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The Explainability of Experience
The Explainability
of Experience
Realism and Subjectivity
in Spinoza’s Theory of
the Human Mind
zz
URSULA RENZ
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
Published with the support of Austrian Science Fund (FWF): PUB 31-V15
Contents
Preface ix
Preface to the English Translation xi
Abbreviations xiii
7. Body and Mind: What Spinoza’s Theory of Identity Seeks to Achieve 108
Bibliography 275
Index of Passages Cited 299
Index of Persons 303
Index of Subject Matter 307
Preface
This book results from many years of long and intensive reflection on the
question of how Spinoza’s theoretical philosophy must be conceived of in order
to serve as the basis for his ethics and moral philosophy. I assumed from the start
that the second part of the Ethics plays a major role in answering this question,
but the project only came together when I gave up the Hegelian notion that
Spinoza takes individual subjects to disappear into the one substance. It was also
only after making this shift that it became possible for me to draw the parallels
that I do between Spinoza and issues in contemporary philosophy of mind.
In writing the book, I was supported by several institutions, among which,
the University of Zurich, where it was accepted as a habilitation thesis in the
summer of 2007. From 2002 to 2003, I spent a year at Yale University and from
2003 to 2004, at the École Normale Supérieure in Lyon—both of these stays were
supported by several fellowships from the Kanton Zurich. During the period in
which the manuscript was written, I was supported by both the ETH Zurich and
the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Without the encouragement and support of various people, this book would
not have been possible. The conversations I had with Michael Della Rocca during
my time at Yale not only challenged me in the most fruitful manner but also
forced me to clarify the question behind my research and to sharpen my views
on it. Pierre-François Moreau not only pointed to the need for more philolog-
ical precision but also encouraged me to elaborate my novel views on the Ethics.
Michael Hampe, who was always open for discussion, confronted me time and
again with surprising empirical or historical facts. Helmut Holzhey was particu-
larly important in the very beginning of this project. Significant comments came
from the members of the habilitation committee, in particular Peter Schulthess
and Hanjo Glock. Wolfgang Marx, who led the committee with great foresight,
gave me the gift of a summer free of sorrows.
Various colleagues have been invaluable to my work on this over several years.
Particular thanks go to Robert Schnepf who read the manuscript in several stages;
x Preface
Zurich/Copenhagen/Klagenfurt, 2009
Preface to the English Translation
Every book has its story, and so does this translation. When I visited Yale
shortly after Michael Della Rocca’s review of the German original was published
in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, I heard from Barbara Sattler that
Michael, with her help, had made a partial translation in the course of the writing
of his review. After the book was awarded the JHP prize, I was encouraged by sev-
eral colleagues to publish a translation. This plan would never have been realized,
though, were it not for the support of various people and institutions. The
Austrian Science Foundation (FWF) supported the final translation, by Mark
Ilsemann, through a translation grant.
I would like to thank various people without whom this translation would
never have been finished. In particular, I would like to thank Barnaby Hutchins,
who spent innumerous hours correcting the original translation and discussing
problematic passages with me, while Namita Herzl copy-edited the manuscript.
I also owe thanks to my research team at Klagenfurt, Namita Herzl, Barnaby
Hutchins, Sarah Tropper, and Philip Waldner, who discussed the whole book
with me at great length and helped greatly to clarify certain passages. I am very
grateful to Peter Ohlin and Lucy Randall at Oxford University Press for their
encouragement and patience, as well as their willingness to go through the whole
complicated process.
When I discussed the translation with Mark Ilsemann and Barnaby Hutchins,
we often preferred more liberal articulations over literal translations. Perhaps it is
worth mentioning that while, over the years, many of my views on several details
have changed, I am still, overall, committed to the reconstruction of Spinoza that
I originally presented ten years ago. While the literature has progressed in that
time, my overall views have not changed substantially, and I therefore present
them here as originally set out. For this reason, it is only in rare places that I have
added references to more recent literature.
While I did not dedicate the German version of this book to anyone—this
is not always done in the German-speaking context—I want to dedicate this
xii Preface to the English Translation
English translation to my father, who passed away three years ago. Although not
inclined toward philosophy himself, he never failed to love me for the person
I am and to support me along the path I have taken.
Zurich/Klagenfurt, 2017
Abbreviations
Descartes’ Works
AT Adam and Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes
CSM Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (eds. and trans.), The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes (third volume edited by A. Kenny also)
Spinoza’s Works
C Curley (ed.), The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 & 2
CM Cogitata Metaphysica (an appendix to Spinoza’s DPP)
DPP Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Parts I & II (Descartes’ Principles
of Philosophy)
Ep. Spinoza’s Letters
KV Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand (Short Treatise on
God, Man, and His Well-Being)
NS Nagelaten Schrift en (the 1677 Dutch translation of Spinoza’s works)
OP Opera Posthuma
TdIE Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione
TP Tractatus Politicus
TTP Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
proposition 16 of part 1. Passages from DPP are cited using the same system of
abbreviations used for the Ethics.
References to Gebhardt (ed.), Spinoza Opera, follow this format: volume
number, page number, line number. Hence, “II/200/12” stands for volume 2,
page 200, line 12. Passages from AT are cited by volume and page number. Thus,
“AT VII 23” stands for page 23 of volume 7 of this edition.
Introduction
The Explainability of Experience
salvation. Spinoza’s Ethics attempts all of this, even if the attempt is not fully con-
vincing in all aspects.
I will not be able, in the present reconstruction, to spell out this entire
enterprise. I want only to describe the theory of the human mind on which
that program is based. That is not to say that I am limiting myself to marginal
issues; rather, I am focusing on the systematic center, as it were, of the pro-
gram outlined above. The theory of the human mind is central, not simply be-
cause it appears in the middle of the Ethics, as far as the organization of the text
is concerned. More importantly, it is central because not every conception of
the mental is compatible with the concern about the explainability of experi-
ence. Whether the intuition that experience is explainable makes sense or not
depends, crucially, on how the human mind is conceptualized and how its ac-
tivities are described.
It is the main thesis of this study that Spinoza contemplated this connection
more than any other philosopher has. Hence, the question of what is required to
show that experience is something that can be explained will also be used to re-
construct and elucidate the most important decisions, concepts, and arguments
that Spinoza develops in the Ethics with regard to the human mind. As it turns
out, many passages of the Ethics that are barely comprehensible, thanks to their
terseness and the rather technical language of the entire work, suddenly be-
come plausible if considered against this background. Thus, Spinoza’s theory of
the human mind will be analyzed according to the way in which it takes into
account the assumption that human experience is explainable. On the one hand,
that means elucidating the requirements that any philosophy of the human
mind would have to fulfill to make such a claim. On the other hand, it means
addressing the many problems of comprehension that confront any reader of
Spinoza’s theory of the human mind.
Before I begin, I would like to spell out a few of the fundamental considerations
that lie behind this conviction, as well as comment a little further on some of the
methodological premises of this study.
admit that subjective experience can be accounted for in some way or another,
even if it cannot necessarily be explained with the instruments of the exact nat-
ural sciences.3
Affirming that experience is explainable does not entail that phenomena of
consciousness must supervene on, let alone be reducible to, physical entities. The
intuition we are dealing with here is both more ambitious and less ambitious than
that. If we want to consider experience to be explainable, we must be able to jus-
tify the following assumption: provided we know all the factors that influence
someone’s experience directly or indirectly, we must be able (so the assumption
goes) to comprehend another person’s affective state arising at the occasion of
a certain event, without thereby necessarily creating the same affective state in
ourselves. This assumption is less ambitious than some materialistic scenarios in
that it refrains from implying that there must always exist a purely scientific expla-
nation for our way of experiencing things. At the same time, however, it is more
ambitious in that any successful explanation of experience requires a lot of back-
ground knowledge. To explain the experience of anguish following the sudden
death of a friend, for instance, we have to know not only about the relationship
the person had to that friend but also about such things as the situation he was in
when he received the message, his prior experiences with cases of fatality, how he
thinks about death in general, etc.
Whether a philosophical position of this kind—let us refer to it as real-
istic rationalism—is justified largely depends on three conditions. First and
foremost, a realistic rationalism must be able to make plausible that every-
thing that is or that happens can in principle be grasped or comprehended—
that every being is, to use a traditional term, intelligible. The rationalism that
will be the subject of the following discussion therefore has an ontological,
rather than an epistemological, foundation; it proceeds neither from positing
innate ideas4 nor from deriving all possible knowledge from simple and intu-
itively cognizable ideas but from the general assumption that all being is fully
intelligible.
Second, in order to justify the thesis that experience is explainable, one must
make sure that what we seek to understand does not coincide with the act of un-
derstanding it but that its existence is ontologically prior to its being understood
3. Chalmers 1996, for instance, makes this conception the basis for his theory of consciousness.
4. That the notion of innate ideas doesn’t play a big role in my reconstruction is among the
most important differences between my reconstruction of Spinoza’s theory of the human mind
and the one proposed by Marshall 2013. (Note added to the English translation.)
Introduction 5
or known. With regard to experience, that means that experiencing is prior to its
being explained.5 If (and only if ) that is the case, experience is not only explain-
able but also, at the same time, conceivable in its difference from its explanation.
And only in that case does rationalism avoid lapsing into absolute idealism—and
it is this that justifies its claim to be a realistic rationalism.
These two conditions give rise to a third, a methodical condition, as it were, that
must be met by the realistic rationalism outlined above. It must be possible, in prin-
ciple, to secure the intelligibility of human experience within the concepts already
employed in our attempt to grasp beings as beings with metaphysical intent. Only
then is the full intelligibility of all being compatible with realism.
As will be shown later on, this position corresponds rather precisely to the
approach developed by Spinoza in the first few propositions of the second part of
the Ethics and thus at the very outset of his philosophy of mind.6 In my opinion,
his rationalism is a realistic rationalism—and not, as many commentators assume
or read into him, an idealistic one.7 However, this is not yet the time for a precise
characterization of Spinoza’s rationalism; instead, we should inquire into the reasons
that might compel us to grant this kind of position priority over its many conceiv-
able alternatives—for instance, that the notion of experience is itself considered a
fundamental concept in the philosophy of mind or that any conceptual difference is
abandoned, either between experiencing and comprehending or between being and
knowing.
This kind of realistic rationalism is chiefly supported by a conviction on
which our everyday conception of knowledge is implicitly based. The convic-
tion is that knowledge refers to something else, something whose origin is not
itself knowledge. I consider this conviction indispensable because it illuminates
better than anything else what drives us, in the end, whenever we want to know
5. This does not rule out that current experiences can be shaped by earlier explanations, nor that
our current notions are capable of defining our future experiences. In this context, see Part IV,
Chapter 13, § b, as well as Chapter 14, § b.
6. See Part I, Chapter 3.
7. Among those who construe Spinoza’s rationalism as a—potentially absolute—form of ide-
alism are Gueroult 1968; Della Rocca 2002, 2003a; see also Della Rocca 2005 for argumen-
tative background. Deleuze 1992 also moves in that direction. From these kinds of idealistic
interpretations, which conceive of Spinoza’s approach as a closed system of concepts lacking ex-
ternal referents, we must distinguish reconstructions that tend to see transcendental arguments
at work in the Ethics. Such is the case in Della Rocca 2011, for example. In contrast to the inter-
pretation advanced in Della Rocca 2003a and 2005, his reconstruction from 2011 is compatible
with my reading here.
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be proved here later. Every one was now ready to say good-by and a
long queue passed by the machines. Mention of the photographer
must not be forgotten, either, in this connection.
Whilst we waited the motors continued to run and the clock went
round to five. Before the two planes got away the following orders were
sent out: (1) The command of the remaining part of the expedition
should be taken over by Captain Hagerup of the “Fram.” (2) In fourteen
days from the start the expedition’s return by flying-machine might be
expected. “Fram” and “Hobby” should remain together in the fairway by
the Danske Öen so long as it was possible to see the North Coast.
Should the light diminish “Hobby” must steer towards the east as far as
conditions allowed, but not east of Verlegen Hook. (3) After fourteen
days had passed “Hobby” was in any event to steer eastwards if
possible as far as Nordkap. After collaborating with “Fram” they were
to take up the work of patrolling as near the edge of the ice as
possible, both ships keeping a sharp lookout. (4) From the 16th to the
19th of May “Fram” shall remain in King’s Bay for boiler-survey. (5) The
ships (if necessary “Hobby” doing this alone should “Fram” have gone
back earlier) shall remain by the north coast of Spitzbergen and
continue patrolling for six weeks counting from the start; “Hobby” going
afterwards to King’s Bay to collect the remaining material to be
delivered at Tromsö, where it will be sent back in accordance with
special instructions here enclosed. The despatching will be attended to
by the chemist Zapffe. (6) When “Fram” goes to King’s Bay for boiler
survey it will give those members of the expedition who wish it the
opportunity to accompany the boat to King’s Bay in order to travel
home by the first opportunity. (From here Horgen, Ramm and Berge
are the first to return when both boats definitely set off.)
First Lieutenant E. Horgen, who was engaged as the expedition’s
reserve airman (after he had obtained permission from the Norwegian
American Line, where he was first mate), became the expedition’s
leader on board the “Hobby.” The services Horgen rendered us were
many and valuable. I would have liked so much to have granted his
great wish to fly northwards with us, but there was no room. Next time I
hope to see Horgen an active participator in the flight. He belongs
absolutely to the type which I have always sought for, calm, resolute,
and afraid of nothing. As a flyer Horgen is now counted among the
best.
THE CREW OF N 25
LEFT TO RIGHT: RIISER-LARSEN, AMUNDSEN,
FEUCHT
THE CREW OF N 24
ELLSWORTH, DIETRICHSON, OMDAL
It was now ten minutes past five. The motors were quite warm and
Green nodded approvingly. His smile expressed complete satisfaction.
A last handshake from Director Knutsen and then good-by. The motor
was running at top speed as N 25 trembled and shook. The plan was
that our machine should make the first start and try if possible to start
out over the fjord with the wind in order to glide and swing at a low
altitude between the fjord boundaries. If this were not successful we
were to set our course direct against the wind, towards King’s Bay
Glacier. It was also agreed that the machines should try to keep
together during the entire flight. What the one did the other should do
afterwards. One last pull and then N 25 was free and glided gracefully
down the slide on to the frozen fjord. The trip was started. “Welcome
back to-morrow,” was the last I heard as with tremendous speed—
1,800 revolutions a minute—it set off towards the starting place in the
middle of the fjord. There we noticed all at once that the ice was
bending right over and the water surging up. In a second the machine
was across the fjord heading straight for the glacier and making 2,000
revolutions. This was one of the most anxious moments. Could the
machine bear the tremendous excess weight or must we stop and
lighten it? The pilot sat at the wheel. Had he been seated at the
breakfast table he could scarcely have looked less concerned. As the
speed still continued, and we were nearing the glacier at a mighty rate,
the pilot’s coolness seemed greater than ever. His mouth was the only
indication of his resolution and determination. We went over the ice
like a hurricane. The speed continued and continued; then suddenly
the miracle happened. With a mighty pull the machine raised itself from
the earth. We were in the air. The master stroke was accomplished. It
seemed to me after the breathless anxiety that I at last heard a light
Ah! which grew into a ringing shout of joy.