The Rise and Fall of Scottish Common

Sense Realism First Edition. Edition

Ferrier
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-scottish-common-sense-realism-fir
st-edition-edition-ferrier/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Common Sense in the Scottish Enlightenment C B Bow

https://ebookmass.com/product/common-sense-in-the-scottish-
enlightenment-c-b-bow/

Common Stocks and Common Sense: The Strategies,

Analyses, Decisions.. (Fully Updated) Edgar Wachenheim

https://ebookmass.com/product/common-stocks-and-common-sense-the-
strategies-analyses-decisions-fully-updated-edgar-wachenheim/

Blood And Power: The Rise And Fall Of Italian Fascism

1st Edition John Foot

https://ebookmass.com/product/blood-and-power-the-rise-and-fall-
of-italian-fascism-1st-edition-john-foot/

The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order Gary Gerstle

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-
neoliberal-order-gary-gerstle-2/
The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order Gary Gerstle

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-
neoliberal-order-gary-gerstle/

The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire Michael Bregnsbo

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-danish-
empire-michael-bregnsbo/

The Rise and Fall of the Age of Psychopharmacology

Edward Shorter

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-age-of-
psychopharmacology-edward-shorter/

The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth Michael Mandelbaum

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-peace-on-
earth-michael-mandelbaum/

The Rise and Fall of Peacebuilding in the Balkans 1st

ed. Edition Roberto Belloni

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-rise-and-fall-of-peacebuilding-
in-the-balkans-1st-ed-edition-roberto-belloni/
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

The Rise and Fall of Scottish Common

Sense Realism
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

The Rise and Fall

of Scottish Common
Sense Realism

Douglas McDermid

1
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Douglas McDermid 2018
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2018
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017957223
ISBN 978–0–19–878982–6
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

For Michelle, Julia, and Andrea

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

Contents

Acknowledgements ix
Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1
1. Reid and the Foundations of Scottish Common Sense 8
1.0 Introduction 8
1.1 Thomas Reid: Curriculum Vitae 10
1.2 Scepticism and Reid’s Principles of Common Sense 11
1.3 Why Philosophy Depends on Common Sense 16
1.4 ‘The Pride of Philosophy’ 21
1.5 ‘To Common Sense They Now Appeal’ 24
1.6 James Oswald: Primary Truths and Rational Perceptions 26
1.7 James Beattie: The Desolation of Philosophy 29
1.8 George Campbell: Miracles and Rhetoric 38
1.9 A Common Sense Credo 43
1.10 Descendants and Ancestors 47
2. Kames and the Argument from Perceptual Reliability 56
2.0 Introduction 56
2.1 The Primacy of Natural Feeling 57
2.2 The Argument from Perceptual Reliability 59
2.3 The Perceptual Reliability Thesis 59
2.4 The Immediate Object Thesis 64
2.5 The Incoherence of Idealism 67
2.6 A Diamond in the Rough 69
3. Reid and the Problem of the External World 72
3.0 Introduction 72
3.1 The Cartesian Reformation in Philosophy 74
3.2 The Argument from the All or None Thesis 79
3.3 The Cartesian Solution to the Problem of the External World 84
3.4 Scepticism and The Way of Ideas 94
3.5 Perception as Fact and Mystery 99
3.6 How to Be a Common Sense Realist 103
3.7 Reid and Kames 106
3.8 ‘A Scandal to Philosophy’ 107
4. Stewart and Hamilton: Defenders of the Faith 113
4.0 Introduction 113
4.1 Stewart and Common Sense Realism 114
4.2 Hamilton and the Relativity of Knowledge 120
4.3 Hamilton and Natural Realism 125
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

viii contents

4.4 Hamilton’s Critique of Hypothetical Realism 129

4.5 A Northern Ozymandias 132
5. Ferrier and the Myth of Scottish Common Sense Realism 137
5.0 Introduction 137
5.1 ‘As helpless as a whale in a field of clover’ 138
5.2 Reid and Berkeley on Intuitive Perception 140
5.3 Metaphysicians or Psychologists? 143
5.4 Hypothetical Realism and its Discontents 146
5.5 The Common Sense Argument for Realism 149
5.6 Realism and the Inconceivability Principle 151
5.7 Five Morals 154
5.8 Solving the Problem of Perception 155
5.9 From Reid to Hamilton 158
5.10 What’s Past is Prologue 161
6. Ferrier and the Foundations of Idealism 165
6.0 Introduction 165
6.1 Ferrier’s Master Argument for Idealism 166
6.2 The Law of All Knowledge Defended: Part I 170
6.3 The Law of All Knowledge Defended: Part II 173
6.4 The Law of All Knowledge Defended: Part III 177
6.5 From the Law of All Knowledge to the Law of All Ignorance 183
6.6 Against Things-in-Themselves: Beyond Kant and Hamilton 188
6.7 Where Did Reid Go Wrong? 190
6.8 Why Philosophy Does Not Depend on Common Sense 193
6.9 A Tradition Transcended from Within 197
7. ‘Scottish to the very core’ 203

Bibliography 211
Name Index 223
General Index 227
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

Acknowledgements

I would be remiss if I did not thank the following individuals, each of whom helped me
think better about the issues and authors dealt with in this book: Peter Baumann,
Michelle Boué, Justin Broackes, Alberto Corona, Cairns Craig, Phillip Ferreira, James
Foster, Giovanni Gellera, James Harris, Colin Heydt, Damian Ilodigwe, Ralph Jessop,
Jennifer Keefe, Arthur Kleinman, Esther Kroeker, Keith Lehrer, Bill Mander, Jorge
Ornelas, Stamatoula Panagakou, Carlos Pereda, Sabine Roeser, Nathan Sasser, Ernest
Sosa, Jan Swearingen, James Van Cleve, and Rory Watson. Special thanks go to Gordon
Graham for his enthusiasm for this project, and for organizing the superb series of
conferences on Scottish Philosophy at Princeton Theological Seminary. I am also
deeply indebted to Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press for his patience
and editorial guidance, and to two anonymous readers for their instructive comments
on the manuscript. I also wish to thank Joanna North for her skilful and efficient
copy-editing.
Some of the early work on this book was done during my 2011–12 sabbatical,
which I spent as a visiting scholar at Harvard Divinity School. I wish to thank William
Graham, Karin Grundler-Whitacre, and David Lamberth, all of whom made my
stay at Harvard pleasant as well as possible. I also want to acknowledge the assistance
I received from the helpful staff at Widener Library, the Harvard Law School Library,
and the Andover-Harvard Theological Library. Finally, I thank my colleagues and
students at Trent University, my home institution, for their interest and support.
This book incorporates material from two previous publications of mine: “Ferrier
and the Myth of Scottish Common Sense Realism”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11
(2013): 87–107; and “Scottish Common Sense and American Pragmatism”, in A History
of Scottish Philosophy in the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. Gordon Graham (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 205–35. I thank the publishers for their permission to
reproduce that material here.
Finally, I dedicate this book with love to Michelle, Julia, and Andrea, all of whom
have more common sense than I do.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

Abbreviations

ACS James Oswald. (1766–72) An Appeal To Common Sense In Behalf of Religion,

ed. James Fieser. Bristol: Thoemmes, 2000.
AM James Burnett, Lord Monboddo. (1779–99) Antient Metaphysics: Or,
The Science of Universals. 6 volumes. London and New York: Garland
Publishing, 1977.
BAL Thomas Reid. (1774) “A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic”. In Thomas Reid:
Philosophical Works, With Notes and Supplementary Dissertations, ed.
Sir William Hamilton. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1967: 681–714.
DM George Campbell. (1762) A Dissertation on Miracles. In Early Responses to
Hume’s Writings on Religion. Volume 2, ed. James Fieser. Bristol: Thoemmes,
2001: 1–114.
DPL Sir William Hamilton. (1853) Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,
Education and University Reform. Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart.
EAP Thomas Reid. (1788) Essays on the Active Powers of Man, ed. Baruch Brody.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969.
EIP Thomas Reid. (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Derek R.
Brookes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.
EOT James Beattie. (1771) Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in
Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Hildesheim and New York: Georg
Olms Verlag, 1975.
EPM Henry Home, Lord Kames. (1751) Essays on the Principles of Morality and
Natural Religion. London and New York: Garland Publishing, 1976.
FW James Frederick Ferrier. (1864) Philosophical Works of James Frederick Ferrier.
3 volumes, ed. A. Grant and E. L. Lushington. Bristol: Thoemmes, 2001.
HSD William Hamilton. (1846) Dissertations, Historical, Critical, and
Supplementary. In Thomas Reid: Philosophical Works, With Notes and
Supplementary Dissertations, ed. Sir William Hamilton. Hildesheim: Georg
Olms Verlag, 1967: 741–987.
ICR John Calvin. (1559) Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry
Beveridge. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2009.
IHM Thomas Reid. (1764) An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of
Common Sense, ed. Derek R. Brookes. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1997.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

xii Abbreviations

LML Sir William Hamilton. (1861) Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. 4 volumes,
ed. H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons.
POR George Campbell. (1776) The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963.
RC Thomas Reid. (1764–92) Correspondence of Dr. Reid. In Thomas Reid:
Philosophical Works, With Notes and Supplementary Dissertations, ed.
Sir William Hamilton. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1967: 39–92.
SCG St Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1975.
SP James Frederick Ferrier. (1856) Scottish Philosophy: The Old and the New.
Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox.
ST St Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947.
SW Dugald Stewart. (1854–60) The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart. 11
volumes, ed. Sir William Hamilton. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and
Company.
All passages from the Old and New Testaments are taken from The Bible: Authorized
King James Version, ed. Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi

It shows a lack of education not to know of what things we ought to seek proof
and of what we ought not. For it is altogether impossible for there to be proofs of
everything; if there were, one would go on to infinity, so that even so one would
end up without a proof; and if there are some things of which one should not seek
a proof, these people cannot name any first principle which has that characteristic
more than this.
—Aristotle, Metaphysics

If the fear of falling into error sets up a mistrust of Science, which in the absence
of such scruples gets on with the work itself, and actually cognizes something, it
is hard to see why we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust.
Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of error is not just the
error itself? Indeed, this fear takes something—a great deal in fact—for granted,
supporting its scruples and inferences on what is itself in need of prior scrutiny to
see if it is true. To be specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as
an instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between
ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it assumes that the Absolute stands on one
side and cognition on the other, independent yet separated from it, and yet is
something real; or in other words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it
is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside the truth as well, is nevertheless
true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as
fear of the truth.
—G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/06/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/08/2018, SPi

Introduction

About the very cradle of the Scot there goes a hum of metaphysical divinity . . .
—Robert Louis Stevenson

This book tells the lively and little-known story of common sense realism’s rise and fall
in Scotland. The plot revolves around the contributions of five philosophers, each of
whom enjoyed a generous measure of renown during his lifetime:
I. Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782)
II. Thomas Reid (1710–96)
III. Dugald Stewart (1753–1828)
IV. Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856)
V. James Frederick Ferrier (1808–64)
It goes without saying that Thomas Reid, the canny apostle of common sense, is far
and away the most famous of the five. Nevertheless, the other four authors on our list
are also worth reading; and if you are seriously interested in understanding what any
one of the five has to say about the central questions of epistemology and metaphysics,
you would do well to study the works of the rest. Why? Simple: Kames, Reid, Stewart,
Hamilton, and Ferrier are members of a rich and underappreciated tradition, and they
routinely develop and define their positions by reference to the contributions of their
predecessors. Such, at any rate, is the first of this book’s principal contentions, and
I shall support it by carefully analysing what Kames, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, and
Ferrier had to say about a major issue which lies at the intersection of epistemology
and metaphysics—namely, the thesis of realism about ordinary physical objects, or
what J. L. Austin called “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods” (Austin 1962: 8). To
be more specific, this book shall follow the career of a position known as ‘common
sense realism’ through four main developmental stages in Scotland: its humble begin-
nings (Kames), its definitive formulation (Reid), its elevation to the status of academic
orthodoxy (Stewart and Hamilton), and, finally, its dramatic repudiation and over-
coming (Ferrier).1
This brings us to the book’s thematic, as opposed to its historical, focus. In what fol-
lows, I explore the different ways in which Kames, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, and Ferrier
tackled a problem which has haunted Western philosophy ever since Descartes: that of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/08/2018, SPi

2 Introduction

determining whether any form of perceptual realism is defensible, or whether the very
idea of a material world existing independently of perception and thought is more
trouble than it is worth.2 As we shall see, this century-long conversation about the
relation between mind and world led our five Scots to think uncommonly hard about
a host of challenging issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and
meta-philosophy:
• Is the very idea of ‘things existing without the mind’ hopelessly confused or
incoherent? Is a mind-independent world even a possible object of thought or
conception? What, for that matter, are the limits of thought and conception, and
what is supposed to determine or fix them?
• If a mind-independent world exists, is there good reason to suppose that we
can have knowledge of it? Can we refute or disprove the thesis of external
world scepticism, according to which we can never have knowledge of a mind-
independent world? And if there isn’t any way to refute this thesis, does that
mean it is reasonable for philosophers to endorse it?
• If we reject external world scepticism, what (if anything) can we learn from our
encounter with it? Must we regard external world sceptics as wholly mistaken, or
can we credit them with some significant philosophical discoveries or fresh
insights?
• What are the objects of sense-perception? Does perception yield immediate epi-
stemic access to anything beyond one’s mental states or representations (i.e.—our
‘ideas’ or ‘impressions’, in the parlance of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
philosophy)? If so, how? If not, does this mean that external world scepticism is
unavoidable?
• Can we prove that our faculties of sense-perception are fundamentally reliable or
trustworthy? If we cannot prove this, does it follow that doubting the veracity of
their deliverances is a reasonable thing to do?
• Is our knowledge of the physical world inescapably conditioned by subject-
derived forms of thought or sensibility? Can we know objects only as they appear
to us, or can we know things as they are ‘in themselves’?
• Should philosophers begin their inquiries with radical and all-devouring doubt
à la Descartes? Is such doubt even coherent, or is it ultimately self-defeating?
Moreover, what are the proper starting-points for philosophical reflection, and
in virtue of what feature(s) do they qualify as such?
• Can we refute a philosophical thesis by showing that it contradicts some plain
dictate(s) of ‘common sense’? If we can, then what gives common sense its
authority? How are its authentic dictates identified? And—finally—what does
the primacy of common sense reveal about human nature and our place in the
scheme of things?
That the Scots’ reflections on all these topics repay close study, that their works are
chock-full of bold thoughts and nice distinctions, that their thinking has the power to
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/08/2018, SPi

introduction 3

deepen our understanding of the questions they addressed—that is this book’s second
principal contention, and I shall defend it by offering perspicuous and detailed recon-
structions of their main arguments and theses. In order to present each philosopher’s
views in a fair and reasonably charitable light, I have tried to identify the main prob-
lems he was attempting to solve, to relate his work to that of his predecessors where
possible, to describe the mistakes (real or perceived) he was particularly anxious to
correct, to explain the internal logic of his position, and to discuss some of the main
objections which he anticipated and tried to rebut. My hope is that even seasoned stu-
dents of the realism controversy may learn something new and valuable from this
exercise, if only because I have chosen to focus not on the usual suspects—Descartes,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant—but on a fresh and undervalued cast of characters.
The third aim of this book is to re-contextualize some of the achievements of
Thomas Reid, who has frequently been treated as little more than a pedestrian footnote
to David Hume. According to those who take this interpretive line, Reid was a mere
Nay-sayer or negative thinker, a philosophical reactionary profoundly suspicious of
modern thought, a dull and unimaginative critic who naïvely believed that he could
refute Hume by pointing out that the ordinary person—the sober man or woman of
‘common sense’—finds Humean scepticism unspeakably silly and utterly incredible.
This interpretation is a crude caricature of Reid’s procedure, to be sure, and no one
who has studied Reid’s writings with a modicum of care will be tempted to take it too
seriously. Nevertheless, the shadow cast by this reductive reading leaves us with an
obvious and pressing question: if Reid should not be viewed as a mere footnote to
Hume, what should we say about his place in the history of modern philosophy? My
impulse is to divide this question into two sub-questions. Question 1: Can we construct
a narrative about Reidian common-sensism which deepens our understanding of its
historical significance without taking Hume’s assumptions or conclusions as its sole or
primary point of reference?3 Question 2: Can we find a way of thinking about the con-
nections between Reid’s thought and the work of later philosophers which does not lift
Reid out of his historical and cultural context by presenting him as the precursor of
some current school or movement?4
We can accomplish both of these things, I hope to show, provided we change our
perspective and see Reid’s common sense philosophy as an integral part of the Kames-
to-Ferrier sequence. When we relate Reid’s philosophical outlook to that of Kames, for
instance, we get a much better sense of the ways in which Reid’s common sense realism
was truly original, as well as a better sense of the ways in which it wasn’t; for once we
become aware of his intellectual debts to Kames, we can see how Reid transformed
what he received, both by adding to it and by subtracting from it. Similarly, our overall
understanding of Reid’s common sense realism—our perception of its strengths and
its weakness, its presuppositions and its ramifications—is enriched when we reflect on
the ways in which Reid’s philosophy was received by leading nineteenth-century
Scottish philosophers, who chose either to refine and systematize its contents (as in the case
of Dugald Stewart), to synthesize it with doctrines derived from Kant (as in the case of
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/08/2018, SPi

4 Introduction

Sir William Hamilton), or to reject it altogether in order to start from scratch, buoyed
by the noble hope of creating a system that would be free of all the supposedly crude
and embarrassing blunders committed by Reid and his Scottish epigoni (as in the case
of James Frederick Ferrier).
The fourth and final aim of this book is to win a wider audience for the neglected
work of James Frederick Ferrier, a thinker of rare daring and originality who was argu-
ably the first academic philosopher in nineteenth-century Britain to offer a sophisti-
cated defence of idealism.5 Once a name to conjure with, Ferrier is now a largely
forgotten figure; and the three volumes of his Philosophical Works, written with ferocity
and finesse, gather dust on the shelves of research libraries or antiquarian bookshops in
old university towns. To be sure, many is the mighty name whose lustre has faded, and
time has made phantoms of more than one philosopher reckoned immortal by adoring
contemporaries. But is Ferrier’s pathetic fate fair or fitting? Does he deserve to become a
dumb shade, known only (if at all) for coining the term ‘epistemology’?6
The answer, I submit, is a firm and emphatic No. To be more specific, I believe that
there are at least two reasons why Ferrier’s oeuvre deserves careful study. In the first
place, Ferrier was that rarity among Anglophone philosophers: an honest-to-goodness
speculative system-builder in the venerable rationalist tradition of Spinoza. With its
self-conscious commitment to rigour and its proofs ad more geometrico, the format of
Ferrier’s magnum opus, the Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being
(1854), reminds us much more of the Ethics than it does of any previous work of note
in English-language philosophy. Beginning with a single proposition set up as an
undeniable first principle or irrefragable axiom, Ferrier advances a total of forty-one
propositions, the vast majority of which are presented as unavoidable logical conse-
quences of propositions established at some earlier stage of the Institutes. The result,
which John Stuart Mill called ‘the romance of logic’, is an impressive synthesis of
rationalism and idealism which is remarkable for its breadth, coherence, and intellec-
tual beauty.7 In the second place—and this is closely related to our first point—Ferrier
was an extremely aggressive and skilful dialectician, a metaphysical Hannibal whose
wars were waged with the well-honed weapons of pure reason. As anyone who peruses
the Institutes soon realizes, Ferrier’s book is one long and audacious campaign of argu-
ment from beginning to end; and this campaign’s creator, like a seasoned military
commander, has devised an ingenious and far-sighted strategy, the purpose of which is
to ensure the downfall of his realist and common-sensist enemies by attacking them
directly and repeatedly, and by cutting off their logical lines of retreat with platoons of
necessary truths and regiments of razor-sharp syllogisms. In short, the Institutes of
Metaphysic is a beautifully plotted book, and its fine structure mirrors the subtle yet
far-seeing mind of its maker.
Very little needs to be said about the plot or structure of this book, because its plan
is largely self-explanatory. After introducing the Scottish common sense school of
philosophy led by Thomas Reid (Chapter 1), we delve into its prehistory by examining
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 02/08/2018, SPi

introduction 5

the powerful but little-known defence of perceptual realism mounted by the redoubtable
Lord Kames (Chapter 2). This sets the stage for an extended discussion of Reid’s
insightful treatment of external world scepticism and his influential plea for common
sense realism (Chapter 3). After describing how Reidian realism was appropriated and
re-stated by Dugald Stewart and Sir William Hamilton in the early nineteenth century
(Chapter 4), we take a close look at James Frederick Ferrier’s two great contributions to
the realism debate in Scotland: his no-holds-barred critique of Reid’s position
(Chapter 5) and his little-known argument for a form of idealism which is both neo-
Berkeleyan and post-Kantian (Chapter 6). We conclude with some reflections about
the direction Scottish philosophy took in the years following Ferrier’s death in 1864
(Chapter 7).
Although it is tedious as well as un-Parmenidean to talk about what a book is
not, I would like to make it perfectly clear at the outset that this is not a history
of Scottish common sense philosophy.8 It cannot possibly be that, since common
sense realism is only one part of common sense philosophy—a rather important
part, as I think, but a comparatively small one, all things considered. If you are
inclined to doubt the latter claim, consider two points. (1) There is much more to
Scottish common sense philosophy than epistemology. As students of the primary
and secondary literature know very well, common sense philosophers explored a
wide range of topics—in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy (pure
and applied), aesthetics (including rhetoric and criticism), and philosophy of
­religion—many of which had little or nothing to do with the issues we shall discuss
in this book. (2) Moreover, external world scepticism is only one of many epistemo-
logical problems addressed by Scottish common-sensists. To be sure, Reid and
company were deeply interested in questions raised by sense perception; but they
were also deeply interested in corresponding questions about memory, reason,
introspection, conscience, and testimony. The conclusion supported by (1) and (2)
may be expressed metaphorically: if common sense philosophy were a country,
common sense realism would be a provincial capital whose reputation and charm
once made it a mandatory stop on the Grand Tour. This book tells a story about that
famous city’s rise and fall: about how and when it was built, who lived there, what
they did, and how its once-firm foundations were shaken.
Another thing this book does not do is trace the emergence or evolution of the con-
cept of ‘Scottish common sense philosophy’. That is to say, I shall not focus on how or
when this category was first constructed, what interests and purposes it served, whose
interests and purposes it served, why it survived and spread, or how it was related to
extra-philosophical developments inside or outside of Scotland. As readers will see in
Chapter 1, however, I firmly believe that there was what might be called a ‘school’ of
common sense philosophy; but I acknowledge that there are some scholars of the
Scottish Enlightenment who are sceptical about this old-fashioned judgment, and
whose reservations flow from their account of that judgment’s genesis or historical
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Tori suur' oli muuan varsinkin,
taloin ympäröity uhkein;
oli palatsi, asunto kuninkaan,
näkö jonka on mitä muhkein,

(se on palatsin.) — Pääoven edess' on

kopit vahtien molemmin kulmin.
Punatakkeja vahdissa pyssyineen
on muodoin niin murhan-julmin.

Ties oppaani: "Tässä asuu Ernst

Augustus, suurtorylainen
jalo, vanha lordi, mut vuosikseen
hyvin vielä virkeänlainen.

Olo häll' on idyllisen turvallinen,

näet paremmin kuin punanuttuin
kaikki parvet puuttuva uskallus
häntä turvaa rakasten tuttuin.

Hänet joskus nään, ja hän päivittää

miten kuiva virka on kovin
tää kuninkuus, johon tuomittu hän
nyt on päänä Hannoverin hovin.

Isobritannilaisille tavoilleen
muka täällä ahdasta niin on,
ihan pelkää vaan, että silmukkaan
hänet vielä saattava spleen on.

Toiss' aamuna kamiinin ääressä näin

hänen häärivän kumarassa;
oli kuningas kipeille koirilleen
lavemangia laittamassa."
XX LUKU.

Tulin Harburgista Hampuriin ma tunnissa. Oli jo ilta, ja ilma

lempeä, tähtöset mua tervehti taivahilta.

Ja kun äitini luo tulin äkkiään,

ilo hänt' ihan häpsähytti;
"Rakas lapsi kulta!" hän huus ja löi
kädet yhteen, läpsähytti.

"Lapsi kulta, kolmetoista jo on

ohi vuotta, ennenkuin palaat!
Kova nälkä sulla on varmaankin —
sano mitä sä syödä halaat?

On hanhea, kalaa ja kauniita

myös appelsiineja mulla."
"Anna hanhea, kalaa ja kauniita
vain appelsiineja tulla."

Emo ilosta säteili nähdessään

mun ruokahaluni julman,
sen sitä, tuon tätä hän kyseli,
välin pisti pahankin pulman.
 "Sun, lapsi kulta, nyt tokko vaan
hyvin siell' on vieraissa laitas?
Tokko rouvas on toimekas emäntä
ja parsii sukkas ja paitas?"

"Kala hyvältä maistuu, maammosein,

mut ääneti syödä se pitää;
niin helposti kurkkuunsa ruodon saa,
älä nyt multa kysele mitään."

Tuli hanhi pöytään, kun popsinut

kalan tuon olin kaunihisti.
Emo sen sitä, tuon tätä kyseli taas,
välin pahankin pulman pisti.

"Sanos, lapsi kulta, nyt kumpi maa

on parempi elää, ja kumpi,
tämä Saksan kansa vai Ranskanko,
on mielestäs mieluhumpi?"

"Hyvä Saksan hanhi on, maammosein,

mut muheammiksi kuin meillä
ne ranskalaisin' on syötetyt,
myös paremmat höysteet on heillä."

Tuli appelsiinien vuoro, kun jo

teki lähtönsä hanhenpaisti;
ne ol' odottamattoman oivia,
ihan mainiolta ne maisti.

Jo äiti minulta mielissään

taas kyseli kyselemätään,
hän muisti sen tuhatkin seikkaa — mun
välin saada ol' aivan hätään.

"Mikä, lapsi kulta, on mieles nyt?

Yhä vieläkö ulkona tuolla
sa politikoit? Nyt kannaltas
minkä puolueen olet puolla?"

"Hyvät appelsiinit on, maammosein, ja tosi nautinnolla imen

suuhuni mehun ma makean ja annan kuorien olla."
XXI LUKU.

Taas alkaa kohota poroistaan vähitellen kaupunki polo; kuin

puudelin puoleksi kerityn on Hampurin hahmo nolo.

Näen murehella ma kadonneen

monen kallismuistoisen kadun. —
Missä talo, joss' suutelot suutelin
ma ensi lempeni sadun?

Missä kirjapaino, jost' ilmoille

mun matkakuvani tuli?
Missä kellari, jossa kerran mun
ens osterit suuhuni suli?

Ja Dreckwall, missä Dreckwall on?

Sit' on hakea turha työ nyt!
Missä paviljonki, joss' olen niin
monet sokeritortut syönyt?

Missä porvariston ja senaatin

koti korkea, raatitalo?
Tulen tuiman saalis! Pyhintäkään
ei säästänyt ahne palo.
 Viel' ihmiset huokaili hätäänsä
ja kasvoilla murhe musta
palon suuren surkuteltavaa
he muisteli tapausta:

"Joka haaralla valkea valloillaan,

kaikk' kietoi se liekein ja sauhuin!
Tulipatsaina tornit kirkkojen
ne sortui ryskein ja pauhuin.

On porona vanha pörssi nyt,

joss' isämme asioivat
läpi vuosisatojen keskenään
niin rehellisesti kuin voivat.

Pankki, kaupungin kultainen sielu, jäi,

Herran kiitos! ja kirjat, joissa
joka miehen arvo merkitty
on selvissä numeroissa.

Meille kansat kaukaisimmatkin

keräs apua, kiitos Herran!
hyvä kauppa — se kolehti tuotti noin
miljoonan kahdeksan verran.

Tosihurskaat ja kristityt hoitivat

apukassaa tuota — ei tiennyt
käsi vasempi konsaan, paljonko
oli oikea kulloinkin vienyt.

Avoimiin käsiimme tulvanaan

tuli rahaa kaikista maista,
elintarpeita myös, ylenkatsottu
ei lahjaa minkäänlaista.

Tuli leivät ja lihat ja liemet myös,

puvut, peitteet tukkunansa!
Meille miel' oli Preussin kuninkaan
myös johtaa jo joukkojansa.

Tuho aineellinen tuli korvatuks,

se voitiin arvioida —
mutta hirmu se, meidän hirmumme,
sit' ei millään korvata voida!"

Sanoin rohkaisevasti ma: "Ette saa

noin, veikkoset, itkua valaa;
oli Troija parempi kaupunki,
vaan silt' oli pakko palaa.

Talot uudet tehkää ja kuivatkaa

pois katuinne ropakko-roiskut,
ja paremmat lait te laittakaa
ja paremmat paloruiskut.

Ei kilpikonna-lientänne
pidä liiaksi pippuroittaa,
nuo lihavat suomukarppinne myös
voi terveyttä vahingoittaa.

Vähän vaaraa kalkkunat teille saa,

vaan varottavammat on pillat
sen linnun, mi pesäks on ottanut
pormestarin peruukkivillat.
 Mikä turman lintu se on, sit' ei
tässä tarvis sanoa mulla.
Mult' aina, kun sitä aattelen vaan,
ylös tahtoo yökätys tulla."
XXII LUKU.

Vielä muuttuneemmat kuin kaupunki on kaikk' ihmiset —

kallella-päiset ja apeat kadulla astuissaan kuin rauniot
käveleväiset.

On hoikat viel' yhä hoikenneet,

yhä pullistuneet on pulleet,
on lapset vanhoja, vanhat taas
on jälleen lapsiksi tulleet.

Moni imuvasikka entinen

nyt mua jo mullina kohtaa;
moni pikku hanhonen piiperö
emähanhen jo höyhenin hohtaa.

On vanha Gudel maalattu

ja siistitty sireeni-somaks;
tukan mustan ja hampaat valkeat
upo-uudet on hankkinut omaks.

Oli tuttuni, paperikauppias tuo,

lujin kestämään ajan hallan;
pää kehäss' on hiusten kellahtavain —
kuin Johannes kastaja vallan.

Näin ————:n vilahtamalta vain,

ohi pyyhkäs kuin puhallettu;
aju palanut raukan, ja Bieberill'
oli kuulemma vakuutettu.

Näin vanhan sensori-kuomanikin.

Tuli halki usman ja huurun
hän Hanhitorilla vastaani, —
pään kantoi kovin jo kuurun.

Me toistemme kättä pudistettiin,

ukon silmään kyynel täytti.
Miten iloitsikaan minut nähden taas!
Se liikuttavalta näytti. —

En kaikkia tavannut. Ajalliset

monelt' askeleet jo on laanneet.
Ah, silmäni Gumpelinoakaan
eloss' enää ei nähdä saaneet!

Pois suuren sielunsa henkäsi

jalo tuo juur' ennenkuin saavuin,
Jehovan istuimen eess' on nyt
seraafina kirkkain kaavuin.

Tuota käyrää Adonista turhaan hain

halki Hampurin kadut ja torit,
jolla kuppeja, yöposliineja
oli kaupan kukkurakorit.
 Pikku Meyer vieläkö elossa lie,
sitä tiedä en toden totta;
en nähnyt miestä ja unohdin
selon Cornetilta ottaa.

Sarras, tuo puudeli uskollinen,

pois kuollut on — haikea hukka!
Kynäniekkaa kymmenen ennen maar
ois uhrannut Campe rukka. — —

On juutalaista ja kristittyä,
niin kauas kuin muisti kantaa,
väki Hampurin; — jälkimmäistenkään
tapa juur' ei ilmaiseks antaa.

Koko hyviä kristityt kaikk' on, myös

hyvin päivällisensä syövät,
ja vekselinlankeema-päivänsä
hyvin harvoin he laiminlyövät.

Taas juutalaisten joukkoa kaks

eri puoluetta on heitä;
synagoogassa vanhat vaeltaa
ja nuoret temppelinteitä.

Halu hangotella on nuorten, ne

sianlihan on nielijöitä,
demokraatteja; vanhat pikemmin taas
ovat ylimysmielijöitä.

Pidän vanhoista, pidän nuorista,

vaan varma se on kuin vala,
eräs muu laji: silakat savustetut,
on vielä parempi kala.
XXIII LUKU.

Tasavaltoina Hampurin varjoon saa hyvin Venedig sekä

Florens, mut on Hampurin osterit oivemmat, myö parhaita
kellari Lorenz.

Oli kaunis ilta, kun Campe vei

minut sinne, — meill' iltatuimaan
oli tuumana Reininviinissä
siell' osterit panna uimaan.

Hyvä seura siell' oli myös, mä näin

iloll' entistä veikkoa monta,
Chaufepién esimerkiksi, monta myös
uutta, ennen tuntematonta.

Oli Willen viiruinen naama, tuo

sukukirja, kärjellä miekkain
käsialaa täyteen kirjattu
akadeemisten vihasniekkain.

Ja Fucks oli, umpipakana,

verivihollinen. Jehovan,
vain Hegeliin uskoo ja hiukan myös
kai Venukseen Canovan.

Oli Campeni jalo Amphitryon,

hymy huulilla luopumatonna;
hänen silmänsä autuutta säteili
kuin kirkastettu Madonna.

Ma aattelin, pöydän aarteita

alas kaulaani halulla ajain:
"Tuo Campe on todella suuri mies,
kukka kaikkien kustantajain.

Joku toinen ois nälässä antanut

mun kulkea maita, teitä,
tää juottaa janonkin sammuksiin;
hänt' en mä ikinä heitä.

Ole kiitetty, luoja taivahan,

tään rypälemehun kun luonut,
ja kustantajaksi kun minulle
olet Julius Campen suonut!

Ole kiitetty, luoja taivahan,

kun suuri tulkoon-sanas
loi osterit mereen ja kasvamaan
maan Reininviiniä manas!

Sitruunia myöskin, antamaan

meren ostereille mehun —
tän' yönä suo, isä, vatsassain
vain hyvästi sulaa rehun!"
 Tuo Reininviini niin hellyttää
minut aina, rinnasta haipuu
joka ristiriita, siell' elähtää
syvä ihmislemmen kaipuu.

Mun ajaa se katuja astelemaan

ulos alle taivallan välkeen;
sydän sydäntä hakee, ja silmä käy
valkohelmain hentojen jälkeen.

Ihan riutua moisena hetkenä

olen kaihoon, mi rinnan täyttää;
katit kaikki harmailta silmissäin,
Helenoilta naiset näyttää. — — —

Ja Drehbanin päähän päästessäin

kuun valossa kuninkainen
tuli vastaani vaimo-ihminen,
ylen korkeapovinen nainen.

Oli kukkeat kasvot kuin täysi kuu,

sini silmäin kuin turkoosikivi,
kuin ruusut posket, kuin kirsikka suu,
nenä myös vähän punehtivi.

Päässä päähine valkealiinainen

ihan linnakruunun malliin,
sen tärkkäys poimuihin taitettu
kuin tornit ja sakarat valliin.

Hän kantoi valkoista tunikkaa

alas pohkeille ulottuvaista.
Ja mitkä pohkeet! Kulkimet kuin
pari pylvästä doorilaista.

Mitä maallisin, mitä luonnollisin

joka ilme, mut että vaimo
oli ylempi olento, tiesi taus
yli-inhimillisen aimo.

Kävi kohti hän virkkain: "Terve taas

tykö Elben pitkältä tieltäs —
nuo kolmetoista ei vuotta viel'
ole, näämmä, muuttanut mieltäs!

Haet noita kauniita sieluja kai,

kera joitten niin monesti muinen
tässä kauniissa seudussa karkeli pois
sult' yö sulohaaveiluinen.

Nieli elämä, hirviö satapää,

ne jo irjuvin ikenineen;
pois aika vanha on vaipunut
jo armaine ajattarineen!

Poiss' on sulokukkaset, sydämes

jumaloimat nuoren — ne kukat
on langenneet, on lakastuneet,
ne myrsky runteli rukat.

Ne kuihtui, murtui, musertui

raa'an kohtalon-anturan alle —
niin, veikkonen, täällä kaikelle käy
ihanalle ja armahallel"
 "Ken olet sa?" — huusin ma — "olethan
kuin unelma aikojen takaa!
Miss' asut sa, korkea kulkijatar,
ja saanko matkas ma jakaa?"

Hän hymyillen virkkoi: "Sa erehdyt,

olen kunniallinen nainen,
siveellinen, hieno henkilö, en
katuperhonen kaikellainen.

En moinen pikku mamselli,

siro etelän seikkailijatar —
sa tiedä: Hammonia, Hampurin
olen suojelusjumalatar!

Sä säpsähdät, laulaja uljas sa,

sä säpsähdät, säikähdytkin!
No niin, tule äläkä tuumaile,
jos tahdot seurata nytkin!"

Hohonaurussa tuohon ma huudahdin: "Heti kanssas ma

tulla tuumaan — käy edellä vaan, peräss' astutaan, vie vaikka
hornaan kuumaan!"
XXIV LUKU.

Miten salin ahtaista portaista lien ylös tullut, sit' en mä tiedä;

mua näkymättömät henget kai ylös sinne mahtoi viedä.

Siellä, kammiossa Hammonian,

pian hetket herttaiset kulki.
Mulle sympatiansa Jumalatar
jo vanhan tunnusti julki.

"Näes", — virkkoi hän — "ennen enimmän

tuo laulaja lempeni voitti,
joka meille hartaalla harpullaan
Messiaan suuruutta soitti.

Klopstockini kipsinen kaapin pääll'

on vielä, mut verkoissa lukin,
jo vuosia mulla hän ollut on
vain toimessa myssytukin.

Sua lemmin ma nyt. Näet vuoteeni

pääpohjissa kuvasi oman,
ja tuores laakeri, katsopas,
on seppelnä kuvan soman.
 Se vaan, että olet mun poikiain
niin näykkinyt usein, se mua
välin todella syvästi loukkas, — nyt ei
saa enää se tapahtua.

Kera vuotten suita jo vallattomuus

tuo toivottavasti talttui,
ja mieles narreja kohtaankin
kai suvaitsevammaksi malttui.

Vaan sanos, kuinka sun pohjolaan

tuli matkata tuuma päähän
tähän vuoden-aikaan, kun tantereet
vilu talven jo vetää jäähän?"

"Oi Jumalatar!" — ma vastasin —

"syväll' ihmispovessa asuu
moni uinuva aatos, mi heräämään
ihan väärällä hetkellä osuu.

Hyvin päällisin puolin ma kyllä voin,

mut sisällä vaiva valvoi,
se päivä päivältä paheni vaan —
mua kotikaipaus kalvoi.

Kävi painostamaan tuo muuten niin

kevyt Ranskan ilma mua;
piti tänne päästäni hengittämään,
jos mieli ei tukehtua.

Käry turpeen ja tupakan täällä taas

piti tuntea täyttä rintaa;