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Electoral Rules and Democracy
in Latin America
Electoral Rules
and Democracy
in Latin America
C Y N T H I A M C C L I N TO C K
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
For My Family, in All Its Iterations
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
1. Introduction 1
Appendices 209
Notes 263
Bibliography 273
Index 295
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The road to the completion of this book took many unexpected turns. My colleagues’
guidance, my friends’ encouragement, and my family’s love helped me find my way.
The original inspiration for this book came from a conversation with Arturo
Valenzuela about Chile’s 1970 election at a conference on presidentialism at
Georgetown University in 1989. My interest was reignited during a trip to Venezuela
in 2004; to my surprise, the problems of Venezuela’s fraught 1993 election were re-
peatedly raised in interviews. At the same time, my colleague Jim Lebovic and I were
co-authoring an article on the correlates of democracy in Latin America and we
found that a larger number of political parties was not significant to inferior levels of
democracy. The question of presidential-election rules and political parties has also
been very salient in Peru, and I gained many insights from stimulating exchanges
with wonderful Peruvian and Peruvianist scholars.
At the start, I had expected that the book would be based on statistical analysis
worldwide and on four Latin American country cases. However, statistical analysis
worldwide was impossible because of the paucity of plurality rules and, as I assessed
the trajectory of democracy in countries under plurality and runoff, I realized that,
to understand statistical trends, it would be necessary to incorporate virtually all
Latin American countries. Also, each country added a unique insight. The project
became more ambitious as the “N” for the statistical analysis decreased and the “N”
for the country cases increased.
I did not anticipate that the statistical analysis for the book would be as challenging
as it was. The statistical skills of my research assistants at George Washington
University (GWU) were a sine qua non. I am very grateful to Kelly Bauer, Barnett
Koven, and Josiah Augustine for their patient responses to my queries and assid-
uous collection and analysis of data. They all achieved major breakthroughs in the
analysis. My GWU colleagues Eric Lawrence and Michael Miller provided expert
guidance to us all.
ix
x Ack nowl edg ments
It was a joy to work on the statistical analysis and other parts of this project with
Barnett. He was invariably thoughtful and rigorous, providing innumerable data
updates and calculations with astounding efficiency and precision. He deserves
much more credit than I can provide in this acknowledgment.
I also owe a special thank-you to Aldo F. Ponce. In the summer of 2011, Aldo
was at GWU in our Minerva Program for PhD students completing their doctoral
dissertations. Aldo was the first to provide a statistical breakthrough—and the last,
resolving a perplexing problem in July 2017. Aldo is now a professor at CIDE and
I am looking forward to future collaboration with him on electoral rules and polit-
ical parties in Latin America.
In addition, GWU PhD students made tremendous contributions to various
datasets. The collection of the data on pre-election opinion polls was a major
effort, and Barnett Koven and Julian Waller were tremendously helpful. Barnett
tracked down some of the hardest-to-find poll numbers and Julian gathered data for
European countries. The collection of the data on old-timers was also challenging
and Julian provided the information for old-timers in European countries. In
addition, in the early stages of the project, Amanda Alcorn provided very useful
overviews of key issues in elections in numerous countries.
I am also very appreciative of the research assistance of other students. Francisco
Hernández, Shana Montrose, Abigail Poe, Adam Schaffer, and Sayre Weir all
contributed significantly. Among their many important endeavors, they checked
candidates’ backgrounds for the data on outsiders and researched smaller parties’
endorsements or lack thereof between first rounds and runoffs.
For insights into political dynamics in countries for which my knowledge was
limited, I benefited greatly from the help of numerous colleagues who responded
to my queries and commented on my drafts. I would especially like to thank Diego
Abente (for insights about Paraguay), Paula Alonso (Argentina), Michael Coppedge
(Venezuela), David Fleischer (Brazil), Jonathan Hartlyn (Dominican Republic),
Adam Isacson (Colombia), Jennifer McCoy (Venezuela), Kevin Middlebrook
(Mexico), Stephen B. Kaplan (Argentina), Nazih Richani (Colombia), and Geoff
Thale (El Salvador).
Numerous colleagues were also very helpful. Richard Webb provided me with a
wonderful office for several months at the Universidad San Martín de Porres, where
I greatly benefited from many conversations. The survey on legislators’ preferences
for runoff versus plurality was only possible through the good graces of Diego Abente
(Paraguay), Rafael Fernández de Castro (Mexico), Claudio Fuentes and Gonzalo
Alvarez (Chile), and the late Henry Pease (Peru). For data about the number of
political parties in particular countries prior to the third wave, information from
Fabrice Lehoucq, Mark P. Jones, and Martin Needler was indispensable. Alejandro
Moreno aided in the collection of survey data from Mexico. Scott Mainwaring and
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán kindly made datasets from their research available to me.
Ack nowl edg ment s xi
Introduction
The Puzzle
In 1973, a savage military coup overthrew the elected president of Chile, Salvador
Allende. Founded in 1833 and undergoing only two brief interruptions, Chile’s de-
mocracy had been one of the oldest in the world. The military coup took almost
three thousand lives and initiated more than sixteen years of dictatorial rule. Among
the explanations for the coup was that the Allende government had “started out with
a serious birth defect” (Smith, 2005: 159). In Chile’s 1970 election, there were three
major political blocs—one at the left, a second at the center, and a third at the right;
Allende, the candidate at the left, was elected with only 36.6% of the vote. Allende’s
margin was narrow; the candidate at the right tallied 35.3% and the candidate at the
center, 28.1%. The “birth defect” of the Allende government was election through
plurality (or, first-past-the-post—in other words, victory to the candidate with the
most votes, even if not a majority of the votes). Although Chile’s constitution pro-
vided that, if no candidate won a majority, the president would be chosen between
the top two vote-getters by the legislature, the tradition was that the candidate with
the most votes would be approved, and this tradition was maintained in 1970.
Election with a small plurality was a factor in military coups elsewhere in Latin
America. In Brazil in 1955, the winner secured only 36% of the vote; prominent
rightists called the election invalid and the winner was inaugurated only after a coup
against an acting rightist president by pro-democratic military leaders. In Peru in
1962, three candidates tallied more than 25% but not the 33.33% required to avoid
the selection of the president by the congress; the subsequent politicking was un-
scrupulous and a military coup ensued. In Argentina in 1963, the winner had only
32%; in Ecuador in 1968, only 33%; and in Uruguay in 1971, the winner’s party
had 41%, less than one point more than the runner-up’s party. Although these three
elections were problematic in numerous respects and military coups were not im-
mediate, the presidents’ dubious legitimacy worried political leaders.
Accordingly, when Latin American countries were returning to democracy in
the 1970s and 1980s in what is called the third democratic wave, political leaders
1
2 Electoral Rules and Democracy in L atin America
The Argument
In this book, I argue that runoff is superior for democracy in Latin America. Runoff
opens the political arena to newcomers; it lowers barriers to entry into effective
competition in the presidential election. But, at the same time, it assures that (a) the
president has majority support and, accordingly, legitimacy and (b) the president is
not at an ideological extreme. Each of these points and the concepts of legitimacy
and ideological moderation are briefly discussed in this chapter and elaborated fur-
ther in subsequent chapters. The statistical evidence for the superiority of runoff is
provided in Chapter 2.
In addition, in Latin America during the third wave, a virtuous circle emerged
among the lower barriers to entry, the requirement for majority support, and
4 Electoral Rules and Democracy in L atin America
ideological moderation. During the Cold War, polarization between left and right
was intense in many Latin American countries; Marxist parties were common and,
amid the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s, they did not lose
their appeal. During the third wave, a key challenge was the incorporation of leftist
political leaders into the democratic political arena. By lowering barriers of entry,
the democratic process was more respected by parties that were formerly excluded
and, with this new respect, parties that were formerly excluded and possibly at ide-
ological extremes were more likely to moderate. For their part, although formerly
dominant parties would have preferred higher barriers to entry, they knew that, by
definition, an extremist party could not win 50%; they were less likely to panic at
the prospect of a victory by a leftist party or another new party and less likely to
resort to ugly tactics—again, gaining the respect of the leftist party or other new
party. By contrast, in most plurality countries, fraud was more likely to be suspected
by leftist parties and was more likely to have been a resort by elites.9 It is relevant
here that scholars such as Ahmed (2013) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have
highlighted that elites’ fears often influence the adoption of particular electoral rules
during transitions to democracy.
Often, a new party is channeling voters’ current concerns and demands. Even if
a new party never wins, it can represent sectors of voters who feel excluded. Said
public-opinion analyst Marta Lagos, “There is a demand for diversity. . . . 60% of the
people in Chile say that none of the candidates represent their ideas well. There is a
real questioning here of what is democracy.”11 Voters have an option by which they
can “reject the status quo and still remain within the system” (Morgan, 2011: 258).
In Latin America at the start of the third wave, voters’ demands were focused on
economic growth and equality. In the 1990s and early 2000s most incumbent parties
faced a severe challenge: what is called the “debt crisis.” The crisis is dated from
1982, when Mexico announced that it could not service its debt. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in and demanded that countries shift to market eco-
nomic policies; the costs were steep. Most Latin American governments tried to ne-
gotiate with the IMF but considered the agency hostile and its demands draconian.
The result was the “lost decade” of the 1980s and, in some countries as well, “the
lost half-decade” of 1998–2002. Many countries, in particular major oil exporters
such as Ecuador and Venezuela, were wracked by unemployment and hyperinfla-
tion. Between 1980 and 1990, real wages in Latin American urban areas fell by at
least 20% (Felix, 1990: 742). For most incumbent parties that had advocated statist
intervention, the shift to neoliberalism exacted a huge toll (Lupu, 2014).
In the twenty-first century, voters’ concerns were often focused on corruption.
Newcomers who emphasized integrity and concern about the environment, such
as Marina Silva in Brazil, Marco Enríquez Ominami in Chile, Antanas Mockus in
Colombia, and Ottón Solís in Costa Rica, won surprisingly large tallies.
New parties may also be advantageous because, unfortunately, many long-
standing parties in Latin America were either never very democratic or gradually
became undemocratic. In Latin America, as in other regions where authoritarian
regimes were common in the past, some long-standing parties harbor significant
“authoritarian legacies” (Hicken and Martínez Kuhonta, 2011: 588). Also, some
entrenched parties are “cartel” parties; intertwined with the state, they gain power
over electoral laws and machinery and, when there are two long-standing parties,
collude to ensure that at least one of them wins (Katz and Mair, 2009). Parties
are not bridges between state and society but castles with vast moats that protect
their lords from the masses. Further, the phenomenon of “caudillismo (strongmen)”
continues; incumbents and former presidents want to “die with their boots on” and
refuse to retire (Corrales, 2008).
Yet, these entrenched parties and leaders have significant advantages. This is
the case by definition for cartel parties; also, by implication, parties harboring au-
thoritarian legacies are more likely to skew electoral institutions in their favor. Old-
timer leaders also enjoy advantages merely as a result of their longevity. They have
loyal campaign donors and friends in important places such as the courts and the
media. They have name recognition. There may be a cultural bias in favor of known
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THE OCCUPATION OF NEW ORLEANS.
At eleven o’clock, A. M., on the 24th, the flag-ship raised her anchor,
and led the way up the river towards New Orleans. Commander
Farragut had been apprised of the obstacles which he would meet,
and was therefore prepared to encounter them. There was no
occurrences of moment on the way up the river, except the
demonstrations of joy or of opposition made by the people, according
to their loyal or disloyal sympathies. Boats loaded with cotton were
burnt or burning along the river as they passed, and fragments of the
Mississippi battery floated down the stream.
At about the same hour of the next day, the fleet reached two forts,
one on either side of the river, about two miles below the city, known
as the Chalmette batteries, which had no flags flying. At eleven
o’clock they opened on the Cayuga, which was then in the advance.
After a short time spent in firing the bow-guns, the Hartford poured
in a terrific broadside, which appeared to be very destructive. Other
discharges followed from other vessels, and the garrison abandoned
the works without hoisting a flag. The guns being silenced, and the
forts evacuated, the fleet passed on and came to anchor opposite the
city about one o’clock. The river was filled with vessels on fire, and
along the levee cotton, stores, and other property were wantonly
burned, filling the atmosphere with suffocating smoke, and adding to
the heat of the day. Vast amounts of property were thus destroyed.
On shore and on the wharves the people hastened to and fro, some
cheering for Jeff. Davis and the Confederacy, Beauregard, and
others, while some of the more exulting loyalists cheered for the
Union and the old flag.
NEW ORLEANS AND VICINITY.
May 4, 1862.
May 5, 1862.
BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
Thus they came, swifter than it can be told, until their line, now
broken and irregular, was within two hundred yards of the
unwavering columns. Then Hancock showed himself the coolest and
bravest of the brave. Taking off his hat, and using the courtly prefix
of the olden time, he said: “Ready, now! Gentlemen, CHARGE!” The
whole line swept forward, as the reaper’s sickle rushes through the
grain. Its keen edge had not yet touched the enemy, when his ranks
broke simultaneously, fled in confusion to the rear, and the field of
Williamsburg was won.
About five o’clock P. M. some excitement was caused in the rear,
and soon an officer, with his staff, rode to the opening in the woods
where he could get a view of the field. It was General McClellan. The
moment he was seen, loud and deafening cheers rose up along the
lines of the centre, and rolled away to the right and left, imparting a
new enthusiasm to the forces. The chief officers were quickly
consulted, and reinforcements were sent to the aid of Hancock and
Hooker. Hancock’s brilliant and successful charge had already won
the day on the right, and the effect of it in the panic and rout of the
rebels was becoming sensibly felt in front of Hooker’s division, when
the long-looked for assistance came to his side. The rebels promptly
retired, and the desperate struggle of the day closed on a splendidly
contested field. The men were compelled to bivouack on the ground,
with the rain still falling, in proud anticipation of a renewal of the
conflict in the morning.
The rebels had been reinforced as late as five o’clock, and it was
expected that General Johnston would command them in the
morning in person, but the opportune appearance of the Federal
reinforcements, together with the successful movements of General
Hancock, created a panic among them, and they fell back on
Williamsburg, and commenced their hasty retreat from that place. At
two o’clock on Tuesday morning the Federal forces began to move.
As they approached Williamsburg they found the way clear, and on
coming up to the city the rear guard of the foe were flying on the road
toward Richmond, leaving the town to be occupied by the Federal
troops. General McClellan appointed General Jameson Military
Governor of the place, and the troops marched through the main
street of the city to the homely, but glorious and soul-stirring strains
of “Yankee Doodle.”
The houses, churches, barns and stables were found filled with the
wounded of the rebel army, as well as the Federals whom they had
taken prisoners. It was a sad, heart-rending scene, those brave
soldiers mangled, dying and dead. The Federal troops immediately
commenced the work of burial, while the surgeons found incessant
occupation in the discharge of their duties. The battle field presented
a frightful scene of carnage, and several days passed before all the
dead and wounded stragglers were found in the woods and among
the underbrush where they had fallen.
The loss of the Federals was about 500 killed, 1,600 wounded, and
623 prisoners. That of the rebels was somewhat greater in killed and
wounded. Five hundred prisoners fell into Federal hands. Some
hundred of the rebel dead were buried on the day following the
battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin, of the Eighth Alabama, formerly
United States Senator, was found dead on the field.
Thirty-five regiments of the rebels were engaged in the action, that
number being represented by the wounded men left after the battle.
BATTLE OF WEST POINT, VA.
May 7, 1862.