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The Securitisation
of Climate Change and
the Governmentalisation
of Security
Franziskus von Lucke
New Security Challenges

Series Editor
George Christou
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in
their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand
responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy
community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective,
but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the
centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has
been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional
approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of secu-
rity, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental
security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing
political and research agenda.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14732
 Franziskus von Lucke

The Securitisation
of Climate Change
and the
Governmentalisation
of Security
Franziskus von Lucke
Institute of Political Science
University of Tübingen
Tübingen, Germany

New Security Challenges

ISBN 978-3-030-50905-7    ISBN 978-3-030-50906-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50906-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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 Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the continuous support
of a number of people. The journey that eventually led to this book started
at the University of Hamburg in the seminars of Angela Oels, which gave
me a first glimpse into the rabbit hole of Foucauldian governmentality
studies and climate politics. Thus, many thanks to Angela Oels for the
inspiration, various interesting discussions and the fruitful collaboration in
the CliSAP excellence cluster. I am also very grateful for the support of
Antje Wiener and Michael Brzoska during my time at the University of
Hamburg.
The journey then continued at the University of Tübingen where I
want to particularly thank my PhD supervisor Thomas Diez who sup-
ported my theoretical ideas from the beginning and with whom I had
countless fruitful debates on governmentality, power, securitisation and
climate change. I am also obliged to my colleagues, the student assistants
and my fellow PhD students in Tübingen, with whom I had great discus-
sions, who helped to compile empirical data and who proofread the book.
Thus, many thanks go to Zehra Wellmann, Schielan Babat, Sandra Dürr,
Thea Güttler, Leonie Haueisen, Benno Keppner, Miriam Keppner,
Katharina Krause, Hanna Spanhel and Josefa Velten. Beyond the Tübingen
crowd, a special thanks to Stefan Elbe, whose ideas greatly inspired my
theoretical approach, and who gave me invaluable feedback on earlier ver-
sions of this book. I am also grateful for the input at workshops, confer-
ences and particularly in the Tübingen IR colloquium. In particular, I
want to thank Ingrid Boas, Olaf Corry, Rita Floyd, Stefano Guzzini,
Andreas Hasenclever, Markus Lederer, Matthias Leese, Matt McDonald,

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Aysem Mert, Delf Rothe and Jürgen Scheffran. Finally, I am indebted to

my interview partners in the US, Mexico, Germany and the UK who took
the time to openly discuss with me the climate security debates in their
respective countries.
Last but not least, a special thanks to my wife Sabrina von Lucke, to my
children as well as to my family and friends who had to endure me in times
of crisis, always took the time to listen to my ideas and continuously helped
me to keep up my motivation to continue this journey until the end.

Tübingen Franziskus von Lucke

29.02.2020
Praise for The Securitisation of Climate Change and
the Governmentalisation of Security

“In this important book, Franziskus von Lucke provides a theoretically sophisti-
cated and empirically rich account of the relationship between security and climate
change. Developing a Foucauldian-inspired account of securitization, the book
rejects blanket or universal claims about the climate change–security relationship,
instead insisting on the need to critically examine how the securitization of climate
change plays out in particular empirical contexts. Exploring the cases of the US,
Germany and Mexico, von Lucke points to distinctive dynamics of securitization
in these settings, with different implications for the practices these in turn encour-
age. Ultimately, this book constitutes an important addition to literature on the
relationship between climate change and security, while developing a distinct and
nuanced account of securitization that will be of interest to a wide range of schol-
ars of security in international relations.”
—Associate Professor Matt McDonald is a Reader in International Relations at
the University of Queensland, Australia

“In 2019 a number of states and other actors (notably the European Union) have
made climate emergency declarations. It is therefore more important than ever to
understand what the securitization of the climate means. That is: Who can securi-
tize? What security measures are likely/deemed legitimate by relevant audiences?
How does securitization affect the population within and outside a securitizing
state? And perhaps most importantly of all, will it succeed? Franziskus von Lucke’s
carefully researched book offers answers to all of these questions and many others
besides. von Lucke proceeds by examining with the US, Mexico and Germany,
three real-life empirical cases of climate securitization. Each one provides unique
insights that enable a fuller understanding of climate security. Accessibly written
this is a must read for scholars and practitioners alike.”
—Dr Rita Floyd, University of Birmingham, UK, author of The Morality of
Security: A theory of just Securitization, 2019

“With great empirical detail and conceptual clarity, the book compares discourses
and practices of climate security in different contexts. An essential reading for any-
one interested in international climate politics, securitization theory, governmen-
tality and the notion of power in International Relations.”
—Dr Delf Rothe, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg
at the University of Hamburg, Germany
 Contents

1 Introduction and Theoretical Framework  1

2 United States: Climate Change, National Security

and the Climatisation of the Defence Sector 59

3 Germany: Climate Change, Human Security

and Southern Populations117

4 Mexico: Analysing Securitisation in the Global South177

5 Revisiting the Securitisation of Climate Change

and the Governmentalisation of Security225

Index279

ix
 About the Author

Franziskus von Lucke is a researcher in International Relations at the

University of Tübingen. His research focuses on critical security studies,
climate politics and climate justice, and he has worked extensively on the
securitisation of climate change. His works have appeared in
Geopolitics, the Journal of International Relations and Development and in
the Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen.

xi
 List of Abbreviations

ASP American Security Project

BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und
Reaktorsicherheit – Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (German
Environmental Ministry) (temporarily renamed BMUB in 2013)
BMVg Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – Federal Ministry of
Defence (Germany)
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und
Entwicklung – Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Germany)
C2ES Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
CAN Climate Action Network
CAP Center for American Progress
CCC Centro de Colaboración Cívica – Civic Cooperation Centre
CCS Center for Climate & Security
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – Christian
Democratic Union of Germany
CEMDA Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental – Mexican Centre for
Environmental Law
CENAPRED Centro Nacional de Prevención de Desastres – National Centre
for Disaster Prevention
CENTCOM US Central Command
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICC Comisión Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático – Inter-­
Ministerial Commission for Climate Change

xiii
xiv List of Abbreviations

CISEN Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional – Centre for

Research and National Security
CMM Centro Mario Molina – Mario Molina Centre
CNAS Center for a New American Security
COP Conference of the Parties
CPI Climate Performance Index
CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies
CSS Critical Security Studies
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
ENCC Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático – National Strategy on
Climate Change
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FONDEN Fondo de Desastres Naturales de México – Mexican Natural
Disaster Fund
FOPREDEN Fondo para la Prevención de Desastres Naturales – Mexican
Federal Fund for the Prevention of Disasters
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit –
German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
(formerly GTZ)
GLOBE Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment
HDI Human Development Index
IfP-EW Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action
INE Instituto Nacional de Ecología – National Institute for Ecology
INECC Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático – National
Institute for Ecology and Climate Change
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MAB Military Advisory Board
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSS National Security Strategy
ODUSD-ES Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense –
Environmental Security
 List of Abbreviations  xv

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAN Partido Acción Nacional – National Action Party
PDCI Partners for Democratic Change International
PEACC Plan Estatal de Acción ante el Cambio Climático – State Level
Plan for Climate Action
PECC Programa Especial de Cambio Climático – Special Programme
on Climate Change
PIK Potsdam Institut für Klimafolgenforschung – Potsdam Institute
for Climate Impact Research
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional – Institutional
Revolutionary Party
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SAGARPA Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y
Alimentación – Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock,
Rural Development, Fisheries and Food
SEGOB Secretaría de Gobernación – Mexican Home Office
SEMARNAT Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales –
Department of the Environment and Natural Resources
SERDP Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – Social Democratic
Party of Germany
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit – German Institute for
International and Security Affairs
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAM Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México – National
Autonomous University of Mexico
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WBGU Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung für Globale
Umweltveränderungen – German Advisory Council on
Global Change
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Sovereign power 21

Table 1.2 Disciplinary power 24
Table 1.3 Governmental power 27
Table 1.4 Sovereign discourse 33
Table 1.5 Disciplinary discourse 35
Table 1.6 Governmental discourse 38
Table 5.1 Political impacts of climate security discourses 239

xvii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Theoretical Framework

Introduction
On June 22, 2018, at a European Union (EU) high-level event on
‘Climate, Peace and Security: The Time for Action’ High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini urged that act-
ing on climate change was to invest ‘in our own security’ (EEAS 2018).
Only a few weeks later, on July 11, 2018, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) once again discussed ‘climate-related security risks’ and
the Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed made clear that ‘cli-
mate change is a real threat and it is proceeding at a relentless pace’ (UNSC
2018). Finally, in January 2019 at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Greta Thunberg, who has become famous for her passionate and inexo-
rable climate activism and her role in starting the Fridays for Future move-
ment, warned that ‘our house is on fire’ and urged political leaders to
immediately adopt measures to stop climate change (Thunberg 2019a).
These three examples are all part of a longstanding political debate that
has highlighted the catastrophic consequences of climate change and
linked the issue to a range of security concerns (Brauch 2009; Rothe 2016;
Dyer 2018; Lippert 2019; McDonald 2013). This ‘securitisation process’
(Buzan et al. 1998) already began in the 1980s when climate change first
entered international politics and began to be discussed in relation to
broader environmental security concerns (Floyd 2010, p. 75; Hardt
2017). Since then, the debate has expanded continuously and made

© The Author(s) 2020 1

F. von Lucke, The Securitisation of Climate Change and the
Governmentalisation of Security, New Security Challenges,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50906-4_1
2 F. VON LUCKE

climate change the undisputed focal point when it comes to linking

changes in the environment to security concerns (Brzoska and Oels 2011,
p. 51). Politically, these debates have not been without consequences.
Even though the empirical and causal connection between climate change
and security or conflict is contested in the academic literature (Scheffran
et al. 2012b; Barnett 2000; Buhaug et al. 2014), the persistent linking of
the two has nevertheless established climate change as one of the defining
security problems of the twenty-first century in global politics (Chaturvedi
and Doyle 2015; Rothe 2016; Lippert 2019; Dyer 2018; Dalby 2013b).
Linking climate change with security thus has decisively transformed how
political practitioners handle these issues and has legitimised numerous
policies and practices (Floyd 2010; Diez et al. 2016; Oels 2012; UNGA
2009b; WBGU 2008; Scott and Ku 2018). However, despite the apparent
consensus that climate change is not only an environmental concern, eco-
nomic problem or a matter of justice but will very soon have tangible
security implications, activists, political practitioners and scientists differ
considerably when it comes to conceptions of security to make sense of
climate change.
Some have predominately pointed to its ‘national security’ conse-
quences, for example, direct threats to the territorial integrity of states and
the increase in violent conflicts. As a consequence, they have urged to
integrate climate change into the planning of traditional security institu-
tions to prepare for a future ravaged by climate-induced violent conflicts
(CNA 2007, p. 6; CNA Military Advisory Board 2014, p. 21; Chaturvedi
and Doyle 2015; Buxton et al. 2016; Briggs 2012). In stark contrast, oth-
ers have emphasised the repercussions of rising temperatures for ‘human
security’, meaning the general deterioration of living conditions of poor
populations mainly due to resource scarcity and an increase in extreme
weather events (WBGU 2008, p. 1; see also GTZ 2008b, p. 8; Scheffran
et al. 2012a). To handle the resulting problems, they have recommended
lowering the vulnerability of affected populations by transforming prob-
lematic behaviour, to scale up adaptation efforts and to increase develop-
ment aid (GTZ 2008a, p. 55; WBGU 2008, pp. 10, 115). Finally, many
have refrained from concrete threat constructions and have instead
depicted climate change as an overall ‘risk’ that will gradually affect count-
less variables and in turn pertain a whole range of risk groups and areas
around the world (adelphi 2012, p. 31; World Bank et al. 2013, pp. xviii,
xx; Corry 2012; Lippert 2019; Oels 2011; Rothe 2011b). From this point
of view, the appropriate response is to develop sophisticated risk
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 3

management schemes to increase the resilience of risk groups and areas in

order to eventually keep the overall risk at a tolerable level (Greenpeace
México 2010, p. 57; World Bank et al. 2013, p. xvii).
Thus, despite the agreement that climate change is somehow linked to
security problems, the exact nature of the threat, the affected referent
objects as well as the political and normative consequences of handling
climate change as security issue are far from clear. This is not only true for
the political debate but even more so for the academic literature, which
tries to make sense of the empirical ‘climate security nexus’ (Scheffran
et al. 2012a) and the political consequences of linking climate change to
security conceptions (Brauch 2009; Diez et al. 2016; Detraz and Betsill
2009; Corry 2012; McDonald 2013; Dyer 2018; Buxton et al. 2016;
Rothe 2016). The aim of this book is to contribute to these debates by
exploring how specific security representations of climate change have
influenced political debates, policies and practices. It thus focuses on how
to theoretically make sense of the diversity of security conceptions that are
associated with climate change; how different discourses of climate change
as security issue have come about in diverse contexts; whether and how
they make a difference in terms of political consequences and what norma-
tive implications this has.

The Evolution of the Climate Security Nexus in Academic

and Political Debates
Much of the alarming political debate on climate security is based on aca-
demic literature about the nexus between the environment, climate change
and security (Buhaug et al. 2014; Brauch and Scheffran 2012; Lee 2009;
Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Hardt 2017). This research to a considerable
extent draws on older works on environmental security and conflict origi-
nating in the 1980s and 1990s (Ullmann 1983, p. 134; Dalby 2009,
p. 14; Deudney 1990; Deudney and Matthew 1999; Pirages 1991). It also
stems from the theoretical debates about the ‘broadening’ (e.g. not only
states are considered as security threats) and ‘deepening’ (e.g. new episte-
mological foundations of thinking about security and the consideration of
new referent objects such as individuals) of traditional understandings of
state or military security (Ullmann 1983; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams
1996, 1997; Mathews 1989). Empirically, this research focused on the
questions whether and how environmental change could initiate or con-
tribute to social, political or ultimately violent conflict (Homer-Dixon
4 F. VON LUCKE

1991, 1994) as well as lead to hundreds of millions of environmental refu-

gees (Myers 1995). Notwithstanding the weak empirical evidence for any
of these claims (Hartmann 2010, p. 235; Greenpeace 2007; Oels and
Carvalho 2012), a range of different political actors eagerly adopted this
argumentation to advance their political agenda.
At the beginning of these debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
climate change was only discussed as one issue besides other environmen-
tal problems that were increasingly linked to security concerns and con-
flict. However, due to its global reach and overall magnitude, it soon
became one of the key dangers. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s,
several environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Oels
2012, p. 186; Myers 1995) picked up the security framing to raise atten-
tion for climate change. Amongst other factors, this contributed to impor-
tant breakthroughs in the international negotiations on climate change.
Examples are the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the commencement of the
yearly Conferences of the Parties (COP) in 1995 and the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which all, to some extent, were also legitimised
by referring to the threatening potential of climate change.
While environmental and climate security debates became less prevalent
towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the increasing scientific
evidence for the far-reaching implications of global warming epitomised in
the ever more detailed reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2001, 2007) restarted the debate in the mid-­2000s
(Brzoska and Oels 2011; Oels and von Lucke 2015). In contrast to the
earlier discussions, other environmental problems largely ceased to play an
important role, and climate change became the undisputed centre of this
novel environmental security debate. Academically, this led to a renewed
interest in questions about how environmental degradation and particu-
larly climate change contributed to violent conflict or migration (Scheffran
et al. 2012b; Barnett 2003; Barnett and Adger 2007; Scheffran et al.
2012a; Hsiang et al. 2013; Gleditsch 2012). While the findings of this
research were mixed (Scheffran et al. 2012c; Barnett and Adger 2005,
2007; Salehyan 2008; Gleditsch 2012), this did not prevent numerous
political actors from claiming that climate change indeed was one of the
main security challenges of our times and necessitated urgent action,
which entailed genuine climate mitigation, but also the development of
military counter-strategies.
 1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 5

Amongst the first political actors that actively waged this debate were
security policy-focused think tanks in the United States (US), which par-
ticularly since 2007 have repeatedly drawn a connection between climate
change and national security (CNA 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Campbell
2008). Beyond these, the former Vice President of the US and Democratic
presidential candidate Albert ‘Al’ Gore at various occasions highlighted
the far-reaching security implications of climate change (Gore 2007). On
the other side of the Atlantic, the German Advisory Council on Global
Changes (WBGU) published a widely received report on ‘Climate Change
as Security Risk’ (WBGU 2008), and the European Union (EU) as well
discussed the security implications of climate change in 2008 (Solana and
EU Commission 2008) and most recently in 2018 (EEAS 2018).
Moreover, several environmental and human rights NGOs began to
frame climate change as security issue (Greenpeace 2007, 2013; Christian
Aid 2006, 2007; Smith and Vivekananda 2007). On the global level, the
UN Secretary-General has published a widely noted report on the possi-
ble security implications of climate change (UNGA 2009a), and the
UNSC discussed the repercussions of climate change for ‘global peace
and security’ in 2007, 2011, 2013 and 2018 (UNSC 2007, 2011, 2013,
2018; Scott and Ku 2018) and in 2019 held a debate on climate change
as a ‘threat multiplier’ (UNSC 2019). Finally, even though not always
directly mentioning the word ‘security’, Greta Thunberg, Fridays for
Future, as well as other movements such as Extinction Rebellion have
repeatedly emphasised the catastrophic and existentially threatening con-
sequences of climate change. Instead of ‘climate change’, they hence
increasingly use terms such as ‘climate crisis’, ‘climate breakdown’, ‘cli-
mate apocalypse’ or ‘climate emergency’ (Fridays for Future Austria
2019; Thunberg 2019a, b; Extinction Rebellion 2019). While aiming at
conveying the far-reaching consequences of the issue and calling the pub-
lic and politicians to action, they also contribute to the continued securi-
tisation of climate change.
In general, while economic arguments (Stern 2006), justice concep-
tions (Caney 2006, 2010; Finley-Brook 2014) and growing scientific evi-
dences (IPCC 2007) also mattered, constructing climate change as
security issue has been central when it comes to raising attention and facili-
tating as well as accelerating political responses. One example is the 15th
Conference of the Parties (COP) summit in Copenhagen in 2009, which
received unparalleled attention in the media and public debates not least
because it took place during the peak of the global climate security debate
6 F. VON LUCKE

(Oels 2012; Methmann and Rothe 2012). The widespread political and
media attention for the various UNSC debates on climate change and its
implication for peace and security further illustrates this argument (Sindico
2007; Goldenberg 2011; Brössler 2019; Oels and von Lucke 2015; Scott
2015; Scott and Ku 2018). Beyond the international level, linking climate
change to security concerns also changed the domestic debates and influ-
enced a range of policies and political practices in various countries
(Brzoska 2012; Buxton et al. 2016; Rothe 2016). As the Chaps. 2, 3 and
4 of this book show in more detail, it helped to legitimise far-reaching
climate policies in Germany, facilitated an integration of climate change
into security policy in the US and transformed disaster management
approaches in Mexico.
Having said that, these widespread climate security debates did not result
in a consensus about what specific kind of security issue climate change is,
what the appropriate countermeasures could entail and whether linking cli-
mate change to security is to be welcomed from a normative perspective.
The academic literature on the climate security nexus is not of much help
here because even though it casts doubt on the connection between climate
change and security, it has not looked at the resulting political debates. This
raises the questions why and how climate security discourses (entailing dif-
ferent conceptions of security) have become so prominent in the political
debate notwithstanding their sometimes weak empirical foundations and
what political consequences this securitisation has had exactly (see, e.g.,
Floyd 2010; Trombetta 2011; Oels 2012; McDonald 2005, 2008, 2013;
Corry 2012; Dyer 2018; Rothe 2016; Lippert 2019).
According to the original securitisation theory, the Copenhagen School
(Buzan et al. 1998), security issues are socially constructed (Buzan et al.
1998, p. 24) and a successful securitisation establishes a political platform for
the legitimisation of extraordinary measures to counter a threat (Buzan et al.
1998, p. 21). While some might understand the yearly COPs or milestones
of the international climate regime such as Kyoto or the latest Paris
Agreement as extraordinary, most scholars agree that they do not go beyond
normal politics, particularly given their more than questionable effect on the
abatement of climate change (Oels and von Lucke 2015, p. 47; Gardiner
2004; Caney 2016; Buzan and Wæver 2009; Stripple 2002). The increasing
criticism by social movements and climate activists such as Greta Thunberg,
Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, which have become much
more vocal since 2016, further underline that the current handling of cli-
mate change is far from extraordinary. Theoretically, one conclusion
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castle. The little bird that just before had been singing so sweetly on
the windowsill hushed its song. The distant hum of voices from the
courtyard beneath was stilled. Even the old woman, who had been
standing beside her wheel telling the princess how to spin, stopped
short and fell asleep. In the great hall, the king and queen, who had
just returned, and were inquiring for their daughter, fell asleep before
the lady-in-waiting could answer them, and the lady herself began to
snore. The guards slumbered at their posts. The horses in their stalls
became motionless, and so did the dogs in the yard, the pigeons on
the roof, and the flies on the wall. The fire on the hearth stopped
burning, and the meat on the spit ceased roasting. In short, sleep fell
on the whole castle, and round about it there sprung up a thick and
thorny magic wood which it seemed impossible for anyone to
penetrate, and which hid the entire castle from view except a
weather-vane on the roof.
Time went on until a hundred years had passed, and then one day
a king’s son happened to be hunting in the region. He became
separated from his attendants in the excitement of the chase, and at
length he came to a woodcutter’s cottage and dismounted to ask the
way. The old man who lived in the hut gave him the required
directions, and then told the prince about a thick wood a little farther
on in the direction he had been riding. “No one has ever been able to
get through that wood,” said the old man, “and my grandfather used
to say it surrounded a castle in which was a beautiful princess
condemned to sleep for a hundred years. He said some prince would
come and awaken her with a kiss.”
On hearing this, nothing would do but the prince must go and have
a look at the wood. He found it, and dismounted and prepared to
push his way through the thorny thicket. But no sooner did he start to
penetrate the wood than the tangled briars of the undergrowth were
changed into beautiful flowers which parted and bent aside to let him
pass. When he reached the courtyard he saw the dogs lying asleep,
and on the roof the pigeons were sitting with their heads under their
wings. He went indoors, and there were the flies asleep on the wall,
and there was the cook with his hand uplifted to strike the kitchen
boy, and a maid sitting near by had a fowl on her lap ready to pluck.
When the prince entered the great hall he found the whole court
asleep, and the king and queen slumbering on their thrones.
Everything was so still he could hear his own breathing.
As yet he saw no princess, and he continued looking about till he
came to the old tower and ascended the narrow, winding stair. He
went into the little room where the princess lay, and she looked so
lovely in her sleep that he could not turn away his eyes, and
presently he stooped and kissed her. At once she awoke and said:
“O prince, are you here at last? I have had such pleasant dreams!”
She sat up laughing and rubbing her eyes, and after a few
moments stood on her feet, and they went hand in hand out of the
room. The old woman stared at them in amazement, and then,
mumbling to herself, resumed her spinning. They descended the
stairs and passed along the corridors until they came to the throne
room. The king and queen and whole court had just waked up and
were gazing at each other with wonderment. The long sleep was
ended for the rest of the palace also. Roosters crowed, dogs barked,
the cats began to mew, the clocks struck the hours, the heralds blew
their trumpets, the pigeons flew away from the roof to the fields, the
kitchen fire blazed up, and the meat was again roasting, the cook
gave the kitchen boy such a box on the ear that he roared lustily, and
the maid began to pluck the fowl.
In short, everything went on as if there had been no enchantment
at all. To be sure, the dress the princess was wearing was such as
the prince’s great-grandmother might have worn, but that gave them
something to laugh at.
As soon as preparations could be made, the wedding of the prince
and princess was celebrated with great splendor, and they lived
happily ever after.
THE LOVE OF THE SNOW-WHITE FOX

O
NCE upon a time there lived a young fox that was snow-white,
and it was so gentle and intelligent that it was beloved by all
the good people for miles around. If, in the evening, it
knocked softly at their doors with its tail they were glad, and were
quick to let it in. When it entered it would play with the children, eat
of their humble fare, and then trot away. But there were hunters in
the country who wanted to kill the beautiful white fox. Once or twice it
nearly lost its life at the hands of these cruel men.
One summer afternoon, as it was frisking about in the woods with
some young fox friends, two men caught sight of it. They were fleet
of foot and had dogs with them. Away ran the white fox, and the men
uttered an excited cry and gave chase. Instead of going deeper into
the forest the fox ran across the open farm lands until it came to a
holy temple. “There, surely, I will find a safe refuge from my
pursuers,” it thought.
In the temple there happened to be a young prince of noble family
named Yashi, deep in meditation. The white fox, whose strength was
nearly spent, came running in at the door and went directly to the
prince and took refuge behind him. The poor creature trembled with
fright, and Yashi took pity on it and did all he could to calm its fears.
“I will protect you, little one,” said he. “No one shall harm you.”
The fox looked up at him and seemed to understand his words. It
ceased to tremble. The prince went to the door of the great temple.
Two men hastened up to him and asked if he had seen a snow-white
fox. “It must have run into the temple,” they declared.
 But
Yashi,
faithful
to his
promis
e,
answer
ed, “I
have
been in
the
temple
praying, but I can tell you
nothing of the fox.”
The men were about to go on
when they caught a glimpse of
the fox behind him. Fiercely they
demanded that he should stand
aside. The prince firmly refused. Then the men, intent on having their
prey, attacked him, and he was obliged to draw his sword in self-
defense. At this moment Yashi’s father, a brave old man, came up.
He rushed on the assailants of his son, but a deadly blow, which
Yashi could not avert, struck the old man down. This made Yashi
very wroth, and with two mighty strokes he felled his adversaries to
the ground.
The loss of his father filled Yashi with grief, and as he stood
looking down on the body his heart was very heavy. Just then a
sweet song from within the sacred building greeted his ears. Who
could the singer be? for there was no one inside when he came out.
He reëntered the temple, and a beautiful maiden appeared before
him. He saw from her look and manner that she knew he was in
deep trouble, and he told her of the snow-white fox and the cruel
hunters, and of the death of his father. Then the maiden spoke to
Yashi tender words of sympathy, and her voice was so kindly and
gentle that even the sound of it brought comfort to him.
 Presently he asked her who she was, and she replied that she
was a homeless stranger. So he insisted that she should dwell with
him. As the days passed she constantly became more attractive to
him, until he loved her more than anyone else in the world and asked
her to be his bride.
“I already love you,” she replied. “I know that you are good and
brave, and I would solace you for the loss of your father.”
So they were married and lived happily together. Time passed
swiftly, and Yashi ruled his people wisely. At length a son was born to
the prince and princess, and they were more happy than ever. But
one day Yashi noticed that the princess was sorely troubled. For
hours she sat alone, and tears sprang to her eyes when Yashi asked
her the cause of her sorrow.
She took his hand and said: “My life with you has been very
delightful. But now that I have given you a son to be with you always,
I must leave you. I am the snow-white fox whose life you saved.”
Once again she looked into his eyes, and then without another
word was gone. Yashi and his son lived long and were greatly
beloved, but the snow-white fox was seen no more.
 THE GRAZIER’S WIFE

I
N a certain valley, long ago, there dwelt a grazier who had a wife
named Barbara. The grazier was famous for his valor in
encountering wolves, and there was not in all the valley a man
who was his match in handling the quarter-staff. Moreover, so expert
was he with a sling that he could hurl a stone a distance of a
hundred yards and hit a deer between the eyes, and so kill it. With
his knife he was equally skilful, and he was greatly feared in a
quarrel. Yet in spite of all his prowess and courage he quailed before
his wife Barbara.
She was no longer young, and her beauty was a thing of the past,
but she was a woman who made herself respected. She never failed
to produce a startling effect on her husband when she visited him as
he was tending his herds on the mountain-sides, for no other woman
ever had such a tongue. He often prayed to the saints for relief, but
she continued to both plague him with her tongue and mark him with
her nails.
At last he applied for advice to an old wizard who lived in a
neighboring valley. He had begun telling of his troubles when the
wizard interrupted him and said: “I see plainly that you are
complaining bitterly, but I would have you know that I am deaf, and
no matter how violently you shout and jump and gesture, what you
say or do will have no effect on me. Nevertheless, let me tell you,
that if you have some bright yellow gold to bestow on me, you will be
heard and understood. Yes, I would hear and comprehend, even if
you were dumb and had no voice whatever.”
 “I will hasten to the market,” said the grazier, “and sell some of my
finest beasts, and the money that I receive for them I will gladly give
to you.”
So away he went and sold some of his beasts and returned to the
wizard and counted out the gold-pieces one by one. Then the wizard
listened patiently to his story and sent him home with a promise of
speedy relief.
That very night, after the grazier and his wife were in bed, and the
latter was delivering a lengthy lecture on his lack of breeding in
snoring when a lady was speaking, a white figure appeared at the
bedside with a mirror in its hand.
“Barbara,” said the specter, “your virtues are known to me, and as
a reward you shall be restored to youth and beauty, which you shall
yourself behold when you look into this mirror. But beware lest angry
or vain words pass your lips, for such a lapse will be punished by
hideous old age and infirmity.”
 So saying, the apparition vanished. Barbara lit a lamp and
occupied herself in admiring her reflection in the magic mirror. Thus
the grazier was enabled to enjoy an unbroken sleep till morning, a
thing he had not done for years. He had peace also on the morrow
and ever after, for Barbara never allowed the mirror to pass out of
her possession, and it was a constant solace to her even to the day
of her death.
 THE MAGIC HORN

O
NCE upon a time there was a poor farmer who had three
sons, and the sons’ names were Peter, Paul, and Philip. None
of the three liked work very well, and instead of helping their
father they spent most of their time sauntering about. At last Peter
heard that the king wanted a keeper to watch his rabbits. So the
youth told his father that he would go to the king’s palace and apply
for the position.
“I doubt if you are fitted for just that sort of work,” said his father.
“He who keeps the king’s rabbits needs to be light and quick, and no
lazy-bones. You could not loiter when the rabbits began to skip and
frisk, for if you dawdled as you do at home you would be
discharged.”
But the father’s advice had no effect. Peter was determined to go,
and after filling a bag with something to eat and drink and a few
other necessaries, he took the bag on his back and started. He had
not traveled many miles when he heard a voice calling for help. On
going in the direction of the sound he found an old woman in a pit
from which she was unable to climb out. “Don’t stand there staring,”
said she sharply. “Reach me your hand and pull me up. I have been
in this pit a whole year, and in all that time I have not had a morsel of
food.”
“What!” exclaimed Peter, “a whole year, do you say? Then you
must be a witch, or you could not fast so long, and I will have nothing
to do with you.”
 So off he marched. At length he arrived at the king’s palace and
was engaged as the keeper of the rabbits. He was promised plenty
of food and good pay and maybe the princess into the bargain, for
the king had decreed that any keeper who took such good care of
the rabbits that not one of them escaped should have the princess
for his wife.
The next day Peter let the rabbits out to browse. As long as they
were near the stables and in the adjacent open fields he kept them in
one flock, but toward evening they got into a wood and began to
scuttle about among the trees. Peter ran after them this way and that
until he had no breath left for any more running. He could not get the
rabbits together. They all disappeared, and he saw nothing more of
them.
After resting a while he started to go back to the palace. As he
went along he kept a sharp look-out, and he stopped to call his
fugitive charges at every fence. But no rabbits came, and when he
reached the palace there stood the king waiting for him. It was plain
that Peter had failed, and for a punishment he was banished from
the country.
The king presently got a new lot of rabbits, and then he let it be
known that he wanted a keeper. Peter’s brother Paul heard of this,
and nothing would do but he must try for the place. Away he went,
and by and by he found the old woman in the pit just as Peter had,
and he would not help her out. When he got to the palace he was
promptly engaged as keeper of the rabbits, and the next day he let
them out to feed. All went well until in the late afternoon they went
from the fields into the woods. Then they skipped and hopped away,
and though he rushed about and raced after them till he was ready
to drop, they all escaped. So he returned to the palace without a
rabbit, and the king ordered that he should leave the country.
More rabbits were obtained to replace those lost, and again word
went forth that his Majesty wanted a keeper for them. Philip, the
youngest of the three brothers, heard of this and concluded to apply
for the job. “It will be just the right work for me,” he said to his father.
“I would like nothing better than to spend my days in the fields and
woodlands watching the rabbit flock, and I would be sure to have
plenty of time to nap on the sunny hillsides.”
“I fear,” said the old farmer, “that you will fare no better than your
two brothers. The person who keeps the king’s rabbits must not be
like a fellow with leaden soles to his shoes, or like a fly in a tar-pot.”
“Well,” responded Philip, “however things may turn out, I shall get
the job if I can. Surely it will be no harder than to take care of the calf
and goat here at home.”
So he packed his bag, lifted it to his shoulder, and started for the
palace of the king. He trudged along until he heard a voice calling,
and when he looked about he saw the old woman in the pit. “Good
day, grandmother,” said he, “what can I do for you?”
“Help me out of this hole,” she said, “and give me something to
eat. I will do you a good turn afterward, you may depend on it.”
He was willing enough, and he pulled her out of the pit. Then he
opened his bag and sat down to eat and drink with her. She had a
keen appetite after her long fast, and naturally got the lion’s share,
but that did not trouble Philip any. As soon as they finished, she gave
him a magic horn, and said: “If you blow into the small end of it,
whatever you wish away will be scattered to the four winds; and if
you blow into the large end the things you wish near will at once
come about you. Should the horn ever be lost or taken from you, all
you have to do is to wish for it, and it will return to you.”
“Very good,” responded Philip. “Such a horn is worth having.”
So saying, he resumed his walk, and at length he came to the
king’s palace. He was hired to keep the rabbits, and he was much
pleased, for he was certain of good food and generous wages, and if
he were clever enough not to lose any of the rabbits he might win the
princess, too. The next morning he began work, and at first he found
the task an easy one. As long as the rabbits were in the lanes and
fields they behaved very well, but while he was eating his noon lunch
they wandered to the woodland, where they frisked about and
scampered away into the underbrush.
 “Ho, ho!” cried Philip, “you want to leave me, do you? Well, off with
you then,” and he blew into the small end of the magic horn.
Immediately they were all gone from view, and Philip found a
mossy spot to his liking and lay down to sleep till eventide. The sun
was low in the west when he awoke, and he took up his horn and
blew into the large end of it. At once the rabbits came frolicking
about him, and he led them like a flock of sheep to the king’s palace.
The king, the queen, and the princess, too, all came out on the porch
and wondered how he contrived to manage the rabbits so well.
Several times the king counted them to make sure they were all
there and he had to acknowledge that not one was missing.
“That rabbit-keeper would be a fine lad,” said the princess, “if only
he was of noble birth.”
The next day he took the rabbits out again, and when they roamed
to the woodland he lay down in the shade at the edge of the wood
close to the sunny slope where the wild strawberries grew and
scented the air with their sweet odor.
The king was curious to learn how the youth contrived to control
the rabbits so admirably, and he sent a servant to watch him. By and
by the servant came peeping about among the trees and spied Philip
asleep in the pleasant shade of the woodland. He hid in a thicket and
waited. Toward evening he saw Philip rise to his feet and blow his
horn, and immediately all the rabbits came scampering about him.
The servant hastened home and told the king what he had observed,
and the king told his wife and daughter.
“Unless we put a stop to his using that horn,” said the princess, “I
shall have to marry him, and he is only a common farmer’s son.
Tomorrow I shall go to the wood, and while he is asleep I will take his
horn and bring it home to the palace.”
She went to the wood just as she had planned, and she had little
trouble in getting possession of the horn. When Philip awoke it was
gone—and how was he to bring the rabbits together? But he
remembered that the old woman had said he could get it back by
wishing. So he wished for it; and the princess, who had nearly
reached the palace, felt it suddenly slip through her fingers, and
though she searched all about she could not find it. The horn had
returned to the hands of Philip in the woodland, and he immediately
blew it to fetch the rabbits together, and then he went with them to
the palace.
 Philip blows into the large end of his horn

The royal family saw that Philip had the horn, and the queen said
she would go the next day and take it, and they might be sure she
would bring it home. The morrow came, and in the early afternoon
off she tramped to the wood. She secured the horn and hurried away
with it, holding it very tight, but as she approached the palace it
slipped from her grasp, and by and by the rabbit-keeper returned
with his horn and flock as usual.
“I shall have to look into this matter myself,” grumbled the king, “if
we are going to get that wretched horn into our possession. You
women plan all right, but it usually takes a man to carry a plan to a
successful conclusion.”
The following day, while Philip was having his nap in the wood, the
king came to the spot where the youth lay and took the horn. To
make doubly sure of it, the king put the horn in a bag he had brought
along for the purpose. Back he went to the palace. His wife and
daughter met him at the door, and he triumphantly opened the bag to
show them the horn; but it was not there. He had not succeeded any
better than the women folk. “Plague take the fellow!” he exclaimed.
“There is some magic about the way that horn disappears. The lad
gets the best of us every time, and I suppose he might as well marry
into the family first as last.”
Pretty soon Philip arrived with his flock of rabbits and put them in
their night quarters. Then he heard the king calling to him, and went
to the palace porch, where he found all the royal family waiting for
him. “What sort of a horn is that of yours?” asked the king. “It looks
ordinary enough, but I am sure it has some strange power or you
would not be able to take such excellent care of the rabbits and
never lose a single one of them.”
“It was given to me by an old woman,” said Philip, “and if I blow in
one end it does one thing, and if I blow in the other it does the
opposite.”
“Oh, bother your explanations!” cried the king. “Show us its power,
and then we shall understand.”
“But perhaps the showing would not please your Majesty,” said
Philip.
“Stuff and nonsense!” the king exclaimed. “I said, ‘Show us.’ Who
is king here—you or me? It is my business to command, and it is
yours to obey.”
“Very well,” responded Philip, “then I wish you to scatter;” and he
blew a good strong blast into the little end of his horn.
At once the king, very much against his will, and kicking savagely,
was hurried off north, the queen flew east, and the princess west,
and a little kitchen-maid, who had come up behind Philip and was
looking on, was hustled off south in such sudden haste it seemed to
her she would be scared out of a year’s growth.
“Stop me, you rascal! Bring me back!” yelled the king as he
vanished in the distance.
Philip turned the horn about and blew into the big end. In a few
moments the king and the others were back on the porch; and the
little maid, vastly astonished by her experiences, lost no time in
escaping to the kitchen. “What do you mean by treating me in that
fashion?” the king demanded. “You shall hang for it.”
Philip raised the little end of the horn to his lips, and the king,
fearful that he would have to repeat his wild race, called out:
“Enough! enough! The fault was mine. You shall have my daughter
and half the kingdom if only you won’t blow that horrible horn in my
presence. I’m too old and stiff to be dashing about over the country
as I did just now.”