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THE ETHICS OF GIVING
THE ETHICS OF GIVING
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
List of Contributors ix
Introduction 1
Paul Woodruff
1. Duties and Choices in Philanthropic
Giving: Kantian Perspectives 13
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
2. Virtue Ethics, Thick Concepts, and Paradoxes
of Beneficence 40
Christine Swanton
3. Doing Good and Doing the Best 78
Jeff McMahan
4. Severe Poverty as an Unjust Emergency 103
Elizabeth Ashford
v
Contents
Index 221
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
These papers were written for this volume; most of them were
presented at a conference convened by John Deigh, Jonathan
Dancy, and Paul Woodruff. The conference was supported by the
Royal Professorship in Ethics and American Society and also by
the Once Upon a Time Foundation, which is devoted to promoting
discussion about philanthropy. We are all grateful to Geoffrey
Raynor, who founded a program of university courses called The
Philanthropy Lab, which gave rise to the discussions that led to this
project, and who also funds the Once Upon a Time Foundation.
I am grateful to John Deigh and Jonathan Dancy for advice and
editorial suggestions. Anonymous readers for Oxford University
Press have been helpful as well. My largest debt is to my assistant
editor, J. Drake, who helped with format and judgments about
content.
vii
LIST OF CONTRIBUTOR S
ix
Li st o f Co n t r i b u to r s
x
THE ETHICS OF GIVING
Introduction
PAU L W O O D RU F F
Philanthropy can be a matter of life and death, for both people and
institutions. Some human lives depend on philanthropy, and so does
the quality of life for many others. Philanthropy is especially impor-
tant to us who teach at institutions supported by donations; we de-
pend on those who raise money to support, among other things,
philosophy. Yet few of us have dealt directly with hard questions
about the subject.
Philosophy matters more for philanthropy than for most subjects
in ethics, because differences in theory point to different philan-
thropic practices. Consequentialism, for example, calls us to give
where our giving can do the most good, generally in terms of lives
saved or health restored; for us in the first world, this means giving
to people who are far away from us. Virtue ethics, if situated in social
practices, may call for a more localized approach to giving. And if
justice requires the wealthy to return wealth to those who should, in
justice, have had it in the first place (as Kant suggests), then justice
asks the wealthy to determine who are the rightful owners of their
wealth. Justice may also require us to guarantee human rights, in-
cluding the rights that are violated by systemic poverty.
1
the ethiCs of GivinG
2
introduCtion
3
the ethiCs of GivinG
effect a lesser good by giving to the local library, have I done wrong?
Strong act utilitarians will be inclined to say that I have, but ethicists
from other schools of thought will not agree. Jeff McMahan in this
volume shows that, when it is not wrong to give nothing, it does not
appear to be wrong to give toward a lesser good. Thomas Hill shows
why a Kantian would approve of gifts to the arts and education, and
Brandon Boesch argues for a concept of integrity that competes
with utilitarian considerations. Christine Swanton’s theory of virtue
opens new, nonutilitarian ways of thinking about such matters.
I have added my own thoughts on justice as an afterword.
Here I offer brief summaries of the chapters.
1. Thomas E. Hill Jr., “Duties and Choices in Philanthropic
Giving: Kantian Perspectives.” Philosophers before Hill have done
little to explore the implications of Kant’s theory for philanthropy.
Hill has a distinguished record as an interpreter of Kant and also as
a philosopher who, in his own right, applies Kantian method to eth-
ical issues not directly addressed by Kant. The principal method is
that of systematic moral legislation on a rational basis. Applying this
to the human situation, Kantians propose principles that aspire to
be worthy of agreement by reason-governed human beings.
Philanthropy fulfills a duty that is wide or imperfect, in Kant’s
vocabulary—meaning that it is not specific about how, when, and
how much to help others. But it falls under a strict duty to make the
happiness of others an end of our own. That is, moral law requires us
to be philanthropic but leaves us some latitude as to how to do this.
It does not require us to be impartial with regard to family, friends,
or neighbors. The principle of beneficence as Hill understands it
is not a decision procedure for all cases and does not determine in
every case an action one should take. It is, after all, one principle in
a system of moral legislation; other principles, which may be more
demanding, will probably apply to a case in question. For example, a
4
introduCtion
5
the ethiCs of GivinG
it is when the act hits the target of virtue—what Aristotle calls the
mean. Swanton does not accept the agent-centered view that an act
is virtuous when characteristic of a virtuous agent.
Her general thesis is that such a theory can resolve certain
paradoxes of philanthropy. These paradoxes have arisen within what
she calls the welfarist consequentialist tradition. This is the tradi-
tion which, setting virtues to one side, insists that morality consists
in the promotion of the good, understood in terms of welfare. This
tradition, which she opposes, depends on the use of thin moral
concepts, such as right and wrong, and therefore stops at what she
calls the simple thought that it’s never right to prefer a worse state
of affairs to a better.
Swanton’s approach emphasizes the way in which we are situated
with other people. We “have a need for bonding with others.”
We need to nurture the qualities on which communities depend,
and these qualities include caring about individuals, groups, and
projects that are special to us.
Using this theory Swanton shows how one can respond to a
number of paradoxes: (1) Why does philanthropy seem overly
demanding? Because people cling to the simple thought and do
not temper it with respect for personal bonds. (2) Why does
supererogation—going beyond one’s duty—seem paradoxical?
That is because we forget that a duty of virtue may be understood as
“calibrated according to the nature and development of the agent.”
Saints and heroes go beyond duties calibrated in that way. (3) What
are philanthropists to do when reason does not determine a course
of action? Which charity to support? And by how much? Here she
introduces the concept of narrative virtue: within a narrative con-
text, one can be influenced virtuously by factors, such as bonds
of love and loyalty, that are independent of optimizing welfare.
(4) Why should I give if my gift literally makes no difference? In such
6
introduCtion
a case it seems that I have no fair share to give, because even if I give,
I have no share in the result. Swanton’s answer is complex: failing to
act in a “making no difference” case might be virtuous or vicious. To
see the difference, we need to use thick concepts, and specifically to
treat fairness as thick.
This is rich and productive theory. The layperson may find it
harder than welfarism to understand but, at the same time, will
recognize its results as more in line with everyday thinking about
philanthropy.
3. Jeff McMahan, “Doing Good and Doing the Best.” As a propo-
nent of effective altruism, McMahan is disappointed with the result
of his argument: when giving is supererogatory—that is, when it is
not wrong not to give—he finds that it is not wrong to give ineffec-
tively. So he challenges effective altruists to show “that much less of
doing good is supererogatory than we have hitherto imagined.” If
Leona Helmsley would not do wrong in giving nothing for human
welfare, then she does not do wrong in giving to the welfare of dogs
in preference to human beings. McMahan looks closely at several
proposed counterexamples to this result and draws a series of subtle
but telling distinctions. We do find cases in which it appears wrong
to do a lesser good, but those are cases in which one would incur no
added cost in doing the greater good.
Leona Helmsley has an interest in the welfare of dogs that she
would have to sacrifice if she diverted her legacy to human welfare.
Sacrificing such an interest adds to the cost for her of doing some-
thing that (we have agreed at the outset) she is not obliged to do
at all: philanthropy. The Helmsley case is extreme, but many of us
have interests we support with charitable giving—such as in the
arts or in education—knowing that we could do more measurable
good if we gave more effectively. Are we doing wrong by giving to
the arts?
7
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rauhassa. Ennen ensi kierrosta etsin vasikan taas käsiini, ja jos se
nyt on kyllin suuri erotettavaksi lehmästä, ei minun tarvitse muuta
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Minä en tietystikään saa kaikkia merkkipuoliani, mutta ainakin
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käyttänyt veistään. Me saimme viime kierroksessa koko joukon
merkkipuolia aitaukseen», hän päätti tyynesti.
»Mikä nyt on?» hän kysyi hymyillen onnellisena. »Mitä nyt taas
olen tehnyt hullusti?»
»Päivällisestä?»
»Se nimi sopii hänelle hyvin», huomautti Patches, »ei ihme, että
kaikki sitä käyttävät. Ja te olette varmaan saanut omanne
ratsastamisesta?»
»Omani?»
Phil nauroi. »Ettekö ole vielä kuullut sitä juttua? No, saatanhan
yhtä hyvin kertoa sen teille. Meillä on hyvää aikaa. Ratsastakaamme
eteläistä tietä, niin kenties voin näyttääkin sen teille.»
Phil nyökkäsi.
»Kuuluvatko ne Risti-Kolmiolle?»
»Musta ori oli silloin vuoden vanha», hän alkoi. »Minä olin ihaillut
sitä koko vuoden ja niin olivat kaikki muutkin pojat, jotka olivat
nähneet lauman, johon se kuului, sillä siitä näki jo varsana, mikä siitä
tulee. Vapaina elävät hevoset olivat hiukan liian lukuisia sinä vuonna,
ja me suunnittelimme ajojahtia vähentääksemme niitä hiukan, kuten
meillä on tapana tehdä vuoden tai parin väliajoin. Jokainen ajoi takaa
tuota mustaa oritta, ja eräänä päivänä, kun olimme jo hajoittaneet
monta laumaa, yllätin sen aivan sattumalta. Ajoin juuri takaa erästä
harmaata hevosia ja ratsastin samaa tietä, jota tänäänkin kuljimme,
kun se äkkiä tuli vastaani selänteen harjalla. Se tapahtui niin äkkiä,
että ori ja minä hämmästyimme kumpikin yhtä suuresti. Voitte uskoa,
että värisin kuin haavanlehti. Mutta toinnuin yhtäkaikki
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ennen kuin se ehti paeta. Mutta se taisteli kuin paholainen, niin etten
lopulta tiennyt, minäkö pitelin sitä vai se minua. Mutta se oli silloin
vielä varsa, ja minä sain sen lopuksi pysähtymään.»
Philin hymy levisi yli koko hänen kasvojensa. »Niin teittekin», hän
vastasi pyyhkiessään hikeä kasvoiltaan. »Olen teille siitä hyvin
kiitollinen.»
Patches pudisti päätään. »En voi sanoa tienneeni muuta, kuin että
te olitte pahassa pälkähässä ja että minun oli nopeasti tehtävä
jotakin. Miten kaikki oikeastaan tapahtui?» kysyi hän innokkaana
kääntämään keskustelun toisaalle.
»Ei ollut mitään syytä tappaa hyvää härkää niin kauan kuin oli
muita mahdollisuuksia. Minun tehtäväni on pitää se hengissä, — ja
sen minä yritin nyt tehdä.» Näin paimen muutamin sanoin luonnehti
ammattinsa perusohjeen, joka ei salli ottaa lukuun henkilökohtaista
vaaraa tai onnettomuutta, kun isännän omaisuus on kyseessä.
»Nuo miehet tuolla ylhäällä ovat saman näköisiä kuin ne, jotka
silloin näin, toinen kookas, toinen pienenläntä. He olivat samalla
etäisyydellä minusta, ja — niin — olen varma siitä, että nuo ovat
samat hevoset.»
»Hyvä, Patches, mutta teidän olisi pitänyt ilmoittaa siitä heti kotiin
tultuanne.»
»Hyvästi!»