the nature and character of electoral violence in Nigeria?

ii. What is the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria’s democratization process.?
iii. What is the impact of electoral violence on Nigeria’s democracy in the Fourth
Republic, 1999-2011?
iv. How has the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state, promote electoral
violence in the Fourth Republic.
1.7 Significance of the Study
This thesis is significant for the following reasons.

i. It will contribute immensely to the existing literature on elections related violence
in Nigeria, and since the study used Delta and Oyo as study States, the findings of
this study will be useful as referral materials for scholars undertaking similar
studies on electoral process thereby contributing to knowledge production on
election matters.
28
ii. Results emanating from this study will provide data for cross-cultural study on
electoral violence in other states in the country and by so doing, will allow room
for effective comparison on election violence matters.
iii. The study is also significant because it will provide necessary information on how
to curb the problems associated with elections violence in Delta and Oyo States in
the near future, Nigeria and Africa in general.
iv. The study is also significant because it will account for electoral violence as a
debilitating political phenomenon that has made it impossible for Nigeria to attain
stable democratic culture since 1999 till date.
v. The research is also significant in that it attempted to answer an inquiry about a
conflict between moral goods, legitimacy and search for power.
1.8 Scope of the Study
The scope of this research was limited to the 1999-2011 general elections in
Nigeria. However, references were made to materials and information as they relate to
past general elections in the country with a view to properly situates them. The essence of
limiting the scope between 1999 - 2011 general elections with particular reference to
Delta and Oyo States as study areas was to enable the researcher undertake an in-dept
study of issues at stake so that findings could be adequate in terms of coverage for cross-
cultural studies elsewhere in Nigeria. This scope was adopted for this study because,
since the inception of this Fourth Republic, 1999 to 2011, Delta and Oyo States have
been major flash spots of electoral violence in Nigeria politics.
The choice of Oyo State as one of the study states was informed by the fact that
Oyo State happened to be the core of the old Western region which has been a major
theatre of electoral violence till date. As for the choice of Delta, Delta State is an
heterogeneous State having all the traits inherent in the Nigerian nation in terms of
different cultural backgrounds, religious differences and ethnic groupings. These
attributes have influenced people’s attitudes toward voting and their reactions which can
inform the nature, course and trends of election violence in the state. Delta has a long
history of inter-ethnic rivalries and violent conflicts over lands, lakes and rivers over the
years. Added to these, is that ethnicity has been identified as one of the major
29
determinants of voting behaviours of Deltans and a viable source for electoral victory
since the creation of the state. The need to understand the place of ethnicity in Delta
politics necessitated the choice of Delta State. In addition, Delta state is an oil producing
state in the country which obtained extra revenue from the federation account through the
13% derivation. This gives the state an edge over other states, which do not produce
crude oil, hence, there is always the fierce struggle as to who controls the state and its
resources, including the distribution of oil revenue and resources. Consequently, electoral
process is often heightened by tension in the state, leading in most cases to electoral
violence. The need to underscore the place of oil revenue and inter-ethnic rivalries and
violent conflicts in election related violence gave rise to the choice of the state. In
addition, this scope was adopted in order for the researcher to be able to show the
increasing intensity of electoral violence over time and since the researcher was a
participant observer in the 1999-2011 general elections, his experiences provided some of
the unwritten information that helped in enhancing the quality of this thesis.
1.9 Limitations of the Study

(a) Information Hoarding: Owing to the sensitive nature of the issues at hand,
relevant information relating to electoral process in the States were not released,
since those who are assumed to have shuttled to the top through election
malpractices are directly in control of such information. To overcome this
problem, the researcher embarked on making informal friendship with some
(INEC) officials who are in charge of such information. This provided avenue to
have access to some of the information needed for the study.
(b) Security Challenges: The tense security condition of some areas, especially
among riverine communities in Delta State, as a result of kidnappings was a cog
in the course of data gathering. However, the security challenges were
ameliorated by assistance received from some security operatives who were
personal friends of the researcher.
(c) Difficult Geographical Terrain: The researcher was also constrained by the
delicate geographical terrain of some communities in Delta State while
administering questionnaires for information for this thesis. The geographical
features, made accessibility to some communities very difficult. This necessitated
30
the recruitment of field assistants to gather information from such affected areas
who had knowledge of such terrains.
(d) Collection of Administered Questionnaires: Some sampled respondents in the
two states, especially civil servants were of the opinion that whatever response
they may give will not affect the trajectory of future elections in the country.
According to them, electoral violence is already a means to winning political
opponents, provided politicians are ready to hire the required “area boys” and
thugs” to do the rigging for them. To overcome these biases and sentiments
expressed by the civil servants, the researcher with his field assistants have to do a
lot of persuasion to change the mindsets of the respondents on the issue before
committing them to complete the questionnaires given to them for information
needed for this study.
1.10 Operational Definition of Terms
For the purpose of this thesis, the following terms were operationally defined.
Elections: It is defined as the institutional mechanism or process by which individual or
groups of individuals are selected into official positions. It is the entire process involved
usually by the citizens of any democratic nation from the age of 18years and above to
give legitimate mandate for those who are to rule them as stipulated in the constitution.
Democracy: This is a government through representation. Democracy provides greater
opportunity for people’s involvement in governance and policy formulation for the
majority of the people.
Electoral violence: This involves all actions that result in bodily harm death, and
destruction of private/public property during the whole stages of electoral process often
perpetrated by either losing or the winning candidates, political parties or allies.
Electoral Fraud: This involves the various forms of malpractices that distort the normal
procedures of choosing people to govern. It involves deliberate efforts to influence,
manipulate and subvert the electoral processes in one’s favour.
Democratization: This simply means the expansion of society’s structures and values
and how these structures and values allow or encourage people to participate in and
determine the processes of exercising state power, and to what degree the exercise of
state power, is in the interest of the electorate and consented to by them.
31
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Literature Review
The concept, democracy has no universally acceptable definition. However, it is

generally accepted that democracy is a form of government that demands that leaders
must be elected periodically as constitutional provided for. As such, those in leadership
position are expected to be accountable and responsible to the people. In a democracy,
emphasis is usually placed on multi-party elections at regular intervals with eligible
voters’ participation. The electorate must therefore chose who become their leaders and
those elected to lead must give account of their actions and decisions to the people. As
must be emphasised, elections in democratic system are expected to ensure and create an
atmosphere where there can be confirmation or reconfirmation of the right to rule or
power to govern. Furthermore, elections provide avenue where the will of the majority
of people become paramount and develop.
Unfortunately, Democracy in Nigeria, especially elections have been characterized

by pessimism, uncertainty and fears for the safety of people’s lives and property. Violent
confrontations and struggles for power have from time immemorial become defining
features of elections in Nigeria. In many instances, the rights of the voters have often
been violated due to violence. This is why electoral process rather than becoming a
platform for the aggregation of the interest of the people in governance has often turned
into a conflict ridden exercise, that has continued to cast negative shadows on the
survival of the country. As must be noted, elections in Nigeria have always been violent
ridden, from the beginning to the end, that is pre-election time, election time and post
election period. This trend runs counter to democratic principles premised on election as
stipulated in the country’s 1999 constitution. The centrality of election and participation
to the enthronement of a viable political culture has been stressed by (Diamond 2002:16).
In his words,
32
Democracy thrives on the tripod of mass process of
interest aggregation, involving the periodic conduct of
election and negative zero sum attitude to governance, a
significant respect for people’s right to vote and be
voted for under a credible electoral process, such that
the universal adult suffrage is not undermined, and
further placing paramount emphasis on people’s right to
choose, voice their opposition to certain governmental
policies, freedom to express their thought in writing and
join or form any organization, albeit with sufficient
respect for citizen’s right to join any association of
people with similar political interest and values.
These scholarly opinions of writers and researchers on democracy, recognize that
the rights to vote and be voted for constitute the plank of any viable democratic process.
Democratic theories place elections under laid down laws as precursors of the success of
democracy globally. As a matter of fact, past efforts at defining the concept democracy,
suggest that periodic elections is without measures the singular most important feature of
democracy anywhere in the world. In the view of Schumpeter (1947:270), democracy is
about conducting elections and choosing political leaders. Robert Dahl, in his theory of a
democratic polyarchy considered elections to be quite germane. Dahl (1991:72-75)
identified seven criteria that a polyarchy must possess. These include:
elected officials must accord the electorate their basic

rights to choose those who rule over them at periodic
interval under a credible process devoid of force; that
sovereignty lies with the people; there is respect for
universal adult suffrage; political sovereignty lies with
the people; there is a system of public accountability
and probity, and there is an enforceable right to form
and join political organizations including political
parties and interest groups.
Implicit in Dahl’s conceptualization is the point that, elections symbolize popular

will premised on “social pact” between governed and the government; defining the
framework of political authority, legitimacy and citizens’ obligations to the state. It is the
foundation of political accountability and respect for popular will as entrenched in the
laws of the land. Rose (1978:19) argues that the more consent authority has, through
elections, the better rulers can economize on using their limited resources for compelling
33
obedience. The import of these definitions are that any claim to democracy by any regime
or State must essentially be based on popular will, competitive choice through elections.
The respect for popular sovereignty, through respect for the rule of law. It is against this
backdrop that Okoye (2003:33) defines election
as a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a

steam of connected antecedents and subsequent
behaviours; it involves the right of the people to vote and
be voted for, and respect for people’s choices in decision.
Elections cover all activities that pre-date and post-date
the actual period of voting those who eventually govern
the state.
Other scholars, define election from other perspectives. For instance, Osumah &
Aghemelo (2010) saw election as a process through which the people choose their leaders
and indicate their policies and programme preference and consequently invest a
government with authority to rule. They see election more as a means of pacifying
various groups insociety. They further contend that elections provide a platform for
guaranteeing legitimacy of government actions, choices and decisions as they impact on
the citizens. Eya (2003) on his part sees election simply as a process of selecting
individuals among competing persons for position in governance through the ballot
boxes. Ozor (2010) aptly gave a more broader definition of election when he said that
election involve the exercise of suffrage especially by qualified adults over those who
should govern them or represent them in the legislative organ of the state. Osumah (2002)
added that election simply entails the selection of those who are to hold public offices in
trust for the people, and with power to make decisions on behalf of the people. He posited
further that election increases the platform for mass participation in governance.
An essential deduction from these conceptual clarifications is that election in a
democracy should be credible. Mackenzie (1967:35) has identified four conditions
necessary for a credible electoral process,
an independent judiciary to interpret the

electoral laws, an honest, competent and non-
partisan electoral umpire, a democratic party
system with a clear concept of public service
for the electorate to choose from, and a respect
34
for the rules guiding electoral process, that help
to curtail the zero-sum tendencies of political
actors.
Unfortunately, these conditions stipulated above by Mackenzie are almost absent in
Nigeria when these are examined against the reality of the nature of electoral process in
Nigeria. Since 1922, when the Clifford’s Constitution provided the elective principle,
Nigeria has conducted numerous elections, the major ones being the elections of 1951,
1954, 1959, 1964, 1979, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. It must be noted that the
partitioning of Nigeria along six geopolitical zones has further intensified the problems of
electoral violence in the country. Below is a tabular presentation of the six geo-political
zones into which the country was subdivided.
Table 2.1: Composition of Nigeria’s Six Geo-political Zones
North North North South South East South South
West East Central West
Kaduna Bauchi Plateau Lagos Enugu Delta State
Katsina Gombe Nasarawa Osun Anambra Rivers State
Jigawa Borno Niger Ogun Ebonyi Cross Rivers
Sokoto Taraba Kwara Oyo Abia Akwa Ibom
Kebbi Adamawa Kogi Ekiti Imo Bayelsa
Kano Yobe Benue Ondo Edo State
Zamfara
Source: Ugbekwe P. (2008) A Political Geography of Nigeria. Ibadan, Kings Resources
Limited, p. 39
The partitioning of the Nigerian state into these geo-political zones also showcased the
pattern and trends of electoral violence across the country. Nonetheless; the trigger,
machinery and methods used may vary and the underlining causes may as well vary
across zones and States. Researches on election related violence are scarce and often
times focus broadly on mixture of political and electoral violence. However, some
researchers have made attempts to critically examine electoral violence. Fischer (2002:7),
defined electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that seeks to
determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through all known
antidemocratic behaviour. The work of Fischer (2002), resulted in a more broad based
study by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) on electoral violence,
which later set the tone for the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER)
project that has been implemented in nations across the world such as Ghana,
35
Kyrgyzstan, Guyana, Iraq, and East-Timor. The EVER study is presently undergoing
experimentation in Nigeria and the results have displayed a deeper understanding of the
nature of election related violence.
Anifowose (1982:41) contended that
Violence during elections is the use of or threat
of , physical acts perpetrated by individuals and
groups on persons and properties, with a
premeditated action to cause injury or death to
persons and/or damage or cause destruction to
properties; and whose objective, victims,
surrounding circumstances, implementation,
and effects have political significance and tend
to alter the behaviours of others based on pre-
determined status-quo of a power arrangement
with some implications for system stability.
Some observers of Nigeria’s politics since 1999 have argued that, violence during
elections witnessed so far were products of a political culture in which every contestant
always want to win, but none is ready to accept defeat. This position has been supported
by Agbegunde (2007:144), in his words:
losers in an election who assumed they have

been shortchanged from reaching an important
goal to which they feel entitled, usually
become frustrated and aggrieved at the winner
and decide to inflict injury on, or death to,
persons and destruction of properties.
From the various summation of the context of electoral violence, it can be
deduced generally that electoral violence involves the actions of key stake holders in the
electoral process (Fischer, 2002). This summation is similar to the conceptualization of
electoral violence in a cross country study of the period preceding the Second World
War, in which Hibbs (1973) opined that electoral violence must involve specific
victim(s), perpetrator(s) and occurs within a time frame and location. Electoral violence
also comes with motive(s) and the victims can be people, places, things or data (Hibbs,
1973:34). This presupposes that electoral violence is not limited to anti-democratic
actions perpetrated during elections period only but also those acts perpetrated before and
after elections. Fischer (2002: 27), highlighted four possible factors suggestive of the
36
causes of violence during elections. He equally suggested possible reasons that may give
rise to such violence related acts during elections: These are:
i. Aggrieved electorate who are dissatisfied with the state from perceived unfairness
in the election process
ii. The government versus the electorates over the outcome of the elections
iii. Struggle among party rivals over power and
iv. A combination of two or more of the above categories.
Oshiomhole (2011:44) in a lecture organized by the Nigerian Bar Association

(NBA), also highlighted three forms of electoral violence since the enthronement of
democracy in 1999 namely;
i. Violence unleashed by individuals or at the instance of individuals to forcefully
ensure that the elections swing in their favour or against their parties, their
godfathers or their cronies. This may take different forms, including assassination,
use of thugs, and ballot snatching.
ii. In addition, there is the structural dimension in which the State through its
custodian applies violence to tilt the political balance in the favour of a candidate
or simply to overwhelm the voters into accepting a predetermined outcome.
iii. The fluid form of violence is often the collateral violence involved in popular
resistance to electoral fraud or in legitimate protest of election rioting.
In today’s world, election provides avenue for peaceful transition from a crisis
ridden situation to a more stable polity. It increases the scope of political association and
mobilization from an autocratic regime. It offers a government a unique opportunity for
legitimacy and is also a recognised way of building trust in former authoritarian States
and also a way to validate negotiated political pacts (Brown, 2003:4 ; Sisk,2008:11) .
Election also provides the platform to strengthen the peaceful change of leadership.
Moreso, due to the freedom associated with election and the momentum it generates, it
thus allows individuals, groups and parties to use words and/or actions that are capable of
intimidating, coercing, humiliating or causing even bodily harm to the electorate.
Because, elections provide the space whereby people retain, regain and usurp power and
also the space to highlight social differentiation of individuals and party opponents,
players tap into the deep vulnerability created by such interaction to create violence (Sisk
37
2008:20). As such, (Sisk 2008:22) warned that negative expression of social
differentiation is likely to lead to extreme clashes between opposition supporters as
witnessed in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Guyana, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe.
Such tendencies can lead to high scale violence and bring a country to near level
of terrorism and un-governability. It also lead to proliferation of arms because more
often, the machinery for perpetrating election violence are mostly unemployed youths,
which thereafter resort to the use of those arms for other social vices. Legitimacy of any
government also depends on the acceptability of the election outcome by all parties.
Thus, a credible election gives the government, the confidence and legitimacy to ensure
they respond appropriately towards improving the welfare of the citizens through
effective service delivery. However, when on the contrary and based upon false or forced
legitimacy, the reverse might as well be the case. Ivory Coast is the nearest case in mind
(Sisk 2008:22).
Election in every country provides the platform for debate among competitors,
persuasion and common rules for selecting those that govern, especially those who can
serve in the executive, legislative, and other institutions of government. Elections are in
this sense a veritable means of aggregating the interest of the people that ultimately leads
to the authoritative allocation of values, in which parties abide by the pre-election
promises and the looser given the opportunity to provide constructive criticisms to aid the
party in power, while opposition parties prepare against the next election.. In this case
therefore, election becomes in the word of Robert Dahl, a mutual security pact (Dahl,
1973:67); and operates with the consistent consent of elites under conditions of bound
uncertainty (Przeworski, 1991:12). In a study carried out in San Francisco in California
USA 2008, Sisk (2008:2) highlighted election as two sides of the same coin proving
voice and legitimacy when the process is followed and all stakeholders adhere to the
agreed framework and processes and also a violence induced factor when on the contrary,
particularly in fragile States (Sisk, 2008: 2). The next sub-headings will be devoted to the
review of some critical factors that promote violence, pre during and after elections in
Nigeria and beyond. These are discussed one after the other, beginning with ethnicity and
regionalism.
38
2.1.1 Ethnicity and Regionalism
The history of politically and election motivated violence in Nigeria began before
the attainment of political independence. This is because, election violence, though had
not reached the magnitude it is now, its symptoms were obvious in the Nigerian state
before 1960. The Constitution of 1946 gave constitutional sanctity to the 1939 partition
of the country into three regions, namely, North, East and West. The North, built around
the Hausa-Fulani, the East around the Igbo and the West around the Yoruba (Michael
2007:102). However, in these regions were other ethnic groups whose identities, interests
and agitations were sought under the domination of the major ethnic groups. This led to
agitations by these groups for self-determination and separatist movements. These
microcosmic imbalances in the region also played out at the centre where the Northern
region alone was larger in size and population than the rest of the country put together.
The Northern region exploited this advantage to the fullest. It controlled the central
government, though in a coalition with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens
(NCNC) representing the East; it received the highest amount from the federal
government account; it assumed the toga of one who was ‘anointed to rule’ the others.
The North, through (Northern Peoples Congress) exercised hegemony over the rest of the
country, especially using its numerical advantage in parliament. Accordingly, the
centralization of power in the centre and in the regions promoted violence as those groups
and individuals excluded from power and whose interests and identities were
precariously balanced resorted to violence (Michael 2007:103).
Thus, the politics of the First Republic from 1960-1966 was characterized by
political violence, intolerance and exclusion leading to frustration and bitterness. This
period has been described regarding the Western part of the country (the main theatre of
contestations) as the ‘wild-wild west’ reflecting the nature of political violence at the
time. According to Michael (2007:104), for groups and individuals alienated from power
and the perks of office, political violence became the only means of expression of grief
and dissatisfaction. It is a known fact that politics by its nature is inherently segmentary,
involving conflicts and confrontations, as people and groups organize to have access to
and then control or exercise power in a given society. Ayoade (1983:26) posits that
39
though, ethnic groups are not the organizing units for political control in Nigeria,
nevertheless ethnicity plays a very critical role in the expression and organization of
interest groups. This is largely the result of two main factors. First, politics and
government are regarded not only as means of distributing patronage and therefore
creating and maintaining alliances and support from critical areas of the society, but,
access to political control and to government is an insurance against domination or
oppression of one ethnic group by another. It is thus a means of asserting personal and
group pre-eminence in Nigeria.
There is, therefore, vested interest in the ethnic control of those organizations
called political parties which are the open and the direct units in the competition for the
prime places in national politics. However, Rothschild (1981:3) noted that ethnicity by
itself does not create political cleavages, but it becomes important when its interests are
given a political translation through their role in the structure and function of political
parties in Nigeria. These aspects of ethnicity were crucial in the organization of political
parties in an independent Nigeria. Coleman (1960:25) gave the chronology of the
introduction of ethnicity into Nigeria politics, following the ethnic based crises that
rocked the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1937 and the subsequent formation of
the three major political parties, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in 1949, the
Action Group (AG) in 1951 and the National Council of Nigerian and Cameroun
(NCNC), in the 1941. The NYM had a nationalist character and outlook from 1938 aimed
at the unification of Nigeria’s diverse people and culture and sectional interests, but its
political elites from different parts of the country, were disorganized on grounds of
ethnicity only three years later. The three successors factors in the names of the three
political parties had the core of their supporters in the Northern, Western and Eastern
Regions as well as among the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo (Otite,1977:39-40).
This format reflect the three regional groupings into which Nigeria was arranged by the
Richard’s Constitution of 1946. Thus there was a tripod for promoting the struggle for
ethno-political supremacy.
The pattern of ethnic support remained substantially unchanged during the First
Republic (1960-1966), as well as the Second Republic (1979-1983). Locality and support
40
were expected and went from members of the ethnic group to a leader from the same or
allied group. (Dudley, 1986:252). This was perhaps a natural event since ethnic loyalty
and cleavages were stronger than class or any other form of social organization. Members
of one’s ethnic group were regarded classificatory and putatively as kinsmen who were
distinguished from “strangers”, with the implied kinship trust and obligations. In
analyzing the votes and voting behaviours of Nigerians during the Second Republic,
Eleazu (1984:26) pointed out that although each presidential candidate chose his running
mate from a different ethnic group, the usual pattern of voting for the ethnic notables did
not change… The Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) candidate received the highest
number of votes from the home State of the leader, Borno, 54 percent. The People’s
Republican Party ( PRP) candidate, Alhaji Aminu Kano, polled 76.4 percent of the votes
in Kano. Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) candidate, carried
all the Yoruba States. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe carried the two Igbo States, while Alhaji
Shehu Shagari, who emerged the winner, drew much support from the Hausa-Fulani
States. The implication of the above analysis showed that ethnic factor played a decisive
role in the politics of the First and Second Republics. As was in many ways responsible
for the political violence that was to define the whole electoral process in this period.
Even at present, the situation has not changed substantially. Ethnicity has continued to
create a situation in which the unity of Nigeria remains a mirage. Current researches have
shown however that ethnicity is no longer a major determinant of voting behaviours in
Nigeria. It has been established that corruption is now tilting voting behaviours of
Nigerians in the Fourth Republic. The replacement of ethnicity by corruption as a major
determinant of voting behaviour was demonstrated by Ehwarieme (2011:194).
According to him,
Corruption of the electoral process, especially of

the nature and magnitude in Nigeria, simply
means that votes do not count. Consequently,
standards variables known to influence electoral
outcomes, such as personal qualities of
candidates, issues, party programmes and
ideologies, can hardly be used to explain electoral
outcomes. Even if it can be conceded that, there
could have been a few instances in which victory
41
or defeat had depended on such variables in local
elections, they have hardly been significant bases
of differentiation between candidates and parties
in Nigeria especially in elections that cut across
ethnic boundaries. Parties are hardly ideological
or programmatic and politics is rarely issue-
oriented. This is why ethnicity and money have
played more determinate roles in electoral
outcomes and many popular candidates have
failed to get elected.
Regionalism which became a forerunner to ethnic politics was noted by Osaghae

(2002) to have been reflected in the marginalization of the minorities. In his words,
regionalism created a platform in which people are discriminated against because of
region or tribal origin and consequently denied certain access to public goods. This
implied the use of various illegal means to exclude certain group of citizens based on
their ethnic differences. The discrimination that resulted from regionalism further
accentuate the degree of domination and the cry for emancipation from the plethora of
ethnic groups in the country. For example, the Tivs people in the North, the Ijaws in the
East and the Urhobos in the West during the First Republic. Thus, rather than promote
national cohesion and unity, regionalism, the Nigerian kind, based on ethnic nationality
stimulated ethnicity, and formed the umbrella of ethnic competition and distrust with
attendant crisis in the country. The major effect of regionalism as the offshoot of
Richard’s Constitution was the multiplication of groupings along ethnic or tribal lines.
The 1954 and 1959 elections witnessed manifestations of ethnic politics. Notable political
parties like the Action Group (A.G), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C),
Northern People’s Congress (N.P.C), Niger Delta Congress (N.D.C) and Northern
Elements Progressive Union (N.E.P.U), were formed along ethnic/tribal lines. This ethnic
configuration reflected in the voting pattern of the people(Osaghae, 2000).
For instance, Table (1) showed clearly party performance in the 1959 general
elections.
42
Table 2.2 Party Performance in Strongholds, 1959 Elections
Area of Dominance Total no of Seats No. of Seats Won

NPC North 174 134
NCNC East 73 58
AG West 62 33
Source: Nnoli (1978:166-167). Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu; Fourth Dimension.
Although the N.C.N.C went into coalition with the N.P.C to form a government at
independence, it however did not douse the air of ethnic bias that already pervade the
political system and the desire to promote national integration. For example, the
exclusion of the Tiv people from the benefits that they ought to obtain from the N.P.C led
to series of violent crisis in the Northern region. According to Tarka (1982:112),
there was persistent refusal by N.P.C local and

regional authorities to show more than casual
concern to the grievances and petitions of the
Tiv people individually and collectively.
Arising from this state of powerlessness, the
people rightly developed the feeling that they
would never be heard or get justice anywhere.
Thus, this persistent feeling of alienation and
felt injustices bred frustration and the natural
resort to retaliation against N.P.C members and
their property.
There is need to emphasize too that all the parties that grew up in the First
Republic were ethnically or regionally based and their leadership recruitment were all
done along ethnic lines with the result that till the present day, the country have had no
leaders that have gained general acceptance to rule from the Nigerian populace except
perhaps, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan who gained general acceptance by receiving
majority votes across the States during the 2011 general elections to govern. His victory
in the 2011 Presidential elections was laced with some unproven allegations that resulted
in what can be described as an ethnic motivated violence in some Northern states. Even,
his quest to contest the 2015 elections was challenged by the North based on ethnic or
regional colouration, proving once again that ethnic/regional biases still pervade the
43
political landscape and continued to be major cause of election related violence in the
country.
2.1.2 The Nature of Electoral Process in Nigeria
It has become a truism that electoral processes in Nigeria often feature violence,
corruption, rigging, ethnic influence, thuggery, kidnappings and all sorts of anti-social
behaviours. These features have always replayed themselves right from the first election
conducted in the country up to this present Fourth Republic (Obi, 2004:12). Under the
First Republic, election campaigns were visibly characterized by palpable violence,
thuggery and different types of physical assaults on political opponents. According to
Dudley (1973:25), much of the violence resulted from the intra-party crisis that rocked
the Action Group (AG) which was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The AG crisis,
initially started as a form of inter-personal conflict between Awolowo and his deputy,
Chief S.L Akintola, which eventually snowballed into total breakdown of law and order
and a declaration of a state of emergency in the Western region. The violence that was
associated with this incident also resulted in a free for all fight between the supporters of
Akintola and Awolowo on the floor of the regional house. Dudley (1973:29) further
noted that arising from ethnic factors that became prominent in Nigeria politics, party
campaigners and candidates were freely molested in areas where their parties were not
popular. For example, Action Group candidates were denied electoral registration forms
in the North while the Helicopter that brought Awolowo to Sokoto for a campaign rally
was refused landing. Similarly, the campaigners of the United Progressive Grand
Alliance (UPGA) and electoral officials were physically assaulted and kidnapped in the
North and West.
The Second Republic, like the first, also witnessed a lot of election violence
particularly in Ondo and Oyo States with the former witnessing a lot of criminal arson
(Nwabueze, 1984:12). The situation in Ondo was very tense. The 1983 election was
particularly rated as one of the worst election ever held in Nigeria because of the violence
that accompanied it. There was fear of violence so much that results were announced at
night for fear of violent attack (Eleazu 1984:17). Violence in Nigeria’s politics assumed a
more disturbing dimension during the present Fourth Republic. This is because, apart
44
from the usual form of violence that has crept into the body politics, unwarranted and
mindless assassinations and killings had gradually and systematically become defining
features of Nigeria body politics. Still fresh in our minds are the killings and unfathomed
assassinations of Harry Marshal, Bola Ige, Funso Williams and Deji Daramola, the last
two, being PDP governorship aspirants in Lagos and Ekiti States respectively
(Akpor,2004).
However, Ayoade (2007:3) argued that political violence can also be traced to the
role of the organs responsible for the regulations of elections in Nigeria. In his words, the
inability of the electoral bodies from independence to the present to exert its
independence amidst political influence often attract rancor from the aggrieved party and
their supporters. The case against the conduct of the 2007 general elections by (INEC)
and the consequent nullification of some States elections by tribunals and courts
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the INEC to conduct credible elections. In all
however, it must be added that the growing incidences of election related violence in
Nigeria has a strong correlation with the zero sum nature and the uncontrollable desire to
capture power by all means by politicians.
2.1.3 The Nature of the Nigerian State and Its Political Elite
The evolution and character of the Nigerian State is quite an essential input in
understanding the nature and behaviour of Nigerians generally and, political leadership in
particular (Adejumobi,1998:5). The State, in its evolutionary process, particularly in the
colonial era, shaped the outlook and provided the orientation of the elites and
citizens(Dudley,1973:9). Nigeria as is known today, was born in 1914, after the
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates. The unilateral merger of the
two regions has been largely described as a ‘fraudulent’ social contract and not of a
‘negotiated will’ of the welded parts. The expediency of economic imperialism was the
sole rationale. Lady Flora Shaw (1904) (later Mrs. Lugard) who coined the name
‘Nigeria’ comments:
45
as in India, so is in Nigeria, we meant to trade, but
conquest was forced on us. Having conquered, we are
obliged to administer and the hope that lies before us is
to develop from small beginnings, which have been
made in Nigeria, such another great or prosperous
dominion as our ancestors have created for us in India
(Shaw,1904:8)
These coerced groupings of diverse peoples, with varied backgrounds and

cultures, created both horizontal polarization and primordial loyalties which invariably
made national integration difficult (Adejumobi, 1998:11). This in many ways helped to
explain the current negative and warped State of development in Nigeria. Agagu
(2005:4) however added that, the colonial politics of divide and rule, and its strategy of
regionalism effectively laid the foundation for ethnic chauvinism, sectional political
parties, and parochial cum disunited indigenous political elite. This essentially turns
politics into warfare, a situation in which power is overvalued.
The colonial State also imposed a patrimonial system of administration (in the
ideological guise of indirect rule) on the country. This was targeted at enlisting the
dominant status group in the service of colonial rule and to contain the political
consequences of changes in class structure. In this case, the political relations that existed
were vertical in nature. It was one of domination and dependence. The British resident
became the Great White patron at the zenith of governance (William, 1980:19). The
whole governmental structure was characterized by a military-like chain of responsibility
extending from the Governor down to the village heads (Oyediran,1988:6). The local
potentates (native chiefs) were judged only by their loyalty to and dependence upon the
colonial friends. No room was given for opinion dissent; public institutions like the
bureaucracy, police and the army only reify the State, and acted as its vehicles of
domination and plunder. Succinctly, the colonial State was a police State (Adejumobi,
1991:16).
Yet, it has been argued by Anam-Ndu (1998:45) that the commonest diagnosis of
the Nigerian sickness is bad leadership and it seems the situation have developed
indignant resistance for ages now. The post colonial State and its leaders are products of
46
the institutions of the colonial regime, and its vices. It inherited and nurtured the military
chain like administration, which guarantees a relation of domination and control between
the leaders and the led, a system of patronage of public offices, the practice of political
intolerance, and the notion of political opposition being an anathema (Adejumobi,
1991:21).
The Nigerian State at independence was therefore a disabled, underdeveloped and

crises - ridden State in many senses. These disabilities as Ogunsanwo (1990:79)
identified, exist in the structural, economic, elite orientation and value areas. The first
supported by Adejunmobi (1991:56) is in the dysfunctional tripod upon which the
country is laid, in which, one region in area is twice as big as the other two regions put
together. This negates Wheare’s (1947:56) concept of federalism which holds that the
units should be equal, coordinate and independent, thus, makes the practice of
cooperative federalism difficult.
The second problem with the country was in the area of her economic structure.
The nation inherited a totally peripheral dependent economy, which is outer-directed and
cut off by and large from the economies of the neighbouring countries. A poor and
dislocated economy could therefore not meet the revolution of rising expectations of the
citizens nor could it secure a good material base for the governing elite. The consequence
of this is two folds, first, political repression is used to suppress the masses and secondly,
the governing group is bound to be gruesome and violent. The third disability has to do
with the orientation and attitude of the newly created indigenous elites and citizens. The
colonial government perfectly produced ‘foreign’ multidimensional elites, who are
entirely British, save for their pigment, and were neither patriotic nor selfless. This was a
veritable means to protect the colonial structures and interests in a neo-colonial State.
The fourth disability is in the duality of values. Colonialism produced what Ekeh
(1975:89) called the two publics. There is the primordial public which is socially moral,
and the amoral civil public that tolerate immorality. Unfortunately, it is the amoral civil
public which dominates governance and public actions. As such, the tendency is to regard
public property, assets, or resources as something that must be vandalized and
misappropriated, while the nation is viewed as something that must be assaulted and if
47
possible privatized. After independence, there emerged out of continual agitations with
the colonial authority, political leaders whose interests were based on primitive
accumulation of the commonwealth and this predisposition was not easy to accomplish
under colonial rule. This orientation of attitude of the elites, according to Dudley
(1973:59),
was not accidental, nor was it self-generative,

but was due to the heterogeneous direction
provided by the colonial predators who for their
own convenience divided the country into three
administrative areas grouped round the major
ethnic groups. This, later created political
antagonism among the elites along the cultural
divide.
Despite the fact that these elites operated against colonial regime, their alliances
were never free from tensions and conflicts. As the prospects for political independence
became imminent, the existing bond among the elites began to waiver and competition
among them took the centre stage. It is within this context that the prevalent ‘loot and
warfare’ mentality in politics, the ‘opposition phobia’, the pre-occupation with interests
of politics of survival and personal security, (African Leadership Forum, 1988:12), the
sit-tight syndrome and political killings/assassinations within this class and the citizens,
all seek expression in this paradigm and Nigerian leaders seem to seek explanation in
Machiavelli political thought.
2.1.4 Structural Imbalance and Electoral Violence in Nigeria

In many ways, the formal partition of Nigeria into three regions by Britain in
1946 was targeted at differentiation. These measures were aimed at granting self-rule to
the three regions, while leaving the centre to the colonial government. However, the
regionalization of Nigeria in 1946 was a decision which resulted in acrimony based on
two main grounds. In the first place, the Northern Region was geographically and
demographically larger than the other two regions combined. This situation gave the
Northern Region electoral advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the regions (Claude,2002:19). In
addition, the partition of the country into three regions secured regional hegemony for the
three “biggest” ethnic groups in Nigeria – Hausa-Fulani (Northern Region), Yoruba
48
(Western Region) and Igbo (Eastern Region). In the three regions, three political parties
were dominated by the three majority ethnic groups. This scenario created fear and
apprehension from the smaller ethnic groups in the country about the tendency of the
major ethnic groups to dominate others.
The tripartite structure of Nigerian federation enhanced the growth of cultural-

nationalism among the three major ethnic groups. This was reflected in the establishment
of socio-cultural associations such as the Ibo State Union and the Pan-Yoruba group:
Egbe Omo Oduduwa – Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa (Chike,2009:17).
Although the aim of these organizations were community development and preservation
of communal identity, with time, these associations acquired political importance.
Through their leaders, these associations became affiliate to different factions within the
nationalist movement, and later the political parties.
Akindele and Olaopa (2009:67), for instance, contend that although the National
Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) had a national focus at its inception, it was
later considered to be the political organ of the Ibo State Union. This was because Late
President Nnamdi Azikiwe was able as from 1944 onwards to effectively mobilize the
people of the Eastern Region through persuasion to be actively involve in politics by
becoming members of the NCNC. This led to the translation of the activities of the Ibo
State Union to be in alliance with the NCNC programmes of actions. The NCNC was
now reflecting every attribute of the Ibo State Union in her objectives in national politics,
hence, it was seen as an outfit of the Ibo State Union. The Action Group (AG) on its part
was seen as a political protrusion of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. The promotion of cultural
nationalism by the leading ethnic groups as well as their preponderant influence in
regional and national politics generated a lot of anxieties among the elites from the
minority groups. The elites from these groups made several efforts to remain relevant by
mobilizing different socio-cultural organizations and political parties to press for the
creation of new States. As the terminal date for colonial rule approached, the minority
groups became even more articulate, unrelenting and forceful in their demand for the
restructuring of the federal system.
With the opening up of the democratic space in 1999, many ethnic groups became
vocal in their demands for a more inclusive federal structure. The hitherto federal
49
structure was perceived by many as constituting a barrier for national unity and cohesion,
while many others also contended that the dysfunctional nature of the existing federal
system has been the foundation of the numerous ethno-religious conflicts that have
plagued the country over the years, including electoral violence and insurgencies in the
country. In various regions, agitation by these groups epitomize the conflicts inherent
when sub-national groups seek greater political and economic clouts and use the language
of Human Rights and the democratization struggle as ‘basis of their campaigns’
(Fasehun,2002:6). While these groups operate on one hand between the primary units of
society and ruling collective institutions, they emphasize the collective identity of
specific groups, and are willing to use confrontation and violence to realize their goals.
In its structural and political context, Nigeria’s federalism may be likened to a
biological cell capable of dividing and reproducing itself (Dent, 1995:35). This has
resulted in the continued division of the units. In 1954, it began as a federation of three
regions but by 1964, it became four with the creation of the Mid-Western Region from
the then Western Region. By 1967, the federal structure became subdivided into 12 States
and by 1976, it was further split into 19 States. By 1989, it became a federation of 21
States, increasing to 30 by 1991 and by 1996 it has become a federation of 36 states. In
addition, the creation of more states have often led to further subdivision of the local
government areas. Thus, from 12 states and 301 local governments in 1976, Nigeria
became a federation of 36 states and 774 local government areas.
Implicit in the above description is that the federal system in Nigeria lies on the
tripod of administrative structure- the federal, States and local governments. While it is
not unusual to have, in a federation, of more than two tiers so as to cope with diverse
exigencies, the seemingly division of the country, however, has not produced a
satisfactory outcome for the component units. This is evidently so because every attempt
at further administrative division of the country to accommodate more ethnic units have
been followed by increased agitations for more (Agbaje, Diamond and
Onwudiwe,2008:56). It is thus fair to state that the expansion of the federal structure has
often ended up creating more tensions and agitations among the federating ethnic groups
in the country. Apart from this, there has been a tendency for agitation among and
between people hitherto living together within an existing federating units. The
50
lopsidedness in the federal structure and actual practice has continued to generate
reactions on the need to pattern the present federal system to that which truly reflect the
cardinal principle of federalism as practised especially in the United States of America.
The dysfunctional nature of the federal system has in recent time given rise to various
agitations from various ethnic nationalities for self realization and self determination in
the country.
Indeed, self realization and self determination are expected to lubricate the
enthronement of a stable and prosperous national community. Unfortunately, the inherent
contradictions that have given rise to the quest for self determination have constantly
remained a source of worry. To give more insight into the contending issues, researchers
have advanced theories to buttress or refute the operational deficiencies and defects in the
practice of federalism. Chief among the theories put forward are the lopsided pattern of
relationships among federating units in a federal structure and imbalance in power
relations. This is why Ojo (2005), argued that the federal system in Nigeria present a
dysfunctional anomalies that manifested in structural variation in size and scope that
often create the false impression of regional superiority in terms of size and population
that unfortunately has become over the years a yardstick for authoritative allocation of
values that is not commensurate with regional contributions to national wealth. As noted
by scholars, the Northern Protectorate with its 281,782 square miles (729,815.38km2)
constitutes more than three-quarters of the country(Crampton, quoted in Gofwen,
2004:19; Jinadu, 1994:6) and as such, the largest of the two protectorates.
As Akinyemi (2001:4) noted, politics in Nigeria has transcended the realm of
Zero-sum game of what the north gains, the south losses or vice versa. Rather, it is a
multiple sum game in which units would agree on some issues while they disagree on
some others. For instance, issues such as having a State police, instituting the Sharia law
and even control over resources, as volatile as they were, did not completely take on a
north-south divide. A federal system is largely expected to only provide means by which
the federating units will find avenue to express themselves so that issues of common
interest will be adequately addressed to restore some form of confidence and sense of
belonging among the federating units. The institutionalization of the federal character
principle in Nigeria points in this regard. Although there are challenges with how this
51
principle is implemented, as already noted by scholars (Ojo,2005:34; Onyeoziri, 2001:9),
such problems are not a direct aftermath of how a federal system is practised.
Furthermore, there has been views on how military rule impacted on the practice
of federalism in Nigeria, including how the central government have come to be
dominated by leaders from a particular ethnic group as if it is the exclusive birthright of
that group (Nwabueze, 1999:4). Having ruled for a total period of 29 years (between
January 1966 and October 1979 and between 1983 and 1999), it is without contention
that the military constitute a significant influence on Nigerian government and politics,
especially in the area of centralization of power in Nigerian federalism. It should be
Stated, however, that, the pendulum of federalism usually swings either in the direction
of centralization or decentralization depending on the peculiar circumstances of the
polity. The circumstance of its emergence coupled with its dynamics within the system is
what determines the extent to which power is centralized or decentralized in the
federation. Unfortunately, the centralization of power have remained a defining feature of
federal system in Nigerian till date. Even older federations such as the United States of
America (USA) which started as decentralized system have continued to evolve through
time towards centralization, though in the United States of America, the government
knows its limit.
Nigeria’s federalism began on a decentralized note because considerable powers
were devolved to the regions. However, due to the ever burgeoning powers of the region,
the practice became problematic. As it would later revealed, the excessive regionalism of
the period draw the country to the verge of disintegration that more or less led to the
military take over of 1966. Interestingly, the mood of most Nigerians at this period
favoured a centralization of power as a way of breaking the hegemonic tendencies of the
regional governments that were largely seen as responsible for the tense ethnic relations
within the country at that particular time. In addition, it has been alluded that the creation
of more states from existing ones was seen by many as desirable in order to forge a sense
of unity to the already frustrated minorities in each region. The military, by creating more
States and moving the country towards a centralized federal structure, was merely giving
formal backing to what Nigerians themselves desired. The joy and elation that followed
52
the creation of states in Nigeria attest to the deep seated desire for ethnic groups to attain
some form of self-recognition and actualization.
Like every policy decision, there must be intended outcomes as well as
unintended outcomes. The manifest outcome of certain decisions should take the place of
the positive outcome of the policy option. Relatedly is the contention that some part of
the country have remained marginalized and under-represented because of the
domination of its political leadership by people of a particular ethnic extraction. But
while at the surface level, there may be a predominance of people from a particular
section (the North) as Heads of State and in some other key posts, however, probing into
bureaucratic representation showed that this is firmly under the control of the South. For
instance, while the North may have dominated political leadership (cumulatively, the
north has produced 9 out of 12 Heads of State between 1960 and today), the bureaucracy
is manifestly in favour of the South, the region which has persistently alleged
marginalization. Indeed, going by the 1996 federal staff audit, the entire Northern region
is said to have provided less than 20 percent of workers in all categories at the federal
level (Ojo, 2005:105). Even till date, there seem to have been no improvement in this
trend especially when we juxtapose the figures of 1999 and 2007 for officers on grade
level 15 and above. Table 2.2Below shows a graphic representation of this trend.
Table 2.3: Federal Officers on Grade Level 15 and Above.

Zones 1999 2007 Zones 1999 2007
North-West 339 (12.2%) 969 (10.6%) South-West 820 (29.6%) 2202 (24.1%)
North-East 291 (10.2%) 883 (9.7%) South-East 437 (15.8%) 1751 (19.2%)
North-Central 456 (16.4%) 1589 (17.4%) South-South 429 (15.5%) 1660 (18.2%)
Source: Federal Character Commission (FCC), Abuja
Similarly, according to the 2005 federal staff audit , the entire Northern geo-political
zone has about 38.4 percent of officers on grade level 07 and above in the 158 federal
Parastatals against the Southern geo-political zone’s 61.2 Percent. The point of reference
from the information above is that despite the fact that Nigeria federal system has
displayed series of dysfunctional features, resulting in numerous calls for modification or
alternative model, it is however a truism that the problem inherent in the Nigeria federal
53
system is not in the framework per se, but from the refusal of the leadership to adhere to
the provisions of the constitution that in many ways define how the federating units
should co-exist.
Moreover, past experiences have shown a deeper danger in applying the unitary
system as exemplified by the introduction of the unification decree by Late General
Aguyi Ironsi, which, ab initio was unpopular among all sections of the country, which
was also one of the major factors that precipitated his removal from office through a
military coup in July, 1966. Similarly, the excessive regionalism and the seeming
weakness of the centre are part of what many argued led the secession attempt by the
Eastern region and the consequent war of unification between 1967 and 1970. Going by
Nigeria’s past experiences, it appears that there is no better alternative to federalism in
Nigeria. Even the call for the so called ‘true federalism’ leaves much problems.
In any political system, be it federal or otherwise, effective leadership cannot be
over-emphasized in the governance of a country. This is because the leader more than
ever needs to give direction in other to engender commitment on the part of the people
towards achieving national greatness. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, the dearth of good
leadership with a clear concept of public service ethics has further undermine the
realization of the potentials of federal system in Nigeria. In many cases, leaders that
emerged have often pursued sectional interest or have been accused to pursue only
sectional interest, this scenario has made it difficult to form a consensus for national unity
and development in Nigeria. Indeed, the series of leadership crises experienced since
independence axiomises this perspective.
Without doubt, structural imbalance manifesting into intense ethnic competition
and violence in the political process has become a logical factor in Nigeria’s federal
structure. It has become a weapon used by most regional leaders to garner support for
political solidarity or agitation. In the Nigerian federation, ethnic chauvinism have
dominated many forms of relations between and among various ethnic groups in the
country. Ethnic factors have become rallying point that political leaders often adopt to
either generate support or sentiment when they perceived that their interest is at stake
within the political space. In the past, the country had experienced ethnic and sectional
violence that threatened the very corporate existence of the country (Asaju, 2006:19). The
54
proliferation of armed brigandage and ethnic groups claiming to be fighting perceived
imbalance and marginalization have emerged and become a recurring decimal in the
country’s federation. As it stands, there is an increasing lacuna in social relations between
and among ethnic groups in the country. The situation is such that there is mutual
suspicion and mistrust among various groups and this more often than not rear its ugly
head during electioneering period. Indeed, since 1999, ethnic groups from the Southern
part of the country have repeatedly clamoured for the correction of perceived
marginalization arising from the dysfunctional nature of the federal system in the
country. This perhaps also explained why a significant numbers of electoral violence
have arised from the region in recent elections.
As such, one can infer that the structural imbalance is a plague that is
undermining democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Agbaje, Diamond, Onwudiwe, 2008).
This is so because inherent imbalance have created a superior-inferior level of
relationship that has further intensify tension and political instability, especially during
and after elections in the country, hence, in the contest for the control of State power and
resources, electoral violence have since 1999-2011 been employed by both minority and
majority ethnic groups in the pursuit of national resources and political representation.
However, this structural imbalance can be addressed through the restructuring of
the Nigerian state, by the devolution of powers from the centre government to the states’
governments and from the states’ governments to the local government councils.
Presently, the federal government has powers to legislate on the exclusive list which
contained sixty-eight (68) items, while the states’ governments have powers to legislate
on the concurrent list which contained thirty-four (34) items. It is our contention that
these powers have to be reduced so that every level of government could actively be
involved in policy making so as to reduce the overbearing powers or influence of the
centre government and the states’ governments respectively within the Nigerian state.
2.1.5 The Nature of the Electoral Management Bodies and Political Violence in
Nigeria.
As should be noted, elections that is free, credible and fair, are not restricted to
events that take place on election day alone, but comprises a plethora of activities that
covers the whole gamut of election administration that includes, the provision of credible
55
and updated voters’ register, a functioning party system, nomination of candidates,
electoral campaign that is violent free, adequate provision of voting materials, the
conduct of the voting proper, quick counting of ballot papers, results declaration, and all
necessary post elections activities including elections petitions and resolution of all
litigations emerging from the conduct of the electoral process (INEC 2006:49). These
important issues that make up the electoral cycle are expected to be overseen by an
independent electoral institution. This requirement places the electoral body at an
important position in a nation’s democratization process, as it remains the principal body
with the onerous responsibilities of superintending the electoral process. In view of this,
the outcome of any electoral process has a direct relationship with the capacity of the
electoral umpire.
The history of the conduct of elections in Nigeria has no doubt demonstrated a
strong relationship that exists between the conduct of elections and the managing
institution. History has demonstrated that a non-competent, partisan, bias and resource
starved institution cannot midwife successfully an important, highly delicate and complex
issue like elections and electoral process. The nation’s history abound with instances
where efforts at sustaining democracy have been marred on the alter of badly managed
electoral process. The present Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was
inaugurated on August 11, 1998 by the then Head of State, General Abdulsalam
Abubakar (Rtd) to manage the transition process expected to lead the nation to its Fourth
Republic.
INEC derives its legal existence from Section 153 (F) of the 1999 Constitution.
Also the Constitution under Section 14 of the Third Schedule provides for the
composition of the Commission, while Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Constitution
stipulates the functions of the Commission. INEC has garnered experience in conducting
elections into elective positions in Nigeria. INEC has organized and administered the
transitional elections that heralded this Republic in 1999 and conducted the 2003, 2007,
2011and 2015 civilian-to-civilian general elections. By virtue of its critical stake to the
conduct of elections, its capacity, sensitivity, independence and competency are highly
crucial to the successful conduct of general elections (Aiyede 2006:46). However, it is on
56
record that INEC’s performance of its constitutionally assigned duties particularly in the
2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 post elections violence leaves much to be desired.
To most observers and stakeholders, INEC’s handling of the 1999 transitional
elections were highly commendable given the minimal period under, which it conducted
the elections. However, with respect to the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections, the
story was markedly different. INEC was confronted with mirage of logistic problems that
seriously marred its successful conduct and administration of the 2003 elections
(Akinboye, 2005: 299). While the Commission strive to overcome certain pertinent
problems confronting it, the Commission’s institutional weakness were more glaring.
The most critical was the voters’ register review exercise, which was characterized by
many irregularities, as was the situation with previous process in the nation’s political
history (Omotola, 2004:131). The problems that bedeviled the review exercise were later
extended to the period of elections and official declaration of winners.
In some reported scenario, candidates for the legislative positions who never
contested were announced as winners in the elections, while the controversy that
surrounded Dr Chris Ngige, the erstwhile governor of Anambra State, was the executive
version of declaring loser a winner in the elections by INEC (Akinboye, 2005:306;
Aiyede, 2006:46; Ogunsanwo, 2003). All these issues brought to question the
independence, competency and integrity of the Commission. Compared to the conduct
and administration of the 1999 transitional elections, INEC’s performance in the 2003
elections was nothing but abysmal. The woeful performance of INEC in 2003 from all
indications was re-enacted in April 2007 and the violence that followed the declaration of
results of the 2011 general elections.
However, as observable in most political transitions, democratic societies are
founded on the principles of elections and on opinion expression capabilities. Most
sovereign nationalities are governed by pure democratic ideals where citizens express
their rights through the conduct of an election in choosing a leader whom, they believe
their nation’s destiny can be entrusted with. In March 2015, Nigeria held its fifth general
elections since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Previous elections in
Nigeria have been marked by allegations of fraud and disputes over results. As a result of
these problems, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the government,
57
civil society groups and Nigeria’s development partners initiate and implement electoral
reforms. Part of these reforms led to the introduction of the Smart Card reader in the
conduct of the 2015 general elections.
Stakeholders hailed INEC for introducing card readers in the 2015 general
elections, which they said, helped in no small measure in reduce election fraud across the
country. The use of card readers for elections is highly commendable because it has
helped reduced election fraud like multiple registrations and multiple voting. With the
card readers, the true identities of card holders were matched with the details contained in
their permanent voter's cards (PVCs), during accreditation and the process helped in
reducing fraudulent accreditation that marred electoral processes in the past,(Ekuwem,
2015). In addition, the card reader makes the process of counting of votes faster than the
conventional process. The smart card reader also reduces to a great extent the quantity of
papers used, thus saving a large numbers of trees making the process eco-friendly. It
reduces the cost of printing almost nil as only one sheet of ballot paper is required for
each polling units(Sanjay & Ekta, 2011). It must be noted however, that the card reader
can only be effective when there is constant electricity supply, availability of honest and
competent personnel and a sound maintenance culture in the country.
It will be good if INEC takes into consideration the observed lapses from the use
of the machines, and perfect them in subsequent elections in order to surpass the election
credibility and transparency it achieved in the 2015 general elections and thus reduce the
incidence of electoral violence that often arise from perceived manipulation of electoral
results (Amenaghawon, 2015). This will reduce drastically the cases of electoral violence
in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
2.1.6 The Media and Electoral Violence

The media often referred to as the Fourth Estate or the Fourth Realm of
government is a vital instrument in the entire electoral process in any country in the
world. This is based on the fact that the positive or negative nature of media reportage of
events or marketing of political parties and contestants influences in many ways the
possible outcome of an election, influence the electorate’s supports for a party and
58
candidates, and ultimately shape the image of an election of any country to the outside
world.
The early political baptism in the country remained a strong factor in the
influential interventionist role it has been playing in the political history of Nigeria. As
such, irrespective of the type and temper of the government (military or civilian) in the
governance system, do not preclude the fact that the media in the country has always
played the people’s tribune is hardly ever disputed (Arogunde 2004:109). The Nigeria
media did not attain the present position as the gate keepers through any act of
benevolence, but earned it from making vital contributions to societal development. The
most visible and significant evidence of that position is the mandate given the media by
the 1999 Constitution which saddles the media with the task of monitoring governance
and holding the government accountable to the people (The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999).
Conflict or Violence, by its very nature, holds a forceful attraction for the mass
media. In the words of Owens-Ibie (2002:32), the media play a critical role in conflict
reportage and are often crucial gatekeepers that often influence issues that are discussed
around conflict situations. Often time, the media brings an emotional angle into
discussions about conflict and by so doing, objectivity are often relegated to the
background. Objectivity in media reportage are often put to several tests when your
nation goes to war (Adie as cited by Allan & Zelizer, 2002:3). Often time, a journalist
finds it difficult to separate personal sentiment from issues on ground, because the issues
on ground also affect them psychologically. As Allan and Zelizer (2002:3) have aptly
Stated, confronted with the often horrific realities of conflict, any belief that a journalist
can remain distant, remote, or unaffected by what is happening ‘tends to go out of the
window’ in a hurry. This cannot be less true when one consider how elections are
conducted in the country.
By all prevailing norms and values guiding media practitioners in the country , the
media in the country could best be described as highly propagandist in their reportage, if
only to stay in the market. This is amply justified by the headlines that often
characterized their reportage of news event, stories and issues generally. Since it is
unethical for news houses to sensationalized news report, it has however become
59
important to succinctly x-rayed how media reportage has contributed to incidences of
electoral violence in Nigeria. As must be pointed out, the media are critical agents of
entertainment, information and transmission of values from one generation to another
within any given society (Dominick, 2002: 34). How a media reports event especially
conflict situations goes a long way in influencing the dimension of the conflict. In its
information function, the media is a critical gatekeeper that help to moderate how
economic, political and social issues are discussed to ensure even attention and by
extension stability in the polity (Mu’azu, 2002:47). In performing this role, the media
often bring to the fore those hidden issues and agenda that affect the decisions and
choices of both the government, individuals and groups as they relate with one another in
the polity. In fulfilling this critical role to the society, it has equally become important to
examine how the media goes about providing information that is objective of prevailing
situations in order not to distort or sensationalized issues so as not to further heat up the
polity especially during elections in the country.
However, owing to the number of political parties and contestants during
elections, it has often been difficult for the media to be fair especially in the area of
coverage of the activities of contestants during elections. Regardless of this situation, it is
pretty impossible to excuse the overall lopsidedness of media coverage of the campaigns
and elections. In the campaigns for Presidential elections between 1999-2011, the ruling
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) dominated the media for the durations of the campaigns
and elections. There were perceived lopsidedness of how the media covers campaign
rallies and events of the ruling party and that of the opposition in the country
(Agbese,2006:9). Besides the extent of coverage they received, the ruling party and the
President were often shown in good light in most of the reports while some of his
opponents were frequently portrayed negatively.
This is particularly true of General Buhari, widely believed to be the then
President's strongest rival, who received a lot of negative coverage arising from several
issues including an earlier Statement credited to him that no Muslim should vote for a
Christian candidate as President. Another Statement also reportedly made by him during
an interview on the Voice of America was that the proposed National Identity Card
Scheme was not in the interest of the North, his failure to appear in the Presidential
60
debates; the reported funding of his election campaigns by some Islamic countries; and
the alleged wastefulness and corruption in the Petroleum Trust Fund, which he presided
over as Executive Chairman under the governments of the late General Sani Abacha, and
his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Constant reference was also made to his
military background and antecedents when he governed the country and in his dealings
with the politicians whom his government overthrew, with the media and other sectors of
the society (Bajraktari, and Parajon,2007:8). President Obasanjo's similar military
antecedents were often not mentioned or overlooked. Rtd General Buhari carried
particularly heavy baggage over his government's promulgation of the controversial
Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No. 4 of 1984. His
Statement during his campaigns that he had no regrets over the promulgation of the
decree only served to anger many journalists and earned him more negative coverage.
Conversely, President Obasanjo's record of having banned the Newbreed
magazine during his earlier rule as military Head of State, his establishment of the
infamous Ita-Oko Detention Centre, and other sundry abuse of people’s rights perpetrated
by his regime were not brought to the front burner of discussions. Likewise, while the
Justice Party's presidential candidate, Reverend Chris Okotie, was frequently ridiculed in
many newspapers’ stories and articles over his claim that he had been called by God to
run for President, President Obasanjo's similar claim to divine inspiration was not a
subject of media attention (Digby-Junger,2006:4).
It is conceded that objective reportage of elections and campaigns is a difficult
challenge as facts which are reported will often seen to be injurious to contending
contestants and political party or to the advantage of the other party or candidate. An
appearance of bias or lack of accuracy may also come from the point that such issues can
be reported from different perspectives different from the party. Besides the
PDP/President Obasanjo and the ANPP/General Buhari, other candidates and parties who
received varying degrees of media coverage were Chief Emeka Ojukwu, of the then All
Peoples Grand Alliance (APGA); Senator Jim Nwobodo, of the then United Nigeria
Peoples Party (UNPP); Senator Ike Nwachukwu, of the then National Democratic Party
(NDP); Reverend Chris Okotie, of the Justice Party (JP); Mrs. Sarah Jibril, of the
Progressive Action Congress (PAC); Chief Gani Fawehinmi, of the National Conscience
61
Party (NCP); Alhaji Balarabe Musa, of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP); and Alhaji
M.D. Yusuf, of Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ) (Frohardt and
Temin,2007:12).
The campaigns by these contestants and their parties received some coverage in
the media, but the other parties and their presidential candidates were almost completely
forgotten and got no more than occasional mention. There was relatively little or no
media focus on them and their rallies and where some of them had media mention, it was
sometimes too negative or meant to ridicule them. An impression was thereby created
that they were not serious candidates or parties. While this lopsidedness in coverage was
most glaring in the Federal Government-owned media, similar situations played out in
media houses owned by private organizations. Several factors apparently give credence to
this situation (Galadima,2006:9).
Firstly, there was a tendency by those in power at both the federal and State levels
to view the government-controlled broadcasting stations as the propaganda arms of their
governments and, as such these media houses were used to further the political interest of
those in power while denying other stakeholders access. For instance, the PDP being the
party in power influences significantly how government media house functions during
elections period, particularly the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and the Federal
Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) (Igboanusi, 2006:11).
Although both the NTA and the FRCN made commendable efforts to provide
some coverage for other political parties and candidates, their coverage was far from
equitable. The FRCN, (2007) for instance, issued House Rules on Political Coverage to
its staff on January 28, 2007. Although this directive was to ensure a somewhat level
playing grounds for all the parties the station remained the mouthpiece of political
leaders within the Federal Government, particularly for the candidates of the then ruling
party. Many of the provisions in the laws establishing both the NTA and the FRCN
ensured their susceptibility to political manipulation and were exploited by government
officials to ensure that the organization remain glued to the party interest of the then
ruling party. These provisions include those of sections 10, 11, and 12(2) and (4) of the
NTA Act and Sections 10(1) and (2), and 11(3) and (4) of the FRCN Act.
62
These provisions impose a duty on the stations to broadcast government
announcements. However, the stations were often unable to distinguish between
government activities being carried out by public office holders, which were newsworthy,
and the activities of government officials that amounted only to election campaigns.
Often times, the campaign speeches of contesting ruling party members especially the
President were routinely reported as government activities without commensurate airtime
given to other political parties or candidates. This situation led to some protests in 2003
by some newly registered political parties in Abuja against perceived lopsidedness in
news reportage by Nigerian Television Authority. The group also complained of
discriminatory charges by the Nigerian Television Authority before reporting their
activities. However, as alluded to earlier, the tendency of the ruling party to dominate the
government-owned media was not limited to the Federal Government or the PDP alone,
but was also evident in virtually all the States and cuts across the different political
parties in control in those States. Many opposition candidates were frequently denied
access to such State media (Keeble,2005:9).
A number of politicians complained about the activities of various State-run
broadcast stations, which they claimed were blacking out news of their political activities,
especially campaigns while virtually singing the praises of the incumbent governors
round the clock. One such complaint came from Mr. Femi Falana, a lawyer and Human
Rights activist who contested the governorship race for Ekiti State on the platform of the
National Conscience Party (NCP). Mr. Falana petitioned the National Broadcasting
Commission in February,2007 over the selective coverage of political activities in the
State and complained of lack of coverage of his election campaign in the State by the
Ekiti State Broadcasting Service (ESBS),he called on the NBC to prosecute the ESBS. In
a letter to Mr. Falana, NBC Director General, Dr. Silas Babajiya Yisa, apologized over
the situation saying that the "Commission is as a matter of urgency investigating your
complaint and will definitely initiate necessary follow-up actions after this process” Dr.
Yisa pointed out that “before now, the Commission had taken adequate steps to educate
broadcast stations across the country on political broadcasts which it said should
accommodate the principles of fairness and equity and promote pluralism of views and
ideas (Tumber,2004:3).
63
But there were a number of complaints from other States over the unfair use of
government-controlled broadcast stations. In Katsina State, for example, there were
complaints that the then Katsina State Governor, Alhaji Yar'Adua, had turned the Katsina
State Radio and Television Stations (KTRTV) to his campaign organisation. One
complaint came from an indigene of the State, Sada Sodangi, who asked the NBC to
check the activities of the station so that the indigenes can get balanced programmes from
it. Mr. Sodangi said in a letter to the NBC: “Of the 30 political parties now in place, you
will not hear or see anything about them except the governor's party which is the Peoples
Democratic Party. If your opinions differ from that of the government, even if you are a
member of the PDP, you will neither be heard nor seen on the stations (Udomisor,
2007:8).
In Imo State, Dr. Ezekiel Izuogu, the protem chairman of Progressive Liberation
Party (PLP) alleged that the PDP government of Chief Achike Udenwa was
monopolizing the Imo Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) as he was not allowing other
candidates to air their views on the State radio and television stations. Similarly, Senator
Rasheed Ladoja, who contested the governorship race in Oyo State under the PDP and
later won the elections, was in January,2003 locked out of the offices of the Broadcasting
Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS), which was then controlled by the ruling party in the
State, the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Senator Ladoja had gone to the BCOS office as
part of his campaign tour of broadcasting stations but was not received by any of the
corporation's officials. The State Ministry of Information had similarly rejected his
written request to be allowed to appear on a phone-in programme, Eyi-Ara, which is aired
weekly on the station (Udomisor,2007:8). In Gombe State, Alhaji Danjuma Goje, the
PDP gubernatorial candidate for the State, alleged that the ANPP government in the State
dominated the Gombe State Media Corporation and that it has denied other political
parties access to the station. He said the station had refused to accept or air jingles from
the PDP, among other acts of denial of equal opportunity to all stakeholders as required
by the National Broadcasting Code.
In a press Statement signed by Mr. Isa Magaji Bangus, the public relations officer
of the Alhaji Goje Campaign Organisation, the politician appealed to the NBC to
investigate the Corporation's refusal to allow other parties and the candidates of other
64
political parties access to the airwaves. In Ogun State, the PDP governorship candidate,
Otunba Gbenga Daniel, also petitioned the NBC alleging that the AD government of
Governor Segun Osoba, was monopolizing the State Radio and Television stations.
Otunba said all the campaign advertisements he sent to the station were rejected while the
State media refused to use any news item from his campaign tour. Rtd. General Buhari,
the ANPP presidential candidate, protested in March complaining that his campaign tour
of Yola, the Adamawa State capital, on March 12 was blacked out by the FRCN and
NTA, both federal stations. He said that the coverage of the presidential campaigns by
both stations had been “one-sided and partial”, contrary to the demands of equity and fair
play.
A second factor responsible for the favourable coverage often received by ruling
party candidates in relation to the other political parties and candidates was the financial
advantage which the ruling parties wielded as the ruling party and its candidates had or
controlled far more resources than their opponents. Because of the absence, both in law
and in fact, of mechanisms for accounting on campaign finances, it was impossible to
determine the source of these funds and, in particular, whether they were public funds.
The issue is of critical importance because besides being in control at the Federal level,
the PDP also controlled a majority of the States in the country and therefore had
unlimited access to State resources. There was indeed a widespread perception that public
funds, both at the Federal level and in the various States, were misappropriated and
deployed for electoral campaigns by the chief executives that attracted wide outcry from
the opposition (Udomisor,2007:9).
In any event, the huge resources at the disposal of the ruling (PDP) across board
played to their advantage and possibly explained why they are often able to buy more air
time for their rallies than the opposition parties. The situation was aggravated by the
absence of any policy of providing free slots for electoral campaign broadcasts for all
contestants to outline their programmes and introduce their candidates for the elections
both at the federal and State levels. The absence of a media policy on electioneering
campaigns and the dearth of resources by opposition party members, meant that majority
of them could not create the necessary visibility for their campaigns. A third factor
responsible for the lopsided coverage is that right from the inception of the political
65
campaigns, especially in the Presidential elections, the media actively promoted the
notion that the elections were a straight fight between the PDP's Presidential candidate,
and the Presidential candidate of the ANPP, Rtd. General Buhari and thereby dismissed
all the other candidates.
Arising from this situation, many media houses focused their attention on
candidates they perceived has more chances of success at the polls to the disadvantage of
other contestants and parties in the elections. As indicated earlier, while the coverage of
President Obasanjo was largely positive, media coverage of Rtd. General Buhari was
often negative. ANPP's Assistant National Publicity Secretary for the North Central
Zone, Mr. Ismaila A. Sani, protested the negative media coverage of General Buhari in
March saying “Time and again, and almost on a daily basis, especially since his
emergence as the ANPP presidential flag bearer, our sensibilities are assaulted and
affronted by what appears to be a deliberate and calculated negative reportage of
Muhammadu Buhari by a section of the press. Both space and prominence are devoted to
slanted stories and skewed comments often with scarcely concealed mission to disparage,
blackmail and malign. Alleging that the Nigerian Tribune newspaper led the campaign,
Sani said a content analysis of the stories, features, comments, cartoons and other
publications carried on General Buhari since January 1, 2003 showed that the newspaper
had waged a hate propaganda against the ANPP presidential candidate. He cited as an
example of the alleged hate campaign the newspaper's March 11, 2003 editorial comment
entitled “Buhari and the ID Scheme” which was repeated the following day
(Udomisor,2007:9).
On September 6, 2010, a respected trade union leader, Comrade Issa Aremu used
the back page of the Daily Trust to attack the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) for
grand partisanship in favour of the incumbent President of Nigeria- Dr.Goodluck Ebele
Jonathan. Comrade Aremu made reference to the 9’oclock prime time news of the
Nigerian Television Authority of September 3, 2010, allegedly aired four news items in
quick succession in favour of Goodluck Jonathan. In 2011, the European Union Election
Observation Mission, in its final report on the 2011 general elections, also gave a
damming report on the activities of the federally owned media houses. The organization
accused government media houses of bias against opposition parties in campaign and
66
rallies reportage. The government owned Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) lacked
balance in the coverage allocated to the candidates and their parties: 80 percent of the
coverage devoted to political actors were given to PDP, five to ACN and CPC each; 75
percent of the direct speech in the NTA's news was dedicated to President Goodluck
Jonathan; Buhari received eight, Ribadu and Shekarau three percent each. The editorial
policy of the government-owned Federal Radio Cooperation of Nigeria(FRCN) stations
was better than the one of NTA: PDP was allotted 64 percent of the coverage in the
Abuja-based Kapital FM and 61 percent in the Lagos-based Radio Unity. However,
Jonathan was the only presidential candidate quoted on FRCN Kaduna. On Kapital, FM
Jonathan received 85 percent of direct speech and 87 on Radio Unity (the European
Union Election Observation Mission,2011).
While the State-owned media were encumbered by the inconveniences of their

ownership, the private media were largely free of such constraints. They generally
provided greater access to the media for political parties and candidates in opposition
than the State-owned media. However, the private media also suffered from two major
disabilities. Firstly, their proprietors often had political and economic interests, which
sometimes resulted in their aligning with particular political parties or specific
candidates. Such proprietors’ interests sometimes influenced the coverage by various
privately owned media establishments either in the volume of coverage given to
particular candidates or parties or in the nature of such coverage and by implication
created a tense atmosphere that often resulted into political violence.
2.1.7 The Nature and Dynamics of the Nigerian State and Electoral Violence.
There are scholars who believed that the character of the Nigerian State, as
reflected in her role in the economy is a major factor to be properly examined. Osaghae
(2003); Ake (1981); Obi (2004); Dudley (1973) are major proponents of this argument.
The crux of this argument is that the emergent independent Nigerian State is rich,
controls major economic heights and services as a measure of last resort to all those who
seek public office and wealth. This gives room to a situation where public office seekers
use any means available to them to get to the centre with a view to controlling the wealth
67
of the state and its distribution to themselves and their kinsmen. In this regards, politics in
Nigeria is seen as warfare.
According to Osaghae (2003:45-46), the States of post colonial Africa (Nigeria)

inclusive have very limited autonomy, particularly from the hegemonic social classes and
are immersed in class struggle. This limited autonomization reflects the limited
development of the productive forces especially as they have compared the
commercialization of commodity production and exchange. We may interpret the limited
autonomization as meaning that the country is still rudimentary since autonomization is
the unique quality of the process of domination in question. Some may prefer to look at it
as a deformity since further development have been stalled for ages. However, what
needs to be kept in mind is that limited autonomization means that the country is
extremely weak to perform adequately the essential functions of the State. It also means
by extension that the structure of the country undermines the ability of the Nigerian state
to improve her capacity to create wealth by properly harnessing her resources. It hampers
them because it is weak to mediate on the conflicts between social capital and particular
capitals. Thus, the progress and growth of the State within the social formation remains at
a level not much higher than the stage of primitive accumulation, with massive
intervention of forces in the labour process to the detriment of the realization of the law
of value.
The State in post colonial Africa (Nigeria) inclusive is unable to mediate on the
conflict of interest between classes and even within classes particularly the hegemonic
class. The results of this is that political contest has been reduced to zero sum contest,
where the only thing that matters lies in getting access to power and enjoying all the
perks that comes with access to state resources by the political elite. This has created a
situation where might is coextensive with right. In these circumstances, government in
power cannot claim legitimacy, only power, political instability is thus endemic due to
the normlessness and extremist’s pattern of political competition. The political class
operates in a State of siege. One of the paradoxes of social formation in Nigeria is that
despite the centrality of power, political order does not appear to have emerged. Rather,
68
violence is endemic, anarchy lurks just below the surface and the political system is as
disarticulated as the economy.
There is also the problem of legitimacy, arising from the lack of autonomy of the
Nigerian State and the style of politics, which is associated with it, produces
governments, which are lacking in legitimacy. Given the Hobbesian character of politics,
only limited range of social forces are articulate enough and the government which
emerges from the political struggle has been unfortunately been based on a primordial
interest. Thus, it becomes extremely impossible to see the government with any veneer of
legitimacy. The high incidences of violence that now characterized political contestations
have also created a heavy reliance of the government on coercion. This further showed
starkly the nature of the political system as a form of domination. The effect of the
foregoing, according to Ake (2001:25), is that the material conditions of the state has
foster a system of governance that thrives on the centralization of power by patrimonial
networks of power that reproduces themselves by capturing State (oil) power, distributing
oil largesse to members, while excluding non-members. The emerging system offers no
real incentive for the decentralization of State power, accountability or development.
Governance is, therefore, reduced to a hegemonic class project, directed at sharing

the spoils, of oil, but excluding the enemies of the group in power, and holding on to
power. Politics is highly personalized and factionalised, and political institutions are
weak, thus making it difficult for a coherent national ruling class to emerge, and for a
developmental ethos to take root within the State. This had unfortunately provided
ground for the use of force in the quest to have access to power, that again create political
instability in the polity. This type of instability is a cause for concern not just because the
State is an actor in conflict, but that it is difficult for it to effectively mediate conflicting
demands because it is captive to the elite who are often the cause of conflict in the
society.
For this reason, some groups of the marginalized but contesting forces distrust the
state, see it as an alien force, and either seek the use of violence to seek redress from the
system or to challenge it. The implication of this is that violence and instability assumes
the appearance of permanence in governance (Obi, 2004:8). This also means that the elite
69
determine the location, allocation and distribution of scarce resources. It is in line with
this contention that Dudley (1973:20) submits that
the shortest cut to affluence and influence is

through politics. Politics means money and
money means politics, there is always a price.
Access to government means access to public
resources amongst others.
The basic assumption here is that the opportunistic tendencies of the political elite
is basically to control the riches of the State and as such, politics is seen as an avenue for
creating wealth, hence, competition for access to government power. It also precludes
why every form of anti-democratic behaviour is employed during elections. According to
Osaghae (1995:33),
the central position of the government over all

socio-political and economic affairs makes
access to the political market, control of
apparatuses of States as well as control of
resources represent important sources of
competition among the various cleavages
present in the Nigerian State.
By implication, the control of governance structures allows the controlling

groups/parties to redistribute income and wealth to the advantage of its members and
supporters. Consequently, the competition for scarce resources induces individuals
mobilized along ethnic or political cleavages to involve in conflictual attitude so as to
ensure that access to public resources are continually guaranteed. The failure of
development and the failure to put development on the agenda in Africa and Nigeria in
particular is often linked to negative political conditions. According to Ake (2005:51),
one salient negative conditions is the conception of politics as ‘warfare’ by the politically
active segment of the elite. The result is that such situation create an atmosphere of
tension and mistrust that ended up creating instability in the polity. According to Ake
(2005:4), a culture of elections that is marked by violence and warfare is thus totally
anathema to the possibilities of development.
70
2.1.8 Godfatherism and Political Violence in Nigeria.
The politics of godfatherism, no doubt, constitutes a serious problem to the

democratization process in Nigeria. It promotes intra-party and inter-party problems and
wranglings and sustains enduring political crises in the management and administration
of State affairs. Godfatherism has been implicated in political crises in Oyo State,
Anambra State under Governor Chris Ngige and Kwara State under the late governor,
Mohammed Lawal, to mention just a few. In the words of Onwuzuruigbo (2006:40),
among the orthodox Catholics, Anglicans and

Pentecostal churches and in Islam, the Mallams
and Almajiris, the godfather is one who
command respect among his people either
through his knowledge, skills, wisdom and
wealth or on account of his popularity and
public acceptance. The godfather, therefore, is a
father-figure and mentor who guides the godson
to the path of achieving success, skills and
excellence in the aspirations or professional
calling of the individual. By raising
knowledgeable and skilled individuals in
commerce, religions, politics, the godfather and
his godson(s) become critical factors in the
development agenda and process of their
community.
According to Uzoigwe (2004:146), the godfather also exercised social, economic and
political leadership which was collective, never dictatorial or oligarchic, and sometimes
almost outrageously democratic. As Tibenderana (1989:74) observed,
patrons were also expected to fulfil their

customary obligations to their clients if they
were to retain their allegiance. These included
protecting their clients’ civil liberties and
economic interest. When in office, patrons were
expected to reward their most loyal and able
clients with administrative positions or to grant
them trade concessions. In fact, political
71
clientage entailed mutually beneficial relations
and solidarity of interest of clients and patrons.
Godfatherism was also an integral aspect of Yoruba pre-colonial structure. The

Baba-Ogun (war patron) played a prominent part in pre-colonial government and politics
of Ibadan. As Falola (1985:100), noted
Baba – Ogun was a warrior who had

distinguished himself in the numerous wars and
battles that characterized inter-group relations in
Yoruba land especially in the 19th century. He
exercised control over numerous people of
several scattered compounds, collected taxes,
tributes and levies from them. In addition, he
settled disputes in his domain and recruited
eligible male members of compounds under his
control to be soldiers in his army during periods
of wars.
According to Awe (1964:109), prominent Ibadan warriors and leaders like Ogunmola,
Osungbeku, Fijabi and Are Latosa began their military careers this way.
The concept of godfatherism as espoused so far presents a practice of

godfatherism that focuses on the stability and progress of the community and seeks to
prepare the individual – godfather and godson to be an active agent of development of the
community. Norms of benevolent and altruism are its guiding principles, and the
godfather is expected to be a benevolent mentor and patron; the interests of people
involved in the relationship – the godfather, godson and the community it accommodated
are adequately protected. However, the notion of godfatherism as applied to Nigeria’s
politics in the Fourth Republic is at variance with this earlier notion of the concept.
According to Joseph (1991:51),
an individual seeks the support and protection of

an oga or a godfather in order to acquire the
basic social and material goods-loans,
scholarships, licencses, plots of urban land,
employment, promotion and the main resources
of the patron in meeting these requests is quite
72
literally a piece of the State. Such a view can
easily be made in the case of ministerial
appointments, or positions on government
boards. It also applies, however, to individuals
within the nominally private sector, since the
business world is hemmed in by bureaucratic
regulations which arose from the nationalistic
and development concerns of post-independence
governments.
This conception of godfatherism differs significantly from the notion of

godfatherism identified earlier. It suggests some notion and motives that differentiate it
from the previous notion. According to Onwuzuruigbo (2006:11),
godfatherism suggests a practice deeply rooted in

individualism and selfishness that discounts and
subverts the interest of the community. The
godfather maintains a selfish and parasitic
relationship with his godson and community. Not
only are the needs of the godson and community
abandoned in fulfillment of those of the
godfather, but the godson and community are
coerced to work and make sacrifices for the self
interest of the godfather.
In Nigeria, however, the system of government in practice has provided avenue

where everybody from all works of life wants to form a relationship or link with
government or those in position of authority: builders, farmers, traditional rulers, teachers
as much as that of politicians and politically motivated individuals in the usual sense of
these terms (Joseph,1991:35).
According to Adeyemo (2007:305), party donations often gives room for the rise
of godfather politics. Since parties need funds to fulfill their obligations, individuals who
are financially buoyant are contacted for assistance. Once the funds have been received,
the donors see themselves as highly placed stakeholders of the party. They do not only
enjoy the goodwill of party members, they also take decisions for the party. Godfathers
decide who get nominated for party positions such as ministers, board members and
Commissioners or who represent the party in elections. Many godfathers see these
73
donations as “investments” that must yield “dividends”. Such dividends may come in the
form of unmerited contract award or in form of cash rewards. In this last case, the
original amount donated plus the interest is expected back by the “godfathers”. In order
not to lose their “investments”, elections must be won at all cost. Once the godsons
assume office, negotiations are made on how to get their ‘investment’ back.
The News Magazine (2004:12) reports the relationship between Uba (godfather)
and Ngige (godson) was smooth till modalities for sharing the booty of office set them
and their supporters apart. This disagreement led to Ngige’s abduction and forced
resignation and the spiral of violence that follows in July 2003. In another scene of this
godgather/godson drama involving Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu and Governor Rasheed
Ladoja of Oyo State, The News Magazine (2004:19) reported that Rasheed Ladoja went
down in history as the governor of Oyo State who was booted out of office for daring to
challenge Adedibu, “the Ibadan garrison commander”. The Anambra case seems more
despicable. Emeka Offor, a multi-billionaire businessman held his home State hostage
from 1999 to 2002 because he alleged governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju reneged in an
earlier agreement to allow him have unrestricted control over the State and its allocation.
Chris Uba, self-styled godfather of Anambra State politics taught the world a new version
of political godfatherism. He moved against Governor Chris Ngige, made him signed a
resignation letter abdicating his office and also got him abducted for failing to pay him
N3 billion from the State treasury.
Anambra State has not known peace since the birth of this democratic
dispensation, no thanks to the rapacious godfathers. Indeed, the impact of godfatherism in
Nigeria’s political process cannot be over emphasized. Elections are won not because the
candidates are popular or enjoy the people’s goodwill but that the godfather wishes it so.
The choice of candidate is based on whom the godfather thinks will accept to be used as
“pawn” for their selfish interests. In order to have their way, their candidates must win
the elections. This creates room for rigging, and manipulations of election results. This
stems from the unwholesome behaviour of politicians and their so-called ‘god-fathers;
their political manoeuvre and manipulations, electoral practices, violence and killings.
According to Olaoye (2005:36),
74
the syndrome of “political god-fathers”
usually diverts the attention of the
power-holder from the concerns of
positive governance either to the
satisfaction of a “political godfather” or
to survivalist maneuvers that ultimately
detract from the ends of governance.
In addition to these arguments about the place of political godfathers in politics,

Kolawole (2004:22) sees godfatherism as a
form of disguised individual

colonization whereby the political
godfather either by force of acquisition
or conquest, colonises the political
godson. It is described as a mutual
prebendalised relationship of exchange
between two individuals based on
political surrogacy involving financial
and moral assistance where the
‘godfather’ is the first major donor and
the “godson” the primary beneficiary or
receiver.
The Fourth Republic in Nigeria has witnessed the ugly trend of political
godfatherism, from inception soon after the government was sworn in 1999. According to
Uwhejevwe-Togbolo (2005:45), in Christendom, the godfather assists the godson to
attain the level of a responsible person in society.
In the case of Nigeria however, the political godfather is another ball game
altogether, it is the opposite. Godfathers are usually those who decide and influences who
gets what, when and how. Whenever a political godson wants to free himself from the
‘political web’ of his godfather, such political waywardness is always attended by violent
or adverse consequences because the estranged godfather is naturally not ready to loose
the anticipated gains on his investments in the election of the godson. Such anticipated
returns are usually in forms of contracts, government loans, jobs and special allowances.
Similarly, Olusola Saraki sees himself as the pacesetter of Kwara politics, and he proved
75
this in 2003 when he brought to bear his political wizardry by making sure his son
Bukola Saraki won the governorship seat.
According to Akin (2006:1), to all intents and purposes, Saraki the father may be
the real governor, while Saraki the son is no more than a surrogate governor with no
obvious mandate. In the case of Oyo State, Lamidi Adedibu boasted openly about his
control of the entire Oyo political terrain, his vast knowledge of the true situation of
issues and his deadly knockout munitions for whosoever dares to cross his part to victory
in any election. Violence erupted in Ibadan after the Appeal Court nullified the
impeachment of Ladoja on November 1, 2006 because Adedibu wanted to maintain the
status quo by controlling the State indirectly through his political stooge ;-Akala.
According to Oluwatosin (2007:121),
at the grassroot level, political power

means the ability to put friends and
clients on the payroll as council
employees, thus ensuring for them
secured salaries as well as other benefits
to divert development initiatives, to
favoured communities. Party primaries
usually feature shootouts and attempted
assassinations between different factions
of the same party in order to win
nominations to run for office.
As already stated, the godfathers not only want a quick return on their
investments but equally desired the control of the State. As such, it breeds corruption,
thuggery and political violence among others. Corruption in the sense that the adopted
political son will involve in sharp practices to meet the demands of the godfathers. It will
lead to thuggery and violence should the adopted political son decides to confront the
godfather. From the discussion so far, certain deductions could be made with regards to
the features of Nigeria elections. These include the fact that primitive accumulation is a
critical defining feature of Nigerian politics. The violent nature of the electoral process
therefore is a necessary evil emanating from the desire to extrapolate from the political
system by any means possible including the monetization of the process through the
76
instrumentality of the godfather syndrome that has become a common phenomenon of the
polity under the present democratic dispensation.
2.1.9 Voters Education and Enlightenment and Electoral Violence in Nigeria
Available literature have suggested that election violence in Nigeria’s political

history could be traced to poor and inadequate voters education and enlightenment as
from 1964 till the present Fourth Republic. It has been established that the absence of
election violence in some African Countries like Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire could be
attributed to effective and adequate voters’ education and enlightenment. Sustainable
voters’ education is usually directed towards providing proper advertisement and
registration of voters, effective campaigns directed toward marketing existing political
parties and their candidates and programmes of actions, orderly conduct during general
election and an independent electoral umpire to defend the people’s franchise whenever
they are tempered with.
In a paper titled “Voters Education and Enlightenment in Nigeria: The Bayelsa

State Experience, Etekpe (2015:2), identified two types of elections, namely democratic
and undemocratic elections. He went further to state the conditions under which they
operate.
According to him:
Democratic elections are conducted in

accordance with the provisions of the Electoral
Act and Constitution with transparency,
fairness, justice and equity without the
interference of the incumbent leadership, there
is an absence of electoral violence and other
forms of malpractices because the contestants
and supporters are well educated to understand
and appropriate virtues of the “diversity and
different” positions of each other while
undemocratic election negates all accepted
norms of democracy (Etekpe 2015:2)
77
In an undemocratic election, there is poor voters education, incredible voters
register, acute rigging, unlawful exclusion of validly nominated candidates, poor
organizations and the emergence of unpopular candidates. The aftermath of undemocratic
elections are protracted violence and litigations and these have been the trend, nature,
character, pattern and the dynamics of the Nigerian electoral processes since 1964 till
date. He went further to state that all post-independence elections in Nigeria lacked
integrity of voters education, voters enlightenment and the conduct of general elections
have systematically declined since 1964, with that of 2007 as the worst in the country’s
history (Etekpe 2015:2).
The main argument of his paper was that poor voters’ education, poor
enlightenment and unholy alliances are some of the causes of electoral violence since
independence in Nigeria’s politics. He went further to demonstrate that the 2007 general
election was bound to fail from the beginning. In his opinion,
This was because there was no sustained voters

education, disputable voters register, very little
enlightenment, corruption, high tendency of
exclusionary politics where validly nominated
candidates, including Atiku Abubakar, former
Vice-President were unlawfully excluded, evil
alliance between law enforcement, security and
INEC officials, and outright rigging. The voters
registration exercise was marred by acute
shortage of materials that prevented many
eligible voters from registering. There was so
much confusion when the voters register were
eventually displayed (Etekpe 2015:3).
Other facts emerging from the paper are that some of the political parties in this
Fourth Republic have no internal democracy to really appreciate the role, voters
education and enlightenment could play in the selection of party flag bearers. Candidates
for election are usually selected at the whims and caprices of the god-fathers and these
are imposed upon the electorate to vote for. This creates room for violence because, the
candidates chosen by the god-fathers might not be the people’s choice and this creates
further room for aggression which has to be filled through violence. Secondly, since
78
independence, Nigeria’s elections have not been democratic, hence all the elections have
witnessed one form of violence or the other. The resultant impact of electoral violence
have been, stagnation of the nation’s economy, rise in terrorism, general political
instability, persistent and increasing cases of litigations about elections’ outcomes,
political assassinations and corruption of public office holders.
The table below gave a graphic picture of how non sustenance of voters
education, lack of enlightenment and unholy alliances among political parties gave rise to
major indices of election violence in Nigeria since 1964-2011.
Table 2.4: Major Indices of Electoral Malpractices in Nigeria, 1964 – 2011
S/N Year of National Political Political Forms of Consequences

General Parties Alliance Malpractice
Election
1 1964 Northern Peoples - NCNC – AG = - Poor voters register UPGA boycotted
Congress (NPC) United - Mass arrest of the election
National Progressive UPGA and Political parties
Convention of Grand Alliance Opposition rejected the results
Nigeria Citizens (UPGA) candidates and Bloody civil
(NCNC) - NPC- pooling agents resistance
Action Group NNDP=NDC - Preventing especially in
(AG) Nigerian opposition Western Nigeria
National candidates filing
Alliance (NNA) nomination papers
- Massive rigging
2 1976 National Party of - Poor voters register UPN and NPP
Nigeria (NPN) - Rigging and rejected
Great Nigerians None intimidation Presidential
Peoples Party election results
(GNPP) Filed election
Unity Part of petition against
Nigeria (UPN) Shehu Shargari at
Progressive the Supreme Court
Redemption Party The unresolved
(PRP) question of 2/3 of
Nigerian People’s 19 states
Party
3 1983 - Dumping of ballot General
Ditto None papers by Presiding dissatisfaction on
Officers and electoral processes
pooling agents Military seized
- Rigging powers
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4 1999 Peoples - AD and APP (to - Poor voters General
Democratic Party produce single registration dissatisfaction
(PDP) Presidential - Falsification of Threat to the unity
All Peoples Party candidate) results by and stability of
(APP) Returning Officers Nigeria
Alliance for - Massive rigging
Democracy (AD)
5 2003 PDP, AD, ANPP None - Fraud General rejection
- Unlawful exclusion of results by TMG
of candidates Litigationss at the
- Evil alliance Supreme Court
between law
enforcement
/security agencies
and INEC officials
6 2007 PDP, AD, ANPP, None - Poor voters register General rejection
Action Congress, - Monumental fraud of results by
CPC and 46 other - Poor organization Nigerians
parties, making a - Outright rigging Unprecedented
total of 50 parties litigations (1,249)
7 2011 PDP, AD, ANPP, None - Poor voters Less litigations
CPC, etc. education General acceptance
- Some level of
rigging
Source: Etekpe, A (2015). Voters Education and Enlightenment in Nigeria: The Bayelsa
State Experience. An unpublished paper on Student Sanitization Programme, Niger Delta
University (NDU), March 4th.
To reduce the incidences of electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,
Etekpe (2015:5-8) identified eight (8) stakeholders in the electoral process whose roles
can put to an end the increasing cases of electoral violence in Nigeria politics. These are:
i. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

ii. National Orientation Agency (NOA)
iii. Political Parties
iv. Faith-Based (Religious) Organisations
v. The Media
vi. The Federal, States and Local Governments
vii. Civil Society and Community Based Organisations (CSOs/CBOs)
viii. Students’ Union Governments.
80
Since these identified groups have assigned functions to perform, with regard to
elections in the country, they should come together to develop a synergy towards
intensive, massive, awareness and re-awakening campaign (IMARC) about elections
which will help to change the people’s mindsets toward elections. The IMARC will bring
about a positive change in the minds of the electorate toward seeing election as a process
that will produce the right caliber of people who can provide the needs of the people
rather than those who are to exploit state resources to satisfy their primordial interests.
The IMARC model will reverse the declining value system and ethics in the political
process among Nigerians in which corruption and ethnicity will have no role to play in
determining who govern the people but will be determined by party manifestoes or
programmes of actions across the country.
2.1.10 The History of Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria.
Elections, in terms of their origin in Africa and Nigeria in particular were a

colonial contrivance that evolved as part of the institutional transfer of the superstructure
of liberal democracy. In the words of Jinadu (1995:76),
although the pre-conlonial political systems in

Africa has some shades of democratic
principles, and practices embedded in them, the
concept of voting and the notion of a political
majority and minority were not part of the
African political tradition.
Consequently, dialogue and the political collective were emphasized, as opposed to

individualism, atomization and the majoritarianism of the Western capitalist political
system. Thus electoral history in Africa is an early 20th century phenomenon. For
instance, in Nigeria that this thesis is dealing with, the elective principle was introduced
in 1922 with the Cliffords Constitution. However, from 1945 the process of political
decolonization was marked by the extension of both the franchise and the scope of
representative institutions, indeed as Cohen (1983:73) argues, the electoral procedure was
generally used to determine, or at least to legitimise, the form, rate and direction of the
decolonization process.
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While electoral administration took place under colonial rule, colonialism
produced three sharp contradictions or paradoxes for post-colonial electoral politics and
behaviour, particularly of the leadership (Adejumobi, 2000:63). First, colonialism by its
very nature and character is antithetical to the logic and philosophy of elections and
democracy, having been constructed on the bases of authoritarianism and domination.
Thus superintending the electoral processes, particularly when the electoral regime itself
was deeply interested and involved in the politics of power transfer, was very complex
and problematic and the extent to which an impartial or a free and fair colonial electoral
process was possible was therefore questionable. Second; although the decolonization
project was woven around democratic principles and the ideals of self-determination and
social justice, the emergent political elites were educated and socialized under a highly
centralized and authoritarian order(Chazzan,1993:56). Third, the statist character of
colonial rule which survived the era was later to determine the object and terrain of
electoral competition. Given this situation, what are the implications of electoral politics
in post-colonial Africa and Nigeria in particular?
A demeaning politics of de-participation and the shrinking of the electoral arena

which characterized the post-colonial era in Africa and Nigeria in particular had its roots
in earlier colonial history. Post-colonial politics was constructed on the logic of neo-
patrimonialism in which State offices and rents were appropriated, with the State serving
as the focus of capital accumulation and the fulcrum of social control (Adejumobi,
1998:145). The way of doing politics, to use the words of Max Weber, was therefore not
to live for it, but to live from it (Ibrahim 1994). Elections in this context could at best be
restricted and at worst, anomalous. One party rule; military regimes and what Luckham
(1994:79) calls “garrison socialism” littered the continent, all placing little value on the
issue and importance of elections and the electoral process.
Africa leaders generally and Nigeria in the same way had a lethargic disdain for
open and competitive elections which might threaten the bases of their power and
authority. Thus, Milton Obote, former President of Uganda, was reported to have made
the remark that an election was a way of controlling the people rather than being a means
through which they could control him (Cohen, 1983:85-86).According to Olaoye
82
(2003:7), it operated mainly by a mixture of financial rewards with appeals to ethnic
sentiments and ultimately; it sounded the death knell for the First Republic. It has been
argued that there has hardly been any election conducted in the country that has not been
tainted by one manipulation or the other (Jinadu and Edoh, 1990:18). The Second
Republic was arguably worse. Despite series of cautions taken both to ensure that
political parties were ‘national’ in structure, outlook and in the composition of their
executive committees; and in spite of the lengthy and detailed registration, campaign and
electoral laws and guidelines that were made available, there was rigging of
unimaginable proportions during actual voting, vote counting and result declaration
(Ofonagoro, 1979:19; Kurfi 1983:40). According to Iyayi (2005:25) all the elections in
Nigeria have thus been negatively impacted upon by ethnic and hence primordial
considerations.
Table 2.5: Ethnic Distribution of Leaders of the Major Nigerian Parties in 1959 as
Percentage of the Total Vote Cast
Party Igbo Other Yoruba Other Hausa Other Others

Eastern Western Falani Northern
Group Groups Groups
NPC - - 6.8 - 51.3 32.4 9.4
NCNC 47.3 9.9 26.7 5.6 2.8 - 5.6
AG 4.5 15.2 68.2 7.6 3.0 - 1.5
Source: Sklar and Whitakeer, Jr. (1966) “Nigeria”, in J.S Coleman C. Rosberg Jr;
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley. University of
California Press p.206
Between 1985 and 1993, the Third Republic witnessed series of political
contraptions under the regimes of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Abacha. There were
many elections with cases of electoral malpractices but the most serious case of election
rigging took place under the Babangida regime, following the annulment of the results of
the June 12, 1993 presidential election. That election was believed and adjudged by the
3,000 accredited local and international observers to be the fairest and the best in
Nigeria’s political history. According to Oshun (1999:17),
83
the election has been monitored and
uncharacteristically endorsed by poll-watchers
from developed countries… to the last person in
all the monitoring teams, the consensus was that
the election has been well conducted, free, fair
and therefore credible… a significant and
laudable departure from past patterns.
Finally, on June 23, 1993, the Federal military government announced the
annulment of the presidential election in an unsigned paper that was circulated by the
then press secretary to the Vice President. That event set the stage for the bitterest
struggle for the defense of democracy Groups, professional associations, students bodies,
market women and the international community began a long-drawn battle against the
dictatorial regime which leadership was at the centre of an ethnically hatched plot for
self-succession of Ibrahim Babangida. According to Olurode (1993:14),
the cancellation of the results has proved once

again that no matter how elaborate the legal
framework for an orderly succession, those who
may lose in the process of power transfer may
deliberately throw spanner into an otherwise
perfect arrangement to undermine the country
democracy.
The very manager of Nigeria’s transition to civil rule programme are the very
people that have aborted a successful transfer of political power. In response, both Britain
and America imposed several sanctions on Nigeria all of which are directed at the
military. According to Olurode, (1993:10).
the American government announced the

suspension of the entire package of economic
and military assistance to Nigeria totaling
$750 million. Nigeria’s military attaché to the
Nigeria embassy in Washington was also
expelled and his Nigeria counterpart was
asked to stay at home by the American
government.
Nigeria’s pro-democratic bodies – Campaign for Democracy (C.D), the
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (C.D.H.R); the Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity
84
Association (G.F.S.A) and many others organized successful public protests between the
5th and 10th of July 1993. According to Osaghae (2002:16), the annulment of the election
was the greatest catalyst of Nigeria’s descent into anarchy. Spontaneous riots and
demonstrations sprang up every where, but were serious in Lagos and other capitals in
the Southern part of the country. Rioting paralyzed activities in the Southern part of the
country, especially Lagos and it took the intervention of anti-riot police and military
squads on orders to shoot-at-sight for it to abate. The Fourth Republic was ushered in
with the short but brief transition programme that was put in place by the then General
Abubakar Abdulsalami administration after the death of Abacha. Six political parties
participated actively in the 1999 general elections. These include, the Peoples Democracy
Party, Alliance for Democracy, All Nigeria Peoples Party, United Democratic Party,
United Nigeria Peoples Party, and All Progressive Grand Alliance.
The 1999 April general elections that produced Rtd. General Olusegun Obasnajo
as President was not so violent when compared to those of 2003 and that of 2007. The
reason for this was that the political class were not too sure that the military will actually
relinquish power to a civilian led administration in the country. For the conduct of the
2003 general elections, thirty political parties were registered by the Independent
National Electoral Commission. These include:
Table 2.6: Number of Registered Political Parties
S/N Registered Political Parties

1. African Renaissance Party (ARP)
2. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
3. All Peoples Liberation Party (APLP)
4. All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)
5. Alliance for Democracy (AD)
6. Better Nigeria Progressive Party (BNPP)
7. Community Party of Nigeria (CPN)
8. Democratic Alternative (DA)
9. Green Party of Nigeria (GPN)
85
10. Justice Party (JP)
11. Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN)
12. Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)
13. Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ)
14. National Action Council (NAC)
15. National Conscience Party (NCP)
16. National Democratic Party (NDP)
17. National Mass Movement of Nigeria (NMMN)
18. National Reformation Party (NRP)
19. New Democrats (ND)
20. New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP)
21. Nigeria Advance Party (NAP)
22. Nigeria Peoples Congress (NPC)
23. Party for social Democracy (PSD)
24. People’s Redemption Party (PRP)
25. Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
26. Peoples Mandate Party (PMP)
27. Peoples Salvation Party (PSP)
28. Progressive Action Congress (PAC)
29. United Democratic Party (UDP)
30. United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP)
Source: INEC office, Abuja 2007.
While INEC was battling to put infrastructure on ground for a free and fair
elections, the political class were heating up the polity by some negative behaviours. The
approach of the 2003 general elections increased the tempo of conflicts such as
communal crisis and political violence culminating in politically motivated
assassinations. The Nigeria April 2003 general elections were characterized by acute
violence, thuggery and politically motivated assassinations which created fear in the
minds of the people.
86
Table 2.7: Records of Politically Motivated Assassinations.
S/N Names of Victim Position Party Date State of

Affiliatio Murdered Origin
n
1. Hon. Odunayo Member, State House of A.D 21/12/2001 Osun
Olagbaju Assembly
2. Chief Bola Ige Minister of Justice and A.D 23/12/2001 Osun but
Attorney – General killed at
Ibadan
3. Mrs. Janet Olapade Women Leader PDP 12/8/2002 Ondo
4. Alh. Ahmed Pategi Chairman, Kwara PDP PDP 15/8/2002 Kwara
5. Mr. Victor Publisher 4th Dimension N/A 29/5/2002 Anambra
Nwankwo
6. Mr. Barnabas Igwe Chairman NBA Anambra Not Sept. 1, Anambra
and his wife Abigail State Known 2002
7. Mr. Dele Arojo Gub. Aspirant PDP 25/11/2002 Ogun
8. Alh. Kabiru Party Chairman UNPP Dec. 2002 Kano
Mohammed
9. Chief Ogbonna Senatorial Candidate ANPP 8/2/2003 Imo
Uche
10. Mr. Theodore Civil Servant: Principal Not 15/2/2003 Imo
Egwuate Secretary to Gov. of Imo Known
State
11. Alh. Kola Kasum Party Chairman, Kwara PDP Feb. 2003 Kwara
12. Prof. Chimere Ikoku Former VC UNN N/A (Not Oct. 2003 N/A (Not
available) available)
13. Mrs. Emily Omope Women Leader A.D 3/3/2002 N/A (Not
available)
14. Chief Harry Marshal South-South Party ANPP 5/3/2003 Rivers
Leader
15. Mr. Udo Akpan Federal Commissioner PDP August Akwa-
2003 Ibom
Source: Guardian Newspapers of 2/9/2002; 29/12/2002,3/3/2003;
Fears were heightened as a result of the massive resurgence of identity based

conflicts in different parts of the country with return to a constitutional framework of
government in 1999. For instance, in the North-Central parts of the country inhibited by
ethnic minority groups, conflict expressed in ethno-religious forms, but fought around
issues of citizenship and access to local power and resource, had led to mass killings,
destruction of property and displacement of thousands of people. In Jos, and the Southern
87
part of Plateau State, as well as in Nasarawa, communal conflicts threatened civil
activities including elections.
The spectre of conflicts and violence remained outstanding in Warri,

Ife/Modakeke, and in Umuleri/Aguleri area of Anambra State. Added to these were the
violent outbursts associated with militia groups such as the Niger- Delta Volunteer Force
(NDVF) and the Ijaw Youth Congress (NYC) in the Niger-Delta, the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South-East and the
Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) in the South-West. According to Egwu (2007:22),
in terms of such violence the North-Central

zone closely followed the Niger-Delta in the
South-South zone. In the Northern zone, Benue
State recorded over 40 deaths. In one single
incident, as reported by ANPP gubernatorial
candidate in an interview, 22 people were shot
dead.
In Delta State, the tension in Warri area linked to the politics of oil, but outwardly
expressed in the unending disputations over the ownership of Warri, created a unique
condition of tension. Two issues stood out in the tendency of people to resort to violence
in expressing their grievances. First was the perception by political parties, contestants
and the generality of people that INEC was partisan and was willing to do the bidding of
the ruling PDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party). The second was the undue sensationalism
exhibited in the media reportage of political events and conflicts. These issues gave rise
to intense conflict in the polity which eventually climaxed into electoral violence.
Beyond Olufemi’s (2003:19) view of politics as a phenomenon that evokes a great deal of
apprehension and uneasiness among ordinary citizens all over the world, the situation in
Nigeria has gone to a level that the popular perception of politics is that of “dirty game”.
88
Table 2.8: Some Cases of Unresolved Political Assassinations in Nigeria.
NAMES DATE LOCATION MODE OUTCOME
Kola Tokunbo January 31, 1999 Lagos Shot Unresolved

Patrick Okoye January 31, 1999 Lagos Shot Unresolved
Sunday Ugwu Igwe September 9, 1999 Enugu Shot Unresolved
Francis Nwankwo February 15, 2000 Anambra Shot Unresolved
Nicholas June 2000 Lagos Shot Unresolved
Okhuakhua September 2000 Lagos shot Unresolved
Mohammed October 17, 2000 Onitsha shot Unresolved
Shuaibu Obatou November 5, 2000 Ondo shot Unresolved
Mumbo Idowu December 4, 2000 Benin shot Unresolved
Braimoh Joseph December 10, Lagos shot Unresolved
Osayande 2000 August 19, Port Harcourt shot Unresolved
Chief Layi Balogun 2001 August 23, Ebonyi shot Unresolved
Monday Ndor 2001 August 23, Ebonyi shot Unresolved
Onyebuchi Ede 2001 August 23, Ebonyi shot Unresolved
Chibueze Idah 2001 August 23, Ebonyi shot unresolved
Ogbonna 2001 December Ife shot unresolved
Odimbaiwe Ifeanyi 20, 2001 Ibadan shot unresolved
Nnaji Odunayo December 23, Abuja Stabbed unresolved
Olagbaju Chief 2001 January 7, Calabar unresolved
Shot
Bola Ige 2002 April 2002 Lagos Unresolved
Shot
May 9, 2002 Nsukka ununresolve
Eyo Eyo Ifeanyi Shot
May 26, 2002 Cross River d unresolved
Igbokwe Shot
June 11,2002 Onitsha unresolved
Musa Dayo Shot
September 1, 2002
Christopher Owerri Unresolved
Shot
Ogbonna Maria- February 8, 2003 Imo unresolved
Shot
Theresa Nsa Chief February 13, 2003 Owerri unresolved
Shot
& Mrs. Barnabas February 22, 2003 Ibadan unresolved
Shot
89
Igwe March 3, 2003 Abuja Shot unresolved
Mr. Ogbonnaya March 5, 2003 Yamatu Shot unresolved
Uche E. Emenike March 17, 2003 Deba Ibadan Shot unresolved
Theodore Agwatu June 21, 2003 Delta Shot unresolved
Emily Omope February 6, 2004 Ibadan Shot unresolved
Marshal Harry July 16, 2005 Benin Shot unresolved
Source: Adapted from Igbinovia, P.E (2003); The Criminal In All Of Us: Whose Ox
Have We Not Taken, University of Benin Inaugural Lecture Series 71, p.143;Human
Right Watch 2007.
2.1.11 Empirical Cases of Electoral Violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999-

2011)
Electoral violence is as old as Nigeria’s democratic history. Indeed, Nigeria’s

elections had been generally characterized by violence and all forms of anti-democratic
behaviours. Since the commencement of democratic rule in 1999, the same features of
electoral violence and anti-democratic behaviours have characterized all elections. In
1999, an election to usher in a democratic government was conducted by the then
military government of General Abdulsalam Abubakar (rtd). The election from all
observations was relatively peaceful, perhaps, due to the fear of military force and the
thinking among the political elite that the military may not likely relinquish power to an
elected civilian government. This thinking gave rise to the limited cases of electoral
violence that were recorded. However, in subsequent civilian to civilian transition
programmes, cases of electoral violence skyrocketed. The following discussion will thus
give account of empirical cases of electoral violence throughout the country, specifically
from 2003-2011. Most of the details of electoral violence used here were extracted from
the records of Human Rights Watch (HRW), Transition Monitoring Group(TMG), Civil
Liberty Organizations (CLO) and other election observers that covered the elections
during the period under consideration.
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Rivers State
Violence and blatant rigging were widely used in Rivers State to secure victory at
the elections, primarily by the ruling PDP and other parties (TMG,2003). The police
were widely reported to have supported the PDP’s interests in Rivers State (HRW,2003).
In 2003, an armed All Nigerians Peoples Party (ANPP) supporter called Nnena Mwuzi
was killed by PDP supporters in Etche local government, outside the local government
headquarter where INEC was preparing materials for distribution (CLO,2003). He was
killed during a dispute between ANPP and PDP supporters over whether INEC could
distribute a photocopy of the election results form rather than the original. In other areas
in Rivers State, many incidents of violence, including several killings, were reported in
different parts of Ikwerreland, which covered four local government areas. Many other
incidents of violence in Rivers State were reported by election observers, non-
governmental organizations, political activists, and others. These included incidents
where members of the security forces used excessive force, for example in Port Harcourt
on April 19,2003 when soldiers whipped ANPP supporters who were protesting at the
INEC office. A petition by the ANPP in Rivers State submitted to the INEC Chairman
also contains examples of violent intimidation and other abuses by the PDP during the
National Assembly elections (HRW,2003).
Delta State
As one of Nigeria’s most important oil-producing state, the race for government position
in Delta State was even more desperate, and the financial benefits of gaining political
office even higher, than in other states (HRW,2003). Not surprisingly, therefore, it
experienced a high level of violence before, during and after the elections. Not all of
these violence were directly related to the elections, but the elections contributed to
heightening of existing tensions in the area. The TMG (2003)reported that in Ughelli,
angry youths burnt down the INEC office in protest at the postponement of elections. In
other locations, armed thugs snatched ballot boxes and vandalized election materials. An
TMG (2003) election observer in Warri described vehicles full of PDP thugs screeching
into view at polling stations, large numbers of youths jumping out and leaving the doors
open to show that the vehicles were full of guns and ammunition. The thugs then stood
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over voters, asking them who they would be voting for. Some voters were so frightened
that they replied: “who do you want us to vote for?” Many others simply did not vote.
Most of the violence in Delta State were noted by the TMG (2003) to have been
carried out by PDP supporters. However, opposition party supporters were also reported
to have engaged in violence and intimidation, as groups of armed youths affiliated to
particular ethnic groups, rather than political parties. For example, on April 11,2003 on
the eve of the National Assembly elections in Koko, the headquarter of Warri North
Local Government area, Ijaw militia launched an attack in which at least one government
soldier and perhaps tens of civilians were killed. They also destroyed about fifty
buildings, including the local government secretariat (TMG,2003). On May 2 and 3 2003,
there were confrontations between armed Ijaws and the Navy in Warri, and armed youths
tried to disrupt the state house of assembly elections. At least, eight people were reported
to have died in clashes between political thugs in some locations, including Okpe and
Burutu, during the state house of assembly elections. In Delta State, the re-scheduled
Delta North Senatorial district primary was marred by sporadic gunshots at the Cenotaph
venue, Asaba. The State chairman of the party, Chief Peter Onyeluka Nwaoboshi escaped
being lynched by some angry delegates during the senatorial rerun (TMG,2011).
Electoral Violence in the South-East Geo-Political Zone
Imo State
According to HRW and TMG (2003) widespread rigging and armed intimidation
at polling booths were reported by independent observers in Imo State. As in other
Southeastern states where the Igbo ethnic group forms a majority, the All Progressive
Grand Alliance (APGA) presented a strong challenge to the ruling PDP in the state. In the
evening of April 19, 2003 in Amaimo, Ikeduru local government, Onyewuchi
Iwuchukwu, an ANPP member, was shot in front of his family by PDP supporters
associated with the PDP’s local chairmanship candidate, Samuel Anyanwu, known as
Samdaddy. He died on his way to the hospital (TMG,2003).
On April 19, 2003. Tony Dimegwu, an ANPP state House of Assembly candidate
from Ahiazu-Mbaise local government, was seriously injured by PDP supporters.
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According to TMG (2003), Tony Dimegwu heard rumours that PDP agents were
carrying marked ballots into his constituency. When he challenged them, he was severely
beaten by PDP thugs, who were reportedly led by Chidi Ibe, the local government’s
transition committee chairman. Dimegwu was taken to hospital, where his political
associates said he remained for several days before being flown to Italy for more medical
treatment resulting from injuries. An ANPP leader in Ahiazu-Mbaise local government
described to TMG (2003:6) of how Tony Dimegwu was attacked:
We met the transition committee chairman
and a whole lot of [PDP] thugs. They had five
or six vehicles. Tony challenged them [the
PDP supporters], saying he suspected they
were carrying ballots or boxes. I saw Chidi Ibe
hold Tony while boys were beating him, some
with bare hands, some with irons [iron bars].
About five policemen were there with Ibe. I
saw the police were just shooting into the air.
Finally Tony fell down. I thought he was
dead. The PDP thugs raced off and the police
went with them. One other vehicle collected
Tony; I learnt later they took him to hospital. I
saw him two days later in hospital. He was
still bad then, he couldn’t talk at all.
The Civil Liberty Organisations (2003) recorded at least twelve cases of

assassinations of ANPP members in Ebonyi State, believed to have been orchestrated by
the PDP, in March and April. Among the victims were Anthony Nwodu, secretary of the
ANPP in Ezza North local government, who was abducted from a police station by armed
PDP supporters on March 21, 2003 and killed, allegedly in the house of a prominent PDP
politician in the state. Two of the leaders of the group who allegedly killed Anthony
Nwodu were charged with his murder. A few days later, on March 27,2003. Ikenna Ibor,
a councillorship candidate for the ANPP, was shot dead at the ANPP secretariat in the
state capital, Abakaliki. The incident was reported to the police, who confirmed that he
had been shot in the stomach, thigh and hand, and that they were investigating the
case(CLO,2003).
In Uwanna, in Afikpo North, there was serious inter-communal violence
following the May 3,2003 State House of Assembly elections. The former minority
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leader from the State House of Assembly, Arinze Egwu, who before the elections had
defected from the ANPP to the PDP, was from this area, and had been attacked and
beaten before the elections. On the day of the House of Assembly elections on May 3, an
APGA supporter known as Ziko had been shot and killed. Reprisal attack and counter-
reprisal ensued. Supporters of opposition parties, who had come together in the wake of
earlier elections, organized to disrupt the elections and destroy ballot boxes, and burnt the
house and car of the PDP supporter suspected of killing Ziko. In response, PDP
supporters burnt homes and attacked opposition supporters (HRW,2003).
Godwin Aleke, a headmaster who was appointed a ward presiding officer in
Umuoghara, Ezza North local government, was beaten to death on the night of April
12,2003 the day of the National Assembly elections (Human Rights Watch,2003). In
another case of electoral violence in Ebonyi State, a local Human Rights group reported
that in Effium, in Ohaukwu local government, on April 12, 2003, House of Assembly
PDP candidate, Bernard Uzimu was beaten and kicked by ANPP supporters after he tried
to snatch a ballot box; they abducted him and detained him for three days. An ANPP
ward chairman, Hyacinth Ekebe, was also reportedly beaten in his house on the day of
the National Assembly elections(HRW,2003).
Electoral Violence in Other Northern States

The level of violence in the north was not as severe as in other parts of the
country. Nonetheless, some incidents of violence were recorded. For example, in Tudun
Wada area of Kaduna town, capital of Kaduna State, there was a clash between ANPP
and PDP supporters two days after the State House of Assembly elections of May 3,2003.
Local sources reported that a PDP supporter attacked an ANPP campaign coordinator
(CLO,2003). The police arrested a large number of people, but not the perpetrator of the
attack. Majority of those arrested were reportedly released after paying ransom to the
police.
In Sokoto State, election observers recorded at least two deaths as a result of
clashes between ANPP and PDP supporters. Both incidents occurred in the aftermath of
the National Assembly elections of April 12, 2003, one in Tureta local government, the
other in Kebbe local government. In both cases, ANPP candidates to the National
94
Assembly won the elections, displacing the PDP. Celebrations by ANPP supporters
turned to violence as they clashed with PDP supporters. Election observers reported that
in Tureta, a PDP supporter was stoned to death, while in Kebbe, an ANPP supporter died
after being severely beaten(HRW,2003).
In Niger State, the trouble there started with violence during the campaign. In
Suleja for instance, hand-held explosives were thrown into the venue of the Niger East
Senatorial campaign flag-off by unidentified persons. Angry youth protesting the results
of the elections stormed the Nigerian Christian Corpers Fellowship Secretariat in Minna,
Niger State Capital and locked 50 corps members serving in the State in the building and
set it ablaze. The lucky ones among these corpers were relocated to the army barracks at
Minna for safety. In Plateau state, the flag-off of the Labour Party (LP) Gubernatorial
campaign led by Pauline Tallen was marked with a sad beginning as twelve of the party
supporters were involved in a ghastly motor accident on their way to Jos.
In Kano State, during the primaries, there were cases of disagreements over the
primaries. For examples, Governor Ibrahim Shekarau of the All Nigerian Peoples Party
(ANPP) had fallen apart with his deputy, Alhaji Abdullahi Tijani Gwarzo over his
support for Alhaji Sagir Takai, as the governorship candidate of the party. On the other
hand, within the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) the governorship ticket was
controversially handed over to (Rtd) General Lawal Jafaru Isa, former military
administrator of Kaduna State instead of the much-touted Mohammed Abacha. Even
though, the position was surrendered to Mohammed Abacha, the aftermath of the election
was not favourable. Aside, property worth hundreds of millions of naira owned by the
Emir of Kano, Dr. Ado Bayero, the Galadima Kano, Alhaji Tijani Hashim, chieftains of
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) like former speakers, House of Representatives,
Ghali Umar Na’Abba and Salisu Buhari were reduced to rubble. The All Nigerian
Peoples Party (ANPP) Elders Committee leader and former presidential candidate of the
defunct National Republican Party (NRP), Alhaji Bashir Tofa’s residential building was
also burnt. Hundreds of Kano residents were severely injured, their cars damaged by the
aggrieved youth who claimed the presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive
Change (CPC) was denied victory at the polls (TMG, 2003)
95
In Zamfara State, thousands of youths went on the rampage in Tsafe Local
Government area of the State where they destroyed dozens of shops and vandalised three
churches. Major roads were also barricaded, bonfires were made to disrupt vehicular
movement while about 47 suspects were arrested. The violence that broke out in Katsina
state escalated to many areas such as Malumfashi, Kankara, Daura and Jibia which
claimed scores of cars and at least five churches. The PDP Secretariat, Kankara private
residence of local PDP Chieftains and Governor Shema campaign offices were destroyed
in the melee. In the same vein, nearly all the States in the North-East also experienced
violence. In Gombe, 17 people lost their lives during the post-presidential poll violence in
Gombe and 100 suspects were arrested. The Acting Head of Clinical Services and
Training of the Federal Medical Centre, Gombe, Dr Ali Shaliza stated that 71 patients of
post-election violence were brought to the hospital.. In Bauchi State, 10 Youth Corpers
who served as election umpires, a Divisional Crime Officer (DCO) and a policewoman
lost their lives. Over 4,500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on
the residents of Bauchi of supporters of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP). Four
INEC offices were equally burnt down in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama’are local
government areas while 500 laptops used for the voters registration exercise were looted
by the irate youths.In Taraba State, many people were shot by the police during a protest
at Mutum-Biyu headquarters of Gassol Local Government Council.
Electoral Violence in the 2007 General Elections, South-South Nigeria
Edo State
Several deaths and incidents of violent intimidation were reported in Edo State
during the elections. Voting on April 12,2007 was violently disrupted by party thugs in
several locations, especially in the state capital, Benin City. An ANPP returning officer
reported that on April 19, 2007 three ANPP members of his escort were killed outside the
collation centre at Ehor, the headquarter of Uhunmwode local government, while he was
inside, but the identity of the perpetrators was not confirmed. Later that same night, he
refused to sign the result sheets, because he had received a message that results had
already been announced in Benin City, even though the votes were still being counted in
the collation centre. In an interview with TMG, (2007:9), the returning officer stated thus:
96
I wrote, I disagree with the result and I signed.
That’s when everything went wild. The INEC
official yelled at me, asking me: “how could you do
this to us?” A soldier came and pointed a gun at me.
Other ANPP supporters were waiting outside,
monitoring and making sure I was safe. There was
shouting and then we heard repeated rapid gunshots
from outside; everyone including my driver ran
away, so I was left alone.
The same ANPP agent who escaped the above incident unharmed told TMG
(2007:11) that he witnessed the killing of an ANPP youth leader called Obadiarho in
Oredo local government:
We heard gunshots from where the voting
was taking place. As we drove closer, we
saw people running away. We stopped. We
were scared to move forward. Someone who
was shot was still running. He fell down and
others came to rescue him. I drove back to
look for mobile police who were supposed
to be guarding, but they were nowhere to be
found. Before he (Obadiarho] died a few
minutes later, he said “the military killed
me. The same witness told TMG that Sgt.
Ofabuo Khen, a police officer who had been
sympathetic to ANPP complaints about the
elections, was also killed on May 3,2007
However, in a separate interview with the Transition Monitoring Group (2007),

the ANPP governorship candidate in Edo State reported that four ANPP members were
killed at Anegbette in Estako Central local government area in a dispute with security
agents over access to the collation centre. A PDP official claimed that violence had also
been committed by ANPP supporters against PDP supporters in Edo State. He gave the
example of an attack in Irrua, in Esan central local government, in which two PDP
supporters were killed by ANPP supporters, during elections for members of the National
Assembly. Another source reported that in Estako West local government, a former PDP
local government chairman was beaten by ANPP supporters. This angered PDP
supporters who started shooting into the air, and reportedly killed one of their own group
by accident(TMG,2007). In Edo State, protests came over the way the primaries were
97
conducted. Matthew Uroghide who lost to Ehigie Uzamere in Edo south alleged that he
won, while Theo Okoh and Onikolease Irabor both claimed victory in Edo Central as
they alleged that the announced winner, Herberta Okonfua rigged the election. There
were also protests from House of Representatives and State House of Assembly aspirants
(Aliu, 2011:65).
Electoral Violence in other South-South States
States in the South-South were equally engulfed in electoral violence. Thus in
Akwa-Ibom, political campaigns took destructive dimension when both Ikot-Ekpene and
Uyo were turned into theatres of political war. The face-off was between loyalists of the
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). The
ACN had its gubernatorial campaign rally at Ikot-Ekpene while the PDP had its own in
Mkpat Enin and Abak Local Councils at Uyo. Different versions of the cases of the
quarrel were advanced, but, it was certain that the quarrel took place between the
supporters of ACN and those of the PDP which resulted into the death of fifteen people
while many were wounded. The presidential campaign office of Goodluck
Jonathan/Namadi Sambo situated along Abak Road was set ablaze. 127 Peugeot, 307
Salon Cars and 157 Keke NAPEP tri cycles belonging to the state government were
burnt. 20 vehicles belonging to well meaning Nigerians were equally burnt at different
locations. About 51 suspects were arrested in connection with the political violence at
Uyo (Akpan-Nsoh, 2011:22 and 23). Akwa-Ibom is also a place where a Diaspora
aspirant had his mother brutally assassinated.
Electoral violence in Cross River has been on the low side as there were no
reported cases of politically motivated killings. However, at Ugep, there was violence
and some people were injured and cars destroyed while guns were used freely. The
violence led to the arrest of one of the aspirants to the Federal House of Representatives,
Mr Patrick Okomiso and the incumbent member, Chief Bassey Ewa.
Electoral Violence in the South-West

In Ondo State, three people were shot dead in Obanla area with four people
reportedly injured in Iro street in a clash between supporters of the Peoples Democratic
Party (PDP) and the ruling Labour Party (LP). The electoral violence and irregularities
98
that marred the election at Ondo State prompted the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)
to submit a 47 page petition to the election tribunal in Akure seeking a rerun of the
election. Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had
already declared the Labour Party (LP) candidate, Rapheal Nomiye as winner in the
National Assembly election. The ACN claimed in a petition EPT/ODS/NAE/HR/2/2011
that the election was marred by violence, unprecedented irregularities, voters intimidation
and various instances of ballot snatching in two riverine councils of Ilaje and Ese-Odo
which made up the constituency (TMG, 2011).
In Ado-Ekiti, the Ekiti State Capital, two supporters of the PDP identified as Ayo
Kehinde Faluyi and Michael Ipindola were killed by assassins dressed in police uniform
during a brawl between the supporters of the PDP and the ruling Action Congress of
Nigeria (ACN). The clash in Ado-Ekiti caused pandemonium as the corpse of one of the
casualties, Ayo Michael was dropped at the Governor’s office by protesting members of
the PDP in the state. Ogun State had before the elections thrown itself into a confused
state by presenting two controversial lists of candidates to the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC), Adetunji Olurin and Gboyega Isiaka. However during the
campaign, no fewer than two people died in a clash between supporters of the
governorship candidate of the Labour Party (LP) and commercial motorcyclists. In Osun
state, the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) accused Elijah Adewale,
Governor Babatunde Fashola’s Special Adviser of leading hooligans from Lagos State to
Osun State to foment trouble during the National Assembly election. It was pointed out
that the assignment of the immigrants was to scare the electorate from performing their
civic rights(CLO,2011). The squad being sponsored by the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN) in the state was allegedly spearheaded by Prince Sola Adewumi, Dr Elijah
Adewale, Dr Gbenga Ogunleye, Chairman, Care Taker committee of Obokun and Taiwo
Fatiregun, Caretaker Chairman, Oriade Local Government. This could not be far from the
truth as six members of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) were later arrested and
arraigned at the magistrate court at Osogbo over alleged arson and political violence.
Electoral Violence in 2011 General Elections
In the 2011 general elections, electoral violence was more prominent in the
Northern states. However, most of the empirical cases of electoral violence were post
99
election violence in nature. Most of the victims of the electoral violence were members of
the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) who were drafted to participate in the conduct
of the elections in various parts of the country. The corps members were butchered like
animals by rioters. They have been become known as the “NYSC 10”. The Corpers
include Adewuni Paul (Ekiti), Okeoma Okechukwu Chibudom (Imo), Ukazeone
Amsalem Chukwunonyere (Imo), Olawale Tosin (Kogi), Akonye Ibrahim Sule (Kogi),
Gbenjo Ebenezar Ayotunde (Osun), Adeniyi Kehide Jelil (Osun), Anyanwu Agnes (Imo),
Okpo Kori Obina (Imo) and Adohe Elliot (Beyelsa). In a bid to assuage the families of
the victims, the president decided to pay a compensation of #5 million each to their
families. According to the then inspector General of police, Hafiz Ringim, the cost of the
2011 elections was alarming, 520 persons were killed, six policemen, 157 churches, 46
mosques, 1435 houses were burnt, 437 vehicles, 219 motor cycles and 45 property
belonging to the police were burnt, 22,141 persons become internally displaced in
Kaduna state, 77 persons injured, 987 shops burnt. Besides this cost, the country spent a
total sum of #89 billion to conduct the elections. (CLO,2011; TMG,2011)
From the analysis so far, it is clear that electoral violence has almost become an
institutionalized culture in Nigeria politics, and the nature, scope and pattern of electoral
violence have also been changing and becoming more sophisticated. What emerged from
the picture so far in Nigeria’s electoral violence has been that the party in power do not
at any time want to accept defeat from the opposition. Hence, all the instances cited in the
thesis point to this direction, which confirmed the assumption that African political
leadership hate opposition. In addition, as long as the state still remains the major
distributor of wealth to public office holders, electoral violence will continue to play
dysfunctional roles in Nigeria’s democratic project. In addition, the rising rate of
unemployment of youths in the country has continued to pose danger to any attempt at
ensuring credible elections in the country. Furthermore, as long as the premium placed on
wealth, status and affluence remain high, and access to public office serve as viable
means for wealth acquisition, elections to public office in the country will unfortunately
be violent ridden.
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Summary of Reviewed Literature
In this chapter, the researcher examined related literature on the meaning and
relevance of election to any democratic country in the world and the causes of electoral
violence in Nigeria. In discussing the causes of electoral violence in Nigerian politics,
issues such as ethnicity and regionalism, the nature of the electoral process, the place of
political elite in the democratic process, the structural imbalance of the Nigerian state, the
role of electoral management bodies, the media, the place of Godfatherism and the nature
and dynamics of the Nigerian state, including the place of voters’ education and
enlightenment were carefully examined. Furthermore, an excursion into the history of
politically and election related violence in Nigerian politics were discussed. In reviewing
the extant literature on electoral violence in Nigeria, one obvious observation that
emerged was that most of the scholarly works on election violence stressed the causes of
electoral violence without empirically looking at how these variables affect Nigeria’s
democracy. The thrust of this thesis was therefore to bridge this gap. This was done by
empirical examination of how the variables discussed in the literature review have
impacted on Nigeria’s democracy with particular reference on the Fourth Republic.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Bearing in mind the importance of theories in research as a result of the roles they
play in providing explanations to social and political phenomena, no meaningful research
can be undertaken in the absence of a sound theoretical base, hence the need for a theory
of explanation in every research endeavour. For the purpose of this thesis, the Marxian
political economy theory, premised on dialectical and historical materialism was adopted.
The Marxian political economy theory owes its origin to the works of Karl Marx,
Federick Engels and Lenin. Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) are
the creators of what they called "scientific socialism".Karl Marx continued to develop his
thought in collaboration with German thinker Friedrich Engels and published various
works, of which the two most well-known are the 1848 pamphlet The Communist
Manifesto and the three-volume Das Kapital. Lenin’s work called “Leninism” comprises
socialist political and economic theories, developed from Marxism,
andLenin's interpretations of Marxist theories, for practical application to the socio-
political conditions of the Russian Empire of the early 20th century.There work has since
101
influenced subsequent intellectual, economic and political history. The subject matter of
Marxian political economy is the production (economic) relations between people. These
include the forms of ownership of the means of production, the position of the various
classes and the social groups in production and their interrelations and the forms of
distribution of the national wealth. Marxism is based on a materialist understanding of
societal development, taking as its starting point, the necessary economic activities
required by human society to provide for their material needs. The form of economic
organization, or mode of production, is understood to be the basis from which the
majority of other social phenomena including social relations, political and legal systems,
morality and ideology arise. These social relations form the superstructure, for which the
economic system forms the base. As the forces of production (most notably technology)
improve, existing forms of social organization become inefficient and stifle further
progress. These inefficiencies manifest themselves as social contradictions in the form of
class struggle (Tucker,1961).
As Hegel,(1953) observed:
At a certain stage of the development, of the material

productive forces of society come into conflict with the
existing relations of production, the forms of
development of the productive forces turn into their
fetters. These inefficiencies manifest themselves as social
contradictions in society in the form of class struggle.
Under the capitalist mode of production, this struggle
materializes between the minority (the bourgeoisie) who
own the means of production, and the vast majority of the
population (the proletariat) who produce goods and
services. Taking the idea that social change occurs
because of the struggle between different classes within
society who are under contradiction against each other,
leads the Marxist analysis to the conclusion that
capitalism exploits and oppresses the proletariats.
According to Nikitin (1983), political economy, clarifies the laws governing production,
distribution, exchange and consumption of the material wealth in human society at
various stages of its development. According to Lenin (1977) it is not production that
political economy deals, but with the social relations of men in production with the social
102
system of production. Marxian method of political economy is dialectical materialism
which according to Nikitin (1983) presupposes
The investigation of the production relations in

the process of their emergence and development,
the consideration of this process as an objective
reality and the revelation of the internal
contradictions of development inherent in social
production.
Accordingly, the system of economic production is the foundation on which the

institutional and ideological superstructure of society is built. In other words, man’s
material condition alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external
world. The significance of the Marxian political economy is that it provides the working
class and all working people with a knowledge of the laws governing the economic
development of society and allows them to fulfil successfully, the task facing
them.According to Iain (1996) the concern of the classical political economists was to
identify the social classes which comprise society, define the economic relationships
between these classes and discover the laws which regulate these relationship. The
structure of society is thereby conceptualized on the basis of an understanding of its
economic foundation. As an approach, Ake (2005:1) sees political economy as a method
which gives primacy to material condition, particularly economic factors in the
explanation of social life.
For liberal theorists, the market lies at the centre of economic life. Economic
progress results from the interaction of diverse individuals pursuing their ends. Scholars
use the term political economy to refer to a set of questions generated by the interactions
of economics and political activities, questions that are to be explored with whatever
theoretical and methodological means that are readily available. According to Sodaro
(2007:344),
political economy is the study of how people

pursue collective economic goals and deal with
conflicts over resources and other economic
factors in an authoritative way by means of
government .
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In other words, political economy is about the relationship between the economy and the
State and about the various ways people try to use the State to improve their economic
welfare. As a result of the fact that economic transactions and political activity go on all
the time, the relationship between politics and economics is frequently interactive. That is
economic variables affect political variables which in turn affect economic variables and
so on.A central purpose of political economy is to clarify these interacting relationships.
One of the most important of these relationships is the relationship between States and
markets. Such terms as “markets” “the market economy” and “market forces” refer
mainly to the private sector. They apply broadly to the production, buying and selling of
goods and services by private companies or individuals with prices and salaries
determined largely by the forces of supply and demand rather than by government fiat.
Political economy examines such questions as how do government policies affect market
forces and vice versa.
Having examined the major thrust of the Marxian political economy theory, its
relevance to explaining electoral violence in Nigeria politics can now be closely looked
at. In applying the theory to understand electoral violence and sustainable democracy in
Nigeria politics, one has to understand the role the Nigerian State plays in the nation’s
economy. The Nigerian State plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of
the underdevelopment of private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the State as a
primary instrument of accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development
process, the Nigerian State is a major owner of the means of production. Buoyed by the
expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the State effectively dominated all aspects of
the national political economy (Jega, 2000:30). This made the State not only the biggest
spender of resources but also the largest employer of labour. As noted by Joseph
(1991:56), the expansion of petroleum production and the resultant increased revenues
heightened the centrality of the State as the locus of the struggle for resources for
personal advancement and group security. Under this circumstance, access to the State
becomes a platform for primitive accumulation. Ake (1996:23) captures the immensity
and the ubiquity of State power under this situation when he observes that, the State is
everywhere and its power appears boundless. There is hardly any aspect of life in which
104
the State does not exercise power and control. That makes the capture of State power
singularly important.
This character of the Nigerian State encourages clientele politics which, according
to Huntington (1997:378), exists where the State controls opportunities for commerce and
a wide range of jobs in the academics, administrative and legal fields. Within this
context, politics means more than competition for political power but assumes the
character of a desperate struggle for positions in the bureaucracy or for access to those
who have influence over government decisions (Leeds, 1981:353). Arising from the
profitability of State power for primitive accumulation, the struggle for State power is
reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elites. In this struggle, commitment to
public service and ethics of governance becomes secondary (Egwu, 2005). Thus, political
(State) power does not only represent the license to wealth, it is also the means to security
and the only guarantor of general well-being (Ake, 2001:7). It is within this context of
the dominant role of the State in the political economy that one can explain the
desperation of Nigerians’ governing elites for State power as evident in the brazen
manipulation of the electoral process, many times with impunity.
Given the focus of the subject matter of electoral violence in Nigeria in the
context of a struggle to secure or retain political power in democratic political
environment, the theory primarily focuses on material or economic aspects of society. In
other words, dialectical materialism is premised on the issue of man’s inherent
motivations of economic pursuits and needs. Thus, man’s fierce inclinations and
struggles to acquire, control and maintain political power at all cost justify the choice of
the theory. Economic issues according to Marx, are the major or primary causes of
tension and violence in all societies. Thus, the relations between people in the production
processes are symbiotically connected with the nature and direction of the political
struggles to capture political power in order to determine economic factors.
A practical relevant way by which the political economy theory was applied to
our study is that in the construction of our questionnaire, care was taken to ensure that the
questions were such that relate to the interplay between economic and political factors
and forces. Of course, bearing in mind that this study is guided by the political economy
theory framework we had earlier statedour hypotheses in ways that relate to the interplay
105
of economic and political forces.In other words, the relevance of this theory in the
explanation of electoral violence in Nigeria lies in the fact that in contemporary times, the
economic system of most societies, especially in developing countries, Nigeria inclusive
is regulated by the political system; hence the competition for the control of the political
space is high. This is because, who controls the State power, equally controls the
economic resources of such country and its production and distribution. Based on this,
the fierce struggle to win election and control State apparatuses and invariably exploit the
situation for personal economic gains and advantage sparks off the roots of all electoral
violence in Nigeria. This has implications for the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic. It should be noted however that in the developed World, those who go
into politics are the least paid. Their purpose is not to make money or wealth, but in
Nigeria and Africa in general, the goal is geared towards primitive accumulation of
wealth.
106
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD
Introduction
The central focus of this chapter is to carefully examine the research method used
in the collection of relevant data and information for the thesis. It took cognizance of the
various techniques used in soliciting for relevant information and data, including the
validity and reliability of the relevant instruments and the specifications of the method of
data analysis.
3.1 Research Design
The study made use of the Ex Post-Facto research design, with the survey
research method. The survey method of data collection focused mostly on empirical
observations of political and social phenomena in social sciences researches. The survey
research method uses the techniques similar to those used in pure sciences in the quest for
information and the acquisition of relevant empirical data for the study of any problem of
interest to the researcher. It was in the light of the above reasoning that Obasi (1999:62),
opined that survey research design can be descriptive or historical, it is historical when it
evaluates and explain past events for the purpose of gaining clearer understanding of the
present and making a more reliable predictions of the future; and its is descriptive, when
it tries to unravel major elements and characteristics of any phenomenon. The survey
method of data collection was applied in the study because it is only the method best
suited for the collection of data from a sample of a chosen population of any study, which
was applicable in the study. In the social sciences, the survey method had been applied by
scholars to obtain first hand information in empirical studies.
3.2.1 Population of the Study.
The population of any study is usually made up of all the relevant and intrinsic
characteristics that the researcher is interested in studying. The population for this study
was made up of all the registered voters in the 2011 general elections in the two states
selected for the study. The registered voters in Delta state was put at 1,950,008, while
107
that of Oyo state was 2,169,719. This population was made up of both adult male and
female from the age of 18 and above from the study states.
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques
The researcher made use of the stratified sampling technique to obtain data and
relevant information for the study. The sample size used for the study was made up of
1,800 (one thousand eight hundred) selected subjects from the two states under
consideration. Eight hundred (800) was selected from Delta state, while one thousand
(1000) was selected from Oyo state. From the selected sample size, generalizations were
made about the opinions of the entire population of the registered voters from the two
states on electoral violence and its implication for democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic. The subjects selected comprised of civil society organization groups, civil
servants, coalition of political parties, youth organizations/associations, party members,
women groups/leaders, traditional rulers and the general public from the ages of 18years
and above.
3.4 Sources of Data and the techniques of data Collection.
The main avenues through which data and information were gathered for this
study were made up of primary and secondary sources. The primary data for this study
were personally sourced by the researcher with his field assistants carefully selected from
the two states, while the secondary data and information were obtained from documented
sources already put in place by scholars in the field of study. The questionnaire was used
to gather primary data for the study. The designed questionnaire contained both close and
open ended questions in which relevant questions dealing with the topic were asked from
the respondents or sampled subjects. The questionnaire contained a wide range of
questions and possible answers to choose from. In addition, the open ended questions
were also drawn up to enable the respondents to freely give their opinion on the issues
under consideration. This choice was provided for the respondents to enable them, as
participant observers of the electoral process to freely contribute reasonably to issues that
are outside the questionnaires that were administered to them, but important in shaping
the quality of information needed for the study.
108
The questionnaire was divided into sections A, B and C. Section A was designed
to elicit personal data as age, sex, educational qualifications, while Section B was used to
obtain general information on electoral violence in Nigeria. Section C questions were
designed from which the researcher obtained three questions with which the hypotheses
for the study were tested. The secondary sources of data were derived from textbooks,
journals, seminar papers as well as internet printouts.
3.5 Administration of Data Collection Instrument
The administration of the data collection instrument was carried out by the
researcher and his field assistants in each of the two States chosen for the study in the
gathering of data and necessary information for the thesis. The questionnaires were
personally administered to the respondents with the assistance of the researcher’s field
assistants chosen from the two States to represent the population and dominant local
languages spoken by the people.
The use of the field assistants was to facilitate the distribution and the collection
of the questionnaires from the selected respondents. In addition, since the field assistants
were taken from the area, and also understand the local languages of the people and the
sampled groups, this reduced the problem of interpreting the questions to some of the
respondents. Furthermore, their choice was also informed by the fact that they are
familiar with the geographical terrain of the areas and this reduced the problems of
transportation and access to the respondents.
3.6 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments
Reliability of Instrument
In order to ensure the reliability of the instrument for the study, the questionnaire was
pre-tested before embarking on a full scale work in order to finalize the design structure
and ensure that the instrument captured the desired data and information. To ensure the
reliability of the quantitative data, the researcher summarized and verified the responses
which came up at the end of the administered questionnaires. In addition, the researcher
cross checked information from other sources and also engaged in meaningful discussion
with the key informants selected for the study. Thus, the researcher was able to minimize
incorrect course with maximum precision.
109
Validity of the Study
In order not to doubt the credibility of the information and data sourced for the
study, attention was paid to the issue of validity. Because of the fact that the researcher
was aware of the potential problems extraneous factors will have on respondents in
giving valid answers to questions during the field work, adequate steps were taken to
ensure confidentiality and neutrality of respondents who were used as sample subjects for
the study. This process gave the sampled subjects, the assurance that they will not be
victimized nor punished for it, hence they freely provided the relevant information
needed for the study
Furthermore, attention was adequately given to the identification of the research

population, data collection methods and techniques, appropriate analytical tools for data
interpretation from where conclusions were drawn up. In addition, the questions drawn
up for the thesis covered all the relevant segments of the variables required for the study.
3.7 Method of Data Analysis
Different instruments are available for measurement of research variables in

political science. This include: tables, simple percentages, graphs, correlation analysis, t-
Test analysis, Chi-square (X2) statistic and the use of Regression and Time series. For the
purpose of this thesis, the researcher made use of tables, Pie Charts, Bar charts and Chi-
square tool for data collected. The Chi-square instrument for data analysis was
formulated by statisticians. Chi-square, usually written as X2,is a statistical instrument
used in the analysis of variables used in empirical research. The choice of the Chi-square
statistical tool was informed by the fact that it has been used in a number of similar and
related studies, with particular reference to election violence across the globe and Nigeria
in particular. Such works includes the researches conducted on electoral violence by
Dauda (2011) in Nigeria, Agba (2011), Alejandro and Carreras (2012). However, the
analysis of data for this thesis was done with tables, Pie charts, Bar charts and Chi-square
(X2) at 0.05 alpha level of significance. The Chi-square statistic is mathematically
expressed thus
110
X2 = ∑ (Fo - Fe)2
Fe
Where
X2 = Measure of the departure of obtained or observed frequencies from expected

frequencies by chance.
∑ = Summation of all observed and expected frequencies.
Fo = Obtained or observed frequencies.
Fe = Expected Frequencies
111
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to carefully examine the impact of
electoral violence on Nigeria’s democracy, with particular reference to the Fourth
Republic, 1999-2011. To do this, three hypotheses were raised and tested.
This chapter analyzed the data collected from the field work for the study. Out of
the one thousand, eight thousand (1,800) questionnaires administered, one thousand,
seven hundred and ninety three (1,793) were duly completed and returned (Delta State
798 and Oyo State 995). This represented approximately 99.7% of the total
questionnaires administered by the researcher.
The following tables showed the responses to the questions asked in section A of
the questionnaire.
4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis
SECTION A Socio-Bio-data
Table 4.1 Summary of Responses Based on Sex
Sex Number Percentages
Male 1,121 62.5%
Female 672 37.5%
Total 1,793 100
Source: Field work 2017
From the results of the data collected, it was found that out of the 1,793 persons
sampled, one thousand, one hundred and twenty one (1,121) constituting approximately
62.5% of the respondents were male, while six hundred and seventy two (672) persons
constituting 37.5% were female.
112
A pie chart showing percentage of responses based on sex is presented in Figure 4.1a
37.5
62.5
Male
Famle
Figure 4.1a: Sex Percentage Distribution

Sources, Field Work: 2017
Table 4.2: Summary of Responses Based on Age

Age Number Percentages
18- 28 years 147 8.2%
29 – 39 years 567 31.6%
40 – 50 years 475 26.5%
50 – Above 604 33.7%
Total 1,793 100
Source:: Field work 2017
From the table above, it was discovered that 147 persons, constituting approximately
8.2% of the sampled population falls within the age bracket of 18 -28 years; 567 persons
constituting 31.6% falls within the age bracket of 29 – 39 years and 475 persons
constituting approximately 26.5% falls within the age bracket of 40–
40 50 years and 604
falls within the age bracket of 50 years and above.
persons constituting 33.7% falls
113
Figure 4.2a Age Bracket Frequency Distribution
35
30
25
20
Base on Age
15
10
0
18-28 years 29-39 years 40-50 years 50 - above
Sources, FieldWork:2017
Figure 4.2b Age Bracket Percentage Distribution
8.2
33.7
18-28 yrs
31.6 29 - 39 yrs
40 - 50 yrs
50 above
26.5
Sources, Field Work:2017
114
Table 4.3 Summary of Responses Based on Group/Designation
Designation/cadre/group Number
Percentages
Delta Oyo Total
Civil Society Organizations 151 170 321 8.4% 9.5%
Civil /public servants 125 167 292 7.0% 9.3%

120 160 280 6.7% 8.9%
Women Groups
Coalition of Political Parties 162 173 335 9.2% 9.6%
Traditional/Community Leaders 115 165 280 6.4% 9.0%
Youth Organizations 125 160 285 7.3% 6.7%
Total 798 995 1,793 45% 55%

From the above data, it was discovered that 321 members of the sampled population,
constituting aggregately 17.9% of the population were members of civil society
organizations sampled from Delta and Oyo states, 292 respondents constituting
aggregately 16.3% of the sampled population were civil /public servants sampled from
both states, 280 respondents constituting aggregately 15.6% were from the women
groups from Delta and Oyo states, 335 respondents constituting aggregately 18.8% were
sampled from coalitions of political parties from both Delta and Oyo states. On the other
hand, 280 persons constituting aggregately 15.4% were from the traditional/community
leaders group sampled from both Delta and Oyo states, 285 respondents constituting
aggregately 14% were members of youth organizations, sampled from both states.
115
Figure 4.3a: Designation Frequency Distribution of respondents from Delta and Oyo
states
10
6 civil society organizations

civil/public servants
5
women group
4 coalition of political parties

Traditional Leaders
3
Youth Organisations
0
1 2 3 4
Sources, Field Work: 2017
Figure 4.3b: Designation Percentage Distribution of respondents from Delta state
civil society organisations
7.3 8.4 civil/public servants
women groups
6.4 7.0
Coalition of Political Parties
9.2 6.7
Traditiaonal Leaders/Community
Leaders
Youth Organisations
116
Source, Fieldwork:2017
Figure 4.3c: Designation of Percentage Distribution of respondents from Oyo States
civil society organisations
6.7 9.5 civil /public servants
women groups
9.0 9.3
Coalition of Political parties
traditional leaders/community
9.6 8.9
leaders
youth organisations
Source, Filed Work: 2017
Table 4.4 Summary of Responses Based on Academic Qualifications

Qualifications Number Percentages
WASSC/NECO 127 7.1%
OND/NCE/DIP 493 27.5%
HND/B.SC/B.ED/B.A 751 41.9%
M.Sc/M.A/M.ED/Ph.D/ other 422 23.5%
professional degrees
TOTAL 1,793 100%
Sources:: Field work 2017
showed that 127 respondents constituting 7.1% of the sampled

The table above showed
population possessed the Senior School Secondary certificates.
certificate 493 respondents
constituting approximately 27.5% of the sampled population possessed Ordinary
National Certificates, while 751 persons constituting 41.9% of the sampled population
possessed First degree Certificates and 422 persons constituting approximately 23.5% of
postgraduate degree Certificates.
the sample population possessed post
117
Figure 4.4a: Educational Qualification Frequency Distribution
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 4.4b: Academic Qualification Percentage Distribution
7.1
27.5 SSCE/NECO
27.5 OND/NCE
HND/B.SC/B.ED
M.Sc/M.P.A/Ph.D/other
41.9
professional degrees
118
Table: 4.5 Summary of Responses to Question 18
The nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state as the main controller of the economy is a
major source of electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Responses Number Percentages
Strongly agree 1,038 57.9%
Agree 710 39.6%
Undecided 2 0.1%
Strongly disagree 26 1.4%
Disagree 17 1.0%
Total 1,793 100
From the above table it was established that 1,038 respondents, constituting
approximately 57.9% of the sampled population strongly agreed with the assertion that
the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state promote electoral violence. While, 710
respondents constituting approximately
approximately 39.6% also agreed; 2 persons were undecided,
while 26 respondents constituting 1.4% strongly disagreed and 17 respondents
constituting approximately 1.0% equally disagreed
Figure 4.5a:
a: Responses to Research Question 18
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Strongly Agree Agree Strongly Disagree Undecided
Disagree
119
Figure 4.5b:
b: Percentage Distribution.
1.0
1.4 0.1
Strongly Agree
Agree
39.6 Strongly Disagree
57.9
Disagree
Undecided
Source, Field Work: 2017
Table 4.6 Summary of Responses to Question 19

Electoral violence is a major impediment to democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Agree 700 39.0%
Undecided 3 0.2%
Disagree 38 2.1%
Total 1,793 100%
The table above established that 1,024 respondents constituting 57.1% of the sampled
population asserted that electoral violence is a major impediment to democracy in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, while 700 respondents constituting approximately 39.0%, also
agree; 3 were undecided; 28 respondents, constituting approximately 1.6% strongly
disagreed and 38 respondents constituting 2.1% disagree.
120
Figure 4.6a:: Frequency Responses to Research Question 19
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
Figure 4.6b:
b: Percentage Distribution
2.0 1.6 0.3
Strongle Agree
39.0
Agree
Strongly Disagree
57.1 Disagree
Undecided
FieldWork:201
121
Table 4.7 Summary of Responses to Question 20
The Increasing electoral violence between 1999
1999-2011
2011 have negative impact on the
Agree 645 36.0%
Undecided 6 0.5%
Disagree 17 0.9%
Total 1,793 100%
From the above table, it was found out that 1,110 respondents constituting 61.8% of the
sampled population strongly agree that increasing electoral violence has been the bane of
successful democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. 645 constituting
constitut
approximately 36.0% of the respondents also agree. On the other hand, 6 respondents
were undecided. 15 respondents constituting approximately 0.8% strongly disagree, while
17 respondents constituting approximately 0.9% disagree with the assertion that intense
electoral violence has been the bane of successful democratization process in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic.
Figure 4.7a: Frequency Distribution to Research Question 20
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
122
Figure 4.7b:
b: Percentage Frequency Distribution
0.9 0.8 0.5
Strongly Agree
36.0 Agree
Strongly Disagreeq
61.8 Disagree
Undecided
Table 4.8: Summary of Responses

Response to Question 24
Poverty and unemployment among youths, is a major source of electoral violence in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
Agree 648 36.1%
Undecided 5 0.3%
Disagree 18 1.0%
Total 1,793 100%
The table above established that 1,101 respondents constituting approximately 61.4% of
the sampled population strongly agreed with the assertion that poverty and
unemployment of youths, is a major source of electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic. 648 constituting approximately 36.1% of the respondents equally agree, while
5 respondents representing 0.3% were undecided. On the other hand, 21 and 18
respondents constituting approximately 1.2% and 1.0% respectively were of the opinion
123
that acute poverty and unemployment of youths, is not a major source of electoral
violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Figure 4.8a:
a: Frequency Distribution
Di
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
4.8b
b Percentage Frequency Distribution
1.2 1.0 0.3
Strongly Agree
Agree
36.1
Strongly Disagree
61.4 Disagree
Undecided
124
Table 4.9: Summary of Responses to Question 25
Unabated corruption is a major factor in electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
Agree 609 33.9%
Undecided 3 0.2%
Disagree 11 0.6%
Total 1,793 100%
From the table above, it was discovered that 1,151 respondents constituting
approximately 64.2% of the sampled population strongly agree with the assertion that
Unabated corruption is a major factor in electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
609 respondents constituting approximately 34.0% equally agree. On the t other hand, 19
and 11 respondents constituting approximately 1.0% and 0.6% respectively strongly
disagree and disagreed, while 3 respondents were undecided.
Figure 4.9a: Frequency Distribution
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Disagree
125
Figure 4.9b: Percentage Frequency Distribution
1.1 0.6 0.2
Strongly Agree
34.0 Agree
Strongly Disagree
61.4 Disagree
Undecided
SECTION B
4.3 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES
TESTING OF STATED HYPOTHESES FOR RESPONDENTS IN DELTA STATE
Hypothesis I
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and
To test this hypothesis, responses to question number 18 in the questionnaire were

presented below and analysed with Chi-Square(X
Chi 2
cal technique and interpreted.
) statistical
126
TABLE 4.10: Observed Frequencies (FO) (5X6) Contingency Table
Responses Civil Coalition Civil/pu Youth Women Tradition Row %

Societ of blic organiza groups al/commu Total
y political servants tions nity
organi parties leaders
zation (E)
s (B) (C) (D) (F)
(A)
Strongly 83 60 50 80 55 79 407 51%

agree
Agree 49 57 61 66 50 62 345 43.2%
Undecided 2 1 0 1 1 3 8 1.0%
Strongly 12 3 2 3 2 2 24 3.0%
disagree
Disagree 2 1 2 7 1 1 14 1.8%
Total 148 122 115 157 109 147 798 100
Source: Field work.2017
Step 1: Calculation of Expected Frequencies (Fe)

(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe
Expected Frequency =Row Total x Column Total

Grand Total
Let: 1-30 Represent Row Total
While: A-F Represents Column Total
Cell 1= 407 x 148 = 75.5

798
Cell 2 = 407 x 122 = 62.2

798
Cell 3 = 407 x 115 = 58.7

798
Cell 4 = 407 x 157 = 80.1

798
127
Cell 5 =407 x 109 = 55.6
798
Cell 6 = 407 x 147 = 74.9

798
Cell 7 =345 x 148 = 63.9

798
Cell 8 = 345 x 122 = 52.7

798
Cell 9= 345 x 115 = 49.7

798
Cell 10 = 345 x 157 = 67.9

798
Cell 11 = 345 x 109= 47.1

798
Cell 12 = 345 x 147 = 63.6

798
Cell 13 = 8 x 148 = 1.5

798
Cell 14 = 8 x 122 = 1.2

798
Cell 15 = 8 x 115 = 1.2

798
Cell 16 = 8 x 157 = 1.6

798
Cell 17 = 8 x 109 = 1.1

798
Cell 18 = 8 x 147= 1.5

798
Cell 19 = 24 x 148 = 4.6

798
128
Cell 20 = 24 x 122 = 3.7
798
Cell 21 = 24 x 115= 3.6

798
Cell 22 = 24 x 157 = 4.7

798
Cell 23 = 24 x 109= 3.3

798
Cell 24 = 24 x 147 = 4.4

798
Cell 25 = 14 x 148 = 2.6

798
Cell 26 = 14 x 122 = 2.1

798
Cell 27 = 14 x 115 = 2.0

798
Cell 28 = 14 x 157 = 2.6

798
Cell 29 = 14 x 109 = 1.9

798
Cell 30 = 14 x 147= 2.6

798
TABLE 4.11: Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x2)
CELLS F0 Fe (F0 – Fe) (F0 –F e )2 (F0 - Fe)2
Fe
1 83 75.5 7.5 56.3 0.7
2 60 62.2 2.2 4.8 0.1
3 50 58.7 8.7 75.7 1.3
129
4 80 80.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
5 55 45.6 9.4 88.4 1.9
6 79 71.9 6.9 47.6 0.7
7 49 63.9 -14.9 222.0 3.5
8 57 52.7 4.3 18.5 4.3
9 61 49.7 11.3 127.7 2.6
10 60 67.9 -7.9 62.4 7.9
11 50 47.1 2.9 8.4 0.2
12 62 53.6 8.4 70.6 1.3
13 2 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.2
14 1 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.5
15 - 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2
16 1 1.6 -0.4 0.2 0.1
17 1 1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
18 3 1.5 1.5 2.3 1.5
19 12 4.6 7.4 54.8 11.9
20 3 1.7 1.3 1.7 0.9
21 2 3.6 -1.6 2.3 0.6
22 3 4.7 -1.3 1.7 0.4
130
23 2 3.3 -1.3 10.9 3.3
24 2 4.4 -2.4 5.8 1.3
25 2 2.6 -0.6 0.3 0.1

26 1 2.1 -1.1 1.2 0.6
27 2 2.0 0 0 0.0
28 7 2.6 4.4 19.4 7.4
29 1 1.9 0.9 0.8 0.4
30 1 2.6 1.4 2.0 0.7
Total 798 798 55.7
Source, FieldWork:2017
Degree of Freedom (Df) = (r-l) (c-1) = (No of Rows - 1) x (No of columns - 1)

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20
Step 3: Research Decision at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated x2 value = 55.7
Critical x2 value = 31.41
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
Step 4: Research Result/Interpretation and Decision.
The calculated value X2 of 55.7 is higher than that of the critical X2 value of 31.41 at an
alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a
significant relationship between the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and
electoral violence in Delta State, Nigeria.
131
Hypothesis II
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in


presented below and analysed with Chi-square(X2) statistical technique and interpreted.

zation (E)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (F)
Strongly 80 60 61 75 55 70 401 57%

agree
Agree 52 57 50 71 50 71 351 39%
Undecided 2 1 0 1 1 3 8 0.3%
Strongly 2 3 2 5 4 2 18 1.6%
disagree
Disagree 12 1 2 3 1 1 20 2.1%
Total 148 122 115 157 109 147 798 100

(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe

Grand Total
Cell 1= 401 x 148 = 74.5

798
Cell 2 = 401 x 122 = 61.3

798
132
Cell 3 = 401 x 115 = 57.8
798
Cell 4 = 401 x 157 = 78.9

798
Cell 5 =401 x 109 = 54.8

798
Cell 6 = 401 x 147 = 73.9

798
Cell 7 =351 x 148 = 65.1

798
Cell 8 = 351 x 122 = 53.7

798
Cell 9= 351 x 115 = 50.6

798
Cell 10 = 351 x 157 = 69.1

798
Cell 11 = 351 x 109= 47.9

798
Cell 12 = 351 x 147 = 64.7

798
Cell 13 = 8 x 148 = 1.5

798
Cell 14 = 8 x 122 = 1.2

798
Cell 15 = 8 x 115 = 1.2

798
Cell 16 = 8 x 157 = 1.6

798
Cell 17 = 8 x 109 = 1.1

798
133
Cell 18 = 8 x 147= 1.5
798
Cell 19 = 18 x 148 = 3.3

798
Cell 20 = 18 x 122 = 2.8

798
Cell 21 = 18 x 115= 2.6

798
Cell 22 = 18 x 157 = 3.7

798
Cell 23 = 18 x 109= 2.5

798
Cell 24 = 18 x 147 = 3.3

798
Cell 25 = 18 x 148 = 3.3

798
Cell 26 = 20 x 122 = 3.1

798
Cell 27 = 20 x 115 = 2.9

798
Cell 28 = 20 x 157 = 3.9

798
Cell 29 = 20 x 109 = 2.7

798
Cell 30 = 20 x 147= 3.9

798
134
TABLE 4.13:Step 2: Computation of Chi-square (5x6) Contingency Table Formula (x2)
CELLS F0 Fe (F0 – Fe) (F0 –F e )2(F0 - Fe)2
Fe
1 80 74.5 5.5 30.3 0.4
2 60 61.3 1.7 2.9 0.1
3 61 3.2 10.6 0.2
4 75 78.9 -3.9 15.2 0.2
5 55 44.8 10.2 104.0 2.3
6 70 -3.9 15.2 0.2
7 52 65.1 -13.1 171.6 2.6
8 57 3.3 10.9 0.2
9 50 9.4 88.4 2.2
10 71 61.1 9.9 98.0 1.6
11 50 41.9 8.4 70.6 1.7
12 71 64.7 6.3 39.7 0.6
13 2 0.5 0.3 0.2
14 1 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.5
15 - 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2
16 1 1.6 -0.4 0.2 0.1
17 1 1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
135
18 3 1.5 2.3 1.5
19 2 3.3 -1.3 1.7 0.5
20 3 1.2 1.4 0.5
21 2 -1.4 2.0 0.8
22 5 -1.3 1.7 0.5
23 4 -1.5 2.3 0.9
24 2 -1.3 1.7 0.5
25 12 8.7 75.7 22.9

26 1 -2.1 4.4 1.4
27 2 -0.9 0.8 0.3
28 3 1.9 1.1 1.2 0.6
29 1 2.7 0.9 0.8 0.3
30 1 3.9 -2.9 8.4 2.2
Total 798 798 47.2

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20
Calculated value of X2 = 47.2
Critical Value X2 = 31.41
136
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
The calculated x2 of 47.22 is higher than that of the critical X2 value of 31.41 at an alpha
or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a significant
relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in
Delta State.
Hypotheses III
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and

democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

presented below and analysed with Chi-square(X2) statistical technique and interpreted
Responses Civil Coalition Civil/publ Youth Women Traditiona Row %

Society of political ic servant organizati groups l/communi Total
organi parties ons ty leaders
zation
(A) (B) (C) (E) (F)
(D)
Strongly 87 77 56 86 65 90 461 61.8%
agree
Agree 45 40 55 60 40 51 291 36%
Undecided 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 0.5%
Strongly 3 3 2 5 4 4 21 0.8%
disagree
Disagree 8 1 2 3 5 1 20 0.9%
Total 144 122 115 155 115 147 798 100
(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe

Grand Total
137
While, A-F Represents Column Total
Cell 1= 461 x 144 = 83.2

798
Cell 2 = 461 x 122 = 70.5

798
Cell 3 = 461 x 115 = 66.4

798
Cell 4 = 461 x 155 = 89.5

798
Cell 5 =461 x 115 = 66.4

798
Cell 6 = 461 x 147 = 84.9

798
Cell 7 =291 x 144 = 52.5

798
Cell 8 = 291 x 122 = 41.9

798
Cell 9= 291 x 115 = 56.5

798
Cell 10 = 291 x 155 = 44.5

798
Cell 11 = 291 x 115= 41.9

798
Cell 12 = 291 x 147 = 53.6

798
Cell 13 = 5 x 144 = 0.9

798
Cell 14 = 5 x 122 = 0.7

798
138
Cell 15 = 5 x 115 = 0.7
798
Cell 16 = 5 x 155 = 0.9

798
Cell 17 = 5 x 115 = 0.7

798
Cell 18 = 5 x 147= 0.9

798
Cell 19 = 21 x 144 = 3.8

798
Cell 20 = 21 x 122 = 3.2

798
Cell 21 = 21 x 115= 3.0

798
Cell 22 = 21 x 155 = 4.1

798
Cell 23 = 21 x 115= 3.0

798
Cell 24 = 21 x 147 = 3.9

798
Cell 25 = 20 x 144 = 3.6

798
Cell 26 = 20 x 122 = 3.1

798
Cell 27 = 20 x 115 = 2.9

798
Cell 28 = 20 x 155 = 3.9

798
Cell 29 = 20 x 115 = 2.9

798
139
Cell 30 = 20 x 147= 3.7
798

Fe
1 87 83.2 3.8 14.4 0.2
2 77 70.5 6.5 42.3 0.6
3 56 -10.4 108.2 1.6
4 86 89.5 -3.5 12.3 0.1
5 65 36.4 28.6 817.9 22.5
6 90 5.1 26.0 0.3
7 45 52.5 -7.5 56.3 1.1
8 40 -1.9 3.6 0.1
9 55 -1.5 2.3 0.0
10 60 44.5 15.5 240.3 5.4
11 40 41.9 -1.1 1.2 0.0
12 51 53.6 -2.6 6.8 0.1
13 1 0.1 0.0 0.0
14 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1
15 - 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7
16 1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
140
17 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0
18 1 0.1 0.0 0.0
19 3 3.8 -0.8 0.6 0.2
20 3 -0.2 0.0 0.0
21 2 -1.0 1.0 0.3
22 5 0.9 0.8 0.2
23 4 1.0 1.0 0.3
24 4 0.1 0.0 0.0
25 8 4.4 19.4 5.4

26 1 -2.1 4.4 1.4
27 2 -0.9 0.8 0.3
28 3 3.9 0.9 0.8 0.2
29 5 2.9 2.1 4.4 1.5
30 1 -2.7 7.3 1.9
Total 798 44.5
141
(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20

Calculated X2 value = 44.5
Critical value X2 = 31.4
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
The calculated value of X2 of 44.5 is higher than that of the critical X2 value of 31.41 at
an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a
significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in Delta State.
TESTING OF STATED HYPOTHESES FOR RESPONDENTS IN OYO STATE
HypothesisI
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and

presented below and analysed with Chi-Square(X2) statistical technique and interpreted.

zation (E)
s (B) (C) (D) (F)
(A)
Strongly 89 79 70 80 77 79 474 47.6%

agree
142
Agree 61 65 61 79 81 72 419 42.1%
Undecided 2 1 9 5 1 3 20 2.1%
Strongly 11 8 6 4 4 2 35 3.5%
disagree
Disagree 7 14 14 5 2 4 47 4.7%
Total 170 167 160 173 165 160 995 100

(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe
Expected Frequency e = Row Total x Column Total

Grand Total
Cell 1= 474 x 170 = 80.98

995
Cell 2 = 474 x 167 = 79.55

995
Cell 3 = 474 x 160 = 76.22

995
Cell 4 = 474 x 173 = 82.41

995
Cell 5 =474 x 165 = 78.60

995
Cell 6 = 474 x 160 = 76.22

995
Cell 7 =419 x 170 = 71.58

995
Cell 8 = 419 x 167 = 70.32

995
143
Cell 9= 419 x 160 = 67.37
995
Cell 10 = 419 x 173 = 72.85

995
Cell 11 = 419 x 165= 69.48

995
Cell 12 = 419 x 160 = 67.38

995
Cell 13 = 20 x 170 = 3.41

995
Cell 14 = 20 x 167 = 3.35

995
Cell 15 = 20 x 160 = 3.22

995
Cell 16 = 20 x 173 = 3.48

995
Cell 17 = 20 x 165 = 3.32

995
Cell 18 = 20 x 160= 3.22

995
Cell 19 = 35 x 170 = 5.98

995
Cell 20 = 35 x 167 = 5.87

995
Cell 21 = 35 x 160= 5.63

995
Cell 22 = 35 x 173 = 6.09

995
Cell 23 = 35 x 165= 5.80

995
144
Cell 24 = 35 x 160 = 5.63
995
Cell 25 = 47 x 170 = 8.03

995
Cell 26 = 47 x 167 = 7.89

995
Cell 27 = 47 x 160 = 7.56

995
Cell 28 = 47 x 173 = 8.17

798
Cell 29 = 47 x 165 = 7.79

798
Cell 30 = 47 x 160= 7.56

798

Fe
1 89 80.98 8.11 65.8 0.8
2 79 79.55 -0.55 0.3 0.0
3 70 -6.22 38.7 0.5
4 80 82.41 -2.41 5.8 0.1
5 77 78.60 -1.6 2.6 0.0
6 79 2.78 7.7 0.1
7 61 81.58 -20.58 421.9 5.2
8 65 -5.32 28.3 0.4
9 61 11.63 135.3 2.7
145
10 79 72.85 6.15 37.8 0.5
11 81 69.48 11.52 132.7 1.9
12 72 67.38 4.62 21.3 0.3
13 2 -1.41 2.0 0.6
14 1 3.35 -2.35 5.5 1.7
15 9 3.22 5.78 33.4 10.4
16 5 3.48 1.52 2.3 0.7
17 1 3.32 -2.32 5.4 1.6
18 3 -0.22 0.1 0.0
19 11 5.98 5.02 25.2 4.2
20 8 6.13 35.6 19.0
21 6 0.37 0.1 0.0
22 4 -2.09 4.4 0.7
23 4 -1.8 3.2 0.6
24 2 -3.63 13.2 2.3
25 7 -1.03 1.1 0.1

26 14 11.11 123.4 42.7
27 14 6.44 41.5 5.5
146
28 5 -3.17 10.1 1.2
29 2 7.79 -5.79 33.5 4.3
30 4 -3.56 12.7 1.7
Total 995 109.9

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
The calculated value of X2 of 109.9 is higher than that of the critical X2 value of 31.41 at
an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a
significant relationship between the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state and
electoral violence in Oyo State, Nigeria.
Hypothesis II
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in


147

y political servant tions nity
zation (E)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (F)
Strongly 80 74 72 89 75 81 471 47.3%

agree
Agree 70 70 59 70 83 70 422 44.2%
Undecided 1 4 4 1 5 3 18 1.8%
Strongly 9 8 6 4 14 7 48 4.7%
disagree
Disagree 7 14 4 5 2 4 36 3.0%
Total 167 170 145 169 179 165 995 100

(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe

Grand Total
While, A-F Represents Column Total
Cell 1= 471 x 167 = 79.05

995
Cell 2 = 471 x 170 = 80.47

995
Cell 3 = 471 x 145 = 68.64

995
Cell 4 = 471 x 169 = 79.99

995
Cell 5 =471 x 179 = 87.73

995
148
Cell 6 = 471 x 165 = 78.12
995
Cell 7 =422 x 167 = 70.82

995
Cell 8 = 422 x 170 = 72.10

995
Cell 9= 422 x 145 = 61.49

995
Cell 10 = 422 x 169 = 71.68

995
Cell 11 = 422 x 179= 83.55

995
Cell 12 = 422 x 165 = 69.97

995
Cell 13 = 18 x 167 = 3.02

995
Cell 14 = 18 x 170 = 3.07

995
Cell 15 = 18 x 145 = 2.62

995
Cell 16 = 18 x 169 = 3.06

995
Cell 17 = 18 x 179 = 3.24

995
Cell 18 = 18 x 165= 2.98

995
Cell 19 = 48 x 167 = 8.05

995
Cell 20 = 48 x 170 = 8.20

995
149
Cell 21 = 48 x 145= 6.99
995
Cell 22 = 48 x 169 = 8.15

995
Cell 23 = 48 x 179= 8.63

995
Cell 24 = 48 x 165 = 7.96

995
Cell 25 = 36 x 167 = 6.04

995
Cell 26 = 36 x 170 = 6.15

995
Cell 27 = 36x 145 = 5.25

995
Cell 28 = 36 x 169 = 6.11

995
Cell 29 = 36 x 179 = 6.47

955
Cell 30 = 36 x 165= 5.97

995
Fe
1 80 79.05 0.95 0.9 0.0
2 74 80.47 -6.47 41.9 0.5
3 72 3.36 11.3 0.2
4 89 79.99 9.01 81.2 1.0
150
5 75 87.73 -12.73 162.1 1.8
6 81 2.88 8.3 0.1
7 70 60.82 9.18 84.3 1.4
8 70 -2.82 8.0 0.1
9 59 17.51 306.6 7.4
10 70 61.68 8.32 69.2 1.1
11 83 73.55 9.45 89.3 1.2
12 70 61.97 8.21 67.4 1.1
13 1 -2.02 4.1 1.4
14 4 3.07 0.93 0.9 0.3
15 4 2.62 1.37 1.9 0.7
16 1 3.06 -2.06 4.2 1.4
17 5 3.24 1.76 3.1 0.9
18 3 0.02 0.0 0.0
19 9 1.05 7.95 63.2 60.2
20 8 6.8 46.2 38.5
21 6 -0.99 2.0 0.1
22 4 -4.15 17.2 2.1
23 14 11.38 129.5 49.4
151
24 7 -0.96 0.9 0.1
25 7 4.96 24.6 12.1

26 14 11.85 140.4 65.3
27 4 1.75 3.1 0.6
28 5 -1.11 1.2 0.2
29 2 6.74 -4.74 22.5 3.3
30 4 -1.97 3.9 0.7
Total 995 253.3

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
The calculated value of X2 of 253.3 is higher than that of the critical X2 value of 31.41
at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a
significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic as shown in Oyo State.
152
Hypotheses III
Ho: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and

democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic


y political servant tions nity
zation (E)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (F)
Strongly 65 94 82 90 73 71 475 47.3%

agree
Agree 95 50 49 69 85 70 418 44.2%
Undecided - - 2 3 3 3 11 1.8%
Strongly 9 8 6 6 10 7 46 4.7%
disagree
Disagree 10 12 4 5 6 8 45 3.0%
Total 179 164 143 173 177 159 995 100

(x2) = Σ (Fo - Fe) 2
Fe
Expected Frequency e = Row Total x Column Total

Grand Total
Cell 1= 475 x 179 = 85.45

995
Cell 2 = 475 x 164 = 78.29

995
153
Cell 3 = 475 x 143 = 68.27
995
Cell 4 = 475 x 173 = 82.58

995
Cell 5 =475 x 177 = 84.49

995
Cell 6 = 475 x 159 = 75.90

995
Cell 7 =418 x 179 = 75.19

995
Cell 8 = 418 x 164 = 68.89

995
Cell 9= 418 x 143 = 60.07

995
Cell 10 = 418 x 173 = 72.68

995
Cell 11 = 418 x 177= 74.36

995
Cell 12 = 418 x 159 = 66.79

995
Cell 13 = 11 x 179 = 1.97

995
Cell 14 = 11 x 164 = 1.81

995
Cell 15 = 11 x 143 = 1.58

995
Cell 16 = 11 x 173 = 1.91

995
Cell 17 = 11 x 177 = 1.96

995
154
Cell 18 = 11 x 159= 1.76
995
Cell 19 = 46 x 179 = 8.27

995
Cell 20 = 46 x 164 = 7.58

995
Cell 21 = 46 x 143= 6.61

995
Cell 22 = 46 x 173 = 7.99

995
Cell 23 = 46 x 177= 8.18

995
Cell 24 = 46 x 159 = 7.35

995
Cell 25 = 45 x 179 = 8.09

995
Cell 26 = 45 x 164 = 7.42

995
Cell 27 = 45 x 143 = 6.47

995
Cell 28 = 45 x 173 = 7.82

995
Cell 29 = 45 x 177 = 8.0

955
Cell 30 = 45 x 159= 7.19

995
155
Fe
1 65 85.45 -20.45 418.2 4.9
2 94 78.29 15.71 246.8 3.2
3 82 13.73 188.5 2.8
4 90 82.58 7.42 55.1 0.7
5 93 84.99 8.01 64.2 0.8
6 71 -4.5 20.3 0.3
7 95 75.19 19.81 392.4 5.2
8 50 -18.89 356.8 5.2
9 49 -11.67 136.2 2.2
10 69 72.66 -3.66 13.4 0.8
11 85 74.36 10.64 113.2 1.5
12 70 66.79 3.21 10.3 0.0
13 - -1.98 3.9 1.9
14 - -1.81 -1.81 3.3 1.8
15 2 1.58 0.42 0.2 0.1
16 3 1.91 1.09 1.2 0.6
17 3 1.96 1.04 1.1 0.6
18 3 1.24 1.5 0.9
156
19 9 8.27 0.73 0.5 0.1
20 8 1.39 1.9 0.3
21 6 -1.99 3.9 0.5
22 6 -2.18 4.8 0.6
23 10 7.65 58.5 24.9
24 7 -1.09 1.2 0.5
25 10 2.58 6.7 0.9

26 12 5.53 30.6 4.7
27 4 -3.82 14.6 1.9
28 5 -3.0 9.0 1.1
29 6 8.0 -2.0 4.0 0.5
30 8 0.81 0.7 0.1
Total 995 69.4

(6-1)(5-1 = (5) (4)
Df = 5 x 4 =20
Critical value of X2 = 31.41
Df = 20
Alpha= 0.05
157
The calculated value of X2 of 69.4 is higher than that of the critical value of X2 of 31.41
at an alpha or significant level of 0.05. The research result is therefore that, there is a
significant relationship between electoral violence and democratization process in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic as demonstrated in Oyo State.
4.3 Discussion of Findings
Introduction
The primary objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of electoral violence on
democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. In doing this, three hypotheses were raised and
tested. These hypotheses were tested each for each state used for the study.
Hypothesis 1: There is no Significant Relationship between Electoral Violence and

the Nature and dynamics of the Nigerian State.
The result of this hypothesis tested showed that there is a significant relationship between
electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. This position was
supported by works of numerous scholars and researchers. Jega (2003), contends that the
crisis of the electoral system in Nigeria will be better understood if situated within the
context of the nature of the political economy of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian state
plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of the underdevelopment of
private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the state as a primary instrument of
accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development process, the Nigerian state is
a major owner of the means of production. Resulting from the expanded oil revenues of
the early 1970s, the state effectively dominated all aspects of the national political
economy (Jega, 2000:30). This has made the state not only the biggest spender of
resources but also the largest employer of labour. Adding to this assertion, Joseph
(1991:56), opined that the expansion of petroleum production and the resultant increased
revenues heightened the centrality of the state as the locus of the struggle for resources
for personal advancement and group security. In this situation, access to the state
becomes a platform and sources for primitive accumulation of wealth, Ake (2003:23)
158
equally captures the immensity and the ubiquity of state power under this situation when
he observes that the state is everywhere and its power appears boundless. There is hardly
any aspect of life in which the state does not exercise power and control. This makes the
capture of state power singularly important, hence politicians and public office seekers
use every available means to get state power with a view to controlling its resources for
themselves and their cronies, ethnic groupings and friends. This selfish attribute of
Nigerian elites and politicians have continued to heighten tension and upsurge of violence
at every election.
The dynamics of the Nigerian state also encourage clientele relationships in

Nigerian politics. Huntington, (2007:378) contends that this exists where the state
controls opportunities for commerce and a wide range of jobs in the academics,
administrative and legal fields. Within this context, politics means more than competition
for political power but assumes the character of a desperate struggle for positions in the
bureaucracy or for access to those who have influence over government decisions.
(Leeds, 2001:353) Arising from the profitability of state power for primitive
accumulation, due to the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state, the struggle for state
power has been reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elite. In this struggle,
commitment to public service and ethics of governance becomes secondary. Egwu,
(2005) Thus, political power does not only represent the license to wealth, it is also the
means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being. In the words of Ake,
(2001:7), it is within this context of the dominant role of the state in the political
economy that one can explain the desperation of Nigeria’s governing elite for state power
as evident in the brazen manipulation of the electoral process, many times with impunity
and its resultant violence manifested at every level of government in the Nigerian state.
This dominant character and dynamics of the Nigerian state continue to endure
even in the face of the prevailing hegemony of the free market regime, which preaches
minimalist state intervention and privileges. Put differently, the gradual transformation of
Nigeria into a market economy with the attendant disengagement of the state from social
provisioning and cutback in public expenditures have not significantly reduced the
struggle for the control of the economy of the Nigerian state among the governing elite.
159
To further buttress the findings of this thesis, Okolie (2005:434) asserted that the linkage
between the state and electoral violence in Nigeria cannot be clearly understood outside
the context of the nature and character of the Nigerian state. In his words Social science
literature is replete with several strands of thoughts and explanations on the persisting
and deepening incidences of electoral fraud and violence in Nigeria’s body politics.
However, these explanations appear to melt in the boiling pot of the character and
parasitic nature of the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, state power and position have largely
been used as instrument of personal, sectional, class or primordial interest. Ibrahim,
(2000: 47) similarly noted that the Nigerian state has a patrimonial character where the
distinction between the public and private domains is blurred and power which has
become a major source of wealth is personalized.
As largely unproductive and parasitic group, the dominant class in Nigeria relies
essentially on the acquisition of state power for survival and reproduction. Thus, the state
in Nigeria, as in Marxist analysis has remained a veritable and potent instrument for the
domination, deprivation, suppression and alienation of the many by the very few who
control state power. Its post colonial character of an overdeveloped superstructure in
comparison with its economic base has ensured as Miliband, (in Okolie, 2005: 435)
notes, that the state is the source of economic power as well as an instrument of it. This
inevitably results in a high premium placed on political power; making politics a zero
sum game. Indeed, the spate and degree of electoral violence in Nigeria’s electoral
process is largely a product of a low level of autonomy of the Nigerian state – a situation
which makes it possible for the political leadership to use the instruments of the state to
commit acts of criminality and unmitigated electoral fraud resulting in the imposition of
unpopular and unelected candidates on the people (Okolie, 2005: 436).
In supporting the result of this hypothesis, Etanibi (2011), opined that electoral
violence in Nigeria is primarily due to the perception of politics and political office as
investment and as an avenue for acquisition of extraordinary wealth through corruption,
which otherwise not possible through any form of legitimate vocation and enterprise. As
a result of this perception and reality, Nigeria politicians turn electioneering and elections
into warfare in which violence and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudices
160
are employed. It is against this background that former President Obasanjo Obasanjo
perhaps counselled his party members to see the 2007 election as a do or die affair
(Etanibi 2011:67).
The nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state seem to have made politics, the
shortest cut to wealth and influence. Olaopa (2009) asserted that Politics means money
and money means politics. In his words, Once politicians recognise or know the
probability of having power, the party (and the individual members) naturally uses the
same government to stay in power. The leadership becomes a self recruiting oligarchy
and no self recruiting oligarchy has been known to tolerate oppositions to itself. In this
situation, violence becomes an instrument for seeking power. In Nigeria, politicians and
parties rigged elections in most blatant fashion - violence, corruption, arson, and
brigandage are always employed in the mad desire to win and retain power both in the
region and at the centre. Even the Political Bureau (1987) seems to agree with the
findings of this study. The bureau as afar back as 1987 noted that the nature of Nigeria
democracy and its predicament is as a result of political violence right from 1960.
Omolulu (2007) added that the normlessness of the Nigerian state has given birth
to political gladiators who constantly manipulated the people and political process to
advance their selfish agenda. The Political gladiators vie for power and control over the
vast spoil of office. The so-called godfathers cultivate and nurture personal militias
(thugs) to secure their positions by promoting local arms race in their states and regions.
Indeed, in the opinion of Omodia (2009), the character and dynamics of the Nigerian
state encourage clientele politics in which the state controls opportunities for commerce
and a wide range of jobs. The resultant impact of this is that politics means more than
competition for political power but assumes the character of a desperate struggle, by the
political class that is often reduced to warfare by factions of the governing elites.
Commitment to public service and ethics of good governance become secondary. Thus,
political (state) power not only represents licence for wealth, it also means security and
guarantor of general well-being of those who have access to power and their
kinsmen(Egwu, 2005).
161
Hypothesis 2: There is no Significant Relationship Between Electoral Violence And
Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
The result of this hypothesis showed clearly that there is a significant relationship
between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, as shown in the
results from Delta and Oyo states. This position was supported by the works of many
scholars. Kurfi (2003) for instance noted that electoral violence has negatively impacted
on the quest for deepening democratic rule in Nigeria. In the history of elections in
Nigeria, only elections organized by the colonial master and the military that were
minimally marred by violence. As for the military-supervised polls, Kurfi (2003:9) has
perceptively observed that the absence of acute electoral violence could not be attributed
to the internalization of a culture of tolerance but rather it was a consequence of the
recognition of the threat of military retribution for possible breakdown of law and order
as well as the possible extension of the transition programme. This position was also
supported copiously by Anifowose (2002). He noted that election-based violence
imperiled Nigeria’s first democratic experiment with violence in Tivland and Yorubaland
as the two significant cases. According to Anifowose, the violence in Tivland was a
reaction to political intimidation and harassment of the opposition politicians by the
ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC).
Egwu, (2007) also added his opinion to buttress the findings of this thesis by
giving another historical account. In his words, electoral violence rear its head again
during Nigeria’s second attempt at constitutional rule between 1979 and 1983. The
second election of Nigeria’s Second Republic, which was organized by the Shehu
Shagari civilian administration, was massively manipulated in favour of the ruling
National Party of Nigeria (NPN). In a spontaneous reaction to the official results released
by the election management body, Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), mayhem
was unleashed on the two Southwest states of Oyo and Ondo. The violence was
organized in protest against perceived manipulation of the governorship polls in the two
states, widely acclaimed as electoral strongholds of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), in
favour of the candidates of NPN, which controlled the centre. In addition to the heavy
human and material losses suffered by political opponents, the headquarters of FEDECO
162
in Oyo and Ondo states were torched. With the collapse of the Second Republic in
December 1983, four years after inauguration, Nigeria was again prone to prolonged
years of military rule.
Democratic rule was restored in 1999 following the conclusion of the 1998/99
transition elections. Akume (2006) noted that if the transition elections that ushered in
the Fourth Republic were not characterized by political violence and serious contestation
of election results, the same can not be said of the 2003 general elections. The first to be
organized by a civilian regime since the rebirth of democratic governance in 1999. The
period following the 2003 polls was marked by organized violence, as well as by
attempts at actual assassinations of political opponents and rivals. The elections
themselves failed to meet basic international standards, though Nigeria passed the second
election test through the 2003 polls. There was consensus among stakeholders of the
Nigerian democratic project that the elections lack all known ingredients of democracy.
For instance, Akume(2006) contends that the elections were characterized by large scale
malpractices including rigging at all levels while General Muhammadu Buhari, who
contested the 2003 presidential polls on the platform of All Nigerian Peoples
Party(ANPP), described the election as a dark period in our history (Buhari,2006). The
2007 elections, in a profound manner, deepened electoral crisis in Nigeria. This is
underscored by the huge size of election petitions that greeted the elections. Indeed, the
elections will go down in history as the one that attracted the highest number of post-
election litigations in Nigeria. Official results of the elections were contested at the three
levels of governance: local, state and federal. Several results declared by Nigeria election
management body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), were
reversed by the election tribunals and the courts while the disputes that arose from the
presidential election got settled in December 2008, nineteen months after the formal
conclusion of the election. All these indicated that democracy has been and still operating
under stress, unable to meet demands of the people of the Nigerian state.
Jega (2007: 249) added his opinion in support of the findings of this thesis by
noting that elections in Nigeria have historically been conflict ridden. The campaigns
preceding every elections are invariably marked by pettiness, intolerance, and violence.
163
There are many reported incidences of intra-party, as well as, inter-party, violence,
conflicts, including abductions and assassinations. The elections and their outcome have
not been free nor fair. Jega (2007). They have always been characterized by violations of
the process, corrupt conduct by officials, rigging of results and so on. Again, various
scholarly studies on electoral violence, indicate that incidences of election violence were
pervasive during party primaries, and that some candidates were busy scheming to ensure
favourable outcome for themselves, by hook or by crook, in future elections.
Usman,(2000), did not also differ in his opinion, as he argued that, Political
violence over elections has been the phenomenon occurrence in Nigeria’s democratic
environment. He demonstrated that electoral violence of the forties and fifties had
actually transformed political tension and crises and consequently wrecked all attempts
by Nigerians to build and sustain democratic governance. Violence associated with
elections have continued to rise perilously with new forms and dimensions introduced
and old ones modified. The failure of stable democratic governance in Nigeria may not
be unconnected with the nature, form, character, direction and dynamics of the Nigerian
state and its system of economy. The pattern of the struggle for political power or
democracy without its appropriate sustenance has produced the problem of democratic
politics and practice in Nigeria today. He concluded that the problem of electoral
violence generated from electoral process poses serious challenges and dilemmas to the
democratization process in the country. To him, issues central to economic
underdevelopment and weak institutional structures, political instability, legitimacy
arising from electoral process and other ethnic, religious and sectional conflicts are all
rooted and occasioned within the dynamic problem of democracy and governance. The
question is: do democracy and democratic system have any relevant reflections in the
economic, social and cultural lives of Nigerians and their struggles for liberation and
freedom?
Ibeanu (2007) in lending his support to the findings of this thesis noted that with
the nature, type and dimension of electoral delinquency in Nigeria, democratization
process, over time and space, had been marked by eruption of political violence
occasioned by elections. These types of violence particularly between 1999 and 2011
164
have plunged the country into a phenomenal and deep-seated crisis unparalled since the
era of the Nigerian civil war. Apart from violence emerging from the privatization of
group violence, the system has also been transformed into state violence with the
transformation of the ruling party militias to hold on to power by hook or by crook. The
variety of tactics the incumbent regime (party) uses to manipulate the electoral process,
right from the primaries, as well as the breaking up of the opposition are some of the
political and democratic anathema experienced in our present democratic system. These
have continued to weaken democratic institutions in the country.
Animashaun, (2008) in his view noted that in the five decades of Nigeria’s
existence as a sovereign nation, it has not fared satisfactorily in democratic politics or
experiment with most of the years being in military rather than civilian and democratic
system. When Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, we noted the rush by the military
for competitive elections. These turned out to be a big political gimmick for the country
with the imposition of a former military dictator as president(Olusegun Obasanjo). The
negative consequences this has had on democratic politics and democratization process
are retrogressive and dangerous. During this period, human rights were openly abused,
social and ethnic cleavages were intensified with unprecedented electoral violence and
other forms of fraud. State corruption becomes a norm which destroyed the confidence
and democratic euphoria Nigerians had been expecting, since the beginning of the 1999
transition programme that ushered in the Fourth Republic.
Since political contests in Nigeria represent what may be seen as means for
primitive accumulation of wealth with other new and old inherited built-up relationships,
it must be realized that it is only through elections that power is used and abused to
reengineer rewards and punishments within and outside the ruling party with the flagrant
use of the fraudulent activities and theft of state funds. Thus, elections are now preceded
by a process of political and constitutional engineering under the pretext of establishing
the requisite institutions and structures for democratic rule. Seldom have elections been a
process whereby contending forces negotiate for the political viability of an even playing
field. Incumbents have been preoccupied with the need to organize electoral system in
165
their favour as the surest way to maintain their stranglehold on political power (Debrah,
2005:127) .
Amuta, (2008) in support of the findings of this thesis noted that the problems of
Nigeria’s democratic politics with regard to the nature, dimension and violence that
always characterize and accompany electoral process have fundamentally stifled the
quest for democracy. Since electoral violence is a bane of democratic politics in Nigeria,
elections conducted over time have significantly failed to produce legitimacy because
election results, in one way or the other, have been juggled or inflated or annulled. All
these have brought about political instability through challenging of election results in the
courts of law and tribunals or protests or boycotts on grounds that the elections were
rigged and other forms of malpractices employed to achieve victory.
The 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 general elections in Nigeria witnessed several
dimensions of electoral violence. All these elections questioned the credibility of the
democratic process and invariably posed serious challenges for democratic practice in the
country. This is so because for an election to be legitimate, credible and democratic, it
must provide and ensure fairness in competition and must guarantee basic freedom for
equal contest with equitable distribution of resources among contestants. Democratic
politics in Nigeria, particularly between 1999 and 2011, have retrogressed to autocracy
due mainly to the elimination of all potential competitors, state sponsored assassinations
and turning election contests into a matter of life and death(Nwolise, 2011).
The above assertion was supported by Human Rights Watch (2012), when the
organization noted that since the return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999, there have been
politically motivated assassinations and other election related killings. All these have
jeopardized Nigeria democratic project. A large number of Nigerians have lost their lives,
many others displaced with properties worth billions of naira destroyed. These forces
have turned the political climate into hostility, instability and uncertainty. Intra and inter
party struggles have generated into party indiscipline, lawlessness with patron-client
relationships dictating who stands or wins at any given elective position. The resultant
effect of these fierce struggles have continued to pose serious challenges to the survival
of democracy in the country.
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From the above analyses, it is evident that democracy in Nigeria is under threat.
Many of Nigeria’s elected leaders obtained their positions by demonstrating abilities to
use corruption and political violence to prevail in sham elections. These forces have
denied millions of Nigerians any real voice in selecting their political leaders. Under such
situations, it is very difficult for democracy to thrive.
Hypothesis III: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and

The result from the third hypothesis also showed that there is a strong relationship
between increasing electoral violence and democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic, as demonstrated from the results gotten from Delta and Oyo State. The result
is strongly supported by works of researchers such as (Salimano 2004, Aurrel, 2005).
They all contended that there exist a correlation between increasing electoral violence
and successful democratization. Aurel (2005), for example, observed that violence is the
greatest threat to democracy in developing countries. Snyder (2000), contends that the
problems of Nigeria’s democratic politics with regard to the nature, dimension and
violence that always characterize and accompany electoral process have fundamentally
stifled the quest for democracy. Since electoral violence is a bane of democratic politics
in Nigeria, elections conducted over time have significantly failed to produce legitimacy
because as election results, in one way or the other, have been juggled or inflated or
annulled. All these have brought about political instability through challenging of
election results in the court of law or protests or boycotts on grounds that the elections
were rigged and other forms of malpractices employed.
Nwolise, (2011) added that democratic politics in Nigeria, particularly between
1999 and 2011, with regard to the development of electoral issues indicate that
democratization process has retrogressed to autocracy partly due to the elimination of all
potential competitors, state sponsored assassinations and turning election contests as a
matter of life and death. He noted that since the return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999,
there have been politically motivated assassinations and other election related killings.
All these have jeopardized Nigeria democratic project. A large number of Nigerians have
lost their lives, many others displaced with properties worth billions of naira destroyed.
These have turned the political climate into hostility, instability and uncertainty. Intra
167
and inter party conflicts directly and indirectly related to power struggles have generated
into party indiscipline, lawlessness with patron-client relationships dictating who stands
or wins any given elective position. The consequence of this has been fierce struggles
and violence which have continued to pose serious challenges to the survival of
democracy in the country.
The scenario described above made Ijim-Agbo (2007) to contend that the
dilemma in the Nigerian democratic politics are numerous and complex. Whereas
competition is a driving force in any democratic elections, Nigerians have mastered the
ways and manners to manipulate and jettison it to their advantage. These, more often
than not, generate into a spectre of controversies and blackmails leading to political
acrimony, rancour and inevitability of violence, before, during and after any election.
This no doubt constitutes an important component of the problematic of Nigerian
democratic politics. To further highlights the impact of electoral violence on democracy
Hoglund (2006), contends that electoral violence have had some dire consequences in
Africa’s new democracies. First, there are security implications for the continent in
general, and affected countries in particular. Some notable security implications include
the collapse of public order, the emergence of large numbers of internally displaced
persons (IDPs), the flow of refugees, and further militarisation of the state and society.
Apart from the security challenges, Hoglund (2006) also asserted that electoral violence
also accounts for a deep-seated legitimacy crisis across the country. In Nigeria, the
constitutionality of the governments is being seriously challenged, not only by opposition
forces, but also by the people. Some of the famous ways of protests include peaceful and
violent ones – peaceful demonstration and litigations in electoral courts, and violent
outbreaks resulting in killings, arson, looting, destruction of properties and the resultant
imposition of curfew, and the militarisation of the state and society. These serve as
potent sources of diverting government attention away from governance and towards
consolidating its illegal/contested capture of power and managing the resulting conflicts.
In Nigeria, it is not surprising to see that months after elections, there are still ongoing
judicial proceedings or violent protests challenging the legitimacy of the government.
This situation often hampers effective political competition and participation. Since
might became right, as in the Hobbesian view of nature, only those with adequate
168
coercive power became main players. As such, the democratisation process is gradually
facilitating the de-institutionalisation of the people to become mere clients, onlookers
and/or consumers, instead of acting as the primary stakeholders of democracy. The
attendant culture of political apathy represents a major threat to democratic consolidation.
In all, the persistent trends in electoral violence in Nigeria no doubt undermines

democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Mainwarring and Scubly (2011) noted that electoral
violence have undoubtedly weakened the political structures and institutions in Nigeria.
In their words, It is important to note that democracy anywhere is sustained when built on
virile and stable political structures and institutions. For instance, a strong and stable
electoral system is a vital factor for an evolving democracy like that of Nigeria.
Mainwarring and Scubly (2011), argued further that developing democracies like Nigeria
needed a credible electoral system because according to them, a credible electoral system
enhance and promote the positive attributes essential for democracy to thrive. Strong and
stable political structures and institutions also help to establish in a democratic society,
the fundamental rules and constraints that help to shape interactions in the body polity.
169
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction
The biggest threat to any organized society is insecurity. Violence breads

insecurity while insecurity creates numerous other social ills which include ethnic
clashes, communal disturbances, illegal arms trafficking, terrorism, secret cults, ethnic
militias, electoral violence and other forms of disputes. One common trend in electoral
violence in Nigeria is that it assumes higher sophistication with time. In today’s politics
in Nigeria, many actors on the political scene no longer see performance as a yardstick
for determining who gets an elective position, rather, violence and other unorthodox
means are employed. This definitely runs counter to any conceivable democratic
principle. This thesis is thus seen as one in the series of the researches conducted to
examine electoral violence and its impact on democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. To
do this research, questions and hypotheses were outlined and empirically tested
statistically to examine the impact of electoral violence on democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic.
5.2 Summary of Findings
On the bases of the analyses of the responses to questions derived from the
hypotheses, the study demonstrated significant relationships in the three hypotheses
tested. These were also portrayed in the data presented and analyzed in the various
distribution tables, bar charts, pie charts and the chi-square analysis.
i. For instance, the first hypothesis seek to examine if there is any significant
relationship or not between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the
Nigerian state. The results showed that there is a significant relationship between
electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. This position
was supported by a critical analysis of the responses to questions raised and tested
through the Chi-square statistical tool. The calculated Chi-square value of 55.7
(Delta Sate) and 109.9 (for Oyo State) was greater than the critical table value of
31.41 at 0.05 alpha level of significance. The implication of this is that
respondents from both states confirmed that there is a significant relationship
170
between electoral violence and the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian state. In
other words, the study established the fact that the dynamic nature and character
of the Nigerian state resulting from its dominant role in the economy as a measure
of last resort to public office holders for wealth accumulation necessitated
electoral violence in the country.
ii. The second hypothesis tested also indicated that there is a significant relationship
between electoral violence and democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The
calculated Chi-square value of 47.2 (for Delta State) and 253.3 (for Oyo State)
was greater than the critical table value of 31.41 at 0.05 alpha level. In other
words, electoral violence negates the tenets of democracy in Nigeria. The
implication of this is that the country has not been able to create the enabling
environment for investors to come in. The insecurity that emerged from the post
2011 general elections equally gave rise to the increasing upsurge of terrorist
activities in the North Eastern part of the country by the Boko Haram sect, which
today has created unfavourable atmosphere for democratic institutions to thrive.
iii. The third hypothesis was raised to determine whether or not there is a significant
relationship between electoral violence and successful democratization process in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The results showed that there is a significant
relationship between electoral violence and successful democratization process in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The Chi-square analysis showed that the Calculated x2
value of 44.5 (for Delta State) and 69.4 (for Oyo State) is greater than the Critical
x2 value of 31.41 at an alpha of 0.05. In order words, the study have also shown
that the democratization process of all institutions of governance has been
hampered by electoral violence since the inception of the Fourth Republic.
iv. In the course of the study, some observations that also lend credence to the results
of the hypotheses were made, and these were used to enrich the statistical
analysis. Some of these observations include the fact that the party in power has
continuously adulterated, through its strategies in maintaining the status quo, the
electoral processes and procedures with what is called “consensus candidates” to
perfect a deregulated or controlled elections which, more often than not, lead into
violence and question the credibility of our democracy. The study also observed
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an increasing trend in the sophistication of electoral violence in Nigeria. For
example, in terms of the instruments and strategies, political assassinations of
opponents have become the other of the day. The study observed that a new
dimension to electoral violence has come to feature prominently as a product of
aggravated provocations, extension of deep-seated and age long conflicts between
individuals, groups, families and communities.
i. Ethno-political cleavages were also observed to have remained one of the salient
determinants of political and electoral violence in election related issues. Since
electoral contest is characterized by competition, the Nigerian factor of
continuous harassment, threats and intimidation of the opposition parties or
‘enemies’ within the ruling party, perhaps gives everybody an open ended licence
to display physical and brute force to either protect or safeguard one’s areas of
political control. The ruling party often devices strategies to weaken opposition in
order to exert absolute monopoly over electoral outcomes and loyalty. Formal and
informal practices are also used like bribing the leadership of the opposition, or
generate split within the opposition until members defect to the ruling party or
even through the deceptive strategy of the government of national unity where
opposition members take ministerial slots and other lucrative appointments.
ii. Democratic politics guarantees intra-party democracy and provides for the
selection of candidates for all the elective positions. This provides for standards
and some measurement of fairness to gauge the consistency and reliability of the
elective principles. Conventionally, the selection of party candidates to stand for
elections on the platform of political parties at local, State or federal levels, is
naturally to be contested for by all the prospective candidates at primary elections
by delegates constitutionally chosen. The Nigerian experience as observed
negates all known democratic principles. This act has had a very serious impact
on democratic politics and exact negative consequences on the democratic
system. Those who resist democratic procedures have continued to use violence
against the party, thereby undermining democracy.
iii. Another important aspect of the electoral process is the political party campaigns.
This process is expected to articulate party manifestoes and market candidates to
172
voters. This is a period when the electorate should assess parties’ programmes of
actions and of course ideologies. These are expected to be conducted at peaceful
rallies. Again, advertisement of programmes and candidates are to buttress issues
of great concern without any rancour or violence. In Nigeria, since times past,
political campaign processes have been marked with unfair practices which often
involve the use of state own media by the ruling party to the disadvantage of the
opposition party. This situation often generate rancour that sometimes snowball
into violence during or after elections. Thus, the use of physical violence,
intimidation and coercion to influence the outcome of elections is perhaps the
most blatant perversion of the electoral process which has remained the feature of
all elections in Nigeria.
iv. A further observation made in the course of this thesis is that there seems to be a
norm in Nigeria election that a candidate must have a gang of ‘area boys’ whom
he pays to support him and attack his opponents. He must therefore demonstrate
the superiority and monopoly of violence to scare the opponents’ gangs and at the
same time terrorize all persons during the electioneering campaigns/period and on
election days. Agents stationed during the counting of votes are all part of the
candidates’ thugs who are to display all form of physical violence in order to
make their candidates be declared the winner by hook or crook. This norm was
visible in both Delta and Oyo States that were the focal point of the study. Thus,
non-adherence to the rule of the game for competitive democratic elections has
been seen as one of the major factors for electoral violence, that often arise
through hate speeches, actions and other unorthodox democratic practices.
v. A further finding of the thesis was that majority of the ‘area boys’ are usually
made up of unemployed youths who see the period of elections as avenues for
temporary jobs, and the hope of being members of the core group who may be on
the pay rolls of their masters after victory.
vi. In addition to the above findings, it was established that, unlike other African
countries like Kenya and Mozambique that have been experiencing post-election
violence, election violence is more intense during the election day in Nigeria,
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except in the 2011 general elections when Nigeria witnessed post-election
violence.
vii. The study further discovered that election violence was more intense at the local
and state levels than at the Federal levels because of the closeness of the
candidates to the electorate.
5.3 Conclusion
In many respects, democratic consolidation process in the Nigerian situation is
quite unique, particularly in examining the nature of the relationships between theory and
practice. The contradictions in the society have demonstrated much of the substantive
issues of the kind of democracy being practised. Persistent and endemic electoral
violence in Nigeria over time have remained a log in the wheels of democratic politics
and invariably portends ills for democracy. As elections held did not follow the rules of
the game, their were no doubt fraught with fraud and endangered with excessive
corruption as well as all forms of violence to property and humanity. The study
concluded without any iota of doubt that democracy in Nigeria will continue to be a
mirage in the face of undemocratic political culture, ethnic cleavages, weak political and
democratic institutions and the investment mentality that is often attached to political
processes in Nigeria. Evidently, politics has turned out to be a business venture where
one acquires wealth and affluence supersonically. The crisis of democracy, its dilemma
and challenges in Nigeria have indicated very fundamental socio-economic policy
implications as reflected in the electoral process. Since the outcomes of elections are
often known in advance, the electoral process in Nigeria is therefore a fraudulent exercise
in futility. Thus electoral violence is, no doubt, a failure of the democratic practice, and a
threat to sustainable democracy in Nigeria.
5.4 Recommendations
From the above findings and conclusion, the following recommendations were
made:
First, given the nature of the structural underdevelopment in Nigeria, the
exploitative nature of leadership and the extreme level of poverty among Nigerians, there
is the need to mobilize human and natural resources to promote the economy in all forms,
like genuine participation, politics of social equality, and electioneering campaigns.
174
There is also the need to combine forces and ideas especially between the legislature and
judiciary to curb the executive excesses in its manipulative and maneuvering tactics. The
courts have occasionally made some differences especially in the landmark judgments in
Anambra, Edo, Ondo and Ekiti, Governorship election cases. The inability of the country
to conduct free, fair, credible and acceptable elections will ultimately lead to the demise
of the political and democratic system. Therefore, for democratic politics in Nigeria to be
void of violence and enjoy both domestic and international legitimacy, the value
orientations of the political elite must be transformed so that elections are not regarded as
means to an end and end to everything.
Every level of government in the country, the local, state and federal level should
embark on massive creation of job opportunities for the teaming youths. This is due to the
fact that, one fact that stood out in the course of this thesis was the problem of mass
unemployment of youths in the country. The statistics of unemployment in the country
had shown that the unemployment trend is rising geometrically and this create a ready
market for the recruitment of youths as thugs for rigging during elections in the country.
Nigeria’s democracy must be mass oriented and founded on the configurations
and circumstances of the Nigerian masses. Elite based democracy as currently the case
will continue to fail in all respects. This is because elites are extremely individualistic and
this individualism is a primary causal factor for the type of democracy Nigeria practices.
Mass based democracy will provide access to basic resources needed to energize mass
and active participation with zero-level violence in seeking for power. This will provide
certain checks and balances which will prevent personalization and individualization of
power, money politics and above all corrupt practices. However, this does not remove the
possibility of a mass based democracy creating its set of new elites that may dominate the
politics and behave like the old elites.
In addition to the suggestions already made, there is the need to de-emphasis the
State as a measure of last resort. Public officers should be seen to serve the people who
elected them to power and not the other way round. Major economic heights in the
country should be private sector driven so as to reduce the competition for public offices.
Furthermore, politicians should be least paid in the country so as to discourage them from
offices and at the same time make such offices less attractive among others.
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5.5 Contributions to Knowledge
The study has contributed to knowledge in the following ways:
i. The study established the fact that persistent electoral violence at post-
independence Nigeria have been largely responsible for the country’s inability
to sustain democracy in the Fourth Republic.
ii. The consequence of electoral violence has impacted negatively on the country’s
practice of democracy.
iii. There is a significant relationship between electoral violence and the nature and
dynamics of the Nigerian state in the Fourth Republic.
iv. The study provides a peaceful process of political succession in Nigeria through
elections.
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APPENDIX I
Department of Political Science,

Delta State University,
Abraka, Nigeria.
Dear Respondents,
I am a student of the Department of Political Science, Delta State University
Abraka, undertaking a Survey research on Electoral Violence and its impact on
Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. A study of Delta and Oyo States.
This questionnaire is designed to solicit for your genuine opinions on questions on

electoral violence and its impact on democracy in Nigeria. Your name may not be
required as it is strictly for academic purpose. Your responses will be treated with strict
confidence. Please tick from the boxes provided, your choice of answer. Thank you.
Agah Benjamin
199
QUESTIONNAIRE ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN
NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES
SECTION A
Socio-Demographic Data
1. Sex: Male Female

2. Age: 18 – 30 31 – 45 45 – above
3. Educational background/qualifications
(a) Primary school learning certificate
(b) NECO, WASC
(c) OND/NCE
(d) HND/B.Sc, B.Ed.
(e) M.Sc/M.A/M.Ed/Ph.D.
(f) Other Professions
4. Nationality………………………………….
5. Religion: Islamic Christianity African Traditional Religion
6. State of Residence of respondent. Delta ( ) Oyo ( )
200
SECTION B: General Questions on Nigeria Elections and Politics
1. Did you vote in the elections of 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011
Yes No
2. If Yes, State your reasons for voting. …………………………………
3. If No, State same. ………………………………………………………
4. Have you witnessed electoral violence since the inception of the Fourth Republic 1999-
2011
Yes No
5. If yes, in which of the elections 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 do you observed this trend
a) 1999 b) 2003 c) 2007 d) 2011. all of the them
6. Do you see the political parties in the Fourth Republic representing the peoples’ interests
as manifested in the parties’ manifestoes. Yes No
7. What factor do you consider to play major role in membership recruitment of party
members.
a) Money b) The personality of the person c) Educational qualifications
d) His contributions to his community in the past
8. How are political parties funded in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
a) Members’ contributions
b) Subsidy from the three tiers of government
c) Voluntary donations from members of the public
9. Did the source of political party funding play any role in the choice of candidates for
elective post in the Fourth Republic
a) Yes No
10. Do you see reflection of past political party activities in the organizations and
management of political parties in the FourthRepublic. a) Yes b) No
11. If yes, does such trait has any impact in the functioning of party activities in the Fourth
Republic. a) Yes No
12. If yes, State such impact. ……………………………………………
13. Do politicians in the Fourth Republic, service oriented towards the people who voted
them into power. a) Yes No
201
14. Do primordial interests play any role in the appointment of public officials after
successful elections in the Fourth Republic. a) Yes b)
15. In this Fourth Republic has ethnicity any role to play in the voting pattern and choice of
candidate for election. a) Yes b) No
16. At what level of elections in the Fourth Republic do we have intense electoral violence.
a) Local government level b) Governorship level
c) Presidential level d) Houses of Assemblies
17. Do you see electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic a result of a breakdown of
national values
a) Yes b) No
202
SECTION C: Hypotheses Testing Questions
Likert Scale
Responses
S/n Questions Strongly Agree Undecided Strongly Disagree
Agree disagree
SA A UN SD D
18. The nature and
dynamics of the
Nigerian state as the
main controller of the
economy is a major
source of election
violence in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic.
19. Electoral violence is a
major impediment to
democracy in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic
20 The increasing
electoral violence
between 1999 – 2011
has negative impact in
the democratization
process in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic
21 The control of Nigerian
godfathers over their
godsons, in the affairs,
of governance, is a
major cause of
203
increasing electoral
violence in Nigeria
politics in the Fourth
Republic.
22. Electoral violence in
Nigeria since the first
republic up till date has
signaled the non-
emergence of
nationally accepted
political leadership in
the country.
23. The appointment of the
independent electoral
commission’s
members, is a source of
electoral violence in
Nigeria politics in the
Fourth Republic
24. Poverty and
unemployment of
youths, is a major
source of electoral
violence in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic
25. Unabated corruption is
a major factor in
electoral violence in
Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic.
204

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ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH

REPUBLIC: A STUDY OF DELTA AND OYO STATES.

AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma

B.Sc (Hons.), M.S.c, University of Ibadan

Being a Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Postgraduate School in Partial

SUPERVISORS: DR.W. EHWARIEME

DR. E.V. CLARK

Also acknowledged for the successful completion of this thesis is the

AGAH, Benjamin Ekevwoyoma

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - -

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND

Table 2.1 Party Performance and Strongholds in 1959 Elections

Table 2.2: Federal Officers on Grade Level 15 and Above. - -

Table 2.3: Major Indices of Electoral Malpractices in Nigeria, 1964 – 2011

Table 2.4: Ethnic Distribution of Leaders of the Major Nigerian Parties in

Table 2.5: Number of Registered Political Parties - -

Table 2.6: Records of Politically Motivated Assassinations. - -

Table 2.7: Some Cases of Unresolved Political Assassinations in Nigeria, -

Table 4.1 Summary of Responses Based on Sex - -

Table 4.2 Summary of Responses Based on Age - -

Table 4.3 Summary of Responses Based on Group/Designation -

Table 4.4 Summary of Responses Based on Academic Qualifications -

Table 4.6 Summary of Responses to Question 19 - - -

Table 4.7 Summary of Responses to Question 20 - - -

Table 4.8 Summary of Responses to Question 24 - - -

Table 4.9 Summary of Responses to Question 25 - - -

Table 4.10 Observed Frequency Contingency - - -

Table 4.11 Computation of Chi-Square Contingency - - -

Table 4.12 Observed Frequency Contingency - - -

Table 4.13 Computation of Chi-Square Contingency - - -

Table 4.14 Observed Frequency Contingency - - -

Table 4.15 Computation of Chi-Square contingency - - -

Table 4.16: Computation of Chi-square Contingency - - -

Table 4.18: Computation of Chi-square Contingency - - -

Table 4.19: Observed Frequencies Contingency - - -

Table 4.20: Computation of Chi-square Contingency - - -

Figure 4.1 Sex Percentage Distributions - - -

1.1 Background to the Study

Though, violence during the period of elections remained a marked feature of

A study by the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE,2007) found

Since Nigeria’s attainment of independence in 1960, violence and myriad

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The following hypotheses were stated and tested in the study.

Ho2: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and democracy in

Ho3: There is no significant relationship between electoral violence and

1.6 Research Questions

i. What is the nature and character of electoral violence in Nigeria?

1.7 Significance of the Study

This thesis is significant for the following reasons.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

The concept, democracy has no universally acceptable definition. However, it is

Unfortunately, Democracy in Nigeria, especially elections have been characterized

elected officials must accord the electorate their basic

Implicit in Dahl’s conceptualization is the point that, elections symbolize popular

as a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a

an independent judiciary to interpret the

losers in an election who assumed they have

Oshiomhole (2011:44) in a lecture organized by the Nigerian Bar Association

Corruption of the electoral process, especially of

Regionalism which became a forerunner to ethnic politics was noted by Osaghae