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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

Semantic Singularities
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

Semantic
Singularities
Paradoxes of Reference,
Predication, and Truth

Keith Simmons

1
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

3
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/03/2018, SPi

for
DORIT and LEAH
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

Preface

The famous liar paradox is the most prominent member of the family of semantic
paradoxes. But there are other members too: the so-called definability paradoxes,
turning on reference or denotation, and versions of Russell’s paradox, turning on exten-
sion. This book is about the whole family.
Attention has been lavished on the Liar, but a guiding idea of this book is that the
members of such a close-knit family should be treated alike. So I am after a unified
approach to the semantic paradoxes. My aim is to develop a theory that applies equally
to truth, denotation, and extension.
A second guiding idea, tantalizing expressed by Gödel, is that the paradoxes are
analogous to dividing by zero. The concept of division is significant everywhere except
for a certain ‘singular point’ or ‘singularity’. The theory I present here says the same
kind of thing about truth, denotation, and extension. A particular use of the predicate
‘true’, for example, applies almost globally, except for certain singularities where its
application breaks down.
I’ll be arguing that the singularity idea has a number of attractive consequences. To
paraphrase Gödel, we need only minor corrections to our logical intuitions. Our
ordinary semantic notions stand in need of only minimal revisions – they don’t need to
be unnaturally stratified, or replaced. There is also no need to depart from classical
logic or classical semantics. And we can respect Tarski’s intuition that natural lan-
guages are universal, that a natural language such as English has the potential for say-
ing anything that can be said in any language. We need not impose counterintuitive
restrictions on the expressive power of natural languages.
I’ll also be arguing that the singularity theory of our semantic concepts has conse-
quences for the debate about the nature of truth. That debate pits the substantivist
against the deflationist. I’ll conclude that if we accept the singularity theory, we cannot
be deflationists about our semantic concepts.
Over the years, I’ve benefitted a great deal from exchanges with many people,
including Jamin Asay, Jc Beall, Simon Blackburn, Tyler Burge, Steven Dalglish,
Michael Glanzberg, Anil Gupta, James Hardy, Thomas Hofweber, David Kaplan, Greg
Littmann, Bill Lycan, Michael Lynch, D.A. Martin, Graham Priest, Michael Resnik,
David Ripley, Gil Sagi, Kevin Scharp, Lionel Shapiro, Stewart Shapiro, Zoltan Szabo,
the participants in many conferences, workshops, and talks, most recently at the
University of Connecticut, Ohio State University, Humboldt University, Szcecin
University, and the University of Frankfurt, and the members of my graduate seminars
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

viii Preface

at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and here at the University of
Connecticut, Storrs.
Thanks also to Peter Momtchiloff of Oxford University Press for shepherding
through this project.
And thanks, most of all, to Dorit Bar-On for her love and support.
University of Connecticut, Storrs
April 2018
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

Contents

1. Semantic Paradox 1
1.1 Three Paradoxes 1
1.2 Ramsey’s Division 3
1.3 Universality 6
1.4 The Plan of This Book 8
2. Paradox and Context 10
2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 Repetition, Rehabilitation, Iteration 10
2.3 Context-change and Discourse Analysis 12
2.4 Context-change and Repetition16
2.5 The Action of Context on Content 17
2.6 Reflective Status as a Contextual Coordinate 25
2.7 Four Tests for Context-sensitivity 27
2.8 A Simple Russell 30
2.9 A Simple Liar 34
3. Singularities  37
3.1 Minimality and Singularities 37
3.2 Reflective Status 40
3.3 More on Singularities 44
4. Identifying Singularities 51
4.1 Primary Trees 51
4.2 Singularities and Semantic Universality 62
4.3 Comparisons 64
5. Paradoxes of Definability, Russell’s Paradox, the Liar 68
5.1 Paradoxes of Definability 68
5.1.1 Richard’s Paradox 69
5.1.2 Berry and König 75
5.2 Russell’s Paradox 77
5.2.1 Sets and Classes 77
5.2.2 Extensions 85
5.2.3 Extensions and Paradox 88
5.3 The Liar Paradox 91
5.3.1 The Strengthened Liar 91
5.3.2 More Liars 98
6. A General Theory of Singularities 100
6.1 Preliminaries 100
6.1.1 Explicitly Reflective Contexts 100
6.1.2 Determination Sets and Values 105
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/28/2018, SPi

x Contents

6.2 Basic Notions 106

6.3 The 0-expressions 109
6.4 The Reflective Hierarchy 110
6.5 Reflection-free Expressions and Singularities 112
6.6 Higher Levels of the Reflective Hierarchy 117
6.7 Summary124
7. The Theory at Work 126
7.1 A Transfinite Paradox of Denotation 126
7.2 The Truth-Teller, a Curry Sentence, Loops 128
7.2.1 The Truth-Teller and the Curry Paradox 128
7.2.2 Loops131
7.3 New Paradoxes without Circularity 133
7.3.1 A Definability Paradox without Circularity 133
7.3.2 A Russell without Circularity 138
7.3.3 Truth Paradoxes without Circularity 141
8. Revenge, I  145
8.1 Forms of Revenge 145
8.2 Kripke’s Theory of Truth 147
8.3 Field’s Theory of Truth 151
8.3.1 Kripke and Non-classical Logic 151
8.3.2 Field’s Theory of Truth 153
8.3.3 Field’s Conditional 156
8.3.4 Determinate Truth 159
8.3.5 Field’s Theory and Natural Language 164
8.4 Dialetheism and Revenge 173
9. Revenge, II  182
9.1 Contextual Theories and Direct Revenge 182
9.2 Contextual Theories and Second-order Revenge 186
9.3 The Singularity Theory and Revenge 189
9.4 Summary201
10. Consequences for Deflationism 203
10.1 Deflationary Truth 203
10.2 Deflationism Extended 207
10.3 Deflationism and Semantic Paradox 209
10.4 Three Deflationist Responses 211
10.4.1 Pathology as Meaningless? 211
10.4.2 An Unrestricted Truth Schema? 212
10.4.3 A Restricted Truth Schema? 213
10.5 The Expressive Role of Truth 218
10.6 The Prosentential Theory and Horwich’s Minimalism 226
10.6.1 The Prosentential Theory 226
10.6.2 Horwich’s Minimalism 227
10.7 Concluding Remarks 232

Bibliography  235
Index 245
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

1
Semantic Paradox

1.1 Three Paradoxes

Suppose I write on the board the following expressions:
pi
six
the sum of the numbers denoted by expressions on the board.
What does the third expression denote? Well, suppose it denotes the number k—that is,
k is the sum of the numbers denoted by expressions on the board. But if the third
expression denotes k, then, since the first denotes π and the second denotes 6, the sum of
the numbers denoted by expressions on the board is π + 6 + k. But then k = π + 6 + k,
and we obtain a contradiction. So, on pain of contradiction, the third expression is
defective, and it cannot denote any number.
But we need not stop here. Since only the first and the second expressions denote
numbers, it follows that the sum of the numbers denoted by expressions on the board
is π + 6. But here is the third expression again, so it does denote a number, namely
π + 6. And if that is so, then the sum of the numbers denoted by expressions on the
board is π + 6 + (π + 6). But then the third expression denotes π + 6 + (π + 6). And we
can iterate the reasoning, and obtain the absurdities that π + 6 = π + 6 + (π + 6) =
π + 6 + (π + 6 + (π + 6)) = . . .1
This is an example of a semantic paradox—a paradox of denotation. It’s related to
what are traditionally called the paradoxes of definability, associated with Richard,
Berry, and König. The semantic relation between a denoting or referring expression
and its denotation or referent is one of our basic word–world relations, so it is unset-
tling to find that we are led so quickly to paradox. And there are parallel paradoxes for
our other basic semantic concepts—for example, the extension of a predicate, and the
truth of a sentence.
Consider a paradox for extension, related to Russell’s paradox. Now I write on the
board these two predicates:
moon of the Earth
unit extension of a predicate on the board

1
This paradox was first presented in Simmons 2003.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

2 Semantic Singularities

(where a unit extension is an extension with just one member). Let E1 be the extension
of the first predicate. Let’s suppose that the second predicate has a well-determined
extension, E2. Since E1 is a unit extension, E1 is a member of E2. Either E2 is a member of
itself or it isn’t. If it is a member of itself, then it has two members (E1 and E2); but then
it isn’t a unit extension of a predicate on the board, and so it isn’t a member of itself—
contradiction. So suppose on the other hand that it isn’t a member of itself. Then it has
one member (E1), so it is a unit extension of a predicate on the board—so it is a mem-
ber of itself, and we have a contradiction again. Since we’re landed in contradiction
either way, we must conclude that the second predicate is defective, and does not have
a well-determined extension.
But again we can keep going. If the second predicate has no extension, and a fortiori
no unit extension, then E1 is the only unit extension of a predicate on the board. But
here is the second predicate again, and so it does have a determinate (unit) extension,
with the sole member E1. And then this extension is a unit extension of a predicate on
the board, and so it is a member of itself. So we are led to the absurdity that the exten-
sion of the second predicate has no members, one member, and two members.
A Liar paradox is generated by the following sentence, written on the board:
(L) The sentence written on the board is not true.
If L is true, then it isn’t—contradiction. If L is false, then it’s not true—which is what it
says, so it’s true. Either way we reach a contradiction. So L is defective—it cannot be
given truth conditions.
But if L is defective, then the sentence written on the board is not true. But this is just
L again. So L is true. And now we’re caught in an endless cycle of contradictions: L is
true, so L is not true, so L is true, . . .
Each of these paradoxical discourses establishes that an expression is paradoxical—
but they go further. The defectiveness or pathology of the expression becomes a new
premise in the reasoning; we reason past pathology. A remarkable feature of this later
stage of the reasoning is that the paradoxical expression reemerges: we find ourselves
asserting that the sum of the numbers denoted by expressions on the board is π + 6, or
that E1 is the only unit extension of a predicate on the board, or that L is not true. There
is nothing technical or recherché about the paradox-producing reasoning—ordinary
speakers with the notions of denotation, extension, and truth in their repertoire can
easily follow it, and readily appreciate the challenge that the paradoxes present.
Accordingly, any adequate solution to these paradoxes must respect the naturalness of
the reasoning, and provide an account of these discourses in their entirety. The solu-
tion may identify an unwarranted assumption or find a logical flaw in the reasoning; it
may show that what seems contradictory really isn’t; it may instruct us to accept the
contradictions. But whatever the solution, it must take the reasoning seriously. An
adequate solution cannot block the reasoning in an ad hoc way, or simply set it aside.
I am after a unified account of these particular paradoxes and, more generally, of the
paradoxes of definability, Russell’s paradox for extensions, and the Liar. It’s clear that
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

semantic paradox 3

the notions of reference, predicate application, extension, and truth form a family: the
name ‘Napoleon’ refers to a man, the predicate ‘man’ is true of Napoleon and Napoleon
is in its extension, and the sentence ‘Napoleon is a man’ is true. Attention has been lav-
ished on truth and the Liar paradox; the paradoxes of definability have taken a back
seat, and Russell’s paradox has largely been treated in the setting of sets and classes, not
extensions. But the notions of denotation, predicate-application, and extension are
arguably no less fundamental than truth, just as referring expressions and predicates
are arguably no less fundamental than sentences. I shall argue that the expressions
‘denotes’, ‘extension’, ‘true’, and ‘true of ’ are all susceptible to the same kind of analysis,
as befits the members of such a close-knit family. To give it a name, I shall be develop-
ing a singularity theory of these terms. The guiding idea of the singularity theory was
briefly (and tantalizingly) expressed by Gödel this way:
It might even turn out that it is possible to assume every concept to be significant every where
except for certain ‘singular points’ or ‘limiting points’, so that the paradoxes would appear as
something analogous to dividing by zero. Such a system would be most satisfying in the follow-
ing respect: our logical intuitions would then remain correct up to certain minor corrections,
i.e. they could then be considered to give an essentially correct, only somewhat ‘blurred’, ­picture
of the real state of affairs.2

1.2 Ramsey’s Division

I will be proposing a unified account of the paradoxes of denotation and the Liar para-
dox, along with a version of Russell’s paradox (in terms of extensions). This prompts
some adjustments to Ramsey’s well-known division of the paradoxes. According to
Ramsey, the paradoxes:
fall into two fundamentally distinct groups, which we will call A and B. The best known cases are
divided as follows:
A. (1). The class of all classes which are not members of themselves.
(2). The relation between two relations when one does not have itself to the other.
(3). Burali-Forti’s contradiction of the greatest ordinal.
B. (4). ‘I am lying’.
(5). The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables.
(6). The least indefinable ordinal.
(7). Weyl’s contradiction about ‘heterologisch’.3

Ramsey continues:
Group A consists of contradictions which, were no provision made against them, would
occur in a logical or mathematical system itself. They involve only logical or mathematical

2
Gödel, in Schilpp 1944, p.150.    3
Ramsey 1925, p.20.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

4 Semantic Singularities

terms such as class and number, and show that there must be something wrong with our logic
or mathematics. But the contradictions of Group B are not purely logical, and cannot be
stated in logical terms alone; for they all contain some reference to thought, language, or
symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms.4

Peano anticipated Ramsey’s division, claiming that Richard’s paradox (a variant of

(5) and (6)) belongs to “linguistics” rather than mathematics.5 Nowadays, Ramsey’s
division is often drawn in terms of the “logical” paradoxes versus the “semantic”
paradoxes.6
I believe that it is sensible to distinguish two types of paradox here, though not
quite in the received terms. On the one hand, there are paradoxes that arise within
mathematical language, in particular the language of set theory, and these turn on
technical notions like set, cardinal number, or ordinal number. I would resist calling them
logical paradoxes, since it is far from clear that sets are logical objects; ‘set-theoretical
paradoxes’ is a better label. On the other hand, there are those paradoxes that arise
from semantical terms, like ‘denotes’ or ‘defines’, or ‘true’ and ‘true of ’. These are terms
of natural language, not terms drawn from a technical, mathematical language. So the
paradoxes arise in two very different settings, the setting of a formal, mathematical
language and that of a natural language such as English. Here, then, is a principle of
division for Groups A and B.
This is not to deny that there may be structural similarities between the paradoxes
of the two groups. They may have certain common features, perhaps self-reference, or
circularity, or a shared diagonal structure. But if they are couched in different kinds of
language, we should be prepared to find differences in what will count as an adequate
solution. What is required of an adequate response to the set-theoretical paradoxes
of Group A? Perhaps the development of a contradiction-free set theory, which is
expressed in a formal, precise language, and which provides a suitable foundation for
mathematics. For the semantic paradoxes of Group B, on the other hand, we are after
an account of our familiar notions of reference and truth—not an artificial, formal
theory that fails to respect our employment of these concepts. Tarski himself was sus-
picious of bringing formal methods to bear on natural language—for example, he
rejected a ‘Tarskian’ solution to the Liar as it occurs in natural language. It is doubtful,
he thought, that natural language, once regimented into a series of object languages
and metalanguages, “would still preserve its naturalness and whether it would not
rather take on the characteristic features of the formalized languages”.7 An adequate
solution to the Group B paradoxes must not replace our ordinary concepts with sani-
tized, artificial surrogates, or fail to capture semantic concepts available to the ordinary
speaker, or fail to respect the reasoning we carry out using these concepts.

4
Ramsey 1925, p.20. 5
Peano 1906, pp.357–8.
6
For just one example, see Mendelson 1964, pp.2–3.
7
Tarski 1933/1986, p.267.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

semantic paradox 5

Consider, for example, Russell’s paradox. Russell’s paradox arises in both settings.
Couched in terms of sets, and turning on the set of exactly those sets that are non-self-
members, Russell’s paradox belongs to Group A. What should we expect of a solution
to Russell’s paradox in this setting? Consider the claims sometimes made for Zermelo–
Fraenkel set theory. Not only is it a formally precise axiomatic theory that avoids the
contradiction (by restricting the Axiom of Comprehension), it also provides a natural
conception of set (the iterative conception), and diagnoses and explains the fault in the
reasoning that generates Group A paradoxes.8 And, moreover, ZF provides a suitable
foundation for mathematics. If all this is true of ZF, then it has a claim to be a solution
to the set-theoretical paradoxes.
But as we have seen, Russell’s paradox also arises for extensions. We should be care-
ful to distinguish extensions and sets—or so I shall argue in Chapter 5. Extensions are
tied to predication—extensions are the extensions of predicates. And so Russell’s para-
dox for extensions arises in the setting of natural language. Accordingly, this version of
Russell’s paradox belongs to Group B. Here our concern is not to develop a formal set
theory that will serve as a foundation for mathematics, but rather to provide an account
of the relation between our predicates and their extensions, and explain the reasoning
that appears to lead to contradiction. Resolutions of Group B paradoxes will be
­centrally concerned with everyday, non-technical notions, and certain discourses in
natural language that turn on these notions. A resolution will be adequate to the extent
that it captures those ordinary notions and provides a plausible analysis of the
­discourses. Technical maneuvering will be quite out of place here.
Should we think of the paradoxes of Group B as semantic paradoxes? This is surely
reasonable, for Russell’s paradox as well as the others. It is plausible to take the relation
between a predicate and its extension to be a semantical relation (after all, an object is
in the extension of a predicate if and only if the predicate is true of the object). Still,
here we should be open to the idea that the distinction between the semantic and the
logical paradoxes may blur. Frege took the move from a predicate to its extension to
be a purely logical move (more on this in Chapter 5). If we were to follow Frege here,
extensions are logical objects and Russell’s paradox is a logical paradox.
So we can make some adjustments to Ramsey’s division—we can call the paradoxes
in Group A ‘set-theoretical’ rather than ‘logical’, add a version of Russell’s paradox to
Group B, and call the paradoxes of Group B semantic (though it is arguable that the
distinction between semantical and logical blurs in the case of extensions). But the
division is sound, and what primarily distinguishes the two groups is the kind of lan-
guage in which the paradoxes arise: mathematical language of set theory in the case of
Group A, natural language in the case of Group B. And this division places different
adequacy conditions on a solution to a given paradox, depending on which side of the
division the paradox falls.

8
For a recent defense of ZF as a solution to the set-theoretical paradoxes, see Giaquinto 2002, pp.214–18,
and for discussion, see Simmons 2004, pp.172–5.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

6 Semantic Singularities

1.3 Universality
The adequacy conditions on a solution to the Group B paradoxes will depend on the
special features of natural languages. Tarski remarked that a characteristic feature of
natural language is its universality (we shall look more closely at Tarski’s remarks in
Chapter 4). When he speaks of the universality of a natural language, Tarski has in
mind its expressive power, its flexibility and open-endedness, its capacity to evolve and
expand. A natural language has the potential for saying anything that can be said in
any language. In contrast, a mathematical or scientific language—such as the language
of ZF—is expressively restricted. Unlike natural languages, these languages have a
­limited vocabulary and a limited subject matter.
Moreover, Tarski has shown that a suitably regimented language cannot express its
own semantic concepts. If L is a classical formal language, it cannot contain a predi-
cate ‘true-in-L’ applying exactly to the true sentences of L, on pain of contradiction.
L cannot contain its own truth predicate, or its own denotation predicate, or its own
satisfaction predicate.9 If we want to express the concept of truth-in-L, we must
ascend to an essentially richer metalanguage M for L, where M contains the predicate
‘true-in-L’. However, M cannot express its own truth concept—the predicate ‘true-in-M’
belongs in turn to a metalanguage for M. In this way, “we arrive at a whole hierarchy
of languages”.10
The situation is quite different with natural languages. English, for example, con-
tains the semantic predicates ‘true’, ‘denotes’, ‘true of ’, and ‘extension’, and it has the
resources for explaining how these words are used. The very idea of an ascent to a
metalanguage makes little sense for a natural language. We cannot move from English
to an “essentially richer” metalanguage—that metalanguage will just be more English,
or a language in principle translatable into English. In Tarski’s terminology, English is
semantically universal or semantically closed. Tarski identified this feature of natural
languages as the primary source of the semantic paradoxes. And according to Tarski,
this feature presents an insuperable difficulty for anyone seeking a definition of ‘true’
(or any semantical term) in English. If we bring formal methods to bear on a semantic-
ally universal language, then contradictions will inevitably arise, contradictions asso-
ciated with the semantic paradoxes. Accordingly, Tarski turned away from natural
languages, and defined truth for formal languages only.
In my view, we should respect Tarski’s intuitions about natural languages. And so
any account of the semantic paradoxes must be sensitive to the idea that natural lan-
guages are universal, and in particular semantically universal. We must reject any solu-
tion that regiments away the characteristic features of natural language.
For example, suppose we adopt a naive hierarchical solution to, say, the paradoxes
of denotation. We start with a fragment L0 of English free of the term ‘denotes’. We

9
Satisfaction is the converse of the ‘true of ’ relation: x satisfies y iff y is true of x.
10
Tarski 1944, in Blackburn and Simmons 1999, p.126.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

semantic paradox 7

obtain the metalanguage L1 by adding to L0 its denotation predicate ‘denotes-in-L0’. The

extension of this two-place predicate is composed of ordered pairs of denoting phrases
of L0 and their denotations.
In turn, we obtain the metalanguage L2 by adding to L1 its denotation predicate,
‘denotes-in-L1’. And so on, through the hierarchy. Now consider the paradox-­
producing phrase: the least positive integer which is not denoted by an expression of
English containing fewer than thirty-five syllables. (This phrase contains thirty-four
syllables.) According to the hierarchical account, any occurrence of ‘denotes’ is
assigned a level—the phrase itself is a phrase of a language at some level of the hier-
archy. So the phrase will contain the predicate ‘denotes-in-Li’ for some level i, and
the phrase is represented by:

the least positive integer which is not denoted-in-Li by an expression of Li containing fewer
than thirty-five syllables.

Now the original phrase is a phrase of Li+1, not Li. And so the paradox is avoided, since
the expression itself is not among the expressions of Li to which it makes reference.
Indeed, in principle a denotation can be found for the expression, by a suitable survey
of the denoting expressions of Li containing fewer than thirty-five syllables.
The paradox is avoided, but at a high price. English appears to be a single language
containing a single denotation predicate ‘denotes’. According to this hierarchical
account, however, English is stratified into a series of distinct languages, each with its
own denotation predicate. We have left natural language behind. Here it does seem
that English has been regimented away—we have merely described an artificial struc-
ture in which paradox does not arise, a structure with little or no bearing on English.
Further, consider the language in which we present the hierarchical solution. In
this language we describe the hierarchy and its levels. But surely this language is just
more English. If we can describe the hierarchy, we can do so in English—here again
is the intuition that natural languages are universal. But if we can describe the hier-
archy in English, we have the resources within English to articulate new paradoxes,
‘revenge paradoxes’ couched in the very terms of the theory. Consider for example
the phrase ‘the least ordinal number not denoted by any expression at any level of the
hierarchy’. On the plausible assumption that the ordinals outrun the number of
denoting expressions in the hierarchy, this phrase appears to denote a number. If
every phrase appears in a language at some level of the hierarchy, so must this one.
But the phrase denotes a number different from any expression in the hierarchy—
and we have a contradiction again. If our task was to resolve the denotation para-
doxes for English, then we have failed.
More generally, the universal character of English poses a challenge to any would-be
theory of the semantic terms of English. The language of the theory will be expressible
in English, and so there is the threat of new revenge paradoxes, expressed in English
and employing the terms of the theory itself. The theory must meet this threat. If it
doesn’t, then it is not an adequate account of the semantic terms of English.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

8 Semantic Singularities

Here then are a number of desiderata for an account of the semantic paradoxes.
Since the paradoxes arise in natural language, we must take into account the special
character of natural language. The account must not be “harsh and highly artificial”, to
use Russell’s phrase;11 it must not force on, say, English an unnatural regimentation.
And it must respect the apparent universal character of English—in particular, the fact
that English contains its own semantic terms, and the resources for explaining their
use. A consequence of universality is that any theory of the paradoxes will itself be
expressed in English, or at least be translatable into English—and so if the theory itself
generates new revenge paradoxes, then the paradoxes as they arise in English remain
unresolved.

1.4 The Plan of This Book

In developing the singularity theory I make two main claims: first, that the semantic
expressions ‘denotes’, ‘extension’, and ‘true’ are context-sensitive, and second, that these
expressions are significant everywhere except for certain singularities. In Chapters
2–4, I lay out the main ideas of the singularity theory, framed by a close analysis of the
simple paradoxes introduced in Section 1.1. Chapter 2 defends the claim that ‘denotes’,
‘extension’, and ‘true’ are context-sensitive expressions, in the light of recent work by
philosophers, semanticists, and linguists on the kinematics of context-change.
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of a singularity, and Chapter 4 develops the central
notions that will allow us to identify singularities.
Chapter 5 extends the scope of the singularity theory beyond the simple paradoxes,
to the traditional paradoxes of definability and a variety of forms of the Russell and the
Liar. In the case of the Russell paradoxes, I’m particularly interested in the distinction
between sets and extensions—I argue that extension and set are two distinct and mutu-
ally irreducible notions, and provide two very different settings for Russell’s paradox.
In the case of truth, I pay special attention to the so-called strengthened Liar, which has
received a good deal of discussion in the literature.
Chapters 2–5 set the stage for the general, formal theory of singularities, presented
in Chapter 6. The formal theory is pitched at a sufficiently high level of generality, so
that it treats the paradoxes associated with denotation, extension, truth, and truth-of
in a single, unified way.12 The singularity theory is put to work in Chapter 7. I present a
number of paradoxes that are of interest in their own right, and I show how they’re
resolved by the singularity theory. These paradoxes include a transfinite paradox
of denotation, various versions of the Liar that have figured in recent discussions

11
Russell 1903, p.528. Ironically enough, this was Russell’s reason for rejecting a type-theoretic response
to the paradoxes, a response that he was later to endorse.
12
The specific theory of truth that I develop in Simmons 1993 is similar in spirit to the general theory
that I develop here. But the present theory is at a higher level of abstraction and generality, and also differs
from the earlier theory in a number of more specific features.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/25/2018, SPi

semantic paradox 9

(including the Truth-Teller and the Curry paradoxes), and new paradoxes of denotation
and extension that, like Yablo’s version of the Liar, do not involve self-reference or
circularity.
Any solution to the paradoxes must take on the revenge phenomenon, and revenge
is the focus of Chapters 8 and 9. We’ve already seen one form of revenge exhibited by
the simple paradoxes of Section 1.1. In each case, the defective expression on the
board reemerges in the course of the reasoning, apparently intact and with a semantic
value. The paradoxical expressions exact their revenge—our declaration that they’re
defective seems to lead only to their rehabilitation! Another form of revenge turns the
theory against itself. For example, if a theory of truth introduces truth value gaps,
then a revenge Liar takes the gaps on board (‘This sentence is false or gappy’); and
similarly with a hierarchical solution (‘This sentence is not true at any level’) or a
­contextual solution (‘This sentence is not true in any context’).
In Chapter 8, I examine the revenge problem for several prominent theories of
truth—Kripke’s theory, paracomplete theories, especially Field’s, and dialetheist
­theories, especially Priest’s. I argue that Kripke’s theory fails to deal with the revenge
problem, that Field’s theory is too distant from natural language, and that Priest’s
­theory is itself subject to revenge, despite its embrace of true contradictions. In
Chapter 9, I turn to the revenge problem for contextual theories in general, and the
singularity theory in particular. I present the singularity theory’s response to revenge.
In Chapter 10, I draw out the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary
accounts of truth, principally disquotationalism, Horwich’s minimalism, and the
prosentential theory. I argue that if the singularity theory is correct, then we cannot
take a deflationary view of truth—or of denotation or predicate-application. The
semantic paradoxes have a direct bearing on the nature of our semantical concepts.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 [401] Negro in Chicago, p. 567.
[402] Yale Lit. Magazine, p. 237.
[403] Pinckney, The Coming Crisis, p. 61.
[404] Ibid. p. 58.
[405] Evans & Cogswell; List of Taxpayers Charleston, S. C.
1860.
[406] Rene Maran, Batouala, pp. 10, 12.
[407] Ibid. pp. 22, 24.
[408] The Nation, December 17, 1924, p. 675.
[409] Ibid.
[410] Rene Maran, Batouala, p. 90.
[411] Ibid. pp. 98, 103, 105, 106, 107.
[412] Gonzales, The Black Border, pp. 212, 213, 214.
[413] Ibid. p. 215.
[414] Department of Commerce, Estimates of population, p.
138.
 Transcriber’s Notes

pg 10 Changed: the assent of their constitutents

to: the assent of their constituents
pg 20 Changed: accompained by an ever increasing investment
to: accompanied by an ever increasing investment
pg 55 Changed: so lamentable an occurence
to: so lamentable an occurrence
pg 76 Changed: promotion of this homogeniety
to: promotion of this homogeneity
pg 110 Changed: did’nt have a leg to stand upon
to: didn’t have a leg to stand upon
pg 126 Changed: they were slighly surprised
to: they were slightly surprised
pg 131 Changed: assailants with five casulties
to: assailants with five casualties
pg 133 Changed: has in its revoluntionary progress
to: has in its revolutionary progress
pg 146 Changed: whatever it may me called
to: whatever it may be called
pg 150 Changed: peace between ‘the two countires
to: peace between ‘the two countries
pg 152 Changed: the ruling politicial leaders
to: the ruling political leaders
pg 158 Changed: comparitively small price
to: comparatively small price
pg 160 Changed: securing wealth and properity
to: securing wealth and prosperity
pg 163 Changed: who declared of this colored offical
to: who declared of this colored official
pg 174 Changed: more properous and progressive
to: more prosperous and progressive
pg 174 Changed: attain the full statue
to: attain the full stature
pg 175 Changed: enlightment and progress
to: enlightenment and progress
pg 178 Changed: Five yeare before Booker Washington
to: Five years before Booker Washington
pg 196 Changed: Lower South the responsibilty
to: Lower South the responsibility
pg 197 Changed: preventitive of the breaking up
to: preventative of the breaking up
pg 197 Changed: seven-eighths of Caucasion blood
to: seven-eighths of Caucasian blood
pg 203 Changed: all hopes of social eqality
to: all hopes of social equality
pg 233 Changed: which if taken generaly
to: which if taken generally
pg 243 Changed: Iimmigration Facts and Figures
to: Immigration Facts and Figures
pg 305 Changed: Meanwhile the mass are growing
to: Meanwhile the masses are growing
pg 338 Changed: eternal langour is right and good
to: eternal languor is right and good
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