Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts,

and the Infrastructure of Democracy

Lisa Herzog
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/citizen-knowledge-markets-experts-and-the-infrastruc
ture-of-democracy-lisa-herzog/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Reclaiming the System: Moral Responsibility, Divided

Labour, and the Role of Organizations in Society Lisa
Herzog

https://ebookmass.com/product/reclaiming-the-system-moral-
responsibility-divided-labour-and-the-role-of-organizations-in-
society-lisa-herzog/

Spaces on the Spectrum: How Autism Movements Resist

Experts and Create Knowledge Tan

https://ebookmass.com/product/spaces-on-the-spectrum-how-autism-
movements-resist-experts-and-create-knowledge-tan/

Democracy Without Politics in EU Citizen Participation

Alvaro Oleart

https://ebookmass.com/product/democracy-without-politics-in-eu-
citizen-participation-alvaro-oleart/

Eleanor Roosevelt's Views on Diplomacy and Democracy:

The Global Citizen 1st ed. Edition Dario Fazzi

https://ebookmass.com/product/eleanor-roosevelts-views-on-
diplomacy-and-democracy-the-global-citizen-1st-ed-edition-dario-
fazzi/
The Virtues of Vulnerability. Humility, Autonomy, and
Citizen-Subjectivity Sara Rushing

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-virtues-of-vulnerability-
humility-autonomy-and-citizen-subjectivity-sara-rushing/

Citizen Fetus: The Changing Image of Motherhood

Alessandra Piontelli

https://ebookmass.com/product/citizen-fetus-the-changing-image-
of-motherhood-alessandra-piontelli/

The Economics of Financial Markets and Institutions

Oren Sussman

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-economics-of-financial-markets-
and-institutions-oren-sussman/

Modernism and the Meaning of Corporate Persons Lisa

Siraganian

https://ebookmass.com/product/modernism-and-the-meaning-of-
corporate-persons-lisa-siraganian/

The Consumer Citizen 1st Edition Edition Ethan Porter

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-consumer-citizen-1st-edition-
edition-ethan-porter/
Citizen Knowledge
 Citizen Knowledge
Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of
Democracy

LISA HERZOG
 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2024

Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes, without the prior permission in
writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with
the appropriate reprographics rights organization.

This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a Creative
Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0),
a copy of which is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2023942167

ISBN 978–​0–​19–​768171–​8

DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197681718.001.0001

Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

 Contents

Acknowledgments  ix

1. Introduction  1
1.1. Democracy’s Trouble with Knowledge  1
1.2. The Argument in a Nutshell  6
1.3. Political Epistemology  12
1.4. A Note on Methodology  16
1.5. Chapter Preview  19
2. Knowledge: Social, Practical, Political  23
2.1. Introduction  23
2.2. Epistemology’s Shift toward the Social  27
2.3. Knowing and Acting  36
2.4. Epistemic Injustice  43
2.5. Conclusion: The Epistemic Is Political  48
3. Markets, Deliberators, Experts  51
3.1. Introduction  51
3.2. Markets  53
3.3. Deliberation  61
3.4. Knowledge Generation in Communities of Experts  72
3.5. Epistemically Well-​Ordered Societies  83
3.6. Conclusion: The Epistemic Complexity of Modern Societies  85
4. The Rise of Free Market Thinking  87
4.1. Introduction  87
4.2. The Epistemic Underpinnings of Free Market Thinking  88
4.3. From Academic Discourse to Popular Narrative  92
4.4. Institutional Consequences of Market Thinking  95
4.5. Conclusion: The Fragility of Marketized Democracies  102
5. What’s Wrong with the “Marketplace of Ideas”?  104
5.1. Introduction  104
5.2. Historical Sources  105
5.3. Why the Metaphor Fails  107
5.4. Markets, Battles, or Sport Games?  112
5.5. Different Fields, Different Rules  114
5.6. Conclusion  120
vi Contents

6. Democratic Institutionalism  122

6.1. Introduction  122
6.2. From Principles to Institutions  124
6.3. Institutions and Individual Rights  130
6.4. Self-​Stabilizing Democracy  133
6.5. Truth as Precondition of Democracy  139
6.6. Conclusion  143
7. Putting the Market in Its Place  145
7.1. Introduction  145
7.2. The Need for Reforms toward Epistemic Functionality  147
7 .2.1. Are Markets a Good Idea at All?  148
7.2.2. Which Preferences Do Markets Satisfy?  150
7.2.3. Which Epistemic Infrastructures Do Markets Need?  156
7.2.4. Do Market Prices Reflect Costs to Society?  160
7.2.5. What Do Financial Markets Reflect?  161
7.2.6. How Is Knowledge Traded in Markets?  165
7 .3. The Epistemic Primacy of Politics  169
7.4. Conclusion  175
8. Experts in Democracies  177
8.1. Introduction  177
8.2. Expert Communities in Democratic Societies  180
8.3. Accountability or Trustworthiness?  186
8.4. The Partnership Model between Expert Communities and
Democratic Societies  192
8 .4.1. Providing Expertise  193
8.4.2. Managing Interfaces  198
8.4.3. Working toward Epistemic Justice  205
8.5. Conclusion  207
9. The Epistemic Infrastructure of Democracy  209
9.1. Introduction  209
9.2. Lottocracy to the Rescue?  212
9.3. Epistemic Infrastructures for Democratic Citizenship  221
9 .3.1. Schools for Democracy  223
9.3.2. Media for Democracy  227
9.3.3. Civil Society Organizations and Unions  235
9 .4. Epistemic Upgrades for the Internet  239
9.5. Conclusion  248
10. The Epistemic Benefits of Social Justice  250
10.1. Introduction  250
10.2. The Social Circumstances of Epistemic Trust  252
10.3. Empirical Insights on Social Trust  258
10.4. The Epistemic Impact of Workplace Organization  264
 Contents vii

10.5. Conclusion  268

11. Defending Democracy: Socially, Institutionally, Pragmatically  270
11.1. Introduction  270
11.2. Does Democracy Expect Too Much from Citizens?  272
11.3. Minimizing Capture  280
11.4. Learning to Rule Democratically  284
11.5. Conclusion  286

Bibliography  289
Index  331
 Acknowledgments

Thanking all those who have helped to write a book is one of the most beau-
tiful moments in the process—​the only challenge being not to overlook anyone!
I started thinking about the relation between knowledge, markets, and democ-
racy during a wonderful year at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 2017–​
18. The next year I left German academic feudalism behind and moved to the
Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. After a few happy months,
however, the corona pandemic started. In retrospect, it blurs into one endless
Zoom call, with a completely messed-​up sense of time. But it also brought new
opportunities for digital collaboration with colleagues across the globe, which
philosophy, Western-​centric as it continues to be, will certainly benefit from. In
2020–​21, I had the opportunity to take up a short fellowship at the Hamburg
Institute for Advanced Study, which provided the perfect environment for
incorporating the comments of one rather mean and two excellent reviewers.
I put final touches on the manuscript back in Groningen, finally fully back in
person.
Those are the bare facts, but they hardly do justice to the many enriching, in-
spiring, and thought-​provoking encounters I had along the way. I’ll start with
Georg, my husband, not only because his support has been invaluable—​as al-
ways!—​but also because during the corona lockdowns, confined to “home of-
fice,” keeping each other sane was crucial. Then, there are a number of people
close to my heart who helped in all kinds of direct or indirect ways: Katya Assaf,
Michaela Golic, Sarah Hegenbart, Friedemann Pestel, Anna Kelber, as well as
my mom, sisters, and extended family. A few collaborative project during the co-
rona period were particularly important for keeping up my spirits; let me men-
tion in particular the Democratizing Work Initiative that started with the 2020
manifesto and led to the 2021 Global Forum on Democratizing Work, and the
working group on international vaccine distribution that lead to the “fair pri-
ority” model.
I had conversations about the book project with too many people to list
them all, but let me mention a few, in no particular order: Adrian Haddock,
Luise Müller, Ute Frevert, Jenny Saul, Roger Brubaker, Jürgen Kocka, Bénédicte
Zimmermann, Daniel Schönpflug, Thorsten Wilhelmy, Ute Frevert, Ivan
Boldyrev, Tim Wihl, Erin Nash, Keith Breen, Claus Offe, Christian Joerges, Dean
Moyar, Eugénia da Conceicao-​Heldt, Stefan Wurster, Miranda Schreurs, Martin
Oppelt, Just Serrano Zamora, Jakob Moggia, Frauke Schmode, Alexander
x Acknowledgments

Krüger, Selina Schröttle, Patrizia Nanz, Michael Frazer, Mark Reiff, Garrath
Williams, Kai Spiekermann, Keith Breen, Fabian Schuppert, Franziska Dübgen,
Eric Schliesser, Uğur Aytaç, Simon Caney, Ingrid Robeyns, Mathias Frisch,
Verina Wild, Isabelle Ferreras, Jo Wolff, Emanuela Ceva, Maria Paola Ferreti,
Rowan Cruft, Einat Albin, Michal Shur-​Ofri, Jeroen de Ridder, Boudewijn de
Bruin, Michael Hannon, Megan Blomfield, Julian Müller, Catarina Duthil
Novaes, Daniele Santoro, Hand Radder, Eric Boot, Nikolas Kirby, Oliver Milne,
Jacob Garrett, Anna Alexandrova, Albert Dzur, David Cassasas, David Guerrero,
Steven Klein, Shai Agmon, Neil Wilcock, Leon Wansleben, Gabriel Abend,
Bernardo Zacka, as well as my great colleagues in Groningen, in the Faculty of
Philosophy and beyond.
I presented ideas that have something to do with the book in colloquia,
workshops, or conferences, in person or digitally, at Goethe University Frankfurt,
the University of Iceland, the University of Ottawa, the University of Münster,
Freie Universität Berlin, the University of East Anglia, Technical University of
Munich, the London School of Economics, the Hertie School of Governance,
INSEEC Paris, the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, the University
of Hamburg, the University of Applied Sciences Vienna, the University of
Edinburgh, Queen’s University Belfast, Hochschule für Philosophie München,
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, the University of Amsterdam, Technical
University of Dortmund, the University of Tampere, Bavarian Academy of
Sciences, the Alfred Wegener Institut Bremerhaven, Fordham Law School,
the University of Manchester, Tilburg University, Braunschweig University,
Southampton University, the University of Geneva, the University of Genova,
the University of Montreal, the University of Paderborn, the University of
Utrecht, Sharif University Teheran, Pontificia University Catolica del Peru, HIAS
Hamburg, Academy of Sciences Hamburg, George Mason University, Kadir Has
University, and the University of Groningen. I sincerely thank all organizers and
participants for their feedback, on ideas that turned out to be impasses as well as
on those that were fruitful.
In March 2022, Alice Pinheiro-​Walla organized a digital manuscript work-
shop at McMaster University for me—​a wonderful treat that I benefited a lot
from, and that delivered food for thought far beyond the manuscript. I would
like to thank Alice, as well as the commentators Eyja Brynjarsdóttir, Stefan
Sciaraffa, Rudolf Schüssler, Jack Knight, Alfred Moore, Thomas Christiano,
Johannes Steizinger and other participants for the care with which they have
read my chapter drafts and the comments they have provided. I would also like to
thank three reviewers of the book for Oxford University Press, two of whom read
the manuscript in great detail and gave me very valuable feedback; a third one
pointed me to interesting further literature that I might otherwise have missed.
 Acknowledgments xi

I thank Peter Ohlin and the whole team at OUP for their support during the re-
view and publication process.
While working on the book, I was also busy with setting up the SCISO
Project (“Science with Society”; see https://​glo​baly​oung​acad​emy.net/​sci​sco/​
) at the Global Young Academy, the topics of which partly overlap with those
of Chapter 8 of the book). I greatly enjoyed working with the members of the
working group, and with Kristin Raabe and Shruti Madhani, as well as the
colleagues at the National Institute for Science Communication (NaWik) and
the fantastic staff at the GYA office in Halle. I decided not to include a chapter ex-
plicitly about the role of science (in contrast to experts more generally speaking)
in society, but my contributions to this project reflect some of my ideas about it.
Some earlier ideas were presented in the following papers:

-​ “Markt oder Profession? Die Politik zweier Wissenslogiken.” Leviathan

46(2) (2018), 189–​211.
-​ “The Epistemic Division of Labor in Markets: Knowledge, Global Trade,
and the Preconditions of Responsible Agency,” Economics & Philosophy
36(2) (2020), 266–​86.
-​ “The Epistemic Seduction of Markets,” The Raven, December 2021, https://​
ravenm​agaz​ine.org/​magaz​ine/​the-​episte​mic-​seduct​ion-​of-​mark​ets/​.
-​ “Are Financial Markets Epistemically Efficient?,” in The Philosophy of Money
and Finance, ed. Lisa Warenski and Joakim Sandberg, forthcoming with
Oxford University Press.

I would like to thank the publishers of the relevant journals for the permission to
reprint this material.
As I finalize the manuscript, the world looks rather darker than when I started
working on it. The climate and biodiversity crisis continue to loom large. The
scars that the corona pandemic has left in the social fabric of many societies
will probably stay for a long time, and as so often, many of those hit hardest are
among the most vulnerable members. The Russian attack on the Ukraine has
been a kind of existential shock, even for many of those who, like me, have no
direct family connections or collaborations in the country. Questions about ec-
onomic reform, or reforms of epistemic institutions, as suggested in the book,
seem to have moved to the background of political attention again. I try to re-
main optimistic, in the “optimism of the will” sense. I hope that the perspective
that this book offers will contribute, in its own little way, to understanding our
current time and what we can do to work toward peace and social justice.
 1
Introduction

1.1. Democracy’s Trouble with Knowledge

Democracy, at its core, means that the members of a society jointly decide about
its fate, on an equal footing. To do so, they need to know what they are doing.
They need to know about political institutions and practices, and they need to
draw on various forms of knowledge to formulate and implement policies. Social
policies need to draw on insights, whether from statistical analyses or testimonies
by affected citizens, about the causes of poverty and possible mechanisms to fight
it. Environmental policies need to rely on an understanding of the causes and
effects of climate change and the loss of biodiversity, and on sound proposals
for addressing them. Without knowledge, and processes for integrating it into
decision-​making, democratic self-​rule cannot be but a sham. But democracy and
knowledge seem to be in a difficult phase of their relationship, with many signs of
trouble. Let me name a few.
There is, first, the resentment against “experts,” which populists in many coun-
tries both fuel and exploit. “People have had enough of experts,” was an infa-
mous phrase in the Brexit campaign.1 As a general statement, this seems plainly
false: surveys show that scientists, for example, continue to be seen as one of the
most trustworthy professions.2 Moreover, some voters continue to hold rather
“technocratic” positions, scoring high, in empirical studies, on reliance on ex-
pertise and elitism.3 The infamous phrase about people “having had enough
of experts” referred to economists, arguably a specific kind of experts, and to
their alleged ability to predict economic outcomes with high precision.4 Many
individuals may have “had enough” of that, and yet trust their doctors and other
experts they encounter in their daily lives. But on several specific issues such as
climate change or vaccination, we see strong polarization. And certain politicians
do not even want citizens to get informed. As then-​US president Donald Trump
once put it: instead of listening to others, “Just stick with us.”5 Group cohesion

1 See, e.g., Eyal 2019, 1–​4, and Nichols 2017, 209, for discussions.
2 E.g., Funk et al. 2020.
3 See Bertsou and Caramani 2022 for data based on a 2017 survey in nine European countries.
4 For a discussion see also Dow 2017.
5 Tornoe 2018; for a discussion of Trumpian politics with regard to truth see also Rosenfeld 2019,

chap. 1.

​ ​
2 Citizen Knowledge

and blind allegiance instead of dialogue and reliance on knowledge—​is that the
future of public discourse?
There are, second, many forms of knowledge that are distorted by vested in-
terest. In their book Merchants of Doubt, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway
document how the tobacco industry obfuscated public knowledge about the
harmfulness of smoking, thereby providing the playbook for numerous other
industries with regard to other harmful products.6 Evidence about the relation
between smoking and lung cancer started to accumulate by the 1940s. But the
tobacco industry was not willing to face the foreseeable consequences of this
knowledge, namely restrictions on the selling of tobacco products. It started to
fight back, claiming that there was “no proof ” of the harmfulness of smoking.7
Corporations and industry associations sought out the few scientists who did
not believe in a connection between smoking and lung cancer and showered
them with money, on the understanding that they would serve as mouthpieces
for the industry, for example, as expert witnesses in court. Often, they specifi-
cally targeted renowned scientists such as Nobel Prize winners, even if they came
from completely different fields. They relied on the media’s tendency to listen to
“famous scientists” and to always report “both sides” of debates.8 In addition, in-
dustry associations set up think tanks, sent out thousands of booklets to doctors,
published op-​eds, and accused critics of “junk science.”9 Through these strategies,
the tobacco companies managed to delay regulation for decades. The prevalence
of free market thinking, with its general suspicion of state interventions, prob-
ably helped their case.10
What came to be known as the “tobacco strategy” was also used in other
areas, including climate change. It exploits a core feature of scientific re-
search: that it thrives on a plurality of approaches and on the willingness to
question received wisdom. As Oreskes and Conway write: “Doubt is crucial to
science . . . but it also makes science vulnerable to misrepresentation, because it is
easy to take uncertainties out of context and create the impression that everything

6 I follow the account by Oreskes and Conway 2010, which is widely considered authoritative in

the literature (for a constructive assessment see, e.g., Wynne 2010; he critically notes the assump-
tion that science alone could decide political issues, but it is not clear that Oreskes and Conway
hold this view. He also points out that there have been cases in which scientific uncertainty has been
underplayed instead of overplayed.) For other accounts of the “tobacco wars” see, e.g., Proctor 1999;
Glantz et al. 1996; Michaels 2008, chap. 1. In general, see also Otto 2016, chap. 10, “The Industrial
War on Science.” O’Connor and Weatherall 2019, chap. 3, and Cassam 2018 discuss the topic from
the perspective of social epistemology. See also recently Cook et al. 2019 on similar phenomena with
regard to climate change. On effects on academic research see also Franta and Supran 2017; Johnson
2017; Gillam 2019; and Lawrence et al. 2019.
7 Oreskes and Conway 2010, 16.
8 Oreskes and Conway 2010, 19.
9 See, e.g., Otto 2016, 292–​96.
10 Oreskes and Conway 2010, e.g., 134, 174, 237–​50.
 Introduction 3

is unresolved.”11 This can make it difficult for politicians and the democratic
public to understand where research stands and what action should be taken.
And it makes democratic processes vulnerable to strategic maneuvers by those
who do not want the public to know certain things and to act on them. Instead
of fighting policy proposals directly, it can be a better tactic to fight the knowl-
edge they are based on, in a kind of “epistemic politics.”12 In the United States, for
example, there is a large “product defense” industry, specialized in preventing
market regulation.13 And often, the battleground is not only the policy proposals
themselves, but also the knowledge they are based on.14
But it is not only knowledge and information as such, in the sense of hard
facts and scientific findings, that can have a hard time prevailing in public dis-
course. Even the ways in which these are presented and framed can get caught
in controversy and legal battles—​a third indication that something is not going
well between democracy and knowledge. Take, for example, the so-​called ag-​gag
laws: laws that ban the production of pictures and video footage recorded in in-
dustrial farms.15 In many US states, the industrial farming lobby has pushed for
draconic laws against such actions. Information about industrial farming and
its problems is widely available, but pictures or videos of suffering animals can
send stronger, more emotionally loaded messages that might move consumers
to change their purchasing behavior. Hence the strong interest of the agricultural
industry in keeping such pictures out of the public eye, and hence the dispropor-
tionate criminalization of animal rights activism.16
Some critics of democracy would add citizens’ lack of knowledge about,
or maybe even lack of interest in, politics to the list of problems.17 As many
surveys show, considerable numbers of citizens cannot reproduce basic pieces
of information about the political system they inhabit. Moreover, especially in

11 Oreskes and Conway 2010, 34. On the difficulties of delineating legitimate from illegitimate sci-

entific disagreement see also de Melo-​Martín and Intemann 2018.

12 This also concerns specific regulatory decisions and the institutions that are responsible for

them. For example, Michaels (2008, 149–​50) lists various examples of how the research done to get
FDA approval for new drugs can be manipulated.
13 Michaels 2008, chap. 5.
14 See also Pielke 2007, 63. Otto 2016 provides various examples from different countries.
15 See Broad 2016 for a discussion; I thank Garrath William for sharing this paper with me.
16 Fights about how information has to be presented—​in contrast to what information has to be

made available—​are frequent. Another example, discussed by Crouch (2016, 43–​44), was the vehe-
ment lobbyism on the part of the European food industry to prevent a “traffic light” system for the
content of fat, sugar, and overall calories in processed food. This information is already available, in
small print, but a “traffic light” system would have made it more salient for consumers. Hence, one
must suppose, the resistance.
17 In this camp, prominent names are, for example, Caplan 2007; DeCanio 2014; Pennington, e.g.,

2011; Somin, e.g., 2013, 2021; on the empirical side see, e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016 and Mason
2018. Jason Brennan’s 2016 book summarizes many of the earlier debates; see also his recent proposal
of “enlightened preference voting” (Brennan 2021). For a critical discussion see, e.g., Christiano
2019b, 2021; Bhatia 2019; and Reiss 2019. I take up this literature in Chapter 11.2.
4 Citizen Knowledge

countries with two-​party systems, there has been a lot of discussion about po-
larization: about citizens behaving like fanatic sports fans who cheer for their
team rather than carefully thinking about political issues and then casting their
vote on an informed, reflective basis. The idea of “holding the powerful to ac-
count” hardly works if a population is divided into two camps who deeply resent
each other and who would never vote for the other side, no matter how their
own leaders behave in office. In fact, in some countries the media landscape
is so bifurcated that citizens hardly ever get a chance to seriously consider the
positions of the other side.18
But are these problems really new? Or have they existed ever since demo-
cratic forms of government came into existence, or since there was something
one could describe as “public discourse”? Attempts to mislead the public have
existed for a long time; for example, in the nineteenth century the Belgian reign
in the Congo, which has become a symbol of colonial terror, was accompanied
by a systematic misinformation campaign by the Belgian crown.19 In the 1920s,
Walther Lippmann and John Dewey argued about the existence of a democratic
“public” and the state of its knowledge.20 In the 1980s, social scientists explored
the patterns of political controversies, which often concerned the publication
and presentation of knowledge.21 In many political struggles, knowledge gets
weaponized in ways that do not conceptualize it as something to be shared—​
maybe even as a public good—​but rather as something to be hoarded and
instrumentalized.22 What is hard to swallow is not this mere fact, but rather how
widespread this phenomenon continues to be in our allegedly open, transparent,
and democratic age, in which the internet places so many sources of information
and knowledge at our fingertips.
Some commentators have, in fact, argued that we have reached a point at
which knowledge no longer matters. The “tobacco strategy” playbook still held
up the facade, in the sense that claims were made in the name of “science.”23 In
recent years, however, more and more actors seem to have transitioned to com-
plete cynicism, declaring truth irrelevant. For example, as Russell Muirhead and
Nancy Rosenblum argue, many recent “conspiracy theories” do not even pro-
vide detailed theories; instead, they flourish on repetition alone, which the in-
ternet facilitates.24 Some political advisers, for example Trump’s ex-​adviser Steve

18 See especially Benkler et al. 2018 on the United States; in Chapter 9.3.2 I discuss the role of the

media for democracy.

19 Barton and Davis 2018, 3–​6.
20 Lippmann [1927] 1993; Dewey [1927] 2016.
21 See, e.g., Nelkin’s 1984 volume on “controversies.”
22 See Davies on a military vs. a civilian understanding of knowledge (2018, esp. 139, 150).
23 As Michaels laconically puts it, in the United States, “Industry has learned that debating the

science is much easier and more effective than debating the policy” (2008, xi).
24 Muirhead and Rosenblum 2019.
 Introduction 5

Bannon, declared the established media, with their commitment to factful re-
porting, their foremost enemies. One of his own strategies was to simply create
more and more content that would obscure the line between truth and falsehood,
leading to “a growing weariness over the process of finding the truth at all.”25 At
the same time, politicians, civil servants, journalists, and maybe even ordinary
citizens get more and more used to studies being skewed or facts being presented
to them in a one-​sided way.26
And yet there is not only shadow, but also light. For one thing, many of these
phenomena are now being openly discussed, with more and more calls for trans-
parency, accountability, and clear guidance concerning conflicts of interests and
other ethical issues. For another, more and different voices have become audible
in the public conversation: of women, of people of color, of all those previously
excluded by visible and invisible barriers. In this respect, the internet, despite all
its problems, seems to have fulfilled part of its promise. It has made the public
conversation more polyphonic than ever. But this very fact has also led to irri-
tation and resentment on the part of actors who might, in earlier periods, have
been faced with less competition for attention. Metaquestions about the state
of public discourse are, in turn, controversially debated in public. It seems that
we might be in a period of transition, in which the deficits of previous periods
have become painfully clear, but we have not yet been able to draw the right
conclusions and to implement solutions.
It is this confusing and disconcerting state of the relation between democracy
and knowledge that I take as my starting point. I use the term “knowledge” in a
broad and general sense;27 and my focus is on democratic capitalist societies as
they exist in the “Western” world. I wish I could have written a book that would
also take into account other parts of the world, but I do not feel competent to do
so. Having spent only short periods in the Global South and relying mostly on
Western sources, I would be presumptuous to claim a global perspective. What
I can say with confidence, however, is that the problems of “the West”—​where
they mar different countries to different degrees—​that I discuss in this book have
global repercussions, not least through the ways in which they delay and obstruct
collective action against climate change and other environmental problems. The
need to bring the global economy onto a more climate-​friendly path adds ur-
gency to the topics about the relationship between democracy and knowledge
that this book discusses.

25 Illing 2020; he speaks of “manufactured nihilism.” For an example of a manufactured fake news

story see also Robb 2017 on the “pizzagate” case.

26 Michaels 2008, 55.
27 Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for the way in which I use this term.
6 Citizen Knowledge

1.2. The Argument in a Nutshell

This book discusses how knowledge—​understood in a broad sense that includes

theoretical and practical knowledge in various fields—​is dealt with in societies
that combine a democratic political system and a capitalist economic system,
and how effective democratic self-​governance can be ensured. In recent decades,
a key argument in favor of markets has been that they allow for the efficient “use
of knowledge in society,” in the famous words of Friedrich August von Hayek.28
The argument about the epistemic superiority of markets was a key element of
the intellectual movement often dubbed “neoliberalism,” though the term has,
arguably, becoming a fighting word of limited analytic usefulness.29 Even many
critics of markets, who loathe their inegalitarian consequences, have accepted
the idea that markets have a unique capacity to process information.30 But this
argument is far more limited in scope than is often assumed, and it cannot be ap-
plied to all forms of knowledge. Giving over too much knowledge to markets has
made our societies vulnerable to various forms of manipulation, distortion, and
exploitation.
The relation between democracy and capitalism gets out of balance if too
much or the wrong form of knowledge is treated according to the logic of
markets, rather than the logic of either expert inquiry or democratic deliber-
ation. Complex modern societies need different mechanisms for dealing with
knowledge, instead of relying on the market mechanism alone. It is true, as many
economists have claimed, that many forms of knowledge that modern societies
rely on are distributed to different agents and cannot easily be gathered for the
sake of centralized decision-​making. But this does not mean that markets are
the only mechanism for dealing with them, nor does it mean that all forms of
knowledge are equally difficult to gather. I distinguish three key mechanisms for
creating, transmitting, and processing different forms of knowledge: markets,
expert communities, and democratic deliberation. All can have a role to play in
complex societies, but in recent years, the market has been given far too much
scope—​or so I will argue.
If too many processes that produce or transmit knowledge are handed over to
markets, this usually does not lead to a situation in which all market participants
benefit equally. Rather, the opportunities are grasped by the most powerful—​
and maybe also the most cynical—​players. Given the democratic-​and-​capitalist
constellation in Western democracies, these players are often corporations, with
their deep pockets and sometimes ruthless commitment to profit maximization.

28
Hayek 1945.
29
For a discussion and contextualization see, e.g., Biebricher 2019.
30 An interesting example is Carens 1981. In Chapter 4.2 I briefly revisit the debate about “market

socialism” that tried to adopt the epistemic advantages of markets to socialist economic systems.
 Introduction 7

They typically have an interest in knowledge if it creates opportunities to in-

crease profits. In contrast, if knowledge comes with responsibilities, or if it leads
to questions about the legitimacy of one’s behavior, they are keen to hide it, mar-
ginalize it, or shift the responsibility for it to other agents. In a way, this should
not surprise us. Corporations are currently set up to maximize profits, and the
narratives about their raison d’être have, for decades, focused on nothing else.
The belief in the ability of markets to self-​regulate—​among other things because
of their capacity to process knowledge—​and the resulting cutback in regulation
has given them free rein in many areas. For the way in which democracies deal
with knowledge, however, this has been rather disastrous.
Democracies rely on knowledge, and they need what I call “epistemic infra-
structure”: institutions and social practices in which relevant knowledge can be
created, checked, corrected, and passed on to decision-​makers. Leaving all these
processes to markets alone fundamentally misunderstands the nature and func-
tion of various forms of knowledge in modern societies. Markets can play a posi-
tive role with regard to certain kinds of knowledge, but it is far more limited than
is often assumed, and, ironically, for them to play this role well, they need to be
regulated in the right way. There is no “invisible hand” that takes on this coordi-
nation task on its own. And there is also no invisible hand in the alleged “mar-
ketplace of ideas” that would automatically create truth out of the unregulated
cacophony of individual speech. The spheres in which knowledge is created and
processed often depend quite heavily on regulatory frameworks, and also on a
truth-​oriented attitude among those acting within them.
We will never be able to achieve a situation in which the processes of knowl-
edge generation are completely shielded from political struggles, nor do we
need to strive for this. Values, interests, and facts are too intertwined to think
that we could have something like “knowledge creation first, politics second,”
with knowledge creation concerning facts, and politics concerning values and
interests. In the philosophy of science, the presence of values (though not neces-
sarily political values) within processes of knowledge generation has long been
acknowledged.31 But this does not mean that we should give up the ideal of agree-
ment on basic facts, even among those who disagree about values and about the
interpretation of facts—​for the alternative, ultimately, is a situation in which each
political side has its own claims to truth, and its own methods for establishing
facts, which makes processes of democratic deliberation and decision-​making
impossible. This may well be an appropriate description of the current state of
certain highly polarized societies, for example, with regard to issues on which

31 See notably Douglas 2009 on the role of value judgments in the acceptance of evidence. On

values in social sciences see, e.g., Sayer 2011; on why it would be wrong to try to ban values from
science see also de Melo-​Martín and Intemann 2018, chap. 9.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
through clerical passion, the other perhaps through that esprit de
corps which makes of the war offices the Holy Ark, unassailable.
I accuse General de Pellieux and Major Ravary of having conducted
a rascally inquiry,—I mean by that a monstrously partial inquiry, of
which we have, in the report of the latter, an imperishable monument
of naive audacity.
I accuse the three experts in handwriting, Belhomme, Varinard, and
Couard, of having made lying and fraudulent reports, unless a
medical examination should declare them afflicted with diseases of
the eye and of the mind.
I accuse the war offices of having carried on in the press, particularly
in “L’Eclair” and in “L’Echo de Paris,” an abominable campaign, to
mislead opinion and cover up their faults.
I accuse, finally, the first council of war of having violated the law by
condemning an accused person on the strength of a secret
document, and I accuse the second council of war of having covered
this illegality, in obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the
judicial crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.
In preferring these charges, I am not unaware that I lay myself liable
under Articles 30 and 31 of the press law of July 29, 1881, which
punishes defamation. And it is wilfully that I expose myself thereto.
As for the people whom I accuse, I do not know them, I have never
seen them, I entertain against them no feeling of revenge or hatred.
They are to me simple entities, spirits of social ill-doing. And the act
that I perform here is nothing but a revolutionary measure to hasten
the explosion of truth and justice.
I have but one passion, the passion for the light, in the name of
humanity which has suffered so much, and which is entitled to
happiness. My fiery protest is simply the cry of my soul. Let them
dare, then, to bring me into the assize court, and let the investigation
take place in the open day.
I await it.
Accept, Monsieur le Président, the assurance of my profound
respect.
Emile Zola.
At the sitting of the French chamber of deputies on the day of the appearance of
the foregoing letter, Comte de Mun, a member of the chamber and representing
the monarchical party, questioned the government “as to the measures which the
minister of war intends to take, in consequence of the article published this
morning by M. Emile Zola.” After a stormy debate and a suspension of the sitting,
M. Méline, the prime minister, reluctantly declared the intention of the government
to prosecute the author of the article.
Accordingly, on January 20, the assize court of the Seine served notice on M. Zola
and M. Perrenx to appear before it at the Palais de Justice on the following
February 7, and there answer to a charge of having publicly defamed the first
council of war of the military government of Paris, the charge being based on the
following passages from the incriminated article:
“A council of war has just dared to acquit an Esterhazy in obedience to orders,
a final blow at all truth, at all justice. And now it is done; France has this stain
upon her cheek; it will be written in history that under your presidency it was
possible for this social crime to be committed.”
“They have rendered an iniquitous verdict which will weigh forever upon our
councils of war, which will henceforth tinge all their decrees with suspicion.
The first council of war may have been lacking in comprehension; the second
is necessarily criminal.”
“I accuse the second council of war of having covered this illegality, in
obedience to orders, in committing in its turn the judicial crime of knowingly
acquitting a guilty man.”
On January 22 “L’Aurore” published a second letter from M. Zola, addressed to the
minister of war, in which he complained that the government had based its charge
of defamation exclusively on those passages of his first letter which related to the
trial of Major Esterhazy, carefully refraining from specification of those passages
relating to the trial of Captain Dreyfus, lest thereby the truth about the latter should
come to light and compel a revision of his case. This second letter concluded as
follows:

Why were you afraid to take notice of all my charges? I will tell you.
Fearing an open discussion, you have resorted, in order to save
yourself, to the methods of a prosecuting attorney. They have called
to your attention, in the law of July 21, 1881, an Article 52 which
permits me to offer proof concerning only the matters “set forth and
complained of in the summons.”
And now you are quite at your ease, are you not?
Well, you are mistaken; I warn you in advance; you have been ill-
advised.
The first thought was to bring me before the police court, but they did
not dare, for the court of appeals would have upset the whole
procedure.
Then they conceived the idea of delaying matters by greatly
prolonging the preliminary examination; but they were afraid that this
might give a new development to the case, and pile up against you a
crushing mass of evidence, methodically recorded.
Finally, in desperation, they decided to impose upon me an unequal
struggle, tying my hands in advance, to assure you, by the methods
of a lawyer’s clerk, the victory that undoubtedly you did not expect
from a free discussion.
You have forgotten that I am to have for judges twelve French
citizens, in possession of their independence.
I shall find a way to win by the force of justice; I shall illuminate
consciences with the effulgence of truth. At the first words we shall
see the methods of the quibblers swept away by the imperious
necessity of proof. This proof the law bids me give, and the law
would be a liar if, imposing on me this duty, it should refuse me the
means of doing it.
How could I prove the charges of which you complain, if I were not
allowed to show the concatenation of facts and were prevented from
placing the whole matter in the fullest light?
Liberty to prove,—that is the power on which I depend.
On January 24 M. Zola’s counsel served notice on the attorney-general of a long
list of witnesses whom he intended to summon, in which notice he called on the
attorney-general to produce in court all the papers relating to the trials of Captain
Dreyfus and Major Esterhazy, and made formal offer to prove, not only the matters
set forth in the summons, but also, as inseparable from them, the charges
preferred in the letter to President Faure against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de
Clam, General Mercier, General Billot, General de Boisdeffre, General Gonse,
General de Pellieux, Major Ravary, the three experts in handwriting,—Belhomme,
Varinard, and Couard,—the war offices, and the Dreyfus council of war.
On February 7 M. Zola and M. Perrenx appeared for trial, and the record of the
court proceedings here follows.
 THE TRIAL.
First Day—February 7.
The first day’s proceedings began with the entrance of the presiding
judge, M. Delegorgue, the other members of the court being
Councillors Lault and Bousquet. Attorney-General Van Cassel
appeared for the prosecution, M. Fernand Labori for M. Zola, and M.
Albert Clemenceau, assisted by his brother, M. Georges
Clemenceau, for M. Perrenx, the gérant of “L’Aurore.” The court-
room of the assize court of the Seine was crowded to its utmost
capacity; wherefore the judge, on taking his seat, addressed those
present as follows:
“I notify the public that we shall not begin until all are seated. I
likewise warn the public that every sort of manifestation, whether for
or against the accused, is formally forbidden, and that at the first sign
of disorder I shall order the court-room cleared. Please consider this
said once for all, for I shall not repeat it.”
The usual dialogue then ensued between the judge and M. Zola.
“Your name?”
“Emile Zola.”
“Your profession?”
“Man of letters.”
“Your age?”
“Fifty-eight years.”
“Your residence?”
“21 bis, Rue de Bruxelles.”
The drawing of the jury was then proceeded with. Three challenges
were used by the prosecution, and seven by the defence, the jurors
finally selected being as follows:
Foreman, Auguste Dutrieux, merchant; Auguste Leblond, roof-
builder; Pierre Emery, merchant; Bernier, molder in copper; Edouard
Gressin, clerk; Bouvier, proprietor; Albert Chevanier, wine merchant;
Nigon, leather-dresser; Charles Fouquet, seedsman; Joseph
Moureire, wire-drawer; Charles Huet, market-gardener; Brunot,
linen-draper. Supplementary jurors: Antoine Jourde, tradesman;
Alfred Boucreux, butcher.
Then began the reading of the documents in the case by the clerk,
the only one of interest being the complaint of Gen. Billot. Referring
to M. Zola’s letter, the complainant declared:
This article contains a series of insults and slanders directed
against two ministers of war, general officers, and army officers of
all grades under their orders. Chiefs and subordinates are above
such outrages, and the opinion of parliament, of the country, and
of the army has already placed them beyond reach of attack.
Though the minister of war does not consider it his duty to lodge
a complaint for the persons above referred to, any more than for
the council of war which rendered the verdict of 1894, the
authority of which must remain intact, we cannot admit any
suspicion of the independence of military justice or any
accusation that it rendered on January 11 in obedience to orders
an iniquitous sentence and committed a judicial error in
knowingly acquitting a guilty man. Consequently I have the honor
to lodge a complaint against the gérant of “L’Aurore” and M.
Emile Zola on account of the defamation directed against the first
council of war of the military government of Paris, which at its
sessions of January 10 and 11, 1898, declared the acquittal of
Major Esterhazy.
After the reading of the documents, Attorney-General Van Cassel
took the floor to make what he described as “a statement of the
case,” speaking as follows:
“The minister of war has taken notice, in his complaint, of the
imputation cast by M. Emile Zola upon the first council of war of
having acquitted Major Esterhazy in obedience to orders. The
summons could not go beyond the terms of the complaint. It is
natural that every complainant should circumscribe the grievances
for which he demands reparation. Otherwise it would be too easy for
the accused to turn the discussion from its proper course, and create
a diversion for the audience, which is the great art in the assize
court. A single question is submitted to you, gentlemen of the jury:
Did the first council of war act in obedience to orders in acquitting
Major Esterhazy? The other imputation contained in M. Zola’s article
the minister of war holds in contempt. Nevertheless the accused
assert the right to discuss all the allegations contained in the article.
Their avowed plan is to make you judges of the legality of the
sentence passed upon Dreyfus. We shall not permit it. I warn them
that any attempt on their part to provoke a sort of indirect revision of
the Dreyfus case would be illegal and futile. No one has a right to
indirectly call in question the thing judged. Our legislation, in its
desire to avoid judicial error, has laid down rules for revision. These
rules were broadened by the law of 1895. This law was passed prior
to the trial of Dreyfus. Why have the accused not availed themselves
of it? Why have they not attempted revision by the legal methods?
They have not done so. They have tried to secure the conviction of a
second officer on account of the crime of which Dreyfus was
convicted. They have failed in their undertaking. Since then no new
fact has been produced; no unknown document of such a nature as
to establish the innocence of the condemned has been revealed to
justice. In the absence of material wherewith to secure a legal
revision, they wish—I use the words of M. Emile Zola—to provoke a
revolutionary revision. The court will not lend itself to this manœuvre.
Respect for the thing judged requires that the discussion be
circumscribed to the single matter of which the minister of war takes
notice in his complaint. Therefore no evidence can be admitted here
except such as tends to prove the charges relating to the pretended
iniquity committed in obedience to orders in 1898 by the military
judges of Major Esterhazy. Accusations foreign to this special matter
must remain outside of the discussion. I ask, then, that the accused
may not be authorized to attempt proof thereof, either by documents
or by testimony. The charges preferred by them against the officers,
the witnesses, the experts, the members of the council of war of
1894, which convicted Dreyfus, have no connection with the
defamation of the council of war of 1898.”
To this contention M. Labori made the following reply:
“I am not much astonished, gentlemen, at the difficulties which M.
Zola meets in this affair, and I expect that this incident, which is the
first, will not be the last. We expected that they would offer to you
and impose upon us a restricted discussion. Such was the desire of
the minister of war, and it was his right. It will be ours, at a certain
moment, to ask what could have been the underlying reasons for the
exercise of this right under the circumstances in which the minister of
war has made use of it. However that may be, it was his right, and I
do not deny it. But, gentlemen, I do not believe that the form of the
complaint within which he confines himself involves the
consequences which he has hoped for.”
Reading then all the charges made at the end of M. Zola’s letter, M.
Labori continued:
“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day
when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty,
the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you
now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-
general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own
name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion?
Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent
to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to
stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They
had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which,
gentlemen, I shall speak,—public opinion, which is not enlightened,
and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most
faithfully supports the ruling powers,—public opinion perhaps would
have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to
prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they,
then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs
cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with
the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the
article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the
court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the
minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to
the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the
first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same
crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted.
The document of the trial was the bordereau; the bordereau
concerning which the first experts testified; the bordereau concerning
which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it is not
strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same,
feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a
discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the
document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the
Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is the bordereau. The two
crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major
Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting
aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as
a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question
remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the
form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any
proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be
permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that
of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would
not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and
his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove
at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing
of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his
complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a
little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council
of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself.
Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered
an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an
illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean—and I
confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to
this discussion—to acknowledge that the illegality has been
committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the
civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be
permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the
authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of
the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove
matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have
shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely
bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It
remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the
attorney-general,—the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be
left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been
irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has
such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream
for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they
are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is
their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they
believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is
no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-
General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”
In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau
then addressed the court:
“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general.
He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he
is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form
that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it
will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general
discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all
French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,—namely,
would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The
attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He
would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would
have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those
which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point.
The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of
words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to
make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he
finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the
court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”
M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the
introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s
letter.
Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in
handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through
their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they
had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no
introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be
permitted.
The Judge.—“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in
case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for
outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the
council of war.”
M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We accept any discussion before the
assize court.”
M. Labori.—“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I
ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in
the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their
testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a
special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the
production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only
congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the
name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”
M. Zola.—“Complete light!”
M. Clemenceau.—“Whatever motions may be made in this court,
and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to
bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them.
In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well
founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us
here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion
before the assize court.”
Without passing upon the motion of M. Cabanes, the court then
rendered an adverse decision on M. Labori’s motion for the
introduction of evidence concerning all the charges preferred by M.
Zola, claiming that they were not indivisibly connected with the
matter on trial.
The time having arrived for the calling of the witnesses, the court
announced that it had received letters from several of them, in
explanation of their absence.
The Judge.—“I have a letter from the keeper of the seals, saying that
the minister of war, General Billot, has not been authorized to
respond to the summons. M. Labori and M. Clemenceau, do you
forego this witness’s evidence?”
M. Labori.—“In regard to him we make a reservation.”
The Judge.—“Here is a letter from General Gonse. He asks to be
heard among the first, because of his service.”
M. Labori.—“We shall be able to hear General Gonse among the
first. It was our intention to do so. But, in spite of our great desire to
hear him, we cannot take his personal convenience into
consideration.”
The Attorney-General.—“Nor his service?”
M. Labori.—“Nor his service.”
The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Major d’Ormescheville, declaring
that, having been the reporter for the council of war, he does not
believe it his duty to respond to the summons.”
M. Labori.—“I make a reservation, as in the case of General Billot.”
The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Gibert, cited as a witness by
M. Zola. ‘I have left Havre, and have retired to.... In view of the
gravity of my condition, it is impossible for me to come to testify in
person, and I have just sent what I have to say to M. Labori.’”
M. Labori.—“I have not yet received it.”
The Judge.—“Then you make a reservation?”
M. Labori.—“Yes.”
The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Casimir-Perier, in which he
says: ‘I am unable to enlighten justice on any matter that has
occurred since my resignation of the presidency of the republic. I add
that, if I were questioned concerning matters which occurred when I
held the presidency, personal responsibilities would impose silence
upon me. Out of deference for the court, I am ready to appear before
it, if it deems it necessary that I repeat this declaration verbally.’”
M. Labori.—“I make a reservation in regard to M. Casimir-Perier.”
The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de
Clam. He says: ‘In the Dreyfus case I performed the functions of an
officer of judicial police. My only part in the Esterhazy trial was to
testify behind closed doors, and in the matter of this testimony I am
bound to professional secrecy. Under these circumstances I have
the honor to pray you to excuse me from appearing in court, where I
should be unable to furnish any information concerning the matters
mentioned in the summons.’”
M. Labori.—“M. Zola and M. Perrenx deem Lieutenant-Colonel du
Paty de Clam a witness of the highest importance, not only in
matters relating to the Dreyfus trial, but in matters relating to the
Esterhazy trial. Furthermore, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du
Paty de Clam is necessary, because it bears upon the good faith of
the accused, for, if certain information that has come to M. Zola, and
the production of which he will call for before this court, is to be
believed, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam has been mixed up in
matters which concerned Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, certain of
which are very curious. Furthermore, a complaint has been lodged
against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the consideration of
which has been entrusted to Examining Magistrate Bertulus. For all
these reasons the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam
is indispensable. We cannot produce here certain evidence that
concerns him, unless he is called to explain himself in person. And
under these circumstances I believe it my duty to make formal
motion that all legal means be employed to make Lieutenant-Colonel
du Paty de Clam come here and testify concerning his relations with
the de Comminges family, concerning the scene with the mysterious
lady in 1892, and concerning the telegrams signed ‘Speranza’ and
‘Blanche,’ addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart at Tunis.”
The Attorney-General.—“M. du Paty de Clam declares in his letter,
like all the members of the council of war, the hearing of whom has
been abandoned because it was evident that it could not be exacted,
that professional secrecy prevents him from giving any information
whatever. Consequently there is no reason for rejecting his excuse.
But M. Labori points out that Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam
was interested as a witness in an examination not yet finished, but
opened on the complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The reply to
this is manifest and direct. There can be no confusion here between
M. Zola and the gérant of ‘L’Aurore’ on the one hand, and Colonel
Picquart on the other. The latter has lodged a complaint which is
being regularly examined, and it is for him alone to intervene if he
sees fit. But his proceeding is the proceeding of a third party, so far
as these defendants are concerned. From no point of view, then, do
the arguments that have just been presented seem to me well
founded.”
M. Labori.—“Will the court permit me to indicate the matters
concerning which M. Zola desires to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du
Paty de Clam, and the connection between them and the verdict of
January 11? In 1892 Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who had
not then risen to his present office, was in very close relations with
the de Comminges family, whose society Lieutenant-Colonel
Picquart also frequented. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges and her
brother, Captain de Comminges, have been summoned here as
witnesses.”
The Judge.—“I regret to inform you that Mlle. de Comminges is sick,
and that she has sent a doctor’s certificate.”
M. Labori.—“We hope that she will be well again within forty-eight
hours. There are many sick people in this case. We shall have
something to say concerning the things that are happening in this
matter to prevent witnesses from coming, and we shall expose all
intimidations and threats. Mlle. de Comminges knew Lieutenant-
Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. At the
beginning of the campaign in relation to Major Esterhazy, Lieutenant-
Colonel Picquart received at Tunis two singular dispatches. One of
them read: ‘All is discovered. Speranza.’ The court will remember
that this is a signature which has been met already in the Esterhazy
trial. The other dispatch said in substance: ‘It is known that Georges
(that is the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart) is the author of the
telegram. All is discovered. Blanche.’ By Blanche was meant Mlle.
Blanche de Comminges, and that this was understood by the military
authorities is proved by the fact that they demanded of Mlle. Blanche
de Comminges certain specimens of her handwriting. She protested,
and lodged a complaint, as did Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. These
dispatches, then, were forgeries. It would be interesting to find out
who the forgers are. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart attributes one of
them to the police agent, Souffrain, and we have summoned him.
We hope that he will come, and then we shall have an explanation.
As for the other telegram, we are curious to know how there could
have started from certain circles which must be in touch either with
the minister of war or with Major Esterhazy a dispatch signed
Blanche which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was expected to
consider as coming from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. We should
like to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam concerning these
matters, and others of an earlier date in which he has been mixed
up, and which relate exclusively and very closely to Major Esterhazy.
They happened in 1892, and we shall have need also of the
testimony of Mlle. de Comminges on the same subject.”
The Judge.—“There is no question here of Mlle. de Comminges. The
question is of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam.”
M. Labori.—“But it is Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam whom
these matters concern. He was induced at a certain moment, on the
intervention of one of his most eminent superiors, General Davout, to
restore to the de Comminges family certain correspondence. I
cannot be more precise on this point, and the court understands
why; but the matter is in the hands of the prefect of police. One day
Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam said that a certain letter
belonging to this correspondence was not in his hands, and that he
could not give it up directly, because it had fallen into the hands of a
woman, but that it was not very difficult to see her, and that the only
thing necessary was to hand her a 500-franc bill in exchange for the
letter. Then, it seems, on the demand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty
de Clam, a meeting was appointed at the cours la Reine, at the very
spot to which came the singular veiled lady of Major Esterhazy.
There, in the presence of witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de
Clam entered into conversation with the veiled lady, with whom he
remained a long time, and to whom he pretended to have given a
500-franc bill, which, however, no one had sent to him. Then he
brought back the letter to transmit it anew to the de Comminges
family. These are facts concerning which I can say nothing more, in
presence of the interested parties. I can furnish only indications.”
The Judge.—“But I do not see the relation between what you have
just said and the matter for which your client is prosecuted.”
M. Labori.—“You shall see. M. Zola does not hesitate to think that
the veiled lady, far from being in relations with Colonel Picquart, as
they have not feared to state in official reports, and as Major
Esterhazy loudly and audaciously charges, belongs to the circle of
certain members of the staff, or to the circle of Major Esterhazy
himself. Now, concerning this veiled lady we shall have to have
explanations. For how can you expect us to prove that a guilty man
has been acquitted in obedience to orders, if we do not begin by
proving that he is guilty, and by establishing consequently the
various circumstances which could culminate in his guilt? Under
these circumstances it is for us to examine in detail, in order to get
complete light, points that in no way concern the national defence,
which has been abused. It is our indisputable right to seek light on
Major Esterhazy’s means of defence, which have been welcomed in
another place with a facility that they will not meet at the hands of
this jury.”
M. Albert Clemenceau.—“At the trial of Major Esterhazy, and in the
course of his examination, reference was made to the veiled lady,
and this mysterious person was taken so seriously that the president
of the council of war asked the accused if he could not give some
indications concerning this lady, who had given him the mysterious
rendezvous. I conclude therefrom that in the Esterhazy trial, with
which we are necessarily concerned, the veiled lady was in question,
and that therefore all that concerns her is well within our case. Again,
Major du Paty de Clam, in his letter, says that he cannot come here
to testify, because he was a judicial officer of police in the first
examination. The court perhaps remembers that in this very place, in
the case known as the Prado case, they heard Examining Magistrate
Guillot, who came to testify concerning facts that took place in his
private office. The presiding judge was a Paris magistrate. Now,
what was done in the Prado case can be done in this case, and I do
not see that the fact that Major du Paty de Clam played a part in
another inquiry is a reason why we should not hear him here.”
M. Labori.—“Another thing. This is the first time that I have known
witnesses to be judged according to the utility of their evidence. M.
du Paty de Clam is not sick, nor is he detained, so far as I know, by
the duties of his military office. He does not know upon what points
he is to be examined, or what we shall ask him. It is his duty to
appear in this case. We have to question him as well on matters of
fact as on matters of morals pertaining exclusively to the Esterhazy
case, and not at all to the Dreyfus case. Under these circumstances
it is indispensable that M. du Paty de Clam should appear at this bar.
If we question him upon points in regard to which he can take shelter
behind professional secrecy, he will take such shelter, and will not
answer. And even then it will be our right to make a motion before
the court, asking whether, as a matter of law, M. du Paty de Clam
can cut himself off behind professional secrecy. M. du Paty de Clam
refers to closed doors. Well, if closed doors are necessary in this
assize court, we will have them. With a jury, closed doors have no
terrors for us. But we shall ask no questions concerning the national
defence. None are involved in this affair.”
M. Zola.—“None.”
M. Labori.—“They have put forward the plea of the nation’s defence.
But that is a jest.”
The Attorney-General.—“The defence of the nation a jest?”
M. Labori.—“Ah! really, that is not worthy of you, Mr. Attorney-
General. I do not accept that. No, no! I will suffer no one, not even
you, to suspect my patriotism. No! I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, if
there is any question here that concerns the national defence, we
shall not approach it. If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be
closed; we are willing. But we will not permit them to say, in placing
us at the mercy of all calumnies and all insults, that we are paid men,
when, in fact, in a trial like this, we are fighting a battle in which we
risk our life and honor. We will allow no one to say that we are
triflers, and that contempt is the most that we deserve. It will be seen
later whether we deserve it.”
The Judge.—“I have a letter from Mme. de Boulancy in which she
says: ‘I am kept in bed by an affection of the heart, which gives me
much pain just now. I enclose the certificate of my doctor, M. de
Basse, 4, Rue de Berlin. I beg to refer you to my evidence before M.
Bertulus.’”
M. Labori.—“We must hear Mme. de Boulancy. She cannot lapse
into a state of perpetual silence simply because she testified before
M. Bertulus. From the standpoint of authenticity Major Esterhazy’s
letters belong to this discussion. Major Esterhazy, realizing how
terrible a blow the letter in which he styled himself a Uhlan would be
to him, in spite of his numerous protectors, has denied its
genuineness; now, it is genuine, it is, I declare it! And, if Mme. de
Boulancy were here, we would prove it. In the presence of all these
obstacles, I have the right, in the name of my client, who, I am sure,
will approve me” ...
M. Zola.—“Certainly.”
M. Labori.—“... and it is my duty, to tell the whole. Mme. de Boulancy
has other letters” ...
M. Zola.—“That is absolutely true.”
M. Labori.—“... which are authentic and still more serious. For weeks
she has been the object of all sorts of threats. Major Esterhazy visits
her house daily, with the support and protection of the police, who do
not prevent him. And Major Esterhazy threatens her with death, if
she gives up the letters. Mme. de Boulancy has also in her hands
telegrams from Major Esterhazy of a later date, in which he begs her
to give him the letters, and this is a fact known to more than one
witness. For instance, there is M. Tysse. We shall be told directly that
he will not come because, it seems, the Crédit Lyonnais threatens
him with discharge if he comes, and promises to pay his fine if he
does not come. We submit these facts to the jurors, and we ask
them whether it is M. Zola, or the minister of war by his complaint
and his limitations, who is creating in France a situation which,
whatever may be said, is really revolutionary.”
M. Albert Clemenceau.—“It was not until this morning that Mme. de
Boulancy became afflicted with heart trouble, but for two days we
have known that she would not come, and that, in the fear that the
court will send an expert physician to examine her, she will remain in
bed all day. I must add that Mme. de Boulancy has informed the
court that she lives in the Rue de Berlin. I beg the court to send
either a doctor or a sheriff’s officer to that address. He will not find
Mme. de Boulancy there.”
The Judge.—“She lives in the Boulevard des Batignolles, No. 22.”
M. Zola.—“She is not there either.”
M. Albert Clemenceau.—“You will not find Mme. de Boulancy at 22,
Boulevard des Batignolles. I have the honor to offer a motion drawn
up forty-eight hours ago, in which we foresaw that Mme. de
Boulancy would be afflicted with heart trouble, and here, according
to the terms of her letter, she is suffering with an affection of the
heart. We were not mistaken.”
M. Clemenceau then offered a formal motion that, whereas Mme. de
Boulancy had declared on several occasions that she possessed
letters from Major Esterhazy no less insulting to the French army
than those already known, and that she would produce them in the
assize court, and whereas it was known to the defence that Mme. de
Boulancy had recently received three dispatches from Major
Esterhazy demanding a return of these letters, and threatening her
with death if she should produce them in court, and whereas,
because of these threats, Mme. de Boulancy had moved, concealing
her new address, a physician be sent to examine her physical
condition, and that a police officer be sent to seize the letters and
dispatches referred to, wherever he might find them.
The Judge.—“M. Lebrun-Renault writes: ‘I am summoned only
because of the special service that I performed January 5, 1895, at
the parade in which Captain Dreyfus was disgraced. I can report
what took place in the course of this service only to my hierarchical
chiefs, and that is what I did. It is for them to make such use of my
report as may seem to them proper. As for me, outside of them, I am
bound to silence by my professional duty. Wherefore it is impossible
for me to testify before the jurors. Under these circumstances I shall
not respond.’”
M. Labori then offered a motion that, whereas there had been for
some weeks a question in the press and at the tribune of the
chamber of deputies of pretended confessions made by ex-Captain
Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault on the day of the former’s
degradation, the court order the hearing, first, of M. Lebrun-Renault,
who will be asked to state whether he received the confession from
Dreyfus and under what conditions, whether he reported the
confession officially and under what circumstances, and whether he
has spoken to various persons concerning them, and especially to
M. Forzinetti, the baron de Vaux, M. P..., M. Fontbrune, and M.
Dumont, and, second, of any other witness who can be usefully
questioned concerning these matters.
The judge then read the following letter from Major Ravary:
My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain,
then, from appearing.
Ravary.
M. Labori.—“Major Ravary was the first to establish officially, in a
report that has been read publicly, the existence of what is known as
the secret documents in the Dreyfus case. This is a point wholly
pertinent to the discussion, since M. Zola and his fellow-defendant
are authorized to prove that an illegality was committed in 1894 and