From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and

Organization in the Rural Philippines

Author(s): K. G. Machado
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Aug., 1974), pp. 523-547
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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VOL. XXXIII, No. 4 JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES AUGUST 1974

FromTraditionalFactionto Machine:Changing
Patternsof PoliticalLeadershipand Organization
in the Rural Philippines
K. G. MACHADO

T HE institutionalframeworkof Philippinegovernmentand the patternof that

country'spolitical developmenthave recentlyundergonebasic and dramatic
changes.What had been one of thelongeststandingexperiments withrepresentative
institutionsin a contemporary new state was abruptlyended in late 1972 when
PresidentFerdinand Marcos declaredmartiallaw as a preludeto establishingan
openlyauthoritarian politicalsystemof uncertainduration.'Many important features
of Philippinepoliticallife were undergoingsignificanttransformation in the years
priorto the latterevents,and some of themhave criticalimplicationsforthe new
patternof politicaldevelopmentthatis emerging.Among thesefeatureswere im-
portantchangesin the leadershipand organizationof local factionsthat had been
takingplace in some ruralareas forseveraldecades.I have elaboratedon and tried
to explainthesedevelopments in generaltermselsewhere.2 In orderto give a richer
and more detailed pictureof these changes,this articlepresentsa case studyof
the transformationof leadershipin one townduringthiscentury.To the extentthat
such changesrepresent a declinein the autonomyof local elites,theyhave important
implicationsforthe Philippinepoliticalsystemas it now movesin an authoritarian
direction,and thisarticleconcludeswithsome speculationabout theseimplications.
Beforeturningto the case study,however,theprocessof changereferred to needsto
be outlinedmorefully.

ChangingPatternsof Leadershipand Organizationin the Rural Philippines

At the outset,it will be usefulbriefly
to describethe basicunitof Philippinelocal
government,the municipality or town. The countryis divided into provinces,and

K. G. Machado is AssociateProfessorof Political 1973; David F. Roth,"The Deterioration and Re-

Scienceand Asian Studiesat CaliforniaStateUni-
versity,Northridge.Researchfor this study was
carriedout with the institutionalsupportof the
Collegeof PublicAdministration,University of the
Philippinesand financialstupport
of the Fulbright-
Hays ForeignArea StudyProgram.The authoris
alone responsiblefor what follows.
1 On the eventsleading up to the declaration
of martiallaw and subsequentdevelopments, see:
RobertShaplen,"LetterfromManila," The New
Yorker,49 (April I4, I973), pp. 97-II9; Rob-
ertB. Stauffer,
"The PoliticalEconomyof a Coup:
TrransnationalLinkages and Philippine Political
Response,"paperpresentedat International Studies
AssociationWesternMeeting,San Francisco,March
constructionof NationalPoliticalParameters:The
PhilippinesDuring the I970's," Asian Survey,
I3 (September 1973), pp. 8I2-825; and Jean
Grossholtz,"PhilippinesI973: WhitherMarcos?,"
AsianSurvey, I4 (January1974), pp. 101-II2.
2 See my "ChangingAspectsof Factionalism in
Philippine Local Politics," Asian Survey, II
(December I97I), pp. II82-II99; and my
"ChangingPatternsof LeadershipRecruitment and
the Emergenceof the ProfessionalPoliticianin
PhilippineLocal Politics,"in PoliticalChangein the
Philippines: Studies of Local Politics Prior to
MartialLaw, Ben Kerkvliet,ed. (Honolulu: Uni-
versityPress of Hawaii, forthcoming).

523
524 K. G. MACHADO
provincesare dividedinto municipalities. The latter,informallydesignatedtowns,
are at thebase of theadministrative structure
of government. Outsidethefewmajor
urban centers,towns are comprisedof a number of barrios,or villages,and a
poblacion,or town proper.The poblacionis the site of a plaza surroundedby the
public buildings,the main church,and the homesof the leadingfamilies,and, de-
pendingon size, a centralschooland publicmarket.In smalltowns,it may be com-
prisedof littlemorethan this.In largerones,it may be a sizeable urbancenter.In
eithercase,the largestportionof a town'spopulationresidesin thebarrios.
Factionalismhas long been a prominentfeatureof politicallife in Philippine
towns.3During the Spanish era, factionalcompetitionover prestigeand influence
was commonin many towns.Traditionalfactionswere organizedaround leading
familieswhose prominencewas based on wealth associatedwith landownership.4
With the introduction of electionsand the organizationof parties5underAmerican
rule earlyin thiscentury, factionalism becametheprimaryforceunderlying electoral
competition in thesecommunities. Under the auspicesof theirfactions,membersof
leading familiesimmediatelycame to dominatekey town offices. As the organiza-
tionalcenterof the traditionalfactionwas a familyor constellation of families,kin-
ship ties were the basic cementat the faction'score.The primaryties bindingthe
heads of lesserfamiliesat the peripheryto the faction'sleaderswere patron-client
relationships,personalloyaltyand mutual obligationgrowingout of the exchange
of favorsbetweenunequals.fHence such factionswere unspecializedorganizations.
That is, theyhad theiroriginsin extra-political formsof organizationin the tradi-
tionalsocial orderand theydid not come intobeingprimarily forpoliticalpurposes.
Such townfactionsearlybecametheconstituent unitsof thenationalpoliticalparties.
Reflectingtheirorigins,however,theyremainedverymuch locallyoriented.Local
considerations were paramountin determining theiractionsin provincialand na-
tionalas well as in local politicalcompetitions.
And, whiletownfactionleaderswere
linked throughthe partieswith officials in higherarenas,the resourcessupporting
theirpoliticaldominationwerewhollylocal in origin.
Under conditionsprevailingin someareasof thePhilippines,threeimportant and
interrelatedchangesin the traditionalpatternof local leadershiprecruitment and
factionorganizationhad been takingplace forseveraldecades.These changesbegan
as earlyas the 1930's in some areas and becamemore widespreadin the yearsafter
independence.First,while familyprominencewas traditionally the chiefcriterion
forrecruitment to positionsof politicalleadership,therewas a tendencyfornotables
fromold leading familiesto be replacedin positionsof leadershipby upwardly
mobile "new men" fromsmall farming,fishing,and businessfamiliesand other

3 The standardtreatment of local factionalism Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine

in the Philippinesis Carl Lande, Leaders,Factions, Province (Berkeley: University of California Press,
and Par-ties:The Structureof PhilippinePolitics I972) for an analysis of the development of the
(New Haven: Yale University,Southeast Asia local elite in a Philippine province.
Studies MonographNo. 6, I965). The following 5 On the origins of parties, see Dapen Liang,

analysisof traditionalfactionalism followsthat of PhilippinePartiesand Politics,New Edition (San

Lande closely.
4Land6, Leaders,Factions,and Parties,pp. 4-5;
David Wurfel,"The Philippines,"in Governments
and Politics of SoutheastAsia, Second Edition,
George M. Kahin, ed. (Ithaca: CornellUniversity
Press,I964), p. 7I2. See also JohnA. Larkin,The
Francisco: The Gladstone Company, I970), Chap-
ter 3.
6 See James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics
and Political Change in Southeast Asia," Amer-
ican PoliticalScience Review, 66 (March, I972),
pp. 9I-II3.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 525
morehumblebackgrounds. Second,a relateddimensionof changewas the adoption
of moreprofessional criteriaforrecruitment to positionsof townpoliticalleadership
and the consequentemergenceof the professional politicianin the local arena.For
the professionalpolitician,leadershipis, first,a specializedpoliticalactivityrather
than an adjunct to a more generalsocial role (like familymember) and, second,
more a careerthan an avocation.Third,local factionswere losing many of their
traditionalorganizationalfeaturesand being transformed into specializedpolitical
machines.
The new variantof the local factionwas not a family-centered organizationbut
an electoralorganizationcenteredon an individualleader and a hierarchyof fol-
lowers that had been built specifically for politicalpurposes.While kinshipties
declinedas a factor,instrumental relationships became more importantingredients
of the cementbindingthe centralelementof the faction.The new factionwas a
machine,an organizationdevotedprimarily to thepoliticalsupportof its leaderand
the maintenanceof its membersthroughthe distribution of immediate,concrete,
and individualrewardsto them.7Closelyrelatedto thesechangeswas an increase
in the importanceof provincialand nationalconsiderations and a decline in the
importanceof local considerationsin shapingthe faction'scharacterand its political
actions in all arenas. These developmentswere accompaniedby the new local
machine'sgrowingrelianceon resourcesprovidedby politiciansin higherarenasin
exchangeforits turningout voterson behalfof the latter.It shouldbe emphasized
here that despitethesechanges,such new local politicalorganizationsstillhad to
be regardedas factions.They did not exhibitthe combinationof organizational
continuityand stabilityof commitment to a nationalpartythat would have been
necessaryto categorizethem as local partybranches.

Forces forChange
Changes in local leadershipand organizationare partiallyexplainedby the im-
pact of increasinglyintensenational politicalcompetition'in rural communities
and growingmass participation.9 Beyondtheseforces,the emergenceof "new men"
in local politicsand thechangingaspectsof factionalism
and professionals described
weremutuallyinterrelated. In any case,thesechangeswerenot uniformthroughout
7 See James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine participation in the Philippines after the introcluc-
Politics and Political Change," American Political tion of clections early in this century.This growth
Science Revietv, 63 (Deccmber, I969), pp. 1142- was most marked after independence. Whereas
II58. only about one percent of the total population
8 During the preindependence years, the Nacion- voted in the 1907 election for delegates to the
alist Party broke down into two intensely com- Philippine Assembly, and only I4 percent voted
petitive factions on twvo occasions (5922 and in the first election for President of the inde-
1934), but for much of this period it clearly pendent Philippine Republic nearly 40 years later,
dominated Philippine politics with only weak op- in the late Ig60's, nearly a quarter of the total
position. National political competition became in- population normally voted in national and local
creasingly intense after independence. This was a elections. Prewar growth was accountedlfor largely
consequence of: consistent opposition in election by gradual extension of the franchise and the
after election of two parties of roughly com- movement of more polling places into the barrios.
parable strength; the regular election of a Presi- Procedural obstacles reduced, postindependence
dent (a practice which had only begun in I935) growth in mass electoral participation was pri-
on a nationwide basis; and the growing rewards marily a product of increasingly intense com-
of officeholding which made the stakes of elcc- petition and campaigning and increased politiciza-
tions higher than they had ever been. tion of rural people.
9 There was a steady growth in mass electoral
526 K. G. MACHADO
the Philippines,as theywere more likelyto develop under some conditionsthan
others.Such changehad been morelikelyto occurwherein boththe town and the
provinceof whichit was a part: (i) the levelof socialmobilization10 was compara-
tivelyhigh; and (2) the concentration of landownershipwas comparatively low.
More intensenational political competitionresultedin growing demands by
nationalpoliticiansthat as many rural votersas possiblebe turnedout on their
behalvesand a corresponding infusionof externalresourcesintoprovincesand local
communities to supportsuchefforts.Such demandscreatedtheneed forprofessional
politiciansin ruraltowns,thusnecessitating new criteriaforrecruitment to positions
of leadershipin areas of comparatively high social mobilizationand low concen-
trationof landownership. These new criteriaincludedthe organizationalskillsand
the personalqualities (i.e., having "good public relations"and being "approach-
able"'1) thatwere,along withnecessaryresources, requiredto developand maintain
an extensivenetworkof close personalties.These tieswereessentialin securingthe
supportof largenumbersof voters.In areasof lowersocial mobilizationand higher
concentration of landownership, by contrast,criteriafor recruitment had changed
less,as the tiesof prominent familiesstillactedto a greaterextentin buildingpoliti-
cal support.In any case,applicationof the new criteriaunderthe formerconditions
increasingly opened positionsof leadershipto a broadersectorof the populationin
rural communities, resultingin the recruitment of many "new men." Moreover,
becausetheylacked the kind of familyprominenceand tiesthatwould assuretheir
positionof leadershipin the town even when out of office, "new men" had more
compellingreasonsthannotablesfromold leadingfamiliesto make a careerof office
holdingoncetheybecamepublicofficials.
The impactof moreintensenationalpoliticalcompetition in ruralcommunities
had likewisebeen partiallyresponsiblefor erodingthe traditionalpatternof fac-
tionalismand stimulatingorganizationalchange in local factions.JamesC. Scott
has advanced a persuasivegeneralexplanationfor the emergenceof machinesin
societiesin theearlystagesof modernization thatfitsthePhilippinecase verywell.'2
He arguesthatthe machineis the productof competitive, mass participantpolitics
under conditionsin which politicalloyaltiesbased on traditionalpatternsof defer-
ence in ruralsocietyare breakingdown as a consequenceof rapidsocial changebut
have yetto be replacedby more generalloyaltiesbased on a widespreadcivic con-
sciousnessand in which povertyis the generallot of the population.Competitive
politicalorganizationswill seek supportby attempting to meetthe growingbut still
particularisticdemandsof theirfamilyand community orientedpotentialfollowers.

10 See Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilizationand
PoliticalDevelopment,"AmericanPoliticalScience
Review,55 (September,I96I), pp. 493-5I4 fora
full discussionof the concept.
11To have "good public relations"is the usual
English termfor the Tagalog conceptof pakiki-
sama. When used in this way, it is essentially
the same as what Lynch calls "smoothinterper-
sonal relations,"that is "facilityat gettingalong
well with othersin such a way as to avoid out-
ward signs of conflict. ... It means a sensitivity
to what otherpeople feel at any given moment,
and a willingnessand abilityto change tack (if
not direction) to catch the slightestfavoring
breeze." Frank Lynch, "Social Acceptance,"in
Frank Lynch, ed., Four Readings on Philip-
pine Values (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
UniversityPress,IPC Papers No. 2, I968), p. 8.
The "approachable"man is humble ratherthan
arrogantand has a reputationfor responding
warmly,and normallyfavorably,to those who
approachhim (usuallywithsomekindof request).
This implies,among other things,that because
a positiveresponsecan be assumed,the person
wishing to approach him can do so directly
withoutusing a go-between.
12 "Corruption,MlachinePolitics,and Political
Change,"op. cit.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 527
In theareasof thePhilippineswherethelevelof socialmobilizationis comparatively
high,social change has been most disruptiveand traditionalpatternsof deference
have been weakened.And the latterare weakestin areas wherethe concentration
of landownershipis also comparatively low. Correspondingly, these are areas in
whichpopulardemandshave mostrapidlygrownor been stimulatedby the actions
of politicians,albeit such demands are still essentiallypersonalin nature.During
the periodin which electoralcompetition was permitted, then,successfuleffortsto
turnvotersout on a largescale undertheseconditionsrequiredthatpoliticalleaders
meetsuch demandsinsofaras possibleand thattheyorganizemachinesto thatend.
The changingpatternof factionalismand organizationaladaptationto these
generalconditionswere mostfundamentally consequencesof choicesmade by local
politicalleaders.Local factionleaderswho were"new men" tookchoicesand actions
conduciveto such changesmoreoftenthan thosewho were fromold leadingfam-
ilies. And the formerwere,as indicated,more likelyto emergewherethe level of
social mobilizationwas comparatively high and the concentration of landownership
was comparatively low. In any case,"new men" were less likelythanmen fromold
leading familiesto have the familyconnectionsnecessaryto or the motivationto
perpetuateestablishedpatternsof factionalpolitics.National and provincialpoliti-
cians had increasingneed forallies in the townswho could mobilizelargenumbers
of voters,and theircontrolof governmentalresourcesput them in a positionto
providestrongincentivesfor local leadersto becometheirallies. The only way in
which"new men" could developthebase of powerrequisiteto politicalsurvivalwas
to build a machine,as theylacked the kind of local resourcesusefulin political
organizationcustomarily enjoyedby men fromfamiliesof prestigeand wealth.They
had to depend on newly available externalresourcesto do this. Their growing
relianceon externalresourcesgave them clear motivationto base theiractionson
demands originatingin higherarenas,even if this meant operatingoutside the
traditionalpatternof factionalism or rejectingit altogether.
And theycould do this
when it meanttakingactionsindependent of otherfactionleadersmorereadilythan
men whose familieswere still centralelementsof theirfactions.
The foregoingargumenthas elsewherebeen morefullyelaboratedand supported
by two different kinds of data. I carriedout a surveyof the electedMayorsof all
townsin two Philippineprovinces13and a comparativestudyof changingpatterns
of leadershipand organizationin six of thosetowns14in i969-I970. The two prov-
inceswere Batangas (in the southernTagalog regionof Luzon) and Capiz (on the
westernVisayan island of Panay). These were selectedbecause theywere similar
with respectto the politicalvariables-theimpactof nationalpoliticalcompetition
and mass participation-while theywere different withrespectto the environmental
variables-Batangasbeing characterizedby a substantiallyhigher level of social
mobilization15 and a lower concentration of landownership16 than Capiz. As ex-
13 The survey results are reported in my agricultural occupations, urbanization, number of
"Changing Patterns of Leadership Recruitment motor vehicles per iooo population, and percent
and the Emergenceof the ProfessionalPolitician of dwelling units with radios. Each was assumed
in PhilippineLocal Politics,"op. cit. to be related independently and in a somewhat
14 This comparativestudy is presentedin my differentway to the possibility that people in a
"ChangingAspectsof Factionalismin Philippine given province would be exposed to various mod-
Local Politics,"op. cit. ernizing influences.
15 Assessedby each province'srankingon five 16 Assessed by the percentage of the total pop-
indicators:
literacy,percentage of workforcein non- ulation residing on tenant farms. This was deemed
528 K. G. MACHADO
pected,considering the differences
in environmental conditions,the incidenceof the
changescitedwas much higherin Batangas than in Capiz provincetowns.
To give a richerand more detailedpictureof the natureand processof change
describedand particularly to bringinto clearerreliefthe relationshipbetweenthe
variablescited above, this paper presentsa case study of changingpatternsof
politicalleadershipand organizationin the townof Taal, Batangasduringthiscen-
tury.The kinds of changes that have taken place in Taal are in many respects
archetypical of the generalpatternof change outlinedabove. The obvious weak-
nessesof enteringa singlecase studyas illustration of a more generalprocessare
considerably reducedwhen thatcase can be examinedagainstthe backdropof such
pertinent surveydata and data on comparabletownsas have alreadybeen presented.
That Taal is not an idiosyncratic
case is shownby thefactthatwithregardto both
patternsof leadershipand organizationit was in importantrespectssimilarto a
sizeable majorityof the 30 othertownsof Batangasprovince.

ChangingPatternsofLeadershipand Organizationin Taal, Batangas

Taal is one of the oldesttownsin Batangas.It was the Spanish capital of the
provincefora shorttimein the earlyeighteenth century,untilit was destroyed by
volcaniceruption.BatanguenosconsideredTaal to be one of the most"aristocratic"
townsin theprovince,as it had historicallybeen thehomeof someof theprovince's
wealthiestand mostHispanized leadingfamilies.In 1970, it had a totalpopulation
of approximately 32,00017 makingit the tenthlargestamongthe 3I Batangastowns.
Roughly6ooo of thosepersonslived in the poblacion.'8Geographically, its area had
steadilybeenreducedduringthiscenturyas variouspartshad been detachedto form
fivenew towns.
Like the provinceas a whole, and like many otherBatangas towns,Taal was
characterizedby a comparatively high level of social mobilization.It is approxi-
matelyioo kilometerssouthof Manila and verymuch subjectto modernizingin-
fluencesemanatingfromthe political,economic,and culturalcenterof the country.
Taal receivedboth Manila radio and television.It was also linked to Manila by
directand frequentbus transportation. It was only a two and a halfto threehour
trip by road betweenTaal and Manila, and membersof the town's upper and
middle class oftenmade the tripback and forth.Indeed, some of the lattermain-
tained residencesin both places and workedand spentmore time in Manila than
in Taal. These mobileTaalefiosplayedan importantrole in bringingmetropolitan
influencesintotheircommunity.
The poblacionof Taal is itselfpartof a smallurbancenter.It is contiguouswith
the poblacionof the largerneighboringtown of Lemery.Taken together, the two

to be a particularly
politicallyrelevantindicatorof
concentrationof landownership, becauseit showed
the portionof the population(and hence, pre-
sumably,the approximateportionof eligiblevo-
ters) that were directlysubject to the influence
of landlordsat electiontime.
17 Republicof the Philippines,Bureauof Census
and Statistics,
EstimatedPopulationof the Philip-
pines by Provinceand Municipality:i96o-i965
and I970 (Manila: Bureau of Census and Statistics,
I964).
18 The population figure was calculated by ap-
plying the percentage of the people in the pob-
lacion at the 1960 census to the estimated pop-
ulation of the town in I970, from Bureau of
Census and Statistics,Estimated Population of the
Philippinesby Provinceand Municipality:I960-
I965 and( I970.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 529
poblacion.eshad a populationof around i8,oooin 1970.19BeforeWorld War II and
throughthe earlypost-independence years,Taal was an importantmarkettown of
southwestern Batangas.Since the early 1950's, however,Lemeryhad developedas
the primarymarkettown,businessand commercialcenter,and transportation hub
of that part of the province.In any case, the two poblacionesformedone small
urban center.Reflectingthis,a numberof local organizations,such as the Rotary
Club and the TricycleDrivers'Association,were jointlyformedof membersfrom
both towns.Each town,however,had its own distinctpoliticalprocess.The influ-
ence of thissmall urbancenterwas feltat leastas muchin Taal as in Lemery.And
becausetherewas comparatively good transportation betweenmostTaal barriosand
this urban center,the influenceof the latterwas feltin much of the ruralpartof
the town.
By small town Philippine standards,educationalopportunitiesin Taal were
fairlygood. This fact was reflected in a literacyrate of 75 percent.20 Beyond the
primarylevel,therewere severalchurchaffiliated and privatehigh schoolsand col-
leges in the two towns.Many of the studentsin theseinstitutions were fromTaal
barrios.
Though Taal was somewhaturbanized,its populationwas largelyrural.But the
area withinthe currentboundariesof the townhad not,at leastduringthiscentury,
been predominantly a farmingcommunity.Moreover,therehad been some move-
ment out of farmingin that area in recentdecades. By the I960's, only about a
quarter of the total populationwas actuallyengaged in farming.2'Upland rice,
corn,and sugar cane were the main crops.Cattle raisingand fruitand vegetable
farmingwere importantsecondaryactivitiesfor some farmfamilies.The former
was a particularly good opportunity in Taal, as the town was the site of a weekly
cattleauction.Some fruitsand vegetablesweremarketedin Manila. Those livingin
Taal barrioswereengagedin a varietyof occupations.A numberwerewage laborers
at sugar haciendas in nearbytowns that were owned by Taalefios. A few were
fishermen. A substantialportionof the town'sruralworkforcewas engagedeither
part-time in cottageindustry.
or full-time There were,forexample,sawali (bamboo
house siding), baby clothes,and cementbuildingblock industries.And Taal was
especiallywell known forits fineand also commercialqualityembroidery and for
productionof the balisong (similar to a switchbladeknife). Many Taalenioswere
also in the marketingof cottageindustryproductsas travellingmerchants.
There were only two familiesthat still had good-sizedlandholdingsin Taal,
thoughotherof the town's leading familieshad comparatively large holdingsin
nearby communities. Some large landholdings in the town that had belongedto
leading familiesat the turnof the century had been divided among heirsand then
sold in piecemealfashion.Beginning in the I930'S, such small holdings were in-
creasingly acquiredby smallindependentfarmersand members of the town'smiddle

19 This was calculated by applying the per- Censusof the Philippines-I96o

sus and Statistics,
(Manila: Bureau of Census and Statistics,I963),
centage of the people in the respective poblaciones
Volume I, Populationand Housing,BatangasVol-
at the I960 census to the estimated populations of
each town in I970, from Bureau of Census and ume,Table 8.
EstimatedPopulationof the Philippines
Statistics, 21 Republic of the Philippines,Census of the
by Province and Municipality:I960-I965 and Philippines-I6o, VolumeI, Agriculture, Batangas
I970. Volume.Table 49.
20Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Cen-
530 K. G. MACHADO
class (mierchants, businessmen,teachers,lawyers,etc.). Though there were few
farmersin Taal, most of themwere tenants.But with only i8 percentof its total
populationon tenantfarms,Taal rankedlow among Batangastownsin concentra-
tion of landownership.22 Hence the kind of exploitativeand repressivelandlord-
tenantrelationships foundin much of centralLuzon and in a few areasof Batangas
werenota big factorin Taal life.
Socioeconomicconditionsin Taal were generallybetterthan in many areas of
the ruralPhilippines.Changes in theseconditionsin recentdecades and increasing
social mobilizationof barriopeople had, however,spawnednew popularneeds and
demands. For those who were tenant farmers,ties with landlordshad changed
where farmlandhad passed fromold leading familiesinto the hands of members
of the town's middle class. For the latter,farmingwas a secondaryor tertiary
activity.Their ties-with theirtenantswere less paternalistic and more purelyand
impersonally economic,thoughnot necessarily more repressive, than theirpredeces-
sors' ties with theirtenantshad been. Hence theseties providedthe tenantwith
less securityand gave strongmotivationto seek out new kinds of patrons.'. For
thosewho were mobile and somewhatbetteroffthan tenantfarmers, metropolitan
influencesand bettereducationhad createdotherkindsof new aspirations. And the
lack of adequate employment opportunities in the town had creatednew demands.
The town'sproximity to Manila made employment, education,and specializedmedi-
cal attentionin the metropolitan area a veryreal possibilityforTaale?nos,provided
they had the rightkind of connections.Good connectionsin Manila were also
essentialto the town'smany small businessmen, who oftenneeded help with legal
and financialmatters.Hence many of the town'speople had strongmotivationto
cultivateties with thosewho had such connectionsor could help to establishthem.
Moreover,the impactof modernizinginfluencessuch as the media and education
along with the promisesof politicianshad led many barriopeople to expectsuch
thingsas betterroads,watersupplies,accessto local healthfacilities, and electrifica-
tion. Additionally, some ruralTaalefioshad need forprotectionfromthe depreda-
tionsof cattlerustlersand othertroublesomeelements.
Some of the membersof Taal's old leading familiessoughtto maintaintheir
traditionalstatusas patronsto theirfew tenantsin the town,and a small number
even triedto build new rural supportby respondingto the emergentneeds and
demandsof barriopeople. But for the most part,theywere not disposedto exert
much effortto thatend. The socioeconomiccontextin Taal was, then,mostfavor-
able to men who would attemptto meet such needs and demands as a basis for
building supportamong barriopeople. Conditionsin Taal led to the expectation
of the emergenceof "new men" in local politicsand of a morecontemporary form
of factionalism. The followinganalysisdemonstrates that this had occurred.I will
show that"new men" became importantparticipants in Taal politicsbeginningin
the late I950's and thatmen fromold leadingfamiliescontinuedto play a significant
but decliningrole. I will also demonstrate thatthe first"new man" to be elected
22 Calculated from figures for the total 23 See James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-
popu-
lation and total resident on tenant farms in Re- Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural South-
public of the Philippines, Census of the Philip- east Asia," lournal of Asian Stuidies, 32 (Novem-
pines-g96o, Volume I, Population and Housing, ber I973), p. 37 for a discussion of the search for
Batangas Volume, Table 2 and Volume I, Agri- new patrons as a form of peasant response to such
culture, Batangas Volume, Table 5I. conditions.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 531
Mayor developedan effective machinein the ig60's and, on thatbasis,established
politicaldominancein the town.As Taal had a fairlystableand clearcut traditional
patternof factionalism,the Mayor did this withinthe frameworkof a traditional
faction.Furthermore, the opposingfactionwas veryslow in adaptingto changing
circumstances,but in responseto the successof the otherit was also beginningto
change.

The TraditionalPatternof Factionalism

Taal politicswas long dominatedby the town'swealthiestand most prominent
families.These families,which assumedtheirleading positionduringthe Spanish
period,were originallyall large landowners.By the timeof independence,
however,
the town's leading familiesalso includedsome who had acquired theirwealth in
Manila businessand finance.Since Taal was not primarilya farmingcommunity
and since much of the leading families'land lay outside of the town,the latter
lacked one of the more enduringbases of power-the sure votesof large numbers
of tenants-thattheircounterparts in manyotherPhilippinetownshad. Neverthe-
less, theydid have a certainnumberof tenantsin the town and theypossessed
great wealth,and theymanaged to maintainvirtuallyunchallengeddominancein
Taal politics
through
the1950's.
Alliancesamong theseleading familieswere at the centerof the traditionalfac-
tionsin Taal. Faction leaderswere drawnexclusivelyfromtheirranks,and political
competitionwas centeredlargelyin the poblacionwhere theyall lived. Factional
competitionwas fairlystable,clear cut, and veryintenseafterthe introduction of
local elections.The factionshad even had the same names since the earlyyearsof
Americanrule: Bando Noble and Bando Ilaya. In 1970, thesenameswerestillmuch
more widelyused in discussionsof Taal politicsthan thoseof the nationalparties
withwhichtheywereaffiliated as local branches.
OriginalAlignmentoftheLeading Famnilies
Taaleniosknowledgeableabout the historyof theirtown have reportedthatfac-
tional competitiontherehad its originsin the Spanish period,thoughtherewere
several versionsof these origins.Whateverthe specificsourcesof theirpersonal
the major familiescompetingforprestigeand dominancein Taal near
differences,
the turnof the centurywere the Agoncilloson the one hand and the interrelated
Marella and Villavicenciofamilieson the other.All threewere wealthyfamilies
withextensivelandholdingsin Taal and adjoiningtowns.In somePhilippinetowns,
factionaldivisionsoriginatedin or were reinforcedby eventsduringthe revolution,
but thiswas not thecase in Taal. The town'sleadingfamiliescontributedimportant
to the revolutionagainsttheUnited States.One of the leadingmembers
participants
of the Agoncillofamily,Don Felipe, was a key figurein overseassupportactivities
in Hong Kong and Europe and was unofficial representative
of the Revolutionary
Governmentat the Paris Conference(which settledthe Spanish-American War).
Dofia Glicera Marella de Villavicencio,a primaryleader of her faction,was well
known as a financialbackerof the revolutionin Batangasand was somethingof a
local heroine.?4The mutual support for the revolutionby the Agoncillo and
Marella/Villavicencio familiesdid not end theircompetitionwithinTaal.
24 Maurico M. Alip, "Glicera Marella-The 1959 (Batangas, Batangas: Municipal Treasurer's
TandlangSora of Batangas,"BatangasYearbook- League, 1959), p. 39.
532 K. G. MACHADO
Electoral competitionbetweenthese two preeminentfamiliesbegan with the
firstelectionfor delegatesto the nationalPhilippineAssemblyin 1907. The con-
tendersin the First Districtof Batangas were Don Felipe Agoncillo and Don
VicenteIlustre,a son-in-lawof Dofia GliceraMarella de Villavicencio.Similarly,in
Taal politics,thesefamilieswerekeybackersof competitors forlocal office.
Graciano
Punzalan, allied with the Agoncillos,and Pedro Marifio,allied with the Marella/
Villavicenciofamilies,were opponentsforMayor in severalof the earlytown elec-
tions. Both were also fromprominentfamilies,but theirwealth and theirland-
holdingswere not so greatas thoseof theirmentors.Both had been supporters of
the revolution.At thattime,the factionof the Agoncillosand Punzalan was called
Bando Ibaba (below) and that of the Marella/Villavicencio familiesand Marifio
was called Bando Ilaya (north). These names referredto sectionsof the poblaion
in which some of theirmain supporterslived. The latterhad retainedthe name
Bando Ilaya to the timeof thisstudy,thoughrealignment of familieswiththe fac-
tionshad brokendown the geographicalbasis of distinction.
Anotherfamilythat played a significantrole in factionalcompetitionin this
earlyperiodand subsequently becameincreasingly importantwas thatof theNobles.
It was quite large,and while not extremely wealthyduringthe finalyearsof the
Spanish era, it was part of the town'sprincipalia.25VicenteNoble, who eventually
becamethe main politicalleaderof the family,attendedSanto Tomas University in
the latterpartof the nineteenth centuryand was a surveyorby profession. He mar-
ried the widow of a large landholder,however,and subsequentlybecame a very
prosperousman. While initiallyaligned with Bando Ilaya, the Nobles allied with
Bando Ibaba around I9I8. Withina shorttime,theybecamethe dominantpolitical
familyin thatfaction,and fromthe mid-i92o'sto the timeof thisstudyit had been
calledBando Noble.
Initially,Bando Ilaya had a slightedge in Taal factionalcompetition. In i9i9,
however,a Noble was electedMayor,and Bando Noble dominatedTaal politics
fromthat time until independence.Noble candidateswon the seven subsequent
electionsfor Mayor of Taal throughI940. In fourof thoseelections,the winning
candidateswere membersof the Noble family.Despite the consolidationof Bando
Noble's power in Taal, competitionbetweenthe two factionscontinuedto be both
closeand intense.
TraditionalPatternsofFactionalOrganization
Throughoutthe prewar period and in the early postindependence years,the
organizationand behaviorof thesetwo competingfactionswere archetypical of the
traditionalpattern.They were familycentered,and while therewere some major
realignments,therewas considerablecontinuity of familiesin the core of bothfac-
tions.From the early I920'S on, the Noble familywas at the core of one faction,
and a constellation
of interrelatedfamilies,includingthe Villavicencios,was at the
centerof Bando Ilaya. From the mid-I92o's, the primarypoliticalleaderof the latter
was Agaton Orosa, who was closelyrelatedto the Villavicencios.Bando Ilaya di-

25 Originally,the principaliawere incumbent taxation.More generally,

the termapplied to the
and formerindigenouslocal officialsunder the mostprosperousand prestigious familiesin Philip-
Spanishadministration.
This groupenjoyedspecial pine towns.
privilegesin the communityand exemptionfrom
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 533
vided in 1934, when Orosa switchedto Bando Noble undercircumstances described
below. Aside fromthis,however,therewas considerablecontinuity at the centerof
Bando Ilaya throughthe prewarperiodand on into the earlyi960's. Through the
prewarperiod and beyond,then,the centralorganizationalcore of both factions
was a constellation of leading families.
Throughoutmostof the prewarperiod,both factionshad verynarrowbases of
leadershiprecruitment and of electoralsupport.They were centeredon poblacion-
dwellingleading familiesand had only small followingsin the barrioscomposed
mainlyof poorerrelativesand the tenantsof theircentralfamilies.The originsof
candidatesfor town officeclearlyindicatesthe narrowbase of leadershiprecruit-
ment.In 1925, therewere a total of 34 candidatesfor the officesof Mayor,Vice-
Mayor,and 14 Council seats.In thatyear,i6, or almosthalf,of thecandidateswere
drawn fromfamilieswhose names were immediatelyrecognizableas centralto the
respectivefactions.26Completelists of candidatesfor otherprewarlocal elections
were unavailable,but the townofficials In 1934, seven
who were electedare listed.27
of theten,and in 1937, fiveof thetenofficialselectedwerefromfamiliescontributing
candidatesin 1925. During these years,politicalleaders fromthese familiesfelt
littleneed forthe supportof largenumbersof voters.The smallelectoralfollowings
that the factionshad is shown by the small portionof the populationvoting.In
1925, only 1878 personscast votes for Mayor of Taal.28 This was less than nine
percentof the totalpopulationof around22,000 at thattime.9 The voterscasttheir
ballots at only seven polling places, all but one of which was in or immediately
adjacentto the poblacion.While therewereno otherprewarelectionreturnsforthe
town, returnsfor the provinceas a whole stronglysuggestthat this patterncon-
tinuedthroughtheremainderof theprewarperiod.30
True to the traditionalpatternof factionalism, of the Bandos to
the orientation
provincialand nationalpoliticswas governedprimarilyby considerations of town
factionalcompetitionduringthe earlydecadesof thiscentury.This changedsome-
what as leaders of Bando Noble became increasinglyinvolved in national and
provincialpolitics.Don Antoniode las Alas, a nephewof VicenteNoble and a man
who eventuallyacquired great wealth and national prominence,representedthe
FirstDistrictof Batangasin the lowerhouse forfourtermsfrom1922 to 1934 and
thenmovedintoimportant executivepositions,becomingSecretary of PublicWorks
and then Head of the Departmentof Finance. Vicente Noble was Governorof
Batangas for over two termsfrom 1930 tO 1937.3' The Nobles were consistently
associatedwithManuel Quezon and the NacionalistaPartyin nationalpolitics.This
was no-ta criticalfactorin theirdominanceof Taal politics,but it enhancedtheir
capacityto operatein higherarenas.Hence, by the 1930's, maintenanceof thisasso-
26 Municipality of Taal, Batangas, Actas Del Housing, Batangas Volume, Part I, Table i.
Concejo Municipal de Taal, Provincial de Batangas, 30In the I94I election, the portion of the total
I.F., 3 June 1925. Philippine population voting reached its prewar
27 Municipal Council Minutes, cited above, al- peak at io percent. Calculated on a population
ways listed all elected officials at the inaugural estimate made on the basis of the I939 census
sessions when they took office. and a figure for voting turnout from Liang,
28 Municipality of Taal, Batangas, Actas Del Philippine Parties and Politics, p. 232.
Concejo Municipal de Taal, 3 June I925. 31 He was appointed in I930 to fill the unex-
29 Calculated from figures for I9I8 and I939 pired term of the elected Governor and then
censuses in Republic of the Philippines, Censtusof electedin I93I and I934.
the Philippines- r96o, Volume I, Population and
534 K. G. MACHADO
ciationwas of veryhigh priorityto the Nobles. In the traditionalfactionalpattern,
however,Bando Ilaya continuedto oppose whoeverBando Noble supportedand
to supportwhoeverBando Noble opposedin provincialand nationalpolitics.Since
the nationaloppositionto Quezon lacked continuity, Bando Ilaya's connectionsin
thatarena also lacked continuity.
The leadersof the latterwere successively aligned
with Claro Recto and the Democratas,with Osmena, and then with Aguinaldo
whentheywerein oppositionto Quezon in nationalpolitics.

The Impactof Provincialand National Politicsand FactionalRealignment

Under the impactof provincialand nationalpolitics,the traditionalpatternof
factionalism in Taal began to erode in the mid-I930's.Nonetheless,it continuedto
be the primarybasis of competition untilthe earlyI960's. The firstreallysignificant
break in the traditionalpatternwas in I934. In thatyear,VicenteNoble recruited
Agaton Orosa as Bando Noble's candidatefor Mayor. Orosa was an important
leaderof Bando Ilaya, and he had been defeatedin at leastthreepreviousattempts
to be electedMayor as that faction'scandidate.He apparentlyhad a verystrong
desireto becomeMayor,so he acceptedNoble's offer.He was electedwitha Noble
as his runningmate. Orosa was closelyrelatedto the Villavicenciofamily,which
had fromthe outsetbeen at the centerof Bando Ilaya, and his candidacysplitit
politically.He continuedto be a supporterof Bando Noble and the Villavicencios
continuedto be dividedin politicsuntilafterindependence.
This episodewas distinctfrompreviousfamilyrealignments betweenfactionsin
thatit was not simplya consequenceof local considerations. Rather,it was in part
an effort by VicenteNoble to dampenfactionalcompetition in T'aal forreasonsof
provincialand national political competition.He was runningfor reelectionas
Governorof Batangasin I934. Moreover,the nationalelectionsthatyearrepresented
the climax of the strugglefor politicalsupremacybetweenQuezon and Osmenfa,
and theirrespectivesupporterswere attemptingto insurevictoryfor theirallied
House and Senate candidates.Hence Noble wantedto consolidatesupportin Taal
for his own candidacyfor Governorand for allies of Quezon in the House and
Senateraces.There were similarefforts in severalBatangastownsthatyear.In this
manner,provincialand nationalconsiderations overrodepurelylocal ones in Taal,
therebyreversing one basic aspectof the traditional
patternof factionalcompetition.
This incidentwas the firstbreachin the traditionalpatternof factionalismin
Taal. And to the extentthatthatpatternbecame less clear cut,it became a some-
what less compellingforcein local politics.Beyondthis,however,provincialand
national politicalcompetitionhad no furthersignificant, disruptiveconsequences
for the traditionalpatternof factionalism in Taal beforeWorld War II. It would
onlybe withthe adventof heavierdemandsforvoterturnouton the partof politi-
cians in higherarenas and the growthof large-scaleelectoralparticipationafter
independencethatlocal leaderswould have strongmotivations to alterthatpattern.
The Expansionof Mass Participation
and theBeginningsof OrganizationalChange
in theEarlyPostindependence
Years
At independence, Bando Ilaya replacedBando Noble as the dominantfactionin
Taal. From I946 to the timeof thisstudy,Bando Ilaya controlledthe towngovern-
ment for everytermsave one (I955-I959). Bando Noble continuedits traditional
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 535
affiliation
with the NacionalistaParty (NP) in I946, while Bando Ilaya supported
Manuel Roxas and his newlyformedLiberal Party(LP). In thatyear,then,Presi-
dent Roxas appointedDr. Ignacio Ilagan of Bando Ilaya as Mayorof Taal, and he
withRoxasand
was laterelectedfortwotermsin I947 and I95I. The association
the LP was a crucialfactorin the initialaccessionto power of Bando Ilaya, as it
gave the lattercontrolof the town administration for a yearbeforethe firstlocal
electionafterindependence.Beyond that,however,its continuancein power was
largelya consequenceof a changingpatternof leadershiprecruitment and changing
organizationalbase. In short,Bando Ilaya was much quicker than Bando Noble
to adapt to the requirements of the new mass participantpolitics.
The rapidand generalexpansionof electoralparticipation throughout thePhilip-
pines in the earlypostindependence is
years primarilyexplainedby two develop-
ments.Firstwas a growthin mass politicization in somepartsof thecountryduring
the wartimeperiodand an attendantgrowthin populardemands.Second,and more
important, was theincreasingcompetitiveness of nationalpoliticsin thepost-Quezon
era and the attendantgrowthin demand by nationaland provincialpoliticiansfor
expandedlocal followings.Batangueiiosin some areas,includingruralareas around
Taal, experiencedconsiderablepoliticizationthroughinvolvementin resistanceac-
tivitiesduringthe Japaneseoccupation.The impactof nationalpoliticalcompetition
in the provincewas also greaterthanin manyareasof the countryin theearlypost-
independenceyearsdue to the presidential candidacyof prominent Batanguefio,Jose
Laurel, in I949. These two factorshelp to accountforthe factthatthe expansionof
the portionof the totalpopulationvotingin BatangasfromI6 percentin I946 to 24
percentin I949 was somewhatabove thenationalaverage.By the I960's, thatportion
was normallyin the neighborhood of 30 percent.32 In any case,it may be presumed
that the expansionof electoralparticipationin Taal approximatedthat of the
provinceas a whole.
Both Taal bandos recruiteda few "new men" to politicsin the earlypostinde-
pendenceyears.These were men with sizeable followingsin the barrios.Their
recruitment was part of an effort
by the bando leadersto developbroaderbases in
ruralpartsof the town.This effort was occasionedprimarily by the desireof Bando
Noble to regainand of Bando Ilaya to maintaincompetitive advantagein Taal and
by the growingdemandson leadersof both bandos by politiciansin higherarenas
forexpandedelectoralsupport.Despite thisalterationin recruitment patterns,men
fromold leading familiescontinuedto be the decisiveleadersof Bando Ilaya for
some timeand of Bando Noble up to the timeof thisstudy.Some of bothbandos'
more importantmembersnow lived in Manila, wheretheyhad startedmigrating
beforethewar to engagein businessor government serviceor to practiceprofessions.
Such personswere unlikelyto run for town office, but theyoftencame to Taal,
maintainedclose tieswiththeirfamiliesthere,and playedmajor rolesin the leader-
shipof thebandos.
32 Calculated on Batangas population estimates Elections, Report of the Commission on Elections
for the years cited made on the basis of I939, to the President of the Philippines and the Congress
I948 and I960 censuses and officialprojections for on the Manner the Elections Were Held . . .
population up to I970 and figures for voting (the date held in each election year). (Manila:
turnout in I946 and I949 from the Batangas Commission on Elections, dated the year after
Provincial Treasurer's Office and in the 960o's each election.)
from Republic of the Philippines, Commission on
536 K. G. MACHADO
The continuity in bando leadershipfromtheprewarto theearlypostindependence
yearsis evidencedby the careerof Dr. Ignacio Ilagan, Bando Ilaya Mayor until
I955. He was froma familywithits originsin the principaliaof the late nineteenth
century.His grandfather had, in fact,been the last Capitan33under the Spanish
regime.His fatherwas a landownerwith a moderatesized holding.Althoughthe
Ilagan familyhad been a mainstayof the Bando Ilaya,neitherhe norhis fatherhad
been extensively involvedin politicsin the prewarperiod.He had been primarily
engagedin the practiceof dentistry in the decade beforethe war. During the Japa-
neseoccupationhe was an important memberof theintelligence networksupporting
the guerrillasand was imprisonedforhis activitieson severaloccasions.
In the earlypostindependence years,both bandos soughtto broadentheirbases
in the barrios,but under Ilagan's leadership,Bando Ilaya was more successfulin
this.Until I953, Ilagan had an advantageousassociationwiththedominantnational
party.He had also developedclose associationswithmanypersonsin thebarriosas
a resultof his activitiesduringthe occupation,and he activelysoughtto expandhis
personalfollowingthroughoutthe town'sbarrioswhile he was Mayor.By contrast,
Bando Noble leaderstriedto broadentheirbase onlyindirectly, by forgingalliances
withmen who had barriofollowings, ratherthanby developingtheirown townwide
personalfollowings.Moreover,Ilagan's stylewas more in tune with populartastes
and demands.He spokein an essentially populistidiom,and barriopeople saw him
as beingmore "approachable"thanmanyof the othertown"aristocrats." He had a
ratherrough and readyapproachto all problems.He was regardedas matapang,
usually renderedin English as brave but implyinga kind of recklessnessbetter
expressedby the notionof derring-do. This is popularlyregardedas a virtuein a
leader.He reportedly had,forexample,a largeAmericanmotorcycle witha machine-
gun mountedon the handlebarson whichto patrolthe town and descendon trou-
blemakers.On thisbasis,Ilagan was seen to be tryingto meetthe need forsecurity
in the barriosoccasionedby a ratherseriousdeterioration of peace and orderin the
immediatepostwarperiod. While his actual accomplishments were fairlylimited,
he was widelyseen as being moreconcernedwithbarrioproblemsand sensitivities
than the Bando Noble leaders.Hence what was eventuallyto becomea sharpdivi-
sion betweenthe factionsalong barrio/poblacion lines began during Ilagan's ad-
ministration.

Nature of Factional Competition

Antagonistic
Ilagan did not run for a thirdtermas Mayorin 1955,thoughhe continuedto
be an importantleader of the faction.Certain eventsduring his administration,
particularlythoserelatedto his retirement,
indicatethe natureof factionalcompeti-
tion and the antagonismthat it generatedin Taal. During Ilagan's tenure,Taal
declinedas a marketcenterforthe area while Lemerybecame more importantin
that role. Taal's marketrevenuesdeclined nearly20 percent,while Lemery'sin-
creasedover8o percentbetween1949-50 and I955-56.'3 Otherthanthe loss in

33 Capitan was the titlegiven the top adminis- Batangas Provincial Treasurer's Office. Between
trativeofficialin townsduringthe latteryearsof those years, market revenue dropped from ap-
the Spanish regime. proximately Ig,ooo to 15,400 pesos in Taal and
34 Province of Batangas, Municipal Annual it climbed from around 24,600 to 44,000 pesos
Statements,Taal, I949-50, and I955-56, in in Lemery.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 537
revenue,the declineof the markethad littleimpacton Taalefnosbecause of their
close proximityto the Lemerymarket.Ilagan's criticsclaimed that many market
vendorsmovedfromTaal to Lemeryduringthoseyearsbecausehe was overzealous
in enforcement of marketregulationsconcerningstallplacementand sanitation.His
defendersclaimedthatBando Noble leadersinspiredthe vendors'exodusto Lemery
in orderto underminehis administration. Personsfromboth factionssaid thatan-
othermain reasonforthe declinein the Taal marketwas theplacementof the bus
terminalin Lemery,but Dr. Ilagan's supportersclaimed that this was engineered
by Bando Noble leadersto damage his administration. Similarchargesand counter-
chargeswere made concerningotherproblemsin the town's administration, such
as a deterioration in serviceand decline in revenuefromithe water and electric
plants.It was, of course,difficult
to assesstheseconflictinginterpretations
of events,
as theyclearlyreflected intensefactionalbiases,but the factthattheywere mnadeat
all showed the depthof factionalantagonism.
The primaryreason for Ilagan's retirement fromelectoralcompetitionin I955
was the detachmentfromTaal of one of his major bailiwicksto createa separate
town. And this episode, which can be assessedmore accuratelythan those cited
above, clearlyshowed that Taal Bando leaders were not above seekingfactional
advantageat the town's expense.Briefly,Vicente Noble and other Bando Noble
leaderssecuredthe supportof the provincialGovernorand the Congressmanrepre-
sentingtheFirstDistrictof Batangas,forthecreationof a new townfromI2 barrios
of Taal.35This was an area of strongsupportforIlagan, and theireffort was appar-
entlycalculatedprimarilyto make it easierto displacehim. This divisionhad more
than politicalconsequences,however,as it was also financiallydetrimentalto the
town. A fisherywhich was leased by the town for a substantialreturnwas in the
detachedarea.3"In any case, havinglost thatmuch supportso close to the election,
Ilagan feltthatit was fruitlessto run again. He was succeeded,forone term,by a
Bando Noble Mayor.

The Emergenceof Mayor Gahol and OrganizationalChangein Bando llaya

Bando Ilaya began to changefundamentally afterIlagan's retirement. Thcre was
a sharpbreakin thepatternof leadershiprecruitment in thatfactionin I959. A "new
man" who had enteredtown politicssoon afterindependence,Pedro Gahol, was
electedMayor as BalndoIlaya's candidatein thatyear.He was the first"nlewman"
to assume that office.He was firstelected Mayor largelyon the strengthof the
supportthathe receivedfromthe old Bando Ilaya leaders,thoughhe was aided in
the effortby his own following.Afterhis initial election,he began building an
extensiveand highlyspecializedbarrio-based machine,whichincreasingly gave him
an independentbase of power. In I970, Mayor Gahol was formallyonly one of
severaltop Bando Ilaya leaders,but he was, in fact,the strongestpoliticalleaderin
Taal. The Mayor'sorganizationhad clearlyreplacedthe constellation of old leading
familiesat the centerof the faction.And Mayor Gahol, who had no otheroccupa-
tion than town executive,had become a careerpoliticianwho devotedmost of his

35 Towns were createdby act of Congress.If 36 At the time of separation,the fisherywas

a Congressmanwith the majoritypartyintroduces bringingin about 30,000 pesos a yearin revenue
a bill to create a new town withinhis district for the town.Interviewwith the MunicipalTreas-
it is likelyto becomelaw. urerof Taal, 23 FebruaryI970.
538 K. G. MACHADO
time and energiesto the administrative and politicalrequirements of his office.He
was, then,a "new man" who had becomea professional politicianand leaderof a
specializedpoliticalmachine.
Pedro Gahol was bornintoa barriofamilyof verymodestcircumstances in I9I0.
His fatherhad been a travellingmerchant,and he also pursued that occupation
afterattendingpublic high school. In the I930'S, he had been a memberof the
Young Philippines,a nationalistyouth organization,and he had been a barrio
lider37in some prewarelections.He was a guerrillaleader in Batangasduringthe
Japaneseoccupation,and he continuedin armyserviceas an activereserveofficer
until 1948. In 1951, he was asked by VicenteNoble to run forthe Taal Council as
a Bando Noble candidate.He was recruitedprimarilybecause of his sizeable fol-
lowing among formerguerrillas.He won the Council seat easily.Gahol demon-
stratedconsiderableflairfor the new styleof politics,and he was quite ambitious.
Given his background,he could not have receivedthe Bando Noble nominationfor
Mayor.In 1955, however,Bando Ilaya was in need of a good candidateto succeed
Ilagan, and Gahol switchedto thatfactionto becomeits candidate.He was strongly
promotedfor this nominationby the retiringIlagan. He verynarrowlylost that
yearbutwas electedMayorofTaal in 1959.
By the timeGahol becameMayor,politiciansin higherarenashad becomemore
insistentin theirdemands that local leadersturnout large numbersof voterson
theirbehalvesthan theyhad been in the early postindependence years.And they
were increasingly preparedto make resourcesavailable to thosein the local arena
who could and would use them effectively to such politicalends. Moreover,rural
people's expectationsof personaland barrio assistancefrompoliticalleaders had
been greatlystimulatedby the promisesof politiciansand by theirgenerallyin-
creasingsocial mobilization.Hence in 1959, the situationwas ripe fora local leader
with appropriateskillsto build a machinein Taal. Pedro Gahol not only had the
requisiteskills,he had the necessarymotivations.Politicswas a more promising
opp)ortunity than most open to him in the town. And he could best assure con-
til-uilngin officeby buildinga power base independentof the town's old leading
families.He was also interestedin the improvement of barrioconditions.Control
of a machinewas the onlyway he could deliverthe largenumberof votesrequired
to securenationaland provincialresourcesnecessaryto barriodevelopment.These
two factorswere mrutually related,as such resourceswere also necessaryto main-
tenanceof a machine.
During his winningelectioncampaignin 1959, Mayor Gahol began systemati-
cally to expand his own barrio following,and he continuedthis effortafterhis
election.He developedan extensivenetworkof barriolidersthroughoutthe town
whose loyaltieswere exclusivelyto him,thusreducinghis relianceon lidersloyalto
otherbando leaders.He concentrated on securingthe supportof the
particularly
Barrio Captains.38To insure continuingsupportof his barrio liders,he had to
maintainties with them on a regularbasis betweenelections.In additionto his

37 A lider is a personwho mobilizesvoterson theoretically) since 1960. Beside his administrative

behalf of and/or gives the supportof his fol- and peacekeeping functions, the Barrio Captain is
lowersto a candidate. the chief spokesmnanfor the barrio pcople to of-
38 The Barrio Captain is the top officialof the ficials at higher levels of government.
barrio. This post has been elective (at least
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 539
attentiveness to these liders,he had been verydiligentin generatingoutside re-
sourcesto supportdesiredbarrioprojects,particularly in the areas of road construc-
tion, provisionof potable water supplies,and electrification.39As I will show in
anothercontext,his effortsin these respectsresultedin overwhelmingelectoral
supportfor him in the barrios.
During his tenure,MayorGahol had gained the consistent supportof nearlyall
27 Barrio Captains in Taal, and theycomprisedthe backboneof his organization.
Their ties to the Mayorwere further cementedby the factthathe encouragedtheir
almost completedependenceon him. He exercisedvery tight controlover the
distribution of resourcesto the barrios.He had even effectivelyresistedthe station-
ing of a nationalcommunitydevelopmentofficialin Taal fora decade beforeone
was simplyassigned there in 1969. Such officialswork closely with the Barrio
Captains and disperseoutside resourcesindependentof the Mayor. Because he
enjoyed such widespreadsupportand because his competitionfromBando Noble
in the barrioswas quite weak, he had also managed to keep electionsfor barrio
officialsnon-competitive in mostareas.This, of course,meantthathe playeda large
role in the selectionof the BarrioCaptains,thusfurther increasingtheirdependence
on him.
The Mayor'ssupportamong the BarrioCaptainswas largelypersonaland based
on instrumental considerations.They were mostemphaticabout theirlack of parti-
san commitment. One, who explainedthat he was more a followerof the Mayor
than eitherthe latter'sBando or Party,said, typically,
The Bandosare not so important here (in thisbarrio).They neverhave been.
EversinceI can remem-
The peoplein the(poblacion)takepoliticstooseriously.
ber,theBandoshaveneverdoneanything usefulforanybody.
The peoplehere(in
thebarrio)willgo withleaderswhocan helpthem.The Mayoris veryhelpfulto
thepeoplein thebarrio.Beforehis time,therewereno wellshere;peoplehad to
getevendrinking waterfromtheriver.40
The Barrio Captains,in turn,derived theirsupportin severalways. Some were
simplythe men with the largestfamiliesin the barrio,and otherswere popular,
longtimebarrio leaders.Increasingly, however,theywere the men with the best
accessto outsideresources,whichmeanta close tie withMayorGahol. As the latter
he had to be generousin chan-
chose to tryto keep barriopoliticsnon-competitive,
nelingresourcesthroughhis allied BarrioCaptains.
The centralelementof MayorGahol's machinewas an organizationof officials.
In additionto the BarrioCaptains,theotherkey membersof theMayor'sorganiza-
tionwere allied personsin electivepostsin towngovernment. The othercandidates
for towniofficeon the Bando Ilaya ticketgenerallyhad independentbases of sup-
port,and theywere selectedpartlyfor that reason.Some were fromold leading
familiesassociatedwith the faction,thoughthereappear to have been fewersuch

39At the time of this study,all 27 of Taal's mote barrios,extensionof electricity

barrios were accessibleby road; i I had piped
water from the town's waterworks;and 8 had
electricityfrom the town's electricsystem.All
barrios that clid not have piped water had at
least 3 artesianwells, and some had as many as
7. Much of the extensionof roads to more re-
to the bar-
rios, and constructionof artesianwells was ac-
complishedduring Mayor Gahol's administration
with outside resources.Interviewwith superin-
tendentof the Taal Electricand WaterworksSys-
temi,24 February1970.
40 Interview,
2I March 1970.
540 K. G. MACHADO
candidateseveryelectionduringMayor Gahol's tenure.Their inclusionin the slate
of candidateswas meantto securetheirfamilies'supportforthe Bando Ilaya ticket.
Otherswere"new men" who had developedfollowingsin variousways.One Coun-
cilor was, for example,an amateurmedical practitioner, thoughnot a traditional
herbolario.He was acquainted with modern medicine throughassociationwith
towndoctors.He spentmuch timein the barriosgivingpeople medicaladvice and
sometimeshelping to arrangeprofessionalassistancefor them. On that basis he
had developeda following,and he had been a liderfortown and provincialpoliti-
ciansfor20 yearsbeforehe ran foroffice withtheMayorin I967. AnotherCouncilor
was a popular youngManila attorney.He had widespreadsupportin his and his
wife'sbarrios;the supportof most of the town'sphysicians,acquired throughhis
brother-in-law who was a doctorin Taal; and the supportof manyTaalefioswho
had receivedcomplimentary professionalservicesfromeitherhe or his wife (who
was a pharmacist).There was mutualsupportbetweensuchpersonsand the Mayor
at electiontime.Such supportwas clearlyof less importanceto theMayorthanthat
of his barrioliders.This is indicatedby the factthatin I967, the Mayor'srunning
mateslost the Vice Mayorshipand fiveof the eightCouncil seatswhile he was re-
electedwith the largestportionof the vote (58%) he had everwon.4'

The Impact of Provincialand National PoliticalCompetitionand Factional

Realignment
Mayor Gahol enjoyed access to the public resourcesnecessaryto maintainhis
machinebecause of his ties with provincialand nationalNacionalistaPartyleaders
and his skill in turningout votersfor Nacionalistacandidates.Establishingthose
ties was, however,in some respectscontraryto the demandsof Taal factionalpoli-
tics.It requiredthatthe factionbreakits longstandingtieswiththe LP in national
politics,an actionthatsome of the Mayor'sfellowbando leadersdisapproved.But
as I will show, pressuresoriginatingin the provincialand national arenas took
precedenceover the desiresof thoseleaderswho wantedto maintainthe connection
with the LP and consequentlydisruptedrelationships among Bando Ilaya leaders
and otheraspectsof the traditionalpatternof factionalism.
In Taal, Bando Noble had always beeniassociatedwith the NacionalistaParty,
and Bando Ilaya had been affiliated
withtheLiberalPartysinceitsestablishment in
1946. As noted,the LP affiliation
had been mostadvantageousto Bando Ilaya in the
earlypostindependence years.But it increasingly
became a liability,as the election
of PresidentMagsaysayin 1953 inauguratedeight yearsof NP controlof the na-
tionaladministrationand as a verypowerful,long-term provincialGovernorturned
Batangas into a consistentNP stronghold.Hence, even thoughhe was electedas
the candidateof the LP in 1959,MayorGahol foundit prudentto supportthe NP
Governorin orderto assureneeded assistanceforthe town.Afterthe I96I election
of LP PresidentMacapagal, however,the newly appointed Batangas Provincial
Chairmanof the LP insistedthat Mayor Gahol supportthe Party'scandidatefor
Governorin the I963 local elections.He did not thinkthathe could do this con-
sideringthe assistancethe town had receivedfromthe incumbentGovernorand
the remotechance the LP challengerhad of winning.While the kind of realistic
41 Fromelectionrecordsin theMunicipalMayor'sOffice,
Taal, Batangas.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 541
accommodationMayorGahol had made was commonlyacceptedin the Philippines,
the ProvincialChairmanof the LP remainedadamantin demandingthe Mayor's
supportfor the Party'scandidatefor Governor.When he refused,he was denied
the officialnominationof the LP. Mayor Gahol ran as an independentLiberal in
I963 and was reelected,but he remainedin the bad graces of the provincialLP
leadershipand hence of the nationalLP administration. In I965, then,he formally
with the NP and supportedMarcos' bid for the Presidency,and he had
affiliated
been a strongsupporter of theNP sincethattime.As a consequenceof thesemoves,
the respectivepartyaffiliationsof the two Bandos were largelyreversed,but they
became less clear cut than theyhad previouslybeen.
Given the natureof thePhilippinepoliticalsystemand thedemandsplaced upon
him for carryingout variousprojectsin the town,Mayor Gahol's supportof the
incumbentNP Governorand his change of partieswas completelyrational,as it
was the only way to maintaingood accessto provincialand nationalresources.His
decisionto changepartieswas not,however,congenialto some of the olderleaders
of Bando Ilaya, particularly some of those residentin Manila, who preferredfor
variousreasonsto staywith the Liberal Party.Hence it divided the leadershipof
the Bando in a mannerthat became to some extentpermanent.Mayor Gahol's
assessmentof the comparative importanceof the supportof local factionleadersand
of provincialand nationalpartyleadersthat underlayhis decisionsto supportthe
NP Governorand to switchto the NP in I965 is reflected in the followingcom-
ments.He said,
The factionis moreimportant
in somewaysthantheparty.You willalwayshave
the supportof yourcandidacyfromyourfactionbutthisis notnecessarily
so of
Forexample,
yourparty. I wasdropped
bytheLP as candidate
in I963 . . . Many
of thepeoplein thefactionare friendsand relatives-grandparents,parents, and
children. In thepartiesyoudo nothaveto be friends
to worktogether ... Butthe
factionis less importanttodaythaneven20 yearsago . . . Thereis a realization
bymanypeoplethatthesefactional differences forthetown...
arenotso beneficial
Also .... thefaction canonlyhelpyouat electiontime.Afterelection to carryon
theworkof thelocal government, youneedpartytiesto provincial and national
officials.42

In any case, the Mayorwas able to make his choicelargelyon the basis of calcula-
tionsof power and comparativeadvantage.As a "new man," he did not have inti-
mate familyties withotherBando leadersthatmighthave constrained his freedom
of action,and he had less motivationto perpetuatethe traditionalpatternof fac-
tionalismthanmostof theold Bando leaders.And sincehis main base of powerwas
his specialized,barrio-based machine,he was not takinga veryseriouspoliticalrisk
in alienatingsome of the older Bando leaders.
Continuingdemandson bando leadersfromhigherlevels and the necessityof
thosein powerto respondto themhad diminishedtheimportance of townfactional
divisionsin provincialand nationalpolitics.Beforeindependence, will be recalled,
it
the tendencywas foreach bando consistently to supportthe other'sopponentsand
to oppose the other'sallies at higherlevels.This had ceased to be the case in Taal.
While theircompetition in the town was not in the least diminished,forexample,
42 Interview, 2I February 1970.
542 K. G. MACHADO
manyleadersof bothbandos supportedthe Nacionalistapresidentialcandidaciesof
Magsaysayin 1953 and Marcos in i969. They did thisindependently, however,not
throughcombinedorganization. Leaders of the bandos associated with the LP in
each of those years apparentlyacted on the assumptionthat the NP candidates
weresurewinnersand in the hope of securingwhateverbenefitsmightfollowfrom
having supportedthe winner.The unityamong Bando Ilaya leadersin supportof
provincialand nationalpoliticianshad also brokendown as a consequenceof in-
compatibleindividualcommitments thathad developed,particularly afterthe I965
alignmentwiththe NP. They were,forexample,dividedin boththe I965 and i969
race in the Ist Districtof Batangas.
Presidentialelectionsand the i965 congressional
In any event,the supportof one Bando Ilaya leader,Mayor Gahol, had far sur-
passed that of any of the othersin importance.
In responseto the differences among Bando Ilaya leaders over provincialand
nationalpolitics,the Presidentof the Bando had made it his policyafterI965 to
encouragefreechoice in otherthan town elections.He said,
The bandosusedto participate actively Recently
in supportof nationalcandidates.
somemembers havefortheirown reasonsnotgonealongwiththeBandochoices
fornationaland provincial To prevent
office. divisionof theBando .... I have
made it a rulethatfornationaland provincial officesmembers will have a free
choice.The Bandowas createdforlocalpolitics, and I don'twantto compromise
If nationalor provincial
itsexistence. candidateswillask forBandosupport, I will
explainthisto them,butsaythatif theycan sellthemselves, theBandomembers
mightleantowardthem,butat besttheywillonlyworkforthemas individuals.43
The President,who was a Manila dentistand old Bando leader,was primarily
concernedwith maintainingthe integrity of the factionin town politics.Otherold
those
Bando leaders,particularly in Manila, whosecontinuinginterestin the faction
was largelybased on theirability use Bando ties to gain influencewith national
to
politiciansfor theirown purposes,however,foundthis new situationless to their
liking and were apparentlylosing interestin it.

DecliningImportanceof Old Bando Ilaya Leaders

With the growthof Mayor Gahol's barrio-basedmachineand of hiisties with
provincialand nationalNP leaders,the older leadersof Bando Ilaya became less
importantin the mobilizationof voters.The old leadingfamiliesthathad formerly
been at the centerof the factionhad moved increasingly to the periphery.Those
whose memberscontinuedto supportthe Bando could contributemoney,their
families'support,their tenants'votes and/or sometimespersonal followings.A
memberof one of the old leading familieswith the Bando who was directorof a
major medicalfacilityin Manila was able, forexample,to arrangethe employment
of numerousTaalefios in that facility,thus securingvotes fromthem and their
familiesfor candidatesthat he supported.In any case, such men were considered
to be partof the Bando's leadership,and some of themwere includedas officers
in
There was a nucleusof abouttenmen,includingMayorGahol,
its formalstructure.
who comprisedthe top leadershipof the Bando. In fact,however,the Mayor had
becomethe decisiveleader,becausehe had sufficient strengthto act independently.
43 Interview,22 April 1970.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 543
Because of Mayor Gahol's strengthand independence,some of the old Bando
Ilaya leadershad become dissatisfied with him. Some dislikedhis almostexclusive
concernwith barriodevelopment, which theyfeltwas being accomplishedat the
expenseof the needs of the poblacion.Otherswere unhappybecause theyfelthe
had giveninadequatesupportto theirfavoredBando candidatesfortownoffices and
had thus contributed to the latter'sdefeatat the polls. Some also stillharboredre-
sentmentover the Mayor'sdecisionto changepartiesin I965. More generally, these
leaderssimplyfeltthattheyno longerhad sufficient say in Bando or town affairs.
Reflectingthis sentiment,a long time memberof the Bando, who was most out-
spokenin his dissatisfaction gave the followinganalysisof the transitionthat had
taken place in Taal. He said,
As faras I am concerned,Bando Ilaya is dead. I am now moreor less disasso,
ciatedfromit,and am now moreidentified withsomeof theleadersof theother
Bando ... MayorGahol has takenovertheBando.... I supported himearlier,
but beforeany of us knewit he had takenoverthepartyand gottenthetown
underhisthumb. . . He shouldnothaverunagain(in I967) so someof us
workedagainsthim.44
Otherold leadersstillwith the Bando were less critical,but therewere indications
thatsome were consideringjoint selectionand sponsorship of a candidatewiththe
Bando Noble leadersif MayorGahol ran again in Ig7I. They recognized,however,
thatlong standingfactionalantagonismswould probablystandin the way of such
an effortunless a candidatewho had no associationwith eitherbando could be
found.

The OppositionBando Noble in a Periodof Change

One of the reasonsMayorGahol had been able to developsucha strongposition
in the barrioswas thatthe oppositionBando Noble was slow to adapt to changing
conditions.Its leaders had gottenoffto a poor startat independencewhen they
backed the losing candidatein the 1946 presidentialelection,thus insuringthe ap-
pointmentof a Bando Ilaya Mayorto administer thetownfora yearbeforethefirst
election.Many top leadersof bothbandos were now residentin Manila ratherthan
Taal, thoughtheymaintainedclose tieswiththosein townand a stronginterestin
local politics.The leadersof Bando Noble thatremainedin the town continuedto
be orientedprimarilyto affairsin the poblacionratherthan in the barrios.To the
extentthatBando Noble leadersexpandedtheirbarriofollowingit was by making
casual allianceswithimen who had such followingsratherthan cementingtieswith
a growingnetworkof barriolidersof theirown. Such alliancesprovedunreliable
in the face of firstIlagan's and particularly
Gahol's efforts
to developan extended
networkof personaltiesin the barrios.Bando Noble's problemsin thisrespectwere
also compoundedby the factthattheywere out of powermostof the time.
While Bando Noble leaders did not match Mayor Gahol's effortsin barrio
organizationin the I960's, theydid not slackentheirefforts to undermineBando
Ilaya in variousways.One of Bando Noble's leaders,who was a highofficial in the
Garcia administration, was instrumentalin engineeringthe detachmentof five

44 Interview, 25 April 1970.

544 K. G. MACHADO
barriosthat were a strongholdof Mayor Gahol to createa new town in I96I.45 It
was also claimedby Bando Ilaya leadersthatin I964 and I965 Bando Noble mem-
bersresidentin the town were systematically attemptingto underminethe financial
positionof the Mayor'sadministration by leavingtheirwatertaps open,thusneces-
sitatingthe installationof water metersand abandonmentof a flat-rate payment
system.Such activitiesscarcelyoffsetthe Mayor'sorganizationalefforts in the bar-
rios. Continuinglack of successat the polls and various competingactivitiesof
Bando Noble's leadershad led to a steadydeclinein activemembership. One top
leadersaid thatin I970 therewere onlyabout ioo reallyactivemembersof the fac-
tion,includingthe liders,whereastwentyyearsearlier,therehad been around500.46
Beforethe i967 elections,Bando Noble leadersbegan an effort to improvetheir
strongcandidatesfortown
positionin Taal politics.They selectedsome particularly
offices.
The greaterstrength of theircandidatesalong withdivisionsin theleadership
ranksof Bando Ilaya helpedthemto make a verygood showing.Their candidates
were electedas Vice-Mayorand to fiveof the eightCouncil seats.While some of
those electedwere fromwithinthe circleof traditionalBando Noble supporters,
otherswere "new men" who had become professionals(attorneysand college in-
structors).To the bases of supportthe latterhad in theirown barriostheyadded
the supporttheyenjoyedby virtueof being professionals. The lattersupportcame
primarilyfrompersonswho had receivedcomplimentary legal servicesand former
students.The selectionof thesecandidatesseemedto represent an effortto broaden
the faction'sbase of support.Nonetheless,at the time of this study,Bando Noble
was stillin manyrespectsa traditionalfaction.

Emergenceof a Barrio/Poblacion
Division
The different coursestaken by the two Bandos since independencehad been
clearlyreflectedin a major alterationof the traditionalpatternof electoralcompeti-
tion.What was beforethewar strictly a contestbetweentwo constellations of leading
poblacionfamiliesand theirsmall numbersof followersin the barrioshad become
afterindependencea divisionbetweenthe barriosand the poblacion.This line of
divisionbegan duringthe administration of Ilagan and becamemoremarkedafter
the electionof Mayor Gahol. The latter'sdevelopmentpolicies and organizing
effortsgave him an extensivenetworkof supportersin the barrios.The sense of
social exclusivenessof some poblaciondwellersand the feelingof many that the
Mayor allocated a disproportionate share of available resourcesto barrio projects
ratherthan theirneeds lefthim with limitedsupportin the poblacion.In I967, he
received70 percentof thevotesin the barriosbut only34 percentof the votesin the
pablacion.Since over four-fifths
of the votersin the townresidedin thebarrios,this
put him in a commandingposition,and he received58 percentof the vote in the
town as a whole.47This represented thepeak to thattimeof a steadyincreaseof his
supportin the barriosand the valley of a steadydecline of his supportin the

45 The creationof the new town was actually implemented.

not implemented in I96I because of the election 46 Interview,27 FebruaryI970.
of Macapagal, a Liberal Party President.When 47 From electionrecordsin the MunicipalMay-
Mayor Gahol was droppedby the provincialLP or's Office,
Taal, Batangas.
as the Liberal candidatein I963, however,it was
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 545
poblacion.Bando Noble, on the otherhand, had done littleto organizethe barrios
and was the onlyalternative forthosein thepoblacion.Hence theincreasingpolari-
zation. It should also be notedthattherewas on the partof some people on either
side of this divisiona good deal of rancorthat seemed to stem at least as much
fromsocial antagonismas frompoliticaldifferences. The "barriomanners"of the
Mayorand the "aristocratic arrogance"of some Bando Noble leaderswereissuesfor
somepeoplein Taal.

Summary
In Taal, therewas still some resemblancebetweenthe politicsof I970 and the
politicsof I920, but the changesthathad taken place were verysubstantial.There
was stillsome continuity in the familiesprovidingkey participantsin politics.This
was particularly so in the leadershipranks of the oppositionBando Noble. Men
fromold leadingfamilieswere also in leadershippositionsin the dominantBando
Ilaya, but theyhad ceased to have a decisivesay in its affairs.
Pedro Gahol, a "new
man" who was firstelectedMayor in I959, had built a specialized,barrio-based
machine.He had developedclose and consistent ties with an extensivenetworkof
barrioliders,particularly BarrioCaptains,and othertown officials. Key barriosup-
porterswerehis own men,notindirectsupporters gainedthroughalliancewithother
Bando leaders. Hence he had gained a high degree of independencefrom the
latter.Ties betweenthe Mayor and men in his organizationwere cementedby a
varietyof mutualexchanges,and the Mayor'scontribution to manysuch exchanges
was made possibleby his accessto externalresources.On thisbasis,he had become
the paramountleaderof Bando Ilaya and thetown.The priceforthiswas, however,
growingdependenceon leadersin higherarenasand a necessaryreorientation away
fromsome purelylocal concernsand towardconcernsderivingfromthe connections
with thosein higherarenas.In theserespects,then,therehad been a fundamental
alterationin the traditionalpatternof factionalism. The existenceof a fairlystable
and clear-cuttraditionalpatternof factionalismin Taal meant,however,thatchange
had takenplace withinthattraditionalframework and to some extentbeen shaped
by it.

Local Changeand PoliticalDevelopment

The significance of the changesdescribedhere for Philippinepoliticaldevelop-
ment dependsin part on the extentto which theyhad taken place in the country
as a whole. If the argumentpresentedhere is correct,such changes should have
been morepronouncedin areas of highersocial mobilization.This means the areas
directlywithintheorbitof Manila (roughly,a ioo mile radius),thefewotherurban
centersof the countryand immediatelyadjacent areas, and to some extentthe
largertowns(i.e., capitals) of provincesthatare,as a whole,less mobilized.Within
these areas, theyshould have been more pronouncedin thoseplaces where land-
holdingis less concentrated. The long-term significance
of the changesoutlinedalso
depends upon the futuredirectionof Philippinepoliticaldevelopment.
Had the Philippinesmaintainedrepresentative governmentalinstitutionsand
continuedto permitopen political competition,the kinds of changes described
could have been expectedgraduallyto occurin new areas withincreasingmobiliza-
546 K. G. MACHADO
tionand, shouldit have occurred,deconcentration of landownership.While a demo-
craticpatternof politicaldevelopmentwas still being pursued,the emergenceof
professionalpoliticiansand local machinescould be viewed as stepsenrouteto a
more viable partysystem.Even thoughtheyhad not managed to formthemselves
into stablepoliticalparties,therewas an expandingnetworkof professionalpoli-
ticiansstartingin the national arena and extendingquite deeply into society.It
seemed likelythat wheneverotherconditionsfavoredpartystabilization,alliances
of professionalswould have been more readilyable to organizein stableformthan
alliancesbetweenprofessionalsand more traditionalfactionleaders.In any case,
shouldthe democraticpatternof development be revivedwithoutan extendedinter-
ruptionin competitionand mass participation, such trendswould likelycontinue.
Assumingthat the Philippinepoliticalsystemcontinuesto undergoredirection
in an authoritarianpattern,thechangesthathave been describedherewill facilitate
thatredirection.This is so becausesuch changesrepresenta declinein theautonomy
of,local leadershipand a growingcentralization of power in the hands of national
leaders.The bases of politicalpowerin Philippinesocietywere widelydispersedfor
a verylongtime.As one scholarhas noted,

Leaders of the Philippinenation,whetherSpanishgovernors-general,

Malolos
or Philippinepresidents
ilustrados,Americancivil governors, had consistently
recognizedthe need forstrongcentralcontrolif administrationpolicieswereto
be enforcedon the local level.An equallystrongtradition of local autonomy
pervadedthe ruralregionswhichweresubjectto the directives of the national
government. Membersof the principalia who lackedthe abilityto changethe
rulingtriedto retaintheirtraditional
centralauthority's leadershipand local
statusbybuildingup politicalinfluence
which,at themunicipal or regionallevel,
was superiorto thatof the nationalgovernment. Only when concessions were
made to thislocal/rural
aristocracycouldthepoliciesof thecentralauthoritybe
effectively
implemented elite-controlled
in the subnational, areas.48

The decliningstrengthof old leading families,whose power was based largelyon

bureaucraticpenetrationof rural com-
local resources,will certainlyease effective
munitiesand centraldirectionof theiraffairs.
Political competitionand mass participationwere necessaryconditionsfor the
kind of machinesthathad developedin manylocal communities. With the suspen-
sion of those two featuresof Philippinepolitics,thesenew, more specializedlocal
organizationswill no doubt wither.The new professionalswho built them had
becomeverydependenton externalresources, and theywill not be able to fall back
upon traditionalfactionalorganizationor local resourcesto retain positionsof
importancein theircommunities.If theywish to do that,theywill most likely
continueto seek supportfromthe center.Constructionof more centrallydirected
and deeply rootedpoliticalmachineryon some new or modifieddesign will be
requisiteto developmentof a moreeffective authoritariansystem.If such an effort
is made,it seemsprobablethatthe participation of much of the extantlocal leader-
ship will be sought.And it also seems likelythat the new professionals, lacking
Jr.,"Conflictin the Philippine Compadre Colonialism (Ann Arbor: Michigan
48 Frank Jenista,

Legislature:The Commissionand the Assembly Paperson Southand SoutheastAsia, No. 3, I971),

fromI907 tO I9I3," In NormanG. Owen, p. 89.
FROM TRADITIONAL FACTION TO MACHINE 547
independentresources,will have strongmotivationto becomeactivepartsof such
centrallydirectedpoliticalmachinery.
If so, town leaderswill no longerbe brokers
betweenpersonsin the barriosand leadersin higherarenasbut will simplybe local
agentsof nationalauthority.49

49 One early indication that the kinds of devel-
opments suggested above have begun is founcl in
the conduct of the July 1973 referendum on the
indefiniteextension of Marcos' tenure in office.The
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Leo-
nardo Perez, reminded local officialsthat they serve
at the pleasure of the President under the transi-
tory provisions (Section 9) of the new Constitu-
tion and advised them that the results of the
referendum would, therefore,also judge whether
they would continue in office.Pablo Barretto,
"SecretBallotingDecreed,"The PhilippineTimes,
played a major role
I5 July1973. Local officials
in turningout the gI percentyes vote on behalf
understanding
of the Presiclent, that this would
likelyinsurethe extensionof theirown termsin
office.