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Praise for
THE ROOT CAUSE
and Hans Norden
I love The Root Cause! Norden is an expert in the field who turns on
the fire hose. The awe-inspiring breadth of both classic and leading-
edge information is truly amazing. By drawing from such widely
varied and inspirational sources as the Wright brothers, Napoleon
Hill, Sir Karl Popper, Robert M. Pirsig, and Sun Tzu to name but a
few, The Root Cause presents a much more effective and
enlightened example of executive leadership. This book is a must-
read for today’s and tomorrow’s leaders at every level of
management.
—Craig Johnston
award-winning Business Process Management (BPM)
consultant
The Root Cause is not another book about best practices or some
new set of formulas to be plugged into an organization. Instead, it
offers a different level of thinking and a rich source of unique ideas
and metaphors to guide executives with an adventuresome mind
and a clear sense of purpose. I enjoyed the reading, and I intend to
read more of Norden’s sources as well.
—Barry J. Schwartz, PhD
applied neuroscience consultant
You get John Boyd and his ideas. You have put them down in such a
way that a layman can understand how to utilize the information. I
love the analogies; it makes it easier for some who may not be as
technically proficient in theory. I like the interweaving of different
schools of thought put together to gain a full picture. As you know,
my dad used many references from many fields when he was putting
his theories together. You are doing the same, which speaks well to
your time and effort in this book. Too many people focus in one area
and do not look to other areas to increase their ability to synthesize
information. I am enjoying the reading but notice I keep going back
and re-reading areas as I go through. To me a good book is one
where you go back and start re-reading areas what you have already
read.
—Mary Ellen Boyd
executrix of the Colonel John R. Boyd (USAF) estate
The Root Cause is like a deep learning exercise on how the world
works—people, business, and organizations. I greatly appreciate the
focus on business as a system, the fundamental principles that drive
and guide the system, and notable historic bodies of thought. They
are woven together to give a deeper and more powerful foundation
for the building of mental models to help understand business
behavior and the itinerary planning for success that follows. It is a
substantial read that can transform someone’s way of being and
doing in the world. Remarkable and valuable for anyone who wants
to lead an epic journey.
—Brett Hoffstadt
Project Management Professional (PMP), inventor of
multiple aviation devices, and author of Success with
Drones in Civil Engineering and How to Be a Rocket
Scientist
Copyright © 2022 by Johannes Nicolaas Isaäc Norden. All rights
reserved. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act
of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed
in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval
system, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 978-1-26-427460-4
MHID: 1-26-427460-2
The material in this eBook also appears in the print version of this
title: ISBN: 978-1-26-427017-0, MHID: 1-26-427017-8.
TERMS OF USE
—Alfred de Musset
French dramatist, poet, and novelist
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Introduction
PART I
CEO EFFECTIVENESS
CHAPTER 1 The Peter Principle at Work
CHAPTER 2 Top Three Business Gremlins That Sabotage
CEO Effectiveness
CHAPTER 3 Four More Business Gremlins That Handicap
Executive Performance
CHAPTER 4 Mind Shift: The Antidote to the Peter Principle
PART II
BUSINESS MECHANICS
CHAPTER 5 Stewardship and Craftsmanship
CHAPTER 6 The Journey—Function
CHAPTER 7 The Vehicle—Form
CHAPTER 8 The Destination—Itinerary for Arrival
CHAPTER 9 Business Governance
CHAPTER 10 Role of the Chief Executive
Bibliography
Notes
Index
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I
would like to express my sincere appreciation to the following
people for granting their permission to quote from their
copyrighted material:
—Hans Norden
INTRODUCTION
—William Shakespeare
English Renaissance poet, playwright, and actor
T
he Root Cause is about change because nothing is more
constant than change. Change is about decisions and events
that disrupt a business system’s integrity, but it is also about
implementing solutions to restore system integrity and making
course corrections in order to pursue a new strategic direction.
Hence, change is the opposite of routine—business as usual.
Routine operations are the hallmark of a system. Therefore,
maintaining, renovating, and innovating those processes is key to
operational effectiveness and efficiency. Yet, over time, these
initiatives tend to increase system complexity—making processes
more interdependent and increasingly reliant on key resources they
share for the fulfilment of their individual functions.
Complexity, in combination with unfolding new and unforeseen
circumstances, produce systemic problems that manifest themselves
throughout the enterprise. Fixing these problems is a unique
executive responsibility because every lower ranking hierarchical
leader will experience a conflict of interest with their peers when
they try to solve the issues on their own. The main source of conflict
lies in people’s fear that the burden of change will not be shared
equally among all departments involved—a state of affairs that
higher level leaders must acknowledge and address.
Systemic problems tend to be stubborn because their root
cause(s) are not obvious; it takes a deliberate and concerted effort
to diagnose them and to create authentic solutions. Unfortunately,
only a few CEOs deliberately choose to initiate and sustain such an
effort. The majority of CEOs tend to favor investing in the same
familiar solutions that caused the systemic problems in the first place
—because they find them prudent, safer, and easily defensible
because others have already opted for the same solution. This is
precisely why systemic problems are so costly and why they can
linger in the system for such a long period of time. Nothing changes
until someone intervenes with innovative and effective solutions, or
until these problems unleash a destructive chain reaction—whichever
comes first.
[670] According to Bernal Diaz this commission was arranged by the combined
influence of Olmedo and Duero, during Olmedo’s second visit to the camp. The
friar appears, however, to have been there but once, when he was expelled.
Knowing Salvatierra to be a blusterer, Bermudez, the alguacil mayor, proposed
that he should join the commission, but his intended victim, not caring to trust
himself within the power of Cortés, pleaded sickness and a dislike to speak with a
traitor. ‘Señor Veedor,’ chimed in Olmedo, ironically, ‘best it is to be prudent, and
you may have him prisoner before long.’ Hist. Verdad., 93.
[671] Duero was to receive the share of treasures claimed, a command in the
expedition equal to that of Cortés, and after the conquest a grant of towns similar
to his own. As a further inducement, sufficient gold was given to load his two
Cuban servants. On taking leave of the general, on pentecost morning, Duero
asked: ‘What has your worship to say, before I leave?’ ‘God be with you,’ was the
reply, ‘and see to it, Señor Duero, that it be done as arranged, or by my
conscience [Cortés’ favorite oath] I’ll be in your camp within three days, with all my
companions, and the first to receive the lance will be your worship, if I see aught
contrary.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 94. Monjaras states that Duero and Leon
warned Cortés against opposing Narvaez’ army and commission. Cortés,
Residencia, ii. 49.
[672] Cortés to remain governor of the part to be allotted him till the king should
decide. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588. According to Gomara, who
sends Veedor Álvarez Chico, Juan Velazquez, and Juan del Rio, to carry the
message, Cortés proposed a private interview for the discussion of two points,
whether Narvaez would leave Mexico to him and go to Pánuco or elsewhere,
aided by Cortés with gold and supplies, or whether Narvaez preferred to take
Mexico and give him 300 or 400 men wherewith to pass on to new conquests.
Hist. Mex., 144. The last proposal could only have been a trap to secure Narvaez’
men. Prescott chooses to omit the proposal for an interview, and sends instead
the ultimatum with Duero, a glaring disregard of Cortés’ own text, as confirmed by
others. Cortés, Cartas, 121-2; Oviedo, iii. 314.
[674] Bernal Diaz states that Cortés made the request in a manner that appeared
to Velazquez an attempt to probe his loyalty. He therefore refused to take any
valuables with him, but was finally persuaded. Juan del Rio, Cortés’ equerry, kept
him company.
[675] Bernal Diaz adds that, these efforts being observed by Salvatierra, Narvaez
was urged to seize Velazquez, and this would have been done but for the
representations of Duero and others. During the dinner given in his honor, Captain
Diego Velazquez, nephew of the Cuban governor, alluded in one of his remarks to
Cortés as a traitor. The guest appealed to Narvaez against such expressions.
Diego repeated the term, and added that Juan did not deserve to bear the name
Velazquez. Grasping his sword the latter retorted, calling him a liar. He would
prove himself a better man than either uncle or nephew, if permission was
granted. The others had to interfere to prevent the clashing of swords, and
Narvaez was persuaded to order the turbulent visitor away. At leave-taking the
general showed his annoyance, and said that it would have been better had he not
come. Diego Velazquez, who stood by his side, added a threat, to which Juan
rashly retorted, with a twirl of his beard: ‘Before many days I shall see if your
prowess equals your boast.’ Alarmed at his want of self-control, Duero and other
sympathizers hurried him away before he could utter any more indiscretions. He
and the equerry had hardly left camp before some horsemen appeared, as if in
pursuit, and caused them to increase their pace. Hist. Verdad., 95-6; Herrera, dec.
ii. lib. x. cap. i.
[676] Cartas, 122. Bernal Diaz assumes that the proposal for an interview came
from Narvaez, through Duero, to whom he also confided the intended treachery.
Olmedo, who had pretended to be won over, was also informed. Hist. Verdad., 93.
Herrera supposes that Sandoval warns Cortés, who, according to Gomara, is still
at Mexico when the proposal comes. Hist. Mex., 144. Solis is more correct in
ascribing the warning to Duero. Hist. Mex., ii. 83.
[677] The fact that he allowed such dangerous men as Velazquez de Leon and
Olmedo to go free indicates that he harbored no treachery.
[678] Gomara sends them with Velazquez de Leon. Hist. Mex., 144. ‘Chico, é
Pedro Hernandez, escribano.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i.
440. Velazquez having gone on a mediatory mission, Chico must have been sent
after his departure.
[679] ‘La respuesta ... fué prender al escribano y á la persona que con mi poder ...
los cuales estuvieron detenidos hasta que llegó otro mensajero que yo envié.’
‘Escribí una carta al dicho Narvaez y otra á los terceros, diciéndoles cómo yo
habia sabido su mala intencion.’ Cortés, Cartas, 122-3. The reference to a
messenger indicates Cortés’ meaning to be that Chico preceded Velazquez de
Leon. Gomara assumes that Cortés’ pretext for withdrawing the proposal for an
interview was that Narvaez had declined to entertain the points to be there
discussed. See note 19. Chico had warned him of the intended treachery. Hist.
Mex., 144. ‘Y que supiesse que no auian de cantar dos gallos en vn muladar, y
que aparejasse las manos.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. ix. cap. xxi. Bernal Diaz sends the
message with Olmedo, ‘since no royal notary dare carry it,’ and gives Narvaez
three days in which to send in any commission he may possess signed by the
king. Without such commission he must leave the country, or Cortés will seize him
and inflict punishment for the outrage on Aillon and on the Indians. This ultimatum
was signed also by the captains and some soldiers, including Bernal Diaz. Hist.
Verdad., 92-3. An answer was demanded through the same messengers. Tapia,
Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
[680] ‘Daria dos mil pesos, a quien matasse a Hernando Cortes, o a Gonçalo de
Sandoual.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i. ‘Traia mandado de Diego Velazquez que
á mí y á ciertos de los de mi compañía que ... nos ahorcase.’ Cortés, Cartas, 121.
‘Hizo proceso en forma contra Cortés, y por su sentencia, le condenó á muerte.’
Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 300; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 143, 146.
[681] ‘Dende a dos horas que se partiô el Juan Velazquez,’ says Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 95.
[682] Implying that since Narvaez would not listen to reason, Cortés or he should
die. ‘Velazquez dixo al ... Cortés que adonde yva que yva a la carnesceria.’
Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 9, 50, 185-6. On the way to Rio de
Canoas, where they arrived the day after leaving camp, two hogs, with navel on
the back, were killed, an incident which many interpreted as a sign of victory.
Velazquez having arrived with the messenger who carried the ultimatum, the army
proceeded. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 95. ‘Anduvimos aquel dia casi diez leguas.’
Tapia, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588.
[683] Two men were drowned in crossing the stream. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
[684] ‘Dos leguas de los contrarios.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc.. ‘Fuimos
a dormir a vn riachuelo, adõde estava en aquella sazon vna puẽte obra de vna
legua de Cẽpoal.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96. Prescott here evidently follows
the erroneous topography of Solis, who confuses this creek with Rio Canoas. Hist.
Mex., ii. 85; Cortés, Residencia, i. 249; ii. 50.
[685] ‘Como yo deseaba evitar todo escándalo, parecióme que seria el menos, yo
ir de noche, sin ser sentido ... y prenderlo [Narvaez]; ... porque los demás querian
obedecer á la justicia, en especial que los mas dellos venian por fuerza.’ Cortés,
Cartas, 123-4.
[686] He also stated that offers had been made favorable to him alone, not to
them, hence he had declined them. ‘Muera el asno ó quien lo aguija.’ Any other
course will disgrace us, was the concluding remark, whereupon we lifted him upon
our shoulders and carried him round. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 588-
9. ‘Hizo muchas ofertas, y prometimiẽtos, que seriamos todos muy ricos.’ Bernal
Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. It would be his fault, not theirs, if success failed. Herrera,
dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.
[688] Herrera writes 3000, 1500, and 1000 pesos de oro. Cortés’ acts are said by
the men of Velazquez to have been prompted by ‘un diabólico pensamiento é
infernal osadía.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 441.
[689] The above agrees chiefly with Herrera, who assigns Sandoval 60 men, and
names a number of the leading members of each party. The parties were to keep
a stone’s throw apart. One of Cortés’ squads was to look to the cacique’s palace,
and another to Alcalde Yuste’s quarters. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii. He is evidently
confused on many points, and several names are guessed at. Bernal Diaz states
that Pizarro, with 60 young men, including himself, was charged to capture the
artillery; Sandoval received 60 men; Velazquez de Leon also a force of 60,
wherewith to attack Diego Velazquez’ quarters; Cortés remained with a reserve of
20. It is more likely that a higher officer, like Olid, received the order to capture the
artillery, rather than the comparatively unknown Pizarro. Velazquez de Leon does
not appear to have been detailed for his charge till afterward. Cortés names only
Sandoval as the leader of one party of 80 men, he himself following with the
remaining 170. Cartas, 123. Solis reverses Herrera’s order. Hist. Mex., ii. 91-2.
[690] The stout cacique had remonstrated with the general on his carelessness,
assuring him that Malinche with his Teules was far different. ‘When you least
expect it he will be here and will kill you.’ Although the warning was received with
laughter, yet the hint was not lost. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 96.
[691] Eighty horsemen and 500 infantry. ‘Y llegó casi una legua de donde yo
estaba.’ Cortés, Cartas, 123.
[693] Botello, known as the Astrologer, who had made several successful
predictions, had assured Cortés that a night attack would secure him the victory.
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.
[694] Cortés rallied him upon his capture, and addressed him as compadre. After
obtaining certain information, more was demanded. The prisoner declared that he
knew nothing more. ‘Well, then, you will swing,’ said Cortés, half jestingly. The two
pikemen who held the rope round his neck took this for a command, and hoisted
him. Rangel rode up, however, and saved his life, but the compression of the
throat troubled him for some time. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. ii.-iii. Carrasco warned him
against attacking the powerful Narvaez. Vetancvrt, Teatro Ecles., pt. iii. 137; Tapia,
Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589. Prescott says that he with ‘Spartan heroism’
remained silent, Mex., 257-8; but Prescott has evidently not understood his
authorities.
[696] May 28th. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., 277. Clavigero and others assume it to
be the night between Saturday and Sunday, but the authorities are pretty clear in
mentioning the following night.
[698] Expressing the belief that Cortés would be foolhardy enough to attack in the
morning. Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 589.
[699] ‘Llegamos junto á las centinelas sin que nos sintiesen, é iban huyendo é
diciendo: Arma, arma!’ Id., 590. ‘Auisado Naruaez, y se estaua vistiendo vna cota:
y dixo aqui ẽ le auisò, no tengays pena, y mandò tocar al arma.’ Herrera, dec. ii.
lib. x. cap. iii.
[700] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99, calls the flies cocayos.
[701] Prescott, following Herrera, makes Cortés shout the password ‘Espíritu
Santo,’ which Bernal Diaz says was given as a secret word for mutual recognition.
[702] So say all the original authorities that refer to it, except Bernal Diaz, who
claims that four guns were fired, three balls passing overhead and the fourth killing
three men. Cortés acknowledges no casualties from it. Tapia even intimates that
no discharge took place, owing to the fact that to protect the touch-holes from rain
they had been covered with wax and tiles. Confused by the sudden alarm the
artillerists applied the match, forgetful of the wax, and ‘we saw that the charges
failed to go off.’ Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 590. Perhaps he would have
been more correct in saying that the men were confused by the glittering bribes of
Usagre. Bachiller A. Perez testifies: ‘Dixo al artillero poned fuego a estos tiros ...
puso fuego e no salieron los tiros e oyo dezir este testigo que avian puesto cera
en los dichos tiros.’ Cortés, Residencia, ii. 85. This implies that the wax had been
smeared on by accomplices.
[703] With from 40 to 100 men, are the different estimates.
[704] ‘Vinien los contrarios á nuestra gente, creyendo que eran de los suyos, á
preguntar, “¿qué es esto?” é así los prendien.’ Tapia, Rel., in Icazbalceta, Col.
Doc., ii. 590. ‘De las otras dos torres ... no le acudierõ, porq̄ dizen algunos que se
hizieron sordos, otros que no pudieron llegar, por el impedimento de las tropas de
Cortes.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iii.; Cardona, in Cortés, Residencia, i. 181-2.
[705] ‘Uitoria, vitoria por los del nõbre del Espíritu Sãto, q muerto es Narvaez!’
Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 98. Even this authority now shouts forth the password!
[706] Solis assumes that Farfan gave also the thrust. Bernal Diaz’ text leads one
to suppose that Narvaez received the thrust before his followers were driven into
the building, but the other authorities state clearly: ‘al salir de su camara, le dieron
vn picaço.... Echaronle luego mano.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 147; Oviedo, iii. 510.
Monjaras states that Narvaez supplicated for his life: ‘Hidalgos, por amor de Dios
no me mateys!’ Testimonio, in Cortés, Residencia, ii. 51, 85, 107; i. 365. ‘Alonso
Dávila le sacó dichas provisiones reales de V. M. del seno, teniéndolo preso é
abrazado el dicho Pero Sanchez Farfán.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta,
Col. Doc., i. 442. This occurred some time after the capture. Narvaez called upon
his fellow-prisoners to witness the deed, but Ávila shouted that the papers were
merely letters. They were given to Cortés. ‘Las avian quemado.’ Testimonio, in
Cortés, Residencia, i. 345, 365, 250; ii. 52, 187.
[707] He died, however, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera calls him
Diego de Rojas, whom Bernal classes as a captain.
[708] ‘Se retrajeron á una torre alta de un ídolo de aquel pueblo casi cuatrocientos
hombres, é muchos de los de caballo ... salieron al campo.’ Tapia, Rel., in
Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., 590. Herrera says that 300 intrenched themselves till the
morning. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés reached the battery just in time to prevent a
catastrophe, as Tapia relates. A hot-blooded young companion of the latter,
carried away by excitement, rushed to powder barrels, eight in number, and
shouted, ‘Let us fire the powder and spoil it for the enemy!’ Cleaving a barrel, he
cast a brand into it, and threw himself flat upon the ground, commending his life to
God. It happened, fortunately, that this barrel contained sandals, which by some
mistake had been mixed up with the ammunition. After waiting in vain a while for
the explosion, the madcap discovered the reason and began to open another
barrel. At this moment Cortés came up, and learning of his intention he rushed
forward and snatched away the brand.
May, 1520.
Cortés was exultant. During the last brief hour how completely
had his fortunes changed! Again was his star ascendant, filling the
whole heavens with its brightness. Alas now for Montezuma and
Mexico! And Velazquez; this was his fourth attempt on Mexico, and
in some respects his greatest failure. Instead of annihilating the
outlaw with his grand army, the outlaw in one fell swoop had secured
the grand army, and was now master of all the ships, and men, and
munitions of war, which he so much needed in consummation of his
further designs. It seemed to be the fate of the fat governor out of his
solid substance to feed his enemy with wealth and honors.
Before it was fairly light Cortés had seized and placed in
confinement such persons as might question his rights as victor; the
remainder on surrendering their arms were permitted to go at large.
[711] In order to make more secure his magnificent prize before the
all-searching sun should disclose the paucity and poverty of the
victors, Cortés seated himself in state, arrayed in a wide orange-
colored robe, and ordered the conquered troops to pass before him,
and swear allegiance to the king, and fealty to him as captain-
general and justicia mayor. This was done by nearly all, some
humbling themselves and kissing his hand, while the late hostile
leaders and old acquaintances were recognized with friendly
greetings and embraces.[712]
Meanwhile Olid and Ordaz, each with a corps, set out on the
captured horses to summon stragglers and seek the forty troopers in
the field. Duero and other friends of Cortés being among them, little
persuasion was needed to win the party over, and shortly after dawn
the whole cavalcade came in to the sound of fife and drum, shouting
vivas for Cortés.[713] High above this noise were heard from a
window the voices of two women, named Ordaz, filling the air with
their loud philippics. “Villainous Dominicanos!” they cried to the
soldiers of their own party, “the distaff would better suit you than the
sword. A good account have you given of yourselves! Unfortunate
women we to have come to the wars with such men!” Truly might
Narvaez exclaim with Xerxes, as he beheld his fair ally, Queen
Artemisia, outwit her Athenian pursuers, “My men fight like women,
and my women like men.” The Ordaz women, however, fought only
with their tongues, and that after the issue of battle. And thus
relieved they immediately descended and did homage to the victor.
The general did all he could to check this excess of zeal, which he
feared might engender ill feeling, and he even seized some of the
noisiest enthusiasts, although they were afterward rewarded.
The cacique of Cempoala, who had been slightly wounded
during the battle, appeared like the rest to offer fealty to the victor by
crowning him with flowers. Cortés received his demonstrations as if
nothing had taken place to mar their intercourse, and took up his
abode with Catalina, whose hand he had accepted during his
previous occupation of the place. The chiefs vied with one another to
obliterate their unfortunate mistake by increased attention and
hospitality, while many among Narvaez’ men thought it necessary to
excuse their tardy surrender by pleading that they had been
deceived by their principals, who had assured them that Cortés was
a traitor. Great was their chagrin in the morning on discovering how
few the victors were and how poorly they were armed. And where
were the much talked of native auxiliaries? At the same time they
could not but admire a leader who had achieved such results with
such means. Narvaez and his supporters declared that the victory
was due wholly to treachery, particularly noticeable in the action of
the artillerists.[714] In this there was much truth, but the consummate
tact and soldierly qualities of Cortés shine no less brightly for all that.
And the cost of this glory and advantage, how insignificant it was!
Four of his own men and fifteen of the enemy, including a captain,
beside a number wounded on both sides; this was all.[715]
In his report to the king Cortés seeks to gloss over the
occurrence by stating that only two men were killed, intimating that it
was on both sides. There was a deeper reason for this and other
falsehoods than the wish to hide the bloody result of fratricidal
conflict. He was still doubtful as to the view taken in Spain of his
conduct, and could not afford to prejudice his case by laying bare
every misfortune. He was aware that even to the impartial observer
he must appear as a defaulter in the duty owing by him to a principal,
and in the agreement or partnership which he had formed, and also
as the usurper of an expedition fitted out in the name and under the
auspices, at least, of Velazquez. His plea rested on his brave and
masterly conquest of a rich country, and on his election to
independent command by a party formed on the pretence that the
superior interests of the sovereign demanded the immediate
subjugation of the country. But his acceptance of that command was
a breach of duty and of contract; the right of the party to act as it did
was doubtful, and its pretence hasty, or perhaps usurped from
Velazquez, who had first entertained it; while the commission to
undertake the conquest had already been conferred on the latter.
Velazquez held besides the right of a discoverer to this coast, and
above all the royal grant to it, vaguely worded though it was so far as
indicating the situation and extent of territory. He had a right to claim
his own; though circumstances had so changed, Cortés claimed, as
to render this perilous to the interests of God, the king, and the
people, which rose above those of individuals; and in ignoring the
orders of the audiencia to desist from war on his countrymen he
followed only natural law and justifiable impulse. In this respect
Cortés was equally guilty, since his duty was to yield to the rightful
claimant. He pleads in his letter to the king, however, that self-
preservation obliged him to resist, for Narvaez had determined to
hang him and several of his followers. Here he again hides the fact
that favorable terms were at one time offered. “Had Narvaez carried
off the victory,” he continues, “it would have been with a great loss,
which must have so weakened him as to surely enable the Indians to
succeed in their meditated revolt. This would have lost the country to
the king and to the faith, and twenty years would not have sufficed to
regain it.”[716] In brief, howsoever we admire Cortés, however much
we would prefer his banner to that of Velazquez or Narvaez, we must
admit that he had hardly a shadow of right on his side, and that no
position in which he could possibly place himself was tenable. He
was a defaulter, pirate, usurper, renegade, traitor, outlaw, hypocrite;
but he was a most lovable villain, an admirable soldier, a rare hero.
On the other hand, Velazquez was right. But, though deeply injured,
he was disagreeable; though foully wronged, he was vanquished.
And the Spanish monarch was not the first or last to smile on
iniquitous success, or turn the cold shoulder to whining, disappointed
virtue.
In the course of the morning the soldier Barrientos, who had
been staying in Chinantla, arrived with the promised Chinantec
warriors, two thousand in number.[717] They had reached the
rendezvous on pentecost day, as ordered, but Cortés had found it
convenient to advance on Cempoala sooner than he had intended.
An imposing sight they presented as they marched by amidst vivas
in a file of three abreast, gorgeous with plumes and shields, the
centre man with bow and arrows, while his companions on either
side carried the formidable pike, tipped with glistening iztli. It was
fortunate that they had failed to arrive in time, since much bloodshed
was saved thereby. In fact the soldiers of Narvaez expressed a fear
that they would have fared badly with such opponents. Cortés was
nevertheless delighted with their coming, since this proved not only
the sincerity of their friendship, but showed the conquered that he
did indeed control native armies. Distributing some beads and
trinkets, he bade them return peaceably under the supervising care
of Barrientos.
One of the first measures after the fight was to secure the fleet;
and for this purpose a suitable force was sent down to the port to
take the vessels to Villa Rica, and remove the sails and rudders, so
as to prevent the escape of any to Cuba.[718] Shortly after, when the
masters and crews had tendered allegiance, the vessels were
placed in charge of Pedro Caballero, captain of one of the vessels
under Narvaez, in whom Cortés had great confidence.[719] The
fortress was again garrisoned, with a larger force,[720] and thither
were sent Narvaez and Salvatierra in chains.[721]
As for the rest, Cortés applied himself with his usual skill to
recompense those who had remained true, and to conciliate the yet
unreconciled. He reminded them that they had come not to risk their
lives for Velazquez, but to gain honor and wealth under the banner of
the king, and he was prepared to aid in this by offering them equal
terms with his veterans. As an earnest he restored within two days
their arms to all except a few leaders, and ordered his men to return
the horses, weapons, and other effects taken by them as spoils of
war.[722] What with their admiration of the liberality and soldierly
qualities of Cortés, and the prospect of speedy advancement, there
were but few who did not immediately and cheerfully accept the
terms. But this was by no means to the taste of the aforesaid
veterans. They had seen with envy that rich presents were made to
the conquered, while they, whose courage and devotion had
achieved such magnificent results, received nothing, and were even
told to return what they regarded as lawful spoils; and, further, to
share with these late comers and intended despoilers the fruits of
their years of toil and victories. A general murmur arose, and many
soldiers refused to surrender the appropriated effects. Captain Ávila
and Father Olmedo being requested to remonstrate, did so
earnestly, and told Cortés that he acted like Alexander, who honored
more the conquered than those who won the battle. He and all he
possessed belonged to his comrades, was the reply, but at present it
was necessary to conciliate their invaluable acquisition, whose aid
was needed to overcome the threatening danger in Mexico, and who
being the more numerous party might otherwise rise against them.
Their aims effected, the entire resources of a vast and rich country
were theirs. Olmedo was convinced of the wisdom of the course,
although he considered that too great liberality had been shown. The
headstrong Ávila pressed the point with his natural haughtiness,
whereupon Cortés said: “I am for Mexico; those who please may
follow; those who do not, may leave it alone. There are yet women in
Spain to bear soldiers.” “Yes, and captains and governors,” retorted
Ávila. Cortés deemed it discreet to bandy no further words at
present. So spirited a tongue must be curbed with gifts; but Cortés
awaited his opportunity. He never forgot anything.
With a view chiefly to divert the troubled spirits two expeditions
were sent out, each of two hundred men, mostly from the ranks of
the late enemy. One was directed to Goazacoalco, as before, under
the command of Velazquez de Leon, who had already held this
commission, and two vessels were placed at his disposal to send to
Jamaica for live-stock, seeds, and other requirements of the
proposed colony. The other expedition was intrusted to Ordaz for the
occupation of Pánuco, with a view to anticipate Garay. Two vessels
were given him to explore the coast.[723]
While Cortés was thus risking all on the cast of fortune at
Cempoala the troops at Mexico had been exposed to even greater
perils. At the time of his departure for the coast, Toxcatl, the fifth
month, had begun, and with it the most solemn festival of the year. It
was in honor of Tezcatlipoca, the highest of the divinities, and
identified with a supreme god, although less conspicuous in the daily
worship of the people, for they appealed rather to the nearer minor
deities, whom they regarded as intercessors, than to their supreme
divinity, whom they greatly feared, and who was very far away. The
Mexicans had been permitted to hold the celebration in the great
temple, which had been partly dedicated to Christian worship, on
condition that no human sacrifices should take place.[724] A festival
of this prominence could not fail to recall with all its force to the
natives the indignities to which they and their gods had been
subjected. We have seen how narrowly an uprising on account of the
occupation of the great temple by strange religious emblems was
escaped, and how it was restrained only by the promise of the
speedy departure of the Spaniards. Before Cortés had left the capital
he saw the smouldering fire, and it was this that led him to
strengthen the defences of the fort, to obtain extra supplies from
Tlascala, and to enjoin the strictest watchfulness and moderation.
The hostile feeling was by no means diminished by the tidings of
another larger host of invaders with doubtful motives. At a meeting of
native leaders it was admitted that the promises and statements of
the newly arrived Spaniards could no more be relied upon than those
of the deceitful Malinche, and the deferred proposition to drive out or
to kill the Spaniards was renewed with ardor. A better opportunity for
carrying out such a measure could never again be found. The great
Cortés with his cunning controlling mind was absent. There
remained only a small force in charge of the city, and the troops on
the seaboard were divided against each other. On the other hand a
multitude of pilgrims were pouring in for the festival; and what better
subjects to be worked upon for an uprising than these, and what
better incentive than religion? Beside the appeal for vengeance on
the desecrators of their altars came the patriotic call for the release
of an oppressed sovereign, whose influence was still supreme with
many, and the alluring prospect of securing the rich spoils in
possession of the Spaniards and the Tlascaltecs, the latter still more
detested as an inferior race which after years of contest had now
assumed the galling attitude of master. The preparations made
during the late fermentation required only to be perfected. More arms
were made, the people were stirred by passionate appeals, warriors
were enrolled, and other measures taken.[725]
The utmost secrecy had been observed by the conspirators, but
with so many confidants, actuated by race jealousy, by ties of
friendship, by interest, and by one above all others, the love of
woman, that the rumor was whispered in Alvarado’s ear.[726] Yet to
the mistress, who in her devotion to the lover forgot her duty to home
and kindred, must not be charged more than is her due. Sharpened
by the remembrance of past wrongs suffered on battle-field and
stone of sacrifice, the wits of the Tlascaltecs discovered evidence
which their hatred failed not to magnify. Warnings were hardly
required, however, to indicate that something unusual was stirring,
for the demeanor of the Indians had undergone a yet more marked
change. Supplies were further diminished; servants sent to market
were abused and ill-treated, and insolence was shown even to the
Spaniards themselves.[727] A still more alarming sign was the
discovery of an undermined wall,[728] and after obtaining further
particulars from a devoted Tezcucan chief,[729] afterward known as
Don Hernando, Alvarado resolved to inspect the adjacent temple
where the chief celebration was held. Here a number of suspicious
circumstances were noticed, which the Castilians readily wrought
into threatening realities; among them several victims destined for
sacrifice, regardless of the promises given, while some bloody hearts
which they saw testified to the work already done by the knife.[730]
With the victims Alvarado seized their attendants and certain of the
emperor’s courtiers, from some of whom he tortured a confession. In
this manner he learned what he already partially knew, namely, that
many arms were prepared; that during the Incensing of
Huitzilopochtli, as the festival was called, the Christian emblems
would be cast out of the temple, and that the uprising was to take
place at the conclusion of the feast.[731]
A seeming confirmation of the proposed sacrilege came from
Montezuma himself, who sent to request the removal of the Christian
emblems from the summit of the great temple, pleading as high-
priest that the presence of strange images must prove irritating to the
worshippers of other gods. Alvarado indignantly refused; he would
rather fight. The Mexicans did not choose to see their festival broken
up before the appointed time, and so the point was waived. It was
then arranged that the Spaniards should attend the ceremonies, so
as to be assured that no indignities would be offered their images.
[732]