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Full download The Psychological and Cultural Foundations of East Asian Cognition: Contradiction, Change, and Holism Julie Spencer-Rodgers file pdf all chapter on 2024
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The Psychological and Cultural Foundations
of East Asian Cognition
The Psychological and Cultural
Foundations of East Asian
Cognition
Contradiction, Change, and Holism
Edited by
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
CONTENTS
Foreword ix
List of Contributors xv
vi | Contents
CHAPTER 16 Contextual and Cultural Factors Influencing Malleable
Racial Identity 465
Julie A. Garcia, Diana T. Sanchez, and Margaret Shih
CHAPTER 17 When in Rome Think Like a Roman: Empirical
Evidence and Implications of Temporarily Adopting
Dialectical Thinking 489
Ashley M. Votruba and Virginia S. Y. Kwan
CHAPTER 18 Dialectical Emotions 509
Brooke Wilken and Yuri Miyamoto
CHAPTER 19 Dialecticism and Mental Health: Toward a Yin-Yang
Vision of Well-Being 547
Y. Joel Wong and Tao Liu
CHAPTER 20 The Yin-Yang of Stress: The Link Between Dialectical
Thinking and Coping Processes 573
Hi-Po Bobo Lau and Cecilia Cheng
CHAPTER 21 Dialectical Thinking and Attitudes toward Action/
Inaction Beyond East Asia 595
Ethan Zell, Rong Su, and Dolores Albarracín
Index 611
Contents | vii
FOREWORD
Richard E. Nisbett
I n 1982, shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, I was invited to
give a series of lectures on social psychology at Beijing University. This
was part of a faculty exchange program between that university and the
University of Michigan set up by the developmental psychologist Harold
Stevenson. Stevenson and the Chinese developmental psychologist Jing
Qicheng opened up Chinese psychology to world psychology and world
psychology to Chinese culture and thought.
A striking aspect of my visit was an encounter with an undergraduate
physics student who attended my lectures and came to visit me a couple
of times in my apartment at the university’s Foreign Guest House. The
student could barely speak English, but my conversations with him made
it clear that he had a first class mind and that he had a talent and a passion
for psychology.
That student was Kaiping Peng. Kaiping switched his major to psy-
chology and went on to get a degree in it from Beijing University. He
must have greatly impressed his mentors, because he became assistant
chair of the department there within a couple of years of receiving
his degree. Then Kaiping did something surprising, which turned out
to have a big impact on cultural psychology. A decade after we met,
Kaiping decided to get a PhD in psychology in the United States. To
my good fortune—as well as the field of psychology—he came to the
University of Michigan.
Several Michigan psychologists were just beginning to be serious
about studying culture. This required more courage than you might guess
because there was almost no work of value being done in the field of cul-
tural psychology, and it was almost a sign of inferior intellect to say you
were interested in culture. This was partly because there was so little good
work one could point to and partly because of the conviction of (Western)
psychologists that any problem of significance would produce solutions
which would apply to the entire human race. Who cares that the French
eat horses and the Khoikhoi think the moon is a physical manifestation of
a supreme heavenly being? Everybody perceives, thinks, and experiences
emotion in the same way in response to the same circumstances.
One day shortly before Kaiping came to Michigan I walked into Hazel
Markus’s office and said, “Guess what?” I’m going to teach a seminar
on cultural psychology,” taking a step backward to await what I was sure
would be her negative reaction to this announcement. “No you’re not,”
Hazel said. “I’m going to teach a seminar on cultural psychology.” Of
course, we both knew that response meant the two of us would be teaching
that seminar. I was very excited at the prospect of constructing the course
with Hazel, but not nearly as excited as I should have been, because the
course, and the Culture and Cognition program that grew out of it, were
remarkable for the importance of the ideas we dealt with and for the talent
of the students who joined the enterprise.
The students initially involved in the program included Kaiping,
Michael Morris, Susan Cross, Nancy Wong, Margaret Evans, and Dov
Cohen, as well as anthropology students Rachel Heiman and Janet
McIntosh. Very shortly thereafter they were joined by some extraordi-
nary people including several of the luminaries who are authors on some
of the fascinating papers in this book. These include Incheol Choi, Ara
Norenzayan, Li-Jun Ji, Taka Masuda, and Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks. Later
came another raft of extraordinary people, including Yuri Miyamoto, Jan
Leu, Igor Grossmann, Jinkyung Na, and Michael Varnum.
That initial seminar was electric. It was clear early on that (1) you really
could apply the experimental social psychologist’s methodological tools
and habits of thought to questions of cultural difference and (2) Hazel and
I didn’t know what we were doing any more than the students did—so they
knew they were definitely getting in on the ground floor.
After Kaiping had been at Michigan for a few months, he told me that
he and I had completely different ways of thinking—and that our differ-
ences were characteristic of the differences between Chinese and Western
culture generally. Naturally, I said, “Go on!”
Kaiping then went on to sketch many of the ideas about holistic vs. ana-
lytic thinking that we subsequently tested. I was responsive to Kaiping’s
x | Foreword
assertions because I had read philosopher Hajime Nakamura’s Ways of
Thinking of Eastern Peoples. Many of the ideas about reasoning Kaiping
described overlapped with what Nakamura wrote.
So we began to work together on these ideas. And Kaiping worked
also with Michael Morris, notably on the very important studies showing
that Chinese causal attributions emphasize context and situations whereas
American attributions focus on presumed attributes of the actor.
One day Kaiping came to me with a list of ideas about East/West dif-
ferences that might be fruitful to pursue. Every one of the ideas was inter-
esting and important. But dialectical reasoning, which Kaiping labeled
“naïve dialecticism,” leaped off the page. Kaiping had a clear idea of the
differences between Chinese and Western thought along lines that could
be described as dialectical, and was also familiar with Western approaches
to dialectical thinking in the tradition of Hegel and Kant.
Igor Grossmann’s chapter in this volume does a very good job of devel-
oping the relations among dialectical thought in the East Asian tradition,
the European (and especially German) tradition, and the psychological,
”post-formalist” tradition as represented by the German psychologist
Klaus Riegel. The Asian and German forms of dialectical reasoning, espe-
cially as described by Riegel, are remarkably similar. This is quite surpris-
ing given that there would have been no direct contact between thinkers
living several thousand miles apart.
I won’t get ahead of the story by describing the basic differences
between dialectical thinking and what your editors call linear thinking.
I’ll leave that to the excellent chapters of this book. I just foreshadow
what the editors say in Chapter 1 by summarizing their characterization of
dialectical thinking as involving the following: (1) Expectation of change
(East Asians insist upon it, with the default assumption that change will be
cyclical; Westerners expect either stability or linear change. (2) Tolerance
of contradiction (East Asians accept it and make use of it to understand
the world better; Westerners reject it, relying on formal logic to decide
which of two contradictory propositions is true and dismissing the other).
(3) Perception of interconnectedness (East Asians assume it and look for
relationships in the environment; Westerners focus on salient objects and
their intentions with regard to them).
I would like to point in this foreword to some situations where the dia-
lectical approach is particularly helpful and some situations where the
linear logical approach is particularly helpful. The two approaches are
complementary, and each serves as an excellent platform from which to
learn from and critique the other approach.
Foreword | xi
The dialectical approach makes us attend to a wider range of facts and
considerations before coming to a conclusion about some matter. This is
surely all to the good. On the other hand, the linear/logical approach is
impatient and looks for ways to ignore facts. This is helpful or even essen-
tial when it’s time to make a decision, or set out the justification for a pol-
icy, or write the article. Too much attention to too many facts at the end
stage can prevent a decision or muddle a justification or prevent a clear
understanding of the main points of an argument. (Secretary of State Dean
Acheson once warned President Truman that in describing a particular
policy it was necessary “to be clearer than the truth”!)
The dialectical approach, partly because of its attention to many consid-
erations and facts, is the enemy of certainty, which is a trap that the linear/
logical approach is more likely to fall into. Nassim Nicholas Taleb is a
severe critic of the linear/logical approach. He points out that it encour-
ages overly simple models of phenomena that reach conclusions that are
inappropriately confident. A favorite example of mine showing this failing
is the financial manager attempting to predict your financial situation at
some point in the future by “Monte Carlo” runs of 10,000 situations and
their likely outcomes. It’s common for this procedure to come up with a
probability that you will have X amount of money at time Y with Z prob-
ability. The models that run those multiple situations, however, treat most
factors as static or changing in a linear fashion.
The models make no allowance for the possible appearance of what
Taleb calls “black swans.” (All Europeans knew that all swans are
white . . . until the first European went to Australia and discovered that
there are black swans there.) Taleb’s black swans, in addition to being
completely unanticipated, change the world or some important aspect of
it beyond recognition. The 9/11 attack was a black swan—completely
unanticipated, catastrophic, and world-changing. The 2008 collapse of the
financial system is another black swan, anticipated by no economist or
businessperson, and producing huge consequences for all aspects of eco-
nomic life that persist today. It’s been estimated that the average American
will have one-third less wealth in 2030 than would have been the case had
the economy continued its merry linear journey. It’s safe to say that none
of the 10,000 runs your financial manager carries out contains a black
swan: no nuclear war, no asteroid destroying most of Central America, no
revolution in China setting her back 30 years, no invention so spectacular
that it renders money irrelevant.
The linear/logical approach does not include the inherent checks on
certainty that the dialectical approach does. It’s no accident, incidentally,
xii | Foreword
that the person who brought us the concept of the black swan is not a
Westerner. He is Lebanese in origin.
The dialectical emphasis on change provides another hedge against
overconfidence. If the world is constantly changing, outcomes are not
likely to seem certain. The Greek insistence on stasis is a mystery to
me. It’s a fifth century BC invention. The sixth century philosopher
Heraclitus insisted that a man never steps into the same river twice—
because the man is different and the river is different. Fifth-century (and
later) philosophers were contemptuous of this idea. It made the Greeks
receptive to arguments against the possibility of change. Plato’s forms
were eternal and unchanging. In contrast, for the Eastern approach to
the world, change is the only constant. A belief in change encourages
regressive solutions to problems, which I think is normally helpful. An
extreme event is a signal that the next-encountered event of its type will
not be so extreme.
On the other hand, the sign of the Tao, which expresses the idea that
the world is constantly changing its status—frequently to a status which is
the opposite of the current one—can encourage a failure to give sufficient
attention to the possibility that a process is genuinely linear. Not all change
is cyclical. The dialectical stance is too ready to assume that a process will
result in a course reversal. Li-Jun Ji has shown one of the consequences
of this stance. Chinese Canadian business school students are more likely
than European Canadians to prefer to sell a stock they own which is los-
ing value (in hopes that it will turn around and start making a profit) to a
stock that is gaining value (in the expectation that it may soon undergo a
reversal of fortune). Keeping your losers and selling your winners is the
road to the poorhouse.
The assumption of interconnectedness has a clear advantage over the
focus on the most salient object in the environment: you see more of
what’s going on if you make this assumption. Taka Masuda has shown
that, in a 20-second video, Japanese subjects pick up 60 percent more con-
text information than American students and see twice as much in the way
of relationships than do American students. This might be a disadvantage
if Japanese were to record less of the information about focal objects, but
Taka’s research shows that the gain for context and relationship informa-
tion is accomplished with no loss of information about focal objects. It’s
easy to point to circumstances where the East Asian approach could lead
to distraction and thus be disadvantageous, but honestly, wouldn’t you
rather have the default of casting a wide perceptual (and conceptual) net
rather than a narrow one?
Foreword | xiii
There is another very important advantage of the dialectical approach.
It makes you wiser. This is shown in the work by Igor Grossmann and his
colleagues, Jinkyung Na and Michael Varnum (with a little help early on
from Shinobu Kitayama and me). This work shows that young Japanese
are wiser in their approach to social conflict than young Americans.
Wisdom was defined as paying attention to the perspectives of all the
participants in the conflict, a recognition that the conflict was not stable
but likely to change, a search for possibilities of compromise, and the
absence of a stance of certainty. Interestingly, older Japanese were no
wiser than younger Japanese. Older Americans were substantially wiser
than younger Americans. Grossmann and company attributed these facts
to the idea that socialization of Japanese encourages these kinds of dialec-
tical approaches to conflict whereas socialization of Americans does not.
However, Americans show greater wisdom in reflecting on social conflict
as compared to younger Americans, presumably because they encounter
more conflict and must induce effective approaches to it. Grossmann and
company find that old Americans are as wise as old Japanese.
Please note that the approaches I am calling wiser are not just wiser
in the view of those of us immersed in the research tradition represented
in this book: The Chicago Wisdom network, consisting of psychologists,
psychiatrists, members of the clergy, and philosophers interested in wis-
dom, rated subjects’ answers to the social conflict problems in the same
way we did.
I am so pleased that Julie Spencer-Rodgers and Kaiping Peng have pro-
duced this volume. In the best dialectical spirit it has greatly widened the
perspectives on dialecticism by bringing to the party so many impressive
investigators representing such a broad array of viewpoints and method-
ologies. At the risk of seeming overconfident, I feel sure this book is going
to simultaneously broaden our understanding of the dialectical perspective
and win many new converts to an appreciation of its value.
xiv | Foreword
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
71 Op. cit.
Among the 430 hysterical cases of Briquet, only 120 were attacked
with paralysis. In 370 cases of Landouzy were 40 cases of paralysis.
Hughes Bennett and Müller of Gratz call attention to the fact that
young women may exhibit all the signs of primary spastic paralysis,
simulating sclerosis, and yet recover.77 I have seen several of these
cases of hysterical spasmodic paralysis, and have found the
difficulties in diagnosis very great. These patients walk with a stiff
spastic or pseudo-spastic gait, and as, whether hysterical or not, the
knee-jerk is likely to be pronounced, their puzzling character can be
appreciated.
77 Quoted by Althaus: On Sclerosis of the Spinal Cord, by Julius Althaus, M.D., M. R.
C. P., etc., New York, 1885, p. 330.
In one class of cases, which cannot well be placed anywhere except
under hysteria, a sense or feeling of spasm exists, although none of
the objective evidences of spasmodic tabes can be detected.
Comparing these to those which Russell Reynolds describes as
paralysis dependent upon idea, they might be regarded as cases of
spasm dependent upon idea.