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Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
Normativity:
Epistemic and
Practical
EDITED BY
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
# the several contributors 2018
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2018
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
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Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017954189
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
List of Contributors ix
Introduction 1
Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting
1. Putting Fallibilism to Work 12
Charity Anderson
2. Pragmatic Approaches to Belief 26
Jessica Brown
3. The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons 47
Ulrike Heuer
4. Directives for Knowledge and Belief 68
David Hunter
5. How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence 90
Benjamin Kiesewetter
6. Evidence and Its Limits 115
Clayton Littlejohn
7. The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason 137
Errol Lord
8. Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems Are Your Problems! 162
Matthew McGrath
9. Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief 179
Kate Nolfi
10. Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief 200
Baron Reed
11. Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical
Normativity 221
Andrew Reisner
vi CONTENTS
Index 281
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first
question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corres-
ponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativ-
ity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what
one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or
to think, and so on, not simply of what one in fact does or thinks.1
The tendency is to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the
issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and
vice versa. But there is a growing awareness that treating the two separately leads
to distortions, omissions, and misunderstandings. Debates over epistemic nor-
mativity have failed to take on board developments on the practical side; those
discussing practical normativity often make general claims whose implications in
the epistemic case remain unexplored.
Several considerations seem to support adopting a more synoptic approach to
matters normative. First, we use paradigmatic normative terms such as ‘ought’,
‘right’, and ‘justification’ when speaking both of action and of belief: for example,
‘You ought not to smoke’ and ‘You ought not to believe everything the tobacco
companies tell you’. There is no obvious ambiguity here. Second, epistemic
norms appear to govern actions of certain sorts, for example, asserting proposi-
tions or gathering evidence, while practical norms appear to govern thinking of
1
For ease of presentation, we will speak primarily of action and belief. But, of course, practical
attitudes like intention are also subject to norms, and epistemic norms govern other attitudes, such
as credences. Feelings are also subject to norms. The connection between those norms and the
norms that govern action and belief is an interesting and important one, but not the focus of this
volume (although see McGrath’s contribution in Chapter 8 for some discussion).
CONOR M c HUGH , JONATHAN WAY , AND DANIEL WHITING
certain sorts, for example, practical reasoning. Finally, the question of what to do
often seems closely tied to that of what to think. For example, it would be surprising
if it were to turn out that the issue of whether to give a person chocolate were wholly
independent of the issue of whether to think that she is diabetic.
The aim of this volume is to examine the norms which concern us as agents
alongside the norms which concern us as inquirers. More specifically, it is to
explore substantive and explanatory connections between practical and epistemic
norms, to consider whether these norms are at some level unified, and to ask
what that might mean. The aim of this introduction is to provide an overview of
some—by no means all—of those issues and to indicate in which contributions
they appear.
2 Substantive Connections
In this section we will consider some of the ways in which epistemic and practical
normativity might be thought to be substantively connected. A place to begin is
the suggestion that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, that whether
a person knows a proposition does not depend only on, say, whether her evidence
supports that proposition, but also on broadly practical considerations, such as
what is at stake in believing it.2 To illustrate:
LOW On Friday, Karen drives past the bank. She has a cheque to deposit
though there is no urgent need to do so. Karen wonders whether she could
come back tomorrow and recalls that the bank was open on Saturday two
weeks ago. She concludes that the bank will be open tomorrow, too, and so
decides to come back then. It turns out that Karen is right—the bank is open
tomorrow.
HIGH Like LOW except that there is an urgent need for Karen to deposit the
cheque. She has a mortgage payment to make by Sunday, when the bank is
closed, and her house will be repossessed if she fails to make it.3
Many are inclined to judge that in LOW Karen knows that the bank is open. In
contrast, many are inclined to judge that in HIGH she does not know this. In
both cases, paradigmatically epistemic factors, such as the level of evidential
2
See Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2009; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005.
3
LOW and HIGH are variants on the ‘Bank’ cases of DeRose 1992. The original versions of those
cases involve explicit attributions or denials of knowledge, and were intended to support, not
pragmatic encroachment, but the view that the truth-conditions of such attributions depend on
the practical context in which they are made.
INTRODUCTION
support, the reliability of the belief-forming mechanisms, and so on, are the same.
The only difference is that Karen has more to lose in HIGH than in LOW.
Many of those who have the above inclinations are also inclined to say that in
LOW Karen is justified in believing that the bank is open, while in HIGH she is
not, at least, not fully or flat-out.4
Such cases, then, lend intuitive support to the idea that practical considerations
bear on whether a person knows or is justified in believing a proposition.
(McGrath defends the idea in Chapter 8, while Anderson and Reed oppose it
(Chapters 1 and 10, respectively); see also Brown (Chapter 2).)5 Lying behind
those intuitions might be a linking principle like the following:
If a person is justified in believing that p, she is justified in acting on the basis
that p.
Of course, this is just a first pass. The idea it seeks to capture is that, if a belief is
not an appropriate basis for action, if it is not appropriate to act on that belief ’s
content, it is not appropriate to have it.6 This is to say that there is a substantive
connection between the norms governing action and those governing belief. (For
discussion of this idea, independent of the debate over pragmatic encroachment,
see Littlejohn’s Chapter 6 and Star’s Chapter 12.)
If a principle like this holds, it explains the verdicts in HIGH and LOW. It is
appropriate for Karen in LOW to use the content of her belief that the bank is
open as a premise in her practical reasoning as to whether to come back
tomorrow. But it is not appropriate for Karen in HIGH to do the same. Hence,
in HIGH Karen is not justified in believing that the bank is open. Hence, she does
not know this.
The proponent of pragmatic encroachment maintains that in some way
practical considerations, specifically the costs of error, bear on whether to believe
a proposition. An interesting question (which Reed discusses in Chapter 10) is
how this relates to a more traditional form of pragmatism, according to which
the costs and benefits of believing can provide reasons for and against doing
so. Suppose, for example, that a representative of an unscrupulous oil company
4
See, for example, Fantl and McGrath 2009.
5
For further critical discussion, see Anderson 2015; Brown 2008; Levin 2008; Reed 2010.
6
The authors cited in n2 advance some version of this idea (see also Hawthorne and Stanley
2008). For critical discussion, see Brown 2008; Gerken 2011; McKinnon 2011; Neta 2009; Smithies
2012; Whiting Forthcoming.
A related, but distinct, principle is that, if a person is justified in believing that she is justified in
performing some act, then she is justified in performing that act. For discussion and defence of
principles in this ballpark, see Gibbons 2013; Kiesewetter Forthcoming; Littlejohn 2012; Way and
Whiting 2016.
CONOR M c HUGH , JONATHAN WAY , AND DANIEL WHITING
offers you a financial reward for believing that global temperatures are falling.
The offer is not evidence for the proposition. So, one might say, it is not an
epistemic reason for believing it. But the offer nonetheless seems to many to
count in favour of belief; it is, they say, a practical or pragmatic reason for
believing.7
If there are practical reasons for belief in addition to epistemic reasons, this
raises the question of how, if at all, they weigh against each other. If the practical
considerations weigh in favour of belief but the evidential considerations weigh
against it, what should a person believe overall or all-things-considered? It is
difficult to know how to answer this question. That might suggest it is a bad one
to ask. Perhaps there is something that a person should believe from an epistemic
point of view and something that she should believe from a practical point of
view, but nothing that she should believe full stop. (For discussion, see Reisner’s
Chapter 11.)
The distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief seems to be
an instance of a more general distinction between what are sometimes called
reasons of the right kind and reasons of the wrong kind for attitudes.8 Suppose that
the oil company rep offers you a reward for intending to drive to work. To get the
reward, you do not have to drive to work—you only have to intend to do so. The
offer is, one might think, a reason for having the intention but it is a reason of an
unorthodox (wrong) sort. To see this, suppose that driving to work is quicker
than walking. This is a reason of an orthodox (right) kind to intend to drive—it
reveals or indicates something good about what you intend. But the rep’s offer
does not in the same way reveal or indicate anything good about what you
intend; instead, it indicates something good about intending it, about having
that attitude.
This raises the issue of how exactly to distinguish reasons of the wrong kind
from reasons of the right kind. In turn, it raises the issue of whether the way in
which we draw the distinction in the case of belief carries over to the case of
intention or other practical attitudes. If so, this might reveal some important
unity between the norms governing each attitude; if not (as Heuer argues in
Chapter 3), it might cast doubt on whether there is any such unity.
The suggestion that practical considerations bear in some way on the epistemic
status of a belief seems like a challenge to evidentialism. A standard way of
characterizing this is as the view that whether a person is justified in believing
7
For an overview of this issue, and extensive references, see Reisner Forthcoming.
8
For some influential discussions of this distinction, see Hieronymi 2005; Rabinowicz and
Rnnow-Rasmussen 2004; Schroeder 2012.
INTRODUCTION
9
See Conee and Feldman 2004.
10
More carefully, some deny this. Others make the more modest claim that only evidential
considerations bear on whether a belief possesses the kind of justification necessary for knowledge,
that is, for epistemic justification.
11
Williams 1981 is an influential proponent of this principle. For discussion and further
references, see Way Forthcoming-b; Way and Whiting Forthcoming.
12
For versions of this argument, see Kelly 2002; Shah 2006, 2008. For doubts about the claims
about what we can believe and intend that it relies on, see Frankish 2007; Pink 1991; Schroeder 2012;
Sharadin 2016; Way Forthcoming-b. For defence, see Archer Forthcoming; Shah and Silverstein
2013.
13
Proponents of epistemic constraints of this sort include Dancy 2000; Gibbons 2013; Lord
2015; Raz 2011; and Kiesewetter (Chapter 5, this volume).
CONOR M c HUGH , JONATHAN WAY , AND DANIEL WHITING
reasons for her to act or to think.14 This is to say, whether a fact is a reason for a
person depends on her epistemic status with respect to that fact.
The motivational constraint might be taken to support the epistemic con-
straint. The idea, in short, is that if a person is in no position to know a reason,
she is no position to act on it.15
An epistemic constraint of the above sort bears on the debate between object-
ivists and perspectivists about what is sometimes called the deliberative ought, the
ought in play when a person asks herself, with the aim of making a decision,
‘What ought I to do?’16 Objectivists maintain that what a person ought in this
sense to do is determined by the facts, without restriction. Perspectivists, in contrast,
maintain that what a person ought in the deliberative sense to do is determined by
her perspective. What constitutes a person’s perspective? Different answers to this
question result in different versions of perspectivism. For present purposes, suppose
that a person’s perspective is constituted by her evidence, understood as including
only what she is in a position to know. In view of this, consider:
A patient has a treatable disease. If left untreated it will lead to death. All of the
doctor’s evidence indicates that drug A will cure her patient and drug B will kill
her. In fact, drug A will kill the patient and drug B will cure her.
(cf. Jackson 1991: 462–3)
According to objectivists, the doctor in this case ought to give drug B. According
to perspectivists, the doctor ought to give drug A. On the assumption that a
person’s reasons determine what she ought to do, the epistemic constraint on
reasons accords with the perspectivist’s verdicts (defended in Chapter 5 by
Kiesewetter). Perspectivists thus give epistemic factors a crucial role in the
substantive determination of central normative facts in the practical realm.
3 Explanatory Connections
We turn now from substantive connections to explanatory ones. These include
ways that epistemic norms might be thought to be explained in terms of the
practical, or vice versa, as well as unifying explanations of both.
Suppose that evidence for a proposition justifies or provides a reason for
believing it. What might explain this? A standard answer in epistemology is
14
One might, of course, propose alternative principles by appeal to a different epistemic status
than that of being in a position to know.
15
Lord 2015 argues at length that the epistemic constraint follows from the motivational one, at
least when these are restricted to decisive reasons.
16
For some further contributions to this debate, see Graham 2010; Kiesewetter 2011; Mason
2013; Zimmerman 2014.
INTRODUCTION
teleological. Having true beliefs (and avoiding false beliefs) is an end. If a person
has evidence for a proposition, this indicates that, in believing it, she will realize
or secure this end. Hence, such evidence is or provides a reason for so believing.17
In what way is believing what is true an end? One—not the only—way to
understand this is as an aim that people have in forming and revising beliefs.18
This proposal represents epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental
normativity, which is often taken to be a paradigmatic form of practical norma-
tivity. If a person aims to bake a cake, instrumental rationality in some way
requires her to take the means to satisfying this aim, say, by buying the ingredi-
ents. In a similar fashion, when a person aims to believe the truth, instrumental
rationality in some way requires her to take the means to satisfying this aim, say,
by following her evidence. (Steglich-Petersen defends such an account of epi-
stemic normativity in Chapter 13.)
Another proposal takes off from the thought that beliefs provide the basis for
action or the input to practical reasoning. For example, when a person believes
that the recipe requires eggs, she might on that basis fetch some. This proposal
can also be developed in a broadly teleological way. One might think that it is the
function or purpose of belief to serve this role. In turn, one might seek to explain
why evidence provides a reason for belief by appeal to that function or purpose.
Evidence for a belief indicates that it is an accurate guide for action, hence, that it
is fit for inclusion in practical deliberation. Hence, such evidence is or provides a
reason for belief.19 It is an interesting question whether this explanation com-
petes with or complements the preceding one. (Nolfi defends a proposal of this
sort in Chapter 9, while Brown challenges the idea that belief should be under-
stood in terms of its practical role in Chapter 2.)
These are examples of how one might try to ground epistemic normativity in
practical normativity or concerns. (For more examples, see Reed’s Chapter 10.)
In this way, we might find explanatory connections between the epistemic and
practical domains. Of course, such explanatory connections might run in the
other direction. Consider again instrumental rationality. Here is a rough formu-
lation of a norm of instrumental rationality:
You must intend to ψ if you intend to φ and believe that φing is a necessary
means to ψing.
17
Foley 1987 gives a classic development of such an approach; for a more recent defence, see
Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 2014. Influential critics include Berker 2013 and Kelly 2003.
18
For an influential discussion of this idea, see Velleman 2000. See also McHugh 2012-a, 2012-b;
Shah and Velleman 2005; Steglich-Petersen 2006.
19
For other ways of developing this idea, see Côté-Bouchard 2015; Whiting 2014.
CONOR M c HUGH , JONATHAN WAY , AND DANIEL WHITING
Suppose that intending to do something involves believing that you will do it. In
that case, the above norm might seem to follow from a requirement of epistemic
rationality:
You must believe that you will ψ if you believe that you will φ and believe that
you will φ only if you will ψ.
So, given the ‘cognitivist’ assumption that intentions involve beliefs, one might
try to ground a certain sort of practical norm in a certain sort of epistemic
norm.20 (For criticism of this approach, see Lord’s Chapter 7.)
An alternative way to ground the practical in the epistemic is to offer an
account of some normative property, such as that of being a reason, which
appeals to an epistemic property. Consider the proposal that a reason for a
person to φ is evidence that she ought to φ.21 For example, that a person is in
pain is evidence that you ought to help her. Hence, on this view, it is a reason for
doing so. This account (which Star defends in Chapter 12) explains practical
reasons in terms of a central epistemic property, that of evidence.
It is arguably an attractive feature of this view that it offers a unified account
of reasons, one that applies to reasons for belief as well as reasons for action. Reasons
of all kinds are evidence; epistemic reasons are evidence that a person ought to
believe a proposition while practical reasons are evidence that a person ought to act.
Of course, it is not the only view of this unifying sort on the market. Consider
the view that reasons are facts that explain why a person ought to φ, where φing
might be acting or believing.22 Or consider the view that reasons are premises
of good reasoning, whether to a theoretical conclusion, a belief, or a practical
conclusion, an intention or action.23 The teleological proposal noted above
might also be understood in this way: reasons to φ—whether φing is believing
or acting—are considerations which help explain why φing promotes one’s
aims (desires, wants, etc.).24, 25
Despite their differences, these accounts of what it is to be a reason assume that
a unified explanation—that is, one that applies to both reasons for belief and
reasons for action—is possible. Such an account is attractive, insofar as it
20
For an early statement of this kind of view, see Harman 1976. For more recent defences, see
Setiya 2007; Velleman 1989; Wallace 2006. For criticism, see Bratman 1999: ch. 13; Brunero 2009.
21 22
See Kearns and Star 2009; Thomson 2008. For this view, see Broome 2013.
23
For versions of this view, see Setiya 2014; Way Forthcoming-a.
24
Schroeder 2007 expresses sympathy for this view. See also Finlay 2006.
25
Unlike some of the views discussed earlier in this section, these views are typically presented as
analyses of reasons—that is, accounts of what it is to be a reason—rather than simply as accounts of
what grounds reasons or of what explains reasons. For a recent discussion of the relationship
between analyses and grounds, see Rosen 2015.
INTRODUCTION
promises to explain the similarities between reasons for belief and action. None-
theless, one might, of course, doubt that any such account is possible. Perhaps
reasons for belief are just very different beasts from reasons for action (as Heuer
suggests in Chapter 3). Perhaps, in turn, oughts as they apply to belief are very
different beasts from oughts as they apply to action. More generally, perhaps the
norms governing belief are entirely independent of the norms governing action.
On these views, the domain of the normative is fragmented or, rather, there is not
one such domain but a number of them. Such views would also have their
attractions—for instance, they might explain why it is hard to make sense of
weighing practical reasons against epistemic reasons. (For discussion, see also
Reisner’s Chapter 11.)
4 Conclusion
The above provides an overview of some of the themes which the contributions to
this collection explore. We make no pretence that the overview, or for that matter
the collection itself, is exhaustive. The question of how practical norms and
epistemic norms relate raises many more issues than any one volume can cover.
The hope is that the collection as a whole demonstrates the importance and interest
of asking that question and the many lines of inquiry that lead from it.
References
Ahlstrom-Vij, K. and Dunn, J. 2014: A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philo-
sophical Quarterly 64: 541–51.
Anderson, C. 2015: On the Intimate Relationship of Knowledge and Action. Episteme 12:
343–53.
Archer, S. Forthcoming: Defending Exclusivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research.
Berker, S. 2013: The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Issues 23:
363–87.
Bratman, M. 1999: Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broome, J. 2013: Rationality through Reasoning. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brown, J. 2008: Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical
Reasoning. Noûs 42: 167–89.
Brunero, J. 2009: Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality. Philosophical Studies
146: 311–25.
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. 2004: Evidentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Côté-Bouchard, C. 2015: Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23: 337–55.
Dancy, J. 2000: Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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assemblées françaises où le moindre événement distrait aussitôt,
tous les visages se tournèrent vers les deux hommes qui excitaient
cette rumeur, et l’on ne vit pas sans une sorte d’effroi le changement
opéré chez eux. A la Bourse, chacun se promène en causant, et
tous ceux qui composent la foule se sont bientôt reconnus et
observés, car la Bourse est comme une grande table de bouillotte où
les habiles savent deviner le jeu d’un homme et l’état de sa caisse
d’après sa physionomie. Chacun avait donc remarqué la figure de
Claparon et celle de Castanier. Celui-ci, comme l’Irlandais, était
nerveux et puissant, ses yeux brillaient, sa carnation avait de la
vigueur. Chacun s’était émerveillé de cette figure majestueusement
terrible en se demandant où ce bon Castanier l’avait prise; mais
Castanier, dépouillé de son pouvoir, apparaissait fané, ridé, vieilli,
débile. Il était, en entraînant Claparon, comme un malade en proie à
un accès de fièvre, ou comme un thériaki dans le moment
d’exaltation que lui donne l’opium; mais en revenant, il était dans
l’état d’abattement qui suit la fièvre, et pendant lequel les malades
expirent, ou il était dans l’affreuse prostration que causent les
jouissances excessives du narcotisme. L’esprit infernal qui lui avait
fait supporter ses grandes débauches était disparu; le corps se
trouvait seul, épuisé, sans secours, sans appui contre les assauts
des remords et le poids d’un vrai repentir. Claparon, de qui chacun
avait deviné les angoisses, reparaissait au contraire avec des yeux
éclatants et portait sur son visage la fierté de Lucifer. La faillite avait
passé d’un visage sur l’autre.
—Allez crever en paix, mon vieux, dit Claparon à Castanier.
—Par grâce, envoyez-moi chercher une voiture et un prêtre, le
vicaire de Saint-Sulpice, lui répondit l’ancien dragon en s’asseyant
sur une borne.
Ce mot: «Un prêtre!» fut entendu par plusieurs personnes, et fit
naître un brouhaha goguenard que poussèrent les boursiers, tous
gens qui réservent leur foi pour croire qu’un chiffon de papier,
nommé une inscription, vaut un domaine. Le Grand-Livre est leur
Bible.
—Aurai-je le temps de me repentir? se dit Castanier d’une voix
lamentable qui frappa Claparon.
Un fiacre emporta le moribond. Le spéculateur alla promptement
payer ses effets à la Banque. L’impression produite par le soudain
changement de physionomie de ces deux hommes fut effacée dans
la foule comme un sillon de vaisseau s’efface sur la mer. Une
nouvelle de la plus haute importance excita l’attention du monde
négociant. A cette heure où tous les intérêts sont en jeu, Moïse, en
paraissant avec ses deux cornes lumineuses obtiendrait à peine les
honneurs d’un calembour, et serait nié par les gens en train de faire
des reports. Lorsque Claparon eut payé ses effets, la peur le prit. Il
fut convaincu de son pouvoir, revint à la Bourse et offrit son marché
aux gens embarrassés. L’inscription sur le grand-livre de l’enfer, et
les droits attachés à la jouissance d’icelle, mot d’un notaire que se
substitua Claparon, fut achetée sept cent mille francs. Le notaire
revendit le traité du diable cinq cent mille francs à un entrepreneur
en bâtiment, qui s’en débarrassa pour cent mille écus en le cédant à
un marchand de fer; et celui-ci le rétrocéda pour deux cent mille
francs à un charpentier. Enfin, à cinq heures, personne ne croyait à
ce singulier contrat, et les acquéreurs manquaient faute de foi.
A cinq heures et demie, le détenteur était un peintre en bâtiment
qui restait accoté contre la porte de la Bourse provisoire, bâtie à
cette époque rue Feydeau. Ce peintre en bâtiment, homme simple,
ne savait pas ce qu’il avait en lui-même.—Il était tout chose, dit-il à
sa femme quand il fut de retour au logis.
La rue Feydeau est, comme le savent les flâneurs, une de ces
rues adorées des jeunes gens qui, faute d’une maîtresse, épousent
tout le sexe. Au premier étage de la maison la plus bourgeoisement
décente, demeurait une de ces délicieuses créatures que le ciel se
plaît à combler des beautés les plus rares, et qui, ne pouvant être ni
duchesses ni reines, parce qu’il y a beaucoup plus de jolies femmes
que de titres et de trônes, se contentent d’un agent de change ou
d’un banquier de qui elles font le bonheur à prix fixe. Cette bonne et
belle fille, appelée Euphrasie, était l’objet de l’ambition d’un clerc de
notaire démesurément ambitieux. En effet, le second clerc de maître
Crottat, notaire, était amoureux de cette femme comme un jeune
homme est amoureux à vingt-deux ans. Ce clerc aurait assassiné le
pape et le sacré collége des cardinaux, afin de se procurer une
misérable somme de cent louis, réclamée par Euphrasie pour un
châle qui lui tournait la tête, et en échange duquel sa femme de
chambre l’avait promise au clerc. L’amoureux allait et venait devant
les fenêtres de madame Euphrasie, comme vont et viennent les ours
blancs dans leur cage, au Jardin-des-Plantes. Il avait sa main droite
passée sous son gilet, sur le sein gauche, et voulait se déchirer le
cœur, mais il n’en était encore qu’à tordre les élastiques de ses
bretelles.
—Que faire pour avoir dix mille francs? se disait-il, prendre la
somme que je dois porter à l’enregistrement pour cet acte de vente.
Mon Dieu! mon emprunt ruinera-t-il l’acquéreur, un homme sept fois
millionnaire? Eh! bien, demain, j’irai me jeter à ses pieds, je lui dirai:
«Monsieur, je vous ai pris dix mille francs, j’ai vingt-deux ans, et
j’aime Euphrasie, voilà mon histoire. Mon père est riche, il vous
remboursera, ne me perdez pas! N’avez-vous pas eu vingt-deux ans
et une rage d’amour?» Mais ces fichus propriétaires, ça n’a pas
d’âme! Il est capable de me dénoncer au procureur du roi, au lieu de
s’attendrir. Sacredieu! si l’on pouvait vendre son âme au diable! Mais
il n’y a ni Dieu ni diable, c’est des bêtises, ça ne se voit que dans les
livres bleus ou chez les vieilles femmes. Que faire?
—Si vous voulez vendre votre âme au diable, lui dit le peintre en
bâtiment devant qui le clerc avait laissé échapper quelques paroles,
vous aurez dix mille francs.
—J’aurai donc Euphrasie, dit le clerc en topant au marché que lui
proposa le diable sous la forme d’un peintre en bâtiment.
Le pacte consommé, l’enragé clerc alla chercher le châle, monta
chez madame Euphrasie; et, comme il avait le diable au corps, il y
resta douze jours sans en sortir en y dépensant tout son paradis, en
ne songeant qu’à l’amour et à ses orgies au milieu desquelles se
noyait le souvenir de l’enfer et de ses priviléges.
L’énorme puissance conquise par la découverte de l’Irlandais, fils
du révérend Maturin, se perdit ainsi.
Il fut impossible à quelques orientalistes, à des mystiques, à des
archéologues occupés de ces choses, de constater historiquement
la manière d’évoquer le démon. Voici pourquoi.
Le treizième jour de ses noces enragées, le pauvre clerc gisait
sur son grabat, chez son patron, dans un grenier de la rue Saint-
Honoré. La Honte, cette stupide déesse qui n’ose se regarder,
s’empara du jeune homme qui devint malade, il voulut se soigner lui-
même, et se trompa de dose en prenant une drogue curative due au
génie d’un homme bien connu sur les murs de Paris. Le clerc creva
donc sous le poids du vif-argent, et son cadavre devint noir comme
le dos d’une taupe. Un diable avait certainement passé par là, mais
lequel? Était-ce Astaroth?
—Cet estimable jeune homme a été emporté dans la planète de
Mercure, dit le premier clerc à un démonologue allemand qui vint
prendre des renseignements sur cette affaire.
—Je le croirais volontiers, répondit l’Allemand.
—Ha!
—Oui, monsieur, reprit l’Allemand, cette opinion s’accorde avec
les propres paroles de Jacob Bœhm, en sa quarante-huitième
proposition sur la TRIPLE VIE DE L’HOMME, où il est dit que si Dieu a
opéré toutes choses par le FIAT, le FIAT est la secrète matrice qui
comprend et saisit la nature que forme l’esprit né de Mercure et de
Dieu.
—Vous dites, monsieur?
L’Allemand répéta sa phrase.
—Nous ne connaissons pas, dirent les clercs.
—Fiat!... dit un clerc, fiat lux!
—Vous pouvez vous convaincre de la vérité de cette citation,
reprit l’Allemand en lisant la phrase dans la page 75 du Traité de la
TRIPLE VIE DE L’HOMME, imprimé en 1809, chez monsieur Migneret, et
traduit par un philosophe, grand admirateur de l’illustre cordonnier.
—Ha, il était cordonnier, dit le premier clerc. Voyez-vous ça!
—En Prusse! reprit l’Allemand.
—Travaillait-il pour le roi? dit un béotien de second clerc.
—Il aurait dû mettre des béquets à ses phrases, dit le troisième
clerc.
—Cet homme est pyramidal, s’écria le quatrième clerc en
montrant l’Allemand.
Quoiqu’il fût un démonologue de première force, l’étranger ne
savait pas quels mauvais diables sont les clercs; il s’en alla, ne
comprenant rien à leurs plaisanteries, et convaincu que ces jeunes
gens trouvaient Bœhm un génie pyramidal.
—Il y a de l’instruction en France, se dit-il.
MADAME EUPHRASIE.
Cette bonne et belle fille était l’objet
de l’ambition d’un clerc de notaire...
(MELMOTH RÉCONCILIÉ.)
LE CHEF-D’ŒUVRE INCONNU.
A UN LORD.
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1845.
I.
GILLETTE.
MAITRE FRENHOFER.
Le visage était d’ailleurs singulièrement
flétri.