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SUBHUM AN
 SUBHUM AN

The Moral Psychology of Human Attitudes to Animals

T. J. Kasperbauer

1
 3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​069581–​1

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For the bonobos of Iowa, who first made me
wonder what it means to be human.
 CONTENTS

1. Introduction 1
2. Evolved Attitudes to Animals 13
3. Dehumanizing Animals 39
4. Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals 63
5. Diagnosing Moral Failures 85
6. Psychological Plausibility for Animal Ethics 113
7. Animals and the Expanding Moral Circle 138
8. Managing Moral Psychology for Animal Ethics 173

Acknowledgments 197
References 199
Index 229
SUBHUM AN
 Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 COMPARING HUMANS AND NON-​H UMANS

Our identity as human beings is in many ways dependent on our con-

ception of ourselves as different from animals. Some have even claimed
that, across cultures and languages, we have arrived on the same meaning
of “animal”: not human (Russell, 2011, p. 4). Our attitudes toward ani-
mals have been formed by a history in which 1) we hunted them; 2) they
hunted us; 3) we kept them for food, labor, and other useful products;
and 4) we kept them for companionship. But we didn’t just establish cri-
teria for what made something an animal to help make our terminology
or practices around animals clearer. We designated certain creatures as
animals because doing so helped us think about ourselves and our place
in the world.
This book is about the moral psychology that arises out of our com-
parative relationship with animals. Across the cognitive sciences, there
are many accounts of the behavior and psychology of animals themselves.
One can also find well-​developed ethical theories for how we ought to
think about our treatment of animals. But there is strikingly little about
how we actually think about animals and specifically what determines our
moral evaluations of them.
The basic thesis I advance is that our attitudes to animals, both pos-
itive and negative, are largely a result of their role as a contrast class to
human beings. To make my case, I draw from research on what is known
as “dehumanization.” Much of the literature on dehumanization focuses
on the negative effects for humans when they are compared to other ani-
mals (for reviews, see Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014; Haslam et al., 2012;

1
 S u b human

Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). For instance, to justify cruel treatment the
Nazis compared Jews to rats, and black slaves in America were compared
to apes. However, many of the processes used on human beings to make
them seem unworthy of dignity and respect are also used on animals. The
processes at work when we demean other human beings by comparing
them to animals are also at work in our everyday evaluations of animals.
Understanding the influence of dehumanization on our attitudes
toward animals is important for making sense of apparent contradictions
in human–​animal relationships. Many of the animals we love become
targets of abuse, and many that we fear are nonetheless revered and hold
great cultural importance. We also spend significant resources in caring
for animals just to eat them. Why is this? Are we just confused? Or cruel?
Dehumanization research offers an explanation that is not rooted in inher-
ent kindness or cruelty, nor stupidity or confusion. Rather, dehumaniza-
tion suggests that we are fundamentally motivated to compare ourselves
to animals and find a way to view ourselves as superior.
By “animal” in this book I am referring broadly to any member of the
kingdom Animalia. Many different types of animals possess properties
capable of triggering a dehumanization response. Some animals, however,
are more relevant than others to the psychological processes I aim to illumi-
nate. Understanding moral attitudes toward animals is strongly dependent
on people’s concepts about animals, and concepts are notoriously varied
and resistant to definitions (Prinz, 2002; Machery, 2009). For instance, in
­chapter 2, I discuss animals that pose threats as predators and as sources
of disease, but some animals are seen as more threatening in these respects
than others. So although I aim to capture any member of Animalia in my
account, some animals better characterize dehumanization attitudes than
others. As we go along, I will make it clear which animals I have in mind
and how I envision their role in human moral psychology.
The idea that we use non-​humans for comparative purposes is not
new. Within anthropology, for instance, this comparative relationship
is the standard way of conceptualizing human attitudes toward animals.
Many draw from Lévi-​Strauss’ (1963) observation that animals are “good
to think with.” This idea is also not new to philosophy. Dennis Des Chene
(2006), for instance, characterizes the concept “animal” in the history
of philosophy as “charged not only with designating a class of creatures,

2
 I n t roduc t ion

real and imagined, but also with supplying a contrast case to the human”
(p. 216). This aptly describes the phenomenon explored throughout
this book.
My primary source, however, is recent research in social psychol-
ogy, where interest in human–​animal relations has been steadily increas-
ing (Amiot & Bastian, 2015; Herzog, 2010). Though psychologists have
begun investigating the theoretical foundations of dehumanization in
greater detail (Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014), relatively little attention has
been paid to the role of animals. And no philosophers have contributed to
theoretical work in this area. My aim is to fill this gap in the psychological
and philosophical literature on dehumanization and help make sense of
our occasionally puzzling attitudes toward animals.

1.1.1 Dehumanization and Infrahumanization

Dehumanization research tends to focus on the psychology of ingroup/​
outgroup relations. People who are seen as members of an outgroup are
often dehumanized, and conversely, the act of dehumanizing others typ-
ically consists of attributing outgroup characteristics to them. One of the
main proposals of this book, developed in c­ hapter 3, is that a particular
type of ingroup/​outgroup psychology characterizes how dehumanization
processes are applied to animals.
Dehumanization consists of two closely related processes. The first
explicitly identifies other people (or other groups of people) as non-​
human, while the other identifies other people (or groups of people) as
inferior human beings. This second process is known as “infrahumaniza-
tion.” In ­chapter 3 I suggest that infrahumanization provides the key to
understanding human attitudes to animals. Though this proposal may at
first appear counterintuitive, it is well supported by the empirical evidence.
Infrahumanization consists of both negative and positive evaluations
of animals. First, the negative. Central to our comparative relationship
with animals is a negative judgment that animals are members of an out-
group (or multiple outgroups) and should be avoided. The strength of this
aversion varies by species and is influenced by a number of factors, but
the evidence indicates that this is a categorical response in human psy-
chology. Any animal elicits this response to some degree. As we will see in

3
 S u b human

c­ hapter 2, this response is partly an adaptation to evolutionary pressures.

As both predators and prey, animals elicited antagonistic responses in our
evolutionary ancestors. This response has been co-​opted by other aversive
responses to animals, such that animals are seen as presenting a broader
psychological threat to humanity, as we will see in ­chapter 3.
It is not all aversion and hostility, however. Also central to this com-
parative relationship is a positive judgment that animals deserve care
and concern. Some animals possess features that counteract the negative
response. This too is part of our evolutionary history. For instance, our
history with domesticated animals, particularly those kept as compan-
ions, led us to develop positive approach-​related responses to animals. We
instinctively want to offer comfort to a puppy, for example.
These positive responses also help us cope with the presence of psy-
chologically threatening animals. Animals present a categorical threat,
according to dehumanization research. This means that even animals many
of us are disposed to show great concern for, like dogs and cats, pose some
degree of psychological threat. Domestic animals can in fact exacerbate this
psychological threat by sharing human spaces. A dog living inside of one’s
home, for example, is not appropriate for an allegedly inferior creature.
It violates the human–​animal boundary. If animals are intuitively seen as
members of an outgroup, treating them as ingroup members causes some
psychological discomfort to us. This could be expressed, for example, by
feeling disgust at the thought of letting a dog sleep in your bed or paying for
expensive food because it’s “just a dog.” Part of the positive responses we
have developed toward animals is a result of needing to cope with this dis-
comfort. We can’t always avoid animals, and in many cases we benefit from
keeping them around. Caring attitudes toward animals help us overcome
underlying aversion and resist feeling threatened by their presence.
Because animals do not conform to the picture of ingroup/​outgroup
psychology that treats an entity as thoroughly degraded, we need some
other way to account for the comparative relationship between humans
and animals. This is where the concept of infrahumanization is instruc-
tive. In short, infrahumanization leads people to treat an entity as infe-
rior to human beings without thoroughly treating the entity as worthless.
While people generally dehumanize other people by comparing them to
the most universally reviled animals possible (e.g., rats and cockroaches),

4
 I n t roduc t ion

the standard model for animals is a more modest comparison. We think of

animals as inferior to humans while still attributing to them various posi-
tive qualities. This allows us to cope with the presence of animals and the
psychological threat they pose.

1.1.2 Case Studies in Human–​A nimal Comparison

The idea that animals are judged negatively, to any degree, may seem
implausible to some. Concern for animals seems to be at an all-​time high.
And not just for animals kept in our homes. Animals of all types are argu-
ably treated better than ever before. It may thus seem that any comparison
we make to animals primarily results in positive, not negative, judgments.
Although tempting, this generalization fails to capture a wide range of
attitudes about animals; care and concern do not tell the whole story.
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the relevant empirical evidence on this issue.
Before entering into a fuller discussion, however, let’s briefly consider
some examples of how animals have been and continue to be evaluated
negatively.
(1) The Great Chain of Being. Arthur Lovejoy’s (1936) classic The
Great Chain of Being provides some historical background for human–​
animal comparisons. The book lays out the history of the idea that there
is a hierarchical scale in nature and humans’ place within that scale. One
common conception of humans’ place in the natural scale, according to
Lovejoy, is inherently paradoxical. Humans are “constitutionally discon-
tented” with their relatively low rank in the scale, compared to angels and
gods, but they also see this as “appropriate to [their] place in the scale”
(p. 205). Humans constantly strive to ascend the scale of nature while
knowing that they will inevitably fail. This conception of human beings
would seem to have implications for conceptions of non-​humans. One
way of ascending the scale is to be less like animals, which are invariably
beneath humans. But animals, like humans, are only filling their role in the
natural order of things. So we would expect animals to be denigrated if
they threaten human superiority but not in order to help humans ascend
the scale; pushing animals down does not lift humans up. Lovejoy’s scale
of nature suggests that animals will be viewed as mostly benign but threat-
ening when they seem to be too close to humans on the natural scale.

5
 S u b human

(2) Proximity Threats. Ascending the chain of being presents a sym-

bolic, or psychological, threat to humanness. There are different ways that
this threat can come about. In his classic analysis of animal metaphors,
Edmund Leach (1964) proposed that denigration of certain animals was
a result of their physical closeness to humans. It is well known that animal
terms are used to insult and demean others (Haslam, Loughnan, & Sun,
2011; Loughnan et al., 2014). Leach suggested that the most common
animal insults involved animals that encroached on human lives. Pigs,
for instance, are commonly used in animal insults in many cultures (e.g.,
“filthy pig,” “fat as a pig”) and have historically been raised near or some-
times even inside of human homes, even when intended for slaughter. This
physical breach of the human–​animal boundary, Leach proposed, would
have caused psychological discomfort. Pigs have also participated in other
characteristically human activities, such as receiving human food, and are
often seen as being social and having a family life, which would exacerbate
the psychological threat. To deal with the threat, we put an extra stigma on
pigs in order to reaffirm, with language and taboos, that they are separate
from us. We alleviate our concerns with physical closeness by insisting on
a fundamental metaphysical difference.
(3) Mortality Salience. The line of research that has explored the psy-
chological threat of animals in greatest detail is known as “terror manage-
ment theory.” The basic assumption behind terror management theory, as
it applies to animals, is that animals remind us of aspects of our human-
ity that cause existential anxiety, particularly our mortality. This is often
referred to as “animal reminder” or “mortality salience.” Being reminded
of one’s mortality presents a psychological threat and disrupts normal psy-
chological functions, so we have developed various strategies to suppress
these feelings when they arise. For instance, Rozin and Fallon (1987)
argue that, as a result of this threat, human beings “wish to avoid any ambi-
guity about their status by accentuating the human–​animal boundary”
(p. 28). More will be said about the theoretical foundations of mortality
salience in c­ hapter 3.
An excellent illustration of how animals elicit mortality salience comes
from Beatson and Halloran (2007). They presented participants with a
prompt that made them think about death. They also presented an ani-
mal stimulus, which was a video of bonobos having sex. In one condition

6
 I n t roduc t ion

the researchers emphasized to participants how similar bonobo sex is to

human sex. In another condition, the differences between the species’ sex
habits were emphasized. They also measured participants’ self-​esteem
because increasing self-​esteem is a well-​confirmed method for reducing
the effects of mortality salience (Gailliot et al., 2008; Schmeichel et al.,
2009; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). In the condition where bonobo sex
was seen as similar to human sex, those with low self-​esteem evaluated
animals more negatively, while those high in self-​esteem evaluated animals
more positively. These results indicate that bonobo sex elicits mortality
salience, which presents a psychological threat. Reminding people of their
animal nature caused negative evaluations, unless the level of self-​esteem
was sufficient to fend off the attendant existential anxiety.
These examples illustrate different ways animals present psychological
threats to humanness. Further examples will be discussed throughout the
book, primarily in c­ hapter 3 as well as in c­ hapter 4, which focuses on how
animals’ mental states are used to assign moral status. Chapter 5 contex-
tualizes research on moral attitudes to animals within research on broader
psychological obstacles to moral progress. Chapters 2–​5, as a whole, are
aimed at presenting a new picture of the moral psychology behind our
attitudes to animals, looking through the lens of infrahumanization.

1.2 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
HUMAN–​A NIMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Most of this book will be focused on uncovering how people think about
animals, but I will also explain how we should think about and treat ani-
mals. These two matters are not entirely independent of one another
because the psychology of human attitudes to animals has implications
for our treatment of them. Chapters 6–​8 lay out how we should think
about ethical issues concerning animals, given the psychological details
provided in ­chapters 2–​5.
Using empirical moral psychology to inform ethical issues is an increas-
ingly popular approach in philosophy. It is less common among those who
focus specifically on animal ethics, however. Recent advances in empirical
moral psychology are mostly absent from prominent discussions of, for

7
 S u b human

example, the moral status of non-​humans, intensive animal agriculture,

species rights, and a variety of other issues but not because there is noth-
ing interesting about what moral psychology has to tell us about animals.
Chapters 6–​8 show how we can use studies from the cognitive sciences,
primarily psychology, to improve and inform the development of theories
in animal ethics. I seek to develop moral prescriptions about animals that
are morally defensible and psychologically plausible.

1.2.1 Using Psychology to Inform Ethics

Cognitive scientists generally explore statistical regularities, usually as
observed in controlled experimental conditions. Many of the experiments
described throughout the book show a statistically significant difference
in the responses of an experimental group when compared to a control
group. There is, of course, variation within each group, but the experi-
mentally manipulated variable—​whatever it is—​has enough of an effect
to allow researchers to conclude that a pattern exists within the variation.
The effect is due to a specific factor that cannot be attributed to chance.
This is one of the main tools of scientific discovery.
Ethics, we might think, looks nothing like this. The target of inquiry is
entirely different. Normative ethics, for instance, is about what we ought
to think and do—​it is prescriptive (providing advice like “intelligent ani-
mals shouldn’t be treated cruelly”). But normative ethics is also, accord-
ing to many philosophers, distinctly first person–​oriented. It asks, What
ought I do? The statistical approach of cognitive science, by contrast, is
descriptive and third person–​oriented. It asks questions like, What do
cognitive agents do? and How do cognitive processes operate? A common
view among ethicists is that these targets reflect a fundamental difference
between science and ethics. A classic expression of this idea can be found
in the work of Christine Korsgaard (1996). She argues that normative eth-
ics is distinctly unlike science in that it aims to provide individuals with
reasons for action. The bare descriptive facts of science, she thinks, cannot
provide this.
Moreover, many ethicists seem to think that being mistaken about
human moral psychology is only trivially bad. If I have the right moral the-
ory, then what relevance is moral psychology? If I have correctly identified

8
 I n t roduc t ion

a moral duty, why does it matter what I say about human beings’ capacity
to realize that duty? For instance, suppose I claim that our highest moral
duty is to increase the amount of pleasure and decrease the amount of pain
in the world. And suppose I derive from this that our current treatment of
non-​human animals must change dramatically. Assuming these claims are
right and the reasoning sound, what relevance is whatever moral psychol-
ogy that follows? For instance, why should it matter if people are unmoved
by the pain felt by animals?
Of course it is true that descriptive facts do not directly translate into
normative prescriptions. But they do have implications for normative
prescriptions, as we will see. Normative ethics should take more seriously
the third-​person perspective. It should ask, What ought people do, in gen-
eral? Numerous criticisms have been put forth in recent years suggesting
that many mainstream ethical theories are working with an inaccurate
conception of human psychology (e.g., Doris, 2002; Prinz, 2007). These
criticisms have, as a consequence, called into question the utility of the
first-​person approach, as well as empirically uninformed third-​person per-
spectives. First-​person ethics appears to serve as a guide only by assuming
a significantly uniform, and substantially inaccurate, human psychological
profile. Similar problems arise when third-​person ethics takes psychologi-
cal facts for granted. The answers ethicists provide fail to sufficiently gen-
eralize to other human beings.
Rather than ask what individuals should do, ethics should ask what
psychologically similar groups of human beings should do. Statistical
regularities uncovered by cognitive scientists illuminate commonalities
in thinking styles, personality traits, and other aspects of our psychologi-
cal profiles. Understanding these statistical regularities helps ensure that
ethical prescriptions generalize beyond one’s own perspective while also
making sure they don’t overgeneralize, to psychological profiles that are
very different from one’s own. An empirically informed third-​person eth-
ics can provide recommendations that take into account what people are
capable of and what actions their psychological profiles are best suited for,
while still providing substantial advice about what they ought to do. This
may ultimately culminate in an individual (or individuals) asking the first-​
person question, What ought I do? But the general framework for ethi-
cal decision-​making is done in accordance with broader patterns existing

9
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 THE FLOWER-QUEEN’S FALL

A rebel rose climbed to the top of the hedge,

And watched the people go up and down
The winding highway, dusty and grey,
That stretched from the village away to the town.

And an anger surged in her passionate heart,

’Gainst the humble garden where she was born,
And her red lips curled at the old flower world,
And she cast around her such looks of scorn

That the lilies drooped ’neath her withering glance,

And the pansies huddled together with fear,
And the poor pinks paled, and each daisy quailed,
And dropped from her lashes a big round tear.

For of the flower-kingdom this rose was queen,

And never were subjects more loyal than they—
And they fondly dreamed she was good as she seemed,
And because they had loved they were proud to obey.

But lo! as she towered in haughty disdain

High over their heads, with an angry gust
The wind swooped down and tore off her crown,
And its jewels went whirling away with the dust.
 A VETERAN

In his niche in the hall, the old clock stands,

But hushed is his voice, and still are his hands.
He ceased from his labours long years ago,
And he’s only a “pensioner” now, you know.

He did his duty as long as he could,

For a brave heart beat in his breast of wood,
And you could depend on all he said
Till age, at last, turned him queer in the head.

With a visor of glass o’er his grim old face,

In his armour,—a straight, stiff, oaken case,
He “stands at ease” in his sentry box,
And leaves time-telling to younger clocks.
 TO A BUTTERFLY

Butterfly, O butterfly,
With gaily-jewelled wings,
You make me think of fairy folk
And of enchanted things.

You once were held a prisoner

In a castle grim and grey—
A “chrysalis” folk called it—
But you escaped away.

And now you flutter ’mong the flowers,

A restless roving elf,
Or fold your wings and lie so still—
A very flower yourself.

Or hoisting high two gauzy sails,

You softly float away,
Just like a tiny fairy barque
Bound for a fairy bay.

The bees must work, the birds must sing,

The flowers yield perfumes rare;
But you were born a trifler,
Frail thing of light and air!
 WHEN AND WHERE

I wonder “when” and I wonder “where”

The Angel of Death will come,
And, laying a finger on lids and lips,
Will strike me blind and dumb.

I wonder “when” and I wonder “where”!

Like the skeleton at the feast,
’Mid laughter and mirth this thought finds birth
Where it is welcome least.

I wonder “when” and I wonder “where”—

In my prime or old age hoar,
At home, with my loved ones round my bed,
Or alone on an alien shore.

I wonder “when” and I wonder “where!”

Is God not over all?
He knows the time and He knows the place
Who marks a sparrow’s fall.
 WHEN LOVE IS YOUNG

The red and russet of Autumn die,

In the lap of winter their ashes lie,
And the earth is wan and grey the sky.

But the noon of a wondrous joy is mine,

And my pulses thrill with the glowing wine
That flows from the grape of Love’s deathless vine.

What care have I that the brown stems bear

Nor leaf nor bloom, and the mad winds tear
The last poor tatters the forests wear?

Is not the heart in mine own glad breast

A garden of roses, a haven of rest,
A bird that has builded a warm love-nest?
 A CHARACTER SKETCH

Womanly-sweet in all her ways,

Slow to condemn, and swift to praise;
Ready to help in hour of need,
Generous in thought as well as deed.

Pitiful, tender, yet firm and strong

To uphold the right and put down wrong;
Never a thought of self or gain,
Proud of her God-given gifts—not vain.

Laughter-loving, and fond of fun,

When the “daily round” and task are done;
Modest and maidenly, yet no prude;
Perfect enough, but not “too good.”

Half an angel, yet wholly human;

No ideal—a living woman.
 FRIENDS

We are such friends, my little girl and I,

That, though her summers number scarcely nine
I need none other, as I go my ways
With her small fingers closely clasping mine.

A little world we two make of our own,

And people it with all things fair and sweet;
The stars that twinkle overhead at night
Drop down at dawn in daisies at our feet.

My smiles are hers;—my tears are all my own,

I keep my sighs and give her all my song,
Because she is so trusting and so weak
I feel that I can suffer and be strong.

The while I try to keep the narrow way,

’Tis wide enough for both. And my white dove,
With untried wings, knows little love but this,
That “Mother” is another name for “Love.”
 BED-TIME

The sleepy daisies have said “Good night,”

And tied up their wee frilled nightcaps tight.
The summer day’s been hot and long
And daisies, although they are so strong,
Are always tired and ready for bed
Ere the stars, heaven’s daisies, awake o’erhead.

The roses have rocked themselves to sleep.

Awake they could no longer keep—
They’ve been astir since the dawn of day,
Sighing their sweet perfume away,
And feeding the hungry beggar bees
That never say “thanks” nor “if you please!”

And, baby darling, ’tis time that you

Had shut your drowsy eyes of blue—
Wee busy hands, wee busy feet
Must rest sometime, you know, my sweet—
The flower-bells all have chimed “Good night.”
They’ll ring to wake you with the light.
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