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Ideology and Mass Killing
 Ideology and Mass
Killing
The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides
and Deadly Atrocities

JONAT HAN LE A DE R M AY NAR D

 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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 Acknowledgements

This book would not exist, let alone have taken anything like its eventual form,
were it not for the support and assistance of dozens of friends and colleagues. In the
first years of working on this project, two of the leading figures in the Department
of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford inspired and
guided my research. The first was Elizabeth Frazer, who served as both my master’s
and doctoral supervisor. It’s very hard to put into words the depth and breadth of
both Liz’s intellect and her contribution to my life as an academic. She has exerted
a major influence over my understandings of politics, violence, and ideology, and
offered me great feedback on several sections of the book. But more than that,
being supervised by Liz hugely improved my ability to think and the care and depth
with which I thought about theory, argument, and method as a politics researcher.
Like so many at the University of Oxford, I cannot adequately repay her. Second,
I owe a huge debt to Jennifer Welsh, who as Professor of International Relations
at Oxford initiated my scholarly engagement with international relations research
on atrocities, norms, and ideas. In her subsequent roles as United Nations Special
Advisor for the Responsibility to Protect, Professor of International Relations at
the European University Institute, and Chair in Global Governance and Security
at McGill University, Jennifer offered me much feedback and encouraged me to
develop the normative and preventive implications of my research. My work owes
a huge debt to her insight, advice, and scholarship, and I feel immensely privileged
to know her.
Beyond Liz and Jennifer, I owe so much to Thomas (Tad) Homer-Dixon, who
has been a source of inspiration, advice, and intellectual engagement since I first
met him in Oxford in April 2012. Tad took a major leap of faith in inviting me
to join a network of researchers interested in ideology based at the University
of Waterloo, Ontario, and he and that network have tremendously enriched my
thinking. Beyond that, Tad has become a great friend, and was immensely gen-
erous in reading half the book manuscript and giving me invaluable feedback.
I cannot thank him enough. I extend that thanks, moreover, to all those scholars
Tad brought together to create such exciting conversations as part of the Ideolog-
ical Conflict Project at the University of Waterloo, in particular Marisa Beck, Esra
Çudahar, Scott Janzwood, David Last, Matto Mildenberger, Manjana Milkoreit,
Steven Mock, Jinelle Piereder, Steve Quilley, Tobias Schröder, and Paul Thagard.
My appreciation also goes to the Balsillie School of International Affairs and the
vi acknowledgements

Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation for hosting and supporting our
discussions.
Many scholars at the University of Oxford have offered sustained input and
encouragement for my research. I am profoundly indebted to Michael Freeden—
both for offering me so much advice and support over the years, and more
obviously for his preeminent scholarship on ideology, which transformed my un-
derstanding of the topic. I’m similarly grateful to Martin Ceadel, who gave me great
support in my first years at New College, Oxford; to Andrea Ruggeri, with whom
I had much intellectual engagement surrounding our overlapping research agen-
das on ideology and armed conflict; and to Stathis Kalyvas, who gave me much
encouragement for the research project and tremendously invigorated the conflict
studies community at Oxford. I have also gained a lot from broader engagement
with Janina Dill, Todd Hall, Dominic Johnson, Juan Masullo, and Matt Zelina,
and owe thanks to the organizers and members of the ‘Global Ideas’ workshop at
Oxford: David Priestland, Faridah Zaman, Paul Betts, Dace Dzenovska, Faisal De-
vji, and Yaacov Yadgar. I owe both professional and intellectual debts to Hugo Slim
and Martin Shaw, who acted as my examiners for my doctorate and gave me much
input and encouragement for the whole project. The influence of their work is fre-
quently visible in the pages that follow. The first stage of research for this book
was conducted during my doctorate at Oxford funded by a research grant from
the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and extended into a Junior Research
Fellowship at New College, and a Departmental Lectureship at Oxford’s Depart-
ment of Politics and International Relations. All three institutions also have my
deep gratitude. I’m incredibly appreciative to Oxford University Press and my ed-
itor Dominic Byatt for publishing the book, and for showing immense patience
when I decided to heavily rework some of the research between 2019 and 2021. My
thanks also go to three anonymous referees, who offered supportive and detailed
feedback on the original book proposal.
Beyond Oxford, numerous leading scholars have been incredibly generous in
giving various forms of support to my work. My own understanding of mass
killing, and the role of ideology in it, is tremendously influenced by the pioneer-
ing work of Scott Straus, who has given me invaluable advice and feedback on
the project and the draft manuscript. I am also grateful to the support of Lee Ann
Fujii, whose work reshaped my thinking about political violence, who offered me
encouragement and input into my work in the short time I knew her, and whose
unexpected death in March 2018 devastated me, as it did the discipline of po-
litical science. I am profoundly indebted to both the research and assistance of
a broader group of scholars—many of whom have become great friends—who
offered feedback on chapters of the manuscript or in other ways gave key input
and support to my research. I therefore offer huge thanks to Gary Ackerman,
Alex Bellamy, Susan Benesch, Donald Bloxham, Rachel Brown, Zeynep Bulutgil,
Sabina Čehajić-Clancy, Coline Covington, Alan Cromartie, Lesley-Ann Daniels,
 acknowledgements vii

Lorne Dawson, Mark Drumbl, Jonathan Glover, Barbora Hola, Erin Jessee, Siniša
Malešević, Dominik Markl, Omar McDoom, Theo McLauchlin, Elisabeth Hope
Murray, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Emily Paddon, Vladimir Petrovic, Juliane Prade-
Weiss, Scott Sagan, Lee Seymour, David Simon, Savina Sirik, Timea Spitka, Abbey
Steele, Sidney Tarrow, Kai Thaler, Benjamin Valentino, Manuel Vogt, Sri Wahyun-
ingroem, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. My thanks also to the numerous members
of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, International Network of
Genocide Scholars, Conflict Research Society, International Studies Association,
and American Political Science Association, as well as attendees at a wide range of
other workshops, for their comments on presentations of my work. Thanks also
to Sadia Fatima Hameed and all members of the Dangerous Speech Network con-
vened by Wellspring Advisors for providing an invaluable forum for discussing the
dynamics of extreme violence and atrocity prevention.
It’s been a delight over the last year of the book project to have joined King’s
College London, and I’m extremely grateful to several new colleagues for read-
ing and/or discussing parts of the book—Samueldi Canio, Robin Douglass, Shaun
Hargreaves-Heap, Colin Jennings, Steven Klein, and John Meadowcroft—as well
as to Adrian Blau for his constant support. I’m also privileged over the last five years
to have played a role in supervising three terrific doctoral students—Leah Owen,
Paola Solimena, and Angharad Jones-Buxton—from whom I have learnt so much,
and who have all made me a better scholar. I also thank all the friends who have
read parts of the book and supported me on the long journey of writing it, par-
ticularly Ezgi Aydin, Noémi Blome, Caroline Crepin, Blake Ewing, Ryan Hanley,
Irina Herb, Jeff Howard, Helena Ivanov, Katie Mann, Rhiannon Neilsen, and Willa
Rae Witherow-Culpepper. I’m especially grateful to Lise Butler, for holding me
together through the tough times and bringing endless fun and friendship to the
good times; to Will Jones, for always making the world seem that much more inter-
esting; to Raphael Lefevre, who offered feedback on several sections of the book,
and spent many hours with me discussing ideology and helping me develop my
ideas; to Matt Longo, for pushing me to be my best and making Amsterdam almost
a second home; to Timothy Williams, for his faith in me and for his generosity in
going through almost half the book with detailed comments; and to Alex Worsnip,
for making me a better thinker and bringing so many years of adventure into my
life. Finally, there are no adequate words to express my thanks to my parents, Carol
Leader and Michael Maynard: for reading and offering feedback on entire drafts
of the book, for giving me constant support on the journey of writing it, and above
all, for raising me in an environment where it was always good to be curious, and
always safe to be wrong.
 Contents

List of Figures xi

1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Puzzle of Mass Killing 1
1.2 Ideology and Its Critics 4
A Neo-Ideological Perspective 6
Advancing the Debate 12
1.3 Elaborating the Argument 15
Conceptualizing ‘Mass Killing’ and ‘Ideology’ 15
Ideology, Perpetrator Coalitions, and Political Crisis 18
On Method 24
1.4 Plan of the Book 26

2. Clarifying Ideology 28
2.1 What Are Ideologies? 30
Narrow Conceptualizations 30
Broad Conceptualizations 32
2.2 How Do Ideologies Influence Behaviour? 37
Internalized Ideology: Commitment and Adoption 42
Ideological Structures: Conformity and Instrumentalization 45
Infrastructural Diversity 49
2.3 Conclusion 51

3. How Does Ideology Explain Mass Killing? 53

3.1 Explaining Mass Killing Without Ideology? 54
Rationalist Explanations 54
Situationist Explanations 59
3.2 The Basic Argument: Ideologies and Political Crises 63
The Emergence of Justificatory Narratives for Mass Killing 63
Ideological Security Doctrines and Political Crises 65
3.3 Ideology and Perpetrator Coalitions 70
Building a Perpetrator Coalition 70
Political Elites 75
Rank-and-File Agents 79
Public Constituencies 84
3.4 The Roots of Hardline Ideology 87
3.5 Conclusion 92

4. The Hardline Justification of Mass Killing 94

4.1 What Kinds of Ideologies Matter? 95
 contents ix

The Traditional Focus: Revolutionary Transformations and

Moral Disengagement 95
The Neo-Ideological Focus: Radicalized Security Politics 100
4.2 The Power of Justificatory Narratives 103
Portraying the Victims: Threat, Guilt, and Exclusion 105
Portraying the Violence: Virtue, Future Goods, and
Inevitability 115
The Limitationist Alternative 127
4.3 Conclusion 131

5. Stalinist Repression 134

5.1 Overview 134
5.2 Explaining the Rise of Stalinism 138
Marxism, Leninism, and the Early Soviet Union 138
Stalinist Radicalization 143
5.3 Stalinism and Repressive Mass Killing 145
The Stalinist Elite 145
The Rank-and-File of Stalinist Violence 160
Publicly Justifying Stalinist Repression 167
5.4 Conclusion 176

6. Allied Area Bombing in World War II 179

6.1 Overview 179
6.2 The Roots of Allied Bombing Doctrines 181
Early Ideas of Air Power 182
The Development of Air Doctrine in Interwar Britain 185
The Development of Air Doctrine in the Interwar United
States 188
6.3 Ideology and Area Bombing in World War II 191
Policymakers and the Ideology of Area Bombing 191
The Rank-and-File Bombers 205
The Public Legitimation of Area Bombing 210
Ideological Restraints 217
6.4 Conclusion 218

7. Mass Killing in Guatemala’s Civil War 221

7.1 Overview 221
7.2 The Evolution of Military Ideology 228
7.3 Ideology and Counter-Insurgent Mass Killing 235
The Military’s Political Elite 236
Rank-and-File Agents in Guatemala’s Mass Killings 242
Public Justification of the Killings 251
The American Connection 256
7.4 Conclusion 259

8. The Rwandan Genocide 262

8.1 Overview 262
x contents

8.2 The Evolution of Hardline Hutu Ethnonationalism 266

Hutu and Tutsi Identity in Rwanda 266
The Second Republic Under Habyarimana 271
Hardline Radicalization in the 1990s 274
8.3 Ideology in the Genocide 280
The Hutu Power Elite 280
Rank-and-File Agents in the Genocide 287
Disseminating the Hardline Narrative 297
8.4 Conclusion 305

9. Conclusion 307
9.1 The Role of Ideology in Mass Killing 307
9.2 Moving Forward 312
9.3 Prediction and Prevention 315
9.4 The Problem of Extremism and Atrocity 318

Methodological Appendix 321

Comparative Historical Analysis 321
Studying Ideas and Violence 324
Conclusion 329

Bibliography 331
Index 372
 List of Figures

2.1. An infrastructural model of ideology’s influence. 41

3.1. The basic argument in brief. 65
3.2. The spectrum of ideological security doctrines. 66
5.1. Official Soviet executions and forced labour camp sentences, 1930–53. 135
 1
Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle of Mass Killing

Since the start of the twentieth century, between eighty million and two hun-
dred million people have died in mass killings: large-scale coordinated campaigns
of lethal violence which systematically target civilians.1 These mass killings have
taken many forms: from genocides to major terrorist campaigns and from aerial
bombardments to massacres by paramilitary organizations. They have occurred
on every continent bar Antarctica: from the Holocaust in Europe to Mao’s Cul-
tural Revolution in China, and from mass violence against the indigenous peoples
of the Americas and Australasia to the Rwandan Genocide in central Africa. Such
organized killing of civilians represents one of the deadliest categories of political
violence, its victims heavily outnumbering the thirty-four million soldiers who
died in twentieth-century battlefield warfare.2 While there has been some recent
decline in mass killings, they continue to recur.3 In 2003, the Darfur region of
Sudan was subjected to the twenty-first century’s first major genocide, with
300,000 killed, while mass killings have also scarred Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and numerous other states since the turn of
the millennium.⁴ These campaigns involve the most absolute violations of victims’
human rights, and constitute the severest ‘atrocity crimes’ in international law.⁵
Why do mass killings occur? How do human beings come to initiate, participate
in, and support such atrocities against unarmed men, women, and children? In
popular commentary, films, and media coverage, three rough-and-ready answers
to these questions are common. First, the perpetrators are often presented as either
individually insane—as psychopaths and sadists—or as whipped up into a kind of

1 Anderton and Brauer 2016b, 4. The variation in estimates reflects data problems and controversies
over how to classify such violence—higher estimates are open to criticism; see Gerlach 2010, 256–8 &
468, fn.6.
2 Valentino 2004, 1.
3 Bellamy 2012b, 4–9. Overall, states have targeted civilians in one fifth to one third of all wars; see
Downes and McNabb Cochran 2010, 23.
⁴ Butcher et al. 2020.
⁵ Scheffer 2006; United Nations 2014; Sharma and Welsh 2015; Dieng and Welsh 2016; Gordon 2017.
I will therefore often refer to mass killings as atrocities, but not all atrocities are mass killings.

Ideology and Mass Killing: The Radicalized Security Politics of Genocides and Deadly Atrocities. Jonathan Leader Maynard,
Oxford University Press. © Jonathan Leader Maynard (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198776796.003.0001
2 ideology and mass killing

social madness of collective rage and hatred.⁶ Second, mass killings are sometimes
thought to expose humanity’s innately aggressive and destructive nature. When the
restraints of law and order are peeled away, it is suggested, this innate propensity
towards violence is unleashed.⁷ Finally, it is sometimes suggested that perpetra-
tors of mass killing are simply acting under coercion.⁸ As members of totalitarian
societies or harsh military or paramilitary organizations, they kill because they
themselves have the threat of death hanging over them should they disobey.
These explanations might seem superficially plausible, but five decades of schol-
arship on mass killings has shown all three to be inaccurate. Mental illness or
mindless rage amongst perpetrators of organized violence is rare. In fact, as the
psychologist James Waller puts it: ‘it is ordinary people, like you and me, who
commit genocide and mass killing’.⁹ Although disturbing, this should not really
be surprising. Mass killing generally requires the support or acquiescence of sub-
stantial sections of societies over periods of months or years.1⁰ It is unlikely that
this number of people could be psychologically abnormal in any meaningful sense,
or successfully participate in sustained coordinated violence while consumed by
blind rage. Indeed, the organizations that recruit perpetrators of mass killing, such
as secret police departments, state militaries, and insurgent groups, sometimes go
to great lengths to weed out psychopaths, sadists, and uncontrollably hate-fuelled
individuals from their ranks.11
Modern research also refutes claims that human beings are innately predisposed
to violence.12 If anything, as psychologists Rebecca Littman and Elizabeth Levy
Paluck summarize, ‘military history and scientific evidence show that most peo-
ple avoid physically harming others, even at personal cost’.13 Even in war, when
there are overwhelming reasons to kill in order to stay alive, soldiers often strug-
gle to do so. This is not a matter of cowardice: such soldiers often run immense
personal risks, even throwing themselves on grenades, to aid comrades.1⁴ But they
struggle to fire their weapons at the enemy, and often suffer serious trauma for
doing so. If mass killings were really produced by innate human destructiveness,

⁶ Aronson 1984; Kressel 2002; Wilshire 2006; Orange 2011; Bradshaw 2014; https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-34840699. For further examples and critique see Kalyvas 2006, 32–4; Valentino
2014, 92.
⁷ E.g. Ghiglieri 1999.
⁸ Most commonly, perpetrators themselves make such claims; see, for example, Anderson 2017b,
51–2 & 56–7; Jessee 2017, 168–73. For scholarly accounts that emphasize coercive state power see
Brzezinski 1956; Rummel 1994; Rummel 1995, 4–5.
⁹ Waller 2007, 20. See also Staub 1989, 67; Browning 1992/2001; Smeulers 2008, 234; Alvarez 2008,
217–18; McDoom 2013, 455–6; Littman and Paluck 2015. Atrocities may still be ‘evil’; see Card 2002;
Vetlesen 2005; Russell 2014.
1⁰ How much support is needed is, however, debatable; see Mueller 2000; Valentino 2004, 2–3;
Kalyvas 2006, 102–3.
11 Schirmer 1998, 165; Valentino 2004, 42–4 & 57–8; Dutton 2007, 136; Waller 2007, 71; Baum
2008, 77.
12 For summaries see Collins 2008; Grossman 2009.
13 Littman and Paluck 2015, 84.
1⁴ Grossman 2009, 4.
 introduction 3

moreover, they should occur in almost all instances of war and social breakdown.
Yet, while mass killings are tragically recurrent across world history, most periods
of war and upheaval pass by without them.1⁵ Rather than an uncontrolled conse-
quence of human nature, then, mass killings are what the historian Christopher
Browning terms ‘atrocity by policy’: organized collective campaigns deliberately
implemented by certain people, at certain times.1⁶
The third popular explanation, that killers are simply coerced, is not quite so
misguided. Organizers of mass killing do deploy forceful coercion to suppress op-
position, and sometimes to compel people to participate in violence. Nevertheless,
in research on over a hundred years of modern mass killings, only a small minor-
ity of perpetrators seem to have reluctantly obeyed orders to kill issued on pain
of death.1⁷ Even the most powerful totalitarian regimes in history have generally
been unable to micromanage violence through coercion alone, relying instead on
considerable support and willing compliance from their subordinates and broader
populations.1⁸ Where perpetrators are coerced, moreover, this remains only a par-
tial explanation, because campaigns of mass killing are not coercive ‘all the way up’.
Someone (and usually not just one person) has to decide that violence is the right
course to take, and many others have to decide to support them. Coercion does
not explain such decisions.
The inadequacy of these rough-and-ready explanations generates the central
puzzle of mass killing. Mass killings are widely thought to be morally abhorrent,
and typically involve acts (such as the killing of children) that run against estab-
lished cultural norms across the world. The violence is typically psychologically
arduous, at least initially, for those who carry it out. Perhaps most puzzlingly of
all, mass killings often seem irrational for the very regimes and groups that perpe-
trate them. In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror included a
large-scale purge of the Red Army which left it desperately weakened in the face of
Nazi invasion four years later. In 1970s Guatemala, the military regime responded
to a left-wing guerrilla insurgency with brutal massacres of the country’s indige-
nous Maya communities, prompting many Maya to join the guerrillas and thereby
strengthening the insurgency. Sometimes mass killings prove disastrous for per-
petrators by antagonizing other states and encouraging outside intervention, as
in Khmer Rouge Cambodia in 1979, or in recent ISIS atrocities in Iraq and Syria.
Even when not clearly self-defeating, mass killings are risky courses of action, al-
most always wildly disproportionate to any actual challenges their perpetrators
face, and target individuals who present no obvious threat. So why do they occur?
Why do certain political leaders initiate these policies of extreme violence? Why

1⁵ Straus 2012b; Straus 2015a, ch.2.

1⁶ Browning 1992/2001, 161.
1⁷ Ibid. 170; Valentino 2004, 48; Szejnmann 2008, 31; Goldhagen 2010, 148–50.
1⁸ Overy 2004, chs.5 & 8.
4 ideology and mass killing

do their subordinates willingly implement them? Why do broader sectors of soci-

ety support or acquiesce to the violence? These are the questions I seek to address
in this book.

1.2 Ideology and Its Critics

I argue that effective answers to such questions must analyse the role of
ideologies—broadly defined as the distinctive political worldviews of individu-
als, groups, and organizations, that provide sets of interpretive and evaluative
ideas for guiding political thought and action. Ideologies are not the only key
cause of mass killing. Indeed, scholars have identified many others, including
circumstances of war, political instability, and crisis;1⁹ discriminatory processes
of nation-building;2⁰ psychological tendencies to follow authorities, conform to
peer-pressure, or denigrate minorities;21 and various self-interested motives for
violence.22 All of these factors matter. But they matter in interaction with ide-
ology, because ideologies play a central role in determining both how people
privately think about mass killings and how such violence can be publicly le-
gitimated and organized. In cases such as those mentioned above, mass killings
may look, from an outside perspective, like strategic and moral catastrophes. But
they appeared to perpetrators as strategically advantageous and morally defensible.
That impression was not a ‘natural’ consequence of the circumstances in which
perpetrators found themselves, but it was a likely consequence given their pre-
vailing ideological frameworks. Ideologies are therefore crucial in explaining two
key things: first, whether mass killings occur in the first place, and second, the
character of mass killings when they do occur—i.e. who they target, what logic
of violence is employed, and how the killing unfolds within different areas and
organizations.
This argument divides expert opinion. Indeed, the role of ideology is one of the
most disputed issues in current scholarship on mass killing. That dispute rests, I
will suggest, on rather murky theoretical foundations. But most existing research
can be roughly characterized as adopting one of two perspectives.
In what I will call traditional-ideological perspectives, ideologies are seen as
a crucial driver of mass killings, because they provide the extremist goals and
mentalities that motivate ideologically committed individuals to perpetrate the

1⁹ Kalyvas 1999; Harff 2003; Valentino 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Downes
2008; Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Maat 2020.
2⁰ Mann 2005; Levene 2008; Segal 2018.
21 Milgram 1974/2010; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Bandura 1999; Waller 2007; Zimbardo 2007;
Neilsen 2015; Williams 2021.
22 Aly 2008; Gerlach 2010; Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015; Williams 2021.
 introduction 5

violence.23 Emphasis is most commonly placed on revolutionary ideological goals

to remake society, ideological hatreds towards certain victim groups, and the
ideological reversal of traditional moral norms. In early post-Holocaust schol-
arship (including famous works by the likes of Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, and
Hannah Arendt), such dangers were centrally associated with totalitarian ideolo-
gies such as Nazism, Stalinism, and Maoism, which guided arguably the three
most destructive regimes in human history.2⁴ More recent work has broadened
the focus beyond totalitarianism, but still emphasizes extraordinary ‘utopian’ or
‘revolutionary’ ideological projects that upend conventional morality and aban-
don pragmatic political considerations. Such claims take their most emphatic
form in Daniel Goldhagen’s contention that mass support for ‘eliminationist
anti-Semitism’ amongst ordinary Germans provided the necessary and sufficient
motivational cause for the Holocaust.2⁵ But many other scholars, while not going
as far as Goldhagen, also focus on the role of unconventional ideological goals,
mindsets, and hatreds that motivate ideologically committed perpetrators of mass
killing.2⁶
In opposition to such arguments, many scholars adopt what I term a scepti-
cal perspective on ideology’s role in mass killing. Without necessarily declaring it
completely irrelevant, such sceptics downplay ideology’s significance and largely
exclude it from their explanations of such violence. Two main arguments have
been offered here. First, sceptics contend that few perpetrators actually seem
motivated by deep ideological commitments in the way traditional-ideological
perspectives suggest. Second, sceptics suggest that even if radical ideologies do in-
fluence perpetrators, such ideologies are themselves largely a symptom of more
fundamental social or political causes, such as societal upheaval, authoritarian
governing institutions, or war. With either argument, ‘non-ideological’ motives or
forces appear to be the key drivers of mass killing, and ideology is largely reduced
to a pretext or ‘post-hoc rationalization’ for violence.
Such ideology-sceptics therefore offer alternative ‘non-ideological’ explanations
of mass killing.2⁷ The most influential of these, on which I focus most attention
in this book, come from rationalist theories. Rationalists argue that mass killings

23 I include perspectives primarily orientated around concepts distinct from but closely related to
ideology (such as culture, identity, hate propaganda, and so forth) that explain mass killing in essentially
the same fashion.
2⁴ Popper 1945/2003; Arendt 1951/1976; Berlin 1954/2002; Brzezinski 1956; Arendt 1963/2006;
Popper 1963/2002, ch.18; Linz 1975/2000, ch.2; Kirkpatrick 1979; Kuper 1981, ch.5; Shorten 2012;
Berlin 2013; Richter, Markus, and Tait 2018.
2⁵ Goldhagen 1996. For similar perspectives applied to mass killings more broadly see Kressel 2002;
Goldhagen 2010.
2⁶ See, for example, Melson 1992; Weiss 1997; Kiernan 2003; Weitz 2003; Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008; Midlarsky 2011.
2⁷ These sceptical accounts are compatible, since they typically address different ‘levels of analysis’—
with rationalists often focusing on why political decision-makers initiate policies of mass killings, while
situationists focus on why followers participate in such policies.
6 ideology and mass killing

occur because they can be a useful, albeit brutal, strategy for achieving important
goals common to all regimes and groups, whatever their idiosyncratic ideologies—
such as holding onto power, winning wars, or gaining material wealth. Not all
rationalists side-line ideology, and some (correctly, I will argue) see rationality
and ideology as importantly intertwined.2⁸ But most rationalists suggest that mass
killings do not depend on any particular kind of ideological worldview.2⁹ Instead,
they are explained by particular strategic circumstances, such as certain kinds of po-
litical crisis or armed conflict, which create incentives for governments or groups
to target civilian populations with violence.
An alternative source of ideology-scepticism comes from what I term situa-
tionist theories.3⁰ For situationists, mass killing is best explained by various kinds
of situational social pressure on individuals, such as bureaucratic routines, orders
from authorities, peer-pressure, or group emotions. Again, not all situationists
deny that ideology plays an important role.31 But for sceptical situationists, these
social pressures are so powerful that they can induce violence amongst different
individuals and groups irrespective of their ideologies. Like rationalists, situation-
ists tend to emphasize how certain contexts of crisis and war create or intensify
such situational pressures for violence. They often also stress the way such pres-
sures encourage the relatively unplanned escalation of violent policies or practices
within bureaucracies and local communities.
In this book, I challenge both the traditional-ideological perspective and the
ideology-sceptics. Against the sceptics, I argue that ideology is essential in explain-
ing mass killings. I do not reject rationalist or situationist theories per se. They are
quite correct to emphasize the role of strategic circumstances and situational so-
cial pressures. But whether such circumstances and pressures lead to mass killing
or not depends on ideology. This is not just true of a subset of especially ‘ideolog-
ical’ cases, moreover—all mass killings have an important ideological dimension.
Yet, I simultaneously argue that traditional-ideological perspectives mischaracter-
ize that dimension, wrongly rooting mass killings in ‘extraordinary’ ideological
goals and values. This book therefore advances a different account of ideology’s
role in mass killings—one that stresses the interdependence of ideology, strategic
circumstances, and situational pressures. I term this a neo-ideological perspective.

A Neo-Ideological Perspective

This neo-ideological perspective revises the more traditional portrayal of how

ideology might feed into mass killing in two key ways.

2⁸ See, for example, Valentino 2004; Maat 2020.

2⁹ E.g. Downes 2008, 11.
3⁰ See also Fujii 2009.
31 See, for example, Zimbardo 2007.
 introduction 7

First, I argue that the crucial ideological foundations for mass killing are not
utopian ambitions, revolutionary values, or extraordinary hatreds that contrast
with conventional strategic and moral concerns. Instead, the primary ideologi-
cal foundations of mass killing exploit conventional strategic and moral ideas—
specifically ideas associated with security, war, and political order. It is not
the abandonment of strategic pragmatism and traditional morality in favour
of extraordinary ideological goals that matters, in other words, but the radical
reinterpretation of such conventional ideas within extreme ideological narra-
tives of threat, criminal conspiracy, patriotic valour, and military necessity. These
justificatory narratives for mass killing, as I shall call them, are thus largely security-
orientated and yet vitally ideological—embedded in broader political worldviews
and making little sense if stripped from their particular ideological context. Such
narratives are critical, both in guiding the formulation of policies of mass killing
by political elites, and in mobilizing, legitimating, and organizing the violence
amongst broader sections of society.
Mass killing is not best understood, therefore, as a revolutionary project to
transform society (as many traditional-ideological approaches suggest), an in-
strumental strategy largely dictated by circumstantial incentives (as rationalist-
sceptics portray it), or an escalatory campaign primarily driven by social pressure
(as situationist-sceptics often imply). There is truth in each of these portrayals, but
none accurately characterizes ideology’s role in mass killing. Instead, mass killing
is best understood as a form of ideologically radicalized security politics. It is rooted
in the ideological and institutional architecture of war-waging, policing, and na-
tional security found in all complex human societies. It is driven by the familiar
strategic and moral concerns of such activities: the perception of threats and crim-
inality and an assessment of violence as a necessary way of defending the political
order against them. It is typically carried out by state security apparatuses (or their
non-state analogues) with all the organizational norms, capacities, and tendencies
typical of such institutions. But in mass killings, all these familiar features of secu-
rity politics have become radicalized by extreme ‘hardline’ ideological worldviews,
which make civilians appear justified targets of mass violence.
I therefore characterize the central agents of mass killing—both among political
leaders and in wider society—as security hardliners, promoting massive violence
against civilian populations to advance the safety and interests of the society,
regime, or group they identify with. But I argue that it is imperative to understand
such hardliners as an ideological category. Hardliners are not merely responding
rationally to the objective situations they find themselves in, nor are they ‘unthink-
ingly’ following orders or bureaucratic procedures. They are guided by distinctive
sets of ideas about security and politics which ideologically distinguish them from
less hardline groups. This reflects the fact, ignored by too many scholars, that the
politics of war and national security are just as ‘ideological’ as any other branch
of politics, with different factions of society guided by different sets of ideas about
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Title: Mehiläinen 1836

Editor: Elias Lönnrot

Release date: March 23, 2024 [eBook #73240]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Oulu: Christian Evert Barck, 1836

Credits: Jari Koivisto

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MEHILÄINEN 1836

Toim.

Elias Lönnrot

Oulussa, Präntätty Christian Evert Barckin tykönä, 1836.

Imprimatur. Henr. Wegelius.

MEHILÄINEN W. 1836.
Tammikuulta.
Wiipurin Linna.

Iivana iso isäntä,

Meian kuulu kullan solki,
Sukivi sota oritta,
Sorajouhta suorittavi.
Sanovi sanalla tuolla, 5
Lausu tuolla lausehella:
"Et sä itkisi emoni,
Walittaisi vaimo raukka,
Jos ma jonne'ki menisin,
Ruotsin rohkian tiloille, 10
Suurille sotakeoille,
Miehen tappotanterille?"

Emo esteä käkesi,

Warotteli vaimo raukka:
"Ellös menkö niille maille, 15
Ruotsin rohkian tiloille;
Paljo onki mennehiä,
Ei paljo palannehia."

Iivana iso isäntä,

Meiän kuulu kullan solki, 20
Toki mietti mennäksensä,
Lähteäksensä lupasi.

Jala kenki kiukahalla,

Toisen lautsan partahalla,
Pihalla kävysteleksen, 25
Weräjillä myötteleksen.
 Lato laivoja lähelle,
Suoritti sotavenoja;
Niin on laivoja lahella,
Kuni suuret suorsaparvet. 30

Miekotsi tuhannen miestä,

Satuloitsi saan urosta;
Lato miehet laivohinsa,
Suoritti sota'urohot,
Kuni sotka poikiansa, 35
Tavi lapsensa latovi.

Koheteli purje'puita,
Waate'varpoja varasi,
Nosti puihin purjehia,
Waattehia varpapuihin; 40
Niin on puissa purjehia,
Waattehia varpapuissa,
Kuni kummun kuusiloita,
Tahi mäntyjä mäellä.
Läksi siitä laskemahan; 45
Laski päivän maavesiä,
Toisen päivän suovesiä,
Kolmannen merivesiä.

Niin päivällä kolmannella

Loi silmänsä luotehelle; 50
Näki suuren Suomen linnan,
Keksi Wiipurin vihannan.

Weäksen vesiä myöten,

Halki aaltojen ajaksen;
Lanki alle Suomen linnan, 55
Alle Wiipurin vihannan.
Sai hän linnahan sanoja,
Pani työntäen paperin:
"Onko linnassa olutta,
Taaria talossa linnan, 60
Ilman olven panematta,
Mallasten imeltämättä,
Tulialle vierahalle,
Saavalle käkeävälle?"

Lausu Matti Laurin poika, 65

Wirkki Wiipurin isäntä:
"Ompa linnassa olutta,
Taaria talossa linnan,
Ilman olven panematta,
Mallasten imeltämättä; 70
Tuon tukun tulikiveä,
Pannun jauhoja pahoja,
Tiiksin luomia tinoja,
Karpalon kanan munia,
Tulialle vierahalle, 75
Saavalle käkeävälle."

Iivana iso isäntä,

Meiän kuulu kullan solki,
Murti suuta, väänti päätä,
Murti mustoa haventa; 80
Työnti kirjan kiirehesti,
Paperin pakon perästä:
"Onko linnassa lihoa,
Onko voita volmarissa;
Ilman härän iskemättä, 85
Suuren sonnin sortamatta,
Iivanalle iltaseksi,
Wenäläiselle veroksi?"

Lausu Matti Laurin poika,

Wirkki Wiipurin isäntä: 90
"Ompa linnassa lihoa,
Ompa voita volmarissa,
Ilman härän iskemättä,
Suuren sonnin sortamatta.
Uupu muinen musta tamma, 95
Waipu valkia hevonen;
Tuoll' on raato rauniolla,
Luukontti koan perässä,
Miehen suuren suupalaksi,
Miehen murhan murkkinaksi." 100

Iivana iso isäntä,

Meiän kuulu kullan solki,
Siitä suuttu, siitä syänty,
Kovin suuttu ja vihastu;
Pani pyssyt pyykämähän, 105
Umpiputket ulvomahan,
Avokerot ammomahan,
Jalojouset joukomahan,
Alla Wiipurin vihannan,
Alla suuren Suomen linnan. 110
 Ampu kerran, ampu toisen,
Ampu kerran, noin alatse,
Ampu toisen, noin ylitse,
Ampu kolmannen kohulle.
Niin kerralla kolmannella 115
Jopa liikku linnan tornit,
Räystähät rämähtelivät,
Patsahat pamahtelivat,
Kivet linnan kiikahteli,
Tornit maahan torkahteli. 120

Ampu vielä kerran, toisen,

Meni räystähät rämynä,
Tuohet lenteli levynä,
Linnan seinät listeinä.

Siitä Matti Laurin poika, 125

Wiisas Wiipurin isäntä,
Pani Wiipurin avamet,
Kultaselle luutaselle:
"Wenäläinen veikkoseni,
Kauniskenkä Karjalainen! 130
Jätä vielä heikko henki,
Elä murhalla murenna.
Ammuit taaton, ammuit maammon,
Ammuit viisi veljeäni,
Ota kultia kupilla, 135
Hopehia puolikolla,
Oman pääni päästimeksi,
Henkeni lunastimeksi."
 Sano Iivana isäntä,
Meiän kuulu kullan solki: 140
"Jo on ruostu Ruotsin kullat,
Saastu Saksan maan hopiat;
En huoli hopehistasi,
Kysy konna kultiasi,
Kun kauan minua kaihit, 145
Päästä aivoni alensit."

Siitä Matti Laurin poika,

Wiisas Wiipurin isäntä,
Jo itse pakohon pääsi.
Rienti luoksi laivosensa, 150
Astuvi aluksehensa;
Läksi merta lakemahan,
Sinistä sirottamahan,
Kokan koukkupään nojassa,
Melan vaivasen varassa. 155

Itse Iivana isäntä,

Meiän kuulu kullan solki
Kettukenkäset jalassa,
Kut ei pauka pakkasella,
Ei kolka kovalla säällä; 160
Likennäksen linnan luoksi.
Kivet on kirkkoa jälellä,
Torit linnan torniloita,
Patsahat papin tupoa;
Itse pappi paiatonna, 165
Ruotsisi kaunis kaatieita.
 Toisintoja: v. 1, 2. Iivana meiän isäntä, M. kuulusa kuningas. Petri
kuulusa kuningas, Suomen niemen suuri herra. v. 3. S. oritta suurta,
v. 7—11. Itketkö sinä emoni, Walittelet v.r. Jos ma jouvun jonne
kunne, Tahi viivyn viikommanki, Wuosikausia kahenki, Ruotsin
maassa rohkiassa, Suurilla sotatiloilla, v. 27. Laitti l. vesille. Laski l.
merelle, v. 31—36. Lato miestä laivohinsa, Suoritti sota'uroita, Kuni
telkkä tehtyjänsä, Pieni lintu poikiansa, v. 35,36. Kun kana latoo
munansa, Sotka poiat suorittavi, v. 39, 40. Nosti purjet puun
nenähän, Waatot varpahan varasi. v. 51,52. Näki Wiipurin veräjät,
Ulompana linnan ukset, v. 54. Läpi a.a. v. 55,56, Lankes a. S.
niemen, Wiip. veräjäin alle. Lankei a. suuren l. Ruotsin maahan
rohkiahan, Imantrahan ilkiähän, Kuolan linnahan kovahan, v. 56. A.
W. vihasen, v. 71—74. Tynnyri tulik. Pannu j.p. Hevot on kustu
talloihin; Lehmät läävän lattialle. Akat on kustu ammehesen. v.
73,74. Lyiyn luomia tinoja, Kahmalon kanan munia, v. 84. O. v.
volvarissa. v. 86½ Muun karjan murottamatta. v. 95 U.m.m. ruuna, v.
95—98. Akka vanha kiukahalla. Äiä on akkoja kerätty.
Koukkuleukoja ko'ottu. Lihotettu on akka vanha, Kuivareisi
kuorrallettu. v. 100. Weroksi verikäpälän. v. 105. P. p. pyrkimähän, v.
107,108. Avokurkut ammomahan, Jalot jouset jahmamahan. v. 111.
Jahmi päivän, jahmi toisen, v. 112—114. A. hän alatse kerran, A. hän
ylitse toisen, A.k. keselle. v. 116—120. Pani räystähät rämyhyn,
Tuohikattoset tomusi, Linnan patsahat pamusi, v. 122—124. Pani
räystähät rämyhyn, Tuohikattoset tomuhun, Tornipatsahat pamuhun,
Linnan seinät listehille. Ampu r. rämyksi, Tuohik. tomuksi jne.
Raystöt mennähän rämynä, Levyn tuohet tennellähän jne. v. 129. W.
veikko kulta, v. 132—136. Elä raualla rapa'a, Annan kultia kypärän,
H. huokin täyen. 135,136. O. k. kumia, H. huohtavia. v. 143—144.
Situn konna kultihisi, Ilkiä hopeihisi. v. 146. Aivot päästäni alensit, v.
149. Läksi maalta marsimahan. v. 154, 155. K. kultasen kuvussa, M.
vaskisen v. v. 165, 166. Pappi paiatta makasi, R. kaarnis k.

Jälkimaine. Tämä runo on Wuokkiniemen, Paanajärven ja

Repolan pitäjistä, Wenäjän puolelta saatu. Asia, josta kerrotaan,
arvaten tapahtu noin mähä päälle puolenkolmatta sataa muotta sitte,
25 vuotta ennen mainiota nuijasotaa, taikka vuonna 1752 ja
senaikuinen teko lienee itse runoksi. Hallitsi siilon Tsari Iivana
Wasilein poika Wenäjätä, Ruotsia Juhana Kuningas. Nämät olivat
nuorempana kumpanenki Puolan Kuninkaan sisarta, Katrina
prinsessata, kosineet ja aina siitä ruveten vähin toinen toistansa
karsastelleet. Parempi sodan aine sai heille kuitenki Wiron maasta,
joka noin kymmenkunta vuotta ennen oli Ruotsille antautunut.
Sopimaton ja luonnoton ilmanki tämä yhdistys, sillä Wiron maa
Ruotsista erotetaan mereltä, jota maston se on aivin rajatusten
Wenäjän maata, penko Ilvana siitä omalle vallallensa häviöä, sitä
enemmin, kun jo ennenki Ruotsi Suomen maan omistamisella oli
kovin likelle tunkeutunut.

Talvella mainittuna vuona nousi sota heidän välillänsä, jota sitte

kesäksi ja moneksi seuraavaksi vuodeksi pitkitettiin. Muitaki tietoja
myöten, paitsi tätä runoa, oli ollut siilon Iivannalla iso sekä hevos-
että jalkaväki Suomessaki, jota vaston Juhanan parahat voimat olivat
Wiroon kootut, sillä sielläki oli sota valloillansa. Minä muista
kirjoistani en ole löytänyt Wiipurin senaikuisen linnan isännän nimeä,
jos lienee ollutki Matti Laurin poika. Wastauksellansa runon 95-nessä
värsyssä pyysi hän valkian tamman muistelemalla vielä
koskevammin Iivanata pilkata, sillä tämän ennen mainittua Katrina
prinsessata kosiessa, eikä konsa asiasta sen valmiimpata tullen,
hoettiin prinsessan siasta Puolalaisten viimmen komiasti puetun
valkian tammahevosen Iivanalle nauruksi lähettäneen.
Suomen Synty.

Kulki kuuluisa Kaleva,

Poikinensa polkutteli,
Etsien elinsioa,
Asunmaata arvaellen.

Kaukoa Kaleva kulki

Päivän puolelta iteä,
Päässyt päätänsä pakohon
Ihmisiltä ilkeiltä,
Jotk' olivat joutunehet,
Tullehet tulille niille,
Kussa lassa laksaloissa
Kuunteli kevä'käkeä.

Paljo maita matkusteli,

Paljo maita, paljo soita,
Paljo synkkiä saloja,
Korpimaita kauheita.
Ei löynnyt elinsioa,
Asunmaata armahinta,
Wiikon vierevän ohessa,
Eikä viikon, eikä toisen,
Yhen kuun kuluajalla;
Missä maat ylen matalat,
Kussa kankahat katalat,
Muut paikat pahan näköset.
"Ei siinä sioa mulle,
Ei oloa onnellista."
 Niin tuli Nevan joelle,
Laatokan lahen perälle,
Siirty siitäki etemmä,
Pääsi vielä päiväyksen;
Näki maat, metsät, ihanat,
Saavutti sataset järvet,
Salot, saarimaat, tuhannet.

Loi silmänsä loitommalle,

Etäämmälle ennähytti;
Keksi vuoret, keksi vaarat,
Keksi kukkulat komiat,
Lehot, laksot, lempehimmät.

Katselevi, kuuntelevi;
Niin kuuli kevä'käkkösen
Laulelevan laksomailla,
Kuni muinenki kotona,
Elomailla entisillä.

Sanan virkko, noin nimesi,

Itse lausu ja pakasi:
"Tuotapa minäi toivoin,
Ikävöin ikäni kaiken,
Käen kullan kukkumata,
Hopian helähtämätä."

Meni mielehen ajatus,

Tuli tuo ikuinen tuuma:
"Lietkö suotu, maa sulonen,
Maa ihana arvattuna
Asunnoksi armahaksi,
Onnelliseksi oloksi.

Ollet suotu onnekseni,

Arvattu asuakseni;
Niin sun Suomeksi nimitän,
Suomen maaksi mainittelen."

Siitä sai nimensä Suomi;

Sai nimensä suomisesta,
Kalevasta kansan juuren,
Suuresta sukuperänsä,
Mainiosta maan eläjät.

Wieläki kemä'käköset
Laulelevat laksomailla,
Yhet laksot, yhet laulut,
Yhet armahat asunnot,
Ei ole yhet asujat,
Yhet korvat kuulemassa —
Jo on kauanki Kaleva
Ollut poissa poikinensa.

***

Waan sua, kevä'ikäköneni

Kiittelen, ylistelen mä,
Senki kerran kukkumasta,
Hymän hetken hekkumasta,
Puun lehvältä lekkumasta,
Korvihin ukon Kalevan,
Kuulumoille kuulun miehen.
 Sanon sun Kalevan käeksi,
Suomen lakson laulajaksi,
Suomen impien iloksi,
Suomen sulhojen suloksi,
Kaiken kansan kaunihiksi.

Kuku aina aikonasi,

Hellittele hetkinäsi!
Kuku kummut kultasiksi,
Hongikot hopeisiksi,
Huolemme kiiku huviksi,
Ikävät iloksi laula.
Kuku meiän kuusikoissa,
Laula meiän laksoloissa;
Laula lemmet tyttärille,
Naimaonnet neitosille,
Sulhoille suloset retket,
Pojille polut parahat.

Laula miehet lapsistamme;

Aika uhkiat urohot,
Tarkimmat talon isännät,
Poikasista pienosista;
Hyvät muorit morsioista,
Tyttäristä tyynet vaimot,
Taitavat talon emännät.

Jälkimaine. Tämä runo, vaikka muinosia tarinoiva, ei kuitenkan

itse ole muinosempi, kun vasta ensimmäisiä viikkoja yrittelevä;' jonka
sen vuoksi nimitämmä, etteivät runoluvussa äkkinäiset sitä toisinaan
vanhempanaki pitäisi. Ilmanki runoilematta luulisi sanasta suoda
tulevan suomi samate kun sanoista luoda, myödä, syödä tulevat
luomi, myömi, syömi; muinosista (nykyjään kadonneista) sanoista
luoia, tuoia, taida sanat loimi, toimi, taimi ja sanoista elää, särpiä,
hapata sanat eläin, särvin, hapain (happain), jotka viimmeksi
nimitetyt epäilemättä alkuansa olivat elämi, särpimi, happami
(happaami) ja jotka ylehensä ennen vanhaan, kielen vielä paremmin
makaumatta, taisivat kuulua toisellaki päätteellä suoma, luoma,
myömä jne.

Sanat kunki kansan kielessä olivat, samate kun itse saneltavat

aineetki, alkuansa harvalukuset. Näiden aikaa myöten lisäytessä, piti
sanainki lisäytä. Tämä kaikitse ei niin tapahtunut, että, kun mitä uutta
sanottavaksi ilmautu, sille heti olisi uusi, erityinen, nimytki saatu. Ja
vaikka kyllä usein niinki sattu, piti kuitenki toisinaan kahta ja
usiampaaki ainetta yhdellä sanalla nimittää. Niin luultaksemme oli
alusta esimerk. elämä yhteinen nimyt sekä elolle että eläjälle ja niin
osottaa vieläki elo seka elämätä että elatusaineita.

Yhdellä sanalla ei kuitenkan taittu ylen monta ainetta sanella,

koska toisen usiasti olisi tullut vaikia, heti tajuta, mitä millonki sillä
tavoteltaisi. Jopa toisinaan näyttää kyllin kahdestaki aineesta yhdelle
nimyelle tulleen. Jos esimerk. sanoit: en toki minä eloani heitä taikka
en helpolla minä tästä elämästä luovu, niin toinen ei aina arvannut,
mietitkö edellisessä sanelmassa elämätäsi tahi tavaroitäsi,
jälkimmäisessä oloasi eli jotai luontokappaletta. Tarvetta myöten
koettiin sentähdcn sanalukua silläki enennetyksi saada, että
epävertasille sanoille erikäytöksissä hankittiin erityiset pääteensä.
Sillä tavalla erotettiin elämi (eläin) ja elämä, luomi ja luoma, suomi ja
suoma, josta vieläki sanotaan suomalaiset eikä suomilaiset eli
suomelaiset. Missä tätä erotusta tarpeesta tehtiin, siinä ovat päätteet
aikoa myöten kylläki vakautuneet, vaan toisissa sanoissa, joiden
päätteitä ilman aikojaan sommiteltiin näiden mukaan, ovat päätteet
vielä nykyjäanki epävakaisna, esimerk' sanoissa kuutama, muutama,
valkama, vaarama, muurama, joiden siaan toiset sanomat kuutain
(kuudan, kuuan), muutain (muudan, muuan), valkain, vaarain,
muurain ja toisissa mutkissa kuutaman, muutaman, valkaman eli
kuutamen, muutamen, valkamen jne.

Ennen vanhaan taisi tämä epävakaisuus päätetten ma (mä) ja mi

vaihella olla paljoa tavallisempi. Wieläki tapaamma kaikitse päätellen
ma ja mä keralla päätteen minen, joka millään ei ole kun johdettu
muinosesta mi päätteestä, esimerk. polttama, -minen, survoma, -
minen, käymä, -minen, josta viimmesestä vielä onki käymi sillään
säilyksissä.

Muutamat luulevat sanoista suomiehen maa, kuten heidän

arveltuansa tätä maata olisi alkuansa nimitetty, pikasemmasti
puhumalta tulleen viimmen suomen maa. Somanen kyllä onki tämä
arvellus, vaikkemme sitä sentähden päätä asianmukaseksi. 1:ksi
sana suomies ei ole kielessämme tavallinen ja 2:ksi, jos olisiki,
tuskin kuitenkan esi-isämme olisivat itsiänsa suomiehiksi ja
asunpaikkaansa suomiesten maaksi verrailleet, sillä "oma kuitenti
kaunis." Jonkun ulkokansan olisi kyllä sopinut naurulla siksi
maatamme nimittää; vaan mistä olisi siinä tilassa hän tämän
perisuomalaisen nimen keksinyt? Asian mukaan ja muutenki
somasesti voivat esi'isämme paikkoa, kussa näkivät suodun
elääksensä olevan, siitä suomeksi nimittääki, niinpä muinen
Kanaanki maalle sai pian tämän vertanen nimi lupoama eli luvattu
maa, siitä että se Abrahamille ja hänen jälkisillensä oli asunnoksi
luvattu.
 Muinelmia.

Mehiläinen, meiän lintu,

Lennä tuonne, kunne käsken,
Yli kuun, alatse päivän,
Otavaisten olkapäitse;
Lennä luojan kellarihin,
Kamarihin kaikkivallan.

Waikka raamattua myöten uskommaki olleen alkuluoduilla

täydellisemmän tiedon Jumalasta, niin olisi kuitenki väärin tehty, siitä
päättää, tämän tiedon ihmisten enennyttyä ja kansoiksi erittyä,
muuttumatonna sillänsä säilyneen. Toisilla, niinkun Abrahamin
jälkisillä, pysy se kauan kyllä alkuluonnossaan, vaan toisissa väänty,
mutkistu ja turmeltu se pikemmin, tullen viimmen peräti
nimipuutteesen. Niin löytyy vieläki, matkustavaisten maineita
möyten, kansoja maailmassa, joilla ei ole pieninkään tietoa
Jumalasta. Miten Jumalan tunto sillä tavalla taisi kadota, sitä tällä
kerralla emme yritä'känä selvittää, ilman lausuttuamme, niin muuten
asian kohdan olevan. Niin näyttää myös meidänki
kansavanhempamme aikoinansa olleen mitään Jumalasta
tietämättä. Arvoset kyllä taisivat muutki heidän tietonsa sihen aikaan
olla, mutta jos kuinka vähätietonen, ihminen siinä kuitenki
luontokappalesta erotaksen, että hän kaikissa tiloissa on
mahdollinen parempia tietoja käsittämään ja tavallisesti aina uteleeki
syitä tutaksensa, jos mitä näkee, kuulee ei muuten keksii
oudonlaista. Juuri tämä ihmisyyden luonnon etu oli voimallinen
esivanhempiamme uudelleen jommoiseenki Jumalan tuntoon
auttamaan. Näyttää kun olisvat he esinnä, ukkosen jumauksilta
säikähtyneinä ja mielitorruksistaan heränneinä, ruvenneet