Article 14 (2)

ARTICLE 14
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING

PROTECTION OF SCHEDULED CASTES AND
BACKWARD CLASSES
Recognizing the special needs of Scheduled Castes and Backward

Classes, the Constitution of India not only guarantees equality before
the law (Article 14) but also enjoins the State to make special
provisions in the favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes for their upliftment in the society [Article 15(4)]. It
also empowers the State to make provision for reservation in
appointments or posts in the favour of any backward class citizens
[Article 16(4)].
SOCIAL INTEREST
Protection of Economic Interests
1. To promote with special care the educational and economic interests

of the weaker sections, particularly the SCs and STs, and protect
them from any social injustice and all forms of exploitation (Article
46)
2. Special Financial Assistance Fund is charged from the Consolidated
Fund of India each year as grant-in-aid for promoting the welfare of
STs and the development of Scheduled Areas [Article 275(1)] 3. The
claims of SCs and STs to appointment in services (Article 335)
Protection of Political Interests
1. Administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled

Tribes in any State (Articles 244 and 339)
2. Reservation of seats for SCs and STs in the House of People and
Legislative Assemblies of the States (Articles 330 and 332)
3. Likewise, a number of Constitutional provisions exist for the
protection and promotion of the interests of socially disadvantaged
groups.
Equality
1. Equality clause, embodied in Article 14 does not speak of mere formal

equality before the law but embodies the concept of real and substantive
equality which strikes at the inequalities arising on account of vast social
and economic differentiation and is thus consequently an essential
ingredient of social and economic justice.
2. Article 14 of the Constitution states that “the State shall not deny to any
person equality before law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India”.
3. It talks about two expressions namely i.e.
1. Equality before the law; and
2. Equal protection of laws.
Equality Before Law
• The phrase “equality before the law” finds a place in almost all written constitutions that guarantee
fundamental rights.
• It is English in origin. It is a familiar feature of what Dicey called the “Rule of Law”. “Rule of Law”
means that no man is above the law and that every person whatever his rank or condition, is subjected to
the ordinary law of the land and is amendable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.
• “With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a Collector of taxes, is under the
same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.
• “Equality before the law” thus means the absence of any special privileges for any particular person. It
also strikes at arbitrary power on the part of the Government. It is, therefore, a negative concept.
• This, however, is not an absolute rule and there are a number of exceptions to it i.e., Foreign diplomats,
Judges, the President of India as well as state Governors etc.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
• The phrase “equal protection of laws” is based on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America which reads: “nor shall any State deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.”
• This phrase is interpreted to mean “subjection of equal laws applying to all in the same
circumstances.”
• It means that all persons have the right to equal treatment in similar circumstances both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed by laws.
• It requires that equal laws should be applied to all in the same situation and that there should be no
discrimination between one person and another.
• Thus, the phrase “equal protection of laws” lays down the rule that “like should be treated alike
and not that unlike should be treated alike.”
• It is known to be positive in content. It is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
formal equality and substantive equality
Article 14 Right available to:
• Citizens
• Non citizens
• Legal Persons/ Juristic persons and
• Natural Persons
Exceptions to the right to equality.
Equality is not an absolute rule.
The following are exceptions to the ‘equality before the law’ in the Constitution of India is –
1. The President or the Governor of the State shall not be liable in any court for the exercise of the powers and duties
of his office.
2. No criminal process shall be initiated or continued against the President or the Governor of a State in any court
during his tenure.
3. Before or after assuming his office as President or Governor of a State, there may be civil proceedings but two
months before the opposing party has to give notice, in writing describing the name, address, and dispute. (Article
361)
4. No member of Parliament or State Legislature is obliged to appear before the court in any case criminal or civil
while the session is going on. (Article 361-A)
Exceptions to the right to equality.
Equality is not an absolute rule.
• 42nd Amendment – new Art 31- C – Law made by the State for
implementing DPSP –art 39(b) ( c) cannot be challenged as being
violative of Art 14.
• Art 359(1) – proclamation of emergency- Right to move the court for
enforcement of Part III rights suspended ( cant be enforce) ( except Art
20 and 21)
• Art 361, President /governors exempted from criminal proceeding
during their tenure.
• Under International law . Foreign sovereigns , ambassadors – enjoy
immunity from judicial process.
Article 14 permits classification but
prohibits class legislation
Equal Protection of laws does not mean that all laws must be general
in nature.
It does not mean that the same laws must apply to all persons
It does not mean that every law must have a general application for “
All persons are not by nature similarly circumstanced”
Identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to
inequality.
THEREFORE, “A reasonable classification is not only permitted but
is necessary if society has to progress.
TESTS
For 2 decades the SC developed Art 14 jurisprudence in terms of
‘Doctrine of classification’.
From the mid-70s onwards ‘SC interpreted equality in ‘The rule
against arbitrariness’.
Reasonable Classification Test
There were many cases in which the reasonable classification test was used to test whether the legislation
violated Article 14.
1. K.T Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (1961)3 SCR 77
2. State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19
3. Ramkrishna Dalmia vs. Justice TendulkarAIR 1978SC597
4. .D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305
5. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
6. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association – 2021
Reasonable Classification
• All persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or

circumstances. The varying needs of different classes of persons often
require separate treatment. As a consequence the legislature must
have power to make laws distinguishing, selecting and classifying
persons and things upon which its laws are to operate.
• Article 14 permits classification. Classification is merely a systematic
arrangement of things into groups or classes, usually in accordance
with some definite scheme. It must be reasonable and not arbitrary,
artificial or evasive.
Article 14 permits classification but
prohibits class legislation
Art 14 forbids – Class legislation. Class legislation refers to laws that only
apply to a specific group of people or a certain area. This type of legislation
is not fair if it treats people in the same group differently for no good reason.
Class Legislation – That which makes improper discrimination by
conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected
from a large number of persons.
For example, a law that only allows people of a certain race to vote would
be considered class legislation and is not allowed. It is important for laws to
be fair and apply to everyone equally.
Classification – A Necessity
K.T Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (1961)3 SCR 77 (5-Judge Bench)
Classification – judicial deference
State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19
5-judge
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305
Ramkrishna Dalmia vs. Justice TendulkarAIR
1978SC597
The Supreme Court has, over the years, evolved two tests to determine whether particular kinds of State conduct are
Constitutionally permissible under Article 14.
The first of these, referred to as the “old doctrine” or the “classification test”, was developed by the Court in a series of
judgments in the 1950s, including Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar.
Simply put, it permits the State to make differential classifications of subjects (which would otherwise be prohibited by Article
14) provided that the classification is founded on intelligible differentia (i.e. objects within the class are clearly distinguishable
from those that are outside) and has a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved by the classification.
This is an application of the adage, derived from United States jurisprudence, that persons similarly situated are to be treated
equally, which has been held by our Supreme Court to be an integral part of the equality envisaged in Article 14.
1978SC597
1978SC597
1978SC597
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. vs. Union of India
& Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
Facts:
• Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) criminalised consensual sexual intercourse between persons of the
same sex for being “against the order of nature”. In 2009, before the Delhi High Court, the Naz Foundation
(India) Trust (“Naz”) challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 for violating Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of
the Constitution. The court ruled that punishing sexual activity between two consenting adults under Section 377
violates the right to equality, privacy and personal liberty of such persons.
• This decision was appealed before the Supreme Court and in 2013, the Court reversed the Naz verdict in Suresh
Kumar Koushal & Anr. v. Naz Foundation & Ors. (“Koushal”). It held that only the Parliament could
decriminalize homosexuality.
• Five individuals from the LGBTQ communities (Navtej Singh Johar, Ritu Dalmia, Ayesha Kapur, Aman Nath
and Sunil Mehra) filed a new writ petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 377.
& Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
ISSUES & DECISION:
The Court considered whether Section 377 violates:
1. Article 14 as it discriminates against individuals on the basis of their
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity”?
2. The right to autonomy and dignity under Article 21 by penalizing
private consensual acts between same-sex persons?
3. The right to expression under Article 19(1)(a) by criminalizing the
gender expression of the LGBTQI+ community?
& Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
The Decision in ‘Koushal’
• All five judges overruled Koushal.
• The Court drew on the doctrine of progressive realisation of rights to hold that rights should not be
revoked.
• The march of a progressive society should only be forward.
• The Court also noted the guarantee of a fundamental right to privacy in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy
(Retd.) vs Union Of India and held that Koushal’s finding that Section 377 affected only a ‘miniscule
minority’ cannot be the basis to deny the right to privacy.
• It observed that minorities face discrimination because their views and beliefs do not align with the
majority and the Koushal decision violated the right of all persons to equal protection.
& Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination:
• The Court observed that Section 377 arbitrarily punishes individuals who engage in same sex relationships.
• To substantiate this, the Court noted that Section 377 classifies and punishes individuals who engage in carnal
intercourse against the order of nature to protect women and children.
• However, this objective has no reasonable nexus with the classification, as unnatural offences have also been
separately penalised under Section 375 and the POCSO Act.
• Therefore, the Court held that the unequal treatment of LGBT individuals violates Article 14.
• Further, the Court held that Section 377 is manifestly arbitrary as it does not distinguish between consensual and
non-consensual sexual acts between adults.
• It targeted people exercising certain choices and treated them as “less than humans” and encouraged prejudices
and stereotypes accompanied by debilitating social effects.
• This violates Article 14, which is the very basis of non-discrimination.
& Ors AIR 2018 SC 4321
Conclusion
The Court upheld the right to equal citizenship of all members of the
LGBTQI community in India. Thus, it read down Section 377 to
exclude consensual sexual relationships between adults, whether
between same-sex individuals or otherwise. Section 377 will continue to
apply to non-consensual sexual activity against adults, sexual acts
against minors and bestiality.
State of Tamil Nadu & Anr v. National South Indian River
Interlinking Agriculturist Association – 2021
Supreme Court: The bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and AS Bopanna, JJ has upheld the constitutionality of
the Scheme formulated by the State of Tamil Nadu granting loan waiver to small and marginal farmers as these farmers
suffer a greater degree of harm because of their limited capacity and aid.
Factual Background A Government Scheme which granted loan waivers to small and marginal farmers was under
challenge before the Court for being discriminatory against other farmers. The Madras High Court held the grant of
loan waivers only to small and marginal farmers to be arbitrary and directed the appellant to grant the same benefit to
all farmers irrespective of the extent of landholding. The High Court in the impugned judgment has observed that the
scheme is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive since the total extent of land held by a person is calculated based on
the information in the landholding register which permits discrepancies. It also held the scheme to be under-inclusive
for not extending the benefit to ‘other farmers’ or ‘large farmers’.

Reasons for the formulation of this scheme
(i) The small and marginal farmers have faced greater harm due to the erratic climate conditions in
view of the limited technology and capital that they possess; and
(ii) The state seeks to provide maximum benefits with the minimum fund
State’s submissions
• by waiving Rs. 5780 Crore worth of crop loans, the number of small and marginal farmers who
would be benefitted would be 16,94,145.
• On the other hand, waiving the crop loan of Rs 1980 Crore that the other farmers held would
only benefit 3,01,926 of them.
• Hence, providing the benefit of the scheme only to marginal and small farmers leads to maximum
utility for minimum investment.
• Classification was required since the small and marginal farmers suffer a greater degree of harm because of
their limited capacity and aid.
• The consumption expenditure of marginal and small farmers exceeds their estimated income by a substantial
margin, and the deficits are covered by borrowings
• The fact that 16,94,145 small and marginal farmers have availed of agricultural loans as compared to 3,01,926
farmers belonging to the ‘other category’ testifies that the small and marginal farmers have a significant
capital deficit when compared to the rest of the farmers.
• A huge capital deficit, combined with a reduction in agricultural income due to water scarcity and crop
inundation due to floods has led to financial distress.
• Small and marginal farmers are resource-deficient; they do not have borewells to overcome the drought.
These farmers are usually dependent on large farms to access land, water, inputs, credit, technology, and
markets.
• Analysis: Introduction of Scheme in Pursuance of Electoral Promise – Effect : The High Court had taken
the view that because the scheme was in pursuance of an electoral promise, it is constitutionally suspect. This view
was made on the assumption that no study must have been conducted before the electoral promise was made.
• The Supreme Court, however, noticed that it is settled law that a scheme cannot be held to be constitutionally
suspect merely because it was based on an electoral promise. A scheme can be held suspect only within the contours
of the Constitution, irrespective of the intent with which the scheme was introduced.
• Why is the application of the impugned scheme to only the small and marginal farmers justified?
The SC Court noticed that the purpose of providing a waiver of agricultural loans for farmers is to uplift the
distressed farmers, who have been facing the brunt of the erratic weather conditions, low produce, and fall in prices
because of the market conditions. The objective of promoting the welfare of the farmers as a class to secure
economic and social justice is well recognized by Article 38.
• Why is the application of the impugned scheme to only the small and marginal farmers justified?
The percentage distribution of the indebted agricultural households also depicts the poverty that envelops the class
of small and marginal farmers.
• Hence, the scheme propounded by the State of Tamil Nadu passed muster against the
constitutional challenge for the following reasons:
• A climate crisis such as drought and flood causes large-scale damages to small holdings as compared to the large
holdings due to the absence of capital and technology, and The small and marginal farmers belong to the
economically weaker section of society. Therefore, the loan waiver scheme in effect targets the economically weaker
section of the rural population.
• The scheme is introduced with an endeavour to bring substantive equality in society by using affirmative action to
uplift the socially and economically weaker sections. Due to the distinct degree of harm suffered by the small and
marginal farmers as compared to other farmers, it is justifiable that the benefit of the scheme is only provided to a
specified class as small and marginal farmers constitute a class in themselves. classification based on the extent of
landholding is not arbitrary since owing to the inherent disadvantaged status of the small and marginal farmers, the
impact of climate change or other external forces is unequal.
RULE AGAINST ARBITRARINESS – New Concept
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid classification or

differentiation which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction.
The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal
application to all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in
the same position.
“intelligible differentia” means difference capable of being understood. A factor
that distinguishes or is in a different state or class from another which is capable
of being understood.
The varying needs of different classes of persons require different treatment.
In order to pass the test for permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled, namely:
• (1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and
• (2) The differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.
New concept of Equality :
Protection against Arbitrariness
E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu
BACKGROUND: A very prominent case where Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution was further interpreted and the ambit of this Article
was broadened by the judgment given by renowned Supreme Court
Judges:
Ray, A.N. (CJ),
J. Palekar,
J. Chandrachud,
J. Bhagwati and
J. Krishna Iyer.
It was for the first time in the Royappa case that the Supreme Court
laid, a new dimension to Article 14 and that it was a guarantee against
arbitrariness.
BRIEF FACTS
▪ The petitioner was a member of the Indian Administrative Service in the cadre of
the State of Tamil Nadu.
▪ In November 1969, when the post of Chief Secretary to the State fell vacant the
petitioner, as the best suited, was selected for the post.
▪ The draft order with regard to the appointment was approved by the Chief Minister.
▪ But then the State Government gave permission to the creation of a temporary
post of Deputy Chairman in the State Planning Commission in the grade of Chief
Secretary for a period of one year and appointed the petitioner to that post
provided that he shall be entitled to the same rank and payments as permissible to
the post of Chief Secretary.
▪ He joined the post on 7 April, 1971
▪ Against this, the petitioner made a representation that the continuance of
the post of Deputy Chairman in the rank of Chief Secretary for a period of
more than one year would be invalid under r. 4(2) of the Indian
Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954.
▪ So on 27 June, 1972 the State Government created a temporary post of
officer on Special Duty of Sales Tax dept in the grade of Chief Secretary to
the Government and appointed the petitioner to that post.
▪ He did not join this post too and proceeded on leave.
▪ After this, the petitioner was transferred from the post of Deputy Chairman
Planning Commission and appointed Officer on Special Duty.
▪ While the post of the Chief Secretary still was vacant, a junior cadre officer to the
petitioner had been appointed in that post.
▪ The petitioner in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution asks for a
mandamus or any other appropriate writ challenging the validity of his transfer
from the post of Chief Secretary, first to the post of Deputy Chairman State
Planning Commission and then to the post of officer on Special Duty.
▪ Also, it was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the posts of Deputy
Chairman, State Planning Commission and Officer on Special Duty were inferior in
rank and status to that of Chief Secretary.
▪ And that it was made in mala fide exercise of power, not on account of necessities
of administration or public service, but because the second respondent was
annoyed with the petitioner on account of various incidents the respondent
wanted him out of the way.
Main issues
1. Whether it was contrary to the proviso of the Indian
Administrative Services (Cadre) Rules 1954 and Indian
Administrative Services Pay Rules, 1954?
2. It was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution?
3. Whether there was a mala fide exercise of power and abuse of
discretion?
▪ DECISION OF THE COURT
1. The Supreme Court held that the two posts were created for discharging functions requiring very high calibre and specialized
experience and were not to be counted as any less responsible than the topmost cadre posts for which the petitioner was selected.
Thus the wide experience of the petitioner in the field of commercial taxes made the Government post him as Officer on Special
Duty.
2. The affidavit evidence indicated that the government in all circumstances accepted the advice of the petitioner
3. The chief minister cannot be said to have committed acts of violence and intimidation thus the petitioner’s allegations were
baseless.
4. The state of Tamil Nadu could not, therefore, add the posts of deputy chairman, state planning commission and officer on special
duty under the second provision, as these posts did not exist in the cadre as constituted by the central government thus no
application and the challenge based on it must fail
5. There was no compliance with the requirements of rule 9, sub-rule (1) and the appointment f the petitioner to the post of officer on
special duty was accordingly liable to be held invalid for contravention of the sub-rule but no relief can be granted as this rule does
not infringes any fundamental right.
6. The petition was thus dismissed with no order as to costs.

In E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu, the Apex Court has drifted from the
traditional concept of equality which was based on reasonable classification and has
laid down a new concept of equality. Bhagwati, J., delivering the judgment on behalf
of himself, Chandrachud and Krishna Iyer, JJ. Propounded the new concept of
equality in the following words- “ Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects
and dimensions and it cannot be ‘cribbed, cabined, confined’ within traditional and
doctrinal limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithesis (antithetical)
to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies: one belongs to
the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim & caprice of an absolute
monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according
to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14”.
Maneka
• FACTS OF THE CASE
Gandhi v. UOI
1. The petitioner Maneka Gandhi was issued her passport on 1st
June 1976 as per the Passport Act of 1976. Later on July 2, 1977, the
regional passport officer (New Delhi) ordered the petitioner to
surrender her passport.
2. When she asked about the reasons, the Ministry of External
Affairs did not provide any reason for such confiscation and held
that it was for the betterment of the “general public”.
3. Hence, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the
constitution of India for violating her fundamental rights which
were Article 14 (right to equality), article 19( right to freedom of
speech and expression) and Article 21(right to life and personal
liberty).
• ISSUES RAISED
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI
1. Whether the fundamental rights are absolute or conditional or what is the
extent of it in the Indian Constitution?
2. Whether “right to travel” is protected under Article 21?
3. Is there any connection established between articles 14,19 and
21 of the constitution of India?
4. What is the scope of “procedure established by law”?
5. Whether sec 10(3)(c) of Passport Act,1967 is violative of fundamental
rights?
6. Whether the order of a regional passport officer is a contravention
of natural justice?
Maneka
Judgment : It was held that:
Gandhi v. UOI
1. Before the enactment of the Passport Act 1967, there was no law
regulating the passport whenever any person wanted to leave his
native place and settle abroad. Also, the executives were entirely
discretionary while issuing the passports in an unguided and
unchallenged manner. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D
Ramarathnam, the SC stated that – “personal liberty” in its ambit, also
includes the right of locomotion and travel abroad. Hence, no person
can be deprived of such rights, except through procedures established
by law. Since the State had not made any law regarding the regulation
or prohibiting the rights of a person in such a case, the confiscation of
the petitioner’s passport is in violation of Article 21 and its grounds
being unchallenged and arbitrary, it is also violative of Article 14.
2. Further, clause (c) of section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967
provides that when the state finds it necessary to seize the passport or do
any such action in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of the nation, its
security, its friendly relations with foreign countries, or for the interests of the
general public, the authority is required to record in writing the reason of such
act and on-demand furnish a copy of that record to the holder of the
passport.
3. The Central Government never did disclose any reasons for impounding
the petitioner’s passport rather she was told that the act was done in “the
interests of the general public” whereas it was found out that her presence
was felt required by the respondents for the proceedings before a
commission of inquiry. The reason was given explicit that it was not really
necessarily done in the public interests and no ordinary person would
understand the reasons for not disclosing this information or the grounds of
her passport confiscation.
4. “The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are
not distinctive nor mutually exclusive.” Any law depriving a person of
his personal liberty has to stand a test of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred under Article 19. When referring to
Article 14, “ex-hypothesi” must be tested. The concept of
reasonableness must be projected in the procedure.
5. The phrase used in Article 21 is “procedure established by law”
instead of “due process of law” which is said to have procedures that
are free from arbitrariness and irrationality.
6. There is a clear infringement of the basic ingredient of principles of
natural justice i.e., audi alteram partem and hence, it cannot be
condemned as unfair and unjust even when a statute is silent on it.
7. Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967, is not violative of any
fundamental rights, especially Article 14. In the present case, the
petitioner is not discriminated in any manner under Article 14 because
the statute provided
8. unrestricted powers to the authorities. the ground of “in the interests
of the general public” is not vague and undefined, rather it is protected
by certain guidelines which can be borrowed from Article 19.
9. It is true that fundamental rights are sought in case of violation of
any rights of an individual and when the State had violated it. But that
does not mean, Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression is
exercisable only in India and not outside. Merely because the state’s
action is restricted to its territory, it does not mean that Fundamental
Rights are also restricted in a similar manner.
10. It
is possible that certain rights related to human values are
protected by fundamental rights even if it is not explicitly written in our
Constitution. For example, Freedom of the press is covered under
Article 19(1)(a) even though it is not specifically mentioned there.
11. The right to go abroad is not a part of the Right to Free Speech
and Expression as both have different natures and characters.
12. A.K Gopalan was overruled stating that there is a unique
relationship between the provisions of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every
law must pass the tests of the said provisions. Earlier in Gopalan, the
majority held that these provisions in itself are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, to correct its earlier mistake the court held that these
provisions are not mutually exclusive and are dependent on each other
One Person Class
Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India AIR1951
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41.
1. Promulgation of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company
(Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1950, empowering the Central
Government to take over the management and administration of the
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd., which was closed down due to
disputes between the management and the employees.
2. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act of Parliament,
containing similar provisions
Reasonable classification: The court observed that the law would be
constitutional, even if it applied to one person or one class of persons,
if there was sufficient basis or reason for it.
One Person Class
Ram Krishan Dalmia v Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR
1958 SC 538
1.Appointment of Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of inquiry
Act, 1952, with Justice S.R. Tendolkar as its Chairman, against one of the
Dalmia concerns, on the ground of mismanagement in the said concern,
apprehending considerable loss to the investing public. 2. Contended that
the Commission of inquiry Act, 1952 gave wide and unregulated discretion to
the Government which could result in the denial of equality.
Reasonable classification: The discretion conferred by the Act was not
unguided because the Act had clearly laid down the policy, viz, to enquire
into matters of public importance. The Court upheld the action taken against
the petitioner and laid down that while Article 14 forbade class legislation, it
did not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation
In Re Special Courts Bill,
Principles For Determining Reasonable Classification as Laid Down in
Dalmia’s Case11 , Further Elaborated in Re Special Courts Bill, 197812
and followed by Courts
• 1. The basic principle of Right to Equality is that all persons similarly
circumstanced should be treated alike both in privileges conferred
and liabilities imposed.
• 2. The State is vested with power to determine, who should be
regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law,
enacted on a particular subject, by the process of classification
• 3. Classification mean segregation in classes which had a systematic
relation usually found in common properties and a rational basis of
characteristics its postulated.
• 4. Tests for reasonable classification - The classification must have some
basis i.e. must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group. The differentia must have a nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.
• 5. Single individual may be treated as a class by himself on account of some
reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others. 6. The Court will
always presume in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the
burden is upon the person who alleges violation of constitutional norms to
prove any such violation.
6. The Court will always presume in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and
the burden is upon the person who alleges violation of constitutional norms to
prove any such violation
7. For application of this principle of constitutionality, the court may take into
consideration matters of common knowledge, the history of the times and may
assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of
legislature.
8. Where classification is not based on reasonable grounds then this presumption of
constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must
be some undisclosed reasons for subjecting certain individuals to discriminating
legislation.
9. Members of Parliament as well as State Legislative Assembly are the
representatives of the people. They understand their need and make laws in order
to find solution to their problems.
10. Legislature is free to identify the degree of harm and may limit its
restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to the clearest. Thus, it
could recognize the degree of harm but that classification should never be
arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
11. The statute itself cannot be condemned as discriminatory if it has clear
and definite legislative policy, an effective method of carrying out that policy
and discretion vested upon a body of administrators for selective application
of law to certain classes or groups or persons.
12. Discretionary power would not necessarily mean discriminatory powers.
It cannot be assumed that the authority would always act in an arbitrary
manner if discretion is conferred upon it by law.
13. A practical assessment of the operation of the law in a particular
circumstance is necessary.
• Executive Discretion and Procedural Inequality
• 1. State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR1952SC75
• 2. Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra (1952) SCR 435
• 3. In re Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1978) 1 SCC 380
•
•
• Protection of Women
•
• 1. Anuj Garg vs. Hotel Association of India AIR 2008SC663
Article 16
Equal Opportunity in Public Employment
1. Indra Sawhney v. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1993SC477
2.M. Nagaraj & Others vs Union Of India &Others(2006)
Other significant cases:

• 1. M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (AIR 1963 SC 649)
• 2. Devadasan v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 179
• 3..State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490

Article 14 (2)

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Article 14 (2)

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ARTICLE 14

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING

Recognizing the special needs of Scheduled Castes and Backward

1. To promote with special care the educational and economic interests

1. Administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled

1. Equality clause, embodied in Article 14 does not speak of mere formal

1. K.T Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala (1961)3 SCR 77

2. State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19

3. Ramkrishna Dalmia vs. Justice TendulkarAIR 1978SC597

4. .D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305

• All persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or

for not extending the benefit to ‘other farmers’ or ‘large farmers’.

Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid classification or

6. The petition was thus dismissed with no order as to costs.

1. Indra Sawhney v. Union Of India And Others, AIR 1993SC477

2.M. Nagaraj & Others vs Union Of India &Others(2006)

Other significant cases:

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