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EPISTEMOLOGY

R ichard Feldm an
University of Rochester

Upper Saddle River, Newjersey 07458

 7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A
Feldman, Richard
Epistemology / Richard Feldman.
p. cm. — (Prentice-Hall foundations of philosophy series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-13-341645-3
1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. II. Series.

BD161.F385 2003
121—dc:2l
2002042533

VP, Editorial Director: Charlyce Jones Owen

Senior Acquisition Editor: Ross Miller
Assistant. Editor: Wendy Yurash
AM. Contents
Editorial Assistant: Carla Worner
Sr. Managing Editor: Jan Stephan
Production Liaison: Fran Russello / \-
Project Manager: Rebecca Giusti, Clarinda Publication Services.................. ~
Prepress and Manufacturing Buyer: Brian Mackey , H )
Art Director: Jayne Conte ( V } f"
Cover Designer: Kiwi Design
Marketing Manager: Chris Ruel
Marketing Assistant: Kimberly Daum CHAPTER ONE Epistemological Questions 1

This book was set in 10/12 Baskerville by The Clarinda Company and was printed and bound The Standard View 2
by Courier Stoughton Companies, Inc. The cover was printed by Phoenix Color Corp. Developing The Standard View 4
Challenges to The Standard View 5
© 2003 by Pearson Education, Inc.
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458 CHAPTER TWO The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 8

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be Kinds of Knowledge 8

reproduced, in any form or by any means, Knowledge and True Belief 12
without permission in writing from the publisher. The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 15
Real Knowledge and Apparent Knowledge 22
Printed in the United States of America Conclusion 23

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 CHAPTER THREE Modifying The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 25

ISBN 0-13-341fc,45-3 An Objection to The Traditional Analysis 25
Defending The Traditional Analysis 28
Pearson Education LTD., London Modifying The Traditional Analysis 30
Pearson Education Australia Pte, Limited., Sydney Conclusion 3 7
Pearson Education Singapore, Pte. Ltd.
Pearson Education North Asia Ltd., Hong Kong
Pearson Education Canada, Ltd., Toronto CHAPTER FOUR Evidentialist Theories of Knowledge and Justification 39
Pearson Educacion de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
Pearson Education Japan, Tokyo Evidentialism 41
Pearson Education Malaysia, Pte. Ltd. The Infinite Regress Argument 49
Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River, Newjersey Cartesian Foundationalism 52
VI Contents

Coherentism 60
Modest Foundcitionalism 70

CHAPTER FIVE Nonevidentialist Theories of Knowledge and Justification 81

The Causal Theory 81

Truth Tracking 86
Rdiabilism 90
Proper Function 99
Foundations
Conclusions 105
of Philosophy
CHAPTER SIX Skepticism (I) 108

Varieties of Skepticism 109

What Skeptics Claim 111
Four Arguments for Skepticism 114
Responding to Skepticism 119
Interim, Conclusion 128
Many of the problems of philosophy are of such broad relevance to human
concerns, and so complex in their ramifications, that they are, in one form or
CHAPTER SEVEN Skepticism (II) 130 another, perennially present. Though in the course of time they yield in part
to philosophical inquiry, they may need to be rethought by each age in the
The Problem of Induction 130 light of its broader scientific knowledge and deepened ethical and religious
Ordinary-Standards Skepticism and Best Explanations 141 experience. Better solutions are found by more refined and rigorous methods.
Appendix: Contextualism 152 Thus, one who approaches the study of philosophy in the hope of under­
standing the best, of what it affords will look for both fundamental issues and
contemporary achievements.
CHAPTER EIGHT Epistemology and Science 157 Written by a group of distinguished philosophers, the Foundations of Philos­
ophy Series aims to exhibit some of the main problems in the various fields of phi­
Evidence of Human Irrationality 157 losophy as they stand at the present stage of philosophical history.
Naturalistic Epistemology 166 While certain fields are likely to be represented in most introductory courses
Conclusion 175 in philosophy, college classes differ widely in emphasis, in method of instruc­
tion, and in rate of progress. Every instructor needs freedom to change his
course as his own philosophical interests, the size and make-up of his classes, and
CHAPTER NINE Epistemological Relativism 177 the needs of his students vary from year to year. The volumes in the Founda­
tions of Philosophy Series—each complete in itself, but complementing the
Unconlroversial Forms of Relativism 177
others—offer a new flexibility to the instructor, who can create his own textbook
Serious Relativism 178
by combining several volumes as he wishes, and can choose different combi­
Reasonable Disagreements 182
nations at different times. Those volumes that are not used in an introductory
Conlusion 188
course will be found valuable, along with other texts or collections of readings,
for the more specialized upper-level courses.
CHAPTER TEN Conclusion 191
Tom L. Beauchamp, Editor
Index 195 Elizabeth Beardsley and Monroe Beardsley, Founding Editors
vii
Acknowledgments

I wish to express my indebtedness to a great many people with whom I have dis­
cussed epistemological issues. I first learned about epistemology when I sat in
on the lectures in an epistemology course taught by my brother, Fred Feldman.
That course initiated what has become an enduring interest and also taught me
much of what I know about how to do philosophy. My interest and under­
standing were greatly enhanced by a series of seminars with Flerbert Heidel-
berger and Roderick Chisholm. I would not have been able to write this book
were it not for what I have learned from countless discussions of philosophy with
John Bennett, David Braun, Stewart Cohen, Jonathan Vogel, Ed Wierenga, and
especially Earl Conee. Todd Long, Dan Mittag, Nathan Nobis, Jim Pryor, Bruce
Russell, Harvey Siegel, and Matthias Steup all gave me helpful comments on
some or all of the manuscript. Many students, who endured courses making use
of preliminary drafts, have provided useful guidance.
And thanks also to Andrea, for helping me to persevere, and for everything
else as well.
 CHAPTER ONE

Epistemological
Questions

The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is the branch of philosophy that ad­

dresses philosophical questions about knowledge and rationality. Epistemol-
ogists are primarily interested in questions about the nature of knowledge and
the principles governing rational belief. They are less focused on deciding
whether there is knowledge or rational belief in specific, actual cases. Thus, for
example, it is not the epistemologist’s business to rule on whether it is now rea­
sonable to believe that there is life on other planets. That is primarily the job
of astronomers and cosmologists. It is the epistemologist’s business to try to de­
velop a general theory stating the conditions under which people have knowl­
edge and rational beliefs. One can then go on to apply that more general
theory to the specific case of the belief in life on other planets, but to do so is
to go beyond the central epistemological issues. Although in the course of ex­
amining the philosophical questions it is customary to think about many spe­
cific examples, this is mainly to illustrate the general issues. The point of this
chapter is to identify some of the central theoretical issues epistemology
addresses.
A good way to begin is to look at the things we ordinarily say and think about
knowledge and rationality. By systematizing and reflecting on them, we will ar­
rive at a set of questions and puzzles. Thus, we will begin by stating in a system­
atic way some commonly (but not universally) held ideas about what we know
and how we know these things. We will call this collection of ideas The Standard
View. In this chapter we will identify some of the central claims of The Standard
View. In Chapters 2 through 5, we will attempt to spell out in detail the impli­
cations of The Standard View and to state its answers to some of the central ques­
tions. Then, in Chapters 6 though 9, we will turn to several challenges and
objections to The Standard View. Thus, the general aim of this book is to provide
1
2 Epistemological Questions Epistemological Questions 3

a better understanding of our commonsense views about knowledge and ra­ i. Morality:
tionality and to see to what extent those views can withstand criticism. “Gratuitous torturing of infants is wrong.”
“There’s nothing wrong with taking a break from work once in a while.”
I. THE STANDARD VIEW j. The future:
“The sun will rise tomorrow.”
In the ordinary course of events, people claim to know many things and they “The Chicago Cubs will not win the World Series next year.”1
attribute knowledge to others in a variety' of cases. We will give examples below. k. Religion:
The claims to knowledge with which we are concerned are not unreflective or “God exists.”
outlandish. Rather, they are sensible and considered judgments. Thus, the list “God loves me.”
that follows reflects a set of thoughts about knowledge and rationality that many
There are, of course, many things in each of these categories that we do not
people are likely to arrive at if they reflect honestly and carefully about the
know. Some facts about the distant past are irretrievably lost. Some facts about
topic. You may not agree with every detail of the view to be described, but it is
the future are, at least for now, beyond us. Some of the areas of knowledge on
fair to say that it accurately captures reflective common sense.
the list are controversial. You may have doubts about our knowledge in the
areas of morality and religion. Still, the list provides a fair sampling of the sorts
A. What We Know of things we typically claim to know.
Thus, the first thesis within The Standard View is
Most of us think we know quite a lot. The following list identifies some general
categories of these things and gives examples of each. The categories may over­ SV1. We know a large variety of things in categories (a)-(k).
lap, and they are far from precise. Still, they give us a good idea of the sorts of
things we can know.
B. Sources of Knowledge
a. Our immediate environment: If (SV1) is right, then there are some ways we come to know the things it says
“There’s a chair over there.” we know; there are some sources for our knowledge. For example, if we know
“The radio is on.” about our immediate environment, then perception and sensation play a cen­
b. Our own thoughts and feelings: tral role in acquiring this knowledge. Memory obviously is crucial in our knowl­
“I’m excited about the new semester.” edge of the past and also in certain aspects of our knowledge of current facts.
“I’m not looking forward to filling out my tax forms.” For example, my knowledge that the tree that I see through my window is a
c. Commonsense facts about the world: maple relies on my perception of the tree and my memory of the way maples
“France is a country in Europe.” look. Another source of much of our knowledge is the testimony of others. Tes­
“Many trees drop their leaves in the fall.” timony is not here restricted to statements made on the witness stand under
d. Scientific facts: oath. It is much broader than that. It includes what other people tell you, in­
“Smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer.” cluding what they tell you on television or in books and newspapers.
“The earth revolves around the sun.” Three other sources of knowledge deserve brief mention here as well. If per­
e. Mental states of others: ception is our awareness of external things through sight, hearing, and the
“My neighbor wants to get his house painted.” other senses, then perception does not account for our knowledge of our own
“That person over there who is laughing hard found the joke he just heard internal states. You may now know that you feel sleepy, or that you are think­
funny.” ing about what you will do on the weekend. But this is not by means of per­
f. The past: ception in the sense just given. It is, rather, introspection. So this is another
“George Washington was the first president of the United States.” potential source of knowledge.
“President Kennedy was assassinated.” Next, sometimes we know things by reasoning or inference. When we know
g. Mathematics: some facts and see that those facts support some further fact, we can come to
“2 + 2 = 4” know that further fact. Scientific knowledge, for example, seems to arise from
“5 • 3 = 15” inferences from observational data.
h. Conceptual truths: Finally, it seems that we know some things simply because we can “see” that
“All bachelors are unmarried.” they are true. That is, we have the ability to think about things and to discern cer­
“Red is a color.” tain simple truths. Though this is a matter of some controversy, our knowledge
4 Epistemological Questions
of elementary arithmetic, simple logic, and conceptual truths seems to fall into
this category. For lack of a better term, we will say that we know these things by
means of rational insight.
Our list of sources of knowledge, then, looks like this:
a. Perception
b. Memory
c. Testimony
d. Introspection
e. Reasoning
f. Rational insight
No doubt in many cases we rely for our knowledge on some combination of
these sources.
The Standard View holds that we can gain knowledge from these sources. It
does not say that these sources are perfect. No doubt they are not. Sometimes
our memories are mistaken. Sometimes our senses mislead us. Sometimes we
reason badly. Still, according to The Standard View, we can get knowledge by
using these sources.
Whether the list of sources of knowledge ought to be expanded is a matter
of some controversy. Perhaps some people would add religious or mystical in­
sight to the list. Perhaps others think that there are forms of extrasensory per­
ception that we should add. However, these are issues about which there is
greater disagreement. To add them to the list, then, might make the list look
less like something deserving the name uThe Standard View." Thus, we will not
add them here. Others might want to add science to the list of sources of knowl­
edge. Although it may be unobjectionable to do so, science is probably best
seen as a combination of perception, memory, testimony, and reasoning. Thus,
it may not be necessary to add it to the list.
Thus, the second thesis in The Standard Vieiv is
SV2. Our primary sources of knowledge are (a)-(f).
The Standard Vieiv, then, is the conjunction of (SV1) and (SV2).
II. DEVELOPING THE STANDARD VIEW
Numerous questions arise once we reflect on The Standard View. These ques­
tions constitute the primary subject matter of epistemology. This section iden­
tifies some of those questions.
If some cases fall into the category of knowledge and others are excluded
from that category, then there must be something that differentiates these two
groups of things. What is it that distinguishes knowledge from the lack of knowl­
edge? What does it take to know something? This leads to the first question:
Ql. Under what conditions does a person know something to be true?
Epistemological Questions 5
One might think that it is a matter of how sure a person feels about something
or whether there is general agreement about the matter. As we will see, these
are not good answers to (Q l). Something else distinguishes knowledge from its
opposite. (Q l), it turns out, is surprisingly hard, controversial, and interesting.
Working out an answer to it involves thinking through some difficult issues.
This will be the focus of Chapters 2 and 3.
According to many philosophers, an important condition on knowledge is
rational or justified belief. To know something requires something along the
lines of having a good reason to believe it, or coming to believe it in the right
sort of way, or something like that. You do not know something if you are just
guessing, for example. This leads us to a second question, one that has been cen­
tral to epistemology for many years:
Q2. Under what conditions is a beliefjustified (or reasonable or rational) ?
And this will lead us to further questions about the alleged sources of knowl­
edge. How do these faculties enable us to satisfy the conditions of knowledge?
How could they yield epistemic justification? This will be the focus of Chapters
4 and 5, as well as parts of Chapters 7-9.
Our beliefs obviously play a central role in determining our behavior. You will
behave very differently toward your neighbor if you believe that she is a trust­
worthy friend rather than a dishonest enemy. Given the ability of beliefs to af­
fect our behavior, it seems clear that your beliefs can affect your life and the lives
of others. Depending upon your career and the extent to which others depend
upon you, you may have obligations to know about certain things. For exam­
ple, a medical doctor ought to know about the latest developments in her spe­
cialty. Sometimes, however, knowledge can be a bad thing, as when one learns
of an apparent friend’s disloyalty. These considerations suggest that practical
and moral issues interact with epistemological issues in ways that merit exami­
nation. Thus,
Q3. In what ways, if any, do epistemological, practical, and moral mat­
ters affect one another?
We will address this question in Chapter 4.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE STANDARD VIEW
Careful philosophical reflection on the questions listed so far, to be carried out
in Chapters 2-5, will result in a detailed statement of just what The Standard
View amounts to. However, as will be evident as we proceed, there are reasons
to wonder whether this commonsense view really is correct. We will give these
reasons, and the alternative views about knowledge and rationality associated
with them, a full hearing in Chapters 6-9. The central ideas behind these doubts
are the basis for the remaining questions about The Standard Vieiv.
6 Epistemological Questions
A. The Skeptical View
Advocates of The Skeptical Vim contend that we know far less than The Standard
Vieiu says we know. Skepticism constitutes a traditional and powerful philo­
sophical challenge to The Standard View. Skeptics think that The Standard View
is far too charitable and self-indulgent. They think that our confident assertion
that we know a lot results from a rather smug self-confidence that is entirely un­
justified. As we shall see, some skeptical arguments rely on seemingly bizarre
possibilities: Maybe you are just dreaming that you are seeing and hearing the
things you think you are seeing and hearing; maybe your life is some sort of com­
puter-generated artificial reality. Other skeptical arguments do not rely on odd
hypotheses like these. But all of them challenge our comfortable common-
sense view. These considerations prompt the next set of epistemological
questions:
Q4. Do we really have any knowledge at all? Is there any good response
to the arguments of the skeptics?
(Q4) asks, in effect, whether the conditions spelled out in response to (Ql)
are actually satisfied. Advocates of The Skeptical Vieiu hold that the answer to
each of the questions in (Q4) is “No.” They are inclined to deny both (SV1) and
(SV2).
B. The Naturalistic View
The methodology traditionally used by epistemologists is primarily conceptual
or philosophical analysis: thinking hard about what knowledge and rationality
are like, often using hypothetical examples to illustrate the points. However, one
might wonder whether we could better study some of these questions scientif­
ically. Many recent philosophers have said that we can. We will call their view
The Naturalistic View because it emphasizes the role of natural (or empirical or
experimental) ^science. Thus, oneway The Naturalistic Viewchallenges The Stan­
dard Vim has to with the methodology used to support theses (SV1) and (SV2)
of The Standard View.
The Naturalistic View also leads to a second kind of challenge to The Standard
View. There is a body of research about the ways people think and reason that
is troubling. It shows, or at least seems to show, systematic and widespread er­
rors and confusions in how we think and reason. When confronted with the re­
sults of this research, some people wonder whether anything like The Standard
View can be right.
These considerations lead to our next set of questions:
Q5. In what ways, if at all, do results in natural science, especially cog­
nitive psycholog)', bear on epistemological questions? Do recent
empirical results undermine The Standard View?
7
Epistemological Questions
C. The Relativistic View
Another challenge to The Standard Vim emerges from considerations of rela­
tivism and cognitive diversity. To see the issues here, notice that people’s beliefs
and their policies for forming beliefs differ widely. For example, some people
are willing to believe on the basis of rather little evidence. Some seem to de­
mand a lot of evidence. People also differ in their attitudes toward science.
Some people are strong believers in the power of science. They think that the
methods of science provide the only reasonable wray to learn about the world
around us. They sometimes regard others as irrational for believing in such
things as astrology, reincarnation, ESP, and other occult phenomena. Defend­
ers of these beliefs sometimes charge their critics with a blind and irrational faith
in science. People also differ widely over political, moral, and religious mat­
ters. Seemingly intelligent people can find themselves seriously at odds with
one another over these issues. There is, then, no doubt that people disagree,
often vehemently, about a great many things.
The fact that there is this much disagreement leads some people to wonder
whether in each case (at least) one party to the dispute must be unreasonable.
A comforting thought to many is that there is room for reasonable disagree­
ment, at least on certain topics. That is, two people can have different points
of view, yet each can be reasonable in maintaining his or her own view. De­
fenders of The Relativistic Vim are inclined to find room for a great deal of rea­
sonable disagreement, whereas defenders of The Standard View seemed to be
more inclined to think that one side (at least) must be wrong in every dispute.
These considerations about cognitive diversity and the possibility of rea­
sonable disagreements provoke the following questions having to do with epis­
temological relativism:
Q6. What are the epistemological implications of cognitive diversity?
Are there universal standards of rationality', applicable to all people
(or all thinkers) at all times? Under what circumstances can ratio­
nal people disagree with one another?
The questions raised in (Ql) through (Q6) are among the central problems in
epistemology. The chapters that follow' will address them.
ENDNOTE
1. Cubs fans may not like this example. But those who follow baseball know that, no
matter what happens, the Cubs never win. Neither do the Boston Red Sox.
 CHAPTER TWO The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 9

cl. Knowing when: S knows when A will (or did) happen.

“The editor knew when J. D. Salinger’s book would be published.”
e. Knowing how: S knows how to A.
“J. D. Salinger knows how to write.”
f. Knowing facts: S knows p.
“The student knows that J. D. Salinger wrote The Catcher in the Rye."

The Traditional This list is far from complete. We could add sentences using phrases such as
“knows which,” “knows why,” and so on. But the list we have already will be
enough to bring out the main points to be made here.
A n a lysis o f K now ledge
B. Is All Knowledge Propositional Knowledge?
“Knows that” sentences report that a person knows a certain fact or proposition.
These sentences are said to express propositional knowledge One initially plau­
. *I.2

The goal of the next few chapters is to try to get clearer aboutjust what The Stan­
dard View says and what implications it has. While doing this we will not call
into question the truth of The Standard View. We will assume that it is basically
correct, reserving discussion of challenges to our commonsense view until later.
I. KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE
The Standard View says that we have a good deal of knowledge and it says some­
thing about the sources of that knowledge. One central aspect of getting clearer
aboutjust what The Standard View amounts to is getting clearer on just what it
takes knowledge to be. The Standard Vim says that we do have knowledge, but
what is knowledge?
sible idea about the connection between these various ways in which the word
“knows” is used is that “knows that” is fundamental and that the others can be
defined in terms of it. To see why propositional knowledge is more fundamental
than the others, consider how some of the other kinds might be explained in
terms of it.
Consider (c), “knowing whether.” Suppose it is true that
1. T he librarian knows w hether there is a book by J. D. Salinger in the
library.
If (1) is true, then if there is a book byj. D. Salinger in the library, the
librarian knows that there is. If, on the other hand, there is no book by him
in the library, then the librarian knows that there is not. Whichever propo­
sition is actually true—the proposition that there is a book or the proposi­
tion that there is not—the librarian knows it. So, saying (1) is a short way of
saying

A. Some Main Kinds of Knowledge 2. Either the librarian knows that there is a book byj. D. Salinger in the
library or the librarian knows that there is no book byj. D. Salinger
We use the words “knows” and “knew” in a variety of importantly different kinds in the library.3
of sentences. Here are some examples:1
In this respect, the librarian differs from a patron who does not know whether
a. Knowing an individual: S knows x. there is a book by Salinger there. The patron does not know that there is a
“The professor knows J. D. Salinger.” book there and does not know that there is no book there.
b. Knowing who: S knows who x is. The pointjust made about (1) can be generalized. For any person and any
“The student knows who J. D. Salinger is.” proposition, the person knows whether the proposition is true just in case either
c. Knowing whether: S knows whether p. the person knows that it is true or the person knows that it is not true. A per­
“The librarian knows whether there is a book by J. D. Salinger in the son who does not know whether it is true neither knows that it is true nor knows
library.” that it is not.

8
10 77ie Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
We can express the point about the connection between (1) and (2) in terms
of a general definition, using the letter “S” to stand for a potential knower and
“p” to stand for a proposition:
Dl. S knows whether p = df. Either S knows p or S knows ~p.4
Definition (Dl) illustrates an important methodological tool: definitions. A de­
finition is correct only if the two sides are equivalent. To check whether the two
sides are equivalent, you consider the results of filling in the variables or place­
holders with specific instances. In the case of (Dl), you fill in the name of a per­
son for S and you replace p by a sentence expressing some proposition. If the
definition is correct, in all such cases the two sides will agree: If the left side is
true—if the person does know whether the proposition is true—then the right
side will also be true—either the person knows that it is true or the person knows
that it is not true; if, on the other hand, the left side is not true—if the person
does not know whether the proposition is true—then the right side will not be
true either. (Dl) seems to pass this test: The two sides of the definition do co­
incide. Thus, we can explain “knowing whether” in terms of “knowing that.”
It is also possible to define some of the other kinds of knowledge in terms
of propositional knowledge. The definitions are more complicated, but the
ideas are still fairly straightforward. Consider “knows when.” If you know when
something happened (or will happen), then there is some proposition stating
the time at which it happened (or will happen) such that you know that propo­
sition to be true. Thus, to say
3. The editor knew when J. D. Salinger’s book would be published.
is to say that the editor knew, with respect to some particular time, that Salinger’s
book would be published at that time, e.g., she knew that it would be published
in 1950 or that it would be published in 1951, etc. Those who were less knowl­
edgeable than the editor were not in this position. For them, there was no time
such that they knew the proposition that the book would be published at that
time.
Again, we can generalize the idea and express it as a definition:
D2. S knows when x happens = df. There is some proposition saying
that x happens at some particular time and S knows that proposi­
tion. (There is some proposition, p, where p is of the form “x hap­
pens at t” and S knows p.)
Once again, we have a way to explain one kind of knowledge—knowing when—
in terms of propositional knowledge. It is likely that similar approaches will
work for knowing which, knowing why, and numerous other sentences about
knowledge. The case for propositional knowledge being fundamental looks
fairly strong.
11
However, it is unlikely that all the things we say using the word knoxvs can be
expressed in terms of propositional knowledge. Consider the first item on ocu­
list: “S knows x.” You might think that to know someone or something is to
have propositional knowledge of some facts about that person or thing. Thus,
we might propose
D3. S knows x = df. S has propositional knowledge of some facts about
x (i.e., for some proposition p, p is about x, and S knows p).
It is likely that anyone you know is someone you know some facts about. But
knowing some facts about a person is not sufficient for knowing the person.
J. D. Salinger is a reclusive, but well-known, author. Many people do know some
facts about him: they know that he wrote The Catcher in the Rye. They may know
that he does not interact with a great many people. So they know facts about
him, but they do not know him. Thus, knowing a person is not the same as
knowing some facts about a person.
This shows that definition (D3) is not correct. It also illustrates another im­
portant methodological point. The example shows that (D3) is not correct be­
cause it is a counterexample to (D3): an example showing that the sides of the
definition do not always agree—one side can be true when the other is false.
A clear-cut counterexample refutes a proposed definition. By revising a defin­
ition in response to counterexamples, it is possible to get a better understand­
ing of the concepts under discussion.5
The counterexample to (D3) shows not only that (D3) is false but that it is not
even on the right track. We cannot make some minor change in order to fix things
up. It would not help to add that S knows lots of facts about x, or that S knows im­
portant facts about x. You can have that sort of propositional knowledge and still
not know the person. Knowing x isn’t a matter of knowing facts about x. Instead,
it is a matter of being acquainted with x—having met x and perhaps remember­
ing that meeting. No matter how many facts you know about a person, it does not
follow that you know that person. Knowing a person or a thing is being acquaint­
ed with that person or thing, not having propositional knowledge about the per­
son or thing. So not all knowing is propositional knowing.
Consider next “knowing how.” Suppose that there is a former expert skier
who, after a serious accident leaves him unable to ski, becomes a successful ski
coach. His success as a coach is largely the result of the fact that he is unusually
good at explaining skiing techniques to students. Does the coach know how to
ski? The answer seems to be “Yes.” A plausible explanation of this appeals to the
following definition:
D4a. S knows how to A = df. If a is an important step in A-ing, then S
knows that a is an important step in A-ing.6
This seems to show that “knowing how” can be defined in terms of proposi­
tional knowledge.
12 The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
However, other examples suggest a different idea. Consider a young child
who begins skiing and does it successfully, without any training or intellectual
understanding of what she is doing. She also knows how to ski, but she seems
to lack the relevant propositional knowledge. She does not have any explicit
conscious understanding of the various steps. She is just able to do it. This ex­
ample suggests that there is a second meaning to the phrase “knows how.” The
following definition captures this second meaning:
D4b. S knows how to A = elf. S is able to A.
The ex-skier knows how to ski in the (D4a) sense, but not in the (D4b) sense,
just the reverse is true of the young prodigy. So one kind of knowhow is propo­
sitional knowledge, but another kind is not.
C. Conclusion
The attempt to explain all the different kinds of knowledge in terms of propo­
sitional knowledge is unsuccessful. The most reasonable conclusion seems to
be that there are (at least) three basic kinds of knowledge: (1) propositional
knowledge, (2) acquaintance knowledge or familiarity, and (3) ability knowl­
edge (or procedural knowledge).
Even though we cannot explain all knowledge in terms of propositional
knowledge, propositional knowledge does have a special status. We can explain
several other kinds of knowledge in terms of it. Furthermore, many of the most
intriguing questions about knowledge turn out to be questions about proposi­
tional knowledge. It will be the focus of this book. And the point of this section
is mainly to get clear about the sort of knowledge that is the topic of our study.
It is propositional knowledge, or knowledge of facts.
II. KNOWLEDGE AND TRUE BELIEF
What does it take to know a fact? What is propositional knowledge? These are
the questions raised by (O l) in Chapter 1. We will begin our examination of this
with a simple, and inadequate, answer. Then we will attempt to build upon this
answer.
A. Two Conditions on Knowledge
It is easy to come up with two conditions for knowledge: truth and belief. It is
clear that knowledge requires truth. That is, you cannot know something un­
less it is true. It can never be right to say, “He knows it but it’s false.” You can­
not know that Thomas Jefferson was the first president of the United States. The
reason that you cannot know this is that he was not the first president.
p ie Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 13
People can feel very sure of things that are not true. You might feel sure
that Jefferson was the first president. You might think that you remember
being taught this in school. But you are mistaken about this. (Or your teacher
made a big mistake.) You might even claim to know that Jefferson was the first
president. But he was not the first president, and you do not know that he was.
This is because knowledge requires truth. You know a proposition only if it
is true.
There is a possible objection to the claim that knowledge requires truth. It
is illustrated by the following example:
Example 2.1: The Mystery Story
You are reading a mystery story. All the clues presented right up to the last
chapter indicated that the butler was guilty. You felt sure the butler did it
and were surprised when it was revealed in the final scene that the ac­
countant was guilty. After you finish the book you say:
4. I knew all along that the butler did it, but then it turned out that he
didn’t.
If you are right when you say (4), then it is possible to know things that are not
true. You knew that the butler did it, but it was not true that the butler did it.
However, even though people sometimes say things such as (4), it is clear that
these things are not literally true. You did not know all along that the butler
did it. What was true all along was that you felt sure that the butler did it, or
something like that. By saying (4) you convey, in a slightly colorful way, that
you were surprised by the ending. But (4) is not true, and it does not show that
there can be knowledge without truth.
A second condition for knowledge is belief. If you know something, then
you must believe it or accept it. If you do not even think that something is true,
then you do not know it. We are using “belief” in a broad sense here: anytime
you take something to be true, you believe it. Believing thus includes hesitant
acceptance as well as fully confident acceptance. A good way to think about
this is to notice that when you consider a statement, you can adopt any of three
attitudes toward it: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. As an analogy,
imagine yourself forced to say one of three things about a statement: “yes,”
“no,” or “no opinion.” You will say “yes” over a range of cases, including the
ones in which you are entirely confident of a statement and the ones in which
you merely think the statement is probably true. You will say “no” when you
think that the statement is definitely or probably false. And you will say “no
opinion” in the remaining cases. Similarly, as we are using the term here, “be­
lief” applies to a range of attitudes. It is contrasted with disbelief, which in­
volves a similar range, and suspension of judgment.
It is clear, then, that knowledge requires belief. If you do not even think that
a statement is true, then you do not know that it is true. There is, however, an
objection to this claim that deserves consideration. We sometimes talk in ways
14 The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
that contrast knowledge and belief, suggesting that when you know something,
you do not believe it. To see this, consider the following example:
Example 2.2: Knowing Your Name
You have a friend named “John” and you ask him, “Do you believe that
your name is Jo h n ’?” He replies:
5. I do not believe, that my name is “John”; I know that it is.
In saying (5), John seems to be saying that this is a case of knowledge and not
a case of belief. The suggestion is that if it is belief, then it is not knowledge. If
he is right, then belief is not a condition for knowledge.
However, again, this appearance is misleading. John surely does accept the
statement that his name is “John.” He does not reject that statement or have no
opinion about it. When he says (5), his point is that he does not merely believe
that his name is “John”; he can say something stronger—that he knows it. And
one of the ways we typically proceed in conversations is to avoid saying the
weaker or more modest thing when the stronger one is true as well. If your
friend were to say to you, “I believe that my name is John,’” this would suggest,
but not literally say, that he does not know it. There are many other examples
of the same phenomenon. Suppose that you are extremely tired, having worked
very hard for a long time. Someone asks if you are tired. You might respond by
saying something like:
6. I’m not tired; I’m exhausted.
Taken literally, what you say is false. You are tired. The point of your utterance
is to emphasize that you are not merely tired; you are exhausted. The same thing
goes on in (5). By saying (5), John is not really saying that he does not believe
the statement. So this example is not a counterexample to the thesis that knowl­
edge requires belief.
We have now found two conditions for knowledge: To know something, you
must believe it and it must be true.
B. Knowledge as True Belief
The ideas just presented may suggest that knowledge is true belief; that is,
TB. S knows p = df. (i) S believes p, and (ii) p is true.
A little reflection should make it clear that (TB) is mistaken. There are lots
of times that a person has a true belief but does not have knowledge. Here is a
simple counterexample to (TB):
Example. 2.3: Correct Predictions
New York is playing Denver in an upcoming Superbowl. The experts are
divided about who will win, and the teams are rated as even. You have a
The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 15
hunch that Denver will win. When the game is finally played, your hunch
turns out to have been correct. So you.believed that Denver would win,
and your belief was true.
In Example 2.3 you believe that Denver will win, and this is true. Bit I.you did not
know that Denver would win. You just had a guess that turned out. to be correct.
Some will say that the fact the belief in Example 2.3 is about the future ruins
the example. But we can easily eliminate that feature without undermining the
point. Suppose you do not watch the game, but instead go to a long movie.
When you get out of the movie, you know that the game is over. You now have
a belief about the past, namely that Denver won. And you are right. You still do
not know that they won. You are still right as a result of a lucky guess. But now
there are no complications having to do with beliefs about the future.
The objections to (TB) are not limited to cases of lucky guesses. Another
sort of example will illustrate the heart of the problem with (TB).
Example 2.4: The Pessimistic Picnic Planner
You have a picnic scheduled for Saturday and you hear a weather forecast drat
says at the chances that it will rain on Saturday are slightly more than 50%.
You are a pessimist, and on the basis of this report you believe confidently that
it will rain. And then it does rain. So you had a true belief that it would rain.
You did have a true belief that it would rain, but you lacked knowledge. (When
the rain starts, you might say, “I knew it would rain,” but you did not really know
it.) The reason you did not know in this case is not that you were guessing.
Your belief is based on some evidence—the weather report—so it is not simply
a guess. But this basis is not good enough for knowledge. What you need for
knowledge is something along the lines of very good reasons or a more reliable
basis, not just a potentially inaccurate weather report.
Philosophers often say that what is needed for knowledge, in addition to true
belief, is justification for the belief. Exactly what justification amounts to is a mat­
ter of considerable controversy. We will spend a good deal of time later in this
book examining this idea. But for now it will suffice to notice that in the examples
of knowledge that we put forth in Chapter 1, the believers had extremely good rea­
sons for their beliefs. In contrast, in the counterexamples to (TB), you did not have
very good reasons and you could easily have been wrong. What is missing, then,
in the counterexamples to (TB) and is present in the examples of knowledge we
have described isjustification. This leads us to The. Traditional Analysis ofKnowledge.
III. THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE
The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge (the TAK) is formulated in the following
definition:
TAK.. S knows p = df. (i) S believes p, (ii) p is true, (iii) S is justified in
believing p.
16 The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
Something along these lines can be found in various sources, perhaps going
back as far as Socrates. In Plato’s dialogue Meno, Socrates says:
For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but
they are not willing to remain long; and they escape from man’s mind, so that they
are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason
why. . . . After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and
then they remain in place.'
According to one possible interpretation of this passage, to be able to give “an
account” of an opinion is to have a reason or justification for that opinion. And
one idea in the passage is that this is needed in order to have knowledge.8We
will ignore the additional claim, that knowledge is less likely to “escape” from
one’s mind than other beliefs.
Similar ideas can be found in the work of many more contemporary philoso­
phers. For example, Roderick Chisholm once proposed that one knows a propo­
sition just in case one believes the proposition, it is true, and the proposition
is “evident” for one. And this last condition is understood in terms of how rea­
sonable it is for the person to believe the proposition.9
We turn now to a more thorough examination of the three elements of the
TAK.
B. Truth
A. Belief
To believe something is to accept it as true. When you consider any statement,
you are faced with a set of alternatives: You can believe it, you can disbelieve it,
or you can suspend judgment about it. Recall that we are taking belief to include
a range of more specific attitudes, including hesitant acceptance and complete
conviction. Disbelief includes a corresponding range of negative attitudes to­
ward a proposition. At any given time, if you consider a proposition, you will end
up adopting one of these three attitudes.10
For present purposes, think of disbelieving a proposition as being the same
thing as believing the negation (or denial) of that proposition. So disbelieving
that George Washington was the first president is the same as believing that it
is not the case that George Washington was the first president. Suspending
judgment about the proposition is to neither believe it nor disbelieve it.11
One additional point about belief deserves mention here. Suppose a French
child is taught that George Washington was the first president of the United
States. Thus, it becomes true that
7. Pierre believes that George Washington was the first president of the
United States.
The noteworthy thing here is that (7) can be true even if Pierre does not speak
a word of English. He does not have to understand the English sentence
“George Washington was the first president of the United States.” Presumably,
The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 17
he would express his belief using a French equivalent of this sentence. Pierre’s
American counterpart, Peter, might believe what Pierre does. Thus,
8. Peter believes that George Washington was the first president of the
United States.
Peter, we may assume, does not speak a word of French. So Peter and Pierre be­
lieve the same thing, even though there is no sentence that they both accept.
How can this be?
One way to understand these matters is as follows. Sentences are used to ex­
press certain thoughts or ideas. Philosophers use the word proposition to refer
to these items. I he English sentence Peter uses and the French sentence Pierre
uses express the same proposition. Belief is fundamentally a relation to a propo­
sition. So (7) can be true because Pierre believes the relevant proposition about
George Washington; (8) is true because Peter believes that same proposition.
But they would use different sentences to express that proposition.
There are, then, two important points to extract from this: Sentences differ
from the propositions they are used to express, and belief is fundamentally an
attitude one: takes toward propositions.12
The second element of the TAK is truth. People say many complicated and
murky things about truth, but the fundamental idea is very simple. The issue
here is not about which things are in fact true. Rather, the question for now is
about what it is for something to be true. One simple and widely accepted an­
swer to this is contained in the correspondence theory of truth.
The central point of the correspondence theory is expressed in the follow­
ing principle:
CT. A proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts (iff
the world is the way the proposition says it is). A proposition is false
iff it fails to correspond to the facts.13
The idea here is extraordinarily simple. It applies to our example about George
Washington in the following way. The proposition that George Washington was
the first president is true just in case it corresponds to the facts as they actually
are. In other words, it is true just in case George Washington was the first pres­
ident. The proposition is false if he was not the first president. This should come
as no surprise. The principle applies in analogous ways to other propositions.
It will be helpful to spell out a few consequences of (CT) and to mention a
few things that are not consequences of (CT).
1) Whether a proposition is true or false does not depend in any way
upon what anyone believes about it. For example, our beliefs about George
 The Tradit ional Analysis o f Knowledge
Washington have no bearing on the truth value (i.e., truth or falsity) of the
proposition that George Washington was the first president. The actual facts of
the case determine its truth value.
2) Truth is not “relative.” No single proposition can be “true for me but not
true for you.” I might believe a proposition that you disbelieve. In fact, this is
almost surely the case. Any two people will almost surely disagree about some­
thing. However, if there is a proposition they disagree about, then the truth
value of that proposition is determined by the facts.
3) (CT) does not legitimize any kind of dogmatism or intolerant attitude to­
ward people who disagree with you. Some people dismiss without consideration
anyone who disagrees with them. That is a nasty and unreasonable way to treat oth­
ers. However, if we disagree about something, then, trivially, I think that I am right
and that you are wrong. If, for example, you think that Thomas Jefferson was the
first president and I think that it was George Washington instead, then I think
that you are wrong about this and you think that I am wrong about this. It would
be rash for me to generalize from this case and draw any conclusions about your
other beliefs. But when you disagree with me, I do think you are wrong. If you are
not dogmatic, you recognize your own fallibility. You are open to changing your
mind if new information comes along. There are circumstances in which it might
be rude to tell others that you think they are wrong. And possibly die mere fact
that others disagree provides you with some reason to reconsider your views.14
4) (CT) does not imply that things cannot change. Consider the proposi­
tion that George Washington is the president of the United States. That propo­
sition is false. But, it seems, it used to be true. What does (CT) say about this?
There are a few ways to think about this, and a full examination of them
would get into technicalities that are not important for present purposes. One
good approach says that a sentence such as “George Washington is the presi­
dent of the United States” expresses a different proposition at different times.
The proposition it expressed back in 1789 is true. The proposition it expresses
in 2003—the proposition that George Washington is president of the United
States in 2003—is false. We can say that the sentence can be used to express a
series of propositions about specific times. You can think of a proposition say­
ing that a certain thing has a certain property at one time as a predecessor of
a proposition saying that that same thing has that same property at a slightly
later time. So, when things change, for example, when we get a new president,
one dated proposition is true and its successor proposition is false. There is no
problem for (CT) here, provided we are careful about the propositions in
question.
5) Something similar applies to considerations about location. Suppose some­
one in Maine is talking on the telephone to someone in Florida. The person
in Maine says:9
9. It is snowing.
The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 19
The person in Florida says:
10. It is not snowing.
These speakers do not disagree about anything, But what, then, should we say
about the truth value of the proposition that it is snowing? Is it true or is it false?
Once again, there are a variety of ways to think about this. For present pur­
poses, a good approach will be to say that by a sentence like (9) the person ex­
presses a proposition that might more clearly be displayed by the sentence
9a. It is snowing here (in Maine).
Similarly, the person in Florida who says (10) says something that is most clearly
displayed in
10a. It is not snowing here (in Florida).
We may assume both of these propositions are true. Their truth is objective, in
that it depends upon the weather conditions in the two places.
6) There are puzzles about sentences such as
11. Yogurt tastes good.
Exactly what (CT) says about them depends largely on what these sentences
mean. One possibility is that each speaker uses (11) to say, “I like the taste of
yogurt.” If that is the case, then different people use (11) to express different
propositions, each proposition being about what that speaker likes. If a person
who does like the taste of yogurt says (11), then the proposition the person ex­
presses is true. If the person does not like yogurt, then the person expresses a
proposition that is not true.
It is not obvious that (11) says something about individual preferences. Maybe
it means something like “Most people like the taste of yogurt.” If that is what it
means, then it does not express different propositions when said by different
people. It expresses one proposition about majority tastes, and that proposition
is true if most people like yogurt and not true if they do not.
According to another interpretation, (11) says that yogurt satisfies some stan­
dard of taste that is independent of people’s likes and dislikes. This assumes
some sort of “objectivity” about taste. On this view, (11) could be true even if
hardly anyone actually likes the taste of yogurt. You might find this view strange;
it is hard to understand what objective good taste amounts to.
What is crucial for present purposes is to notice that whichever interpreta­
tion of (11) is right, there is no trouble for (CT). The proposition expressed
by (11) will vary from one speaker to another if the first option is right, but
not in the other cases. In all cases, however, the truth value that the proposi­
tion (s) (11) expresses depends upon the relevant facts. In this case, the rele-
 The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
vant facts are either the likes and dislikes of the speaker, the likes and dislikes
of the majority of people, or the objective facts about good taste.
There is no need for us to settle disputes about the right interpretation of
sentences such as (11). That complicated matter can be left to those who study
aesthetics. The crucial point for present purposes is that whichever interpre­
tation is correct, there is no good objection here to (CT).
7) (CT) does not imply that we cannot know what is “really” true. Some peo­
ple react to (CT) by saying something like this:
According to (CT), truth is “absolute” and what’s true depends upon how things are
in the objective world. Because this world is external to us, we can never really know
what’s true. At most, we can know what is “subjectively” true. This subjective truth de­
pends upon our own views about the world. Absolute truth must always be beyond
our grasp.
We will discuss skepticism at length in Chapters 6 and 7. Much of epistemology
is an effort to respond to it. For now it is enough to note two points. First, from
the mere fact that what is true is dependent upon an objective world that ex­
ists independent of us, it does not follow that we cannot know what that world
is like. Thus, if there is any strong argument for skepticism, it relies on a premise
beyond anything stated in the preceding paragraph. We will consider how such
an argument might be formulated later.
Second, throughout the next several chapters we will assume, as The Standard
View does, that we do know things. This is not a matter of prejudging the issues
associated with skepticism. Rather, we are examining what the nature and con­
sequences of The Standard View are. The Skeptical View will get a fair hearing in
Chapters 6 and 7.
8) There is one very puzzling issue associated with the correspondence the­
ory of truth. Consider a sentence such as
12. Michael is tall.
Suppose that someone asserts (12) in a normal conversational context such as
the following: You are about to pick up Michael at the airport. You know that
he is an adult male, but you do not know what he looks like. You are given a de­
scription, of which (12) is a part. Under these circumstances, if Michael is ac­
tually 6'4", then (12) expresses a truth. If Michael is 4'10", then (12) says
something false. If Michael is about 5T0", then it is difficult to say whether (12)
expresses a truth or a falsehood. That height seems to be a borderline case of
being tall (for an adult male).
According to one widely held view about these matters, the word “tall”just
does not have a precise meaning. The problem we have in the final situation,
when Michael is 5T0", is not that we do not know enough about the situation.
We can know everything there is to know about Michael’s height, average
heights for adult men, and anything else that is relevant. On this view, (12) just
file Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 21
is a borderline case. There simply are not exact boundaries to the heights to
which the word “tall” applies. In other words, “tall” is a vague word.
Many other words are vague, including, “healthy”, “wealthy”, and “wise”.
Vagueness causes numerous problems in understanding exactly how language
works. Fortunately, we can largely ignore those issues while pursuing the epis­
temological questions that are our focus. However, issues concerning vague­
ness will arise from time to time, so it is important to have a grasp of the idea.
Furthermore, the existence of vague sentences may have some bearing on the
adequacy of (CT). Recall the distinction between sentences and the proposi­
tions they express. As just noted, vagueness is a feature of sentences. Sentence
(12), it seems, is vague. But now consider the proposition (12) expresses on a
particular occasion, such as the one just described. If that proposition is vague,
or indefinite in truth value, then (CT) needs revision. (CT) says that every
proposition is either true or false, depending upon whether it corresponds to
the way the world is. But if there are vague propositions, then there are propo­
sitions that partially correspond to the way the world is. One might say that
there is a third truth value—indeterminate—in addition to the original two—
true and false. One might even say that there is a whole range of truth values,
that truth comes in degrees. These are complex matters that cannot easily be
resolved. We will not attempt to resolve them here. It is enough to realize that
(CT) may require modification in order to deal with vagueness.
C. Justification
The third, and final element of the TAK is justification. Justification (or ratio­
nality or reasonableness) will be the focus of a large part of this book. This sec­
tion will introduce some preliminary ideas.
Justification is something that comes in degrees—you can have more or less of
it. Consider again Example 2.4, in which you pessimistically believed that it would
rain on the day of your picnic on the basis of a forecast saying that the odds of its
raining were slightly greater than half. Here you have some justification for think­
ing that it will rain. It is not as if you simply made it up, with no reason at all. But
your reasons were far from good enough to give you knowledge. So what clause
(iii) of the TAK requires is very strongjustification. In the circumstances described,
you do not have it for the belief that it will rain. If the day of the picnic comes and
you look out the window and see rain, then you do have strong enough justifica­
tion for the belief that it will rain. Under those circumstances you would satisfy
clause (iii) of the TAK. So clause (iii) should be read to require strongjustifica­
tion, or adequate justification. This may be a bit imprecise, but it will do for now.
You can be justified in believing something without actually believing it.
Clause (iii) of the TAK does not imply (i). To see how this works, consider the
following example:
Example 2.5: Mr. Insecure’s Exam
Mr. Insecure has just taken an exam. The teacher quickly looked over his
answers and said that they look good and that the grades will be available
22 The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
the next clay. Mr. Insecure has studied hard, taken and done well on the
practice exams, found the questions on the actual exam similar to the ones
he had studied, and so on. He has excellent reasons to think that he passed
the exam. But Mr. Insecure is insecure. He never believes that he has done
well and does not believe that he has done well on this exam.
Even though Mr. Insecure does not believe that he has passed the exam, he is
justified in believing that he passed the exam. So condition (iii) of the TAK is
satisfied, but condition (i) is not. To be justified in believing a proposition is,
roughly, to have what is required to be highly reasonable in believing it, whether
one actually believes it or not.
What is justified for one person may not be justified for another. You have
many justified beliefs about your private life. Your friends and acquaintances
may have little or no justification for beliefs about those matters. And what isjus-
tified for an individual changes over time. A modification of Example 2.4 illus­
trates this. A week before the picnic, you may not have had justification for
believing the proposition that it would rain on Saturday. But by Saturday morn­
ing, you might acquire ample justification for that proposition.
li is important not to confuse being justified in believing something from
being able to show that one is justified in believing that proposition. In many
cases we can explain why a belief is justified; we can formulate our reasons.
However, there arc exceptions to this. For example, a child might have many
justified beliefs but be unable to articulate a justification for them.
IV. REAL KNOWLEDGE AND APPARENT KNOWLEDGE
One additional point about The Standard View deserves special attention. The
things that people regard as knowledge differ in a variety of ways. To take some
simple examples, perhaps people in ancient times would have said that among
the things they know is the fact that the earth is flat. Perhaps they would have
said that they knew the earth to be at the center of the universe (with everything
in orbit around it). There may have been widespread agreement in ancient
times that they did have knowledge in these cases.
We can grant for the sake of argument that the ancients thought they knew that
the earth was at the center of the universe. (If you do not like this particular ex­
ample, substitute another one that illustrates the same idea.) We can even grant
that they were quite well justified in believing that they had knowledge of this
fact. We might say that they had apparent knowledge. Nevertheless, they lacked
real knowledge. Even though the propositions in question might have quite rea­
sonably appeared in the list of things known in the first chapter of a distant an­
cestor of this book, the propositions were false. The earth is not, and never was,
flat. It is not, and never was, at the center of the universe. They thought., perhaps
even with justification , that they had knowledge, but they were mistaken.15
Another point deserves mention here. It may be that the claims of those
who are most outspoken, most charismatic, or most powerful will often be
The Traditional Analysis of Knozoledge 23
widely regarded as items of knowledge. This can be distressing to those out of
power, especially when they have better justification for competing views. How­
ever, questions about what determines what gets counted as knowledge, and
how the powerful manage to impose their views on others, are noL the focus of
this book. Our topic is real knowledge, not apparent knowledge.16
V. CONCLUSION
(Q'l) from Chapter 1 asked what it took to have knowledge. This chapter has
introduced an answer to that question based on The'traditional Analysis ofKnowl­
edge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief. This analysis has a
long history. It seems to fit very well with The Standard View. The examples of
knowledge endorsed by The Standard View seem to be cases ofjustified true be­
lief. And cases in which we lack knowledge seem to be cases in which we lack
at least one of these three factors.
There is, however, a significant objection to the TAK. We turn next to it.
ENDNOTES
1. The following examples show general patterns of various kinds of statements, with
an example showing how each pattern could be filled out. The patterns make use
of variables that can be replaced by specific terms. Following standard practices,
“S” is used as a variable to be replaced by a name or description of a person, “x” is
used as a variable to be replaced by a name or description of any object (including
people), “p” is to be replaced by a full sentence expressing a fact or purported fact
(a proposition), and “A” by a description of an action.
2. For discussion ofjust what is meant by the word “proposition,” see Section III, Part
A1 of this chapter.
3. It is important to understand the difference between (2) and
2a. The librarian knows either that there is a book by Salinger in the library or that
there is not a book by Salinger in the library.
(2a) is true; (2a) reports knowledge of a disjunction (an “or” statement) and every­
one can have this knowledge. But the librarian must possess special knowledge if
(2) is true. She must know which of the disjuncts (the parts of the “or” statement)
is true.
4. “~p” means “not-p”, or the negation of p. The negation of “There is a book by
Salinger in the library” is “It is not the case that there is a book by Salinger in the
library.”
5. The methodology used here will be important in what follows. One important test
of a proposed definition is that there are no counterexamples to it.
6. This definition may need some refinement, but it does capture at least the basic
idea under discussion.
7. From Meno, translated by G. M. A. Grube. Reprinted in Plato: Complete Works, edited
by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), p. 895.
8. A similar idea is presented in another dialogue, Theatetus, translated by M. J. Levett,
revised by Myles Burnyeat. Reprinted in Plato: Complete Works. See p. 223.
9. Roderick Chisholm, Theory ofKnowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966),
p. 23.
24 The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
C H A R IE R T H R E E
10. There is an alternative way to think about these matters. Instead of saying that there
are three options, you can say that you can believe a proposition to a greater or lesser
degree. You can think of these degrees of belief as arranged along a scale. When you
accept a proposition with absolute conviction, you believe it to tire fullest degree. When
you completely and totally reject a proposition, you have the lowest possible degree of
belief in it. And in the usual cases, your degree of belief falls somewhere in between.
Suspension ofjudgment is right in the middle.
11. If you have never even considered a proposition, then you neither believe it nor dis­
M odifying
believe it, but you do not suspend judgment either. Perhaps suspending judgment
is best characterized as considering a proposition but neither believing it nor dis­
believing it.
Traditional
12. There are hard questions about exactly what kinds of objects propositions are. We
can safely ignore those questions here.
13. The term “iff” abbreviates “if and only if.” Sentences of the form “p iff q” are true
o f K now ledge
just in case the truth values of p and q agree, that is, just in case both are true or both
are false.
14. This topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
15. At this point you might observe that we might be in a situation like the ancients, in
which our claims to knowledge are mistaken. We will take up this issue when we
consider The Skeptical View.
16. It is possible that some of the attractiveness of The Relativistic View, mentioned in
Chapter 1, results from confusing apparent knowledge and real knowledge. I. AN OBJECTION TO THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
Recall that The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge, the TAK, says that knowledge
isjustified true belief.
This analysis is correctjust in case in all possible examples, if a person knows
some proposition, then the person has ajustifiecl true belief in that proposition,
and if a person has a justified true belief, then the person has knowledge. Un­
fortunately for the TAK, there are compelling counterexamples of the second
sort—cases of justified true belief that clearly are not cases of knowledge.
The first philosopher to argue explicitly against the TAK in the manner to
be discussed here was Edmund Gettier. His brief essay, “Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?,” may be the most widely discussed and often cited epistemology
paper in many years.1 Gettier presented two examples, each showing that one
could have a justified true belief that is not knowledge. Other philosophers
have described additional cases establishing the same point.

A. The Counterexamples
In this section we will examine three examples all designed to illustrate a prob­
lem in the TAIL The point behind all the objections is the same, but the dif­
ferent examples help to make the issue clearer. The first example is a modified
version of one Gettier originally presented.

Example 3.1: The Ten Coins Case

Smith is justified in believing:
1. Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.
25
 Modifying The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
The reason Smith is justified in believing (1) is that he has just seen Jones
empty his pockets, carefully count his coins, and then return them to his
pocket. Smith also knows that Jones is extremely well qualified for the job
and he has heard the boss tell the secretary thatjones has been selected. On
the basis of (1), Smith correctly deduces and believes another proposition:
2. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Smith is justified in believing (2) on the basis of this inference. In spite of
Smith’s evidence, (1) is not true after all. The boss misspoke when he said
thatjones was going to get the job. In fact, the job is going to the compa­
ny vice president’s nephew, Robinson. Coincidentally, Robinson also hap­
pens to have ten coins in his pocket.
In this example (2) is true even though (1) is false. Smith was justified in be­
lieving (1), correctly deduced (2) from (1), and believed it as a result. So, Smith
was also justified in believing (2). And (2) is true. So Smith’s belief in (2) is
justified and true. But clearly Smith does not know (2). It is just a coincidence
that he is right about (2).
Example 3.2: The Nogot/Havit Case2
Smith knows that Nogot, who works in his office, is driving a Ford, has
Ford ownership papers, is generally honest, etc. On this basis he believes:
3. Nogot, who works in Smith’s office, owns a Ford.
Smith hears on the radio that a local Ford dealership is having a contest.
Anyone who works in the same office as a Ford owner is eligible to enter a
lottery', the winner receiving a Ford. Smith decides to apply, thinking he
eligible. After all, he thinks that (3) is true, so he concludes that:
4. There is someone who works in (my) Smith’s office who owns a
Ford. (There is at least one Ford owner in Smith’s office.)
It turns out that Nogot is a Ford faker and (3) is false. However, (4) is
true because some other person unknown to Smith, Havit, works in his of­
fice and owns a Ford.
So Smith has ajustified true belief in (4), but he does not know (4). It isjust a lucky
coincidence, resulting from Havit’s having it, that makes him right about (4).
Example 3.3: The Sheep in the Field3
Having won a Ford in a contest, Smith goes for a drive in the country. He
looks off into a nearby field and sees what looks exactly like a sheep. So
he justifiably believes:
5. That animal in the field is a sheep.
Modifying The Traditional Analysis ofKnoiuledge 27
Smith’s son is in the back seat reading a book and not looking at the
scenery. The son asks if there are any sheep in the field they are passing.
Smith says ‘Yes,” adding:
6. There is a sheep in the field.
Smith is justified by what he sees in thinking that (5) is true, (6) follows
from (5), so he is justified in believing (6) as well.
As it turns out, (5) is false. What Smith sees is a sheep dog (or a sheep
statue, or some other perfect sheep look-alike). But (6), as it happens, is
true anyway. Out in the field, but out of view, there is a sheep.
So, Smith has ajustified belief in (6), and it is true. But he does not know it. It
is only by luck that he is right about (6).
It should be noted that the details of the examples can be modified to
strengthen Smith’s support for his belief in tire false proposition in each case. For
example, you can add whatever you like to his support for the belief that Nogot
owns a Ford. Nogot can show him his keys with a Ford insignia and wear a Ford
tee shirt, etc. No matter how much you add to the case, it will remain possible that
Nogot is faking his Ford ownership. And given that this is possible, it remains
possible to construct a case in which it is coincidentally true that someone in the
office owns a Ford. Similar remarks apply to the other examples. Merely requir­
ing stronger reasons for a belief to be justified would not avoid the objections.
B. The Structure of the Counterexamples
Examples 3.1-3.3 share a common structure. In each case, Smith has some basic
evidence that strongly supports some proposition. It is the sort of evidence that
The Standard Vim counts as good enough for knowledge. He believes that propo­
sition and then draws a further conclusion from it. In each example, the odd-
numbered sentence describes the first proposition Smith believes:
1. Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
3. Nogot, who works in Smith’s office, owns a Ford.
5. That animal in the field is a sheep.
The even-numbered sentences describe the conclusions Smith draws from the
first step:
2. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
4. Someone ■who works in Smith’s office owns a Ford. (There is at least one
Ford owner in Smith’s office.)
6. There is a sheep in the field.
The odd-numbered proposition is false in each case. Still, given the evidence, it is
extremely reasonable for Smith to believe it. It is ajustified belief. And the final
28 Modifying The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge
conclusion follows logically from the previous step. The final conclusion is, in
each case, true. In effect, the final conclusion is true “by coincidence.” It just so
happens that the person who got the job has ten coins, that there is a Ford owner
in the office, and that there is a sheep in the field. So Smith has very good reasons
to believe the first step and follows perfectly good logical principles in deri ving the
second step. Thus, he has a justified true belief in each of the final conclusions.
But in each case the truth of that conclusion is unconnected to the original evi­
dence. Smith does not have knowledge, even though he has justified true beliefs.
Stating the structure of the examples helps to bring out two important prin­
ciples that they rely on. One principle allows that the person can be justified
in believing the odd-numbered propositions even though they are false. We
can state this as The.Justified Falsehood Principle, or (JF):
JF. It is possible for a person to be justified in believing a false proposition.
The second important principle is the one that says that the second proposition
is justified because it is deduced from the first. This is The Justified Deduction
Principle, or (JD):
JD. If S isjustified in believing p, and p entails q, and S deduces q from p
and accepts q as a result of this deducdon, then S is justified in be­
lieving q.
If the three examples just described are possible and these two principles are
true, then the TAKis mistaken. The examples may be odd, but they are clearly
possible. Things like this can, and do, happen. The two principles do seem cor­
rect. Thus, it looks as if we have a strong case against the TAK. As we shall see,
however, some people have tried to defend the TAKby rejecting the principles.
To state a Gettier-style example, then, first one has to find a case of a justi­
fied false belief. If (JF) is correct, there are such cases. One then identifies
some truth that logically follows from that falsehood. There will always be such
truths. The example proceeds by having the believer deduce this truth from the
justified false belief. If (JD) is correct, the resulting belief will be a justified
true belief that is not knowledge.
It appears, therefore, that Gettier-style examples show that the TAK is
incorrect.
II. DEFENDING THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
You may have some misgivings about Gettier-style examples. Usually, doubts
are based on the idea that the person in the example is not justified in be­
lieving the final proposition and thus does not really have ajustified true be­
lief.4 And this idea relies on rejecting one or the other of the two principles
just stated.5 In this section we will examine the plausibility of these responses
to the examples.
Modifying The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 29
A. Rejecting (JF)
One way to defend the TAK is to reject (JF) . You might think that if a propo­
sition is false, then a person who believes it must not have good enough reasons
for that belief. If correct, this provides a defense of the TAK'm the following way.
It implies that in each of our examples Smith is not justified in believing the false
proposition. If Smith is not justified in believing the false proposition (the odd-
numbered one), then he is not justified in believing what he deduces from it.
Thus, his belief in the even-numbered proposition is not justified either. As a
result, Gettier-style examples are not cases ofjustified true beliefs (because they
are not cases ofjustified beliefs), and thus they do not refute the TAK.
Consider how this response applies the Nogot/Havit case. The critic contends
that, in spite of the evidence, Smith is not justified in believing proposition (3),
that Nogot owns a Ford. The reason for this is that (3) is false, and thus Smith’s
evidence must not have been good enough. More generally, the critic says, a per­
son can never be justified in believing a false proposition. (JF) is mistaken.
Because Smith’s reasons for believing (3) can be extremely strong, this is an
implausible response. Moreover, given one very sensible assumption, rejecting
(JF) implies that hardly anyone is ever justified in believing anything! To see
why, consider any example in which a person has what The Standard View re­
gards as ajustified belief. Assume that there is nothing odd about the case, and
that things are exactly as the person believes them to be. Call this “The Typical
Case. ’’Now, it is always possible to construct an example that is a variation on
The Typical Case. In this variant, the person has that very same evidence, but
the proposition in question is nevertheless false. Call this variant "The Unusu­
al Case. ”To fill in the details of The Unusual Case, it will be necessary to add in
unusual efforts at deception and the like. Although such things are unusual,
they are possible. The key thing to note is that in The Typical Case and in The
Unusual Case, the believer has exactly the same reasons for believing exactly
the same thing. So the belief is either justified in both cases or else not justified
in both cases. If (JF) is false, then the belief is not justified in The Unusual Case
(because it is false). But then it is not justified in The Typical Case either, since
the reasons are the same. This can be done for virtually any allegedly justified
belief, so if (JF) is false, virtually no beliefs are justified.
The reasoningjust displayed depends upon The SameEvidence Principle, or (SE):
SE. If in two possible examples there is no difference at all in the evi­
dence a person has concerning some proposition, then either the
person is justified in believing the proposition in both cases or the
person is not justified in believing the proposition in both cases.
(SE) is an extremely plausible principle. If (SE) is true and (JF) is false, then
virtually nothing is justified. And that violates our basic assumption (for now,
at least) that we do know things. So this first defense of the TAK is no good.5
Some readers may still think that rejecting (JF) is correct. Recall, however, that
the point of the current chapter is to see what the consequences of The Standard
30 Modifying The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge
Vieware. The Standard Viewholds that we do know a lot, and rejecting (JF) implies
that hardly anything isjustified and thus hardly anything is known. So rejecting (JF)
requires rejecting The Standard View. In other words, (JF) is a consequence of The
Standard Vim. Thus, rejecting it is out of place at this stage of our inquiry. We will
return to this topic when we examine The Skeptical View.
B. Rejecting (JD)
Recall that the Gettier examples depended on (JD) as well as (JF). (JD) says
that justification can be transferred through deduction. A second possible basis
for defending the traditional analysis from these counterexamples is to reject
(JD). The idea is that when you reason properly from justified truths, the re­
sult is justified, but when you reason properly from justified falsehoods, the
result is not justified. In other words, if you start with a justified true belief and
properly draw a conclusion from it, then the resulting belief is justified. How­
ever, if you start with a justified false belief—remember, we are accepting (JF)—
and correctly draw a conclusion from it, then the resulting belief is notjustified.
Thus, in this view, in each of the Gettier cases the person is justified in believ­
ing the first step—the odd-numbered proposition—but not justified in believ­
ing the consequence drawn from it. Advocates of this view therefore reject (JD).
This view also requires rejecting (SE). Imagine an example like any one of the
Gettier-style cases but in which there is no trickery going on and the first step is
actually true. Drawing the final conclusion is, under those circumstances, justi­
fied. But, according to the present proposal, it is not justified in the Gettier cases.
Yet the person has exactly the same reasons in each case. This is implausible.
Consider carefully what someone who rejects (JD) would be saying about
Smith in each of the Gettier cases. The critic would say of Smith, ‘Yes, Smith is
justified in believing that Nogot, who works in his office, owns a Ford. And it is
true that he can deduce from this that someone who works in his office owns
a Ford. But, nevertheless, he is not justified in believing that conclusion.” This
seems absurd. We might sensibly wonder what attitude Smith would be justified
in taking toward the proposition that someone in his office owns a Ford. Would
it be reasonable for him to believe that Nogot owns one but to deny or sus­
pend judgment about whether someone owns one? Clearly not. But that is what
the rejection of (JD) seems to recommend. Rejecting (JD) just is not a good
way to defend the TAKfrom Gettier’s examples.
These attempts to defend the TAK from Gettier-style examples fail. We turn
next to responses according to which knowledge requires something in addi­
tion to justified true belief.
III. MODIFYING THE TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
A plausible idea is that you cannot have knowledge if your belief depends on
a false proposition. In this section we will consider a few efforts to spell out this
idea more clearly.
Modifying The Traditional Analysis o f Knowledge 31
A. The No False Grounds Theory
One way in which the justification of a belief might depend upon a falsehood
is if there is a false proposition among the grounds or reasons for the belief.
Michael Clark has proposed a solution to the Gettier problem making use of
this idea.7 Clark suggests the following No False Grounds account of knowledge.
It adds a fourth condition to the three in the TAK:
NFG. S knows p = df. (i) S believes p; (ii) p is true; (iii) S is justified in
believing p; (iv) All of S’s grounds for believing p are true.
The idea here differs from, and is better than, the proposal discussed in Sec­
tion II, according to which beliefs that have false grounds are not even justified.
Here the idea is that having all true grounds is an additional condition for
knowledge, but not a condition for justification. Thus, defenders of (NFG)
agree that the victims of the Gettier examples are justified in their beliefs. This
was what the previously discussed critics denied. Instead, this response says that
knowledge cannot depend on any false grounds. In each of the preceding ex­
amples, Smith does have a false ground for his final belief. So (NFG) seems to
avoid Gettier-style counterexamples.
(NFG) will work provided that (a) in all Gettier cases the believer has a false
ground, and (b) there are no cases of knowledge in which the believer does
have a false ground. There are reasons to doubt each of these.
Consider (a) first. There are Gettier-style cases in which the person does not
explicitly go through a false step in his or her reasoning. As we will see, these
may be Gettier cases in which the believer does not have a false ground. We
can use a revised version of the Nogot/Havit case to illustrate the point.
Example 3.4: The A Iternate Route8
Smith notices that Nogot is driving a Ford, has a Ford ownership certifi­
cate, and so on. But instead of drawing a conclusion about Nogot, Smith
draws the following conclusion:
7. There is someone who works in Smith’s office who drives a Ford,
has Ford ownership papers, etc.
On the basis of (7), Smith draws the same final conclusion as before:
4. There is someone who works in Smith’s office who owns a Ford.
The difference between the two examples is that in the original version Smith
explicitly reasoned through a false step to get to his true conclusion, and in
the new version he takes an alternate route to get to that same conclusion.
In the original version of the example, Smith’s thinking went:
N. Nogot, who works in Smith’s office, drives a Ford, has Ford ownership
papers, etc.
Another random document with
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wears sandals showing the motif of the obsidian snake, and his headdress is painted
with the stellar symbol, the round white spots on a black ground, which typifies the
night sky. Here also we see two bamboo staves attached to his neck—undoubtedly the
collar worn by captives or slaves which [93]rendered flight impossible, and which
Tezcatlipocâ wears to symbolize his enslavement of the Mexican people and in allusion
to his name Titlacauan, which means “He whose slaves we are.” The spear and the
net-pouch in this place recall the insignia of Mixcoatl, and seem to indicate that
Tezcatlipocâ was a god of the Chichimec or hunting folk of the North Steppes, or
perhaps it may merely symbolize the proneness of all stellar, lunar and solar deities in
Mexico to the chase.

Tonalamatl of the Aubin Collection.—In this manuscript Tezcatlipocâ appears as the

representative of the Moon-god and sits opposite the Sun-god. He is shown with his
usual attributes and face-painting, the smoking mirror in the region of the ear, the white
ring on his breast, and on his back the quetzalcomitl, the large quetzal-feather
ornament in which a banner is stuck. In his right hand he holds several of the agave-
spikes which the priests employed for piercing the tongue. In this manuscript the
Death-god is also depicted as Tezcatlipocâ, and wears his body-and-face painting and
his general insignia, as well as the rosette at the nape of the neck. In this place,
however, the snail-shaped shield rises above the forehead, which is also decorated
with a row of feather balls and a single arara plume.

(From Codex Vaticanus A, sheet 44 Verso.)

 (From Codex Magliabecchiano, sheet 3, folio 89.)

TEZCATLIPOCÂ IN VARIOUS FORMS.

Codex Magliabecchiano.—A good illustration of Tezcatlipocâ will be found on page 89

of this codex. The figure of the god is surrounded by footprints, symbolic, probably, of
the circumstance that as the youngest and swiftest of the gods he arrived first at the
teotleco festival (coming of the gods) and impressed his footprint on the heap of maize
arranged by the priests for its reception in order that they might know of his coming. He
wears a large panache of green feathers, consisting of two parts; that immediately
above the face being inserted in a tumbler-shaped ornament painted blue, with a red
rim, and having six white disks upon its field. To the lower part of this is joined a
rainbow-like device in various colours, from which springs the main part of the feather
panache. The upper fore-part of the face is painted yellow, the rear portion purple or
grey, and [94]the region about the mouth is bright red. He is bearded. The tunic is white,
with a white shoulder-knot, and a bunch of maize springs from the right shoulder. On
the breast is the god’s mirror, and at the waist an ornament or symbol resembling the
Maya Kin (sun) sign, painted blue. The rest of the body-colour is purple-grey. In the left
hand he carries an atlatl, or spear-thrower, with a serpent’s head having a brown mane,
and bearing a resemblance to some horse-like ornamental motifs found in Guatemala.
In the right hand he bears a shield, the field of which is divided into two parts, the right
painted blue and bearing what would seem to be the nose-ornament of the pulque-
gods, whilst the left resembles the design found on the skirt of the Earth-goddess. The
shield is crossed behind by four darts and is surmounted by a befeathered banner. In
this place Tezcatlipocâ is undoubtedly represented in his variant of “the young warrior,”
as his equipment shows.

Sahagun MS. (Biblioteca del Palacio).—The god’s feather crown is set with obsidian
knives. His face is barred with horizontal lines of black, and on his back he carries a
basket filled with quetzal-feathers. His arm-ring is set with obsidian knives, and one-half
of his leg is painted black. On his legs and feet he wears shells and sandals, the latter
the so-called “obsidian sandals,” painted with a picture of the obsidian snake. His arms
are covered with paper fans. His shield is inlaid with feather balls, and in one of his
hands he holds the “seeing” or scrying implement tlachialoni.

Acosta, describing Tezcatlipocâ, says 42: “They called this idol Tezcallipuca, he was
made of black, shining stone like to Jayel, being attired with some Gentile devises after
their manner. It had ear-rings of gold and silver, and through the nether lip a small
canon of christall, in length half a foote, in the which they sometimes put a greene
feather, and sometimes an azure, which made it resemble sometimes an emerald and
sometimes a turquois. It had the haire broided and bound up with a haire-lace of gold
burnished, [95]at the end whereof did hang an eare of gold, with two fire-brands of
smoke painted therein which did signify the praires of the afflicted and sinners that he
heard, when they recommended themselves to him. Betwixt the two eares hanged a
number of small herons. He had a jewell hanging at his neck so great that it covered all
his stomake. Upon his armes bracelets of gold, upon his navill a rich, green stone, and
in his left hand a fanne of precious feathers, of greene, azure and yellow, which came
forth of a looking-glasse of gold, shining and well-burnished, and that signified, that
within this looking-glasse he saw whatever was done in the world. They called this
glasse or chaston of gold irlacheaya, 43 which signifies his glass for to look in. In his
right hand he held foure darts which signified the chastisement he gave to the wicked
for their sins.… They held this idoll Tescatlipuca for the god of drought, of famine,
barrenness and pestilence. And therefore they painted him in another form, being set in
great majesty upon a stoole, compassed in with a red curtin, painted and wrought with
the heads and bones of dead men. In the left hand it had a target with five pines, like
unto pine apples of cotton, and in the right a little dart with a threatening countenance,
and the arm stretched out as if he would cast it and from the target came foure darts. It
had the countenance of an angry man and in choller, the body all painted blacke and
the head full of quailes feathers.”
Bernal Diaz says of him (bk. vi. c. 91): “Then we saw on the other side on the left hand
there stood the other great image the same height as Huichilobos, and it had a face
like a bear 44 and eyes that shone, made of their mirrors which they call Tezcat, and the
body plastered with precious stones like that of Huichilobos, for they say that the two
are brothers; and this Tezcatepuca was the god of Hell and had charge of the souls of
the Mexicans, and his body was girt with figures like little devils with snakes’ tails.”

Face-mask.—When Cortéz landed at Vera Cruz, the [96]messengers of Motecuhzoma

tendered him, along with other presents, “the ornaments or finery with which
Tezcatlipocâ was decorated.” The mask belonging to this costume is still in existence,
and is to be seen in the room devoted to American antiquities in the British Museum. It
consists of a human skull encrusted with mosaic in alternate bands of black and green,
the nasal cavity being set with a red stone and the eyes with pyrites ringed with white.

Statuette.—A statuette of Tezcatlipocâ from the Valley of Mexico, and now in the Uhde
collection, shows the god as nude, with the exception of a loin-cloth and a flat
headdress, rising in the middle.

Tezcatlipocâ in His Black and Red Forms.—Tezcatlipocâ was regarded by the Mexican
people as possessing two definite forms, the Black and the Red. In this paragraph we
will deal only with the insignia of these and not with their mythological significance,
which we will attempt to explain in its proper place. Perhaps the best and most classical
examples of these forms we possess are to be observed on sheet 21 of Codex Borgia,
on both halves of which we see the two forms represented as parallel figures, closely
resembling one another in nearly every detail. It should at once be stated that the Red
Tezcatlipocâ is merely a variant of Xipe, and indeed in one place in Codex Vaticanus B
we observe that his loin-cloth forks in the swallow-tail fashion noticeable in the loin-
cloth of that god, and, generally speaking, the red colours he wears are those of the
roseate spoon-bill, the feathers of which are typical of Xipe’s dress. These pictures in
the Codex Borgia are supplemented by two on sheets 85 and 86 of Vaticanus B, where
the swallow-tail ends of the loin-cloth and the nasal rod show distinctly that the Red
Tezcatlipocâ is only a form of Xipe. The Black Tezcatlipocâ opposite him is, however,
represented with the striped body-paint of Tlauizcalpantecutli, the arms being entirely
black. In the Borgia paintings the Black Tezcatlipocâ wears the black body-paint of the
priest, his face-paint is alternately black and yellow, he has the warrior’s tousled hair,
the nasal rod with the square plaque falling [97]over the mouth, the forked heron-feather
adornment in his hair, and on his temple the smoking mirror. The foot, too, is torn off
and replaced by a smoking mirror—all symbolical of the “standard” character of the
god’s sable form. The Red Tezcatlipocâ represented in the upper portion of Borgia
(sheet 21) has a yellow face-painting striped with horizontal bands of red and his body-
paint is red. On the red bands crossing the face is seen the stellar eye. A brown fillet
encircles a red headdress, and the torn-off foot is also replaced by the smoking mirror.
On his back is seen the bundle of the merchant, surmounted by the arara bird, two
symbols which indicate his southern character. The representation of the Red
Tezcatlipocâ in the lower portion of sheet 21 is practically similar to this, save that he
wears feather balls and heron plumes in his headdress, is without the merchant’s pack,
and holds in one hand the jaguar-skin copal-bag of the priests and the smoking rubber
ball used as incense.

These forms of the god have been laid down in myth as distinctly separate deities,
especially in the Historia de los Mexicanos por sus Pinturas. 45

FESTIVALS

Toxcatl.—This, one of the most important of all the Mexican festivals, is described by
Sahagun substantially as follows: The fifth month called toxcatl and sometimes
tepopochuiliztli, was begun by the most solemn and famous feast of the year, in honour
of the principal Mexican god, a god known by a multitude of names and epithets,
among which were Tezcatlipocâ, Titlacaoan, Yautl, Telpuchtli, and Tlamatzincatl. A year
before this feast one of the most distinguished of the captives reserved for sacrifice
was chosen for his superior grace and personal appearance from among all his fellows,
and given in charge to the priestly functionaries called calpixques. These instructed him
with great diligence in all the arts pertaining to good breeding, [98]such as playing on
the flute, deportment, conversation, saluting those he happened to meet, the use of
straight cane tobacco-pipes and of flowers. He was attended upon by eight pages, who
were clad in the livery of the palace, and had perfect liberty to go where he pleased
night and day; while his food was so rich that, to guard against his growing too fat, it
was at times necessary to vary the diet by a purge of salt and water. Everywhere
honoured and adored as the living image and accredited representative of
Tezcatlipocâ, he went about playing on a small shrill clay flute or fife, and adorned with
rich and curious raiment furnished by the king, while all he met did him reverence,
kissing the earth. All his body and face was painted black, his long hair flowed to the
waist; his head was covered with white hens’ feathers stuck on with resin, and covered
with a garland of the flowers called izquixochitl, 46 while two strings of the same flowers
crossed his body in the fashion of cross-belts. Earrings of gold, a necklace of precious
stones, with a great dependent gem hanging to the breast, a lip-ornament (barbote) of
sea-shell, bracelets of gold above the elbow on each arm, and strings of gems called
macuextlu winding from wrist almost to elbow, were part of his ornaments. He was
covered with a rich, beautifully fringed mantle of netting, and bore on his shoulders
something like a purse made of white cloth of a span square, ornamented with tassels
and a fringe. A white maxtle of a span broad went about his loins, the two ends,
curiously wrought, falling in front almost to the knee. Little bells of gold hung upon his
feet, which were shod with painted sandals called ocelunacace.

(From Codex Borgia.) (From the Sahagun MS.)

 (Pottery figure from the
Uhde Collection.)

TEZCATLIPOCÂ.

All this was the attire he wore from the beginning of his year of preparation; but twenty
days before the coming of the festival they changed his vestments, washed away the
paint or dye from his skin, and cut down his long hair to the length, and arranged it after
the fashion, of the hair of the captains, tying it up on the crown of the head with
feathers and fringe and two gold-buttoned tassels. At the same time they married to
him four damsels, who had [99]been pampered and educated for this purpose, and who
were surnamed respectively after the four goddesses, Xochiquetzal, Xilonen,
Atlantonan, and Uixtociuatl. Five days before the great day of the feast, the day of the
feast being counted one, all the people, high and low, the king it would appear being
alone excepted, went out to celebrate with the man-god a solemn banquet and dance,
in the ward called Tecanman; the fourth day before the feast the same was done in the
ward in which was guarded the statue of Tezcatlipocâ. The little hill or island called
Tepetzinco, rising out of the waters of the Lake of Mexico, was the scene of the next
day’s solemnities; which were renewed for the last time on the next day, or that
immediately preceding the great day, on another like island called Tepelpulco, or
Tepepulco. There, with the four women who had been given to him for his consolation,
the honoured victim was put into a covered canoe usually reserved for the sole use of
the king, and he was carried across the lake to a place called Tlapitzaoayan, near the
road that goes from Yztapalapan to Chalco, at a place where was a little hill called
Acaccuilpan, or Cabaltepec. Here left him the four beautiful girls whose society for
twenty days he had enjoyed, they returning to the capital with all the people. There
accompanied him only those eight attendants who had been with him all the year.
Almost alone, done with the joys of beauty, banquet, and dance, bearing a bundle of
his flutes, he walked to a little cu, some distance from the road mentioned above, and
about a league removed from the city. He marched up the temple steps; and as he
ascended he dashed down and broke on every step one of the flutes that he had been
accustomed to play on in the days of his prosperity. He reached the top, where he was
sacrificed. From the sacrificial stone his body was not hurled down the steps, but was
carried by four men down to the tzompantli, to the place of the spitting of heads.

TEZCATLIPOCÂ.

STONE ALTAR OF SKULLS TO TEZCATLIPOCÂ CARVED IN STONE.

(Museo Naçional, Mexico.)

In this feast of toxcatl, in the cu called Uitznahuac, where the image of Uitzilopochtli
was always kept, the priests made a bust of this god out of tzoalli dough, with pieces of
[100]mizquitl 47-wood inserted by way of bones. They decorated it with his ornaments;
putting on a jacket wrought over with human bones, a mantle of very thin nequen, and
another mantle called the Tlaquaquallo, covered with rich feathers, fitting the head
below and widening out above; in the middle of this stood up a little rod, also decorated
with feathers, and sticking into the top of the rod was a flint knife half covered with
blood. The image was set on a platform made of pieces of wood resembling snakes,
and so arranged that heads and tails alternated all the way round; the whole borne by
many captains and men of war. Before this image and platform a number of strong
youths carried an enormous sheet of paper resembling pasteboard, twenty fathoms
long, one fathom broad, and a little less than an inch thick; it was supported by spear-
shafts arranged in pairs of one shaft above and one below the paper, while persons on
either side of the paper held one of these pairs in one hand. When the procession, with
dancing and singing, reached the cu to be ascended, the platform was carefully and
cautiously hoisted up by cords attached to its four corners, the image was set on a
seat, and those who carried the paper rolled it up and set down the roll before the bust
of the god. It was sunset when the image was so set up; and the following morning
everyone offered food in his own house before the image of Uitzilopochtli, incensing
also such images of the other gods as he had, and then went to offer quails’ blood
before the image set up on the cu. The king began, wringing off the heads of four
quails; the priests offered next, then all the people; the whole multitude carrying clay
fire-pans and burning copal incense of every kind, after which everyone threw his live
coals on a great hearth in the temple yard. The virgins painted their faces, put on their
heads garlands of parched maize, with strings of the same across their breasts,
decorated their arms and legs with red feathers, and carried black paper flags stuck
into split canes. The flags of the daughters of the nobles were not of paper, but of a thin
cloth called canauac, painted [101]with vertical black stripes. These girls, joining hands,
danced round the great hearth, upon or over which, on an elevated place of some kind,
there danced, giving the time and step, two men, having each a kind of pine cage
covered with paper flags on his shoulders, the strap supporting which passed, not
across the forehead—the usual way for men to carry a burden—but across the chest,
as was the fashion with women. They bore shields of paper, crumpled up like great
flowers, their heads were adorned with white feathers, their lips and part of the face
were smeared with sugar-cane juice, which produced a peculiar effect over the black
with which their faces were always painted. They carried in their hands pieces of paper
called amasmaxtli 48 and sceptres of palm-wood tipped with a black flower and having in
the lower part a ball of black feathers. In dancing they used this sceptre like a staff, and
the part by which they grasped it was wrapped round with a paper painted with black
lines. The music for the dancers was supplied by a party of unseen musicians, who
occupied one of the temple buildings, where they sat, he that played the drum in the
centre, and the performers on the other instruments about him. The men and women
danced on till night, but the strictest order and decency were preserved, and any lewd
word or look brought down swift punishment from the appointed overseers.

This feast was closed by the death of a youth who had been during the past year
dedicated to and taken care of for Uitzilopochtli, resembling in this the victim of
Tezcatlipocâ, whose companion he had indeed been, but without receiving such high
honours. This Uitzilopochtli youth was entitled Ixteocalli, 49 or Tlacauepan, or
Teicauhtzin, 50 and was held to be the image and representative of the god. When the
day of his death came the priests decorated him with papers painted over with black
circles, and put a mitre of eagles’ feathers on his head, in the midst of whose plumes
was stuck a flint knife, stained half-way up with blood and adorned with red feathers.
Tied to his shoulders by strings [102]passing across the breast was a piece of very thin
cloth, about a span square, and over it hung a little bag. Over one of his arms was
thrown a wild beast’s skin, arranged somewhat like a maniple; bells of gold jingled at
his legs as he walked or danced. There were two peculiar things connected with the
death of this youth: first, he had absolute liberty of choice regarding the hour in which
he was to die; and, second, he was not extended upon any block or altar, but when he
wished he threw himself into the arms of the priests, and had his heart so cut out. His
head was then hacked off and spitted alongside that of the Tezcatlipocâ youth, of whom
we have spoken already. In this same day the priests made little marks on children,
cutting them, with thin stone knives, in the breast, stomach, wrists, and fleshy parts of
the arms; marks, as the Spanish priests considered, by which the devil should know his
own sheep.

Teotleco.—The movable feasts sacred to Tezcatlipocâ and alluded to in the list of his
festivals are only briefly mentioned by Sahagun, and do not appear to have been of
any particular importance. As regards the Teotleco Sahagun says: “The twelfth month
was called Teotleco, which signifies the arrival of the gods. A festival was celebrated in
honour of all the gods who were said to have gone to some country, I know not where.
On the last day of the month a greater one was held, because the gods had returned.

“On the fifteenth day of this month the young boys and the servitors decked all the
altars or oratories of the gods with boughs, as well those which were in the houses as
the images which were set up by the wayside and at the cross-roads. This work was
paid for in maize. Some received a basketful, and others only a few ears.

“On the eighteenth day the ever-youthful god Tlamatzincatl, or Titlacauan, arrived. It
was said that he marched better and arrived the first because he was young and
strong. Food was offered him in his temple on that night. Everyone drank, ate, and
made merry; the old people especially celebrated the arrival of the god by drinking
wine, and it was alleged that his feet were washed by these rejoicings. [103]The last day
of the month was marked by a great festival, on account of the belief that the whole of
the gods arrived at that time. On the preceding night a quantity of flour was kneaded on
a carpet into the shape of a cheese, it being supposed that the gods would leave a
footprint thereon as a sign of their return. The chief attendant watched all night, going
to and fro to see if the impression appeared. When he at last saw it he called out, ‘The
master has arrived,’ and at once the priests of the temple began to sound the horns,
trumpets, and other musical instruments used by them. Upon hearing this noise
everyone ran forthwith to offer food in all the temples or oratories, and gave themselves
up to renewed rejoicings, to wash the feet of the gods, as we have already described.

“The next day the aged gods were said to come last, because they walked more slowly
on account of their age. On that day several captives were doomed to be burnt alive. A
great brazier was prepared; young men disguised as monsters danced round about it,
and while dancing, hurled the unhappy victims into the fire, in the manner already
explained. Other ceremonies took place which will be described in the account of this
festival.”

MYTHS

Sahagun says of Tezcatlipocâ that he was invisible and was able to penetrate into all
places, heaven, earth, and hell. The Mexicans, he says, believed that he wandered
over the earth stirring up strife and war, and setting men against one another. He also
remarks that he was the true giver of prosperity, and extremely capricious. 51

Acosta calls him the god of drought, famine, barrenness, and pestilence. 52

Clavigero alludes to him as the chief of the gods worshipped in Mexico, the god of
providence, the soul of the world, the creator of heaven and earth and master of all
things. “They represented him as young, to denote that no length of years ever
diminished his power. They believed [104]that he rewarded with various benefits the just,
and punished the wicked with diseases and other afflictions.” 53

The interpreter of Codex Telleriano-Remensis states that “Tezcatlipocâ is he who

appeared to the nation on the mountain of the mirror, as they say, and is he who
tempted Quetzalcoatl the penitent.” Elsewhere he says: “They do not here paint
Tezcatlipocâ with a foot formed of a serpent, since they say that this festival
[panquetzaliztli] relates to a time previous to his sinning while still in heaven, and that
hence happened the war in heaven, from whence wars sprung below.”

The interpreter of Codex Vaticanus A. says of him: “Tezcatlipocâ, here represented,

was one of their most potent gods. They say that he appeared in that country on the
top of a mountain called Tezcatepu, which signifies the mountain of mirrors.” Later on
he remarks that the god was sometimes painted with the feet of a man and of a cock,
“as they say his name bears allusion to this circumstance. He is clothed with a fowl,
which seems to cry in laughing accents, and when it crows, Oa, Oa, Oa, they say that it
deceived the “first woman, who committed sin, and accordingly they place him near the
goddess of pollution.”

A report on the Huaxtec territory, dated 1579, states that: “They relate another fable,
that they had two other effigies as gods, one called Ometochtli, who is the god of wine,
the other Tezcatlipocâ, which is the name of the most exalted idol worshipped by them,
and with these they had painted the figure of a woman named Hueytonantzin, that is
‘our great mother,’ because they said that she was the mother of all these gods or
demons. And those four above-mentioned male demons, they related, had killed this
great mother, founding with her the institution of human sacrifice, and taking her heart
out of her breast, and presenting it to the sun. Similarly, they related that the idol
Tezcatlipocâ had killed the god of wine with his consent and concurrence, giving out
that in this way he gave eternal life, and that if he did not die, all persons drinking wine
must die; but that the [105]death of this Ometochtli was only the sleep of one drunk, that
he afterwards recovered, and again became fresh and well.”

Tezcatlipocâ, it will be remembered, is alluded to in the cosmogonic myths of Mendieta

and Sahagun, already related in the chapter on Cosmogony. The Historia de los
Mexicanos por sus Pinturas refers to him as the creator, says that “he made the sun to
shine,” and states that he was the constellation Ursa Major, the Great Bear, which
“sank in the water.” He also made the Tazcaquavlt, or “tree of the mirror,” fashioned
four hundred men and a hundred women as food for the sun, and, along with
Quetzalcoatl, constructed “the road in the heavens, the Milky Way.”

Sahagun states 54 that after Tezcatlipocâ had succeeded in driving Quetzalcoatl from
the country, “he proceeded further guilefully to kill many Toltecs and to ally himself by
marriage with Vemac or Uemac, who was the temporal lord of the Toltecs, even as
Quetzalcoatl was the spiritual ruler of that people. To accomplish these things
Tezcatlipocâ took the appearance of a poor foreigner and presented himself naked, as
was the custom of such people, in the market-place of Tulla, selling green chilli pepper.
Now the palace of Vemac, the great king, overlooked the market-place, and he had an
only daughter, and the girl, looking by chance among the buyers and sellers, saw the
disguised god. She was smitten through with love of him, and she began to sicken.
Vemac heard of her sickness, and he inquired of the women who guarded her as to
what ailed his daughter. They told him as best they could, how for the love of a peddler
of pepper, named Toveyo, the princess had lain down to die. The king immediately sent
a crier upon the mountain Tzatzitepec to make this proclamation: ‘O Toltecs, seek me
out Toveyo that goes about selling green pepper, let him be brought before me.’ So the
people sought everywhere for the pepper vendor, but he was nowhere to be found.
Then after they could not find him, he appeared [106]of his own accord one day, at his
old place and trade in the market. He was brought before the king, who said to him:
‘Where dost thou belong to?’ and Toveyo answered, ‘I am a foreigner, come here to sell
my green pepper.’ ‘Why dost thou delay to cover thyself with breeches and a blanket?’
said Vemac. Toveyo answered that in his country such things were not in the fashion.
Vemac continued: ‘My daughter longs after thee, not willing to be comforted by any
Toltec. She is sick of love and thou must heal her.’ But Toveyo replied: ‘This thing can
in no wise be; kill me first; I desire to die, not being worthy to hear these words, who
get my living by selling green pepper.’ ‘I tell thee,’ said the king, ‘that thou must heal my
daughter of this her sickness; fear not.’ Then they took the cunning god and washed
him, and cut his hair, and dyed all his body and put breeches on him and a blanket; and
the king Vemac said, ‘Get thee in and see my daughter, there, where they guard her.’
Then the young man went in and he remained with the princess and she became
sound and well; thus Toveyo became the son-in-law of the king of Tulla.

“Then, behold, all the Toltecs, being filled with jealousy and offended, spake injurious
and insulting words against King Vemac, saying among themselves, ‘Of all the Toltecs
can there not be found a man, that this Vemac marries his daughter to a peddler?’ Now
when the king heard all the injurious and insulting words that the people spake against
him he was moved, and he spoke to the people saying, ‘Come hither, behold I have
heard all these things that ye say against me in the matter of my son-in-law Toveyo;
dissimulate then; take him deceitfully with you to the war of Cacatepec and Coatepec,
and let the enemy kill him there.’ Having heard these words, the Toltecs armed
themselves, and collected a multitude and went to the war, bringing Toveyo along.
Arrived where the fighting was to take place, they hid him with the lame and the dwarfs,
charging them, as the custom was in such cases, to watch for the enemy, while the
soldiers went on to the attack. The battle began. The Toltecs at once gave way,
treacherously [107]and guilefully deserting Toveyo and the cripples. Leaving them to be
slaughtered at their post, they returned to Tulla and told the king how they had left
Toveyo and his companions alone in the hands of the enemy. When the king heard the
treason he was glad, thinking Toveyo dead, for he was ashamed of having him for a
son-in-law. Affairs had gone otherwise, however, with Toveyo from what the plotters
supposed. On the approach of the hostile army he consoled his deformed companions,
saying: ‘Fear nothing; the enemy come against us, but I know that I shall kill them all.’
Then he rose up and went forward against them, against the men of Coatepec and
Cacatepec. He put them to flight and slew of them without number. When this came to
the ears of Vemac it weighed upon and terrified him exceedingly. He said to his Toltecs,
‘Let us now go and receive my son-in-law.’ So they all went out with King Vemac to
receive Toveyo, bearing the arms and devices called quetzalapanecayutl, and the
shields called xiuhchimali. 55 They gave these things to Toveyo, and he and his
comrades received them with dancing and the music of flutes, with triumph and
rejoicing. Furthermore, on reaching the palace of the king, plumes were put upon the
heads of the conquerors, and all the body of each of them was stained yellow, and all
the face red. This was the customary reward of those that came back victorious from
war. And King Vemac said to his son-in-law: ‘I am now satisfied with what thou hast
done, and the Toltecs are satisfied; thou hast dealt very well with our enemies, rest and
take thine ease.’ But Toveyo held his peace.

“And after this, Toveyo adorned all his body with the rich feathers called tocivitl, and
commanded the Toltecs to gather together for a festival, and sent a crier up to the top
of the mountain Tzatzitepec, to call in the strangers and the people afar off to dance
and to feast. A numberless multitude gathered to Tulla. When they were all gathered,
Toveyo led them out, young men and girls, to a place called Texcalapa, where he
himself began and led the dancing, playing [108]on a drum. He sang too, singing each
verse to the dancers, who sang it after him, though they knew not the song beforehand.
Then was to be seen a marvellous and terrible thing. A panic seized the Toltecs. There
was a gorge or ravine there, with a river rushing through it called the Texcaltlauhco. A
stone bridge led over the river. Toveyo broke down this bridge as the people fled. He
saw them tread and crush each other down, under-foot, and over into the abyss. They
that fell were turned into rocks and stones; as for those that escaped, they did not see
nor think that it was Toveyo and his sorceries had wrought this great destruction; they
were blinded by the witchcraft of the god, and out of their senses like drunken men.

“Tezcatlipocâ then proceeded to hatch further evil against the Toltecs. He took the
appearance of a certain valiant man called Teguioa, and commanded a crier to
summon all the inhabitants of Tulla and its neighbourhood to come and help at a
certain piece of work in a certain flower-garden (said to have been a garden belonging
to Quetzalcoatl). All the people gathered to the work, whereupon the disguised god fell
upon them, knocking them on the head with a hoe. Those that escaped the hoe were
trodden down and killed by their fellows in attempting to escape. A countless number
was slain. Every man that had come to the work was left lying dead among the trodden
flowers.

“And after this Tezcatlipocâ wrought another witchcraft against the Toltecs. He called
himself Tlacavepan, or Acexcoch, and came and sat down in the midst of the market-
place of Tulla having a little manikin (said to have been Uitzilopochtli) dancing upon his
hand. There was an instant uproar of all the buyers and sellers and a rush to see the
miracle. The people crushed and trod each other down, so that many were killed there;
and all this happened many times. At last the god-sorcerer cried out on one such
occasion: ‘What is this? Do you not see that you are befooled by us? Stone and kill us.’
So the people took up stones and killed the said sorcerer and his little dancing manikin.
But when the body of the sorcerer had lain in [109]the market-place for some time it
began to stink and to taint the air, and the wind of it poisoned many. Then the dead
sorcerer spake again, saying: ‘Cast this body outside the town, for many Toltecs die
because of it.’ So they prepared to cast out the body, and fastened ropes thereto and
pulled. But the ill-smelling corpse was so heavy that they could not move it. Then a
crier made a proclamation, saying: ‘Come, all ye Toltecs, and bring ropes with you, that
we may drag out and get rid of this pestilential carcass.’ All came accordingly, bringing
ropes, and the ropes were fastened to the body and all pulled. It was utterly in vain.
Rope after rope broke with a sudden snap, and those that dragged on a rope fell and
were killed when it broke. Then the dead wizard looked up and said; ‘O Toltecs, a verse
of song is needed.’ And he himself gave them a verse. They repeated the verse after
him, and, singing it, pulled all together, so that with shouts they hauled the body out of
the city, though still not without many ropes breaking and many persons being killed as
before. All this being over, those Toltecs that remained unhurt returned every man to
his place, not remembering anything of what had happened, for they were all as
drunken.

“Other signs and wonders were wrought by Tezcatlipocâ in his rôle of sorcerer. A white
bird called Iztac cuixtli was clearly seen flying over Tulla, transfixed with a dart. At night
also, the sierra called Zacatepec burned, and the flames were seen from afar. All the
people were stirred up and affrighted, saying one to another, ‘O Toltecs, it is all over
with us now; the time of the end of Tulla is come; alas for us, whither shall we go?’

“Then Tezcatlipocâ wrought another evil upon the Toltecs; he rained down stones upon
them. There fell also, at the same time, a great stone from heaven called Techcatl; and
when it fell the god-sorcerer took the appearance of an old woman, and went about
selling little banners in a place called Chapultepec Cuitlapilco, otherwise named
Uetzinco. Many then became mad and bought of these banners and went to the place
where was the stone Techcatl, and there [110]got themselves killed; and no one was
found to say so much as, ‘What is this that happens to us?’ They were all mad.

“Another woe Tezcatlipocâ brought upon the Toltecs. All their victuals suddenly became
sour, and no one was able to eat of them. The old woman, above mentioned, took up
then her abode in a place called Xochitla, and began to roast maize: and the odour of
the roasted maize reached all the cities round about. The starving people set out
immediately, and with one accord, to go where the old woman was. They reached her
instantly, for here it may be again said, that the Toltecs were exceedingly light of foot,
and arrived always immediately whithersoever they wished to go. As for the Toltecs that
gathered to the mock sorceress, not one of them escaped. She killed them every one.”

These feats of Tezcatlipocâ against the Toltecs seem to have reference to the various
species of charm wielded by the enchanter; the love-charm, the charm by music, by
disease, by destruction of victuals. The rain of stone signified barrenness, drought,
which was implied by the nature of the god, the deity of obsidian and of tempests.
For other myths regarding Tezcatlipocâ see the chapter on Cosmogony.

NATURE AND STATUS

In my opinion the early significance of Tezcatlipocâ arises out of his connection with
obsidian. This stone had an especial sanctity for the Mexicans, as it provided the
sacrificial knives employed by the priests, and we possess good evidence that stone in
its fetish form was worshipped even so late as the eighteenth century by the Nahuatl-
speaking Chotas, who comprised it in a trinity with the Dawn and the Serpent. 56 From a
passage in Acosta 57 we are justified in assuming that Tezcatlipocâ’s idol was of
obsidian, and, like the Quiche god Tohil, mentioned in the Popol Vuh, he wore sandals
of obsidian, as is witnessed by one of his representations in Codex Borbonicus, where
his footgear is painted with the zigzag line of the obsidian snake. [111]

Tezcatlipocâ was unquestionably the god of the itztli (obsidian) stone, and Seler 58 has
identified him with Iztli, the stone-knife god, the second of the lords of the night. In
certain codices, too, he is represented as having such a knife in place of a foot, and we
know that it was a fairly common practice of the Mexican artists to indicate the name or
race of an individual by drawing one of his feet in a hieroglyphical manner. 59 I believe,
too, that the net-like garment worn at times by the god above his other attire is an
adaptation of the mesh-bag in which Mexican hunters carried flints for use as spear-
and arrow-heads.

This, as well as the fact that he was the god of the sharp-cutting obsidian from which
such weapons were made, caused him to be regarded as patron deity of the wild
hunting Chichimecs of the northern steppes, a connection which is eloquent of his
erstwhile primitive character. It is clear, too, that Chalchiuhtotolin, the jewelled fowl,
which is ruler of the eighteenth day-sign, tecpatl (obsidian knife), is merely a variant of
Tezcatlipocâ. 60 [112]

But another important link connects Tezcatlipocâ with obsidian. Bernal Diaz states that
they called this “Tezcat.” From it mirrors were manufactured as divinatory media by the
wizard. Sahagun says 61 that it was known as aitztli (water obsidian), probably because
of the high polish of which it was capable. Another such stone he mentions was called
tepochtli, which I would translate “wizard stone,” and from which I think, by a process of
etymological confusion, Tezcatlipocâ received one of his minor names, Telpochtli, “the
youth.” The name of the god means “Smoking Mirror,” and Acosta 62 says that the
Mexicans called Tezcatlipocâ’s mirror irlacheaya (an obvious error for tlachialoni) “his
glass to look in,” otherwise the mirror or scrying-stone in which he was able to witness
the doings of mankind. It is possible that the “smoke” which was said to rise from this
mirror symbolized the haziness which is supposed to cloud the surface of a divinatory
glass prior to the phenomenon of vision therein.

Thus from the shape beheld in the seer’s mirror, Tezcatlipocâ came to be regarded as
the seer. That into which the wizard gazed became so closely identified with sorcery as
to be thought of as wizard-like itself; for Tezcatlipocâ is, of all Mexican deities, the one
most nearly connected with the wizard’s art. He is par excellence the nocturnal god
who haunts the crossways and appears in a myriad phantom guises to the night-bound
wayfarer. “These,” says Sahagun, “were masks that Tezcatlipocâ assumed to frighten
the people.”

He wears the symbol of night upon his forehead; he is the moon, ruler of the night, the
wizard who veils himself behind the clouds; he bears the severed arm of a woman who
has died in childbed, as a magical instrument, as did the naualli of old Mexico. From
him all ominous and uncanny sounds proceed: the howl of the jaguar (in which we
perceive Tezcatlipocâ as the wizard metamorphosed [113]into the wer-animal), and the
foreboding cry of the uactli bird, the voc, the bird of Hurakan in the Popol Vuh.

Tezcatlipocâ was undoubtedly connected with the wind, and this leads me to suspect
that in the course of his evolution he came to be thought of as among that class of
magical stones which in some mysterious manner is considered capable of raising a
tempest under the spell of the sorcerer. 63 Of such a belief world-wide examples exist. In
the Irish island of Fladdahuan such a stone was anointed when the fisher desired a
wind 64 and was kept in wool wrappings. A piece of pumice-stone drifted to Puka-Puka,
says Lang, 65 and was regarded as a god of winds and waves, to which offerings were
made during hurricanes. Tezcatlipocâ is none other than the original “hurricane,” for he
has been identified with the Hurakan of the Quiches of Guatemala alluded to in the
Popol Vuh, from whose name the meteorological expression has been borrowed.

Whether or not he came to be looked upon as the wind of night which ravined through
the empty streets and deserted countryside by virtue of the train of thought suggested
above, many aspects of Tezcatlipocâ are eloquent of his boreal attributes. Thus, he is
invisible and capricious, the object of mistrust among the people, who discerned in
tempestuous weather a manifestation of his freakish bad temper. The myth in which he
was described as pursuing Quetzalcoatl in tiger-form will, in the section which deals
with that god, be indicated as an allegory of the clashing of the hurricane with the rain-
bringing trade-wind. Lastly, as patron of war, of the warrior’s club and dance-house, he
is, as the boisterous storm, emblematic of strife and discord. Seats of stone over-
arched with green branches were provided for him throughout the city so that he might
rest from his wanderings if he thought good. [114]

In the Aztec mind stone was symbolic of sin. Thus Tezcatlipocâ in his variant,
Itzlacoliuhqui, is the just avenger, who punishes evil swiftly and terribly, for obsidian as
the sacrificial knife was the instrument of justice. 66 The coldness of stone, its hardness
and dryness, seem also to have given rise to the conception of him as god of the
Toxcatl festival in the fifth month of the year, the dry season, when the sun stood at the
zenith above Tenochtitlan. Thus, as the prayers to him eloquently affirm, he was the
god of drought, of sereness, and barrenness.

In common with the majority of the greater Mexican deities, Tezcatlipocâ had a stellar
connection. He was one of the Tzitzimimê who had fallen from heaven, and the Historia
de los Mexicanos por sus Pinturas remarks of him, “the constellation of the Great Bear
descends to the water because it is Tezcatlipocâ, who has his seat there,” thus also
indicating that he ruled the northern quarter, out of which, it was considered, no good
thing might come. His Tzitzimimê shape appears to have been the spider. In American-
Indian myth the stars are frequently regarded as having spider form, and especially so
in Mexican myth. In several of the codices, notably in Codex Borbonicus, the
Tzitzimimê or star-demons are represented in insect shape. Thus, Tezcatlipocâ, when
he descended from heaven to harass Quetzalcoatl, did so by means of a spider’s web,
so that we are justified in regarding the spider as his stellar form.

The origin of his conception as the sun of the north and as the setting sun seems
reasonably clear and is secondary in character. As the sun sinks in the west its brilliant
gold turns to a glassy red, reminiscent of the dull reflex of light in a surface of polished
obsidian. The mirror held by Tezcatlipocâ, with its fringe of feathers, obviously
represents the sun of evening. But he is also to be thought of as the torrid and blazing
orb of the dry season, scorching and merciless.

I regard his several coloured forms as symbolic of various [115]kinds of weather. Thus,
in his black form he appears to represent the rainy season; in his red, the torrid and dry
period of the year; in his white, cold and frost; and in his striped painting, the
embodiment of fair weather. Thus Tezcatlipocâ is the atmospheric god par excellence,
ruler of all meteorological conditions. In the prayers offered up to him it is frequently
stated that he may, if he so chooses, send rain and plenty, and this aspect of him
seems to account for his variously coloured disguises. That these were, indeed,
regarded as practically separate divine forms is clear from the first chapter of the
Historia de los Mexicanos por sus Pinturas, which alludes to the Black and Red
Tezcatlipocâ as two entirely different gods.

Tezcatlipocâ, at the period of the Conquest, had developed attributes of a more lofty
kind than any of those already described. Like Quetzalcoatl, and because he was a
god of the wind or atmosphere, he came to be regarded as the personification of the
breath of life. In the mind of savage man the wind is usually the giver of breath, the
great store-house of respiration, the source of immediate life. In many mythologies the
name of the principal deity is synonymous with that for wind, and in others the words
“soul” and “breath” have a common origin. It has been suggested that the Hebrew
Jahveh (the archaic form of Jehovah) is connected with the Arabic hawah, to blow or
breathe, and that Jahveh was originally a wind or tempest god.

Our word “spiritual” is derived from the Latin spirare, to blow; the Latin animus, “spirit,”
is the same word as the Greek anemos, “wind,” and psukhe has a similar origin. All are
directly evolved from verbal roots expressing the motion of the wind or the breath. The
Hebrew word ruah is equivalent to both “wind” and “spirit,” as is the Egyptian kneph. If
we turn to the American mythologies, nija in the language of the Dakota means
“breath,” or “life”; in Netela piuts is “life,” “breath,” and “soul”; the Yakuna language of
Oregon has wkrisha, “wind,” wkrish­mit, “life.” The Creeks applied to their supreme deity
the [116]name Esaugetuh Emissee, Master of Breath, 67 and the original name for God in
Choctaw was Hustoli, the Storm Wind. “In the identity of wind with breath, of breath
with life, of life with soul, of soul with God, lies the far deeper and truer reason,” says
Brinton, “of the prominence given to wind-gods in many mythologies.” 68

But although Tezcatlipocâ was the Giver of Life, he was also regarded as a deity with
power to take it away. In fact at times he appeared as an inexorable death-dealer, and
in this guise he was named Nezahualpilli (“The Hungry Chief”) and Yaotzin (“The
Enemy”). But he was also known as Telpochtli (“The Youthful Warrior”), from the fact
that his reserve of strength, his vital force, never grew less and was boisterously
apparent, as in the tempest. As the wind at night rushes through the roads with more
seeming violence than it does by day, so was Tezcatlipocâ pictured in the Aztec
consciousness as rioting along the highways in search of slaughter. Indeed, seats or
benches of stone, shaped like those used by the chiefs of the Mexican towns, were
placed at intervals on the roads for his use, and here he was supposed to lurk,
concealed by the green boughs which surrounded them, in wait for his victims. Should
anyone grapple with and overcome him, he might crave whatsoever boon he desired,
with the surety of its being granted. The worship of Tezcatlipocâ previous to the
Conquest had so advanced, and so powerful had his cult become, that it would appear
as if the movement would ultimately have led to a monotheism or worship of one god
equivalent to that of the cult of Jahveh, the God of the Old Testament among the
ancient Hebrews. To his priestly caste is credited the invention of many of the usages
of civilized life, and it succeeded in making his worship universal. The Nahua people
regarded the other gods as objects of special devotion, but the worship of Tezcatlipocâ
was general. [117]

[Contents]
QUETZALCOATL = “FEATHERED SERPENT”

Area of Worship: The Plateau of Anahuac.

Minor Names:
Chicunaui eecatl—“Nine Wind.”
Ce acatl—“One Reed.”
Relationship: Son of Iztacmixcoatl and Chimalman or Xochiquetzal; one of the
Tzitzimimê.
Calendar Place:
Ruler of the second day-count, eecatl.
Ruler of the second week, ce ocelotl.
Ninth of the thirteen day-lords.
Festivals:
Ce acatl (movable feast).
Atlacahualco.
Compass Direction: East.

ASPECT AND INSIGNIA

General.—The insignia of Quetzalcoatl is fairly constant in its appearance. He usually

wears the Huaxtec cone-shaped hat painted in the design of the jaguar-skin, which is
occasionally divided vertically into a black or blue and a red field, having an eye in the
middle. The hair is bound by a leather strap set with jewels, which has a conventional
bird’s head on the front, and in Codex Borgia consistently shows a black, stepped
pattern on a white ground. Elsewhere a bow with rounded ends takes the place of this
strap, but in Borgia (sheet 62) the hair is bound up with two intertwined snakes. At the
back of the neck a fan-shaped nape-ornament is usually seen, consisting of black
feathers, from which rise the red plumes of the quetzal bird, and it seems, from the
account of the costume sent to Cortéz by Motecuhzoma, that this nape-appendage
was made from grouse-feathers, although the Spanish account states that they
belonged to the crow. The god usually wears white ear-pendants of hook-like shape,
which, Sahagun states, were made of gold. The necklace is of spirally voluted snail-
shells, and on the breast is worn a large ornament, also sliced from a shell. The ends
of the loin-cloth are rounded off and are generally painted in two colours—brown, the
colour [118]of the jaguar-skin, and white or red. The god’s atlatl, or spear-thrower, is
painted with the stellar design of white circles on a black ground, and in his headdress
is stuck the agave-leaf spike and the bone dagger, the implements of penance and
mortification. The body-paint is frequently black, like that of the priests. Most of these
insignia are of Huaxtec origin and show that Quetzalcoatl was usually associated with
this coastal people. The snail-shell ornament on the breast, the hook-shaped ear-
pendant, the fan-shaped nape-ornament, and the cone-shaped cap, were undoubtedly
of Huaxtec origin, and such objects have been taken from Huaxtec graves and are
found represented on vases and jugs from the State of Hidalgo. In many
representations of him the god is seen wearing a long-snouted mask, usually painted a
bright red, through which he was supposed to expel the wind in his guise of Eecatl, the
Wind-god. This mask is frequently fringed with a beard.

FORMS OF QUETZALCOATL.

Quetzalcoatl (right) and Tlauizcalpantecutli. (Codex Borgia, sheet 19.)

Codex Vaticanus B.—Sheet 75: Quetzalcoatl’s body-paint is a dark colour, and in his
hair he wears unspun cotton, as does Tlazoltcotl. Sheet 76: Here his face is painted
black and he wears the fillet with the step-pattern and the two-coloured cap, and in his
hair are stuck the instruments of mortification. He holds in his hand a snake, which is to
be regarded as the agricultural implement with which he tills the ground.

Codex Borgia.—Sheet 73: In this place he is set back to back with the Death-god and
is surrounded by the twenty day-signs. The body-paint is light blue, and the anterior
part of the face has the stellar painting of white circles on a black ground. His conical
cap has the parti-coloured painting and the cross, the symbol of the four winds, in the
middle. On his breast he wears the snail-shell and in his hand a blue staff. His wind-
mask is entirely covered with stellar and lunar emblems. His rattle-staff is light blue, in
contradistinction to that of the Death-god, which is sprinkled with blood. Sheet 56: Here
he is equipped with the hoe and wears the body-paint of a priest, a necklace of jaguar-
skin and teeth, the conical bi-coloured cap, the [119]stepped fillet with conventional
bird’s head in front, and the bearded face-mask. Stellar symbols and feather-balls dot
his dress and headdress. He stands back to back with the Death-god, and it is clear
that here he is intended to represent the heavenly Quetzalcoatl, the giver of breath and
life. On sheet 72 we see him as a priest surrounded by day-signs and implements of
mortification. Sheet 19: As represented in this sheet he stands opposite the Death-god.
He wears a dark-coloured garment, and what can be seen of his face is painted black,
with a spiral pattern. His mantle bears the cross-hatchings indicative of rain or water
and is ornamented with feather balls. The red wind-mask protrudes beneath a parti-
coloured cap with stellar eyes, and a fillet with step-pattern and conventional bird’s
head, and he wears the snail-shell breast ornament and carries the implements of
mortification. Sheet 16: On the lower right-hand corner of this sheet he is depicted in a
precisely similar manner.

FORMS OF QUETZALCOATL.

Quetzalcoatl (right) and the Death-god. (Codex Vaticanus, 3773, sheet 76.)

Quetzalcoatl’s Dress sent to Cortéz.—When Cortéz landed at Vera Cruz,

Motecuhzoma, believing him to be the god Quetzalcoatl returned, sent him “the dress
that was appropriate to him.” 69 This consisted of four costumes, that of Quetzalcoatl
proper, and those of Tezcatlipocâ, Tlaloc, and Xiuhtecutli, the Fire-god, who were
regarded as the four deities dominant in the four quarters of the heavens, and had in
the higher theology become fused in the conception of Quetzalcoatl, or were regarded
as variants of him. The Quetzalcoatl dress proper is said by Sahagun to have consisted
of the turquoise snake-mask, now to be seen in the British Museum, and which can be
easily identified by the folds of the snake’s body forming the eyebrows, the quetzal-
feather adornment, and the turquoise throwing-stick, shaped in the form of a snake. It
seems probable, however, that this dress, although it is described as that of
Quetzalcoatl, was that associated with the Fire-god.

Codex Magliabecchiano.—Sheet 89: Quetzalcoatl is here represented in a dancing

attitude. He wears the Huaxtec [120]hat made of jaguar-skin, the shield with the snail-
shell ornament, which is also reproduced on his breast, and the yellow and red face-
painting. The bone “reed” for piercing the tongue is stuck in his headgear, and from it
depend balls of cotton. He carries an atlatl, or spear-thrower, symbolic of rain or wind,
and similar in motif to the nose-ornament of the Maya God B. His mantle is cross-
hatched to symbolize rain or water and is decorated with red bows. He wears anklets of
jaguar-skin, and a panache of green and yellow feathers.

Quetzalcoatl. (From the

Sahagun MS.)
 Pottery figure of Quetzalcoatl from
Tezcuco.

FORMS OF QUETZALCOATL.

Sahagun MS. (Biblioteca del Palacio).—In the illustration which accompanies his
description in this MS. he wears a pointed cap of jaguar-skin, surmounted by quetzal-
plumes. The face and body are painted black with soot, and a curved band falls from
beneath the hat to the neck. He wears the golden “water-snake” collar, and on his back
the wing of the red guacamayo. Over the hips is slung a cloth with a red border. He
wears white sandals, and pieces of jaguar-skin are fastened over the foot. On his
shield he has the shell which is typical of him, and in his hand a staff with a motif like
that of the nose of the Maya God B. Sahagun says of him: “His image was always in a
recumbent position and covered with blankets. The face of it was very ugly, the head
large and furnished with a long beard.” 70

Torquemada states that Quetzalcoatl was a white man, large-bodied, broad-browed,

great-eyed, with long black hair and a beard heavy and rounded. 71

Acosta says of Quetzalcoatl’s image at Cholula: “They called it Quetzallcoalt. This idoll
was in a great place in a temple very high. It had about it gold, silver, jewels, very rich
feathers, and habits of divers colours. It had the forme of a man, but the visage of a
little bird with a red bill, and above a combe full of warts, having ranks of teeth and the
tongue hanging out. It carried upon the head a pointed myter of painted paper, a sithe
in the hand, and many toyes of gold on the legs, with a thousand other foolish
inventions, whereof all had their significations.” 72 [121]

Elsewhere Acosta says: “The greatest idoll of all their gods was called
Quezcalcovately.… He never ware but one garment of cotton, which was white, narrow
and long, and upon that a mantle beset with certain red crosses. They have certain
green stones which were his, and those they keep for relickes. One of them is like an
ape’s head.”

Anales de Quauhtitlan.—In this work Quetzalcoatl is described as wearing the

turquoise snake-mask and the quetzal-feather ornament—that is, the decorations of
the Fire-god: “Lastly in the year one reed they say, when he had arrived on the shore of
the sea, then he began to weep and put off the garb with which he was arrayed, his
quetzal-feather ornament, his turquoise mask.”

QUETZALCOATL.

(From a wall-painting at Mitla.)

 TONACATECUTLI-TONACACIUATL.

(From Codex Borgia.)

STATUARY

A statuette of the god from the Valley of Mexico exhibits him in a high cap, ornamented
round the lower portion with a serpentine motif, and wearing the sliced snail-shell
dress-ornament. A caryatid found in the Calle de las Escalerillas, Mexico City, on the
16th of October 1900, represents him with a long, pointed beard, which might,
however, be interpreted as the mouth-mask of the Wind-god lowered down to show the
upper part of the face more clearly, and it would seem from this statue that the beard
with which Quetzalcoatl is represented in some places in Mexican art is nothing more
or less than the mouth-mask pushed down over the chin and neck, although it must be
admitted that his mask is frequently depicted with what is undoubtedly a beard. A relief
excavated at the Castillo de Teayo shows Quetzalcoatl wearing the feathered-serpent
helmet-mask, which in this representation is most elaborate, and the sliced snail-shell
dress-ornament. Two figures of Quetzalcoatl found near Texcuco exhibit considerable
differentiation from other forms. In both he is seated on the top of a teocalli or temple,
and behind him is seen the solar emblem, represented as a large, flaming disc. He
wears a high cap which reminds one of the crown of Upper Egypt, as seen in Egyptian
representations, except that it is flanked on either side by two large [122]studs or knobs
and is surrounded at the base by the serpent-motif, as in the specimen from the Valley
of Mexico. He also wears his usual breast-ornament. In a round sculpture found at
Puebla we perhaps see Quetzalcoatl as a butterfly, and can only identify this figure as
the god because of the wind-mask it wears.
WALL-PAINTINGS

In several of the wall-paintings at Mitla, and especially in those on the north side of
Palace I, Quetzalcoatl is depicted as wearing the insignia usually connected with him in
Mexico. In one of these he wears the Huaxtec cap with jaguar-skin markings, having
the sacrificial implements stuck in it, and the wind-mouth mask, with beard. The snail-
shell ornament adorns his shield. In another the facial insignia is less easily seen, but
the large nape-fan with which he is frequently adorned is well depicted. Immediately
behind this is a figure, which, though partially destroyed, is still interesting because of
its high degree of conventionality. We have here the cap and panache of Quetzalcoatl,
together with the strip running from brow to eye and from eye to jaw, which is part of
the face-painting of the Moon-god. Moreover, in the corner we have the symbol of the
moon, a pot-shaped bone, so that here, I think, we have a symbol of Quetzalcoatl as
the Moon-god. In the preceding figure, too, we have also the lunar emblem, in this
place in shape like the nose-plug of the octli-gods, but containing the stellar eye, and
flanked by balls of feather-down. It would thus seem that the symbol has some
reference to Quetzalcoatl in his variant of the planet Venus. Moreover the eye appears
as gouged out. This eye-gouging is seen in the Maya Books of Chilan Balam, in the
case of the god Itzamná. These two latter paintings, Seler thinks, are symbolic of the
Uiyatao, or the high-priests of Mitla, who were regarded as incarnations of
Quetzalcoatl. 73 [123]

MYTHS

The myths concerning Quetzalcoatl are numerous and conflicting. In the first place I
shall provide a careful précis of the more important, their prolixity rendering full
quotation impossible.

Sahagun’s account of Quetzalcoatl may be summarized as follows: The arts had their
inception with Quetzalcoatl. His houses were made of chalchiuites, silver, white, and
red shells, and rich feathers. His folk were nimble and swift in passage from one place
to another, and were called tlanquace­milhiyme. 74 He gave his commands to the people
for a hundred leagues round by means of a crier stationed on the mountain
Tzotzitepetl. 75 He had wealth in abundance, provision in plenty, and in his time maize
was so large in the head that a man might not carry more than one stalk in his clasped
arms. Pumpkins were in circumference as great as a man is high, and the stalks of the
wild amaranth grew like trees. Cotton grew in all colours—red, scarlet, yellow, violet,
white, green, blue, black, grey, orange, and tawny. In the city of Tollan, where
Quetzalcoatl dwelt, were many birds of rich plumage and sweet song. The servants of
Quetzalcoatl were wealthy and had abundance of all things, and food was plentiful with
them. Their master did penance by pricking his legs and drawing blood with the spines
of the maguey and by washing at midnight in a fountain. But sorcerers came against
Quetzalcoatl and his people, the Toltecs, and these, we are told, were the gods
Tezcatlipocâ, Uitzilopochtli, and Tlacuepan. Tezcatlipocâ visited the house of
Quetzalcoatl in the guise of an old man, but was told that he was sick, and was at first
refused entrance. Later, however, he was admitted, Quetzalcoatl observing that he had
waited for him for many days. Tezcatlipocâ then produced a draught of medicine which,
he assured the sick king, would intoxicate him, ease his heart, and carry his thoughts
away from the trials and fatigues of death and departure. 76 This [124]latter phrase
roused Quetzalcoatl to ask where he must go, for that he had a premonition of
departure seems clear. “To Tollantlapallan,” replied Tezcatlipocâ, “where another old
man awaits thee. He and you shall speak together, and on thy return thou shalt be as a
youth, yea as a boy.” With little goodwill Quetzalcoatl quaffed the medicine, and having
once tasted of it he drank more deeply, so that at last he became intoxicated and
maudlin. That which he had drunk was the wine made from the maguey-plant, called
teoncetl (“drink of the gods”). And so great a longing to depart came upon him that at
length he arose and went from Tollan. 77 Ere departing, Quetzalcoatl burned his houses
of shells and silver and buried many precious things in the mountains and ravines. He
turned the cocoa-trees into mezquites and dispatched all the birds of brilliant plumage
in Anahuac, three hundred miles away. On his journey to the coast he came to the hill
Quauhtitlan, where he found a great tree, under which he rested. Gazing into a mirror,
as he reclined under its shade, he said, “I am very old,” named the place
Ueuequauhtitlan after his saying, 78 and stoned the tree. The stones he cast at it sank
into its trunk, and were to be seen remaining there for long afterwards. Preceded by
flute-players, he recommenced his journey, but once more became weary, and rested
on a stone by the wayside. Looking towards Tollan, he wept, and his tears pitted the
stone on which he sat, and the imprints of his hands and thighs also remained thereon.
That place he called Temacpalco. Reaching a great river, he halted until a stone bridge
was built over it, and having crossed, he called the place Tepanaoya. Certain sorcerers
now met him, and asked him whither he was bound, why he had left his city of Tollan,
and who would now do penance there. Quetzalcoatl replied that he must go, that he
was called to Tlapallan by the Sun. The sorcerers requested him to leave behind his
knowledge of the mechanical arts, the smelting of silver, the working [125]of precious
stones, and masonry, painting, and feather-work. These he left with them perforce. But
his treasure of jewels he cast into the fountain of Cozcaapan hard by. Another magician
whom he met insisted upon his drinking a draught which he could give “to none of the
living.” Intoxicated, he slept, and when he awoke, tore his hair. That place was called
Cachtoca. Pursuing his journey, he passed between a mountain of snow and a
volcano, where his hump-backed and dwarfish servants perished from the excessive
cold. Bitterly he bewailed their death in song. Passing on, leaving signs of his progress
on every hand, and sliding down the mountains, he tarried here and there, building a
tlachtli court at one place, the markings of which were visible in deep gashes on the
hills. Once he transfixed a tree with a dart or with another tree, so that it resembled a
cross. In other localities he constructed subterranean houses (mictlan­calco), and
elsewhere balanced a great rolling-stone, and on all these spots he conferred names.
At length he came to the sea-shore, where he commanded that a raft of snakes
(coatapochtli) should be constructed for him. In this he seated himself as in a canoe,
put out to sea, and set out for Tlapallan. 79

Torquemada’s account of the Quetzalcoatl myth somewhat resembles that of Sahagun,

due, no doubt, to the circumstance that he had access to the unpublished MS. of that
author, from which he borrowed in a wholesale manner. The points of difference are
these: Quetzalcoatl was high-priest of Tollan, whence he migrated to Cholula. The ruler
of Tollan was one Huemac, but Quetzalcoatl was its chief in spiritual and ecclesiastical
matters. In drinking the magic potion of Tezcatlipocâ, Quetzalcoatl desired to render
himself immortal. He left the impress of his body on a stone situated on a mountain
near the city of Tlalnepantla (or Temacpalco), two leagues from Mexico, as the natives
declared to Torquemada himself. Met by the sorcerers Tezcatlipocâ and the others who
tried to hinder his going, he refused to stay his progress, and said that he must pass on
to the sun-land. [126]Father Sahagun, remarks Torquemada, when at Xochimilco, was
asked by the natives, who were keenly desirous of knowledge on the point, where
Tlapallan was, and replied that he did not know, as he had then not been long among
them. The fountain in which Quetzalcoatl cast his jewels was now called Coaapan, “in
the snake-water.” He then passed on to Cholula, where he was adored as a god. When
he had resided there for twenty years, he was expelled by Tezcatlipocâ. Setting out
once more for Tlapallan, accompanied by four virtuous youths, he embarked at
Coatzacoalco. Bidding farewell to his disciples, he assured them that at a future time
there would come by way of the sea, where the sun rises, certain white men with white
beards, like him, and that these would be his brothers and would rule the land. These
disciples became the rulers of the four provinces of Cholula. Quetzalcoatl was god of
the air, and during his life on earth was devoted to the careful observance of the older
forms of worship, but instituted many new rites, ceremonies, and festivals and made
the calendar. Barren women prayed to him. He swept the road, so that the Tlaloque
might rain. For a month or so before the rainy season stormy winds blew throughout
New Spain. The Cholulans preserved as relics green stones that had belonged to him,
on one of which was carved a monkey’s head. A great temple to him was founded at
Cholula. 80

Elsewhere Torquemada descants on the Quetzalcoatl myth as follows: A body of men

came from the north by way of Panuco, dressed in long robes of black linen, cut low at
the neck, with short sleeves. They came to Tollan, but finding the country there too
thickly peopled, passed on to Cholula, where they were well received. Their chief was
Quetzalcoatl, a man with ruddy complexion and long beard. These people multiplied
and sent colonists to the Mixtec and Zapotec countries, raising the great buildings at
Mitla. They were cunning handicraftsmen, not so good at masonry as at jewellers’
work, sculpture, and agriculture. Tezcatlipocâ and Huemac conceived an enmity to
Quetzalcoatl, and as [127]he did not wish to go to war with them, he and his folk
removed to Onohualco (Yucatan, Tabasco, and Campeche). 81

Motolinia says of Quetzalcoatl that when Iztacmixcoatl, the Mexican Adam, married his
second wife Chimalmat, she bore him Quetzalcoatl, who grew up chaste and
temperate. He instituted fasting and mortification, and never married. He founded the
custom of drawing blood from the ears and tongue in penitence. A certain
Chichemecatl fastened a leather strap to his arm, near the shoulder, and from that time
this Chichemecatl was known as Acolhuatl, and became the ancestor of the Colhua.
Quetzalcoatl was god of the air and many temples were raised to him. 82

Mendieta has much to say of Quetzalcoatl, but in a synopsis of his account we retain
only such circumstances as have not been already alluded to: Many different traditions
regarding Quetzalcoatl existed, some saying that he was the son of Camacotli
(Camaxtli), god of hunting and fishing, and of his wife Chimialuna; others that
Chimialuna, when sweeping one day, found a chalchihuitl stone, by virtue of which she
became miraculously pregnant and gave birth to Quetzalcoatl, who came either from
Tollan or Yucatan. The people came to love him, not only because he taught them
handicrafts, and desired no offerings but those of bread, flowers, and perfumes. He
forbade all war and disturbance. Pilgrims came to his shrine at Cholula from all parts of
Mexico, even the enemies of Cholula, and the lords of distant lands built them chapels
and idols there. Among all the gods only Quetzalcoatl was called Lord, and men swore
by him. The gods thought it well that the people should have some means of writing by
which they might direct themselves, and two of their number, Oxomoco and Cipactonal,
who dwelt in a cave in Cuernavaca, especially considered the matter. Cipactonal
thought that her descendant Quetzalcoatl should be consulted, and she called him into
counsel. He, too, thought the idea of a calendar good, and the two addressed
themselves to the task of making the tonalamatl. To Cipactonal was given the privilege
of choosing [128]and writing the first sign. She painted the cipactli animal, and called the
sign ce cipactli (“one cipactli”). Oxmoco then wrote ome acatl (“two cane”), and
Quetzalcoatl “three house,” and so on, until the thirteen signs were completed. 83

Another form of the Quetzalcoatl myth given by Mendieta is in substance as follows:

Tezcatlipocâ let himself down from the upper regions by means of a spider’s web, and
coming to Tollan engaged in a game of tlachtli (the native ball game) with Quetzalcoatl,
in the midst of which he transformed himself into a tiger. Those who watched the game
were panic-stricken, and cast themselves pell-mell into a ravine, and were drowned in a
river which flowed therein. Tezcatlipocâ then harassed Quetzalcoatl from city to city,