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Evil in Mind: The Psychology of Harming Others Christopher T. Burris full chapter instant download
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Evil in Mind
Evil in Mind
The Psychology of Harming Others
C H R I S T O P H E R T. BU R R I S
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197637180.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Contents
Preface ix
I. CORE PRINCIPLES
1. What Is “Evil”? 3
First Things First 3
oes “evil” =suffering?
D 3
Does “evil” =inflicted suffering? 4
“Evil’s” missing piece 4
“ Evil” Is a Label 6
Some Implications of the Three-Feature Model of “Evil” 8
Looking Ahead 9
References 10
2. “Evildoers”: Who (or What) Earns the Title? 12
I nvisible “Evildoers” 12
Assumptions About “Evildoers”: The Myth of Pure Evil 14
The Myth Takes Form: Demons, Satanists, and Serial Killers 18
Demons 18
Satanists 19
Serial killers 21
randing “Pure Evil”: The Evocative Power of Symbols
B 22
Bringing It Back (Too Close to) Home 25
References 25
3. The “Mark of Cain” 28
e “First” True Crime Story
Th 28
“Evil” as the “Mark of Cain” 29
Deflecting the Mark of Cain 30
oral licensing
M 30
Denying one’s role 30
Minimizing perceived harm 33
Decreasing perceived intent 35
Invoking justifications 38
“I am good” 39
“I am not bad” 40
What’s left? 42
vi Contents
I I . A PA N T H E O N O F EV I L
5. Hate 81
ate and Evil: Are They Linked?
H 81
Hate Is . . . 83
Hate and the Mark of Cain 87
J ustified denial 88
Justified admission 93
Normalized admission 93
eal Hate
R 94
References 95
6. Sadism 99
hat Is Sadism?
W 99
Is Sadism “Evil”? 100
Do Be Bitter: Sadism as an Individual Difference 102
What Does Sadism Feel Like? 104
Why Does Sadism Exist? 106
Testing the Sadism Model in a Novel Context: Pranking 112
It’s Probably Not “Just a Prank”: Disconnected Sadism 115
References 117
Contents vii
III. EPILOGUE
9. “EVIL” Spelled Backwards Is . . .? 169
e Basic Principles of “Evil”
Th 169
Recognizing the Basic Principles Among Some of Evil’s
“Usual Suspects” 172
Some Things That Might Be Bothering You 173
You’ve Reached the End, But We Haven’t 177
References 178
Index 179
Preface
It’s been over 20 years since I first created and taught a course called Psychology
of Evil. As a quite new faculty member of the Department of Psychology at
St. Jerome’s University (part of the University of Waterloo, Canada), the
course seemed like an odd-but-logical fusion of my research interests in
the psychology of religion and my clinical interviewing experiences in a
maximum-security prison. It was a happy coincidence that my course pla-
nning coincided with the release of Roy Baumeister’s thought-provoking
Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty. That book has had a lasting impact
on my thinking—and as the adopted course textbook, on literally thousands
of my students.
With two more decades of human history behind us, the topic of evil seems
no less relevant. But because there’s been more thinking and (a lot!) more rel-
evant research undertaken in that span, now seems like as good a time as any
to revisit the topic from a psychological perspective. Before we launch into
that, however, it makes sense to give you some idea of what to expect—and
what not to expect—in this book.
The four chapters in Part 1 introduce what I suggest are the core princi-
ples necessary for understanding evil from a psychological perspective. In
Chapter 1, I argue that people “diagnose” evil whenever they perceive that a
person’s behavior matches up with certain key features (sit tight—we’ll get to
them soon!). Chapter 2 explains why the mental jump from “evil” behavior to
“evil” people is often a small one, and it also unpacks the assumptions people
make about evildoers—for example, that evildoers are beyond reason or re-
demption. Given that our most negative reactions are typically reserved for
those whom we judge to be “evil,” we shouldn’t be surprised that people often
try to deflect that label if possible, so Chapter 3 delves into why being labeled
“evil” can feel so uncomfortable. It also presents the menu of typical deflec-
tion strategies. Of course, trying to weasel out from under the “evil” label
would be a lot less necessary if people weren’t motivated to pursue a course
of action despite its harmful consequences for others. Chapter 4 aims to offer
you some insight regarding the mindset behind such choices.
x Preface
Having made a case for the core psychological principles of evil in Part 1,
I shift to a topical approach in Part 2. Each of those four chapters focuses on
a specific phenomenon that many people might expect a book about evil to
address—that is, hate, sadism, serial killers, and “organized evil” such as cor-
porate corruption and genocide. My main goal is to show how Part 1’s core
principles play out in each of these specific contexts.
The brief Epilogue (otherwise known as Chapter 9) summarizes the main
ideas presented in Parts 1 and 2. I also try to anticipate and address at least
some of the nagging questions that may pop into your head as you read. By
the time you’re done, I hope you’ll have begun to develop your own answers
to the two biggest questions that reading any book of this sort should pro-
voke: “So what?” and “Now what?”
Having laid out where you and I are headed in broad terms, there are a
few more things that ought to be addressed. For example, one of my big
challenges was to settle on the “right” writing style so that a broad swath
of readers—psychology students, fellow academics, indulgent friends and
relatives, and interested laypeople—would find this book both accessible
and informative. As I hope you can see already, I’ve opted for a some-
what informal, conversational style when I can. Having said that, because
this book takes a psychological—versus, say, a philosophical or theolog-
ical—approach to evil, I’ve also tried to link the ideas I present to existing
research when it seems relevant. That means that the writing will get a
little technical sometimes. My hope is that unpacking how certain studies
were conducted will help you better understand and appreciate what-
ever implications for the psychology of evil we might be trying to draw
from them.
Because every research study has its limitations, it also has its critics. Some
are quick to dismiss a study’s findings based on some methodological detail
or because the study’s participants were “too ________” (few, similar to each
other, etc.). For others, the dismissal seems more personal: “Well, that’s not
my experience.” It’s true that no single study—or set of studies—can give a
once-for-all-time-and-all-people declaration of truth. But, by documenting
trends and tendencies, research can tell us what certain people are more
likely to do, and under what circumstances. And when trying to understand
evil, I’d argue that that’s way better than nothing.
At the same time, I’d certainly agree that it’s beneficial whenever
researchers can gather information from different parts of the world when
trying to understand a specific phenomenon. That’s why, throughout this
Preface xi
book, I’ve made a point to identify the countries in which the research I dis-
cuss was conducted, and/or from which the authors hail. Unless the context
makes it clear, you’ll see those countries listed alphabetically in brackets
wherever the work is first cited in a chapter. (Note that I use [international]
when more than two countries are involved.) Although I limited my search
to English-language sources and did not attempt to be exhaustive, especially
when there’s a ton of work on a particular topic, I’m pleased that I could in-
clude evil-relevant research from six continents in this book. Sorry for the
snub, Antarctica.
I also included a few stories. Of course, the biggest downside of specific
examples is that any one is likely to contain so many peculiarities that it’s hard
to generalize beyond it. In this respect, anecdotes are certainly of more lim-
ited value compared to the studies to which I’ve just alluded. Nevertheless,
I know that a well-chosen real-world example can grab your attention . . . and
engage your emotions. This is particularly important in a book about the
psychology of evil. To be blunt, I need to make you feel at least somewhat un-
comfortable. Otherwise, whatever I’m writing about will probably not seem
“evil” enough. At the same time, I’ve made a conscious choice to present only
the details necessary for you to get the point of a specific example. Beyond
that is sensationalism, voyeurism, and ghoulishness—none of which, I would
argue, helps you understand evil from a psychological perspective.
Before we launch in, I want to offer a big thanks to St. Jerome’s University
(in the University of Waterloo, Canada): Without the ridiculous privilege of a
year-long sabbatical courtesy of SJU, this book never would have happened.
Thanks also to John Rempel and Geoff Navara—both colleagues and dear
friends—for the evil-related research collaborations and discussions over the
years. Thanks to Ray Paloutzian for his unfailingly warm mentorship and en-
couragement. Thanks to Roy Baumeister for his 1997 book, and for feedback
on early drafts of some of Part 1’s chapters. Thanks to Nadina Persaud, Katie
Pratt, and everyone else at Oxford University Press who made it possible for
you to read this sentence right now. Thanks to my many undergraduate re-
search assistants—most recently Tansyn Hood and Marina Vrebac—who
have helped with collecting data and digging into relevant literature, and to
those Psychology of Evil students whose interest and enthusiasm inspires me
to keep on trying to figure this stuff out. Lastly, thanks to those who have
loved me enough to encourage me to walk through the world with more
mindful, thoughtful steps—if this book does any good for you as a reader,
please thank them in your own mind as well.
xii Preface
One word of caution as we get started: The label “evil” is often reserved
for people and acts that we experience as the most abhorrent and objection-
able. Very rarely do we apply it to loved ones or to ourselves. Clearly, “evil”
is a loaded term. As you read, it’s therefore quite possible that you’ll find
yourself feeling smug and self-righteous when you agree with my interpret-
ations, and indignant and outraged when you don’t. When you find your-
self experiencing reactions like this, I encourage you not to ignore them.
Instead, try to learn from them. The very fact that people often have different
understandings of, and reactions to, evil is one of the reasons why this book
was written. We deal with this issue head-on in Chapter 1.
PART 1
C OR E PR INC I PLE S
1
What Is “Evil”?
Before asking why there is evil, it is vital that we come to a common under-
standing concerning what evil is, psychologically speaking. To do so, we need
to look behind the assertion that “I know evil when I see it” and ask why
people think that they know evil when they see it. The answer is not as self-
evident as you might think. Let’s consider some possibilities.
Evil in Mind. Christopher T. Burris, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197637180.003.0001
4 Evil in Mind
Consider another example: For many, the thought of watching a dog con-
vulse after ingesting inadvertently spilled antifreeze is horrific. But contrast
this with the case of an American woman who fatally stabbed her boyfriend’s
dog after months of forcing drain cleaner and bleach down the dog’s throat.
And who journaled about how pleasurable this course of action was (Daily
Mail Reporter, 2012). Invoking the term “evil” seems much more fitting when
coming to terms with the second versus the first example. Why? Because, in
the latter case, the dog’s suffering was the result of intentional behavior.
This seems to get us a step closer to understanding what evil is. That is,
perhaps perceived suffering isn’t enough. Rather, we also need to take into
account how that suffering came to be, so perhaps evil should be understood
as (the perception of) intentionally inflicted suffering. This was foreshadowed
by the subtitle of the book you’re reading, and it’s congruent with Gray et al.’s
(2012 [USA]) assertion that all moral violations can be seen as variations on
the theme of perceived intentional harm.
Keep in mind that harm and suffering can be non-physical as well as
physical. Thus, although death, pain, and disfigurement are obvious “evil”
candidates when perceived as intentionally inflicted, so too are psychosocial
scars resulting from intimidation, reputational damage, strategic economic
disadvantage, and the like.
But we’ve still not quite arrived at a clear understanding of what evil is, psy-
chologically speaking. As Baumeister (1997 [USA], p. 8) put it: “Defining evil
as intentional interpersonal harm leaves many gray areas.” There is an in-
escapably subjective element when people apply the term “evil” to an act in
What Is “Evil”? 5
process (passion, emotion or, more generally, intuition) has already pointed
us toward a judgment or conclusion. We engage in moral reasoning not to
figure out what is really true, but to prepare for social interactions in which
we might be called upon to justify our judgments to others.” Chapter 3
presents a menu of basic strategies that people use to come to terms with
their own harmful acts as well as sway others’ perceptions of them. When
those strategies fall flat—when no reason offered seems sufficient to offset
the suffering experienced or observed—there is “evil.”
With all of this as a backdrop, we’re finally in a position to offer a psycho-
logical answer to the “what is ‘evil’?” question.
“Evil” Is a Label
You may have noticed that I have consistently used phrases like “ ‘evil’
judgments” or “perceived as ‘evil,’ ” and that the word evil often appears in
quotation marks. These are deliberate choices intended to drive home the
point that “evil” is a label assigned to behaviors rather than an inherent
quality of those behaviors. That is, applying the “evil” label is a subjective
process. “Subjective” does not mean “random,” however. Rather, people are
most likely to judge a behavior to be evil when they perceive three prototypic
features. Specifically, the behavior in question is seen as (1) intentionally pro-
ducing (2) harm that is (3) judged to be unjustifiable (see Burris & Rempel,
2008 [Canada]; cf. Gray et al., 2012, who similarly advocate a prototype ap-
proach when making sense of judgments of immorality).
Taking away any one of these three features decreases the perceived ap-
plicability of the “evil” label. Thus, if a person is convinced that the harm
resulting from a behavior is relatively minor and/or unintentional, then the
behavior is less likely to be labeled “evil.” Likewise, if the reasons presented
for the behavior are seen as “good enough,” then the behavior is less likely to
be labeled “evil.” Rarely, if ever, will there be 100% consensus. At minimum,
perpetrators themselves are often extremely reluctant to accept the “evil”
label (you’ll see why in Chapter 3). In particular, because harm severity and,
to a lesser extent, intention are comparatively easy to establish, it is the justifi-
ability of a behavior that most often generates vigorous disagreement.
This three-feature model of evil behavior formalizes what a number of
other scholars have intuited, particularly with respect to the pivotal role of
justifiability. For example, Winter (2006 [UK], p. 153, brackets inserted)
What Is “Evil”? 7
observed that when “this label [‘evil’] is applied to an act or its perpetrator, it
is often also stated that the act is incomprehensible.” McKeown and Stowell-
Smith (2006 [UK], p. 110) poetically expressed the same idea, suggesting
that the label’s “most powerful significance is in exposing the hollowness of
comprehension carved out by the acts in question. Thus, the marking out of
behavior as evil indicates nothing less than our powerlessness to adequately
explain: evil becomes shorthand for incomprehension.” Dubnick and Justice
(2006 [UK/USA], p. 237) equated evil with that which is morally inexpli-
cable. Anderson (2006 [USA], p. 723) argued that evil is a fail-safe concept
that people invoke to help explain (harmful) behavior that otherwise “doesn’t
make sense.” Finally, Ruffles (2004 [Australia], pp. 115–116, emphasis added)
suggested that “the concept of evil is much more likely to be evoked when
confronted with an individual who understands the difference between right
and wrong, yet proceeds to commit a heinously wrongful act without any
clear motivation and which, therefore, defies rational explanation.”
Govrin (2018 [Israel]) questioned the adequacy of the three-feature
model. Armed with a series of thought experiments, he proposed instead
that people detect “evil” when there is an “asymmetric” relationship between
perpetrator and victim (that is, when there is a power differential) and when,
with an “inaccessible” mind, the perpetrator adopts a derisive attitude to-
ward a vulnerable victim and remains steadfastly remorseless for any suf-
fering that the victim endures. Examined closely, Govrin’s proposal overlaps
the three-feature model substantially, however. For example, the “perpe-
trator” and “victim” labels respectively imply intentionality and harm, and
a power differential—even if fleeting and situation-specific—simply allows
harm to be inflicted. Moreover, “inaccessible” is Govrin’s shorthand for
judging a perpetrator’s motives to be incomprehensible, or unjustifiable. The
leftover bits (attitude toward victim and lack of remorse) concern the perpe-
trator: They are therefore more germane to understanding how people re-
spond to perceived “evildoers” (see Chapter 2) than to understanding “evil”
behavior per se.
Pertinent research is scarce but seems to support the three-feature model.
For example, Mason et al. (2002) conducted interviews with forensic psy-
chiatric staff in the UK concerning their attitudes toward the hospitalized
offenders with whom they worked. Mason et al. noted that a shift from un-
derstanding patients’ behavior in psychiatric terms to “evil” was signified by
staff ’s use of terms “such as ‘beyond’, ‘too far’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘inexpli-
cable’ and ‘beggars belief ’ ” (p. 84). Alford (1997) asked a diverse group of
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