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PHILOSOPHY DF MIND SERIES
OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

For example, a thought might represent that grass is green. and a visual
vwuusurim:-i.im=wi=iriri:r-11r1:r=a=i:ir
experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book
is to explain this phenomenon.
It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms
of tracking and informational relations, functional roles, and similar ingredients.
Mendelovici breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate
and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal
consciousness. the felt. subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According
to her phenomenal intentronafily theory. there is a central kind of intentionality.
phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and
any other kind of intentionality derives from it.
The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts. broad and object-involving
contents. and unconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly
strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a
radically internalistic picture of the mind. on which all phenomenally represented
\BASlSOF
contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some
INTENTIONALIT
sense represent are expressly singled out by us.
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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
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Contents
Prcfacc xi
Overvicw xv
PART ONE} INTRODUCTION

r. Fu-mg Rrfémm» im Immlmrm/i!_v 5
.... Ab.......c.s and Dircctcdncss .

.... The Ostcmwc W... 0fFixiug R:f:rencc ;
.3. om. way. of Fixing ucre.c..cc 9
.4. Wbrrics mu. .5.» 0..=..~.v.- 1)efi......... .4

.5. Conclusion .9
1. <;....1. and Me//wdulugy u
2..x. M... is . Theory of 1....-.........i..,v2 1.
1.2.. Thcorylndcptndeiit Acctss m lntemizmaliry :3

2.3. Cunclusion 22%
PART TW’U I ALTERNATIVE THIURIES 0} INTENYIONALITY
3. r/.. Itlrmuxrb p.-mm./ix Tr.u/amg 17...... 3,
1... Tra(kingTheor|cs ..
3.1. om...-..» uflhu Mm....ci. Problem +2.. T..ck...g Ti.......< .5
3.1. Background and .\.......p..m.. 36
5-4- A M.,.....ci. C...-. P:‘rc:prua1Coior Rcprusciumriom .3

3.3. 0.}... M........ci. Cats .4
;.5. Obj:cmms 46
3-7- Rniiabi: Misrcprcxcntannn and me Significance nFTmck1ng .7

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viii (fantzrm Cuntz'n!.< ix
;.8. Conclusion 39 .9, iVarm;Imtun.rXMIr: mo

App:-ndix A: Obiccrions to I11: Mifimarch Probltm 59 8.1. '1'hc Pmbiciii Wltll Nonconscious Smcs 161
8.2. Dcnvazivisr Srraccgim is;

4. F1mrtiunaIRu/2 Tlie..r.e:.m.1 Tmkmg Ihm-.‘::.»1g..m 70 3,3, sanding 5...“; .59
+-I- Th: Functional Rule Theory 7x 5.4. Allcgcdly Nnncnnscious Occiirmirszaics I34,
4... Worricswirh sho...A.... F....c.io..a1 RolcTli:orics 7. .,§_ CW1...-..... .9.
4... Worries with LongAArm Functional Rel: Thmrics 75
4,4. The Real Problnuivirh Both TrackingTlicorics and Functional Min p1vi:,| THE As;-gcr VIEW
Kolc TllC0|’lk'!~ 79 9. I; In/zn/inrialiry a Rel.m/m I0 .. Carimit? 195
4... Conclusion 80 9... The Rclariun Viuwand .h: Aspcc[Vicw .96
9... Two Worries \\’i(l1 uh: Relimiii View we

PART THREE | THE PHENOMENAL INTENTXONALITY THEORY 9,, The Allggcd Vim.‘-5 ofthc R.~1;.;iun Vicw ma
;. The PhenomenalImz-mmmzligz Than} 83 9+ Cm,c[u5;o“ 119
sa. The Phenonicml b-renrionaliav Thwry 8. Apptndix F: Th. Aspcct Vicw and A.iv=.h..1.s... 130
5.2. Argumenrs for PIT 86 AppcndixG: c....m.;. ax Firsr- or s¢m..d.o.dc. sum orl7mp€r(ics .3.
54;. ldcnnry PIT 93 Appendix H; An i...c....J Thmy orT....h and Rcfcrcncc .3;
5.4. Challenging Casts 97
5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION
Appendix B: The Extent oFPl\cnomena1 Inrcnrmml-ry :01 m. CD7lL’lMSI07A: ltllirlilomllily and Ozlm Kzl.1Ira'P/aznammzt 24;
Appendix C: The Multiplt Arisablliry oflmrntional Sm-ts I04 io.i. Return (0 Olhcl’ Ways of Fixing Rcfcrcncc on lnrcnrionality 144
io.z. Radical Inrcrnalism 2.47
.1. P! 1'’; Static: .15 .4 Thmy .5/‘1nm.z.mmlizy [O9
9... Is l’ITaThcory on.......i......1i.y in Terms orphcnom.-hai Consciousness? 109 6.055.... .49
6.2. lsPITTrivial? ..4 5[B]_[Q(]RA[IH\'1§§
4... [si’IT 1....-....i..g.> ..; ,,..,E,. .67
6.4. Is PIT Naturalistic? us
6.5. Cunclusion H9
PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7. Iinmglat ix;
7... The Challenge 6... PIT rm... Though. ....
7... Thoughts‘ i>hc..o....-mi Contents ..7
Sclf-Ascripuvism about Th....,;h.s' Allcgcd Comcnrs .;9
.4
7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

7.5. Conclusion: PIT about Thought .5.
App:ndiX D: Di.-rived Mclilal Rcprcsunmrion in 1>.-.ccp...i.. I54
Apptndlx E: A..i...d.»s .55
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Preface
THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

out to write my undergraduate thesis on phenomenal consciousness. After reading
David Chalmers’ The Curm.’iau.r 1‘l/find. I decided that there wasn’t much more for
me to sayon phenomenal consciousness and resolved to steer clear ofthe topic. So I
turned to the problem of intentionality. But I soon came to realize that attempts to
understand ' ' " y‘ ‘ I ’ ‘y of‘ L ' ' " ‘I
fail. What's more, I came to believe that intentionality is in fact one and the same
thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

this topic (and the idealist consequences I took to ensue), and then my PhD thesis
on this same topic again (minus the idealism). This book is the culrnimtion ofthese
eilorts.
The ideas presented here have benefited from practically every philosophical inter-
action I have ever had with friends. colleagues, students. and mentors at McGill
University, Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University
ofW/estern Ontario, and elsewhere. I was especially lucky to benefit from the cxccp-
tionally rich intellectual environment at the n alinn National University, where I
spent time as a postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Consciousness and as a visitor.
Many of the ideas in this book have been presented in talks I have given at the
Australasian A of Philosophy Conference (2.008 and mu), the European
' '
Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

)(|
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xii Pr: Em Pflfm xiii
the University of Athens, the Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting (zor;, . defended in Chapter 7. and to David Ch’-I1mers.who suggested that my ideas might
2.ot4.. and zol7), the Pacific American Association of Philosophy Meeting (2013), “’°il‘ W5“ “5 1b°°k~
Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University ofToronro, I owe special gratitude to my parents, Lina and Marius, for exemplifying both
the University of Melbourne, the University of Western Australia. the Central Eu— insight and rigor in éicadfimic Work and {Of Ili¢ii'l0V€a 5i1PP°“- ind C0nfid=n¢< in Int»
ropean University, the University ofCrete, Oakland University, Victoria University I 3"‘ ‘5P‘d3llY $’3“f“l ”‘°‘h" and "W lama)’ I“ G'°°‘°—‘5P°°l““Y Glaglai
‘O ml’
at Wellington, Tulane University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University M3733» and Ti')’Ph°“—f°i’ mating 1 nfai’ \1‘0Pi3“ ‘Vmk €iiVii0i'iii'i¢"[ for me at 0'"
of Waterloo, Cornell University, the University of Washington at St. Louis, ['1']: summer house. Most of this book (as well as the theses it is based on) was written
University of Minnesota, CUNY, the University of V€’isconsin—Madison, Yeshiva Elitfci
University, Wellesley College, W’aync State University, Charles Sturt University, Tl” “dim” and P’°d“‘3‘l°“ "am 3‘ OUP hm" b‘°" "‘m¢“d°“5lY h°lPf‘-‘I
Ru)“-.u,,;v¢,5i,§r Bo;-hum‘ and the ungversgty of western on,“-;o_ 1 thank [hg throughout the publication process. Thanks especially to Peter Ohlin, David
audiences a. rim talks. and especially my commentators Mike Collins, rm. chaimm. Isia Ng, Raj suchan. Thomas Mccarthy. and sangeuha vishwanti-an.
Janette Dinishak, Mark I-lerr, David Ivy, Charles Siewcrt, and Brad Thompson for My greatest d=bt by far is to David Boiiigflr "W Partner» Frcil-icnr co-and-on
their helpful and incisive colnlnentaries and our subsequent discussions. and (near) doppeigingcri When I firsr mcr David in 2008. 1 was surprised to find
lam c5P5cial1yindcb[Cd [0 [ha phmcmcnal Imgmionaljry Reading GmuP._ Tim someone with almost exactly the same philosophical views as me. This book has been
Bayne, David Eourget, Rob Stainton, and Chris VigerAfor reading an early version heavily influenced by all our discussions throughout the years, due to which our views
of this manuscript and providing valuable criticisms and concrete suggestions on have almost entirely converged (some residual disagreements remain concerning the
both content and presentations The final version grew out oliour many discussions. m3(€i‘i31 0fCl'|3PWi 9)- D3Vid liai Rid ¢V¢l’)’ Chi|Pf€|‘ °f‘l1i5 b00k m||liiPl€ fimfis and
1 am also extremely thankful to Charles Sicwert, Dcclan Smithies, Laura Cow, and diswsscd every single idea in it with m=- providing iicilvfiii criticisms and Mn morc
Adam Pautz for reading this manuscript in its entirety and providing extremely help- l"9lPf“l °°"5“”“C‘lV¢ 5“EEC5Ti°"5v and in man)’ 535“ 5P€“di“E l|°ui’5 and d3Y5 l'|3lPiiiS
ful and incisive feedback. Thanks ANU Philosophy
also to Daniel Stoljar and the ‘"5 Work ‘l“'°“§l" key ld°“5- I “m l”"“‘“5°lY ‘l"3"k[“l f°‘ 3” his l"‘]Pv 35 WE” 35 Fm’
ofMind Work—invProgress Group for reading and discussing several chapters ofthis his ““""3""l“S "‘°”‘1 5“PP°” ‘md "“3°““‘E°m°m-
work and providing extremely helpful feedback. I am also thankful to those who
read and provided helpful comments on ancestors of various chapters, especially
Frankjackson, Gilbert I-larman.]ack\l(/oods, Adam Pautz, Uriah Kriegel, David Pitt,
Philipp Koralus, Jimmy Martin, Paul Benacerraf, Anthony Appiah, Gideon Rosen,
Jeff Speaks, and David Davies.
This book has also benefited from numerous discussions that have helped me see
many issues in a new light. Thank you to Derek Baker, Sam Baker, John Bengson,
Mark Budolfson, David Chalmers, Tim Crane, Kati Farkas, Bill Fish, Tamar
Gendler, Terry Hotgan,]osh Knobe, Dan Korman, Uriah Kriegel,_lohn Maier, Carla
Merino, Matthew Moss, Daniel Nolan, Gurpreet Rattan, Susanna Schellenberg,
Vanessa Schouten, Daniel Stoljanjackie Sullivan, and Bas van Fraassen.
I am especially grateful to my dissertation supervisors, Frank Jackson and Gil
Harman, for encouraging me to write the dissertation I wanted to write, which
formed the basis of this book. and to my undergraduate |’.l'|CSlS supervisor, David
Davies, for encouraging me to write the undergraduate thesis I wanted to write,
which formed the basis ofmy dissertation. I owe special thanks to Jeffspeaks, who
raised an objection to my undergraduate thesis in zoo4 that inspired the views
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Overview
rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

the aboutness or directedness of mental states, on which intenrionality is simply
identical to phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic, non-relational feature
ofmental life. This View has been described to me as obviously false, unfashionable.
and flying in the face ofeveryday intuition and cognitive science. It has also been
described to me as trivially true and uninteresting. I aim to defend a version of this
view that is true but not trivial, interesting but not false, and surprisingly conciliatory
with our intuitive and scientific understanding ofthe mind.
My target, inrenrionality, can be understood as the observed "aboutness" or
"directedness" ofrnental states. We inrrospectively notice that many mental states in
some way or other seem to “present,” “represent,” or be “about” things. For example,
you might notice that your current visual experiences represent a page before you,
some marks olivarious shapes and colors, and perhaps the words that these marks
form. You might also notice that your current thoughts represent that there is a page
with marks and words before you, something to do with your own mental states, or
a need for a cup ofcoffee. lnrentionaliry, roughly, is this phenomenon ofaboutncss
or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.
My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

nature ofintentionality, or, in other words, that tells us what intentionality really
1:, meraphysically speaking. Examples oftheories ofintentionality include tracking
xvi Ouerwzw 01/tri/mu xvii
tn€01'i¢5- On which Ch‘? "‘°5t I335“? kind °f l“["”l°“““‘Y I5 3 “"531 °" °‘h°‘ kmd the functional role theory are false, it does not pinpoint the precise reasons for their
Of tracking relation b€tW“n intetnal t¢Pi'€5°nt3ti°n5 find it5i'n5 in ti“ W°‘ld (5“v failure. Chapter 4 further argues that the fundamental problem with these theories
L"g'YDtctsltfi I935 and F0d0t 1937)» and i11nCti°n3l t01¢ th=0ti¢5- 0n which the i'n°5t ' isthat tracking relations and functional roles simply do not have what it takes to give
basic kind of intentionality is a matter of internal states’ functional dispositions ‘ rig: to in(en(ionali(y_
with respect to other internal states and perhaps also with respect to items in the Part III turns to my favored approach to intentionality, the phenomenal inten_
€nVlt°ntn¢nt (5¢5- c-g-. Harman 1937 and Blfidt 1939- tionality theory (PIT), on which the most basic kind of intentionality arises from
This book proposescivery different kind oftheory ofintentionality. the phcnoint ‘ phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 5 of Part III presents and motivates PIT. I
3'13‘ ln"“‘l°n3ll‘Y ‘h9°i'Y (PIT): “'l‘i5}‘ Gk“ tn? ni05t 535“ kind °fin“n‘l‘7n3ll'Y 1 argue that, unlike tracking theories and functional role theories, PIT provides the
to arise from a conceptually distinct mental feature. phenomenal consciousness. right kinds of ingredients to account for intentionality and is not clearly empirically
the felt. subjective. or “what it’s like" (Nagcl I974) aspect of mental life- This and inadequate. I distinguish between diitetcnt versions of PIT, focusing especially on
related views have recently been defended by various authors, including Horgan rny favored vtrsion, strong idgnflty PIT, which, roughly, takes every intentional
and ncnson (mi), tear (zoos). rarkas (mosh, mesa). stnwson (zoos), srewm property .0 be .a....rca .0 some phenomenal property. Chapter 5 of i»... 111
(1993) Montague IZOIO)» l3°“tg¢t (7—°1°1)- M€nd€l0ViCi (1010), Kriegel (2-On) considers and responds to some theoretical worries with PIT, such as that it is not
Pitt (1004, won), Pautz (zoxga), and Mendelovici and Bourget (2.014), and have naturalistic,
hiSt0tiC3l F003 intn‘ ‘Votks Of Bi'¢nt3n0 (1874) and H“55¢t[ (1900) This 5°01‘ Part IV furthersupports I’ITbyconsideringcertain challengingcasesfor the view.
proposesaversion ofPIT that is notonly motivated on in-principle grounds but also in doing so, it Hgshgs out my favored version of strong identity PIT and shows
°’“Pl'l‘31lY3d“l“3‘€ in that it 53" “CC°‘T"n°d3t9 3“ C3555 °fint°ntl°n31l‘Yv ln51"dl“E that it is both interesting and tenable. Chapter 7 of Part IV considers the challenge
those that are commonly thought to pose problems for PIT. raised by the case of thoughts, which appear to be rich in intentional content but
Iproceed as follows: Chapter ofI’art I fixes reference on our target, intentional»
1 Poor in Phgngn-.¢na1 ch3[ac[ef_ 1 afguc that thought; l1av¢ a kind of content that
“Y I “'5'” that While ‘M “°(l°"3 °f3b°“"‘“55 md dl"‘°“d“¢55 B°5“-“’° ‘°“’“d [hi5 does indeed arise from their fairly impoverished phenomenal characters, though this
target» they are too fully to P‘'°Vld‘ "5 with a firm grip on it- propose to replace 1 content is correspondingly impoverished. i further argue that. although thoughts do
these notions with an ostensive reference-fixing definition, which can be contrasted not phcnonicnally reprcsent many of their alleged contents, they do the next best
with other candidate definitions that take intentiomlity to be whatever plays certain thing; tlnty dgyiygtiygly {gPfg5gn( than.‘ Ipfoposg sglf-ascriptivism, 3 view on which
roles. suchas rules in Folk psychological or scientific theories of behavior. roles in we clerivatively represent various contents by ascribing them to ourselves, which is a
securing truth and reference, or simply roles in explaining how we get around in matter of being disposed to have thoughts accepting ourselves or our phenomenal
the Worldt On my approach. li1t€ntl0n3llty' l5 1| ph€n0i'n¢n0n WC 0h5€i'V€ and Want contents as representing these further contents. Although, as I argue, the resulting
to explain, rather than a posit in a theory primarily aimed at explaining something kind of derived mental representation does not qualify as a kind of imemnmalizy, it
else. qualifies as a kind of representation on a broad sense of the term.
ChapterofPart I specifies the kind oftheory ofintentionaliry we are after and
2. Anotl-int important chalkngg for PIT is that of accounting for i-ngntal states
describes two theory-independent ways of knowing about our intentional states: that W; taltt to ha in(gn[ignal but that appaar to havg no phenomenal character,
introspection and consideration of psychological role. Such states include standing states, like beliefs and desires that we are not currently
Part II considers and argues against what I take to be the two main competitors entertaining, as well as occurrent states that we are not aware of, such as noncon-
to my Favored approach to intentionality. tracking and Functional role theories. scious stares involved in language processing, blindsight, and early visual processing.
Cn1Pt¢F 5 Of Pitt H “EH55 thiit tracking tn°°i'l€5 (355
ii tni$tn3t€h Pt0bl5tn= tl'|3i'° Chapter 8 of Part IV addresses these challenges. I argue that standing states are not
are C3595 in Which Ffipfcifint 3 C0nt€nt that d0€S n0t Fnfitch anything WE Can
We genuinely intentional states. However, I also suggest that self-ascriptivism can be
plausibly be said to track, The tracking theory. then, is empirically inadequate, since extended to accommodate standing state contents and perhaps even standing states
it cannot accommodate all the required cases. Chapter 4 of Part II argues that the in their gn(ir([y_
mismatch problem also afllicts the best versions of the functional role theory. Now,
while the mismatch problem shows 1/94! the tracking theory and the best versions of
xviii Overview
Chapter 8 also argues that many nonconscious occurrent states. such as states
involved in early visual processing. are neither intentional not derivatively repv
resentational. While this position might seem fairly extreme, even “flying in the
face of cognitive science," it is arguably very much in line with the standard View
on the matter. It agrees with the standard view that such occuirent states track
or carry information about various items in the environment and play various
functional roles, and it also agrees that they represent various items, if all we mean
by “representation” is something that boils down to tracking, carrying information,
or having a functional role. The key disagreement with the standard view does not
concern nonconscious occurrent states, but rather amseiaus occurrent stares.
Part V, which consists in only one chapter, Chapter 9, turns to the question of
whether intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities that play the role of
intentionality is simply an aspect of intentional states
I
content or whether, instead,
or subjects, I argue in favor ofthe latter aspect view ofintentionality. \Vhile it might Intro duction
be thought that the alternative relation View has various virtues that the aspect View
lacks, such as according with common sense, allowing for public contents, helping us
make sense of structured intentional states, and accounting for conditions of truth
and reference, I argue that the aspect view fares no worse than the relation view when
it comes to these alleged virtues.
The main goal of this book is to offer, flesh our, and defend theory of
a MY AIM is to provide a theory ofintentionality. Before comparing com-
intentionality, but it also has a secondary aim. As I mentioned above, Chapter i pmng (hectic: ofimmdonahlyy it is important to fix firmly on our target
will argue that it is possible to get agood grip on the phenomenon ofintentionality and m g“ den on what kind of [hwry W: an art“ Charm‘ I Proposes
without defining it in terms of truth and reference, our abilities to get around in an osmnsivc way Op fixing rcfmmcc on imendomlky whik Chapter I
the world, folk psychology, or the scientific study of the mind. Throughout this Spcdfies what kind of meaty we want and overviews two sources up
book, I return to these alleged roles ofmrcntionality and argue that it turns out that theory-independent knowledge ofintentionality that we can use to test our
most of them are not in fact played by intenrionality itself but by various closely theories: introspection and considerations ofpsychological wk‘
related phenomena: The relevant ability to get around in the world is explained by a
combination offactors, including intentionality and tracking relations; the notions
of representation implicit in folk psychology don't correspond to intentionality but
to some combination of intentionality and derived representation; conditions of
truth and reference might end up requiring something more than merely having
intentional states, like a primitive correspondence relation or our specifications of
how we'd like to be interpreted; and the notions of representation invoked in the
mind-brain sciences are often a matter of tracking relations and functional roles.
The concluding chapter, Chapter io, returns to the alleged roles of intentionality
and summarizes these findings. The end result is a picture on which intentionalitv,
aspicked out ostensively, is a matter of phenomenal consciousness, and the various
other roles intenrionality is sometimes thought to play are in fact often played by
distinct, although sometimes closely related, phenomena.
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1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity
THE AIM or this book is to provide a theory ofintentiomlity. The aim of this
chapter is to clarifyjust what a theory ofintentionality is a [h:O|'yMl[ is important to
get clear on this before we start. A theory ofintentionality is a theory that tells us that
intenrionality has a particular nature, but if it is unclear just what "intentionality"
refers to, then it is unclear what it is that such a theory says has that nature.
it ostensively using introspectively
I propose to get clear on our target by defining
accessible paradigm cases. My ostensive definition can be contrasted with alternative
definitions that may or may not end up picking out the same thing. I will suggest
that the ostensive definition does a better job ofcapturing the core notion we are
interested in. But first, I will say something about why common characterizations
ofintentionality in terms offiboutness" and “direcredness,” though they succeed
in gesturing toward our target, do not provide a satisfactory way of fixing firmly
upon it.
1.1 Aboutness and Directedness
lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

"directedness" ofmental states (and perhaps other items) to things that may or may
3
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6 Part I: lnrradumon Chopin 1: I~‘ixmg Refmnre an Inrennpndttry 7
diey are “about" our experiences, that they “say” that I am pointing out the obvious. The ostensive definition arguably both does justice to the intuition behind
etc.’ the characterization of intentionality in terms of "aboutness" and “directedness"
The above examples show that we have mental states that have a certain feature and is an improvement over a definition of "intentionality" in terms of this
that we at least sometimes introspeetively notice and are tempted to describe characterization. If I am right, “aboutness" talk aims to characterize a phenomenon
using representational terms, such as “about," “of? “represent,” “present." and “saying that we have an antecedent grasp My ostensive definition picks out precisely
on.
something." T/mt feature, whatever it is, is intentionality. that phenomenon. so it does justice to the intuition behind characterizations of
We can put things more precisely as follows: Call the mundane, everyday cases intentionality in terms of "abourness" and “directedness." lt offers an improvement
such as those described above our paradigm cases of intentionality. These are the over a definition of “intentionality” in terms of such characterizations, since it fixes
cases that will fon-n our initial sample of cases of intentionality for the purposes of firmly on our target. Unlike a definition of“intentionality" simply as aboutness or
our ostensive definition. Then we can fix reference on our target as follows: directedness, it avoids being fuzzy or metaphorical, since it merely moztiam our fuzzy
and metaphorical representational terms rather than use them. (Ofcourse, it uses the
intentionality The feature that in paradigm cases we sometimes both (i) notice term “representational term." but this is a term picltingout a class ofterms rather than
introspectively in ourselves and (ii) are tempted to describe using representa- a representational term itself.)’
tional terms, such as “about.” “of? “represent," “present,” or "saying something." We can use this ostensive definition of “intentionality” to define some related
notions: Intentional properties are ways things are or might be with respect to their
It is important to emphasize that the feature picked out by my definition is intentionality, or intentional ways things are or might be, and intentional states are
the feature of paradigm cases that we at least sometimes bath introspectively insrantiations of intentional properties. As I am using the terms. intentional states
notice and are tempted to describe representarionally. This allows that there are are not the same thing as intentional mental states, which are mental states that
features of paradigm
that we either introspectively notice ar are tempted to
cases include, but may not be exhausted by. the instantiation of intentional properties.
describe representationally, but not both, and that do not qualify as intentional. For For example, a judgment that grass is green might involve the instantiation of the
example. die definition does not by itselfrule out the view that paradigm cases have intentional property of representing that grass is green together with a particular
introspectively accessible phenomenal features that are distinct from intentionality. non-intentional ‘judgment’ component. So, it is an intentional mental state but not
It is also important to emphasize that, although we are using introspection to fix an intentional state,‘
reference on intentionality, the ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility What intentional properties and intentional stares “say” or are “directed at" are
of instances of intentionality that are not inrtospectively accessible, or even instances their intentional contents. More precisely. we can think of intentional content as
of intentionality that are not mental. Such cases would not be paradigm cases of
intentionality, but they would nonetheless be cases of intentionality so long as
they had the relevant feature exemplified by paradigm cases, For example. as far
One might object that “abo|Itness" taut gestures at ttrattntt rather than at the ostensively defined
as my definition is concerned, it could turn out that nonconscious beliefs and ‘
phenomenon (but set can: 1oi;.pp.l-9.{or I convincing argument against this), arm all. one might
the nonconscious states posited by cognitive science, which. presumably. are not a.rgI|e,we sometimes say that mental Stiles that fail to Rftr, like I thought that santa Claus exists. lire
introspectively accessible, are instances of intentionality. For the same reasons, the not teany about anything at all.
Now, We might agree that "aboiItness" taut is sometimes used to pick out reference but disagree that
ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility of instances oi intentionality
this means that 'abontness' taut, when uted to rhnrnererize intentionality. gostutos at reference. since
that we are not tempted to describe representationally. For example, it does not rule whatever "aboutrIexs" taut .5 supposed to gesture at is normally taiten to include mental States in which
out the possibility of moods and afterimages being instances ofintentionality. even (her! is a failure ofreference. suth as the thought that santo Claus exists. in any cost. il"‘aboIIzness"
taut X5 notmauy used to pick out reference, this only rntthet tuppont my claim that Chzlactetilauons of
though we (arguably) are not tempted to describe them representationally,
intentionality in terms of"-’Ibt)u!|'iess" would not provide an adequate definition t1fintcntionalil'y.Spenlt§
(zoiob) makes a sinular point, arguing (hill rot xucll reasons the "cluractenlat ion or intentionality is
aboiltness is only true to a rim approximation” (p. nu).
’ I take the category or thoughts ta intiud: fittuflent beliefs. aecurrent desirel. and othot oteuttent The term "Intentional state" is often used [0 mean what 1 mean by "intentional mental stator i dovtatt
“cognmve" states but not standing beliefs, standing desires. 0|’ othtt standing lta(¢$. set 9.4.1. from that usage because my discussion focuses on instanrianons ormtontionai properties. to it is useful
‘ Definitions ofkey tttms can he found in the glossary on p. :49. rot me to reserve the term nnttntionai stator rot them.
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8 Pan l.- lnrradiimnri Chap!!!‘ 1: Fixing Reference an lflltllliflfldlilj 9
follows: When we introspe ' notice intentional states, we notice the general 1 3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference
phenomenon that we are tempted to describe as “directedness" or “saying some-
thing.‘ But we also notice something we are tempted to describe as what our mental I have recommended an osrensive way of fixing firmly upon the phenomenon that
states are "directed at" or what they “say"- this is their (intentional) content.’ When the fuzzy and metaphoric ' notions of aboutness and directedness merely gesture
a state. property, or other item has a certain intentional content. we can say that it toward. This section considers some alternative ways of defining “intentionality”
(intentionally) represents that content.‘ For example. the judgment that grass is and shows that they might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive ‘
green represents the content <grass is green>.' (§§i.;.t— 1.3.4). It then argues that ifwhat we are interested in is the , ‘ enon that
It
worth emphasizing that my starting point is fairly iiuncommittal in that
is ‘aboutness" talk gestures at, the ostensive ‘ ‘ is preferable to these alternatives
my definition of "intentionality" and the introspective observations it is based (§L3ts)-

on do not ptejudge questions concerning the nature of intentionality. As far as
they are concerned, inrentionality might end up being a causal or other tracking
relation, a matter of the functional roles of internal states. or a matter of phenomenal l.].| FOLK PSVCHOLUGY
consciousness. My starting point is neutral on these and other possible views of
One approach to intentionality defines it in terms of its role in
third-personal folk a
intentionality. Likewise. my starting point does not preiudge questions concerning
psychological. or common sense. theory of mind and behavior. We attribute beliefs.
the nature of contents. Contents might turn out to be ordinary objects and proper-
desires. and other mental states to each other, and we take these states to be related
ties, propositions. facts. sense data, ideas in a world of forms. ways of representing,
to one another in various ways and to have various other features. A definition of
properties of intentional states, or even intentional states or properties themselves.
“intentionality" in terms of folk psychology taltes intentionali to be whatever plays
Relatedly, my starting point does not prejudge any issues regarding the vehicles
a particular role in such a folk psychological theory."
of intentionalit . which are the bearers of intentional properties. The vehicles of Such a definition might not piclt out the salne thing as the ostensive ’ ' ' .
inrentionality could turn out to be. for example. subjects, symbols in a language of
For instance. it could turn out that what the ostensive definition picks out lacks
thought. brain states, internal states, or immaterial souls.
some of the extra features attributed to it by folk psychology. If these features are
For simplicity, however, I will assume that the vehicles of intentionality are
considered crucial by folk psychology, then the folk psychological notion will not
internal items that I will call (mental) representations. Since different intentional
pick out the ostensively defined phenomenon. For example. it could turn out that
states involve different vehicles of representation. this way of speaking allows us to
the ostensivel defined phenomenon does not play certain causal roles considered
talk about inten ‘states while remaining nonconimittal on their contents. which
crucial by folk psychology.
'
is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.“

The folk psychological ’ and the ostensive ’ ’ might also pick
out different things if the folk p y ‘ ‘ definition fails to pick out anything
at all. Suppose that folk , ' fly is hopelessly false. Then its theoretical terms,
whcn we inttospcctivcly notice intcntionality. we do so at least in patt by inttotptctivcly noticing out
" in “' 5 those putatively referring to intentional states. will fail to refer, and it will
iiidctd. it ought be that thttc is nothing inotc to notice when wt notice inttntionality than
sonttiitt.
thcsc intcntioiial coiitcnts
turn out that what it calls “inrentionality" does not exist." But the ostensively defined
' l toititni-iics utc wcptttcnt" nioit broadly to describe tcptcscntation-liltc phciaoiaiena that an not
instantts ofinlcnrionality, but contttt should disainbiguatc. The altttnativc would be to use a special
tttni. like "intcnd: rot having an Intentional conttnt. but this would be too swltwatd.
‘ coiittnts niightintludc propositionalconrenmlilte tgtass Isgreen), but niight alsoinelude ptoptictal tional capacities via tlicit alleged vehicles.
However. this assumption. along with tlic assumption that
ot obyecnlal tontciits. like (green) and (George) (St! Montaguc 2007, otunkowslti ton, and bt discharged by replacing tlll( otnicntal tcpttscntations
vehicles ait iiitsnial iitins. tan the niott
Mendelovicl aois. Ms). (1-ht notions of obyecrual and piopnctal contcnts stt something like ctanc‘s awkward talk nrinitntional capatititt and amending my discussion apprnpnzrely. See Ryder too; to.
(son) notions orconttnts and objects. tcsptcnvtlv. though not cquivaltnt.) a uscrul overview ordiltticni views nrthc icpisscntations.
"‘ in what rollowt. I will also Wm es assunic sonitt ng like a languagc orthouglit View (rodot I975). stt Sellnts l9§5. Lewis im. ataddonmitclicll and iacltion K996. and Fodor I937 tot this way offixing
on which thcit at. subptopotitional vehicles Ofrepresenratian, like IE1: and CAT. which come togcthct ttrtttntc on intcntionality.
to tonstinitt con-iplct vthiclts ortcpicscntaiion ttptcstnting coitiplct contcnts. Apart rtont I thinlt. " Paul and ratticia Chnreliland argue that folk psychology is false and hence that its posits rail to tcrtt
btiiig latgcly cottcct. this assumption provides a uscrul way ortallting about out patticulai icpttscnta. (ice. t.g.. Churchland iosi). lrthcy atc tight. and irwc takc intentionality to be inctcly a posit in rout
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to Part I: Inmzdurziim Chapter 1: I-'ixz‘ngRgfermc: an Irltmtiolmlitj ll
phenomenon might still exist. 50, the folk psychological notion might fail to pick It could also turn out that the two ways of defining “intentionality" do not pick out
out the same thing as the ostensive definition. the same thing because the definition based on the mind~brain sciences does not pick
out anything at all. Perhaps the best understanding of talk of representation in the
mind-brain sciences takes representational notions to be merely a dispensable fiction
ma. THE MlNl)»BRAlN SCIENCES (see Egan zoro). Then the mincl«btain sciences do not really posit representational
states after all. Another possibility is that they do posit representational states, but
Another approach to intentionality takes it to be a posit in scientific approaches
nothing plays the roles they are defined in terms of, so the notions of intentionality
to the mind and brain. For instance, some approaches in cognitive science aim to
based on the mind~brain sciences fail to refel: Again, this shows that this way of
explain mental processes and behavior in terms of operations over internal states that
defining “intentionality" might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive way.
ate described as carrying information or “representing” various contents, and it is
not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying

information about or "representing" their causes. A suggestion for an alternative way i.;.5 GETTING AROUND IN THE WORLD
ofpicking out our target, then, takes intentionality to be a posit in the l'nind—brain
For the most part, we manage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things that
sciences."
are harmful to us, perform sophisticated actions involving multiple steps, and, more
There are interesting questions in die philosophy of science surrounding the
generally, get around in the world fairly successfully. It is quite plausible that we
notions of representation operative in various disciplines and research programs.
do this by means of internal representations of the world. Inspired by this way of
What are these notions of representation? What roles do they play? Do different
thinking. we might take intentionality to be whatever explains successful behavior
research programs use the same notion of representation? Sotne philosophers
in the relevant way,“
explicitly claim to be trying to answer these types of questions and not the types
Behavioral phenomena such as those listed above call out for explanation, and it
ofqtlestions I'm concerned with.“
may very well be that the phenomenon we fixed on with our ostensive definition is a
It could turn out that this approach picks out the same thing as the phenomenon of this explanation. What is less clear is exactly what role the ostensively
crucial part
we noticed introspectively in ourselves. But it also might turn out that the best
defined phenomenon plays. Vehicles of intentionality might have properties apart
elucidation: of the notions implicit in the mind-brain sciences pick out different
from intentional properties, such as syntactic, neural, or other broadly physical or
features of internal states than the one we ostensively picked out through introspec-
functional properties.“ It could turn out, then, that intentionality itself is causally
tive observation. One prima facie reason to think this might be the case is that it
impotent and it's these other properties of vehicles of intentionality—say, their
makes sense to ascribe at least some of the kinds of representational states operative syntactic properties—that are responsible for their usefulness in helping us get
in the mind—brain sciences to artifacts that we might not really believe to have
around in the world. If this (unhappy) situation were the case, an explanation of
genuine intentional powers, such as calculators and computers. This suggests that, at
successful behavior might not involve the ostensively defined phenomenon, and so
best. the ostensively defined phenomenon is a species ofwhatever representational
the approach to defining ‘intentionality" based on getting around in the world might
phenomenon is picked out by the mind-brain sciences. At worst, it is something else
fix reference on something other than what the ostensive definition picks out.
entirely.
The two definitions might also fail to pick out the same thing in skeptical scenarios
in which we do not in fact lnanage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things
that are harmful to us, or generally manage to get around in the world successfully,
psychology. then it will turn out that thereis no Intentionality. (Note that the Churchlands do not think perhaps because we are brains in vats or dreaming, disembodied souls. In such
theta 2!! intentional states ofany sort: set: Churehland 1939b.)
no
“ Sec. c.g.. Fodor i957. Millikan wk. and Cumtnlns i994. Note that Fodor takes intlzntionallty to be a
posit In computational cognitive science, as well is n posit in folk psychology; on i115 view, cognitive
science and folk psychology paint to the same thing. " Versionsoftllis approach might also be versions of the approaches based on folk psychology or thc
“ Cummlns (too... pp. 2.7Ev-2.79), for instance. specifically claims (0 be describing a nation or rcpt!‘- mind-brzln scicnccsassciihca earlier.
sentatlon that IS useful for computational theories ofcognltlon but not necessarily (oi the kinds of “ See also Dretske's distinction between representational facts and more facts about representations
representation implicit in folk psychology. (-995. p- 3)-
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I: Part I: lnmulurlmn Chapter 1: I-bung Rcfmm: wt Inzmtumaluy I;
scenarios, the definition based on getting around in the world would fail to For of truth and reference in terms of causation (or other relations). it could turn out
reference on anything. since nothing in fact helps us get by in the world in the way that the second part of the story is secured by the fitst part. that the nature of sense
required. but the ostensive definition would not fail to refer. data and our relation to them makes it the case that intentional states refer to certain
items in certain conditions. But it could also turn out that the first part ofthe story
leaves open whether and how sense data. and hence intentionality, is c nected to
t.;.+ TRUTH AND R£rER£Nct—:
the world through reference. On such a theory, perceptual intentionality alone might
If mental states “say something.‘ then it seems to follow that what they say can not automatic " give rise to condi ons of ’ .
be either true or false. and if mental states are "of" or “about” something. then it Something similar might be trueof other pictures of intentionality. Consider a
seems to follow that they can either refer or fail to refer to whatever they’re “of” or Frege—inspired picture on which intentionality is a matter of being appropriately
“about.” So. perhaps we can use the notions of truth and reference to fix on our target. related to abstract senses, while tmth and reference are a matter of how senses
One such approach takes intentionality to be the having of conditions of truth or connect with the world, Depending on how we characterize senses, their connecting
reference, while another takes intentionality to be that which gives rise to the having with the world might not occur automatically but might instead require an extra in—
of conditions of truth and reference.“ gredient, a “satisfaction” relation or some such. So, if truth and reference require the
This approach is certainly attractive. It promises to provide a substantive charac- ' defined _ " in ' with “' Delse.a ‘
' '
terization ofintentionality, defining it in terms of one of its apparently key features, of"inrentionality" in ren'ns ofconditions of truth and reference or what gives rise to
and it does justice to the intuitive idea that intentionality serves to connect us to the them will pick out this combined phenomenon rather than the ostensively defined
external world, the world outside the mind. It also does justice to the idea that, at phenomenon alone.
least when they are successful. there is some existing thing that intentional states are Relatedly. the definition in tenns of truth and reference would fail to pick out
in some sense directed at or about. The approach also seems fairly unobjectionable. the ostensively defined phenomenon if it fails to refer because having conditions
It certainly seems that intentional states have conditions oftruth and reference, that of truth and reference requires something in addition to the ostensively defined
what we think can be true or false, and that an object we represent can exist or fail phenomenon and our mental states exhibit the ostensively defined phenomenon
to exist. The claim that intentional states have dirions of truth and reference is but lack the additional ingredients. In such a case, there would be no such things
quite uncontroversial. as conditions of truth and reference, and so there would be nothing answering to the
But. like the other ' ' e definitions of “intentionalit ” considered above, definition of “' "ty" in temts of truth and reference. But there would still
definitions in terms of truth and reference might fail to pick out the phenomenon be something answering to the ostensive definition.
picked out by the ostensive definition. They would fail to pick out the ostensively
defined phenomenon if intentionality did not atically connect us to the world
1.3.; WHY WE SHOULD PREFER THE OSTENSIVE DEFINITION
without the help of additional ingredients, Consider. for the sake of illustration.
a sense data theory of perceptual intentionality (a view, of course. which has few I have outlined various alternatives to the ostensive definition of ‘intentionality’
contemporary adherents"). On one way of characterizing such a theory, it can and argued that these ' ‘ e definitions might pick out something other than
be divided into two main claims: First, perceptual intentionality is a relation of the ostensively defined phenomenon. Now. of course. there is no arguing over
awareness to sense data. Second, sense data refer to whatever external items cause de ‘ ’ . Different definitions of "intentionality" might pick out different things.
them (or bear some other special relation to them). The first claim olfets a story of and we are free to theorize about any of them. However. I want to suggest that if we
perceptual intentionality in terms of sense data. while the second claim offers a story are ' ’ in the A L gestured at by " ‘ " and " “ ’ ess" talk,
we should prefer my fairly minimal ostensive definition. As we've seen. alternative
de ' ‘ of “intentionality” build in assumptions about their target that are not
See. e.g.. Siewert -992.Chalmers :oo4. Siegel zoto. and Byrne 2.009 for understandings ofintenrionah
‘
present in the ostensive definition. This leaves someone who adopts these alternative
my based on mm. reference. or are closely related notion ofaceuracy.
in the aoog PhilPapers Surveys, only we ofrespondenrs at leading English-speaking universities definitions vulnerable to eliminativist threats: If there is nothing that satisfies
reported holding . sense am theory (Bouxget and Chalmers XOI4). the additional assumptions. then there is no intentionality, in their sense. But, I
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[4 Part I: Irmndumnn Chapter 1: F1xirlgRefirtn£e lm Irizmtramzltty 15
want to suggest, the phenomenon gestured at by “aboutness" and “directedness” the nature of the ostensively defined I henomenon to be M. The two theorists take
talk is not vulnerable to eliminativism in the same way. which suggests that the diiferent phenomena to have different natures.
extra assumptions that are built into the alternative definitions are substantive However, it seems to me that in the case of many debates on intentionality,
claims about, rather than defining features of, the phenomen we gesture at with there ofien is a real disagreement between L peting theories that employ dif—
“aboutness” and “directedness" talk. Ifthis is right, then there is reason to prefer my ferent definitions of “intentionality." Many theorists who define “intentionality“
fairly ’ ' ostensive ‘ ' ‘ .
in alternative ways still intend their theories to account for the phenomenon
Here is thought experiment that supports this poin Suppose that folk psy-
a .
that we introspectively observe and are tempted to describe representationally, the
chology is horribly mistaken, the mind—brain sciences have no need for a notion phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk. For example, although Dretske (1995)
of content at all, and, relatedly, our best account of ho\v we successfully get by in does not employ an ostensive definition of his target, he states that his tracking
the world doesn't either. Suppose further that there is no determinate fact about theory covers anything answering to the term “intentionality":
how mental states are supposed to correspond to the world, and so there are
no such things as truth and reference, On this scenario, none of the alternative Brentano (I874) conjectured that a mark ofthe mental was intentional-
ways of defining “inrentionality” manage to pick out anything at all. Still. on this ity. Whatever, exactly, Brentano meant by intentionality, and whether
scenario, we might introspect and notice paradigm cases ofintentionality. We might or not he was right about its being a feature of all, and only, mental
notice perceptual experiences and thoughts that seem to be “about” or “directed” events, most philosophers take intentional characteristics (variously
at something or that seem to “say something.” And we might want to know how understood) to be distinctive ofa great many mental phenomena. What
this “aboutness” arises. This curiosity would not be misdirected. a mere result ofour follows is brief catalog of those aspects of intentionality that have
a
ignorance that the alternative definitions fail to refer, Even if we knew that nothing, figured most prominently in the recent literature. In each case we
not even paradigm cases, had the features invoked by the alternative definitions. find that a representational account of the mind provides a satisfying
we would still be left with the question of how thoughts and experiences get to explanation ofintentionality. (Dretske r995, p. 2.8)
have the features we are tempted to describe using representational vocabulary like
The aspects of intentionality that Dretske claims to accommodate are the power to
“aboutness" and “directedness." What this shows is that observation of paradigm
misrepresent, aboutness. aspectual shape (roughly, our ability to represent things in
cases by itself gives rise to curiosity about “aboutness” and “directedness," which
different ways), and directedness (pp. 28-34). In effect, Dretske claims that all there
suggests that my ostensive definition best captures the notion of intentionality that
is to anykind ofintention-ality—like phenomenon we have any reason to believe in is
such talk gestures at.
captured by his account. So, even though he does not define “intentionality” in my
ostensive way, at least part of what he aims to account for is the ostensively defined
phenomenon, the phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk.”
1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition Further reason to think that many theorists who define “intentionality" in
one of the ways I reject aim to be targeting a phenomenon that at least includes
1 now turn to some potential worries one might have with the ostensive ‘ ’
die ostensively defined phenomenon is that they often use what appear to be
of intentionality. introspectively accessible paradigm cases to illustrate their claims, such as judgments
concerning barnyard animals and hallucinations of pink rats and daggers. Although
there could be intentional states that are not introspectively accessible with such
1.4.1 ARE WE TALKING PAST EACH OTHER?
contents, the examples are usually nosed to be of the kinds of states that are or at
When different theorists pick out their topic ofinterest in different ways. there is a least could be introspectively accessible.” This appeal to introspectible cases suggests
danger that they end up talking past one another. Suppose that the folk psycholog-
ically defined phenomenon is distinct from the ostensively defined phenomenon,
" Similarly, Fodor (($90) explicitly mm that his theory Solvls “fitenianols prolileiii" (pp. is7—iii).
It seems that there is no real disagreement to be had between someone who takes
"’ This is especially Clear iii discussions ofthe disiiiiicriaii ptflblcm, wliicli partly rely on iririiiriciis about
the nature of the folk psychological phenomenon to be N and someone who takes what is represented iii possible cases (e Baker I989 and Fador X990). If rliisc iiiriiiripiis arcirr
16 Part I: Inrrnduttnm (ilmprzr 1: Fixing Rrfrrtm 2 an Irilermnmz/II)’ t7
that whatever else theorists who fix reference on their target in ways other than my my ostensive definition that it keeps the clearly intentional inttospectivcly accessible
own are trying to do, they are also often trying to explain intentionality in my sense. feature of mental states separate from whatever it is that the proposed additional
paradigms have, In any case, the terminological difference between me and someone
L41 STANDING STATES who adopts an ostensive definition ' luding standing states as paradigms does not
make a substantive difference in what follows: Although my target is intentionality,
One might agree with my suggestion of defining “' ' y” ostensively but in mysense, I also offer an account ofstanding states, as well as other alleged instances
find my choice of paradigms overly restrictive. All my paradigm cases are current of intentionality (see Part IV). The overall story offered would be the same whether
states, mental states that are used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at or not we include standing states in out paradigm cases, though it would be stated
which they are had, such as judgments and perceptual states. But we might also want diiferentli/i
to include in our stock of paradigms some standing states, mental states that need
not be used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at which they are had, such
t..¢..; PERCEPTION Am.) THOUGHT
as beliefs and desires that one is not currently entertaining. For example, the belief
you had five minutes ago that the Acropolis is in Athens is a standing state, and one The ostensive definition fixes on our target by pointing to several of its instances,
might suggest that it is a prime example ofintentionality." including instances in perception and instances in thought‘ But one might worry
My reason for not including standing states in my stock of paradigm cases is that these instances do not belong to a unified natural kind. Perhaps we end up
that we do not have the same kind of introspective access to them as we do picking out a disjunctive kind, consisting of two distinct natural kinds. This might
to introspectivcly accessible occurrcnt states. While we can simply observe the be the case if perceptual states are importantly different from "cognitive" states such
intentionality ofmy r f “ paradigm cases, we cannot observe our standing states as thoughts, and so what we might call “perceptual intentionality" is not the same
or their features. Instead. we infer that we have standing states, perhaps on the basis kind of thing as what we might call “cognitive intentionality." ifthis is the case. then
of our noticing that we sometimes have corresponding occurrent states or on the my paradigm cases are actually instances of two different kinds of phenomena, which
basis ofa folk psychological theory of mind and behavior. These ways of knowing i am mistakenly lumping together.
about standing states are relatively indirect compared to our ways of accessing my Of course, when we use multiple examples in an ostensive definition, there is
preferred paradigm cases, and, relatedly. their existence is less certain for us than that always a risk that they are very different in their natures and we end up picking
of my inrrospectively accessible paradigm cases. In short, then, we have an especially out a disjunctive kind. One response to this sort of worry is that this scenario is
secure epistemi access to introspectively accessible cases of intentionality, one that unlikely. While it remains a possibility that I've picked out a disjunctive kind, it at
we do not have to standing states, which is why I do not include standing states in least initially seems that the observations concerning thought and those concerning
my paradigm cases. perception are similar in important ways. Both thought and perception are readily
Notice also that if, as the objector is likely to hold, the proposed additional described as “saying something" or being “directed at” something. And both in»
paradigms have the feature that we notice in my paradigm cases, then my choice to tentionality in , and intentionality in thought seem fairly distant from
not include them has no EECCI: My ostensive definition will cover them as well, and other kinds of phenomena, such as reflexive behaviors and the automatic control of
including them in our initial stock is unnecessary. We end up picking out the same vital functions. Their similarity to one another and distance from other phenomena
thing either way. suggest that there is an interesting natural kind that they both belong to.“
Excluding standing states only has an effect on what we end up picking out if A second response [0 this worry is that even if it turns out that perceptual
the proposed additional paradigms either do not exist or do not have the feature intentionality and cognitive intentionality are very diiferent phenomena that do
picked out by my osrensive definition. But, in such cases, it is arguably a virtue of
Ofcoutse. even tfintentionzlity ts n Ilnlfild natural kind. perceptual teptesentstton and teprtszntatlon
supposed to be inlultlflns about the kintb otcantents that a subytcl might notice tn herself, then its in '
, ‘ 5| t. ’
natural kinds. 1-» A myclzims
not clear where they at: supposed to cutnt rtont and why Wt sllollld put any Wtlgllt on them. hm. Since the tssut ts om Wl\eKl1ct intentionality ts . unified natural kind, not whether it has various
“ Thanks (0 David Eaurgtt and Tim Bayne tot pressing tn: on this Worry. dISKllItt5ubl(iI1d$.
https://wvvw.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
is P/I7‘! I: lrltradurrilm C/mpltr 1: Flxlrlg Rrfmmr nn Intcrtmmdllly 19
not form a unified natural kind, this is not a problem, since my starting point includes both raw matter and interpretations, whereas we should only include
will not steer us too far in the wrong direction. Assuming our target is whatever interpretations.“
“aboutncss" and “directedness” talk gesture toward, the problem with approaches However, if the above view is correct. then it is not in fact the case that my
to fixing reference on our target that I want to reject is that they risk missing our approach is too permissive. My observations pick out intentional states, states that
target entirely. For example, defining our target as an explanatory posit in a theory “say” something, not non-' ' components or contributors to those states.
of behavior rislts missing our target if intentionality does not play the requisite role And so, my way of picking out the phenomenon of intentionality isn't meant to
in generating behavior. If nothing plays the requisite role (say, because the relevant and wouldn't in fact pick out unintcrpreted raw matter. if there were such a thing.
parts of the theory are false). then it will turn out that there is no intentionality. If Instead, my method would pick out interpreted raw matter. or interpretations. It
something plays this role. but it is not whatever "aboutness" and “ " ‘ ess” talk might then turn out that sotne of our allegedly perceptual paradigm states are not
gesture toward, then will turn out that there is intentionality, but that it‘s not the mere perceptual states but instead thoughts or combinations of perceptual states
same thing as our targeted phenomenon. In Contrast, picking out a disjunctive kind and thoughts. If the above view is in fact correct, then, ultimately, a complete
does not carrywith it the risk of missing our target. Perhaps perceptual intentionality theory of intentionality should isolate the components of interpreted raw matter and
and cognitive intentionality are two entirely different kinds of things. Then we distinguish their contributions to intentionaliry. Note that nothing in my ostensive
would need two distinct, and perhaps unrelated. theories to explain them, and if definition rules out such a view from the get-go.
we start of? thinking of perceptual intentionality and cognitive intentionality as
relevantly similar. then it might take longer to reach such a conclusion. However.
such a conclusion has not been ruled out from the start because nothing in the way 1.5 Conclusion
we fixed on intentionality requires that it be a unified phenomenon.“

The central aim ofthis book is to offer a theory of’ , the phenomenon
we at least sometilncs notice ' pectively in ourselves and are tempted to
[.44 PERCEPTUAL STATES l)0N.T HAVE CONTENTS describe using representational terms, and which, I've suggested, is the phenomenon
One might object that perceptual states don’t have contents, at least not prior to
that “aboutness" talk gestures at. This book develops a theory of this ostcnsively
defined phenomenon in terms ofa eptually distinct mental feature, phenomenal
an act of “interpretation.” For example, one might argue that the visual experience
one enjoys when one views ti red ball is neutral between multiple external-world
consciousness, the “what it’s like" of mental states.
possibilities, such as that there is a red ball in normal lighting conditions, that there is
This book also has a secondary aim. This chapter considered and rejected
alternative ways of fixing reference on intentionali via some of its alleged additional
a white ball lit by red light, etc. The experience does not by itself“say" which ofrhese
possibilities is the case, so it does not represent the ball as being any particular color
roles. Thus far, I have arguedthat intentionality might not play these roles. A
secondary line of argument in this book argues that intentionality alone in fact
at all. Instead, a further state, such as a judgment, '
I’
the perceptual state and
commits us to one or another possibi ty. On this view, there is a distinction between
due: no: play many of these of them are played by something else. In
roles. Many
Chapter 3, I argue that a crucial part of a story of how representations contribute to
-intentional mental features of some , , ' experien , which ght
we m
successful behavior must invoke non-i ‘ features of representation namely,
call their “raw matter,” and further states that interpret them.
,
or “interpretations."
their tracking relations to external items. In Chapter 8. I argue that folk psychological
Interpretations are intentional, but mere raw matter is not. One might object
notions of content most closely c to a combination of intentional content
that if this view is correct, then my ostensive ’ ‘ is too permissive: it J
and derived mental representational content. In Chapter 8, I also argue that

the kinds of representation implicit in the mind-brain sciences are distinct from
" Ofcourle. whatever mm apparent I perceptual and cognitive

- -
" y and that nonconscious occurrent states might satisfy these notions of
also seem qllflt diflerenr in certain respects. For instance. perceptual intentlonallty I! more vivid.
detailed. and closely related to phenomenology than mag... veintentlonality.I-1venrually.Iwlllofl’et a
3: ... ~ ‘ ...... . .' ppm .. t A ' ' -
in perception ml in thought (see especially Chapter 7). “ 'I'\tavis(;oo4)pre1ents (I View along time lines.
https:l/www.qoppa.comIpdfstudio
2.0 Part I: Intmduzrmn
representation but lack ' tionality, Chapter 9 argues that it is not even clear that
intentionality gives us conditions of truth and reference without the help of further
ingredients.
On the resulting picture, then, intcntionality is a matter of phenomenal conscious-
ness. and many of the other roles that are sometimes used to pick it out are in fact
played by something else.
y 2 Goals and Methodology
THE PREVIOUS cHAi='n-:RfixerI on our target, intentionality. This chapter consid-

ers what exactly we want to know about intentionality and some methods that can
it would take to provide a theory

help us come to know it. In §2..t, I consider what
ofintentionality and the goals around which I will structure most of my discussion.
In §1..2, I suggest two theory-independent ways in which we can know about our
intentional states, which can be used to test competing theories ofintcntionality:
introspection and considerations ofpsychological role.
2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?
A theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of inten-

tionality. where intentIon:iIity's (deep) nature is what it really is, metaphysically
speaking. For example, a theory ofintentionality might tell us that intentionality is a
tracking relation, a relation ofisomorphism between a Functionally defined system of
representations and abstract propositions. a primitive relation to properties. objects.
and facts, or an adverbial modification ofsubjectsi
My aim is to provide a theory ofintentionality that specifies the nature ofnll actual
and possible intentional states. But I will structure much of my discussion around a
zt
11 P47! I: Immiurrzun Chapter 2: Gaul: and Mzrbndalogy 2;
less ambitious goal. that of providing a theory that specifies what give: rise to actual intentionality, or derivatively intentional ways things are or might be. A derivarively
instances oforigirml intentionality. Let me explain these three italicized terms: intentional state is an instantiation ofa derivatively intentional property, and we
can say that something derivatively (intentionally) represents a content when it

Arising
instantiates a derivatively intentional property representing that content.
A gives rise to B (or, equivalently, B arises from A) when E is nothing over and
Note that although it is often thought that the line between original and
above A, e.g., because B is identical to, fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized
derived intentionality is to be drawn between mental instances ofintenrionality and
by A. A theory that tells us what gives rise to intentionality tells us what exactly
non»mental instances, there can also be mental cases of derived intentionality. Bour-
intentionality amounts to, though it might remain neutral on how exactly that ger (zoioa) oflers important early development of this idea, providing a wide
one
thing gets to amount to intentionality. For example, a theory ofintentionality might range of examples of derived mental intentionality. We will soon see that derived
claim that intentionality arises from tracking relations obtaining between internal
mental intentionality plays a role in most versions of the phenomenal intentionality
states and items in the environment, though it might remain neutral on whether
theory, the view diat l will eventually defend. But it is also true of many alternative
intentionality is identical to this tracking relation, grounded in it, or arises from it in
views that accept a language of thought-like picture on which internally unstructured
some other way
representation representations that do not contain other representation
, as proper
parts, come together to form internally structured representations whose contents
Actual and Pnsrilzle Instances tIfIr1IenIirIr1a1it_y
are determined by their representation and the ways they are combined.
Actual, as opposed to merely possible, intentional states are intentional states
As Bourget (zoroa) notes. one natural way of understanding this idea taltes the
existing in the actual world. A theory ofintentionality might account for all actual
intentionality of internally structured representations to be derived from their
intentional states while allowing for the possibility of intentional states that it cannot
constituent internally unstructured representations and their mode of combination.
account for. For example, a theory of intentionality in terms of tracking might
allow that there are non»actual possible worlds in which intentionality is a primitive
Although I will eventually propose a theory of intentionality that specifies the
phenomenon.’
nature of all actual and possible intentional states, I will structure much of my
discussion around the more modest goal of providing a theory of ntionality '
Original and Derived Intmtiwzaiity

that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. My
Original intentionality is intentionality that does not derive from other instances
reason for this is that it allows us to classify theories of intentionality in terms
of intentionality. Original intentionality can be contrasted with derived intention-
of their most general common factors: what they take actual-world instances of
ality, which is intentionality that derives from other instances ofintentionality For
original intentionality to amount to, or, in other words, what they take to be the
example, one might think that linguistic expressions have derived intentionality that
actual-world “source” (Kricgel zou, zotab) of intentionality. As we will see, this
is derived from the original intentionality of mental states, e.g.. from our thoughts,
method of classifying theories ends up classifying them along familiar lines. Once
beliefs. interpretations, or communicative intentions (Grice 1989).
we have settled on the source of actual»world instances of intentionality. we will then
A few more definitions are in order: Originally intentional properties are ways
turn to providing a more complete theory of intentionality, one that settles other
things are or might be with respect to their original intentionality, or originally
questions about intentionality, including those of how exactly intentionality arises
intentional ways things are or might be, and an intentional state is
from whatever it arises from, how it might arise in other possible worlds, and whether
an instantiation of an originally intentional property. We can say that something
and how original intentionality can yield derived intentionality.
'9' " (intentionally) represents a content when it instanriates an "
intentional property representing that content. Cotrespondingly, derivatively in-

2:2 Theory«I 4 4 Access to intentionality
tentional , rries are ways things are or might be with respect to their derived
As we will see in Chapters 3-5, many theories of intentionality make predictions as

‘ Compare: A physicallst theory ofmental states can be neutral on the question ofwhether nonphysieal to the contents of particular mental states. So, in order to assess these theories, it
mental states are possible. is useful to have a theory~indcpendent way of testing these predictions, i.c., a way
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[220] Chevræana, ou Pensées d’histoire, de littérature, etc. Amsterdam, 1700, 2 vol. in-12, t.
Iᵉʳ, p. 142, et notre Histoire du Pont-Neuf, première partie, p. 208.
[221] Curiosités de l’histoire du vieux Paris, par P.-L. Jacob, bibliophile. Paris, Ad. Delahays,
1858, in-12, p. 62.
[222] Voir la figure, p. 175.
[223] Archives hospitalières de Paris, in-4º, p. 152.
[224] Dictionnaire topographique, historique et étymologique des Rues de Paris, par J. de la
Tynna, 2ᵉ édit. Paris, Smith, 1817, in-12, p. 508.
[225] Le Paysan françois, sans nom de lieu, 1609, in-8º.
[226] Pièce inédite tirée des Manuscrits de Conrart, à la Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, t. X, p.
225 et suiv.
[227] Mélanges historiques, satyriques et anecdotiques de Boisjourdain, sur la fin du règne
de Louis XIV et la Régence. Paris, Chèvre et Chauson, 1807, 3 vol. in-8º.
[228] Inventaire sommaire des Archives hospitalières, réimprimé par M. Michel Moring.
Paris, Picard, 1882, in-4º, nᵒˢ 2253 et 2450.
[229] Registre du Châtelet, publié par la Société des Bibliophiles, t. II, p. 502.
[230] Victor Fournel, les Contemporains de Molière. Paris, Firmin Didot, 1866, in-8º, t. III, p.
335.
[231] Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France (extrait des Journaux de l’Estoile).
Cologne, chez les Héritiers de Herman Demen, 1719, 2 vol. in-8º, t. II, p. 127.
[232] Histoire de la ville de Paris, par l’abbé Lebeuf, édition de Cocheris, t. Iᵉʳ, p. 368.
[233] Essais historiques sur Paris, pour faire suite aux Essais de M. Poullain de Saint-Foix,
par Aug. Poullain de Saint-Foix. Paris, Debray, an XIII (1805), 2 vol. in-12, t. Iᵉʳ, p. 194-195.
[234] Cette édition fait partie de la Bibliothèque elzévirienne, 1878, 2 vol. in-12.
[235] Les Enseignes de Paris, feuilleton de la Presse, du lundi 21 juillet 1856.
[236] Notice des émaux, bijoux et objets divers du Musée du Louvre, par de Laborde.
Documents et Glossaire. Paris, Vinchon, 1853, in-12, p. 131.
[237] Même Notice, p. 131.
[238] Livre-Journal de Lazare Duvaux, marchand bijoutier ordinaire du Roy. Paris, pour la
Société des Bibliophiles, 1873, 2 vol. in-8º, fig. L’étude de M. Courajod ne remplit pas moins de
221 pages.
[239] Voir notre chapitre XXVIII, sur les imagiers et les peintres d’enseignes.
[240] C’est dans la collection iconographique de M. le baron Pichon, président de la Société
des Bibliophiles français, que nous avons trouvé ces vingt et une adresses-enseignes gravées,
dont quelques-unes sont d’une grande importance et d’une insigne rareté. Mon vieil ami Paul
Lacroix avait publié, avant nous, dans son Dix-huitième Siècle (Paris, Firmin Didot, 1875, gr. in-
8º), quelques pièces de ce genre, très remarquables au point de vue de la gravure, empruntées
également à la précieuse collection de M. le baron Pichon.
[241] Histoire artistique et archéologique de la Gravure en France, par Alfred Bonnardot.
Paris, Deflorenne, 1849, in-8º.
[242] Abraham Bosse, Catalogue de son œuvre, par Georges Duplessis (Revue univers. des
Arts, publiée par Paul Lacroix (bibliophile Jacob). Paris, Renouard, 1857, in-8º, t. VI, p. 337.)
[243] Tome LIX de la collection d’estampes léguée à la Bibliothèque nationale par ce savant
iconographe.
[244] Revue des Documents historiques, publ. par Étienne Charavay, quatrième année. Paris,
A. Lemerre, 1876, p. 58.
[245] Cette eau-forte de Boucher, restée absolument inconnue, a été signalée par M.
Courajod, qui l’a fait graver en fac-simile par L. Gaucherel, pour mettre ce fac-simile en tête du
Livre-Journal de Lazare Duvaux.
[246] Voir notre Histoire du Pont-Neuf, première partie, p. 272 à 275.
[247] Petit Dictionnaire critique et anecdotique des Enseignes de Paris, 1825, p. 83.—Cette
enseigne du Pauvre Diable a subsisté jusqu’à l’année 1878.
[248] Petit Dictionnaire critique et anecdotique des Enseignes de Paris, p. 84.
[251] Ibidem, p. 21.
[252] Voir notre Esprit dans l’histoire, Paris, E. Dentu, 1883, in-18 elzévir, p. 122-124. Ce
quatrain a eu bien des variantes.
[253] Voir, dans les Œuvres de Clément Marot, édition de Lenglet du Fresnoy, la Haye, 1731,
t. II, à la page 71, le huitain intitulé: Du Roy et de Laure, et à la page 13 l’épigramme: A soy-
mesme, de Madame Laure.
[254] Clément Marot et tous les poètes de cour jusqu’à Ronsard ont fait un grand nombre de
ces épitaphes, qu’on appelait des tombeaux et qu’on aurait pu qualifier d’enseignes de la mort,
puisqu’elles étaient gravées sur les marbres ou les pierres des sépultures.
[255] Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de livres, par Jacques Brunet, 5ᵉ édition. Paris,
Firmin Didot, 1864, 6 vol. gr. in-8º. Voir, dans le tome V, aux pages 1694-1707, la liste
alphabétique des libraires et imprimeurs dont les marques typographiques sont figurées dans
cette cinquième édition.
[256] Il en est à peu près de même pour les marques de commerce, qui sont généralement la
reproduction très réduite de l’enseigne. Cependant quelques magasins, qui n’ont pas d’enseignes
proprement dites, ont des marques spéciales; le magasin du Louvre, par exemple, a pour marque
un lion appuyé contre un L majuscule.
[257] Histoire physique, civile et morale de Paris, par J.-A. Dulaure. Paris, Guillaume, 1821,
in-8º, t. Iᵉʳ, p. 77.
[258] Souvenirs de Paris en 1804, par Auguste Kotzebue, traduits de l’allemand (par Guilbert
de Pixérécourt). Paris, Barba, 1805, 2 vol. in-12, t. II, p. 340.
[259] Petit Dictionnaire critique et anecdotique des Enseignes de Paris, par un batteur de
pavé, avec cette épigraphe: «Au bon vin pas d’enseigne.» Paris, chez les Marchands de
nouveautés, au Palais-Royal. Imprimerie de H. Balzac, rue des Marais Saint-Germain, nº 17.
1826, in-32.
[260] Ballets et Mascarades de Cour, sous Henri IV et Louis XIII, recueillis par Paul Lacroix.
Genève, J. Gay, 1868-70, in-12, t. II, p. 213.
[261] L’Orphelin infortuné. Paris, 1660, in-8º, p. 243-44.
[262] Ballets et Mascarades de Cour, t. VI, p. 73.
[263] Poésies et Lettres de M. Dassoucy. Paris, J.-B. Loyson, 1653, pet. in-12, p. 96.
[264] A. Pougin, Adolphe Adam, sa Vie et ses Œuvres.
[265] Puisque nous reparlons ici d’Eugène Scribe, rappelons qu’il est né, en 1791, rue Saint-
Denis, où son père tenait un magasin de soieries, au Chat noir (Lefeuve, les Anciennes Maisons
de Paris, t. III, p. 58). Cette enseigne abrite aujourd’hui, au nº 32, une boutique de confiseur.
[266] A propos de l’emploi de la mosaïque, assez rare dans les enseignes de Paris,
mentionnons l’ornementation en mosaïque polychrome, figurant des attributs guerriers, qui
entoure la façade monumentale du Panorama construit, depuis trois ou quatre ans, rue Saint-
Honoré, nº 251, sur l’emplacement de la salle Valentino. (Note de l’éditeur.)
[267] On lit dans le Figaro du 27 février 1884: «Il y a encore des enseignes amusantes. Hier,
nous en avons remarqué une assez drôle, dans le haut de la rue Pigalle. Cette œuvre d’art, due au
pinceau d’un illustre inconnu, a pour but d’attirer l’attention des passants sur les mérites des
escargots de Bourgogne, débités par un marchand de vin restaurateur. L’artiste a ainsi conçu son
œuvre: dans le haut du tableau, le Père éternel et le bon saint Pierre émergent des nuages et
conversent ensemble, en regardant au-dessous d’eux une bande de terrain sur laquelle se
promène allégrement un escargot d’appétissante apparence. Une légende traduit ainsi les paroles
des personnages célestes: «Pierre, tire le cordon. Il faut que j’aille voir de plus près sur la terre
cette bête que je ne connais pas et que je ne me souviens pas d’avoir créée.—Ne vous dérangez
pas, Seigneur, c’est un excellent escargot de Bourgogne qui voyage comme échantillon pour la
maison X..., de la rue Pigalle.» Et le bon Dieu semble dire à saint Pierre: «Merci du
renseignement; on apprend à tout âge.» (Note de l’éditeur.)
[268] L’Hermite du faubourg Saint-Germain, par Ch. Colnet. Paris, Pillet, 1825, 2 vol. in-12.
[269] Étude sur les Enseignes de Paris (Journal des Débats, 25 mai et 1ᵉʳ juin 1848).
[270] Les Enseignes de Paris, feuilleton du Gaulois, 7 juillet 1877.
[271] Les Enseignes, par Firmin Maillard, feuilleton du Journal de Paris. 1ᵉʳ octobre 1859.
[272] Histoire de la Société française pendant la Révolution, par les frères de Goncourt.
Paris, E. Dentu, 1854, in-8º, p. 269.
[273] Voir la Feuille du jour, nº 177.
[274] Réimpression du Moniteur universel, in-4º, t. XIX, p. 266.
[275] Journal littéraire de Clément, 1795, t. II, p. 19.—Un peu plus tard reparurent quelques
enseignes de dévotion (voir notre chapitre XVI), telles que l’Image Notre-Dame, sous
l’invocation de laquelle s’était mis, dès 1701, un commerce de droguerie de la rue des Lombards,
transféré aujourd’hui boulevard de Sébastopol, nº 14.
[276] Le Nouveau Paris, par le citoyen Mercier. Brunswick, 1800, 6 vol. in-12, t. III, p. 94.
[277] Au sujet d’une sculpture assez bizarre qui décore la partie supérieure du chevet de cette
église, et qui peut passer pour une véritable enseigne en rébus, voir nos Enigmes des rues de
Paris, p. 301.
[278] Histoire de la Société française sous le Directoire, par Edmond et Jules de Goncourt.
Paris, E. Dentu, 1855, in-8º, p. 88 et 93.
[279] Étude sur les Enseignes de Paris, par Amédée Berger (Journal des Débats, 25 mai et
1ᵉʳ juin 1858).
[280] Œuvres de A.-V. Arnault. Paris, Bossange, 1827, t. VIII, p. 120.
[281] Le Livre des Cent et un. Paris, Ladvocat, 1834, in-8º, t. XV, p. 243.
[282] Le Mercure de France, t. XLV, p. 482.
[283] La France, par Lady Morgan. Paris, Treuttel et Wurtz, 1817, 2 vol. in-8º, t. II, p. 57.
[284] Cette maison, faisant l’angle de la rue de Grammont, et remplacée par l’hôtel du Crédit
lyonnais, appartenait alors à M. Pérès, maître serrurier, auquel on doit la belle grille du Palais de
justice. (Note de l’éditeur.)
[285] Mémorial parisien, ou Paris tel qu’il est, etc. Paris, Dalibon, 1821, in-12, pages 4, 31,
35 et 214.
[286] Voir la figure page 92.—Mentionnons dans la même rue, plus près de la Bastille,
l’enseigne du Chat botté, assez jolie statuette en bois colorié qui décore la boutique d’un
cordonnier.
[287] Étude sur les Enseignes de Paris (Journal des Débats, 25 mai et 1ᵉʳ juin 1858).
[288] Cette sculpture décorait l’entrée du collège de Saint-Michel, fondé au XIVᵉ siècle par
l’évêque de Paris Guillaume de Chanac et doté en 1510 par Antoine de Pompadour. C’est dans
ce collège qu’avait été admis comme domestique-élève le futur cardinal Dubois (Lefeuve,
Anciennes Maisons de Paris, t. Iᵉʳ, p. 397-400).—Rappelons en passant que cette rue de Bièvre
avait eu pour habitant Dante pendant son séjour à Paris, et qu’il allait suivre les cours des
professeurs de la rue du Feurre ou Fouarre, tout près de là.
[289] Recherches historiques sur les Enseignes des maisons particulières, suivies de quelques
inscriptions murales, par E. de La Quérière. Rouen, François, 1852, in-8º, p. 53 et suiv.
[290] Aujourd’hui au musée de Cluny.
[291] Mémoires et Correspondance littéraire, dramatique et anecdotique de C.-S. Favart.
Paris, Léopold Collin, 1808, 3 vol. in-8º, t. Iᵉʳ, p. 94.
[292] Paris à la fin du XVIIIᵉ siècle, ou Esquisse historique et morale des monuments et des
ruines de cette capitale, etc., par J.-B. Pujoulx. Paris, Mathé, 1801, in-8º, p. 14.
[293] Livraison du 10 septembre 1842, p. 38; Bulletin publié sous la direction de Paul
Lacroix (bibliophile Jacob).
[294] Catalogue raisonné de l’œuvre, peint, dessiné et gravé, d’Antoine Watteau, par Edmond
de Goncourt. Paris, Rapilly, 1875, in-8º, p. 88 à 90.
[295] Voir notre Histoire du Pont-Neuf. E. Dentu, édit., 1862, 2 vol. in-18; t. Iᵉʳ, p. 270-274.
[296] Mémoires inédits sur la vie et les ouvrages des membres de l’Académie royale de
peinture et de sculpture, publiés par L. Dussieux, E. Soulié, Ph. de Chennevières, etc. Paris,
Dumoulin, 1854, 2 vol. in-8º, t. II, p. 421.
[297] Grétry, par Arsène Houssaye, dans la Revue de Paris, numéro du 4 juillet 1841.
[298] Voir ci-dessus, à la page 363, cette enseigne, la seule peut-être qui n’ait pas quitté sa
place depuis le Directoire, sauf qu’elle est maintenant à l’intérieur du magasin au lieu d’être au
dehors.
[299] Les Enseignes de Paris, par M. Poignant, feuilleton du Gaulois, 7 juillet 1877.
[300] Voir la remarquable monographie d’Edmond de Goncourt, intitulée: Gavarni, p. 404.—
Voir ci-dessus, page 349, la reproduction de cette enseigne, qui existe encore au coin des rues de
la Huchette et Saint-Jacques.
[301] Les Enseignes de Paris, feuilleton du Gaulois, 8 juillet 1877.
[302] A propos d’Eugène Delacroix, mentionnons, boulevard du Montparnasse, à quelques
pas du boulevard des Invalides, au-dessus d’un magasin de meubles, une copie de son beau
tableau représentant Dante conduit par Virgile au séjour des Damnés. Cette enseigne, qui n’a pas
d’inscription, est en assez mauvais état, mais on peut voir encore qu’elle a été peinte par un
artiste de quelque talent, sans doute un élève du maître.
[303] Voir plus haut, p. 394, une note à ce sujet.—Cette enseigne, qui était telle que nous la
dépeignons quand nous en avons fait prendre copie, aurait aujourd’hui bon besoin d’être
restaurée; à peine en reconnaît-on le dessin.
[304] Ce Richesource, qui se posa en défenseur de la langue écrite et parlée pendant trente-
cinq ans, publia, en 1680, le Camouflet des auteurs négligents en faveur des jeunes orateurs, in-
12, et il ne ménagea pas plus les auteurs en renom que s’il avait eu à leur reprocher les
monstrueux abus orthographiques et grammaticaux des enseignes de Paris.
[305] Journal de Paris, feuilleton du 1ᵉʳ octobre 1859.
[306] Mémorial parisien, ou Paris tel qu’il fut, tel qu’il est. Paris, Dalibon, 1821, in-12, p. 31.
[307] Tout récemment, en février 1884, le journal la France a inauguré un hôtel somptueux,
élevé par l’architecte Ferdinand Bal, sur l’emplacement de l’ancien marché Saint-Joseph.
L’angle, en pan coupé, sur la rue du Croissant et la rue Montmartre, est décoré au sommet d’un
génie, placé devant un exemplaire typique du journal et montrant au public une pièce de 10
centimes, prix du numéro. Au-dessous, dans un médaillon lauré, est le buste d’Émile de Girardin,
fondateur du journal, et plus bas, un bras de bronze, sortant de la muraille, dépose son bulletin
dans une urne électorale.—Le Petit Journal montre, au-dessus de l’immeuble où il est installé
depuis plus de vingt ans, rue Lafayette, nº 61, une énorme pièce de 5 centimes, entourée de
lauriers et autres attributs; encore l’annonce du prix du numéro du journal. (Note de l’éditeur.)
[308] A. Forgeais, Plombs historiés trouvés dans la Seine; 1ʳᵉ série. Méreaux des corporations
d’arts et métiers. Paris, 1862, in-8º, p. 125.
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

1st Edition Angela Mendelovici

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality 1st Edition

Perceptions of Medieval Manuscripts: The Phenomenal

Protein Interactions: The Molecular Basis of

Rights As Security: The Theoretical Basis Of Security

Goodman and Gilman’s The Pharmacological Basis of

Geographies of Transport and Ageing 1st ed. Edition

Non-Propositional Intentionality First Edition. Edition

Goodman and Gilmanu2019s The Pharmacological Basis of

OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

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4... Conclusion 80 9... The Rclariun Viuwand .h: Aspcc[Vicw .96

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5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION

PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.

My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity

1.1 Aboutness and Directedness

lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

my definition of "intentionality" and the introspective observations it is based (§L3ts)-

is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.“

not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying

we fixed on intentionality requires that it be a unified phenomenon.“

and derived mental representational content. In Chapter 8, I also argue that

" Ofcourle. whatever mm apparent I perceptual and cognitive

y 2 Goals and Methodology

THE PREVIOUS cHAi='n-:RfixerI on our target, intentionality. This chapter consid-

it would take to provide a theory

2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?