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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/11/2021, SPi

What Is, and What Is in Itself

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/11/2021, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/11/2021, SPi

What Is, and What

Is in Itself
A Systematic Ontology

ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS

1
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3
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/11/2021, SPi

For David Kaplan

and in memory
of David Lewis
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Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Introduction and Overview 1
1. Actuality 7
1.1 What Is Actualism? 8
1.2 The Indexical Theory of Actuality 10
1.3 Critique of the Indexical Theory 13
1.4 Actualism and Possible Worlds 19
2. Existence 23
2.1 Existence and Essence 23
2.2 Continuing or Ceasing to Exist 30
2.3 Things There Are That Never Exist 32
3. Intentional Objects, Existent and Nonexistent 38
3.1 What Are Intentional Objects? 39
3.2 Extreme Realism about Nonexistent Objects 43
3.3 Moderate Realism about Nonexistent Objects 48
3.4 Anti-Realism about Nonexistent Objects 51
4. Things and Properties 56
4.1 Reification 56
4.2 What Does Quantification Require? 58
4.2.1 Entity without Identity? 60
4.2.2 Identity without Entity? 62
4.3 Subjects and Properties 64
4.3.1 Properties 66
4.3.2 Properties as Universals and as Particulars 68
4.3.3 Ontological Subjects 70
4.3.4 Substance? 74
5. Intrinsic Reality, Relationality, and Consciousness 76
5.1 Real Properties 76
5.2 Intrinsic Reality 79
5.3 Consciousness: Our Surest Example of Intrinsic Reality 81
5.4 Intrinsic Reality and Mental Acts 83
5.4.1 Understanding and Judgment 83
5.4.2 Intending and Trying 86
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5.5 Intrinsic Reality and Relations 87

5.5.1 Part-Whole Relations 88
5.5.2 Relations of Cause and Effect 90
5.5.3 Potentialities 92
6. Reality and the Physical 94
6.1 Modernism 95
6.2 Physical Realism 102
6.3 Idealism 105
6.4 Panpsychism 111
6.4.1 Panpsychism Proposed as a Solution for Two Problems 111
6.4.2 Physicalism and the Combination Problem 113
6.4.3 Panpsychism without the Combination Problem 115
6.4.4 Conclusion 116
7. The Epistemology of Being 118
7.1 Problems for Empiricist Epistemology 118
7.2 Leibniz on Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena 119
7.3 An Empirical Sufficient Condition for Knowledge of Bodies 123
7.4 The Modal Status of the Sufficient Condition 125
7.4.1 Actuality and Incompleteness 126
7.4.2 The Nature of the Sufficiency 126
7.5 Practical Reason and Ontological Belief 130
8. Thisness 133
8.1 Thisness and Suchness 133
8.2 Issues about the Identity of Indiscernibles 136
8.3 Counter-examples and Intuitions 140
8.4 Thisness and Intrinsic Reality 144
8.4.1 Thisness and Things in Themselves 144
8.4.2 Thisness and Things That Are Not Things in Themselves 147
8.5 The World and I: Thisness in Empirical Epistemology 149
9. Identity, Time, and Self 158
9.1 Identity without Distance 158
9.2 Experience and Time 160
9.3 Identity, Persons, and Metaphysics 162
9.4 Life after Death 168
9.4.1 A Toy Model 169
9.4.2 The Body 171
9.4.3 The Soul 173
9.5 Primitive Trans-World Identity? 174
10. God and the Causal Unity of the World 177
10.1 The Problem of Intrinsically Real Causal Relations 177
10.2 Occasionalism 180
10.2.1 How Does Occasional Causation Work? 180
10.2.2 Deterministic and Indeterministic Occasionalism 183
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10.3 Panentheism 185

10.3.1 Is God a Subject of Our Conscious Experiences? 186
10.3.2 Divine Omnisubjectivity 187
10.3.3 Persons, Human and Divine 190

11. God and Possibilities 194

11.1 Can God Know All Possibilities without Actualizing All
of Them? 194
11.1.1 Logical Possibilities and Necessities 196
11.1.2 Qualitative Possibilities and Non-Possibilities 200
11.2 Omnisubjectivity and Single-Subject Models of Possible
Worlds? 205
11.3 How Much Do Non-Actual Worlds Matter? 208
11.4 Causal Possibilities, Powers, Laws, and God 210

Bibliography 213
Index 221
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Acknowledgments
Historically Structured

I had long thought of following my 1974 paper “Theories of Actuality” with a

paper on existence, but did not produce such a paper until the early 1990s when
I presented a first version of it as a lecture at Rice University in Houston. As the
1990s continued, essays that I still regarded in the fall of 2006 as versions of that
paper were presented to groups of philosophers at Wake Forest University,
Harvard University, and the Northern New England Philosophical Association.
As I now see it, the project became much bigger in 1999, when I wrote and
delivered four Gifford Lectures on “God and Being” at the University of St.
Andrews. It became a book project, though not all of the four lectures have
descendants in this present book. The first lecture, on “Existence,” and the second,
on “Substance and Reality,” are forerunners of the foundations of the book in
Chapters 2 to 5. And though I did not return to its agenda until more recently, the
third lecture, on “God and Possibility,” was a forerunner of the last chapter of this
book. There is actually one paragraph in the first of my Gifford lectures that has
remained, more or less verbatim, in most if not all versions of the chapter on
Existence, though not always in the same part of the chapter. But “Metaphysical
Perfection,” the topic of the fourth lecture, is not on the agenda of the book.
The schedule in St. Andrews was relaxed, allowing plenty of time for discussion
and generous hospitality, and there was a lot of extremely helpful critique and
discussion of the lectures, in particular from Crispin Wright, John Skorupski,
Stephen Ferguson, Stuart Shapiro, and especially from Katherine Hawley and
Fraser McBride.
Having spent November in St. Andrews, where my late wife Marilyn McCord
Adams also presented a series of four Gifford Lectures, we flew to Italy and spent a
couple of weeks in December based at the Scuola Normale in Pisa. With help from
our host and friend, the late Professor Francesco del Punta, I got versions of my
first two Gifford Lectures into Italian and presented them to a philosophical
audience at the Scuola. In connection with that I was able to have very fruitful
discussions there with groups of faculty and graduate students. The contributions
of Stefano di Bella, Emanuela Scribano, Andrea Borghini, Giuseppe Varnier, and
Pasqualino Masciarelli in those discussions were particularly helpful to me in
developing a sense of reality as something more than existence.
From that point on, although I published more on other topics—including my
book on virtue in 2006—my ontology book remained a major research and
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writing project. And various versions of an essay on Existence provided the subject
matter of a large proportion of my conference papers and lectures for academic
audiences. Such a paper was my contribution at the meeting of the Australasian
Association of Philosophy in Brisbane in July of 2000.
In June of 2001, I gave four lectures on “God and Being” to philosophy students
at the University of Turku in Finland, where I was hosted by Olli Coistinnen, who
gave me very useful comments over a lovely lunch. In July of 2001, I presented a
paper on “Substance and Reality” at a Pew Foundation sponsored conference on
metaphysics and philosophy of mind in Skaneateles, NY, which generated dis-
cussion very helpful to me, particularly from Peter Unger. And in September of
2001, I presented a paper on “Science, Metaphysics, and Reality” to the Seventh
International Leibniz Congress, meeting in Berlin. It was subsequently published
in the Nachtragsband of the Congress.
Seminars that I taught at Yale on idealism in modern philosophy, focused on
Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, and Carnap (in that order) in the fall semester of 2000,
and on ontology and God in the fall semester of 2003, were also helpful to the
development of my project, as was an ontology seminar I taught at Oxford in the
fall of 2005. I am indebted to the students who participated, for their contributions.
In 2003, I presented my paper “Idealism Vindicated” in Australia in March, at
Macquarie University and at the Australian National University, and in December
at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in
Washington, DC, where Peter van Inwagen was my commentator. And having
moved to England when my wife became Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford at
the beginning of 2004, I presented “Idealism Vindicated” to the Philosophy
Department of the University of York in March of that year.
“Idealism Vindicated” was also published in 2007 as chapter 1 of Persons,
Human and Divine, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 35‒54. It provides most of the material of the
first three of the four sections of Chapter 6 of this present book, in which it is
reproduced verbatim for the most part, though passages of it are presented in a
somewhat different order, and the ontological vocabulary has been revised to
conform with that of this book. No other comparably large part of this present
book has been published before. Section 6.4 of Chapter 6 contains considerable
material drawn from sections IV and V of my paper, “Flavors, Colors, and God,”
first published in Robert Merrihew Adams, The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays
in Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 249‒58—
and from my review of Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds., Panpsychism:
Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), in Grazer
philosophische Studien 95/2 (May 2018): 301‒7. My conclusions in section 6.4 of
Chapter 6, however, differ significantly in some ways from those of those previous
publications.
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During the period 2004‒9, papers of mine on “Being” or “Existence,” trying out
quite a variety of approaches to the topic, and receiving helpful comments from
my hearers, were presented to the philosophy departments of UC San Diego, the
Universities of Nebraska, Arizona, Florence, Edinburgh, Pittsburgh, Sheffield,
Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester, the Australian National University and the
University of Western Australia in Perth, and to the Tuesday group at Oxford.
And the last course I taught at Oxford, in the spring term of 2009, before moving
back to the United States, was a seminar on concepts of God in modern philos-
ophy and theology; I profited from the discussions, and especially from the
contributions of my colleagues, Paul Lodge and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra.
In the fall of 2009, Marilyn and I took up half-time teaching positions in
philosophy at UNC Chapel Hill, and in that fall I taught a graduate seminar on
ontology. Also in November of 2009, I presented to the philosophy department of
Indiana University a lecture that was a forerunner of Chapter 4 of this book.
I received comments on it, particularly from Timothy O’Connor and Allen Wood,
that were helpful in developing my views about things and their properties. And at
a Carolina Metaphysics Workshop at the Outer Banks, on June 13‒16, 2010,
I presented one of a number of forerunners of Chapters 2 to 4 of this book, under
the title of “The Metaphysical Lightness of Being,” and received particularly
helpful comments from Laurie Paul, Ted Sider, and Peter van Inwagen.
In January of 2011, I presented a version of “Idealism Vindicated” to a
philosophical audience at Seoul National University in Korea, and profited from
their questions and comments. Back at UNC in the spring of 2011, Marilyn and
I co-taught a seminar on causation in medieval and early modern philosophy,
which fed into our participation in March of 2011 in a Templeton-funded
conference at UC San Diego on the relation of theology to the development of
natural science in the Early Modern period. I presented a draft of my paper on
“Malebranche’s Causal Concepts.” Questions and comments from conference
participants were very helpful in revising the paper for publication.
That paper is the principal basis of my discussion of occasionalism in section
10.2 of Chapter 10 of this book. I emphasize this here because ideas and argu-
ments borrowed from early modern philosophers, especially Malebranche,
Leibniz, and Kant, but also Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume play important
parts in some of my reasoning in this book, especially in Chapters 5‒11.
In April of 2013, a talk on “Substance and Reality” that I gave to the Syracuse
University philosophy faculty elicited helpful discussion. So did a lecture on
“Kantian Idealism” that I gave at UC Riverside at a meeting of the North
American Kant Society, in the first days of November of 2013; it was a forerunner
of parts of Chapter 7.
In the late spring and summer of 2013, Marilyn and I moved from North
Carolina to Princeton, New Jersey, and took up three-year quarter-time teaching
positions in Philosophy at Rutgers University. That was a turning point in the
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xiv 

development of this book. Outlines that I have for the book (one from December
of 2012 and another from somewhat later) are very different from the present
contents and configuration of the book, especially as regards almost everything
from section 7.4 of Chapter 7 to the end of the book. But after teaching seminars,
in the fall of 2013 on Kant’s metaphysics, and in the fall of 2015 on my plans for
my book, I have in my teaching notes for the 2015 course a fairly complete sketch
of the whole book, in a state approaching its present final state on most points,
though not on absolutely all points.
I mention section 7.4 of Chapter 7 in this context because in it I explain,
succinctly, my reasons for finding metaphysical materialism implausible. I do
not argue, and do not believe, that my colleagues who embrace it are demonstrably
mistaken in doing so. But I have decided not to say more about the issue in this
book than I have, because I think it is one of those issues regarding which
metaphysics is likely to be better served by focusing mainly on what we find
most plausible, than by piling up attempts to disprove what we find implausible.
And I believe that decision in this case was one that helped me find a more
illuminating structure for this book.
On November 14, 2013, I gave a Sanders Lecture on Pantheism to the philos-
ophy department of Rutgers University; it has circulated widely as a YouTube. It
began several years of exploring the topic and revising my views. At a conference
at NYU on early modern philosophy in November of 2015, I presented a paper on
“Leibniz and Pantheism,” and responded to very thoughtful prepared comments
by Jeffrey McDonough. And in April of 2016, an endowed Norman Kretzmann
Lecture at Cornell University, on pantheism, elicited helpful discussion. Those
explorations are part of the background of the discussion of pantheism and
panentheism in Chapters 10 and 11 of this book.
In December of 2018, I gave a Philip Quinn Memorial Lecture on “Life after
Death” at the University of Notre Dame. It dealt with one of the topics of
Chapter 9, and received stimulating discussion. In February of 2019, a talk
I gave to the philosophy department of the University of Arizona, on ideas
drawn from Chapters 2 to 5 of the book, occasioned a valuable discussion. And
in November of 2020, I gave (on Zoom) to the Princeton University philosophy
department a David Lewis Lecture on “Things There Are That Don’t Exist,” and
had good and helpful discussion with graduate students and faculty. It was also an
occasion for rethinking Chapter 3 of this book, resulting in more sharply focused
discussions of Meinong and Thomasson.
Of course my indebtedness to my fellow participants in the philosophical
enterprise is not limited to the interactions in classes, conferences, and public
lectures. In many cases, and not the least important ones, we have interacted in
different ways, and different places, over many years.
A number of those colleagues are now deceased, among whom I think first
of teachers of mine in philosophy and philosophical theology: at Princeton
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University, James Ward Smith, Hilary Putnam, Karl Hempel, Gregory Vlastos,
and Van Harvey, who died July 16 2021, aged 95; at Oxford University, John
Marsh and Donald Sykes (my patristics tutor, who died December 26 2020, aged
90); at Princeton Theological Seminary, John Hick; at Cornell University, Nelson
Pike and Norman Malcolm. Both Hick and Pike were mentors and friends to
Marilyn and me for forty or fifty years.
Other deceased colleagues to whom my debts are relevant in the present context
are William Alston, Richard Brandt, Philippa Foot, William Frankena, Keith
Donnellan, David Lewis, Derek Parfit, and Paul Hoffman (a former student of
mine, from whom I also learned).
Among the living (besides those already mentioned above), I begin with those
whom I mention as teachers of mine: Paul Benacerraf and Sydney Shoemaker, and
Sir Richard Sorabji. The rest I list in alphabetical order by surname:

Joseph Almog, Robert Audi, Simon Blackburn, Tad Brennan, Todd Buras, Tyler
Burge, Laura Callahan, John Carriero, Nancy Cartwright, David Chalmers, Eddy
Chen, Michael della Rocca, Robin Dembroff, Keith DeRose, John Earman, Hartry
Field, Kit Fine, John Martin Fischer, Don Garrett, Alvin Goldman, Matthew
Hanser, John Hare, Karsten Harries, John Hawthorne, Thomas Hofweber,
Andrew Hsu, Anja Jauernig, Frank Jackson, Mark Johnston, David Kaplan, Sir
Anthony Kenny, Jagwon Kim, Suk-jae Lee, Samuel Levey, Paul Lodge, Béatrice
Longuenesse, Julia Markovits, Adrian Moore, Massimo Mugnai, Samuel Newlands,
Calvin Normore, Laurie Paul, Derk Pereboom, John Perry, William Polkowski (a
doctoral student of mine at Michigan, from whom I learned about Bayesian
probability calculus), Michael Rea, Samuel Rickless, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra,
Joseph Raz, Marleen Rozemond, Donald Rutherford, Nathan Salmon, Jonathan
Schaffer, Theodore Sider, Houston Smit, Daniel Star, Richard Swinburne, Amie
Thomasson, Cecilia Trifogli, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, Thomas Ward,
Eric Watkins, Ralph Wedgwood, Howard Wettstein, Timothy Williamson,
Kenneth Winkler, Susan Wolf, Allen Wood, Dean Zimmerman.

I am indebted also to two anonymous readers for the Oxford University Press,
for persuading me that it was a mistake to think of the difference between what is
in itself and what merely is as a difference between heavyweight and lightweight
metaphysics, because metaphysics allows too many different ways of being heavier
or lighter. And for a number of intense and long and ultimately very helpful
discussions of how to replace the metaphors of light and heavy in characterizing
the contrast between what is in itself and what merely is, I am enormously
indebted to Houston Smit.

Robert Merrihew Adams

Princeton, New Jersey, USA
August 1, 2021
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Introduction and Overview

As the title of this book suggests, there is a fundamental distinction at its heart.
What there is is not exactly the same as what is in itself. What is in itself is
included in what is. But not everything there is is a thing in itself.
What is there that is not a thing in itself? Well, there is Harry Potter, for
example. He is not a thing in himself, and indeed does not even exist; but there is
something that he is. He is a fictitious character, and though nonexistent has
significant influence in the world of things that do exist. For instance, his nonex-
istence has not kept his personal attractiveness from being a cause of considerable
wealth (which does exist, though not exactly as a thing in itself) for J. K. Rowling,
the author of the stories about him. And she is a thing in herself.
Why do I say that though Harry Potter is something, he is not a thing in
himself? What is the difference between his being and the being of a thing in itself?
The difference is relational, a difference in the location of Harry’s being what he is,
so to speak. Harry’s being is not located in Harry himself—in a boy called “Harry”
and his acts of wizardry—because he and they do not actually exist. It is located,
rather, in the books and movies about him, and in conscious thoughts and images
in the mind of the woman who wrote the books, and of all the people who have
read the books or seen the movies.
The conscious representation is the crucial point in such a case, in my opinion.
Those conscious thoughts and images that represent the fictitious things are
intrinsically real—real in themselves. But fictitious objects that are thus repre-
sented, such as Harry Potter and his wizard pals, have such being as they have only
insofar as there exist, or have existed, such conscious representations of them.
There, not in themselves but in the conscious representations of them, is where
they have what being they have. But existing people who actually have those
conscious thoughts and experiences in which Harry and his pals are represented
are at least to that extent intrinsically real—and indeed things in themselves.
The concept of intrinsic reality is the central concept of this book. But the book
is meant to be a systematic ontology—that is, an account of what being is and can
be, and of its most important conceptual relationships. And there are ways of
being something without having the intrinsic reality that a thing in itself must
have. In Chapter 5, I will begin to articulate what I think can be said about
intrinsic reality, or what it is to be a thing in itself. But I think it is helpful to
discuss first, in Chapters 1 to 4, various ways in which things can be, or fail to be,
without raising questions about intrinsic reality.

What Is, and What Is in Itself: A Systematic Ontology. Robert Merrihew Adams, Oxford University Press.
Robert Merrihew Adams 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192856135.003.0001
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2   

My account of actuality in Chapter 1 and my account of existence in Chapter 2

have this in common: they both can be stated in terms of truth. “Actually p” is
logically equivalent to “It is true that p.” And in my opinion “x exists” is true if and
only if it is true that x is as x is definitively or contextually represented as being.
For instance Harry Potter does not exist, inasmuch as he is definitively repre-
sented as a human being but is not a human being in truth but only in fiction.
What do I think Harry Potter is, if he is not actually a wizard and does not
actually exist? I think he is merely an intentional object of actually existing
representations of him. One of the main categories in my ontology is that of
intentional objects. It is introduced in Chapter 2, and Chapter 3 is entirely devoted
to it. Merely intentional objects are my paradigm of things there are that are not
things in themselves; what I mean by that will be explained in Chapter 5. I should
add that some merely intentional objects do exist, inasmuch as they are as they are
represented; we must hope that is true of the money in our electronically struc-
tured bank accounts, as is noted in Chapters 4 and 5.
In Chapter 4, I explain why and how I believe that reification, and the contrast
between things and properties, should not be treated as such a big deal as they
commonly are in philosophy. In particular, I argue against presuming that
implying the existence of a thing (for example, a belief) needs more justification
than ascribing a related property would need. Likewise, I take a somewhat
deflationary view of the link between the existence of a thing and its identity.
And in the last half of Chapter 4, I argue that aside from the bare structural fact of
its being a subject of properties, all the positive content of the being of any thing
must come from the properties of which it is a subject.
Chapter 5 is the center of this book. It is where I introduce the central concept
of the book, the concept of a thing in itself, or what is intrinsically real. By “thing in
itself” I mean a thing that has Real properties, which are not purely negative but
have some positive content, and has at least one of them entirely in itself. More
precisely:

A thing, x, that is real in itself is one that has some Real property whose particular
existence or realization in x does not consist, even partly, in anything external to x.

Such a property is a constitutive ground of intrinsic reality for a thing to which it is

completely internal. In speaking of a “constitutive ground” here I intend a clear
distinction between constituting and causing. And I am not implying that my
conscious states and processes contain in themselves all their causes.
Our first and surest example of something real in itself is our own conscious
experience. And the constitutive grounds of its intrinsic reality are qualities of our
conscious states and processes, of which we are immediately conscious, and which
have positive content, completely realized within our states of consciousness.
Several different types of such qualitative properties are discussed at some length.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/11/2021, SPi

   3

An important point for which I argue is that a relation cannot be intrinsically

real unless both terms of the relation are included in a single intrinsically real
subject. That has architectonic importance for the book as a whole, setting the
central problem for Chapter 10, which is to identify a sufficiently inclusive subject
of causal relationships to constitute a causal unity of the whole universe.
In Chapter 6, I discuss whether—and if so, how—the account of intrinsic
reality developed in Chapter 5 can be applied to physical objects. The chapter
begins by revisiting modernity’s stubbornly unresolved mind-body problem.
I accept historic idealist arguments that the properties ascribed by modern physics
to objects that it studies are not qualitatively substantive enough to constitute
intrinsic reality for them. I explore three alternatives: a reductive idealism like
Berkeley’s, or some sort of panpsychism, or a something-we-know-not-what
theory of what qualities purely physical things might have that would be sufficient
constitutive grounds of intrinsic reality. I do not claim to know of any of the three
that it is true or that it is false, but the something-we-know-not-what approach
strikes me as the most desperate of the three, and there is a lot of overlap between
the other two.
Chapter 7 contains the book’s main discussion of epistemology. My skepticism
about intrinsic reality of purely physical things does not keep me (as it did not
keep Berkeley) from affirming the truth of our ordinary and scientific beliefs about
physical things as a matter of superficial ontology. I argue that it is a sufficient
condition of the truth of that affirmation that those beliefs are inferred from what
we consciously experience, in accordance with ways of thinking that enable us to
predict experiences accurately. In the ontologically superficial context there is no
need to decide whether the physical things are intrinsically real, so long as their
lack of intrinsic reality has no impact on our experience. In saying that, I rely on
an epistemological principle (which I share with several early modern philoso-
phers) that in the absence of logical and empirical certainty considerations of
practical reason are relevant in accepting or rejecting beliefs.
That principle applies differently, however, to beliefs about physical objects and
to beliefs about other people’s consciousness. In the case of the physical objects, if
the beliefs enable us to predict and control our experiences, we have what we have
most reason to care about. As regards other minds, however, practical reason’s
considerations regarding the social, personal, and moral significance of our rela-
tions to each other add urgent practical reasons for regarding each other’s
consciousness as intrinsically real. But those same considerations of practical
reason count heavily against judging in this case that our experience of other
people and of what they say about their consciousness is sufficient in itself for the
truth, as distinct from the credibility, of the claim that their consciousness is real.
Chapters 8 and 9 deal principally with issues about relations of distinctness and
identity of particular things—especially but not exclusively those that are intrin-
sically real. The focus in Chapter 8 is on distinctness, understood as “primitive
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Kuusen lehviltä kevään lämmin
sulaa talven lunta.
Todenkin uudesti kirkkahana
löytävi ihmiskunta.

Niinkuin kummulla uusia lehviä kukkivi aarnikuusi, niin tosi,

vaikka on ainovanha, alati siltä on uusi.

Valhe ja totuus.

Valhe se loistoa, kiiltoa etsii, yllensä verhovi välkkyvät

vaipat, jotta se tenhoisi ihmisten silmät, etteivät huomaisi sen
sisäpuolta kuinka se tyhjä ja ontto on.

Totuus kuortansa kelsiä koittaa, yltänsä riisuvi mutkaisat

muodot, niin että silmämme selvemmin nähdä voisivat
puhtaalta sen sisäpuolta suuret ja kirkkaat helmyet.

Turhia kysymyksiä.

Miksikä alati maailmassa vaihtuvi yö ja päivä? Miksikä

verhona totuudenkin väihkyvi valheen häivä?

Miksikä hyvänkin ympärillä

on niin paljo pahaa?
Miksikä särkynyt sekasorto
sydänten sointua sahaa? —
 Vaiti! Turhaan tuhat kertaa teen nämä kysymykset. Ei pysty
juuriin olemuksen älyni yllätykset.

Oikeus.

Oikeus ylevä, suuri on kuni jykevä tammi, joka voi valossa

vasta, valossa ja lämpimässä suoravarreksi selitä,
iaajalehväksi levitä.

Onnemme asunto.

Ei asu elämän onni taivahissa, tuulosissa, ei vesissä, ei

kukissa eikä muissa muotoloissa.

Tuolla onnemme asuvi sydämessämme syvällä,

tuntehettaren tuvassa, hengettären huonehessa.

Karkaiseva kärsimys.

Ei terästy raisu rauta, teräs kirkastu, teroitu, jos ei ensin se

puristu vetten, liekkien välissä.

Lapsi ei tule uroksi, yrkä mieheks ylene, jos ei taistossa

terästy, kärsimyksissä karaistu.
KANSALLISIA LAULUJA.

Pohjolan huhtikuu.

Sinivalkonen taivas,
lumivalkonen maa
helopäivästä taivon
suloloistehen saa!
Niin läikkyvä leuto on viileä sää,
jää päivässä välkkyen kimmeltää,
ja kaukana äärellä vainion
lumenhohtavat huiput vuoriston
yläilmahan yllättää!

Sinivalkonen taivas,
lumivalkonen maa
helopäivästä taivon
suloloistehen saa!
Koko maa ihan huikean kirkas on,
valo väräjävi lehvillä kuusiston,
valo väräjävi, palajavi leivonen
ja livertävi, lurittavi riemuiten
yläilmahan kiemurtain!

Jos mulla olisi —

 Jos mulla olisi leivosen siivet, en minä olisi täällä: livertäen
lentäisin luokse Herran ylhäällä pilvien päällä.

"Herrani", livertäisin hänelle siellä,

"tunnetko Wäinölän kansan?
Miksikä sille sä heittää annoit
vierahan viekkaan ansan?"

Oi, miten palavasti rukoileisin

sydämestä hartahasta:
"Suo säde kansalle kärsivälle
valostasi kirkkahasta!"

Herrani kuulisi, jos minä pyytää

oikein hellästi voisin.
Herrani armoa henkivän viestin
maahani sitte mä toisin. —

Kansani, katsele taivahalle sinisillä silmilläsi! Nouskosi itse

sä luokse Herran veisaten virsiäsi!

Mihin suuntaan?

Orot niityllä hirnuvat korskuen, palo mielemme viehtävi

sinne. Me lentäen riennämme ratsaillen ja kiidämme kilvaten,
riemuiten — mut minnekä, minnekä, minne?

Oi, vielähän taistelutantereet

Ovat taatoilta tallella meille!
Ja vielähän viettävät mantereet
ja vielähän viehtävät välkeveet
sydänsyitämme uusille teille!

Koko kansan me tahdomme kohottaa

hyvän, oikean kukkuloille!
Sen mieli ja kieli kun vapaaks' saa,
Se suurena kuorona kohahtaa
sopusointujen soitelmoille!

Koko kansan me nostamme oikeuteen,

joka miehen naisen ja lapsen!
Me kutsumme hellään veljeyteen
ja vapauteen tasa-arvoiseen
joka nuoren ja harmaahapsen!

Tätä työtä me tyynenä toimimme,

joka tointamme harkiten tarkoin.
Mut muutakin vaativi sentään se:
sydän-intoa, tarmoa tahdolle,
kiven rouhua vahvoin harkoin.

Työ itse se tarmoa kasvattaa ja kansassa kasvun voimaa.

Mut kerta kun työmme valmiiks saa, ei ole ken väärästä
vaikertaa ja sorrosta veljeä soimaa.

Tulkaa ja katselkaa!

Oi, tulkaa käykää ja katselkaa mun maatani, vanhat ja

nuoret! Kas, rannoilta järvien välkkyväin ylös kaartuvat uljaat
vuoret!

Mäen rinteillä runsaina rehottaa

kotilehdot ja kuusikot taajat
ja taustalla lehtojen, vuorien
kovat korvet ja hongikot laajat.

Salon korvessa koppelo kotkottaa,

jänö, karhu ja hirvikin hyppii.
Joka paikassa juoksevat, siivekkäät
elinvoimia luonnosta nyppii.

Kotikansani vakaa ja järkkymätön,

syvämielinen, miettiväinen,
se tarmolla maatansa viljelee,
maa vaikkapa onkin jäinen.

Kevätkaskissa liekkejä leimuaa,

kotirannoilla laihoja loistaa,
hakalehdoissa karjojen kellot soi,
kodit piirtonsa lahdessa toistaa.

Kohukoskissa jyskyen tehtaat käy,

salot pyssyjen kaikuja paukkaa,
venot, laivatkin aaltoja vellovat,
tuliorhit kangasta laukkaa.

Ja hermoina sähköjohdot käy

maan aivoista jäntereihin,
ja tieteemme taivasta tahdittaa,
luo taiteemme kukkia teihin.
 Mäkihaavikon keinuilla kisaillaan,
viriaalloilla nuoriso laulaa.
Sitä ei voi äänettä kuunnella,
sitä itsekin täytyvi laulaa!

Kotikantelo kaunonen kasvattaa

helokirkasta sointujen viljaa.
Surusointuista on se ja vienoa —
sitä täytyvi kuunnella hiljaa.

Oi, kansani, henkesi siiville

kotikantelo kallis nosta,
tuo pöydälle pirtin se helkkymään,
sen kärsimät kohlut kosta!

Ylös nosta se kaunosti kaikumaan, niin henkesi nostaa se

myötään! Ja silloin mielesi puhtainnaan voi tehdä kauneinta
työtään.

Kansanrakkaus.

Kuin aurinko aamulla taivahalle, niin nouskosi

kansanrakkaus, ja tavalla auringon kaikkialle sä levitä lämpösi
runsaus!

Kuin koitar aamulla kuusikoitten

yli yöhyen häivään sajastaa
ja sitten ruskona lehtoloitten
ja kuusten latvahan kajastaa —
 Ja ruskosta taivahan rantamalta
terä kirkas punasena pilkahtaa,
käy kaartansa, usvia kaikkialta,
joka laaksonkin pohjasta hajottaa —

Ja hallan hyytämät niityt, pellot

taas lietsovi vireänä vihertämään
ja herättävi heimojen siskot, vellot
ylös työhön: kyntöön ja kylväntään.

Ja hellästi hivuttavi kaiken kansan

sulolämpöönsä, loistoonsa sulkeumaan,
siten johtaen silmistä surman ansan
sen riemuhun, onneen ja kunniaan —

Niin, niinkuin aurinko taivahalle, niin nouskosi

kansanrakkaus, ja tavalla auringon kaikkialle sä levitä lämpösi
runsaus.

Kristalli.

Oi kansani kalliin henki kuin kristalli kirkas on! Kuin kristalli!

Mutta se vielä niin kovin on muodoton.

Hyvä luoja jos mestarin loisi, joka särmiön siitä sais,

tuhatvälkkehin ympäri maata se päivyttä heijastais.
 Viljelysoppia.

I.

Kovin paljo se tarhuri harhaa. joka laatii kukkatarhaa kedon

kumpuhun karheaan, jota tunne ei laisinkaan.

Kovin paljo te hairahdatte, kun kansaa valistatte, sydän

vaikka on teillä sen kuin suljettu kirjanen.

II.

Mitä voipi se tarhuri voittaa, joka kasveja kastella koittaa, mut

unhotti perkata maan, johon istutti kasviksiaan.

Mihin joudumme valistustyössä, valo vaikkakin liehuu

yössä, jos rinnasta kansamme ei leimua liekki se.

III.

Älä, tarhuri, vieraasta maasta tuliruusuja tarhaasi raasta! Ei

etelän ruusunen kuki hallassa pohjoisen.

Älä, kansani, vieraasta maasta ihanteita ja aatteita raasta!

Hymy, nauru ei vierasten sovi kyynelen suihkeeseen.

IV.

Miten, tarhuri, kukkasen tehnet, jos ensin et varren ja lehdet

ylös kummusta kasvata — nehän versovat kukkia?
 Miten kukkivi kansani henki, jos vartta ja lehtiä ensin ei
hellästi hoidella, ylös mullasta nosteta?

V.

Puutarhuri, tunne maasi, sitä viljele, kasvikkaasi sen rinnassa

kasvata, kunis versoo se kukkia!

Kotikansani, itsesi tunne, sydänsyistäsi tutki kunne sun

täytyvi suunnata tie, joka matkasi määrään vie!

Herrasluontoa.

Olipa puisto pienokainen vierellä herraskartanon ja polku

jäykkä, kaavamainen välissä penkkilöitten on.

Puut vahtii tietä rivissänsä

kuin haarniskoidut sotilaat,
ja saksittuina yrmillänsä,
on pensasaidat pullokkaat.

Ja nurmen, joka vehmahasti

yrittää nousta kukkimaan,
puutarhuri sen nokkelasti
koneella niittää oraassaan.

Ja hovin herra mahtavasti

kuin laiva kulkee polkua.
On sillä rouva rinnallansa
kuin aika auma pellolla.

Kas, siinä sitä on sivistystä, on varakkuutta, arvoa! He

etsivät nyt virkistystä — nähkääpäs! — luonnon helmasta…

Kansanmielinen.

Henttuni hieno on herraslapsi, vaikkei se siltä näytä, vaikkei

se veitikka itseänsä yhtään ylväästi käytä.

Kyllä se taitaisi ruotsinkieltäkin, vaikka se ei sitä solkkaa;

taitaa se valssitkin, vaikka se hippaa vekkulipietun polkkaa.

Pennin saimme

Pennin saimme me perinnöksi sekä vähä rantaluhtaa. Itse

me korpehen peltoja teimme itse ohjaten juhtaa.

Pennin saimme me perinnöksi vanhoilta taatoiltamme —

sittenkin varkaat vahtailevat meidän rikkauttamme.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANSA JA
KANNEL ***

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