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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
Chains of Being
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
Chains of Being
Infinite Regress, Circularity,
and Metaphysical Explanation
ROSS P. CAMERON
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Ross P. Cameron 2022
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2022
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021946684
ISBN 978–0–19–885427–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854272.001.0001
Printed and bound in the UK by
TJ Books Limited
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. Infinite Regress 11
1.1 Infinite Regresses: Vicious and Benign 11
1.2 Pluralism about Viciousness 13
1.2.1 Regress and Contradiction 14
1.2.2 Regress and Failure of Analysis 16
1.2.3 Contingently Vicious Regresses 21
1.3 Relativism about Viciousness 26
1.4 Ontological Dependence and Regress 38
1.4.1 Dependence Regresses and Metaphysical Foundationalism 38
1.4.2 Infinitely Many Finite Chains versus Infinitely Many
Infinite Chains 43
viii
References 237
Index 249
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
Acknowledgments
Thanks to: Matthew Andler, David Baker, Jc Beall, Karen Bennett, Ricki Bliss,
David Chalmers, Sarah Colquhoun, Roy Cook, Aaron Cotnoir, Shamik Dasgupta,
Gabriel Day, Daniel Deasy, Louis deRosset, John Divers, Tom Donaldson, Kenny
Easwaran, Maegan Fairchild, Branden Fitelson, Daniel Greco, Sukaina Hirji, Hud
Hudson, Zachary Irving, Stephan Kraemer, Kris McDaniel, Kerry McKenzie, Ned
Markosian, Chris Menzel, Trenton Merricks, Daniel Nolan, Josh Parsons, Laurie
Paul, Graham Priest, Agustin Rayo, Adam Rieger, Jonathan Schaffer, Amy
Seymour, Ted Sider, Jason Turner, Christina Van Dyke, Pekka Väyrynen, Lori
Watson, Robbie Williams, Al Wilson, Jessica Wilson, Daniel Wodak, and two
readers for Oxford University Press for very valuable comments and discussion.
Most of all, thanks to Elizabeth Barnes: the first person I bounce an idea off, my
final proof-reader, and my constant source of support.
Almost all of the material in this book is previously unpublished, but there is
some overlap between chapter 1 and my entry on Infinite Regress Arguments in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I am grateful to the editors of the
Stanford Encyclopedia for permission to re-use some of that material here.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
Introduction
The world is not a flat place. The world is not just a collection of obtaining
phenomena. Some phenomena obtain in virtue of others. So for example, Al
Capone is a criminal. But this fact isn’t a fundamental fact about reality: it obtains
in virtue of—it is grounded in—more basic facts, such as the purely descriptive
facts about things he did in his life, together with some complex social facts that
render those things illegal. In general, social facts—facts about the law, about
economies, about the borders of countries, about membership of a social group,
etc.—are not fundamental, they are grounded in facts about our beliefs, norms,
actions, decisions, etc.
Likewise, the ontology of the world is not just a collection of entities. Some
entities are ontologically dependent on others. A particular electron, Sparky, exists,
as does the set whose sole member is Sparky. But while Sparky is, perhaps, an
independent entity, whose nature does not demand the existence of any other
thing, and in particular whose nature does not demand that it belong to any set,
Sparky’s singleton set is ontologically dependent on Sparky: its nature demands
that Sparky exists, and is a member of it.¹
Relations like grounding and ontological dependence connect less basic goings
on to more basic goings on. I will call such relations metaphysical determination
relations. A metaphysical determination relation shows us how some features of
reality are brought about by others; so the relation of ontological dependence
shows us how the existence and/or the nature of some dependent entities is
determined by the existence and/or the nature of some more basic entities,
while grounding shows us how less basic phenomena obtain in virtue of the
obtaining of more basic phenomena.
A fact is (absolutely²) fundamental iff it is not grounded: it doesn’t obtain in
virtue of anything, it just obtains. An entity is (absolutely) fundamental iff it is not
ontologically dependent on anything, but is independent. A fact or entity that is
not fundamental is derivative. A fact F is more fundamental (even if it is not
absolutely fundamental) than a fact G iff there are some facts that F grounds, the
X1s, and some of the X1s ground some facts, the X2s, and . . . some of the Xns
ground some facts, the Xn+1s, and some of the Xn+1s ground G, but there is no
chain of grounding back from G to F. Likewise, mutatis mutandis for some entity
Chains of Being: Infinite Regress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation. Ross P. Cameron, Oxford University Press.
© Ross P. Cameron 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854272.003.0001
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
2
being more fundamental than another. (These are just stipulations about how to
use the terms.)
Here is a common view concerning the structure of reality.
Fundamentality allows that there are infinitely long chains of being. It allows, for
example, that there is a fundamental fact F1, that grounds F2, that grounds F3 . . .
and so on, ad infinitum. But what it does not allow is infinitely descending chains
of grounding or ontological dependence.³ Fundamentality says that grounding
and ontological dependence permit infinite ascent—start from the fundamental
and get less and less fundamental as you go—but not infinite descent, where you
get more and more fundamental as you go, but never bottoming out in anything
absolutely fundamental.
Here is another common view concerning the structure of reality.
Linearity rules out circles of grounding or ontological dependence, where you start
with (e.g.) a fact F that is grounded in another fact that is grounded in another fact
³ More carefully: Fundamentality requires that every chain of metaphysical determination ulti-
mately terminates in the fundamental. But it allows that it can take infinitely many steps to get there:
see footnote 32 in chapter 1.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
3
. . . and so on, until you get to the penultimate fact in the chain, that is itself
grounded in F, the very fact you started with.
Putting Fundamentality and Linearity together, and generalizing to metaphys-
ical determination relations in general, gives us:
4
⁴ See, inter alia, Bliss and Priest (2017), Bliss (forthcoming), and Priest (2018) for discussion and
further references.
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5
⁵ See, for example, Epstein (2015), who argues that in addition to grounding we need a distinct
metaphysical determination relation that takes you from one fact to another, anchoring. See Hawley
(2019) and Schaffer (2019) for arguments against taking anchoring to be a distinct determination
relation. See Epstein (2019a; 2019b) for replies.
⁶ See Bennett (2017) and Wilson, A. (2018). ⁷ See Bernstein (2016).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
6
different, and hence not a metaphysical determination relation, but I will not rely
on that view here.
I do not assume that grounding and ontological dependence are fundamentally
different relations. For all that I say in this book, one is reducible to the other.
Perhaps for A to be ontologically dependent on B is for the fact that A exists to be
grounded by the fact that B exists. Perhaps for the fact that F to ground the fact
that G is for G’s obtaining to be ontologically dependent on F’s obtaining. My
sympathies are with the anti-reductionist position, but again I will not rely on that
here. I will talk about both relations, but I take no stand on whether one is
reducible to the other.
I do not assume that grounding or ontological dependence are themselves
unified phenomena. Kathrin Koslicki and Jessica Wilson argue for a pluralism
about ontological dependence and grounding relations, respectively,⁸ whereby
there is no one such phenomenon as A being ontologically dependent on B or
F’s obtaining grounding G’s obtaining. As Wilson puts it with respect to ground-
ing: she rejects the idea of “big-G Grounding”, a sui generis relation that obtains
between every less fundamental fact that obtains and the more fundamental facts
that it holds in virtue of, in favor of a multitude of what she calls “small-g
grounding relations”, particular metaphysical determination relations that con-
nect more and less basic phenomena in a particular domain. These small-g
grounding relations include, says Wilson, “type identity, token-but-not-type iden-
tity, functional realization, the classical mereological part–whole relation, the
causal composition relation, the set membership relation, the proper subset
relation, and the determinable–determinate relation, among others.”⁹ Again,
I will stay neutral on this.¹⁰ I will make many claims about ontological dependence
and grounding, but if you are sympathetic to Koslicki and Wilson’s pluralism then
you can interpret these claims as either being about ontological dependence and
grounding relations in general (so if I say “grounding is such-and-such,” you can
interpret this as me making a claim about every small-g grounding relation), or (if
context suggests this) as being about the particular small-g grounding relation or
ontological dependence relation that is relevant in the particular context. (So, for
example, when I discuss set theory in chapter 2, and talk about ontological
dependence, you can feel free to interpret me as talking about the particular
dependence relation of set membership.)
7
The Plan
Here’s how the book will proceed. While the chapters do build on one another to
make an overall case, I have tried to write them so that they can be read on their
own and the main arguments make sense even if you’ve not read the other
chapters. That said, you should obviously read the whole book beginning to
end, multiple times, making notes in the margins for future generations to
appreciate!
Chapter 1: Infinite Regress. Antipathy to infinite regresses of ontological
dependence or grounding is often a special case of antipathy to infinite regresses
in general. This chapter investigates the nature of infinite regress, and asks what
makes an infinite regress vicious. I will argue for both pluralism and relativism
about viciousness. Pluralism about viciousness is the view that there is no one
feature that all vicious infinite regresses share in virtue of which they are vicious.
Different vicious regresses, I will argue, are vicious for different reasons. Thus
there is no general recipe for viciousness—we must take each infinite regress on its
own merits, and ask whether or not it is vicious or benign. Relativism about
viciousness is the view that whether or not an infinite regress is vicious or benign
can be relative to one’s theoretical goals and starting point: I will argue that the
same regress might correctly be judged vicious by one theorist’s lights and
correctly judged benign by another theorist’s lights, with there being no theory-
neutral way of settling the issue. And so, when asking whether an infinite regress
of ontological dependence is vicious, for example, we cannot answer that question
in isolation of our own theoretical goals and starting point: what are we aiming for
in giving an account of how reality is structured with respect to ontological
dependence?
At the end of this chapter I distinguish between two different kinds of regress of
ontological dependence: Infinitely Many Finite Chains dependence regresses and
Infinitely Many Infinite Chains dependence regresses. I argue that these are
importantly structurally different, and the distinction will matter in chapter 3.
Chapter 2: Set Theory, Infinite Regress, and Circularity. This chapter is a
case study in a theory that, on the face of it at least, offers us both infinitely
descending chains of ontological dependence and circles of ontological depend-
ence. The theory in question is a non-well-founded set theory: Boffa set theory.
The familiar Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC¹¹) sits well with Metaphysical
Foundationalism. We have a base class of entities—the empty set, and the
ur-elemente—and every non-empty set is built up from that base according to
the iterative conception. In this chapter we will look at various non-well-founded
set theories that reject the foundationalist assumptions of ZFC. I will argue for
¹¹ Or ZF. The “C” (for the axiom of choice) will play no role in any of the discussion in this book, but
I’ll use “ZFC” since it’s most familiar.
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8
Boffa set theory, a non-well-founded set theory that allows infinitely descending
chains of set membership, for two sets each of which is a member of the other, for
sets which are their own singleton, and other fun and exotic things. I will argue
that there is no reason for the believer in Boffa set theory to give up on the idea
that sets are ontologically dependent on their members, and so Boffa set theory
yields both infinite regresses and circles of ontological dependence (including the
very smallest of circles: from a thing to itself). The examples from this theory will
prove useful throughout the book.
Chapter 3: Regress and Explanation. This chapter has three main goals. First, it
aims to make some bad news for the claim that there can be infinitely descending
chains of ontological dependence. I will argue that there is inevitably an explan-
atory failure if we have such infinite regresses of ontological dependence: one
cannot explain fully the existence and nature of any thing on that infinite chain (at
least, not by only appealing to things on that infinite chain). That means that there
is, in principle, an explanatory goal that the metaphysical foundationalist can meet
that the metaphysical infinitist cannot: the foundationalist, but not the infinitist,
can explain the existence and nature of all the ontologically dependent entities, by
appealing to the existence and nature of the independent entities upon which
those dependent entities ultimately depend.
Second, it aims to blunt this bad news, and bring the infinitist some good
news. Whether or not failing to meet that explanatory demand is a cost for
Metaphysical Infinitism depends on our explanatory goals, and there is no
theory-neutral demand that we should be able to fully explain the existence
and nature of all the ontologically dependent entities. The metaphysical infinitist
who simply does not share this explanatory goal of the foundationalist can grant
that they do not meet that goal; but since it was not their goal, they will not see
granting this as an indication that the regress of ontological dependence is
vicious (remember the relativism about viciousness defended in chapter 1, out-
lined above). I argue here—both intuitively and for theoretical reasons—for
pulling apart ontological dependence and grounding from explanation. In
doing so, the metaphysical infinitist can hold that there is an infinite regress
whereby each of these entities on the infinite chain is entirely metaphysically
determined by another, without committing to there being a full explanation of
the existence or nature of each.
It’s one thing to say that metaphysical explanation is not grounding or onto-
logical dependence. But what is it then? The third goal of this chapter is to say
something positive about metaphysical explanation: that at least one way there can
be a metaphysical explanation is for there to be a true what it is claim. (Think of,
e.g., Lewis’s claim that what it is to be possible just is to be true at some concrete
isolated world.) What it is claims, I argue, are not grounding claims. They are not
metaphysical determination relations. They offer us a way of reconceptualizing
portions of reality. This, I argue, lets us make sense of the idea of explaining an
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 27/1/2022, SPi
9
infinite regress of entities “from outside the chain”, in a way that won’t simply
collapse into Metaphysical Foundationalism.
Chapter 4: Circles of Dependence. This chapter investigates metaphysics on
which there are circles of ontological dependence (primarily) and (to a lesser
extent) grounding. I reject some arguments against the possibility of such circles
on the grounds that they assume the connection between metaphysical determi-
nation and explanation that I am rejecting. I compare the more familiar epistemic
holism to Metaphysical Holism, and take from it the lesson that in a holistic
metaphysic we should give up on the idea of explanation following the lines of
ontological dependence in a circle, and instead say that when there are circles of
ontological dependence there is a holistic explanation of the nature of the system
of entities.
I go on to look at various case studies of metaphysics that I think are both
attractive and which, plausibly, yield circles of ontological dependence: I will argue
that social categories such as gender and sexuality are mutually ontologically
dependent; that structuralism about numbers yields cases of mutual ontological
dependence and of grounding (with a particular focus on the complex numbers,
i and -i); and that many persons are mutually ontologically dependent on others.
I end this chapter by distinguishing Deep from Shallow Metaphysical Holism:
the Deep Metaphysical Holist thinks that reality as it is given to us contains
entities which are mutually ontologically dependent, whereas the Shallow
Metaphysical Holist thinks only that the reality we create—the socially con-
structed world—contains entities which are mutually ontologically dependent.
While I am sympathetic with Deep Metaphysical Holism, I argue that there should
be no objection at all to Shallow Metaphysical Holism.
Putting together the arguments from chapters 3 and 4, I hope to convince you
that pulling apart notions like ontological dependence and grounding from
metaphysical explanation is theoretically fruitful. It offers us a better treatment
of Metaphysical Holism, by allowing us to give up on the idea of explaining nodes
in the system via other nodes in the system, and instead simply explain the
features of the system of things as a whole by appeal to the dependence (or
grounding) relations that structure the system. And it offers a satisfying treatment
of infinite regress by granting to the infinitist the possibility of infinite ontological
descent while also conceding to the anti-infinitist that you can’t have a successful
complete explanation of something’s existence or nature simply by appealing to
something that it depends on, and then to something that that depends on, and so
on ad infinitum. These moves are only possible, of course, once we abandon the
idea that grounding and ontological dependence are, or automatically underwrite,
explanatory relations.
Chapter 5: Grounding, Circularity and Regress. While chapters 3 and 4 focus
primarily, although not exclusively, on ontological dependence, chapter 5 focuses
on grounding. I make a very minimal, relatively uncontroversial, assumption
Another random document with
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This section includes the Spider-crabs and related genera, in which
the carapace is triangular, with the apex in front formed by a
sharply-pointed rostrum. There are two chief series, the one
comprising the Spider-crabs, with much elongated walking legs, e.g.
the huge Maia squinado of European seas, the yet more enormous
Macrocheira kämpferi from Japan, supposed to be the largest
Crustacean in existence, and sometimes spanning from outstretched
chela to chela as much as eleven feet, and the smaller forms, such as
Inachus, Hyas, and Stenorhynchus, which are so common in
moderate depths off the English coasts. The other series is
represented by genera like Lambrus (Fig. 133), in which the legs are
not much elongated, but the chelipedes are enormous.
The Spider-crabs do not burrow, and their respiratory mechanism
is simple; but since they are forms that clamber about among weeds,
etc., upon the sea-bottom, they often show remarkable protective
resemblances to their surroundings, which are not found in the
burrowing Cyclometopa. Alcock[156] gives a good account and figure
of Parthenope investigatoris, one of the short-legged Oxyrhyncha,
the whole of whose dorsal surface is wonderfully sculptured to
resemble a piece of the old corroded coral among which it lives.
But besides this, the long-legged forms, such as Inachus, Hyas,
etc., have the habit of planting out Zoophytes, Sponges, and Algae
upon their spiny carapaces, so that they literally become part and
parcel of the organic surroundings among which they live. It may,
perhaps, be wondered what are the enemies which these armoured
Crustacea fear. Predaceous fish, such as the Cod, devour large
quantities of Crabs, which are often found in their stomachs; and
Octopuses of all sorts live specially upon Crabs, which they first of all
paralyse by injecting them with the secretion of poison-glands
situated in their mouth. The poison has been recently found by Dr.
Martin Henze at Naples to be an alkaloid, minute quantities of
which, when injected into a Crab, completely paralyse it. When the
Crab is rendered helpless the Octopus cuts out a hole in the carapace
with its beak, and sucks all the internal organs, and then leaves the
empty shell.
Many of the Oxyrhyncha are found in the abysses; among them are
Encephaloides armstrongi (Fig. 132), dredged by Alcock from below
the 100–fathom line in the Indian Ocean, which has the gill-
chambers (G) greatly swollen and enlarged to make up for the
scarcity of oxygen in these deep regions.
Fam. 1. Maiidae.—The
chelipedes are not much larger
than the other legs, but are very
mobile. Orbits incomplete. A very
large family, including all the true
Spider-crabs, very common in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean
littoral. Inachus, Pisa, Hyas,
Stenorhynchus, Maia,
Encephaloides (Fig. 132).
Fam. 2. Parthenopidae.—
The chelipedes are much larger
than the other legs. Orbits
complete. Lambrus (Fig. 133),
Parthenope.
Fig. 132.—Encephaloides armstrongi, Fam. 3.
× 1. The long walking legs are omitted. Hymenosomatidae. The
C, Great chela; G, one of the greatly carapace is thin and flat; the
swollen gill-chambers. (After Alcock.) chelipedes are neither very long
Tribe 5. Catometopa.
These Crabs resemble the Cyclometopa in general appearance, but
the carapace is very square in outline, and its margins are never so
well provided with spines as in the Cyclometopa. The position of the
male genital openings is peculiar, since they lie upon the sternum,
and are connected with the copulatory appendages upon the
abdomen by means of furrows excavated in the sternum. The
Catometopa are either littoral or shallow water forms, or else they
live entirely on land. The Grapsidae are marine Crabs, Pachygrapsus
marmoratus (Fig. 134) at Naples being exceedingly common on
rocks at high-water mark, over which it scuttles at a great rate; in the
Mediterranean it takes the place of our common Garcinus maenas,
which is not found there.
Among the land genera are
Ocypoda, Gelasimus, and
Gecarcinus of tropical lagoons
and coastal swamps. Ocypoda
often occurs in vast crowds in
these regions, and digs burrows
in the sand.
Gelasimus (Fig. 135) is
remarkable for the enormous size
of one of the chelipedes, generally
Fig. 134.—Dorsal view of Pachygrapsus
the right, in the male, which may
marmoratus, × ⅓. (From an original actually exceed in size the rest of
drawing prepared for Professor the body. It is not known what
Weldon.) purpose this organ serves in the
various species. In Gelasimus it is
supposed that the male stops up
the mouth of the burrow with it when he and the female are safely
inside. It is also used as a weapon in sexual combats with other
males; but Alcock, from observations made in the Indian Ocean,
believes that the males use it for exciting the admiration of the
females in courtship, as the huge chela is bright red in colour, and
the males brandish it about before the females as if displaying its
florid beauty.
The species of Ocypoda are exclusively terrestrial, and cannot live
for a day in water. The gills have entirely disappeared, and the
branchial chambers are converted into air-breathing lungs with
highly vascular walls, the
entrances into which are situated
as round holes between the bases
of the third and fourth pairs of
walking legs. As their name
implies, they can run with
astonishing rapidity, and they
seem to be always on the alert,
directing their eyes, which are
placed on exceedingly long stalks,
in all directions.
Some of the Grapsidae, e.g.
Aratus pisonii, are partially
adapted for life on land. Fritz
Müller, in his Facts for Darwin,
alludes to this creature as “a
charming lively crab which
ascends mangrove bushes and
gnaws their leaves.” The carapace
can be elevated and depressed
posteriorly, apparently by means
of a membranous sac, which can
be inflated by the body-fluids.
This Crab retains its gills and can
breathe under water in the
ordinary way.
A great many other
Catometopa are land-crabs; but
we may specially mention the
genus Gecarcinus, related to the Fig. 135.—Gelasimus annulipes, × 1. A,
marine Grapsidae, which has Female; B, male. (After Alcock.)
representatives in the West Indies
and West Africa. The Crabs of this genus may live in sheltered
situations several miles from the sea, but in spring the whole adult
population rushes down in immense troops to the shore, where
breeding and spawning take place; and when this is completed they
migrate back again to the land. The young pass through the normal
larval stages in the sea and then migrate inland.[157]
Fam. 1. Carcinoplacidae.—The carapace is rounded and
broader than long, usually with toothed front margin. The orbits and
eyes are normal, and not much enlarged. Geryon, in the deep littoral
of the northern hemisphere. Euryplax, Panoplax, etc., in the
American coastal waters. Typhlocarcinus, etc., in the Indo-Pacific.
Fam. 2. Gonoplacidae.—The carapace is square, with the
antero-lateral corners produced into spines. The orbits are
transversely widened, and the eye-stalks long. Gonoplax, widely
distributed in the littoral zone. G. rhomboides in British and
European seas.
Fam. 3. Pinnotheridae.—Carapace round, with indistinct
frontal margin. Orbits and eyes very small, often rudimentary. The
members of this family live symbiotically or parasitically in the shells
of living Bivalve Molluscs, corals, and wormtubes in all seas except
the Arctic. Pinnotheres pisum is fairly commonly met with off the
English coasts in the mantle-cavity of Cardium norwegicum.
Fam. 4. Grapsidae.[158]—Carapace square, the lateral margins
either strictly parallel or slightly arched. The orbits and eyes are
moderately large, but the eye-stalks are not much lengthened.
Littoral, fresh-water, and land. Pachygrapsus marmoratus (Fig.
134), the common shore-crab of the Mediterranean. Sesarma, with
fresh-water and land representatives in the tropics of both
hemispheres. Cyclograpsus, marine in the tropical littoral.
Fam. 5. Gecarcinidae.—Carapace square, but much swollen in
the branchial region. Orbits and eyes moderately large. Typically
land forms, which only occasionally visit the sea or fresh water.
Cardisoma is a completely circumtropical genus, with species in
tropical America, West and East Africa, and throughout the Indo-
Pacific. Gecarcinus in West Indies and West Africa.
Fam. 6. Ocypodidae.—Carapace square or rounded, generally
without teeth on the lateral margins. The orbits transversely
lengthened, eye-stalks usually very long. The members of this family
generally inhabit the mud-flats and sands of tropical coasts; in the
southern hemisphere they extend far into the temperate regions.
Macrophthalmus, with numerous species, in Indo-Pacific.
Gelasimus (Fig. 135), in the tropics of both hemispheres. Ocypoda,
with similar distribution.
CHAPTER VII
REMARKS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
MARINE AND FRESH-WATER CRUSTACEA
A. Marine.
B. Fresh-Water.[164]