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Sims’ Symptoms
in the Mind
Textbook of Descriptive Psychopathology
Femi Oyebode
MBBS, MD, PhD, FRCPsych
Professor of Psychiatry & Consultant
Psychiatrist
University of Birmingham, National Centre
for Mental Health
Birmingham, UK
Edinburgh London New York Oxford Philadelphia St Louis Sydney Toronto 2018
iii
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the
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Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: www.elsevier.com/permissions.
This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher
(other than as may be noted herein).
ISBN 978-0-7020-7401-1
Notices
Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and
using any information, methods, compounds or experiments described herein. Because of rapid advances
in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be
made. To the fullest extent of the law, no responsibility is assumed by Elsevier, authors, editors or
contributors for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability,
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contained in the material herein.
The
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Printed in China from sustainable forests
v
For my father, Jonathan Akinyemi Oyebode (1918–1971)
Femi Oyebode
Preface to the Sixth Edition
It is 30 years this year since Sims’ Symptoms in the Mind an atheoretical stance, and finally of the provisional
was first published. It is true to say that it is now well status of our understanding and explanations regarding
established as the leading textbook on clinical psycho- psychopathology. Descriptive psychopathology is today
pathology. In this new sixth edition, as in the previous even more relevant to the endeavours of clinicians and
five editions, I have retained the original structure of researchers. The standard psychiatric nomenclature is
the book but made some changes and many additions. under strain. This means that the fundamental abnormal
I have either introduced or developed some themes, phenomena, the infrastructure of nosology, must of
notably on consciousness and its disorders, disturbance necessity assume greater importance in clinical practice.
of memory, pathology of perception, the disordered Otherwise the ability to communicate meaningfully
self and disorder of the awareness of the body. The across the profession will markedly deteriorate.
most striking additions are on the role of embodiment I am indebted to many more people than I can list.
in the nature of self and of awareness of the body and The Birmingham Philosophy Group has been meeting
of the nature of guilt and shame in emotional disorders. monthly since 1992. Its members (Theo Arvantis, Lenia
These changes have been prompted by my desire to Constantine, Simon O’Loughlin, Kate Robertson, Sandy
ensure that readers fully appreciate that psychopathology Robertson and Persephone Sextou) continue to influence
is not a dead subject but one that is alive and is my thinking about psychiatric phenomena as do the
constantly in need of revision in response to conceptual members of the European Psychiatric Association Section
changes or new empirical findings. of Psychopathology including John Cutting, Maria Luisa
In my preface to the fifth edition I emphasized the Figueira, Mircea Lazarescu, Luis Madeira, Michael
fact that descriptive psychopathology, as a method, has Musalek, Gilberto di Petta and Pedro Varandas. Finally,
endured the past 100 years. It is the pre-eminent without the patients who experience and endure these
foundation for the practice of clinical psychiatry. This abnormal phenomena, and the students and psychiatric
method allows us to observe and describe abnormal trainees who ask awkward questions and out of curiosity
subjective phenomena and behaviours, and to categorize enquire into the nature of these phenomena, this book
these in order to communicate more precisely about would definitely be the poorer.
the world that patients inhabit. The clinician trained
in the phenomenological approach is all the more aware Femi Oyebode
of the need for empathic understanding, for assuming
vii
Additional Materials Within Accompanying
Electronic Version
The searchable full text for Sims’ Symptoms in the Mind, • Nine author podcasts on the following topics:
sixth edition, is available at www.expertconsult.com, 1. What is psychopathology?
accessible via the enclosed pin code. Please follow the 2. Consciousness
instructions on the inside front cover of this book. 3. What are hallucinations?
Additional materials integrated within this enhanced 4. Critique of the nature of delusions
electronic version include the following: 5. Embodiment
• Four patient scenarios (videos with transcripts), 6. The self in psychopathology
exploring: 7. Affect, mood and emotions
1. auditory verbal hallucinations, 8. Shame and Guilt
2. persecutory delusion, 9. The nature of obsessions
3. low mood, and Look out for alongside the related sections within
4. obsessive compulsive phenomenon. this book.
Look out for alongside the related sections within • Interactive question-and-answer sections for each
this book. chapter to test your understanding of key topics.
viii
SECTION 1
1
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 1
Psychodynamic
Explanatory
Behavioural etc.
Psychopathology
Observation
Descriptive
Phenomenology
FIG. 1.1 The psychopathologies.
1 Fundamental Concepts of Descriptive Psychopathology 5
moods and drives, as epiphenomena, that is, as no more is that patients may find that their experiences are not
than froth on top of the beer. In these models (radical fully comprehended by the clinician involved in their
materialism or eliminative materialism), mental life is case. This fact underlines how alienating psychotic
illusory; it is only the material, organic processes that experiences can be. These two formulations, the continu-
are real. The significance the thinker attaches to subjective ity and discontinuity views, continue to influence how
experience is regarded as purely illusory. Such a position abnormal phenomena are conceptualized even today.
poses difficulties for psychological enquiry and treatment There are two distinct parts to descriptive psycho-
and in any case is outside of the scope of this book. pathology – the empathic assessment of the patient’s
Berrios (1996) has described two formulations of subjective experience and the observation of the patient’s
descriptive psychopathology in the nineteenth century. behaviour. Empathy is an important psychiatric term
Psychologists and brain scientists predominantly tended that literally means ‘feeling oneself into’ and in psy-
to regard morbid phenomena as quantitative variations chiatric practice emphasizes the imaginative experiencing
on normal mental functions – the continuity view. of another person’s inner, subjective world. It can be
Psychiatrists, working directly with the mentally ill distinguished from sympathy, which is ‘feeling with’.
(alienists), considered that some symptoms were too A way to appreciate the distinction between ‘empathy’
bizarre to have a counterpart in normal behaviour – the and ‘sympathy’ is to recognize the role of an objective
discontinuity view. Both formulations have contributed stance towards the patient coupled with an active
to the current state of descriptive psychopathology. attempt to fully understand how certain thoughts rise
Undoubtedly, the quality of empathy shown by the from particular moods, wishes or fears and the nexus
doctor contributes to the extent of understanding of of connections between different aspects of the patient’s
the patient that is achieved. However, there is a theoreti- experiences that is integral to empathy.
cal limit to the psychological understanding that an In descriptive psychopathology, the concept of
interviewer can reach for some abnormal phenomena. empathy is like a clinical instrument, conceptual in
It is often true that certain psychotic phenomena are mode but no less incisive for that matter, that needs
such that the patient’s notions and behaviour may no to be used with skill to explore, measure and represent
longer be psychologically comprehensible through the to oneself another person’s internal subjective state.
use of empathy. In these situations the patient and The observer’s own capacity for imaginatively re-
doctor may have difficulty establishing a mutuality of presenting another person’s emotional and cognitive
understanding that, usually, readily underpins reciprocity experience to himself acts as the necessary instrument
and shared understanding. One of the consequences in this clinical task. Empathy is achieved by precise,
6 SECTION I Concepts and Method
Some psychiatrists have held the method of phe- P1 refers to its commonest clinical usage as a
nomenology in derision as archaic, hair-splitting or mere synonym for ‘signs and symptoms’ (as in
hare-chasing pedantry, but the diagnostic evaluation ‘phenomenological psychopathology’); this is a
of symptoms is a task that psychiatrists omit at their bastardized usage, and hence conceptually uninteresting.
own, and their patient’s, peril. Studying phenomena P2 refers to a pseudo-technical sense often used in
whets diagnostic tools, sharpens clinical acumen and dictionaries and which achieves spurious unity of
improves communication with the patient. Patients and meaning by simply cataloguing successive usages in
their complaints deserve our scrupulous attention. If chronological order; this approach is misleading in that
‘the proper study of mankind is man’, the proper study it suggests false evolutionary lines and begs important
of his mental illness starts with the description of how questions relating to history of phenomenology. P3 refers
he thinks and feels inside – ‘chaos of thought and to the idiosyncratic usage started by Karl Jaspers who
passion, all confused’ (Pope, 1688–1744). dedicated his early clinical writings to the description of
A cavalier neglect of abnormal phenomena can have mental states in a manner which (according to him) was
serious repercussions for care of the patient. Eight empathic and theoretically neutral. Finally, P4 refers
mentally well researchers were sent separately to 12 to a complex philosophical system started by Edmund
admission units in American mental hospitals on the Husserl and continued by writers collectively named the
pretence of complaining of hearing these words said ‘Phenomenological Movement’.
aloud: empty, hollow and thud (Rosenhan, 1973). In all Berrios (1992, p. 304)
cases save one, they were diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia. They produced no further psychiatric Of these meanings, this chapter, and indeed this
symptoms after admission to hospital but acted as book, concentrates entirely on the Jaspersian meaning
normally as they could, answering questions truth- of phenomenology, P3 of Berrios. Jaspers defines phe-
fully except to conceal their name and occupation. nomenology perhaps 30 to 40 times in his writings
The ethics and good sense of the experiment can in subtly different ways but always implying the study
certainly be questioned, but what comes out clearly of subjective experience. Walker (1988, 1993a, 1993b,
is not that psychiatrists should refrain from making 1994) has argued, very elegantly, that even though
a diagnosis but that their diagnosis should be made Jaspers himself thought that he had been influenced
on a sound psychopathological basis. Rosenhan, his by Husserl and his system of phenomenology, this
colleagues and the admitting psychiatrists gave no was not in fact so, and his psychopathology owed
information as to what symptoms could reasonably more to Kantian concepts such as form and content.
be required for making a diagnosis of schizophrenia; Walker (1995a, 1995b) considers that Jaspers radically
this requires a method based on psychopathology. misconstrued Husserl’s phenomenology. This view
With adequate use of phenomenological psycho- has been rebutted by others (Wiggins, Schwartz and
pathology, this failure of diagnosis would not have Spitzer, 1992). The implication for what follows in
occurred. this chapter, and in the rest of the book, is that the
Jaspers (1997) wrote, ‘Phenomenology, though one concept of phenomenology used here comes directly
of the foundation stones of psychopathology, is still from Jaspers and was probably influenced by both
very crude’. One of the great problems in using this Kant and Husserl.
method is the muddled nature of terminology. Almost Phenomenology, the empathic method for the eliciting
identical ideas may be assigned different names by of symptoms, cannot be learned from a book. Patients
people from different theoretical backgrounds, for are the best teachers, but it is necessary to know what
example the plethora of descriptions of how a person one is looking for – the practical, clinical aspects in
may conceptualize himself: self-image, cathexis, body which the patient describes himself, his feelings and
awareness and so on. his world. The doctor tries to unravel the nature of the
There is considerable confusion over the meaning sufferer’s experience, to understand it well enough and
of the term phenomenology. Berrios has described four to feel it so poignantly that the account of his findings
meanings in psychiatry: evokes recognition from the patient. The method of
8 SECTION I Concepts and Method
phenomenology in psychiatry is entirely subjugated to On the basis of the absence of demonstrable physical
its single purpose of rendering the patient’s experience lesions, Szasz (1960) argued that psychiatric or mental
understandable (this is a technical word in phenomenology diseases did not exist and that only behavioural deviance
and is described in more detail in the Understanding and moral or social judgements were at play in psychiatry.
and Un-understandable section; however, it incorporates He also argued that mental is an abstract concept and
the capacity for putting oneself in the patient’s place) not an objective, physical thing, and hence it could not
so that classification and rational therapy may proceed. be diseased. Brain diseases, in his view, are real, but
It is not the assimilation of abstruse facts or the mental diseases are a logical impossibility; thus Szasz
accumulation of foreign eponyms that is most difficult uses the term myth to characterize mental diseases.
in phenomenology, although either of these may be Other writers including Scadding (1967), Kendell
hard: it is the comprehension of a method of investiga- (1975), Boorse (1976) and Sedgwick (1973) have put
tion, a rigorous approach and the ability to use new forward arguments that stand in opposition to Szasz.
concepts. In an attempt to avoid the obscure and Scadding and Kendell use the combination of statistical
obvious, some of these concepts are discussed in the deviance and biological disadvantage defined as reduced
rest of this chapter. fertility to determine what a disease is. Boorse adds
that a disease is any condition that interferes with any
Concepts function of an organism (and in this view mental
functioning counts) that is necessary for its survival
DISEASE AND ILLNESS and reproduction. Additionally, a disease becomes an
Psychopathology concerns itself with disease of the mind, illness when it is deemed undesirable, a title for special
but what is disease? And, how does it differ from treatment and a valid excuse for particular behaviours.
disorder and illness? This is a vast subject that has Finally Sedgwick makes the claim that all diseases start
received discussion from philosophers, theologians, off as illnesses because the symptoms are negatively
administrators and lawyers as well as from physicians. valued and hence become a focus of social and moral
Doctors who spend most of their working time dealing interest, and that in this way the symptoms later attain
with disease rarely ask this question and even less disease status. In this account both the so-called physical
frequently attempt to answer it. Talk of disease by illnesses and mental illnesses start off as negatively
definition raises questions about the nature of health. valued states afflicting human beings and there is no
But, an even more pressing issue is whether it is possible sharp distinction to be drawn between them. See
for the mind to be diseased in the same way or manner Fulford, Thornton and Graham (2006) for further
that the liver or the kidneys can be diseased. These elaboration of these issues.
questions are outside of the scope of this book, but it It is clear that there is no widely accepted view
is important to be aware of the varied approaches that about the status of the conditions that fall under the
different authorities take to this matter. I outline the interest of psychiatrists. A simple dictum is to regard
basic arguments in the following text. disease as what doctors treat and illness as what persons
The most compelling model of a disease is that suffer from. Although this distinction between normality
which grounds a medical condition such as pulmonary and disease, health and illness, is by no means trivial:
tuberculosis on the basis of a distinctive morbid anatomy
demonstrable on examination of the lungs and which A large part of medical ethics and much of the whole
is independent of any particular observer and is assumed underpinning of current medical policy, private and public,
to be value free. It is even better if there is an under- are squarely based on the notion of disease and normality.
standing of the detailed pathophysiology – how the Left to himself the physician (whether he realizes it or not)
causative agent, in tuberculosis for instance, results in can do very well without a formal definition of disease
the recognized, typical morbid anatomy of the lungs. … Unfortunately, the physician is not left alone to work
It is obvious from the foregoing that in most psychiatric his common sense. He is attacked from two angles: the
diseases, no such typical morbid anatomy or patho- predatory consumers and the pretentious advisers.
physiology has been described. Murphy (1979)
1 Fundamental Concepts of Descriptive Psychopathology 9
representing to oneself the patient’s subjective experi- Jaspers drew on Dilthey’s formulation and contrasted
ences is fundamental to clinical practice. Understanding, understanding (verstehen) with explaining (erklären).
in both an everyday and a phenomenological sense, He has shown how these terms may be used in both
cannot be complete unless the doctor has a detailed a static and a genetic sense. Static implies understanding
knowledge of the patient’s background culture and or explaining the present situation from information
specific information about his family and immediate that is available now; whereas the genetic (an unfortunate
environment. Neither can phenomenology concentrate term given contemporary use) sense considers how
solely on the individual isolated in a moment of time. the situation reached its present state by examining
It must be concerned with the person in a social setting; antecedents, the evolving process and emerging situ-
after all, a person’s experience is largely determined by ation. This is represented in Table 1.2.
his interactions with others. It must also be concerned Understanding and explanation are both necessary
with the mental state and environment of the individual parts of the psychiatric investigation. Explanation is
before the event of immediate interest and with what concerned with accounting for events from a point of
occurs afterwards. observation outside them, understanding from inside
The method of phenomenology facilitates com- them. One understands another person’s anger and its
munication: its use makes it easier for the doctor to consequences; one explains the occurrence of snow in
understand his patient. The patient is also helped to winter. Explanations also can be described as static or
have confidence in the doctor, because he realizes genetic (Boxes 1.1 and 1.2).
that his symptoms are understood and therefore Jaspers makes an important distinction between that
accepted as ‘real’. The precise description and evalua- which is meaningful and allows empathy and that which
tion of symptoms also helps communication between is ultimately un-understandable, the essence of the
doctors. psychotic experience. There is thus a limit to under-
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) argued that the natural standing psychopathological phenomena. Although one
sciences treat nature as objects and forces that can be can empathize with the content of a patient’s delusion
explained through causal laws. In other words, the and thereby understand how that content of the belief
goal of such science is the formulation of general, originated, the occurrence of the delusion itself is, in
universal laws, whereas the humanities, for example this model, more recalcitrant to our empathy and
history and psychology, have the human subject as understanding. It can be said that our understanding
their focus and causal laws do not apply in these cir- reaches its limit when it confronts the fact of the delu-
cumstances. For Dilthey, science ‘explains’ natural sion itself. For that, we need to appeal to cognitive
phenomena by causal explanation. The humanities mechanisms or other natural science processes. We are
‘understand’ human psychic phenomena through the in need of scientific explanation, not psychological
interpretation of the meaning structures revealed in understanding.
texts or through dialogue with another person. This We can understand from a knowledge of the patient’s
distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ background why, if her thinking is going to be disor-
continues to be influential in our thinking even today dered in form, the topic or content of that thinking
(Phillips, 2004). In science we come to know the object
from outside, but in the humanities we are able to
‘know’ the subject from inside. We are able to represent
TABLE 1.2 Diagram of Understanding and
to ourselves, if not to ‘know’, the inner life of another
Explanation
person because we too have an inner life. We are able
to understand the other person through the network Understanding Explanation
of meanings associated with their behaviour. We start Static Phenomenological Observation
with the premise that behaviour means something; that description through external
is, it arises with internal consistency from psychological sense perception
Genetic Empathy established Cause and effect of
events. Wittgenstein (1953) stated, ‘We explain human
from what emerges scientific method
behaviour by giving reasons not causes’.
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de ses découvertes, leur soumet ses hypothèses et leur demande
des avis. Patience, quelque temps encore et nous saurons ce que
signifient les caractères des tablettes de l’île de Pâques où, dès à
présent, le vieil évêque devine des épitaphes, et dont il a fait l’objet
d’un mémoire adressé à l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-
Lettres.
Les Tahitiens ont un passé ; ils ne sont pas nés d’hier. Leurs
institutions politiques basées sur le régime électif, la suprême dignité
de leur allure, de leurs poses, leur politesse native, sont des signes
que ce passé ne fut pas sans grandeur. Mais en fait de monuments
de ce passé, il n’y a guère que les marae. Le marae est une espèce
de tertre où s’élevait jadis un autel fait de fragments de roches et de
coraux. Il est situé au bord de la mer et planté d’arbres,
principalement de bois de fer. Le marae était à la fois un lieu
religieux et un sanctuaire patriotique. Chaque famille de roi ou de
chef avait le sien. On y accomplissait les sacrifices et l’on s’y
préparait à la guerre. Près de Papeete, dans le district d’Arue, se
voit le marae de la famille de Pomaré.
Il faut convenir que la disposition des lieux se prêtait au mystère
et que la célébration des rites dans le bosquet sacré ne devait pas
être dépourvue d’une certaine poésie toute primitive. En s’aidant des
vagues souvenirs des vieillards et des observations recueillies par
M. de Bovis, on peut sans trop de peine reconstituer ces scènes
intéressantes. Le matin du jour fixé pour le sacrifice, les Tahitiens
affluent aux abords du marae. Ils apportent des vivres, des noix de
coco, des cochons, des régimes de feï, banane sauvage, des huru,
fruit de l’arbre à pain. Les prêtres les haranguent, ils leur répondent.
Chacun d’eux est muni de son tiï, de son idole, dont la dimension est
proportionnée à sa situation sociale. Cette idole, c’est un morceau
de bois, une bûche plus ou moins sculptée, enveloppée d’une gaîne
tressée avec le pandanus.
Devant l’autel est placé un amas de feuilles de bananier dont
personne n’approche. Ces feuilles de bananier recouvrent le
cadavre de la victime choisie pour le sacrifice. La veille, le grand-
prêtre a envoyé au roi une petite pierre noire, et cette pierre
adroitement lancée a frappé à la tempe un homme qui paressait
devant sa case tout en plaisantant avec sa vahiné. L’homme est
tombé, tué sur le coup. Son corps a été apporté dans un panier fait
de feuilles de cocotier.
Les prières ont commencé, entremêlées de litanies et de
discours où tout se confond, la louange des dieux Taaroa, Oro, Tane
Raa, etc. et la généalogie des rois ou des chefs. Tandis que le prêtre
découvre l’idole du marae, les fidèles sortent leur idole particulière
de sa gaîne ; les chants sacrés se font entendre, et les litanies sont
reprises par un acolyte dont la fonction est de crier, d’aboyer cette
liturgie retentissante. Le grand-prêtre s’est baissé vers la victime
étendue au pied de l’autel. Il se relève et tend au roi, d’un geste
inspiré, l’œil du mort qu’il vient d’arracher de l’orbite. Le roi fait le
simulacre d’avaler cet œil. Les prières continuent. Le cadavre est
découpé et ses entrailles sont examinées attentivement. La guerre
est prochaine. Est-ce la victoire ou la défaite qu’annoncent les
indices recueillis par le sacrificateur ? Le crieur se tait tandis que le
grand-prêtre prononce un discours destiné à surexciter les courages.
Le dieu est satisfait ; il agrée le sacrifice. Le chœur recommence.
Après un dernier discours, les petites idoles sont enveloppées, et la
grande idole disparaît aux yeux du peuple qui donne pour épilogue à
la cérémonie religieuse un festin copieux, un amuramaa, et des
danses.
Ce qui ajoute à l’impression produite par ces souvenirs vivants
encore dans la mémoire des vieillards, c’est l’aspect de cette belle et
riche nature, ce ciel, cette mer, ces monts, ce soleil radieux. Quel
spectacle imposant que celui de cette foule d’hommes et de femmes
demi-nus et recueillis participant à ces étranges cérémonies ! Un
dernier trait. Aux abords du marae, aux branches les plus élevées
des arbres de bois de fer, étaient suspendus les cadavres des
guerriers fameux qui pourrissaient ou se desséchaient là-haut,
bercés par la brise qui vient de l’océan ou de la montagne.
Qui peut dire ce qu’il reste des anciennes croyances sous les
nouvelles ? Le Tahitien le plus pieux, chrétien fervent et membre du
conseil de sa paroisse, croit encore aux mauvais esprits, aux
tupapau. Un missionnaire me raconte le fait suivant : Il a donné
l’ordre, un jour, à un homme de défricher une partie de son enclos.
Le travail est achevé ; pourtant, sur un petit espace, la brousse est
intacte. Interrogé, l’homme répond que cet endroit est fréquenté par
les tupapau, et il cite des exemples de gens qui ont été frappés pour
avoir touché aux arbres et aux pierres du sol. Ainsi, un habitant du
district ayant coupé une branche a été, peu de temps après, atteint
du ovi, sorte de lèpre, et s’en est allé mourir à Raiatea. Un autre,
pour avoir brisé une pierre, a subi le même sort. Ces explications
font sourire le missionnaire. Elles lui expliquent pourquoi, seuls, les
cocotiers qui se dressent là ne sont pas dépouillés de leurs fruits par
les indigènes peu scrupuleux. La superstition lui tient lieu de garde-
champêtre.
Mieux que cela ! Un Européen avise, pour prendre son repas, un
endroit ombragé suffisamment. Des Tahitiens s’approchent et lui
conseillent de se retirer. Le lieu où il se trouve est un ancien marae.
Y déjeuner serait s’exposer à la colère des mauvais esprits.
Sceptique, l’Européen sourit, se met à faire sa cuisine, et mange du
meilleur appétit. A huit jours de là, il sent les premières
démangeaisons de l’ovi. Il en est mort. Ce fait venu si à propos pour
confirmer les indigènes dans leur croyance aux tupapau, m’a été
certifié par un ancien lieutenant de vaisseau qui a pris sa retraite à
Tahiti.
Si ce n’est pas assez de ces histoires de revenants, je puis en
conter d’autres. Un tupapau veillait jalousement sur les corps de
deux braves qui séchaient au soleil dans la montagne. Sollicité par
des étrangers, un Tahitien alla un jour couper les têtes des cadavres
et vint les livrer pour cinq francs à l’arsenal maritime. Le tupapau tira
une vengeance éclatante de ce sacrilège. Le même soir, il assaillit le
malheureux indigène coupable de violation de sépulture, le roua de
coups, et le contraignit à reporter les têtes où il les avait prises.
En y regardant de près, on se rend compte que le tupapau se
confond, dans l’esprit de l’indigène, avec le rêve, avec le cauchemar
plutôt. La nuit, quand on dort, le tupapau survient sans bruit et vous
serre à la gorge. On ne peut ni crier ni se défendre. Tantôt il prend la
forme d’un chat, tantôt celle d’un cheval, tantôt celle d’un bœuf. Il ne
court point ; il vole. Jamais ses pieds ne touchent la terre. Il est
impalpable et fuyant.
Il y a de petits tupapau et le grand tupapau. Sur la route de
Punauuia, à dix kilomètres de Papeete, en plein jour, un tupapau
arrêta une voiture qui se brisa. Les Tahitiens ont depuis peur de
passer le soir sur cette route. Ce tupapau audacieux était vêtu
comme un officier d’infanterie de marine. On suppose qu’il est
l’ombre d’un commandant tué dans la guerre de 1844.
Quelle version choisir parmi toutes celles où se perd l’imagination
enfantine de l’indigène ? Les tupapau sont surtout les morts dont les
âmes ne vont point au ciel, de petits diables ; si les uns vous
prennent à la gorge, d’autres vous rouent de coups de bâton.
N’essayez pas de démontrer au Tahitien que ce sont là des fables,
des récits faits pour abuser son imagination. Il vous répond : « Est-
ce que vous autres papâa, vous n’avez pas vos tupapau ? » Cette
réplique m’a fait baisser la tête. Il ne faut pas aller bien loin dans nos
campagnes pour retrouver ces légendes, ces histoires des âmes des
défunts qui reviennent dans la nuit troubler le sommeil des vivants.
Il y a aussi la croyance aux esprits des ancêtres qui logent dans
le ventre des requins. Un jour de fête nationale, Mano, la cheffesse
de Tautira, était venue à Papeete, pleine de santé, suivie de son
district et de son himéné, et elle avait pris part aux repas et aux
réjouissances d’usage. Trois jours après, on l’aperçoit, devant une
case voisine du palais de la reine, assise, accroupie plutôt, dans une
pose triste. Pourquoi n’est-elle pas retournée dans son district ? On
l’avait vue partir cependant, la fête terminée, en compagnie des
siens. Voici ce qui s’est passé. Quand la baleinière où se trouvait
Mano est arrivée devant la passe de Pueu, le requin qui porte les
esprits de ses ancêtres l’a arrêtée. Tous les efforts pour aller plus
avant ont été vains. Elle sait ce que cela veut dire. Elle est revenue à
Papeete et elle attend paisiblement la mort. Naturellement, les
interlocuteurs de Mano essayent de la détromper. Elle secoue la
tête. Ses ancêtres l’appellent, elle va bientôt les rejoindre…
Eh bien ?… La cheffesse de Tautira est morte le lendemain
subitement.
La superstition ne s’attachait pas seulement aux esprits, aux
revenants. La personne du roi et de la reine était sacrée. Toucher à
un objet dont ils se servaient, c’était commettre un outrage et
s’exposer à être frappé du ovi. Plus d’un l’a expérimenté à ses
dépens. Le nom même du roi était entouré de respect à ce point que
les syllabes dont il était formé étaient éliminées de la langue. Ainsi
Pomaré veut dire « Qui tousse la nuit ». Po, nuit ; maré, toux. Po est
devenu rui et maré hota.
On ignore, à l’heure qu’il est, si toutes ces chimères hantent
encore les cerveaux tahitiens. Interrogés à cet égard, les
missionnaires protestants ou catholiques semblent embarrassés.
Plus d’un fidèle parmi les plus assidus au temple songe avec terreur,
la nuit, aux esprits dont il se sent entouré.
Mon domestique tahitien est un brave garçon, très laid mais si
doux qu’un sourire voile incessamment sa laideur. C’est un bon
protestant. Un soir de grand vent, une sonnette retentit dans la
maison ; Pihapiti refuse d’aller voir ce qui a pu causer ce bruit. Il a
peur des tupapau.
Les Tahitiens sont courageux pourtant, la superstition mise de
côté. Nous l’avons éprouvé quand ils ont défendu leur pays contre
l’occupation. Ils se sont montrés irréductibles, et, sans un
mouvement tournant prestement exécuté, on eût eu beaucoup de
peine à en venir à bout. Chevaleresques avec cela, s’étonnant,
s’indignant qu’on ne les avertît pas chaque fois que l’on
recommençait les hostilités, et accueillant courtoisement, entre deux
escarmouches, l’ennemi à qui ils offraient l’hospitalité pour un peu
plus.
Dans un combat, nous nous étions avancés en nous découvrant
jusqu’au pied d’une redoute construite par les tahitiens. Ceux-ci,
armés de mauvais fusils mais en nombre, font une décharge et,
sans plus attendre, se précipitent sur nous. La plupart se font tuer
mais l’avantage leur reste un moment. Un guerrier d’une stature
magnifique et dont les membres nus luisaient au soleil, blesse un
soldat d’infanterie de marine qui tombe au pied d’un cocotier.
Pendant que ce guerrier se dispose à courir à d’autres adversaires,
un de ses compagnons se penche sur le blessé pour l’achever,
comme les indigènes avaient coutume de faire. « Je prends cet
homme ! Cet homme est à moi ! » s’écrie le guerrier. Désormais,
toucher au blessé, ç’aurait été s’attaquer à celui dont il était le
prisonnier. Le combat fini, le guerrier charge le malheureux sur ses
robustes épaules et court à la plage. « Haere mai ! Venez ! » crie-t-il.
Un canot se détache du Phaéton. Après avoir remis le soldat
français aux marins, le Tahitien s’éloigne, non sans avoir salué avec
un geste magnifique : « Ia ora na ! »
« Ia ora na ! » On traduit communément cette formule par :
« Salut à vous ! » Littéralement, Ia ora na veut dire : « Que tu vives là
en bonne santé ! » Un autre trait. Dans un combat suivant, un
aspirant était parvenu le sabre aux dents, les pistolets au poing, à
tourner la redoute tahitienne. Il tombe frappé d’une balle au front. Le
guerrier prend sa dernière natte, en fait un linceul, et ensevelit
l’aspirant à côté de son enfant, non sans lui donner une pensée de
pieux regret.
On remarqua au cours de la guerre que les Tahitiens frappaient
de préférence à la tête. La raison en est qu’à leurs yeux la tête est
sacrée ; que, pour abattre un ennemi, il faut l’atteindre dans ce qu’il
a de plus noble. Aujourd’hui encore, l’indigène n’aime pas qu’on lui
touche la tête. C’est l’offenser que de se permettre une familiarité de
cette sorte. Il lui semble qu’on l’abaisse, qu’on le plonge dans les
ténèbres, si par malheur on lui passe la main dans les cheveux.
Le courage militaire aime la poésie. La guerre a inspiré plus d’un
« barde » tahitien. Voici un chant, une rapsodie plutôt, qui se disait
sur un ton de mélopée et qui est loin d’être sans beauté :
Le Guerrier blessé.
Le guerrier blessé est étendu sur la plage de Faaa, près de
Papeete.
Il attend la mort et il chante :
« Vent de Hauïti qui souffles de la montagne, tu m’as souvent
caressé dans d’autres moments alors que j’étais joyeux et plein de
force ; aujourd’hui je goûte ta douceur qui accroît ma tristesse.
» Vent de Hauïti, pourquoi n’as-tu pas des bras pour me soutenir
et me porter où tu avais l’habitude de me voir ? Tu ne me trouveras
plus peut-être au milieu des miens.
» Vent de Hauïti, remplace-moi quand je ne serai plus là ; souffle
doucement et sèche les larmes de mes parents désolés.
» Et toi, montagne qui m’as connu dans mon enfance, qui m’as
vu grandir, tu sais aussi que j’étais un homme de la montagne, car je
t’ai défendue avec courage.
» Petite rivière où je me suis si souvent assis et rafraîchi, après
mes courses dans la montagne, tu as été douce et bonne pour moi.
Je me sens mourir et je pense que je ne te verrai plus…
» Ia ora na ! »
Je livre ce morceau aux critiques littéraires qui ont pour habitude
d’analyser la poésie, les pauvres ! N’est-il pas vrai qu’il y a là
quelque chose de primitif, d’antique, de grand, et j’ajoute, pour parler
la langue du jour, quelque chose de vécu ?
Il ne faudrait pas croire que le Tahitien, citoyen français comme
vous et moi mais non soumis aux obligations de la loi militaire, ait
perdu toute vertu guerrière ! En dépit d’une déchéance dont il n’est
pas tout à fait l’auteur responsable, l’indigène serait encore un bon
soldat ; on en a fait l’épreuve quand il s’est agi d’aller réprimer les
velléités insurrectionnelles des Marquises. Les volontaires se
présentèrent en foule à Papeete, on les arma, mais ils n’eurent pas
un coup de fusil à tirer et s’en affligèrent. Aujourd’hui, si un péril de
guerre se montrait, on les verrait accourir pour défendre la France,
leur patrie.
La poésie non plus n’est pas morte. Voici une petite pièce
composée par mon ami Poroï, membre du conseil privé de la
Colonie, un personnage, s’il vous plaît !
TE MIHI FENUA !
(Le Regret du Pays natal.)
Ua tufaa te na i Vairaharaha
Le partage de la pluie est à Vairaharaha ;
Pu hai hau mai te matai
Le vent souffle doucement
Haumaru ote fenua nei
Le rafraîchissement de la terre.
Eo mai hoi te oto ia oe
Le regret de Toi (Te Fana) me pénètre
Na tae hoi te manao
Et pourtant ma pensée est venue
Ima ia oe e Mataiea
Sur toi, ô Mataiea !
Eriro atoa hoi ia oe
Car sur toi seront aussi
Tau manao e tau aroha
Ma pensée et mon amour.