4283524

Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality
Author(s): Avraham Sela

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 623-688
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Transjordan,Israel and the 1948 War:
Myth, Historiographyand Reality
AVRAHAM SELA
Wars generate their own political myths, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War
is no exception. A central political myth spawned by that war concerns
the secret agreement between the leadership of the yishuv and the Israeli
government on the one hand, and Jordan's King Abdullah on the other,
regarding the partition of Palestine. According to this myth of collusion,
the course of the war on the eastern front and its political outcomes were
determined by that agreement; undertaken and implemented with the
support of Britain; and emerged out of a shared opposition to Palestinian
national aspirations, and ultimately at the expense of the Palestinian
people.
The roots of this myth derive from the image of King Abdullah as
Britain's notorious agent in the Middle East; and the Hashemite ruler's
traditional ambitions to annex Palestine, or at least its Arab areas, in his
goal to become king of 'Greater Syria'. In addition, there had been a
tradition of political cooperation in various spheres between Abdullah
and leaders of the Zionist movement and the yishuv from the early 1930s;
a convergence of interests supposedly emerged between them after 1937
regarding the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish
state. Adding to these were circumstances such as the early stabilization
of the war front between the two countries, including the defacto division
of Jerusalem; and the renewal of diplomatic contacts between the king
and the Israeli government in August 1948 while the war still raged on the
other fronts. The conclusion of the fighting with the de facto partition of
Palestine between Israel and Transjordan, and the revelation that secret
political contacts had taken place between the king and the Jews before
the war, evolving into negotiations on a peace treaty toward its end, lent
credence to the idea that there had been an ongoing understanding
between the ruler of Transjordan and the leadership of the yishuv and the
State of Israel.
In the war's aftermath, this interpretation of events was advanced by
both poles of the Israeli political spectrum within the context of their
struggle against the government and their emphatic dissatisfaction with
the war's political outcome. On the right, the Herut movement con-
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, October 1992, pp. 623-688
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

624 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
tendedthatan historicopportunityhadbeen missedto gaincontrolof the

whole of Eretz-Israel owing to the leadership'sfaint-heartednessand
lack of conviction.The result, Herutmaintained,was an unjustifiedand
unatonableceding of part of the homelandto foreign rule. On the left,
Mapamsawthe government'sfailureto holdbothpartsof Jerusalem,and
its acquiescencein Jordan'sannexationof the West Bank, as evidenceof
conspiracyandcollusionbetweenfeudalismandimperialism,elementsin
a plot hatched by Britain in collaborationwith King Abdullah. The
Communistsmaintainedthe same interpretationand terminologyabout
the trilateralconspiracybetween Zionism, Reaction and Imperialism.
For their part, however, the Communistsfocused on the argumentthat
this conspiracyhad deprivedthe Palestinianpeople of theirrightto self-
determinationin their own sovereignstate.1
In the Arab historiographyproducedby enemies of the Hashemites,
and adversariesof King Abdullah in particular,the collusion myth
becamethe cruxof an historicalindictmentagainstthe kingfor betraying
the Arabnationalcausein Palestine.Indeed,in a societyoverwhelmingly
motivatedby anti-imperialism,the king'srecordof relationswithBritain
and the Jews, the ostensibly careless and inactive performanceof the
Legion in the war, and above all, his annexationof the Arab part of
Palestine to his kingdom- all became importantthemes in the Arab
publicdiscourseon the reasonsandlessonsof the Nakba(catastrophe)in
the aftermathof the war. These indictmentsportrayedAbdullah'scom-
promise over the fate of Palestine as a shameful and unforgivable
example of disloyaltyto the Arab national cause and a blow to Arab
unity.2
The officialIsraelihistoriographyon this subjectrevealsa rathermore
complexapproach.Althoughthe existenceof a priorunderstandingwith
Abdullahis not entirelydenied, its influenceon Israelidecisionmakers
andon the conductof the waris depictedas marginal,andas such,only in
the first months of the civil war.3
Historical interest in the relations maintained between the Jewish
Agency and the Israeligovernmentand KingAbdullahduringthe 1948
Warcontinuesunabated,as is evidentin the severalstudiespublishedon
the topic in recent years, mostly by Israelis.4The diverse conclusions
adducedin these works stem from their authors'differentapproaches,
emphasis and utilizationof availablesources. The main argumentsin
these worksconcerningIsraeli-Jordanianrelationsin the 1948warmight
be summarizedas follows:
A. The unwrittenagreementbetween the Jews and Abdullahon the
partitionof Palestine had been given virtuallyfull backingby London
before the expiryof the BritishMandate.The Machiavellianrole played

TRANSJORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE 1948 WAR 625
by Britain in the Zionist-Hashemiteagreementwas meant to expand

Transjordanby foilingthe implementationof the UN partitionresolution
and thus preventingthe establishmentof a PalestinianArab state.5
B. By yielding to inter-Arabconstraintsand joining the Arab war
coalition on the eve of the invasion, King Abdullah reneged on his
understandingwith the Jews regardingpartition.However, Abdullah's
primary aim was not to defeat Israel but to seize the hilly region between
Jenin and Hebron.6
C. From the outset, King Abdullahplannedto captureJerusalemin
orderto gain legitimationfromthe Arab worldfor his annexationof the
otherArab-populatedareasof Palestine.7Abdullahandthe Jewsfailedto
reachan agreementon Jerusalemand left its statusto be determinedon
the battlefield.Thusthe ArabLegion'smilitarymissionwasconcentrated
from the start on Jerusalemand its environs.8
D. The fightingdid not affect the political basis underlyingthe prior
strategic understandingbetween the two sides, and it was gradually
reinstated, following the 'Ten Day Battles' (9-18 July). Henceforth,
Israeliactionswould be motivatedprimarilyby politicalconsiderations,
among which was the need to ensure Abdullah's cooperation. These
considerationsdictatedthat Israelrefrainfrom capturingthe 'Triangle,'
the Mount Hebron region and the Old City of Jerusalemin the fall of
1948, althoughthis was militarilyfeasible.9
E. In their military conflict, Israel and Transjordanmaintained a
symmetryof approach:neither side intended to engage the other in
battle. The hostilitieswhichneverthelessbroke out were due to misun-
derstandings,the 'fog of battle', independentinitiativestaken by Arab
officers of the Legion, poor communicationsand the failure of inter-
national mediation. There was nothing inevitable about the military
confrontationbetweenthe sides- theirgoalscouldhavebeen achievedat
the negotiatingtable- but the Jewishside was disposedto employ force
and misreadthe messages of the British and Abdullah.'°
F. Even while the fighting raged, the foundations of the pre-war
strategicunderstandingbetween Abdullahand the Jews remainedfirm.
This understandingwas the cardinalelement in shapingthe strategyof
limitedconflictbetween the sides. Hence, the fightingwas characterized
by mutualrestraintanda desireto attainlimitedobjectives.Nowherewas
this approachmore in evidence than in Jerusalem,which the two sides
wished to divide between them in fear that its full captureby either of
them was liable to bring about its internationalization."1
Essentially, most of the recent studies convergein the thesis that an
unwavering element of strategic understandingremained in place
throughoutthe war. What differsamongthem is their evaluationof the

role played by this understandingin shapingIsraeli-Jordanianrelations

and the outcomeof the war:fromthe conclusionthat the priorunwritten
agreement exercised a decisive influence on the yishuv's capacity to
survive the war;12or that it effectively shaped the territorialmap of
Palestine at the war's conclusion;13to the argument that a 'de facto
partnership'emerged between the Jews and Abdullah after the 'Ten
Days' whichprobablydid not reachthe point of collusion, but whichled
to a 'defacto deal';14to the portrayalof the relationsbetween Abdullah
and the Jews throughoutthe war as outrightcollusion.'5
The divergentconclusionsreached in the recently publishedstudies
affordsufficientreasonto re-examinethe militaryconfrontationbetween
IsraelandTransjordanin the 1948warandits placein the historyof their
relations. Equally importantin this regardare the discrepanciesin the
factual-historicalbackgroundwhich these studies present in supportof
their conclusions.Thus, for example, with few exceptions, they fail to
addressthe complexof considerations,uncertaintiesandconstraintsthat
characterizedthe development of the clash between the two sides in
Jerusalem.Again, with the exception of a partialdiscussionof interac-
tions withinthe Arab regionalsystem,these worksignorethe complexity
and fragmentationof the militarytheater.None of them cites the role of
the Arab irregularforces, either in the actual fightingor as a factor
influencingactions and decisions of the parties, an omission so glaring
that the readermay form the impressionthat no such forces took part.
The presentarticleseeks to re-examineIsrael-Transjordan relationsin
the 1948war and in particularthe 'collusion'myth, throughthe prismof
the campaign for Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the focus because of its
centrality in the military conflict between the two parties. We shall
proceedby analyzingthe developmentof the relationsbetween the sides
and the backgroundto their decisions during the war, viewing the
political and militaryarena from a regionalperspective.
The questionarises,if there had been priorunderstanding,an unwrit-
ten agreementor directtalksbetweenthe leadershipof the yishuvandthe
state andKingAbdullahregardingthe partitionof Palestine,whydid the
two countriesfind themselveslocked in one of the hardestand bitterest
armed conflictsfought by the Haganahand the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) in 1948?Was this conflictunavoidable?Did the king misleadthe
heads of the Jewish Agency, or was his army's behavior dictated by
Britishinfluence?Did the two sidesfollowa strategic'masterplan',andif
not, how did a situationof partitionemergebetweenIsraelandTransjor-
dan despite the war, and why did Israel acquiesceto the Arab Legion's
control of the Old City of Jerusalemand not try to captureit when it
possessed the requisitemilitarycapability?It is in this context that the

question of the historiographicalperiodizationof the relationsbetween

the two sides arises:when did the political-strategicagreementbetween
Abdullahandthe Jewscease to existfor eachside?Whendidwarbecome
inevitable?Whendid the actualfightingbegin betweenthe Arab Legion
and the Jewishforcesin Jerusalem?And when did the relationsbetween
the sides undergo anothertransformation,from war to acquiescence?
The central thesis of this article is that the conditions and basic
assumptionsthat had constitutedthe foundationsof the unwrittenagree-
mentbetweenAbdullahandthe JewishAgencyregardingthe partitionof
Palestine as early as the summerof 1946 were altered so substantively
duringthe unofficialwar (December 1947-May1948) as to renderthat
agreementantiquatedand impracticable.By mid-AprilAbdullah, con-
frontedwith a successfulHaganahoffensive, foundhimselfdraggedinto
a tangle of contradictorypolitical and militarycommitmentsand con-
straints.Eventually,he was forced to operate withinthe frameworkof
the Arab military coalition, and indeed as a leading figure in that
coalition. From this time on, a militaryclash between the Arab Legion
and Jewishforces was almost a foregone conclusion.This articleargues
that the Arab Legion's interventionin Jerusalemwas not planned in
advance but was forced on it by circumstances.Considerationsof a
primarilypolitical characterhad led the Legion to exclude Jerusalem
from its operational plans. Patently, this approachwas based on the
assumptionthat the same considerationson the part of the Jews would
precludea Jewish attempt to seize the whole city. If, nevertheless,the
Legion did intervene in the fighting in Jerusalem, this was the un-
avoidableresultof the militarysituationthatwas createdin the city in the
wake of actionsundertakenby local forces- Arab andJewishalike- and
the potentialpoliticaland militaryramificationsof that situationfor the
politicalcenter in Transjordanand its forces in Palestine.This processis
reflectedin the mannerof the Legion'sinterventionin Jerusalem:it came
relatively late, with pronouncedmisgivingsand a dispute among the
decisionmakers,andwas markedby failuresof communicationbetween
the two sides and mistakenassessmentsof the opponent'sintentions.
The battle for Jerusalemis a touchstone in the developmentof the
relationsbetweenthe two adversariesduringthe warbecauseof the city's
pivotal role in determiningtheir actions in the war, even when the city
itself wasnot the maintheater,as attestedby the battlefor Latrun.In this
context, the Legion'sinterventionin Jerusalemassumedcrucialimpor-
tanceas a strategicmove thattransformedthe cityandits approachesinto
Israel'sprimarytheaterof operationsuntilthe startof the secondtruceon
19July1948.The outcomeof the confrontationin thistheaterdetermined
the fate of the city and, to a large extent, the fate of the West Bank as well.

628 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES
The clash with the Legion was preceded by a period of more than half a
year in which a civil war raged in Palestine, marked by the informal
involvementof Arab states who foughtalongsidethe PalestinianArabs.
The new militaryand political situationforged in this period rendered
doubtfulthe possibilityof implementingin full the UN partitionresolu-
tion. In the absence of an effectual governmentin Palestine duringthe
finalmonthsof the Mandate,the Haganahtook the initiativeandin April
launched an offensive that routed the Arab irregulars.The Haganah
offensivein the last six weeks of the Mandategovernment('PlanD') was
intendedto ensureits controlof the area designatedfor the Jewishstate
accordingto the partitionplan. However, in some sectors territorywas
capturedthat exceeded the partitionboundaries.These achievements
heightenedthe confidenceof the Jewishleadershipin the yishuv'sstaying
powerin a confrontationwiththe Arabs.The Jewishleadershipexploited
the Haganah'ssuccessesto make additionalterritorialgains, both as an
end in itself andto enhancethe Jewishforces'deploymentin a worstcase
scenario:an invasionby Arab regulararmies.16
In the neighboringArabstates, the civilwarin Palestinebroughtabout
the emergenceof a publicand officialconsensusadvocatingjoint action
againstthe nascentJewishstate. The collapseof PalestinianArabmorale
in the wake of the Haganah's military successes, and the stream of
refugeesseeking shelterin the neighboringcountries,createda ground-
swell of domesticpressureon Arab governmentsto fulfiltheir national
dutyandlauncha jointmilitaryundertakingto rescuethe PalestineArabs
andsave Palestine.The Jewishmilitaryaccomplishmentsandtheireffect
on the PalestinianArabs helped bring about the decision to invade.
However, the Jewishgainsinstilleddoubtsamongthe Arabgovernments
regardingtheir own capabilities,and thus, for strictlymilitaryreasons,
compelled them to cooperate in a joint effort in order to avert defeat.
This was in additionto long-livedcontradictoryaspirations,rivalriesand
competitionsamong Arab rulers motivatinga joint action that would
preventindividualstrategiesandgainsin Palestineandpreservethe inter-
Arab balance of power.'7
The situationat the startof the battlefor Jerusalemwas characterized
by the complexityof the arena, markedin particularby the multitudeof
actors. The attendantdilemmaswere reflected in the decision-making
processeson both sides. The theaterof operationswas formed of three
concentriccircles- the Old City, Jerusalem,andthe countryas a whole-
andin each of whicha differentside possessedthe advantage,andin each
of whichthe actionstaken exerciseda close reciprocalrelationshipwith
the decision-makingprocesses in the other circles. The party with the
advantagein each circle felt constantpressureto make furthergains to

strengthenits positionwithinthat arena.Thiswas particularlydue to the

fact that the circle immediatelysurroundingthe advantagebelonged to
rival party. Further,any push from the leading party within the circle
found a response from the strongerrival party in an outer circle.
Each controllingpower within each circle maintainedautonomous
decision-making,but expected and pressuredoutside allies to come to
their aid. In the case of the Jews, there was an authoritativeand fairly
effective centralleadership.The Arabs, however,were dividedand, to a
certainextent, in competitionwith one another,and thus not as likely to
respond to requestsfrom allies within other circles.
Inner Circle
This was limited to the Old City of Jerusalem, in which the Jewish
Quarterendureda lengthysiege whichpredatedthe Britishwithdrawal,
and where the upperhand lay with the Arab irregularswho had volun-
teered for the 'Army of Deliverance' (jaish al-Inqadh) and with the
Palestinianfightersof the 'Holy Jihad'(al-Jihadal-Muqadas)underthe
authorityof the Mufti, al-Haj Amin al-Husseini.These forces viewed
everyJewishattemptto breakthroughon the roadto Jerusalemfromthe
coast, or to expandJewishcontrolin the New City, as a directthreatto
theirpositionin the Old City and as portendinga Jewishtake over of the
Islamicholy places. It bears stressingthat even duringthe fighting,the
parties did not lose sight of Jerusalem'ssensitivityin the eyes of the
internationalcommunity,and were apprehensiveabout the reactionif
holy places were damaged.
Middle Circle
This extendedas faras the municipalboundariesof Jerusalem,an areain
which,fromthe lastweek in April, the Jewishside enjoyeda pronounced
advantage.However, force limitationsprecludedthe Jewspressingtheir
advantage, either in Jerusalemproper or on the road to the city. In
Jerusalem,the Britisharmyforciblyintervenedto preventthe Haganah
from capturingthe Sheikh Jarrahneighborhood:the Britishwished to
ensure that the main road to the north would remain open for their own
withdrawal at the termination of the Mandate. At all events, a costly and
extended allocation of military resources and manpower was required to
maintain the Jewish hold in Jerusalem and break the siege of the city,
which was cut off from the main Jewish population concentration in the
center of the country. From the end of April the Army of Deliverance was
redeployed to assist the local troops in Jerusalem, and successfully

blocked the road to the city in the Latrun-Babal Wad area. These
developments underscored the tenuous nature of the local military
advantagesecuredby the Jewsin Jerusalem.However,it wasthe external
Arab threatthatspurredthe Jews'militarydriveto consolidatecontrolin
all sectionsof the city and ensureaccessibilityfromthe coast. The threat
to Jerusalemwas perceived as being of cardinalnational significance.
Besides the fact that the city's 100,000Jews constitutedabout one-sixth
of the country'sentire Jewishpopulation,the yishuv'sleadershipcould
hardlyignoreJerusalem'smoraland religiousimportanceas the heartof
the Jewish polity. From Ben-Gurion'sperspective, Jewish Jerusalem
counted for as muchas the rest of the yishuv, and the city's defense was
perceivedas a life-and-deathquestionfor the Jewishstate. Thisapproach
of the Israeli commander-in-chief,which his criticstermed 'obsessive',
was to have far-reachingimplicationsfor the war decisions on the
Jordanianfront.18
OuterCircle
This circle encompassedthe entire country and from mid-April was
characterizedby the collapse of the force and the morale of the Arab
population and of the semi-regular volunteers of the Army of
Deliverance, led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji,under the auspicesof the Arab
League. Concretely, Arab preparationsfor the interventionof their
regulararmiesin Palestinedid not get underwayuntil nearlythe end of
April. But even in the final week of the Mandateit was still not clear
whichArab stateswouldtake partin the invasionand in whatforce. For
the Jewishleadership,this questionwas especiallycriticalwithrespectto
the Arab Legion because of the reputed quality of its equipmentand
troops, its British commanders,and above all because of the alliance
between Transjordanand Britain. Despite the Haganah's successes
againstthe irregulars,deep fears attendedthe decision to proclaimthe
state. General Staff officers assessed the yishuv's militaryprospectsas
even, at best, in a comprehensivecampaignagainstthe invadingarmies.'9
Indeed, the openingweeks of the war, until the firsttruce, were critical
for the yishuv,whichexpendeda supremeeffortto containthe oncoming
Arab forces.
The theater of operationswas characterizedby the large numberof
Arabparticipants,bothregularsandvolunteers,andby a sharpriftwithin
the Arab war coalition. The severe disputes and rivalriesthat marred
relationsbetween the Arab governmentsmeantthat they were unableto
agreeon wargoals or on the meansto achievethem, even if they formally
assentedto a joint command.The regularforcesandthe volunteerArmy

of Deliveranceoperatedundertheirown commandsand rarelyachieved

operational coordination. The disunity was especially pronounced in
Jerusalem,where the Arab populationlacked an agreed upon, united
and authoritativerepresentation.The result was that the variouslocal
forces and volunteers from Arab states operated in the city without
coordinationor a joint command.
FROM STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING TO WAR
The leadership of the yishuv and the Jewish Agency had developed
cooperativeties with the EmirAbdullahfromthe early 1930s.Unique in
the yishuv'srelationswith other Arab rulers,these ties were fosteredby
certainsharedeconomic and geopoliticalinterests.They were impelled
by the regionalpoliticalweaknessand isolation of both sides, and their
profound opposition to the Palestinian national aspirations and the
Palestinianleadership,embodiedin al-HajAmin al-Husseini.Fromthe
outset, relations between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah, like the
strategicunderstandingbetween them, were marredby a cripplingflaw.
They were basedon ties of trustwiththe kingalone, maintainedvia a few
court officials who were privy to the secret contacts. Key figures in
Abdullah'sgovernmentand in the Transjordanianelite knew nothingof
the ties, or objectedto themif they did. As a result,the kinghaddifficulty
transforminghis agreementswith the Jewish Agency into political ac-
tion.20
Fromthe summerof 1946an unwrittenagreementof principleexisted
between the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah, that in the event of a
decision to divide Palestineinto two states, Abdullahwould annex Lhe
Arab areato his kingdom,andthe Jewswouldestablishtheirstate in the
territorydesignatedfor that purpose.21 This understandingdid not stipu-
late mutualaid in implementingannexationor the establishmentof the
state, and each side undertookmutuallynot to prevent the other from
carryingout its partof the agreement.The understandingwas reaffirmed
in a meeting between Golda Meyerson (Meir), the acting head of the
JewishAgency'sPoliticalDepartment,andKingAbdullahat Naharayim
on 17 November 1947 less than two weeks before the United Nations
passedthe resolutionpartitioningPalestineinto two states, one Araband
one Jewish.22
Abdullahnever hid from the Zionist leadershiphis ambitionto annex
all of Palestineto Transjordanin orderto furtherhis ambitionof leadinga
regional union that would embrace all of 'Greater Syria'. Within the
framework of this union he was ready to assure the Jewish yishuv

extensive autonomy.In the meeting at Naharayimhe even spoke about

an 'independent Jewish republic' as part of a federation under the
Hashemitecrown.However,Abdullahwas sufficientlyrealisticto recog-
nize his politicaland militarylimitationsand his dependenceon Britain,
as well as the strengthof the yishuv and the Zionist movementand the
intensity of their determination to establish an independent state.
Indeed, as the king was reported to have told Golda Meyerson at
Naharayim,he was willingto acquiescein the creationof such a state in
part of Palestine, provided that 'the partition will not shame me'.
Abdullahdid not elaborate,and for the most partthe conversationdealt
with general matters and principles, without going into details on
borders, the status of Jerusalemor the fate of the joint phosphateand
electric plants.
The meeting at Naharayimtook place at a time when the king was
supremelyconfidentabout his own position and about the standinghe
had acquiredvis-a-vishis rivalsin the Arabworld, as the persondestined
to fulfilthe central- andperhapsexclusive- militarymissionin Palestine
upon the departureof the British.Abdullah'ssense of confidencederived
from a meetingof the Arab League Councilheld in 'Alay, Lebanonon
7-10 October1947.On the agendawas the need to articulatea collective
Arab policy in the face of the recommendationsof the special UN
committee on the partitionof Palestine and the announcementby the
British Colonial Secretaryon 26 Septemberthat in the absence of an
agreed solution between Jews and Arabs his countryintendedto relin-
quish its Mandateand withdrawfrom Palestine with all dispatch. The
Arab League Councilrejectedthe principaldemandsof al-HajAmin al-
Husseini, namely the formation of a Palestiniangovernmentand the
immediatelaunchingof an armeduprising.Furthermore,at the behestof
Iraq's and Transjordan'sprime ministers, the decision was taken to
activateregularforcesin Palestineuponthe terminationof the Mandate,
a decision which displeasedthe Mufti and the Syriangovernment.23 In
light of the unequivocalannouncementby the EgyptianPrimeMinister,
NuqrashiPasha, that his countrywould not commit forces to a war in
Palestine, the effect of the Council'sdecision was to recognizethe pre-
eminent role of the armed forces of the Hashemite states, the best
organizedand most advancedArab armies. First and foremost among
these was the role of the ArabLegion, the bulkof whichwas permanently
stationed in Palestine. The central role to be played by the legion was
furtherrecognizedby the heads of the delegationsto the Arab League
Council in a visit to Amman planned in order to obtain Abdullah's
endorsementof the decisionto deployArabregularforceson the borders
of Palestine.24

TRANSJORDAN,ISRAELAND THE 1948 WAR 633
The meetingat Naharayim,andAbdullah'spositionagainstoperations

by irregularsin Palestinewere partof the Hashemitemonarch'scompre-
hensivediplomaticeffortsto preparethe groundfor the annexationof the
Arab area of Palestine to his kingdomupon the expiry of the British
Mandate.Fromthis point of view, it was vital for Abdullahto thwartthe
intentionsof his adversariesin the interArab systemand to reaffirmhis
agreementwith the Jewish Agency regardingthe divisionof Palestine.
But above all, Abdullahstrove to achieve coordinationwith the British
governmentandto obtainLondon'spoliticalandmaterialsupportfor his
plans, support which he considered a sine qua non to achieve his
objectives in Palestine. Britain, besides constituting the Mandatory
governmentin Palestine,was the king'sformalally andpatron,and bore
the expensesof equippingandoperatingthe ArabLegion, mostof whose
soldiers were engaged in routine security missions in Palestine under
direct British command. More than half of Britain'sannualsubsidyto
Transjordan( 1.3 millionof a total of 2 million)was earmarkedto payfor
the Legion'sservicesin Palestine,withthe remainderostensiblyintended
to enable the king to maintainhis army at a suitable level to fulfil its
commitments under the Anglo-Jordaniantreaty.25According to the
Britishplan for evacuationfrom Palestine,of whichthe principleswere
determinedin November1947, Arab Legion unitsstationedin Palestine
were to withdrawto Transjordanprior to the Mandate'stermination.26
The fact that the Legion would thus be cut off from the BritishArmy
campsandlogisticalsupportsystemin Palestinecompelledthe Jordanian
Army to reorganizeand redeploy its troops with all speed in order to
ready them to re-enterPalestinewhen the Mandateexpired.
As earlyas October1947,Abdullahmadeuse of the good officesof the
Britishrepresentativein Amman, Sir Alec Kirkbride,to sound out the
ForeignSecretary,Bevin, aboutLondon'sreadinessto supporthis plans
in Palestine.27Kirkbride,an ardentproponentof Abdullah'saspirations,
sparedno effortsto win the backingof his mastersin London. Kirkbride
had cultivatedrelationsof trustduringhis 27 years of relationswith the
king and his ministers.His argumentsin favorof Transjordan'sannexa-
tion of the designatedArab areasof Palestinewereimpelledby the king's
loyaltyto, and dependenceon, Britain.Whilenot ignoringthe expected
negative reaction of the Arab world against Britain were it to adopt such a
policy, Kirkbrideendeavoredto playdownits importance.He contended
that irrespectiveof London'sPalestinepolicy, the Arabs would always
blame Britainfor every setback they incurred.28
Kirkbride,who waswell awareof Abdullah'scontactswithrepresenta-
tives of the Jewish Agency (althoughno report to the Foreign Office
aboutthe meetingshas been located), believedthatthe king'splanwould

obviate a militaryclash between the Jews and the Arab Legion. This
assessmentwas based on the premisethat Abdullahwas readyto recog-
nize a Jewishstate andthatthe Jewswouldnot objectto the annexationof
Arab Palestine, as defined by the partitionplan, to the Kingdom of
Transjordan.Kirkbridemaintainedthat his unreservedsupportfor Ab-
dullah'splan was consistentwith Britishstrategicinterestsin the Middle
East. Transjordanshouldthereforebe strengthenedand be considereda
majorcomponentof Britain'sregionaldefense policy, especiallyin view
of London's difficultiesin obtaining militaryprivilegesin other Arab
countries.
Doubts and reservationsattended the articulationof Britishsupport
for the king'splans. Officially,Britainopposedthe partitionof Palestine
and, at Bevin's instructions,efforts were undertakento find an alterna-
tive solution acceptableto both Jews and Arabs. When it became clear
that no suchsolutionwas forthcoming,Britaingraduallycameto support
the principleof partition,althoughthe officialline wasnot to cooperatein
its implementation.29 However, this position was inadequatefor stem-
ming the tide of the negative Arab and internationalcriticismdirected
against Britain in lightof the partitionof PalestinebetweenAbdullahand
the Jewishyishuvand the consequentnon-establishmentof a Palestinian
Arab state. In the eyes of regionalleaders,Abdullah'sabsolutematerial
dependence on Britain, even after his countryhad gained formalinde-
pendence, continued to nourish his image as Britain's agent, whose
actions merely mirroredBritishpolicy. This perception,whichwas not
always consistent with the actual situation, was of particularlygrave
significancefor Britain, since not only did the British Treasuryunder-
write the maintenanceand armingof the Arab Legion, but most of the
Legion's senior staff and command posts were manned by British
citizens, many of them army personnel seconded to the Legion.30The
objectionsthat were raisedin the BritishForeignOfficeagainstsupport-
ing Abdullah'splans, based primarilyon the argumentthat they con-
flicted with collective Arab policy, were overridden.Nevertheless, the
British, anxious not to appear to be acting againstthe collective Arab
interest, urgedAbdullahto demonstrateconformitywith the rest of the
Arab states.
By mid-Januaryof 1948,the ForeignOfficewastakinga favorableview
of the king's intentions, and was ready to go on supportingthe Legion
militarilyand financiallyeven after the terminationof the Mandate.
Abdullah was apprisedthat British backingfor his plan would remain
clandestine and informal, and that in the event of a conflict with the
United Nations, Britainwould not publiclysupportthe plan. Bevin also
made it clear to Abdullahthat London'ssupportwas conditionalon the

Legion'snot attackingany partof the territoryof the Jewishstate.31The

main points of the Anglo-Jordanianagreement on the fate of Arab
Palestinewere concludedin the firstweek of February,when Transjor-
dan's PrimeMinister,TawfiqAbu al-Huda,met with Bevin in London.
During the visit details were also worked out concerningthe Legion's
militarypreparationsprior to the terminationof the Mandate. Among
other items, the Legionwouldreceivearms,ammunitionandmaterielto
offset the dismantlingof the Britishmilitaryinfrastructurein Palestine.32
The king'ssuccessesin the diplomaticarena- coordinationof his plans

with the JewishAgency and securingBritishsupportfor theirimplemen-
tation- were counterbalancedby the narrowingof his freedomof action
in Palestine. The hostilities that had erupted between Arabs and Jews
immediatelyafter the UN vote on partitionbecame a full fledged war
between the two communities,severelyhamperingHashemiteplans. In
mid-December,the PoliticalCommitteeof the Arab League, meetingin
Cairo,had adopteda seriesof resolutionscommittingArab governments
to indirectmilitaryinvolvementin Palestineas partof the driveto foil the
implementationof the partitionresolution and the establishmentof a
Jewish state. Arab states were to dispatchvolunteersto Palestine and
provide militaryand financialassistancefor the Arab war effort, which
henceforthwould be based on irregulars.33 This conceptionplayed into
the handsof Abdullah'savowedadversaries,SyrianPresidentShukrial-
Quwatli and the Mufti, al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, who were bent on
removingthe dangerof the Arab Legion'soperatingin Palestineas the
sole Arab force. With the active backingof the generalsecretaryof the
ArabLeague,Abd al-RahmanAzzam, Kuwatliandthe Muftiformedthe
main impulse behind the reinforcementand heightened activityof the
Arabirregularsin the Armyof Deliveranceandamongthe armedgroups
of the Holy Jihad.
Concurrentwiththe quantitativeandqualitativeupgradingof the Arab
volunteerforces who enteredPalestine,and the expansionof the unoffi-
cial war, King Abdullah's standing in the inter-Arab arena was
weakened. His hopes that his armywouldbe able to intervenealone and
without interferencein Palestinefollowingthe Britishwithdrawalwere
shattered.Fromthe secondhalfof Januaryof 1948,increasingindications
of an apparentshift in the king's policy were discernible.Transjordan
facilitatedthe transitof units of the Army of Deliverancefrom Syriato
Palestine. In fact, this was forced on the king under pressureof Arab
governments and Palestinian notables, who also demanded that he
commit the Legion units deployed in Palestine to act on their behalf.

Under these circumstances,it was essentialfor the king to demonstrate

conformitywith the collectiveArab policy, the more so as suchbehavior
fulfilledBritishexpectations.Nevertheless,the erosionof his standingin
Palestine,andperhapsalso a desireto ensuresteadfastBritishsupportfor
his plans, compelledthe kinggraduallyto raisethe pricefor his assentto
the establishmentof a Jewish state.
This developmentwas soon reflectedin a change of tone towardhis
Jewish partners.In meetingsheld in Januaryand Februaryof 1948 the
king demanded'borderadjustments'for the firsttime. In otherwords,if
the Jewswishedto ensurethe upholdingof the agreementwithAbdullah,
they had to give up part of the territoryallotted to them by the UN
partitionplan. Abdullah'senvoy told the JewishAgency representatives
that the king was being subjectedto heavy Anglo-Arabpressureto act
within the frameworkof the all-Arab coalition. This policy entailed
conqueringthe entirecountryand restrictingthe Jewishstate to the area
of the coastalplain betweenTel Aviv and Atlit. It was in these meetings
that the king'sproposalfor the two sides to divide the Jerusalemregion
between them was first broached.34 Abdullah'sproposalmay seem odd
since accordingto the partitionresolutionJerusalemwas to be a corpus
separatum under the United Nation's aegis. However, the proposal
becomesunderstandablein lightof the growingdoubtsentertainedby the
ForeignOfficeas to the feasibilityof establishingthe specialinternational
regimebeforethe expiryof the Mandate,an evaluationthatalsounderlay
Bevin's proposal to declare Jerusalem an open city.35Abdullah may have
been influencedby the seeds of doubt withinthe ForeignOffice, but in
anycase, the idea of dividingJerusalemdidnot emergeagainbetweenthe
two sides until the end of hostilities.
Clearevidence of the king'sdifficultiesis furnishedby the fact that he
broke off direct contact with Jewish Agency officials following the
meeting held in mid-February,despite the efforts of the Jewish side to
renewthe meetingsin the followingtwo months.Even if the king'splans
had not changed,his eroded standingand the unlikelihoodthat his army
could operate alone in Palestinefollowingthe Britishwithdrawalcaused
the Jewish Agency's Political Departmentincreasinglyto question the
king'sintentionsduringMarch.36 The captureof the Qastel, the deathof
Abd al-Qaderal-Husseini,and Qawaqji'sdefeat at MishmarHa'emekin
the firsthalf of April, demonstratedthe untenabilityof the guerrillawar
conceptionandnecessitateda drasticchangein the collectiveArabpolicy
regardingthe war in Palestine.
Abdullah,displayinga brilliantsense of timingandan abilityto exploit
the alteredcircumstances,made a dramaticappealto the generalsecre-
tary of the Arab League to allow the use of the Arab Legion in orderto

save Palestine.Withthis step, Abdullahrestoredhis prestigein the inter-

Arab arena. Once more he was wooed by Arab governmentsand by the
Arab League'sgeneralsecretary,thus effectivelylegitimizinghis army's
interventionin Palestine.37However, the rapidwar gains made by the
yishuv and the streamof Arab refugeesfleeing areasoverrunby Jewish
forces, forced Abdullah to offer a quid pro quo for this inter-Arab
legitimization, in the form of an undertakingto conquer the entire
country. This decision conflicted with his plans and was beyond his
militarycapability;it also becamea politicaltrapthat souredAbdullah's
relationswith the other Arab governmentsand with the yishuv.
Acting on his new commitment,Abdullah adopted a public stance
consistentwiththe postureof the otherArabstatesbutwhichcompletely
ignored his prior understandingwith the Jewish Agency regardingthe
divisionof the country.In his speechesanddeclarationsthe kingbeganto
address'the Jewishcommunityin Palestine'and againproposedJewish
autonomyunder Arab rule.38Contraryto the explanationput forth by
some studies, the outpouringof bellicose statementsmade by Abdullah
beginning in mid-April should not be construed as readiness to act
contraryto his understandingwith the JewishAgency.39Abdullahgave
his assent to the entry of Iraqiforces into Transjordanand declaredhis
willingnessto cooperate militarilywith the other Arab states, on con-
dition that he be recognizedas the supreme commanderof the Arab
armies.By this, he hoped to gain leeway to rebuffthe pressuresof Arab
governments and the Arab League to send his army into action in
Palestineeven before 15Mayandattemptto conquerthe entirecountry.4
For its part, the JewishAgency, whose attemptsto renewthe contacts
with Abdullahin the wake of the Deir Yassinmassacrewere rejectedby
the king's court, also changed its tone towardshim aroundthe end of
April. Three months earlier the Jewish Agency had still employed
oblique and indirectlanguagein order to warn the king against being
dragged into waging war against the yishuv, and to ensure that the
strategicunderstandingbetween the two sides remainedfirm. Indeed,
the JewishAgency offered Abdullahdiplomaticsupportto obtaininter-
nationalrecognitionfor Transjordan'sindependence,firstand foremost
fromthe UnitedStates, andto haveTransjordanacceptedas a memberof
the United Nations.41In the secondhalf of April, as indicationsmounted
thatthe kingintendedto workin coordinationwiththe otherArabstates,
Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the head of the Jewish Agency's Political
Department, advised threatening Abdullah with overt military reprisals
if he were to become involved in the fightingagainstthe Jews.42
At this time the JewishAgency was engagedin intensiveendeavorsto
keep the Arab Legion out of a probablewar as the terminationof the

Mandateloomed on the horizon. Britainand Francewere requestedto

exert pressureon Abdullahnot to use his armyagainstthe yishuv. The
Jewish leadershipwas concernednot only about the high professional
qualityof the Legion, but also that its entry into the fray would trigger
thatof the IraqiArmy.43Furthermore,it was clearthatthe king'smilitary
intentions were a deciding factor concerningthe involvementof other
Arab armiesin Palestine.This was demonstratedby Egypt'sdecisionto
participate in the war only four days before the terminationof the
Mandate.
Abdullah'smilitaryplan, whichhe had begun to work out towardthe
end of 1947,calledfor the ArabLegionto re-enterPalestineimmediately
uponthe Mandate'sterminationandseize the areaallocatedfor the Arab
state, with the exception of western Galilee, Gaza and the Negev." A
basicpremisewas thatJerusalemwouldbe internationalizedandthat the
seizureof the area betweenJeninand Hebronwould assumethe charac-
ter of a policing operation without sparking hostilities.45From this
opening position Abdullah intended to conduct negotiationswith the
Jewsaimedat minimizingthe territoryof the Jewishstate andarrivingat a
federative arrangementin which the yishuv would enjoy broad auto-
nomy, or an arrangementbased on partition.The exclusionof Galilee,
Gaza and the Negev from Abdullah'sinvasionplan stemmedprimarily
from his assessmentof the limits of the Legion's strength.At the same
time, Britain,seekingto avoidcontradictingthe UN resolutions,madeits
supportfor Abdullah'splan conditionalon the Legion'sabstainingfrom
aggressionagainstthe territoryof the Jewishstate and the international
area of Jerusalem.46In fact, London was concerned about a further
deteriorationin its relationswithWashington.Anglo-Americanrelations
had alreadybeen strainedby differencesbetweenthe two countriesover
the Palestineissue, and Britainwas dependenton US aid to rehabilitate
its economy and to contain Soviet encroachmentin Europe and the
MiddleEast. Indeed, shortlybefore the Mandateexpired,Washington,
pressingits proposalfor a trucethroughoutPalestine,explicitlyurgedthe
Britishto restrainAbdullahand to preventthe Legion fromundertaking
militaryaction againstthe yishuv.47
Whetherdue to the Americancall or to the Jewishmilitarysuccesses
since mid-April,a concertedBritisheffort was discerniblebeginningin
early May to obviate a clashbetween the Legion and Jewishforces. In a
series of moves involvingBritishpoliticiansand militarypersonnel,the
JewishAgencyleadershipandthe Haganahhighcommandwereapprised
that Abdullahdid not intend to act againstthe Jewishstate and that the
Arab Legion wished to avoid a collisionwith Jewishforces.48However,
these messagesseem to have had little impacton the decisionsmade by

the Jewishhighcommand.Manifestly,one cannotdismissthe contention
that the reasonthe Jewishleadershipfailed to read the Britishmessages
properlywas its sinisterperceptionof Britainand its hatredof Bevin.49
More important,however, was Ben-Gurion'sbelief that the proclama-
tion of a Jewishstate would almostinevitablytriggeroff an invasionby
Arab regulararmies,and thus an offensiveby the Legionwas a foregone
conclusion.50
The Holy Citywasnot a goal for the ArabLegionin the planningstagesof

the war, and as such was not part of any prior agreement. To avoid
derogatingfrom the authorityof the United Nations, the commanderof
the Arab Legion, GlubbPasha, had a bypassroad built fromJerichoto
Bittin (Beit El), northof Ramallah,so that when the orderwas given his
troops would not have to pass through Jerusalem and thus risk an
accusationof Transjordanian aggressionagainstthe UnitedNations,with
all that this would imply vis-a-vis Britain.51Both the Foreign Office and
Abdullah continued to evince a cautious approachtoward Jerusalem
even when it becameapparent,upon the expiryof the Mandate,that the
United Nations had been unable to establish effective governmental
authorityin andaroundthe city. The effortmadeby LondonandAmman
in orderto avoid a clashwith the United Nationsis especiallystrikingin
view of Jerusalem'slocationin the veryheartof the regionthatAbdullah
wished to annex; and its being an essential junction for maintaininga
groundlinkbetweenSamariaandMountHebronandthe JordanValley.
Beyond the political constraints,the militarysituation also lessened
any desirethe Arab Legionor the ForeignOfficemighthave entertained
to prosecute the war in Jerusalem. On this issue we should probably
accept the explanationadducedby Glubb (even if he is not an unbiased
witness). Glubbwas concernedthat the Legion, whichconsistedalmost
entirelyof Bedouin who were trainedto operate in open spaces, would
have difficultyfunctioningin a built-uparea. Furthermore,combatin a
built-upareainevitablyexactsa largenumberof casualties,disastrousfor
a smallarmywhichlackedmanpowerreserves,suchas the Arab Legion,
whichnumberedabout6,000 soldiersand officerson the eve of the war.52
Glubb also undoubtedlytook into account the warningof the British
governmentthat it would be forced to terminate the subsidy for the
Legion and withdrawthe Britishofficerson loan to Transjordanif the
Legion became involved in battleswith the Jews in Jerusalemor in the
territoryallocatedfor the Jewish state.53
Yet despite the constraintsand considerationsmilitatingagainstthe
operation of the Legion in Jerusalem, Glubb could not disregardthe
steadilyworseningsituationof the city'sArabpopulationandthe military

advantagesecured by Haganah forces towards the end of April. The

developingsituationwas liable to draghis forces into unwantedbattles.
To precludea clash with Jewishforces in Jerusalem,or more probably,
to clarifythe possibilityof the Legion'senteringthe Arab city withouta
battle, Glubb took the unusualstep of setting up a meeting between a
delegationof officersservingunderhis commandand representativesof
the Haganahhighcommand.In the meeting,on 2 Mayat Naharayim,the
Britishofficers,speakingon behalfof Glubb,emphasizedtheirinterestin
preventing a military encounter between the two sides, particularly
in Jerusalem.The Haganahreply was that 'Jerusalemis a Jewishcity',
and that if there were free and open access to it, a clash need not
be inevitable.4
Glubb'ssummationof the meeting, as reportedby Kirkbride,under-
lined the differencesover Jerusalem.The Haganahrepresentativewas
said to have assented to the Legion'senteringthe Arab areas as desig-
nated by the partitionplan, while makingit clear that if it tried to move
into Jerusalemit wouldhaveto do so over the bodiesof Jewishdefenders.
On both sides, the reportsof the meetingsuggesta missedopportunityto
prevent bloodshed in Jerusalem, although it is extremely doubtful
whether,giventhe complexitiesof the militarytheaterandthe inter-Arab
pressureon the king, Glubb could have 'deliveredthe goods'. In any
event, no satisfactoryanswercould be found as to why this meetinghad
no sequel.
Thismeetingtook place threedaysafterthe Legionhadheavilyshelled
KibbutzGesher,nearNaharayim,in the presenceof CrownPrinceTalal,
and two days after Arab chiefs of staff had convened in Amman for an
initialdiscussionconcerningthe entryof the regulararmiesinto the war.55
So it is not surprisingthat aroundthis time leaders of the yishuv and
officialsof the JewishAgency PoliticalDepartmentbecameincreasingly
skepticalaboutAbdullah'strue intentions:wouldhe abide by the agree-
ment withthe Jewsor wouldhe attemptto conquerareasallocatedto the
Jewish state?56The fervent desire to remove the Arab Legion from the
warfrontlay behindthe repeatedattemptsmade by leadersof the 'state-
in-the-making'to renewthe contactswiththe kingin orderto clarifyfirst-
hand his stand, if not to prevent war. Not until almost the eve of the
Mandate'sexpiry did these efforts bear fruit, in the form of a secret
meeting between Golda Meyersonand Abdullah, this time in Amman,
on the nightof 10-11 May. Significantly,Jerusalemwas not mentionedat
this meeting,in whichthe kingwasproddedto revealhis intentions.Four
days before the terminationof the Mandate, with the Arab armies
makingfeverishpreparationsto invade,Abdullahcouldnot undertaketo
avert a military clash with the Jews unless they agreed to forgo the

declarationof the state and make do with autonomyunder Transjor-

daniansovereignty.Abdullah'sunequivocallanguage,almostamounting
to an ultimatum,compoundedby his manifestlygloomy state of mind,
reflectedthe tangle of domestic and inter-Arabconstraintsin which he
was enmeshed,forcinghim to act in concertwith the other Arab armies.
With precise brevity, the king explained the sea-change which had
occurred in his stand regardingthe establishmentof a Jewish state
following the previous November: 'Then I was one, now I am one of
five.'57
Commentariesand analyseson the Meyerson-Abdullahmeetinghave
attributedto it far-reachingandcrucialimportanceregardingthe coming
moves by the Jewishside. Some maintainthat an opportunitywas missed
to reachagreementor come to an understandingthatcouldhave averted
war, whetherbecause the Jewishside's representationby a woman was
anathemato the king or because of the absence of Eliahu Sasson, as a
result of which the king was misunderstood.58 Such explanationsignore
the highly chargedpolitical atmospherethat prevailedin Transjordan
andthe otherArabstatesduringthe finalweek of the BritishMandate.It
was this atmospherethat swept the Arab governmentsinto war. During
his meetingwith Golda Meyerson,Abdullahadmittedthe existenceof a
prior 'arrangement'with the Jewishside and reassertedthat he had no
interestin invadingthe territoryof the Jewishstate. However, he could
not guaranteeits immunitygiven the formationof an Arab coalition in
which he was the leading member.
For our purposes,it bearsstressingthat the questionof Jerusalemdid
not ariseat the Ammanmeeting.Thiswas evidentlydue to the trucethat
had taken effect in Jerusalemfrom aroundnoon on 8 May. The truce,
whichlasteduntilthe morningof 14 May, was the only practicalresultof
the effortsundertakenby the Britishand Americangovernmentsand by
the United Nations in the final weeks of the Mandate to achieve a
countrywideceasefire. The Britishgovernmentand the High Commis-
sioner were guided chiefly by a desire to reduce the probabilityof the
Arab armies'interventionin Jerusalem.Their non intervention,it was
thought,would facilitateAbdullah'seffortsto seize controlof the Arab
areasof Palestineand lessen the likelihoodof his gettingboggeddownin
a war with the Jews.59Aware of the deteriorationin the situationof the
Arabs in Jerusalemtowardsthe end of April, and recognizingthat the
Arab regularforceswere unpreparedand that interventionin Jerusalem
was out of the question until the expiry of the Mandate,Arab govern-
ments were increasinglydisposedto accepta trucein the city in orderto
remove Jerusalem from the theater of operations, provided this was not
exploited by the Jews to make further gains.

Throughthe mediationof the UN TrusteeshipCouncil,an agreement

in principleon a trucein the Old City of Jerusalemhad been reachedin
New York alreadyon 28 April between Jamalal-Husseini,representing
the Arab HigherCommittee,and Moshe Shertokof the JewishAgency.
Ratified by the Arab League, the agreement, accordingto which the
status quo inside the Old City would be maintainedand the fighterson
both sides would not be disarmed,was intendedprimarilyto safeguard
the holy places. On 2 Maythe Jewishforcesin the Old Citywere ordered
to hold their fire until the negotiationson this matterwere concluded.
Five days later the Jewish Agency gave its assent to the wordingof a
ceasefireagreementon the explicitconditionthat free passagefor Jews
was guaranteedbetween the Old City and the rest of Jerusalem.60 In the
absence of an authoritativerepresentativeof the Arab Higher Com-
mittee in Jerusalemwho could negotiatewith the Mandategovernment
or with the UN ConsularTruce Commission(set up on 23 April and
comprising the consuls-generalof Belgium, France and the United
States), British representativesturned to Arab governmentsand the
Arab League generalsecretaryin an effort to expandthe truce to cover
the entire area of Jerusalem.At a meeting held on 7 May in Jericho,
agreement was reached between the High Commissioner, Sir Alan
Cunningham,andthe Arab Leaguegeneralsecretary,Azzam, on a truce
to coverthe entiremunicipalareaof Jerusalemandto take effect at noon
the followingday, on conditionthat it be honoredby the Jewishside as
well.61
The provisionalMinheletHa'am(People'sAdministration),whichhad
begun functioningas the yishuv governmentin every respect, objected
strenuouslyto the Mandategovernment'sannouncementof the truce, as
it had been undertakenwithoutthe prior assent of the Jewishside and
thus constituteda purelyAnglo-Arabaccord.Nevertheless,even though
the road from the coast to Jerusalemremainedblocked and the Jewish
Quarterwas still inaccessible,the MinheletHa'amgave its consentto the
truce, which took effect as planned. Yet from the outset it was a fragile
affair.The MinheletHa'ammadeit clearto the High Commissionerthat
the ceasefire was temporary,and reiteratedits terms for a truce: free
access fromthe coast to Jerusalem,and fromthe westernpartof the city
to the JewishQuarterin the Old City, as well as the removalof foreign
Arab troops from the Jerusalem region.62On 12 May, the Minhelet
Ha'am, which had alreadyheard Golda Meyerson'sgrim report about
her meetingwith Abdullah,discussedthe variousproposalsput forward
by the British authorities, and by certain UN bodies, for a truce in
Jerusalem.Also on the agendawas an Americanproposalfor an agree-
ment on a three-monthgeneral countrywidetruce between the Jewish

Agency andthe ArabHigherCommittee,an agreementthatwouldentail

deferring the declarationof the Jewish state for the duration of the
truce.63
In the light of the Arab regulararmies'preparationsfor invasion,the
dominant tendency among the Jewish leadership was to view a truce in
Jerusalemas interlockedwith the situationin the countryoverall. Ben-
Gurion stood out in objecting to a truce in Jerusalemwhich, in his
opinion, would tie the hands of the Jewish side preciselywhere it had
achieved a clear militaryadvantage,whereasArab forces would enjoy
freedom of action and could attackthe rest of the countryat will. Even
the advocatesof a truceadmittedthatit wasunfeasiblein the absenceof a
militaryforcethatcouldimposeit on the Arabs, andin view of the virtual
certaintythat the United Nationswouldprove unableto assumerespon-
sibility for the city following the departureof the British forces.64The
same considerationled to doubtson the Arab side as well regardingthe
viabilityof a trucein Jerusalem.Azzamwasconvincedthatin the absence
of a power able to enforce the termsof the truceon the belligerents,the
Jews would not hesitate to violate it in order to improvetheir position,
particularlyin view of the fact that since the end of April the Army of
Deliverancehad been successfullyblockingthe roadto Jerusalemin the
Latrunsector. Indeed, the Haganahwas at this time engagedin 'Opera-
tion Maccabi',a desperateandultimatelyfutileattemptto breakthe siege
of the city. It is noteworthy,however,that both Kirkbrideand the High
Commissionerassessed that if a truce were obtained in Jerusalem,the
city would be spared a militaryconfrontation.65
Ben-Gurion's apprehensionsregardingan Arab offensive outside of

Jerusalemwere borneout even before the startof the Arabinvasion.On
12 May the Arab Legion, assisted by local villagers, attackedKibbutz
Kfar Etzion, which fell after two days of fighting. On 14 May the
remainingthree kibbutzimof the Etzion Bloc surrendered.The attack
was carriedout withAbdullah'sknowledgeand at Glubb'sinstruction,in
order to remove a Jewish position that was located in the territory
allocatedto the Arab state andwhichfor long monthshadbeen a bane to
Arabtrafficon the Hebron-Jerusalemroad.66 It wasof vitalinterestto the
Legion to maintainclear passageas this road was a crucialaxis for the
transitof convoys transportingammunitionand materiel from British
armycamps in the Suez Canal region to the Legion.67
Both BritishArmy HQ in Palestineand the Britishrepresentativein
Amman hastened to defend the Legion and to absolve the British
governmentof responsibilityfor the Etzion Bloc operation.On 13 May,

BritishArmy HQ in Palestineissuedan officialcommuniquestatingthat

the ArabLegionwasno longersubjectto its authority.At thattime, more
than two Legion battalionswere still stationedin the Nablus Ramallah
region and in the JordanValley, most of which were in the process of
being evacuated to Transjordan.Formally, until the evacuation was
completed,these forceswere underthe commandof the BritishArmyin
Palestine.KirkbridecabledLondonthat the attackon the Etzion settle-
ments had been perpetratedby locals and that units of the Arab Legion
that had 'chanced'upon the battle had tried to rescue Jewish civilians
from the hands of Arab villagers.6
The MinheletHa'am viewed the Etzion Bloc operation as the first
phaseof the Legion'sinvasionof Palestineandas the preludeto an attack
on Jerusalem, which was perceived as a key target for the Legion.69
Confusionanddelaysin the processof the Legion'swithdrawalled to this
misinterpretationof the Legion'sactions. On 16 April, Britain'sambas-
sador to the United Nations., Sir AlexanderCadogan,had announced
officiallythat all Legionunitswouldbe pulledout of Palestinebeforethe
official date of the Mandate'stermination,15 May.70Accordingto the
British military plan of evacuation, Arab Legion units stationed in
Palestinewere to withdrawtwo weeks beforethat date. However, due to
constraintsrelating to British evacuation operations, and perhaps in
orderto securethe convoysbearingBritishsuppliesto the Legion'sbases
in Transjordan,some unitsremainedfor a longerperiod. In any case, all
were to have left by 13 May at the latest. Yet, in the finaltwo daysof the
Mandate the local British command appears to have been remiss in
verifyingthe departureof all Legionforcesfromthe country,andperhaps
also in failing to inform the Legion high command about the High
Commissioner'sintentionto advancehis departurefromJerusalemto the
morningof 14May.None of thisis surprisinggiventhe indifferenceof the
Britishmilitaryto the eventsoccurringin the countryduringthe last days
of the Mandategovernment:the sole concernof the Britishwas to secure
their essential withdrawalroutes. However, the possibilitycannot be
ruled out that BritishArmy HQ in Palestinedeliberatelyturneda blind
eye to the two Legion companies assigned to remain in Nablus and
Ramallahbeyond the close of the Mandate,in the assumptionthat the
Jewswouldnot objectto theirpresencein areaswhichin anycase wereto
come under the control of the Hashemitekingdom.71
The Legion, for its part,was takenby surpriseat the earlydepartureof
the British forces from Jerusalem;the Haganah'sblockingof the roaci
from Jerusalemto Bethlehem left one company in the Hebron area,
which accordingto Kirkbride'sreport had not managed to return to
Transjordan.72 It is possible that this companywas accidentallycut off

from the rear. Arguably,however, the unit was left behinddeliberately,
like the guardforces which SuleimanMusa says were deliberatelyleft
behind in Nablus and Ramallah.In this case, too, the Legion could not
reach Bethlehem and Hebron without passing throughJerusalemand
thusviolatingthe city'sinternationalstatus.Furthermore,as of late April
the city's southern approaches were effectively in the hands of the
Haganah,andonly the interventionof the BritishArmyenabledtrafficto
move on the Jerusalem-Bethlehemroad.73
The Haganahcommandin Jerusalemknew in advancethat the High
Commissionerhad decidedto move up his departurefromthe city to the
morningof 14 May, in advance of the Mandate'sexpiry at midnight.
Utilizing this information,the Haganahdrew up a plan to seize road
junctions, buildingsand militaryfacilitiesimmediatelyafter the British
departed.The Hanagah'sobjectivewasto forge a territorialcontinuityto
enable the defense of isolatedsectionsof the city that were underJewish
control ('OperationKilshon').74 Immediatelyupon the departureof the
High Commissionerand the evacuation of the British garrisonfrom
Jerusalemon 14 May, Jewishforcesseized the securityzone in the center
of the city ('Bevingrad')and took controlof the armyand police camps,
capitalizingon the element of surprise and their local superiorityin
force.7 Jewish forces also seized the city's northern neighborhoods
relativelyquicklyandlinkedup withMountScopus.Withintwo daysthe
greaterpartof Jerusalemoutsidethe Old Citywallswas in Jewishhands,
withthe exceptionof MountZion (subsequentlycapturedon the nightof
17-18 May) and the Mount of Olives. The northern and southern
approachesto the city were now held by Jewish forces, leaving the
Jericho-Jerusalemroadas the Arabs'sole accessroute. The implementa-
tion of OperationKilshonwas facilitatedby the absenceof manyof the
Arab volunteersin Jerusalem,who had eagerlyjoined the battle for the
EtzionBloc- whichcontinuedto rageon 14 May- andwho were blocked
in their attemptto returnto the city upon the departureof the British.76
With the situation fluid and uncertaintyprevailingas to the enemy's
intentions,both sides acted accordingto worst-casescenariosand sought
to exploit every opportunitycreatedby the Britishwithdrawalto secure
militaryadvantages.The rapid pace of events, and the confusion sur-
rounding the British withdrawalforced this approachon both sides,
leadingto a cycleof pre-emptiveactionsas each side anticipateda hostile
move from the other.77
The evacuationof the BritishforcesfromJerusalemand the successof
OperationKilshonwere what finallybroughtabout the Arab Legion's
intervention in the fighting for the city. True, this intervention was
delayed for four days (15-18 May) which the Jordanian historian

SuleimanMusa calls 'the lost days'.78During this four-dayperiod, the

Legion units deployed in Samariaand the JordanValley were almost
completelyidle, whilein Jerusalem,Arabvolunteerandlocalforceswere
reeling under the Jewish offensive. On other fronts the yishuv was
desperatelytryingto containthe invadingArab armies.The eventsof the
four 'lost days' are the key to understandingthe political and military
considerationsthatguidedKingAbdullahandthe ArabLegioncomman-
der, General Glubb, and that produceda strategicturningpoint in the
Legion's operationalpolicy for Jerusalemand Latrun.
The withdrawalof the British from Jerusalem created a vacuum of

authority in the city, encouragingeach side to enhance its military
standing.To the Jews, thiswas imperativein view of the ensuinginvasion
of the Arabarmies.Endeavorsby the UN ConsularTruceCommissionto
restore the truce in the city were unavailing.This was in part due to its
inability to enforce a ceasefire; difficultiesof command and control
amongthe Arab irregulars,and non-coordinationbetweenthe Consular
Truce Commission and the representativeof the InternationalRed
Cross, who conductedhis own negotiationswith the Arab side.
On 14 May, duringOperationKilshon, authorizedrepresentativesof
the Jewish side in Jerusaleminformedthe Truce Commissionof their
readinessto resumethe ceasefire,on conditionthat it be honoredby the
Arabs as well.79The Jews reasserted this stance in the coming days,
perhapsfearingArab Legionintervention.However,the situationon the
ground led the local commandof the Arab irregularsto use delaying
tactics in an attempt to gain time, in practice rejecting the ceasefire
proposalsin expectationof interventionby the invadingArab Legion,
which entered the countryon the night of 14 May along with the other
Arabarmies.At the sametime the Arabssteppedup theirpressureon the
besieged JewishQuarterin the Old City, where they enjoyed a marked
local advantage,and broughtpublicpressureon KingAbdullahto come
to their aid.
By the evening of 16 May, the situation in the Jewish Quarterhad
become critical;franticcalls for help confrontedthe Haganahcommand
with the need to breach the Old City walls in order to relieve the
beleaguereddefenders.In retrospect,it is apparentthat preciselythese
attemptsto relieve the JewishQuarterbroughtabout the Arab Legion's
interventionin Jerusalemand sealed the fate of the JewishQuarter.Yet
even if the Haganahhad been awarethat its actionsto raisethe siege of
the Jewish Quarterwere liable to cause the Legion's intervention,it is
doubtfulthatits planswouldhavebeen different.The decisiveelementin

the Jewishcommand'smotivationswasthe urgentneed to preventthe fall

of the Jewish Quarter and the fear of an attendant massacre of its
inhabitantsand defenders.Repeateddailyeffortsto breachthe Old City
defenses were undertakenbeginning on the night of 16-17 May. Al-
thoughthe initialthrustfailed, the Arabsviewed it as an attemptby the
Jews to exploit their successeselsewhere and capturethe Old City. An
attemptthe followingnightwas also repulsed,but its secondaryeffortled
to the capture of Mount Zion, overlookingthe Old City's southwest
section, by a Palmach force. On the night of 18-19 May this force
succeededin breachingthe Zion Gate andreinforcingthe JewishQuarter
with men and ammunition.Followingthis gain, Jewishrepresentatives
renewedtheir ceasefireproposal,evidentlyin orderto obviatethe Arab
Legion's interventionin the fighting.80 But it was too late. The fall of
MountZion constituteda watershedfor KingAbdullah,who now felt he
had no alternativebut to orderhis forcesto join the battlefor Jerusalem.
Thus, as the Jewishceasefireproposalwas beingput forward,the Legion
was alreadyattackingthe Jewishforces in the SheikhJarrahneighbor-
hood as part of a drive to link up with the Old City.
The gains registeredby the Jewishforces in Jerusalemin the firsttwo
days followingthe Britishevacuation,and even more, their attemptsto
breachthe Old City, broughthome starklyto the Arabsthe dangerthat
the whole city mightbe lost. Besides pressuresexerted by Arab govern-
ments and the Arab League general secretary, a mountingstream of
desperatecallsfor help beganto reachAbdullahfromArabnotablesand
publicfiguresin Jerusalem;some of them went to Ammanto plead with
the kingto save the city sacredto Islamfromfallinginto the handsof the
Jews.81
It shouldbe noted that the joint warplandevisedby Arab militaryand
politicalrepresentativesduringfeverishdiscussionsheld in Ammanand
Damascusfrom 11 to 13 Maymade absolutelyno mentionof Jerusalem.
This omissionis accountedfor primarilyby the fact that Jerusalemwas
designatedto be an internationalzone undera UN aegis, and the Arab
governmentswishedto avoid infringingthe authorityof the worldbody.
Yet it is unlikelythat the plannersof the invasioncouldhave ignoredthe
questionof Jerusalemwere it not for the unofficialtrucethatprevailedin
the city from 8 May. Accordingto the originalinvasionplan, the Arab
Legionwas to enterPalestinein the Gesher(Naharayim)area,on the left
flankof the IraqiArmy, with the Syriansadvancinginto Galilee through
Lebanon.The Lebanese Army was to adopt a defensiveposture, while
the Egyptianforces would advancefrom south to northalong the coast.
The plan meant to split the Jewish state in the area of the Jezreel and
JordanValleys, with Haifa as the mainobjective. However, the plandid

not mesh with Abdullah'sintentions,and he insistedthat it be alteredto

enable the Arab Legion to enter via the Allenby Bridge near Jericho and
then deploy in the Nablus-Ramallahregion, and to maintaina reserve
force on the upper part of the Jericho-Jerusalemroad.82Abdullah's
demandwas secondedby the EgyptianArmyrepresentativeto the Arab
General Command,who wished to secure his forces' right flank. The
revised invasionplan, which took effect by order of the General Com-
mandon 14May,disruptedthe deploymentof the Syrians,some of whose
forceswere alreadyin the processof movinginto Lebanon.The new plan
called for the SyrianArmy to attackin the Samakhsector, south of the
Sea of Galilee, with the Gesher-Naharayimsector in the Beit She'an
Valley assignedto the Iraqis.83
In retrospect, Arab leaders complained that in altering the plan
Abdullah had exploited his position - which was only nominal - as
SupremeCommanderof the Arab Forcesto advancehis own ambitions.
This, it was held, caused the failureof the invasion.8At all events, the
majorityof the Arab Legion'ssoldierswould very soon find themselves
engaged in bitter fightingin Jerusalem- whichhad not been taken into
accountas a battletheater- due to the rapiddeteriorationin the situation
of the city'sArab populationfollowingthe High Commissioner'sdepar-
ture on 14 May. Despite the intentionto station a reserve force on the
roadfromJerichoto Jerusalem,Abdullahstill hopedthatthe ceasefirein
Jerusalem would be restored and war prevented.85This approach is
evident from the Legion's manner of deployment and its operational
activity beginning at midnighton 14 May, when Legion units began
crossingthe JordanRiveranddeployingin the Samariaregion,bypassing
Jerusalem.
The Legion's defensive stance was evident in the order by the high
commandto the 1stbattalion- deployednearTulkarmandQalqilia- not
to cross the railwayline westwardof those two towns, regardlessof
Jewishoffensivein that area. The 4th Battalion,deployedat Deir Nizam
and Khirbatha,east of Latrun,was obliged to stand aside as Haganah
forces renewed their efforts to open the road to Jerusalem('Operation
MacabbiB'). In the battle on the night of 15-16 May, Deir Ayub and
Latrunwere capturedand the roadwas opened for the passageof a small
supplyconvoy whichin practiceamountedto a singletruck(the 'orphan
convoy'). The relatively easy capture of these positions was effected
without the Jews realizingthat the Army of Deliverancehad evacuated
those positions the previous night. An effort to get another convoy
through on the night of 17-18 May was only partiallysuccessful, but
sufficient to indicate to the Legion's command that it had become
necessaryto bloc the road to Jerusalem.When the Legion moved in to

retake the Latrunpositions, they found them abandonedby the main

Haganahunitin the operation,whichhadbeen urgentlydispatchedto the
southern front to beef up the forces trying to contain the invading
EgyptianArmy.
The tremendouseffortsinvestedby the Haganahin tryingto open the
road to Jerusalem in the final week of the Mandate government, despite
its other missions and the limited forces at its disposal, attest to the
supreme importancewhich the Jewish leadershipattachedto securing
control of Jerusalemand its approachesbefore the onset of the Arab
invasion. It is preciselyfor this reason and because of the heavy price
Israel would pay in repeated unsuccessfulattempts to capture Latrun
until the end of the 'Ten Day Battles' - that this irrevocablymissed
opportunityto seize controlof the key Latrunsectordominatingthe main
road fromthe coast to Jerusalem,is so glaring.86This mayhave been due
to a misreadingof the rotationof Arab forcesin the sector. On the night
of 14-15 May the Armyof Deliveranceevacuatedthe areawithoutprior
coordinationwith the Arab Legionandwithoutwaitingfor the Legionto
assumethe positionsto be evacuated.87 The evacuationof Latrunwaspart
of a general withdrawalof the Army of Deliverancefrom Palestine to
Syriain orderto reorganize,at the orderof the Damascus-basedHQ of
the Arab volunteer forces. The explanationfor the non-coordination
between Qawuqjiand the Legion regardingthe evacuationof Latrunis
relatedto the Syriancontrolof the Armyof Deliverance,andthe strained
relationsbetween Amman and Damascus.88
The failure of the unofficial Arab war effort, and the impending
invasionof Arab regulararmiesinto Palestine,promptedthe Syriansto
order Qawaqjito withdrawhis forces to Syriafor reorganization.Thus,
the Syriangovernmentintendedto ensurenot only that Qawaqji'sforce
wouldnot be utilizedby Abdullahfor his own purposes,but also that the
Army of Deliverancewould continueto serve Syria'sinterestsin Pales-
tine. As of June, the Army of Deliverancere-enteredPalestine in the
Galilee, operating as the main Arab force in this area, under direct
commandof the SyrianArmy.89
Accordingto SuleimanMusa,fromthe veryfirstdayof the Legion'sentry

into Palestine,some of its Arabofficersbeganto showsignsof impatience
at the defensive posture adopted by their commanders and at the
deploymentof Legion units in a mannercalculatedto averta clash with
the Jews. In a visit to Legion unitsin Samaria,Glubband CrownPrince
Talal heard harsh complaints about the troops' enforced idleness -
complaintswhichsoon reachedAmman.Even local leaderswere critical

of the Legion'sfailureto act as the radioreportedthe triumphantadvance

of other Arab armies. On 16 May the king received a delegation of
notables from villages in the Latrun area who protested the Legion's
inaction and demanded that it seize the villages dominating the road from
the coastalplainto Jerusalem.90
Whetheras a resultof these entreatiesor
out of militaryconsiderationsrelatedto the situationin Jerusalem,and
the continuedJewish effort to secure the road for furtherconvoys, the
Legion's4th Battalionwas redeployed.Fromthe nightof 17-18 May, it
took up positionson the high groundof Bab al-Wadand Latrun,which
had been vacated by Jewish forces. Again they blocked the road to
Jerusalem,preventingadditionalJewish reinforcementsfrom reaching
the city.
It bears stressingthat Latrun,unlike Jerusalem,was in the territory
designatedfor the Arabstate, andthe Legion'sBritishcommanderswere
not troubled about the legitimacyof deployingin this sector. Further-
more, because of the crucialstrategiclocation of these outposts, at the
junctionof the roadsfromthe lowlandsto Jerusalemand Ramallah,the
Legion's deployment - although primarily defensive in character - be-
came a decisive factor in reducingJewish pressure in Jerusalem. If,
nevertheless,the Legiondid not hastento seize the area, the explanation
may lie in its defensive orientationand its wish to avoid a clash with
Jewish forces on the road to Jerusalem.
It was preciselythis defensiveposture,Abdullahcame to realize, that
was encouragingthe Jewsto continuetheirattacksin Jerusalem,particu-
larlytheir unremittingeffortsto raise the siege of the JewishQuarter.It
appeared, indeed, that the Jews were bent on capturingthe Old City.
However, neither the king, and certainlynot Glubb, could ignore the
warningof the British governmentthat was transmittedvia Kirkbride
concurrentwith the Arab armies'invasion.London made it plain that a
Legion attackon territoryallocatedfor the Jewishstate, would compel
Britainto terminateits financialsubsidyto the Legion and to withdraw
the British officers seconded to the Legion.91The optimal means of
resolvingthe dilemmawas to renewthe trucein orderto avertdamageto
the holy places or a violation of UN sovereignty. As the Legion was
unable simultaneously to defend the Nablus-Ramallah area and
prosecute a war in Jerusalem, a truce seemed the only reasonable
solution. But efforts to reinstate the truce were futile, and in the
meantimethe situationof the Arab fightersin the city had deteriorated.
On 16 May, volunteersin the Armyof Deliverance,underthe command
of an Iraqiofficer,FadilRashidAbdullah,hadretreatedinto the Old City
and dug in behind its walls. Accordingto one witness, there were some
60,000 people in the Old City at this time, two-thirdsof them refugees

who had fled from nearbyvillages and from neighborhoodsin the New
City. There were about 700 Arab fightersin the Old City at the time of
the invasion, 300 of them from the Army of Deliverance and the rest
local Palestinians.The total numberof Arab troops in the entire city
stood at approximately2,000, as opposed to 3,000 trained Jewish
troops, only half of whom were equippedwith personalweapons. The
Arab force suffered from a split in commandbetween loyalists to the
Muftiandpersonnelof the Armyof Deliverance,as well as froma severe
shortage of ammunition.Arab ranks were vitiated by organizational
chaos and low morale. The city's civil affairs were administeredby
Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi, the only member of the Arab Higher
Committeewho was still in Jerusalem.92
On 16 May, followingthree days in whicha steady streamof calls for
help reachedAbdullah,the king sent Glubba writtenorderto 'preserve
what exists - the Old City and the Jerichoroad'. He went on to remind
Glubbof the Arab and Muslimworld'ssensitivitytowardJerusalemand
of the severe ramificationsan Arab defeat in the city would have for
Transjordanitself.93At almost exactly the same time, Fadil Rashid
dispatchedtwo cables to Abdullah via the commandof the Army of
Deliverance,appealingfor help. The Jews, Rashidsaid, were shellingthe
Temple Mount, and the Arabs in the Old City faced annihilation.
However, the Legion commandseemed to be in no hurryto execute the
king's instructions,the more so as their vague language gave Glubb
discretionas to theiroperationalinterpretation.The latterspentmost of
his time with the unitson the front- accordingto Kirkbride,in orderto
escapethe pressurebeingexertedon himby the kingto launchoperations
for rescuingJerusalem.94
The Palmach'sattemptto breachthe wallsof the Old Cityon the night
of 16-17 May, and the simultaneouscalls for help fromAhmadHilmi to
the king by telephone (which astonishinglycontinuedto function), left
Abdullahin no doubtthat his ordershad not been implementedand that
the situationof the Arabs in the Old City was desperate. In an urgent
Cabinetmeetingon the morningof 17 May , attendedby Glubband his
second-in-command,the tensionwhichhadbeen buildingup betweenthe
king and his ministersand the Britishcommanderof the armyburstinto
the open. Allegedly threatening abdication, Abdullah reaffirmed his
determination to move the Legion into Jerusalem, and suggested that he
himself assume command of the army. The Cabinet endorsed the king's
stand, but not before an acrimonious exchange had taken place between
Glubb and the interior minister.95
Yet even then the Jordanian government's decision was carried out
gradually and hesitantly: not only Glubb, it seemed, but the king too, still

wishedto exploreeverypossibleavenueto avoidan armedclashwiththe

Jews and to restore the truce. The British continued to insist that
Abdullahnot deviatefromthe parametersof his originalplan. Bevin had
expressedconcernover a reportfrom Kirkbrideon 17 May that he had
received a message from King Abdullah affirminghis commitment
toward 'all of Palestine and particularlyJerusalem'.In response, Kirk-
bridewasinstructedto informthe kingthatanyfullscaleLegionattackon
Jerusalemwould cause Britainconsiderabledifficultiesand prove detri-
mentalto its relationswith Transjordan.6At the same time, the tension
and discordbetween the king and his ministersand Glubbwere clearly
reflectedin a step taken by Abdullahin the wake of the 17 May Cabinet
meeting. Goingover Glubb'shead, the kingphonedAbdullahal-Tal,the
commanderof the 6th Battalion, which was deployed on the Jericho-
Jerusalemroad,andorderedhimto dispatcha companyto Jerusalem.97 A
Legion companyduly took up positions in the Tur neighborhood above
the Mount of Olives on the night of 17-18 May. Followingthe Jewish
forces'captureof MountZion duringthatnight,the companymovedinto
the Old City in the pre-dawnhours.
The actions of both sides at this criticaljuncture,as the Arab Legion
began deployingin Jerusalem,underscoretheirsharedawarenessof the
gravityof the hourandtheiruncertaintyaboutthe future.Compounding
the situationwas a breakdownof communicationsbetweenthe two sides,
and a consequentmisreadingby each of them of the other's moves and
intentions. Even before the first Legion company entered the city,
Legion forces moved into the isolatedJewishsettlementsto its north, in
an apparenteffort to heighten the threat of interventionand deter the
Jewish command from pursuing its offensive against the Old City.
Followingthe fall of the KefarEtzion andthe massacreof its settlers,the
Jewish inhabitantsof Atarot had been evacuatedon the night of 14-15
May. On 15May, a Legionunitenteredthe emptysettlement.On May17
a Legion force entered Neve Ya'akov, also cleared of Jewish residents
followinga heavy barragethe previousday by the Army of Deliverance
and possiblyalso by the Legion. Concurrentlythe Legion moved two 25
pounder cannons to within range of Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, on the morningof 18 May the Legion high command
made yet anotherattemptto avert a directconfrontationin Jerusalem.
This took the form of a cable from Abd al-Qadir al-Jundi, Glubb's
second-in-commandand the senior Arab officer in the Legion, to
Qawaqji,requestinghis urgentaidfor the Arabsin the Old City.98 At this
time Qawaqji'sArmy of Deliverance was moving towardsthe Nablus
sector priorto being evacuatedto Syria.However, Qawaqjirecalledhis
artilleryfrom Nablus, reinforcedit with a companyof Syrianvolunteers

and local fightersroundedup on the way, and launchedan attackon the

Jewishpositionsin SheikhJarrahand on the northernJewishneighbor-
hoods. The Arab Legion remainedinactive. At aroundnoon, Glubb,
then in Ramallah,receiveda cablefromthe kingorderinghimto advance
towardJerusalemin order to create a threat againstthe Jews and thus
ensuretheiragreementto renewthe trucein the city. Half an hourlatera
second messagearrived,this one from the ministerof defense, ordering
Glubb in the king's name to attackthe Jewish neighborhoodsof Jeru-
salem. 'An attackon the Jewswouldease the pressureon the Arabsand
wouldinclinethe Jewsto acceptthe truceforJerusalem,'the cablestated.
Abdullah's order was influenced by the UN Consular Truce Commission
representativewho had visitedAmmanin anotherattemptto establisha
ceasefire.9 However, renewed efforts by the Truce Commission to
arrangea ceasefirein Jerusalemwere stymiedby the determinationof the
command of the Arab irregularsto dictate terms of surrenderto the
Jewish Quarter, where the Arabs had the advantage, although their
situationin the city as a whole was more than desperate.'°
After fourdaysof inactionin whichthe plightof the Arabsin the Old City
worsened,Glubbcould no longerrebuffthe pressuresfromthe king, the
government and public opinion, or cope with the grumblingof the
Legion's Arab officersand soldiers, who were on the brinkof mutiny.
Above all, however, an interventionin Jerusalemhad become a military
necessityfor the Legion itself, since the fall of the Old City to the Jews
would mean that virtuallynothing could prevent their advanceon the
Jerusalem-Jerichoroad to cut off the Legion'sunitsfrom the rear.10' By
the evening of May 18 Glubb had lost all hope that the truce could be
renewed, and henceforthhis ordersreflecteda change in the operative
policyregardingthe use of the Legion. The Jews'captureof MountZion
on the previous night convinced Glubb of the need to reinforce the
defensesof the Old City, to whichend he orderedthe dispatchthereof an
additionalcompany,led by Abdullahal-Tal,who also assumedcommand
of the Arabforcesin the Old City.The reinforcementswereinstrumental
in the recaptureof the Zion Gate only hours after a Palmachforce had
breached it on the night of 18-19 May and had linked up with the
defendersof the JewishQuarter.Significantly,the Legion force had no
difficultyin retakingthe Zion Gate after the Palmachforce left the site
due to faulty coordinationwith the Haganahcommandin the city.102
At best, however, the Arab garrisonin the Old City could delay its
captureby the Jewsonly temporarily.An Arab offensivewas requiredto
raise the partialsiege of the Old City and bringabout the restorationof

the truce. In view of the Legion'slimitedorderof battle, interventionin

Jerusalemwould entail a thinningout of forces which were executing
equally essential missions in other sectors. The 1st Battalion, for
example,wasengagedin battlein the Qalqilyaarea, andthe 4thBattalion
was blockingthe roadto Jerusalemat Latrun.At Glubb'sdisposal,then,
were the 2nd Battalion,whichwas deployedon the RadarRidge, andthe
3rd Battalion, which was being held as a reserve force. Glubb'sorders
were to attackat dawnthe followingdayfromnorthto southin the Sheikh
Jarraharea, in order to create unbrokenArab access to the Old City.103
The Legion'sbattalion-forceattackon the morningof 19 Maytook the
Jews by surprise.Its result was to cut off the Jewishoutpost on Mount
Scopus, which included the Hebrew Universitycampus and Hadassah
hospital. By noon the assaultingforce had reachedthe DamascusGate,
but its Britishcommanderdecidedto retreatto SheikhJarrahfor fear he
would not be able to hold the narrowstriphe had captured.It was not
until 24 May, following bitter fighting and the dispatch of the 3rd
Battalionas well, that the Legion was able to forge a defensiblelink-up
between Ramallahand the Old City. Manpowerconstraintsforced the
Legionto leave MountScopusas a Jewishenclaveon its flankafterbeing
thrownback in a first attemptto capturethe hill. Despite the strategic
importanceof MountScopus,the Legioninvestedin no additionalmajor
effort to take it, perhapsit was not a necessityin termsof the immediate
goal of creatingan unbrokenlandcorridorto the Old Cityandpreventing
its captureby the Jews.
The offensiveexecutedby the 3rdBattalionon 24 Mayin the sectorsof
SheikhJarrah,Mea Shearim,Musraraandthe Notre Dame conventwas
markedby hastypreparationandan absenceof intelligenceinformation.
As a result, the attack registered limited achievements;particularly
glaringwas the failureto take Notre Dame, overlookingthe Old City's
northwestsection. Whatappearedto be the Legion'sonly attemptduring
the warto breachthe Jewishline of defense and stormthe New Citywas
in fact no more than an attemptto broadenthe land corridoralong the
Ramallah-DamascusGate axis. The Legion'sdisinclinationto attackthe
New City has been explainedas emergingfrom Abdullah'snotion that
the capture of the whole city by either side would lead to its inter-
nationalization.Thisexplanationassumesthatthe Legionwas capableof
conqueringthe whole city.1 However,this analysisdiminishesthe acuity
of the dilemmathat accompaniedthe Legion'sinterventionin Jerusalem
and ignores its limited goal.
The decisive factor in the king's attitude toward Jerusalemwas the
urgentneed to save the Old City;only by committinghis armycould he
preventits fall to the Jews and his consequentdenunciationby the Arab

and Muslimworld for its loss. Given the Legion's order-of-battleand

missionsin this period, the captureof the New City, let alone the holding
of it, was totallyout of the question.Furthermore,a close examinationof
the sources,includingBritishForeignOfficedocuments,revealsnot even
a hint, at this stage in the war, that either Abdullah or the British
representativesentertainedthe considerationmentioned above - pre-
venting the city's internationalization.Insofar as the Legion's moves
were conditionaluponBritishapproval,theywereboundby the principle
of internationalization whichremainedfundamentalto the conceptionof
the Foreign Office. From the first truce, the British representativesin
Jerusalemand Ammansoughtto advancethat principleby fosteringthe
existenceof two separatemunicipaladministrations,one Jewishandone
Arab, under UN auspices.1°5 In the war's first week, both Glubb and
Abdullahset as their goal no more than an essentialminimumobjective
that would be commensuratewith the Legion'scapabilities,would pre-
clude the encirclementof its units in Samaria,and would extricatethe
kingfromhis moral-politicalplightin viewof the dangerthatthe Old City
might be conqueredby the Jews.
Beside the kingandGlubb,the BritishMinisterin Amman,Kirkbride,
also playeda partin the decisionconcerningthe Legion'sinterventionin
the battle for Jerusalem. Kirkbride'sindependent approach, and the
considerableinfluencehe wieldedat Abdullah'scourt, at times disposed
him to exerciseselectivityin his reportsto Londonor in fullyimplement-
ing the directives he received.'06This tendency was well illustratedin
Kirkbride'sbehaviorregardingthe Legion'sinterventionin Jerusalem.
Kirkbridewas aware that the British officers seconded to the Arab
Legionwereof vitalimportancefor the realizationof Abdullah'splan. As
the end of the Mandateapproached,Kirkbrideworkedto delay a British
governmentorderrecallingthe officers,as long as he deemed the move
unwarrantedby the circumstances.In support of his case, Kirkbride
arguedthat a militaryclashbetween the Legion andJewishforces might
well be avoided, and reportedincidentallyon a meeting that had been
held betweenLegionandHaganahofficersat Naharayimon 2 May.107 On
19 May, when the Legion's attack on Jerusalem was at its height,
Kirkbridereportedthat Glubbwasundergrowingpressurefromthe king
and the prime minister to intervene in Jerusalem:Legion units were
outragedat theirinaction,and the publicbelievedthat Britainwas using
the Legion as an instrumentto effect partition.Even the primeminister
had askedhim, Kirkbridenoted, whetherhe hadorderedGlubbto avoid
engaging the Jews in battle, or whether Glubb was acting on his own
volition. KirkbridedescribedGlubb'sharshdilemma:shouldhe advance
westwardandattackareasthathadbeen allocatedfor the Jewishstate, or

shouldhe tryto save ArabJerusalemandthe placesholy to Islam.Glubb

had opted for the second alternative,and Kirkbridedid not conceal his
supportfor thischoice. In his view, the defense of the Islamicholy places
would greatlyenhanceAbdullah'sprestigein the Arab worldand, more
important,wouldruleout the possibilitythatthe kingmightbe accusedof
treasonous behavior. 08
The interventionin Jerusalemtook preferenceover an attackon the
Jewishstate, althoughboth moves were a violationof UN authorityand
wouldembroilBritainandTransjordanwiththe worldorganization.The
decision to intervene, however, stemmed from practicalreasons: the
Jewish state, immediately upon its establishment, was a fait accompli,
recognizedby the internationalcommunityand defended by sovereign
militaryforces.In contrast,sinceno concretepoliticalauthorityhadbeen
createdin Jerusalem,interventionin the city did not entailentanglement
witha sovereignentity. Kirkbride'sindependentapproachwas alsomani-
fest in the way he tackledthe issue of the Britishofficerssecondedto the
Legion. Whenthe Britishgovernmentorderedtheirwithdrawalto Trans-
jordan, following the 29 May adoption of a UN countrywidetruce,
Kirkbridewas able to evade implementingthe order. The officerswere
indeed sent to Transjordan,but for a very briefperiod, before rejoining
their Legion units.'°9
The complexityof the Jerusalemtheater of operations prior to the
Legion'sinterventionmade it a magnetfor the war effort of both sides.
Until that intervention, the Arabs inside the Old City and the Jews
outside it sought to maximizethe local advantagethey enjoyed in their
own sectors.Yet by doingso they generatedexternalpressuresthatwere
detrimentalto these advantages.Thusthe pressureexertedon the Jewish
Quarterby Arab irregularsbroughtin its wake Jewishattackson other
sectors of the Old City; these attacks in turn, caused the Legion to
intervene, once it became clear that their blockingof the road from the
lowlandsto Jerusalemwas ineffectualin reducingthe intensityof Jewish
attackson the Old City.By andlarge,these developmentswerethe result
of miscommunicationbetween the Haganahcommandin Jerusalemon
the one handandArabirregularforces, KingAbdullahandGlubbon the
other andmisreadingsby eachside of the adversary'sintentions.The split
in the Arabforcesoperatingin andaroundJerusalem,andthe absenceof
an Arab centralcommand,furtherreducedthe likelihoodof an under-
standingthat mighthave preventeda collisionbetweenthe Jewishforces
and the Arab Legion.
Given the balanceof forces in the variouscirclesof action described
above, the Jewishside could not rely on the Legion'stotal non-interven-
tion, or even on its remainingaloof for a lengthyperiod. If the attackon
the Etzionsettlementshadnot sufficedto bearout the Jewishcommand's

apprehensionsas to the Legion'sintentions,the aggressivepostureof the

Arab volunteer forces even after the invasion destroyed all hope that
truce was possible on the Jerusalem front. The ongoing shelling of
Jerusalemby the Armyof Deliverance;the attackon Neve Ya'akovon 16
May that forced the Jewishinhabitantsto evacuatetheir homes; the 19
May attack by volunteers and a Legion company on Kibbutz Ramat
Rachel in southernJerusalem,fortifiedfive days later by an Egyptian
volunteer force that arrivedfrom Hebron - these actions obliged the
Haganah to adopt a strategyof exploiting every opportunityto make
gains and, further,to take pre-emptivemeasures.
True, the aimof the Haganahcommandin Jerusalem,as it understood
Ben-Gurion'spolicy, was to conquer the whole city.°1 Yitzhak Levy
(Levitze), a rankingHaganah commanderin the city, maintainsthat
between 14 and 18 May the Israelisdid not press their initial advantage
and thus missedthe opportunityto take the entire city."'In view of the
limitationson Jewish strengthand the heavy pressureexerted by Arab
volunteersand regularsalike on the isolated Jewish settlementson the
city'sperimeter,the likelihoodof a successfuloperationto take the entire
city was then questionable, at best. That the Haganah repeatedly
attacked the Old City under these difficult circumstancesis not an
indicationof its militaryability, but ratherreflects the overridingand
urgent motivationto prevent the fall of the besieged Jewish Quarter.
The Legion'sinterventionin the fightingfor Jerusalem,includingthe
need to defendits gainsagainstcounterattacks,necessitatedan allocation
of forces beyondits capability,when takinginto accountits other simul-
taneous missions. The solution lay in a substantive revision of the
Legion'sdeployment,includingsharedresponsibilityfor the area under
its control with the Iraqi Army, which had been thrown back at
Naharayimin its effortsto invadethe Jewishstate. The redeploymentof
the Iraqiand Transjordanianforces was decidedupon at an improvised
Arab summitmeetingheld at Der'a, in southernSyria,on 20 May, with
the participationof Abdullah, the Iraqi regent, the presidentsof Syria
and Lebanon, and military commandersof the four countries. The
meeting'sresults, to which Syriatook exception, reflectedthe prestige
accruedto the Legion thanks to its successes in Jerusalem,in marked
contrastto the setbackssufferedby the Syriansand Iraqis.The initiative
for the meeting had come from the Syrianpresident and the general
secretaryof the ArabLeague. Theywishedto compelAbdullahto revert
to the originalinvasionplan and to designatethe town of Afulah as the
target for the combined Arab offensive. Abdullah forcefully rejected
these ideas, stressingthe importanceof Jerusalemand the tremendous
effort the Legion would requirein orderto completeits missionthere.

Thus, on 28 May the Arab Legion pulled out of Nablus, Jenin and
Tulkarm, and transferredresponsibilityfor these sectors to the Iraqi
Army.12On the same day the JewishQuarterfell to the commanderof
the Legion in the Old City, in spite of relentlessand desperateattempts
by the Jewishforces in the city to avert this fate. The redeploymentof
LegionunitsenabledGlubbto consolidatehis hold alonga shorterline of
defense extendingfrom Rosh Ha'ayinin the north,throughLatrun,Bab
al-Wad,the RadarRidge and Ramallah,culminatingin Jerusalem.As a
result, the Legion was able to improve its positions in Jerusalemand
potentiallycapturethe Jewishenclave on Mount Scopus. In earlyJune,
however, Abdullah came under heavy British pressure to agree to a
truce, at the very time that the ammunitionreservesof the Jewishforces
in the city had reacheda criticallylow point, with provisionfor no more
than five days of fighting."3
Even before the fall of the JewishQuarter,the continuoussiege of the
Jewish city, which endured attacks and shelling and suffered from a
shortageof food, arms,ammunitionand materiel,had causedthe center
of gravityof the fightingbetween the Arab Legion and the Israeliforces
to shift to the Latrunsector. The importancethat the Israelileadership
under Ben-Gurion attached to Jerusalem is indicated by the Israeli
supremeeffortto capturethe strategicsectorof Latrunandopen the road
to Jerusalemfrom 24 May. The scale of the forces committedto the
assault and the repeated attempts to take the site, despite the heavy
casualties,demonstrateBen-Gurion'sunwaveringdeterminationto lift
the seige on Jerusalem. The urgency of the Israeli effort at Latrun
stemmedin largepartfroma raceagainsttimein the wakeof two Security
Councilceasefireresolutions,of 22 May and29 May, implementationof
which was delayed several times.
Although this constituted the IDF's primaryoffensive between the
invasionand the firsttruce, it was not the only one that soughtto whittle
awaythe territorydesignatedin the pre-wartalks to fall into Abdullah's
hands, nor the only one to threatenhis deploymentnorthof Jerusalem.
Also to be taken into accountis the attackon Jenin carriedout in early
June by the Carmeliand Golani brigades,which nearly succeeded but
finallywas repulsedby the IraqiArmy.
Despite the persistentfailuresat Latrun,a temporaryandpartialsolu-
tion was found for the plight of Jewish Jerusalemin the form of an
improvisedroadto the city, opened in the firstweek of June (the 'Burma
Road'). The Legioncommanddid not workto preventthe buildingof the
bypass road to the city through the Judean Hills. However, junior
officersin the Legion made some attemptto halt the buildingof the road
and blockthe passageof supplyconvoys.114 The Legion'sinactionregard-
ing the BurmaRoad was consistentwith the defensiveapproachadopted

in thissectorby its seniorcommandfromthe outsetof the war;in orderto

preventthe buildingand use of the BurmaRoad, the Legionwouldhave
had to wage an attack for which it may not have had sufficientforces;
moreover, the existence of the new road might have reduce the Israeli
pressureon Latrunand hence also the dangerof its captureby the IDF.
The BurmaRoad bypassedLegion positionsand enabled Jerusalemto
be supplied with arms, ammunitionand food in limited quantities,
althoughthese increasedjustpriorto the startof the firsttruce.Indeed,it
was possible to bringarmsinto Jerusalemvia the new road even during
the period of the truce, but at the Legion's behest, UN observers
demandedto monitorthe roadas partof the ceasefireagreement.In the
second half of June the laying of a fuel pipeline to Jerusalem was
completed, and a water pipeline began to be laid, as the Legion, which
controlledthe pumpingstationat Latrun,adamantlyrefusedto allowthe
renewal of the water supply to the city.
The IDF's desperateeffortsto seize Latrunbefore the firsttrucetook
effect are explainedby the serious plight of the Jewish city due to the
shortageof armsand ammunition,andthe even moreseriouscrisisof the
lackof food andwater.But whatultimatelyimpelledBen-Gurionto prod
the GeneralStaffto stormLatrunagainand again,was evidentlythe fear
that Jerusalem would be wrenched from the Jewish State if a land
corridorfrom the coast to the city could not be guaranteed.
TRUCE AND DECISIVE ISRAELI PUSH - 'THE TEN DAYS'
Despite the majorimprovementin the defensesof the Jewishcity during

the firsttruce, the need to widen the corridorto Jerusalemremaineda
cardinalstrategicgoal of the Israeligovernment.15Thiswasmanifestedin
the renewed effort to capture Latrun during the so called 'Ten Day
Battles'. That Abdullah's invasion objectives remained true to his
original plan was evidenced by Amman's consistent support for the
ceasefire once the Legion had consolidatedits gains in Jerusalemand
Samaria.On 25 May, in the first discussionheld by the Arab League
regardingthe Security Council ceasefire resolution, Transjordanwas
alone in urginga cessation of hostilities, in spite of the harshcriticism
leveled by the otherparticipants.16Henceforththe king'srepresentatives
to Arab League deliberationsadvocated an end to the fighting:they
supported the Security Council ceasefire order of 29 May; objected,
unavailingly,to the renewalof hostilitiesupon the conclusionof the first
truce;andagainbackedthe resumptionof the ceasefirethatproducedthe
second truce.
In retrospect,Abdullahwould claim that only his seriousshortageof

ammunition drove him to accept a truce."7 Even if this assertion is

incomplete in that it ignores the political considerations that impelled the
king to seek a truce, its veracity cannot be doubted. Abdullah's desire for
an end to the war stemmed overwhelmingly from the Legion's military
limitations - in manpower and ammunition, and in the financial resources
required to underwrite the continuation of the campaign. To these
motivations was added Britain's consistent prodding of Amman to accept
the Security Council's ceasfire resolutions, of which Britain was the chief
sponsor. Britain viewed the resolutions as an instrument to assure the
realization of Abdullah's territorial objectives in Palestine and the exclu-
sion of the Negev from the Jewish state.'18
The king was also disposed to end the war so that he could continue to
deploy his army according to his own ends, without fear of becoming
entangled in Arab commitments that would conflict with his purposes.
Abdullah's approach was also discernible in the diplomatic effort he
undertook during the first truce. The king sought to exploit his army's
battlefield successes as a lever to obtain political legitimacy and prestige
in the inter-Arab arena, by paying official visits to two of his avowed
adversaries, the kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.19
Toward the end of the first truce, a new and crucial political element
was added to the war. This consisted of the recommendations for
resolving the conflict put forward by the UN mediator, Count Folke
Bernadotte. Bernadotte's recommendations, which were submitted to
the UN Secretary-General on 29 June, included the annexation of the
central part of Arab Palestine to the Kingdom of Transjordan, with the
addition of Jerusalem and the Negev, and recognition of a 'compact and
homogeneous' Jewish state that would encompass Western Galilee as
well as the coastal plain and the northern valleys. To Abdullah, Ber-
nadotte's recommendations, which did not include recognition of the
Palestine Arabs' right to self-determination, represented achievements
he could not hope to win in battle and thus became another argument for
the earliest possible termination of the war. Yet in practice the recom-
mendations turned out to be a drawback for Abdullah during the war.
The king's Arab adversaries, besides objecting in principle to a Jewish
state, were consumed with envy at the territorial gains that would accrue
to Transjordan. Collective Arab opposition to the plan therefore inten-
sified. The king's overt interest in a ceasefire, and the opposition
generated by the proposals of the international mediator - which bore the
clear imprint of the British Foreign Office - heightened Arab criticism of
Abdullah. Further aggravating the inter-Arab situation were administra-
tive measures taken by the Legion in its areas of deployment which
signalled an intention to annex those areas to Transjordan: the establish-

ment of a civil administrationunderthe supervisionof a generalmilitary
governorin effect from 20 May; the start of radio broadcastsfrom the
RamallahstationunderJordaniancontrol;the levyingof tariffs;and the
introductionof Transjordanianpostage stampsin these areas.'20
A more seriousconsequenceof the Bernadotteplanwas a decisionby
the Israeligovernmentto directthe IDF's principaleffort, upon the ter-
mination of the truce, against the Arab Legion. Ben-Gurion had
previouslydepictedthe Legionas Israel'smainenemy, stressingthe need
to breakthe Legion'sstrengthandcapturethe 'Triangle','21 but following
Bernadotte'srecommendationsthe need to shatterthe Legionbecamean
urgentnecessity.Thiswas reflectedin the IDF's 'OperationDani' during
the Ten Day battlesin whichthe main thrustwas towardLydda, Ramle
and Latrun,with the aim of achievinga decisive militaryvictoryin the
central sector. This would ensure an unbrokenland corridorfrom the
coastal plain to Jerusalemand broaden the narrowwaist of the state.
Lyddaand Ramle fell to the Israeliforces on 12 Julywith relativeease,
while Latrunremainedfirmlyunder Legion control.
As for Glubb,he had neverintendedto hold LyddaandRamle, due to
the overextensionof his limitedforces. It was not until the beginningof
June, after repulsing the second attack on Latrun, that the Legion
entered the two cities, but only in companyforce, and only to assist the
irregularsoperatingthere.'22At Latrun, where Glubb was fightinghis
principaldefensive battle, the IDF was unable to dislodge the Legion
and the roadto Jerusalemremainedblocked.Nevertheless,the IDF was
able to broaden the corridorto Jerusalemand relieve the pressureon
the city duringthe Ten Days. The expandedcorridorenabledthe Israelis
to build a more secure and convenient road to Jerusalem than the
BurmaRoad, andto completelayingthe alternativewaterpipelineto the
city - whichbegan operatingon 11 August- withoutthe Legion'sinter-
vention.123
The relative stabilizationthat ensued on the urban Jerusalemfront
duringthe firsttruce, and the broadeningof the land corridorfrom the
lowlandsto Jerusalem,meantthat Israelwas underless pressureto take
the offensivein the city proper.On 7 July, two daysbefore the end of the
firsttruce, an agreementwas reached,with UN mediation,on the status
of MountScopusandon arrangementsfor maintainingcontactbetweenit
and the Jewishcity. Mount Scopuswas declaredan enclave over which
the UN flagwouldfly, conditionalon the replacementof the Jewishforce
there by Israelipolicemen and a maintenancecrew.124
This arrangement,however, did not put an end to attemptsby local
commanderson both sides to improvetheirpositions,actionswhichhad
the potentialto triggerfull-scaleengagementin the entire city. Withthe

resumptionof the fightingon 9 July, the Sheikh Jarrahsector, on the

slopes of MountScopus,once againbecamea battletheater.The fighting
waspartlyinitiatedby the Legion'slocal commander,Abdullahal-Tal,in
an attemptto force the Legion'sBritishcommandinto a more activerole
in the fighting.125
On the Jewishside, a last attemptto breachthe defensesof the Old City
was undertakenon the eve of the second truce. A comprehensiveplan
('OperationKedem')had been drawnup by the Haganahcommanderin
Jerusalem,David Shaltiel,in cooperationwith the local IZL (the Irgun)
and LHI (the Stern group) headquarters.The operation- which Israel
Baer called 'a theatricalshowpiece'- ended in failure, generatingbitter
accusationsfromthe Irgunagainstthe 'Haganah'commandof Jerusalem,
which were to become a basis for an historicalindictmentagainst the
government.126 The operation'slocal characteris all the more strikingin
view of its poor timingon the eve of the truce and the instructionsfrom
Ben-Gurion and the General Staff to Shaltiel to undertake, as a final
effort priorto the truce, an attackon the SheikhJarrahareawiththe aim
of linking up with Mount Scopus.127 This approach may have been
adopted owing to fear of the reaction by Christendomand the United
Nationsif the Old Citywereto fallinto Israelihands.Above all, however,
it reflects the low prioritygiven by Ben-Gurionand the militaryto an
offensive thrust in Jerusalemto acheive new gains, when their main
concernwas to widen the corridorto the city in the Latrunsector before
the advent of the truce.
At the end of the Ten Days, the roadto Jerusalemremainedblocked,
but in terms of militarycapabilitythe Jewish stand has considerably
improved. In contrast, the Arab Legion suffered now from a critical
shortageof ammunition.Accordingto Glubb'stestimony,as the second
truce began the Legion had enough ammunitionfor no more than five
daysof fighting.128The Legion'sammunitionsupplieshadbeen limitedall
along, and the situationwas aggravatedwhenthe Egyptiansconfiscateda
British arms shipment dispatchedby sea from the Suez Canal zone.
Followingthe SecurityCouncil'sceasefireresolutionof 29 May, and the
prohibitionon supplyingarms to the combatants,Britain consistently
refusedto supplyweapons and ammunitionto its Arab allies, including
Transjordan,even withholdingarmscommittedbefore the embargowas
imposed.
The broadeningof the corridorto Jerusalemandthe completionof the
Burma Road led the Israeli governmentgraduallyto retractits earlier
support for Jerusalem'sinternationalization.These developmentshad
imbued the Israeliswith a growingsense of confidencethat they were
capableof holdingthe Jewishcity andcontrollingthe landaccessto it. As

early as the middle of June, Foreign Minister Shertok had apprised

Bernadotteof Israel'sview that in the absenceof progresstowardsinter-
nationalization,the New CityunderJewishcontrolshouldbe regardedas
an integral part of the State of Israel, inter alia because of the road that
had been builtto the city fromthe coastalplain.129 A secondmajorreason
for Israel'srenegingon its assentto internationalization wasBernadotte's
inability to advance his initiativefor the city'sdemilitarization,including
the withdrawalof the belligerentforceson bothsidesandthe stationingof
an internationalpoliceforcein the city. The demilitarizationof Jerusalem
was to be a firststep towardthe proclamationof an armisticethroughout
the country. But the plan was doomed from the moment the United
States refused to commit itself to allot a battalion of marines to the
internationalforce to guardthe demilitarizedzone on Mount Scopus.'30
The demilitarizationplan became no longerfeasible though the deep
mistrustbetween the two sides, reflectedin Amman'srefusalto renew
the watersupplyto Jerusalem,and the Jews'insistenceon buildingtheir
own suplysystemto meet the needs of the city'sJewishpopulation.The
Israeli government'sopposition to demilitarizationstemmed from the
suspicion that it was actuallya step towardsinternationalization.This
opposition was intensified following the publication of Bernadotte's
recommendationsfor Jerusalem'sannexationto Transjordan.Further
influencingthe provisionalgovernment'sdispositionto retractits com-
mitment to internationalizationwas the growing clamor by the city's
leadershipduringthe firsttrucefor the incorporationof the New Cityinto
the State of Israel.A formalstep in this directionwas taken on 2 August
in the form of the government'sdeclarationof Jerusalemas an area of
militaryoccupationin whichIsraelilaw applied,and the appointmentof
Dov Joseph, who had been administeringthe civil affairsof the Jewish
city, as its militarygovernor.131
FROM WAR TO RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE
Although the second truce did not put an end to the war, from Ben-
Gurion'sperspectiveit signalledthe startof the politicalcampaignat the
UnitedNationswhichwouldfocuson the Bernadotteplan.The campaign
was expected to peak during the General Assembly debate in
September-November.This meant that the new truce might last 4-5
months, duringwhich time Israel would do well to enhance its military
capability,both in case the war was renewedand as a meansto substan-
tiate its territorialclaims.Theseincluded,in additionto the boundariesof
the Jewishstate as delineatedin the UN resolutionof 29 November,other
territoriescapturedsince the startof the war. Thus, as the politicalclock

began to run out, and the Israelieconomy reeled underthe unbearable

burdencausedby the long truce, the nascentstate founditself compelled
to set its strategic priorities for the rest of the war. In view of the
internationalpressureexpectedto be exertedon the partiesto the conflict
to abide by Bernadotte's recommendations,and the Arab refusal to
accept them, the Israeli leadershipreached the conclusionthat a com-
bination of force and diplomacy was a sine qua non to ensure its strategic
goals and terminatethe war.132
Once freedomof movementto Jerusalemand the abilityto supplythe
city had been guaranteedby the resultsof the Ten Day battles,the urban
frontstabilizedand wouldundergofew changesuntilthe end of the war.
Fear of an attackon the territoryof the Jewishstate by the Arab Legion
had dissipateddue to the IDF's rapidbuild-upandintelligenceindicating
that the Legion was sufferingfrom a severe shortageof manpowerand
ammunition.133 A majorconcernwas the IraqiArmy, whichhad doubled
its force in Samaria since the start of the first truce. However, the
situationin the Negev seemed to be the most seriousboth militarilyand
politically.Not only was the EgyptianArmycontinuallystrengtheningits
presencethere, but the trucedid not put an end to hostilities:the IDF's
repeated efforts to break throughthe Egyptianlines and gain access to
the besieged Jewishsettlementswere to no avail. Moreover, the threat
posed by Bernadotte'splan- that the Negev wouldbe excludedfromthe
Jewishstate- madeit all the moreurgentto take the offensiveagainstthe
EgyptianArmy. By the beginningof August the Israelipolitico-military
leadership was agreed that the Egyptian front should be given first
priorityin the next militaryoffensive, althoughdifferencesremainedas
to whetherthe secondaryeffortshouldbe directedat the 'Triangle'or the
Galilee. The Negev offensive was planned for the beginning of
September,butit wasrepeatedlypostponedforlackof militaryprepared-
ness, untilmid-October.134 In the meantime,developmentsin the political
arenaheightenedthe necessityfor Israelto concentratethe militaryeffort
on the Egyptianfront.
The failureof Bernadotte'sdemilitarizationefforts in Jerusalem,and
the dangerof a renewalof hostilities,broughtaboutan Anglo-American
agreementregardingthe resolutionof the Palestineproblemon the basis
of a revisedBernadotteplanwhichenvisagedan internationalizedstatus
for Jerusalem. However, in early August, the US Secretaryof State
proposed the establishmentof an 'Arab-Jewishregime in Jerusalem
underthe aegis of the United Nations', insteadof the internationalforce
which now seemed unlikelyto come into being.135 The Bernadotteplan,
stronglysupportedby the United States and Britain, attributedcardinal
to
importance Transjordan in the attainment of a peace settlement.

These endeavoursreceiveda boost in the form of reportson diplomatic

contacts said to be underwayin Paris between a representativeof the
Israeli government and a representativeof King Abdullah. At the
beginningof August, ForeignMinisterShertok,respondingto American
hints, was readyto examinethe possibilityof enlistingSoviet supportin
obtaining UN membership for Transjordan as a step toward an
Israeli-Jordanianagreement.136
The actual resumptionof the political dialogue between the Israeli
governmentandAbdullahat the beginningof Augustwas madepossible
by a diplomaticinitiative undertakenby Israel as part of its political
campaignin conjunctionwith the war'swind-down.'37 In mid-JulyEliahu
Sasson had gone to Paris in order to renew the political dialogue with
Arab governments,whetheras an alternativeto the Bernadottemission,
as he had indicated,or to clarifythe politicalpictureso that Israelcould
better determine strategicprioritiesfor the rest of the war. Although
Sassonhad approacheda numberof Arab governmentswith a proposal
to hold direct contacts, albeit without singling out any of them as a
preferredpartner,it was apparentlynot by chancethat the firstsubstan-
tive contact was with Abdullah, through the JordanianMinister in
London, Emir Abd al-Majid Haidar.138
The Israeligovernment'sdesireto explorepoliticalchannelswhile the
warstill ragedwas impelledby a growingawarenessof the need to ensure
Washington'spolitical support.This need was rendereddoubly impor-
tant for economic reasons related to the exhaustingwar effort and the
indeterminateextensionof the secondtruce. On 25 May, Weizmannhad
asked PresidentTrumanfor militaryand economic aid, and duringthe
summerWashingtonconsideredIsrael'srequestfor a $100-millionloan,
earmarkedfor development and immigrantabsorption.39Israeli con-
cerns were hightened by an official, and unequivocal, clarification
deliveredon behalfof the US governmentby its SpecialRepresentative,
James G. McDonald, at a meeting with ForeignMinisterShertokon 7
September.Washington,he asserted,woulddo everythingin its powerto
preventa violationof the truce, and in case of a violationwouldsupport
immediateaction by the SecurityCouncil againstthe aggressor.40
McDonald took the opportunityto ask Shertok whether any Arab
governmentwas willingto enter into peace negotiationswith Israel, and
mentionedthe possibilityof an agreementwithTransjordanbasedon an
exchangeof territory(the Negev in returnfor WesternGalilee) and an
accord for Jerusalem. The US position regardingJerusalementailed
continuedsupportfor its internationalization,but readinessto consider
any settlementsatisfactoryto both Israeland the Arab states that would
ensure the safety of, and guaranteefree access to, the holy places. This

constituteda substantiveshift in Washington'sstand, which the Israeli

government was willing to embrace immediately, as it held out the
prospectof America'sacquiescencein the inclusionof the New City and
the Jerusalem corridor within the boundaries of the State of Israel,
provided agreement were reached with Abdullah. In reply to
McDonald'squestionregardingthe Arabgovernments'standon negotia-
tions, Shertok provided only partial information about the Sasson-
Haidar dialogue. However, there is no doubt that in his account of
Abdullah'sresponse, Shertokleft the US envoy with a clear impression
of the king'sreadinessto move towardpoliticalnegotiationswith Israel.
In the meantime,UN observershad made progressin their efforts to
consolidatethe trucein Jerusalem.On 22 AugustBernadotteconveneda
meeting of local commandersfrom the IDF, the Legion and from the
Egyptian force positioned south of the city, in order to demarcate
separationlines between their forces, a move that significantlyreduced
shooting incidents.'14In the following weeks the Israeli provisional
governmentwasincreasinglydisposedto acceptthe idea of a dividedcity,
demarcatedaccordingto the militarylines. Thiswas apparentlyintended
to pre-empt an unfavorabledecision at the forthcomingUN General
Assembly deliberationson the Palestine question. As part of the new
approach,Israelwaswillingto concedethe Old Cityandthe Arabsection
of New Jerusalem,which would be placed under either international
controlor Arabrule, as the pricefor incorporatingthe Jewishcity andthe
Jerusalemcorridorwithinthe territoryof the Stateof Israel.Thisposition
was arrivedat following protracteddiscussionsby the Israeli Cabinet,
whichhad to choose betweencompleteinternationalizationof the entire
city or, as the lesser evil, the city's divisionand assent to Arab control
over partsof it.142The government'sstandhad been expressedmore than
a monthearlierin Shertok'sinstructionsto Sasson:readinessto renewthe
understandingwith the king on the basisof the partitionplan, with some
adjustmentsin Israel'sfavor;the kingto retainpartof the New City, with
most of the city and the land corridorremainingin Israel'shands; and
joint administrationof the Old City.'43
On 26 September,followinga seriousincidentin the Latrunsectorthat
was attributedto the Legion, the IsraeliCabinetrejectedBen-Gurion's
proposalfor a large-scaleretaliationon this front. Although the opera-
tion as presentedinvolvedattackingand capturingLatrun,it could have
resultedin a majorconfrontationwith the Legion and the IraqiArmy in
Samaria. Broad agreementexists among historiansof Israel's War of
Independencethat Ben-Guriondid not throw his whole weight behind
this proposal,and even thoughhe would subsequentlytermthe govern-
ment's decision a 'lamentfor futuregenerations',it is doubtfulwhether

his heart's desire and his political logic were on equal footing in this
case.'4 Ben-Gurion'sopponentsurgedan offensivein the south, accom-
paniedby a readinessto talk to AbdullahaboutdividingJerusalem.The
idea was to enlist the king'sbackingfor sovereigntyin the city'swestern
section and in the land corridor,and for removingthe internationaliza-
tion scheme from the agenda. A further argumentin support of an
offensivein the southwasthe establishmentof the 'All-PalestineGovern-
ment'on 22 Septemberin Egyptian-heldGaza. The commonopposition,
on the part of Israel and Transjordan,to a national PalestinianArab
government- a governmentcertainto gain broadArab supportand be
guided by the spirit of the Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini- was further
evidence of a significantshared interest between Transjordanand the
Jewishstate. Above all, the Cabinet'sdecisionagainsta majoroperation
on the Jordanianfront seems to have been influencedby the strong
reaction of the internationalcommunityto the assassinationof Count
Bernadotteby the Stern Gang on 17 September.On the day before his
murder,the mediatorhad submittedto the UN Secretary-Generalhis
final recommendations,and these were subsequently viewed as his
political testamentby the internationalcommunity.145
On 6 Octoberthe Israeligovernmentdecidedto take the offensive on
the southern front, with the aim of lifting the siege on the 26 Jewish
settlements in the Negev and expelling the Egyptian forces from the
territoryallocatedto the Jewishstateby the UnitedNations.A secondary
effortwas to be directedat the southernsectorof the Jerusalemcorridor
which was held mainly by Egyptianirregulars.The Cabinetresolution
reflected a general conviction among Israeli military and political
decision makers that if Israel still possessed sufficient political
maneuverabilityto undertakeanothermilitarythrust,the southernfront
should be given priority, since only there could both of the country's
urgent strategicgoals be achieved:terminatingthe war and lifting the
threatof losing the Negev, whichconstitutedover half of the new state's
designatedterritory.
The preferenceshownfor the Negev over the 'Triangle'or the Legion's
frontat thispoint shouldnot be construedas indicatingacceptanceof the
militarystatus quo on the centralfront; it should be seen, rather, as a
decision forced upon the Israeli governmentby the likelihood that the
United Nations would adopt Bernadotte's new plan, which gave the
Negev to Abdullah. The Cabinettook a calculatedrisk based upon the
assessmentthatthe Hashemiteforceswouldnot intervenein the resumed
hostilities, as long as they themselveswere not attacked;the risk was
lowered by the short time ('seven days will be a miraculousmaximum')
allottedto the operation.146The decisionwas conditionalon clarifications

from ForeignMinisterSharett,then in Paris, regardingthe situationin

the UN arena. Sharett's reply - to go ahead with the operation - was
apparentlymotivatedby the growinginclinationof PresidentTruman,
then in the midst of the presidentialcampaign,to withdrawhis support
for the Bernadotte plan.147 Sharett'saffirmativeanswer and the conse-
quent endorsementof the operation('Yoav') by the governmentshould
be also examinedagainstthe backdropof the diplomaticdialogue that
Israelhad conductedwith Abdullahand the Egyptiancourt representa-
tives in Paris.
Abdullah'squick response to Israel'sproposalto renew the diplomatic

dialogue was motivated in large part by the Legion's weakness and
Israel'sgainsin the Ten Day battles. But the overridingrationaleseems
to have been his politicalisolationin the Arab arenaand his growingrift
with the Arab League and the other Arab states. The Legion's opera-
tions, whichremainedconfinedto the boundariesof the Arab state and
Jerusalem,and its ostensible abandonmentof Lydda and Ramle, pro-
vided a pretextfor the Arab Leagueto deny Transjordanthe bulkof the
financialaid pledgedto it on the eve of the war.Thisshortfallaggravated
Transjordan'salready depressed economic situation, the more so as
Britain had been holding up its quarterlysubsidy to the Legion since
April.148 Considerabletension was generatedby the move into Hebron
and Bethlehem by an Egyptian volunteer force as part of the Arab
invasion;this soon eruptedinto violence between the Egyptiansand the
Arab Legion, which considered itself the exclusive sovereign in this
area.'49Furthermore,the Arab League general secretary,with the en-
couragementof Egyptand Syria,launchedan overtpoliticaleffortto foil
the Bernadotteplan and deny Abdullahits innate advantages,enlisting
for this purposethe Palestiniannationalmovement.Thus, on the eve of
the terminationof the firsttruce,the ArabLeaguedecidedto establishan
autonomousPalestinianadministration,allegedlyto bear responsibility
for the affairsof the local Arab population. As a furtherstep in this
direction, the Arab League, with Egyptianprodding,created the All-
Palestine Government,which took Gaza as its base.150
The appointeesto the Palestiniangovernmentwere loose associatesof
the Muftion the Arab HigherCommittee,as well as oppositionleaders,
chosen with a view to distancethem fromAbdullah.Abdullah'spublicly
expressed opposition to the Palestiniangovernment,even after it was
recognizedby all the other Arab states, furtherunderscoredhis isolation
in the Arabworldandexposedthe depthof the hostilityandmistrustthat
informedhis relationswith the rulersof Egyptand Syria.Egypt'sactions
aimed at strengtheningthe Mufti'ssupportersin the occupied areas of

Palestine placed a local obstacle in the way of the king's ambitionto

consolidate his authorityin the country'sArab area, a problem com-
pounded by the fact that his forces controlledonly part of that area.
It bears stressing that in theory the Israeli government preferred a
settlement based on the establishmentof an independent Palestinian
state in Arab Palestine, rather than the annexation of the areas in
question to Transjordan.It was thoughtthat such a state would be too
weak an entity to endangerIsrael - on the contrary,it would become
dependent on the Jewish state - whereas annexationto Transjordan
would mean the establishmentof Hashemitesovereigntyin the heart of
the Landof Israel, backedup by joint Jordanian-Iraqistrength.But the
option of a Palestinianstate was unworkable,and was no more than
wishfulthinkingon Israel'spart. Israeliforeign-policyexpertscould not
disregardthe absence of basic elements such a state would require,
particularlya political center and an alternativenationalleadershipto
that of the Mufti, one whichwould assent to coexistencewith Israel. In
these circumstances,and despiteconcernat how the Soviet Union might
react to an agreementwith a Britishclient, the argumentsin favorof an
independentPalestinianstate constitutedonly a bargainingcardvis-a-vis
Abdullah.'51
Sasson'sdiplomatictalks in Paris broughtabout a dialogue with the
Egyptiancourt, concurrentwith the talksalreadyunderwaywith Abdul-
lah's representative.The politicalexchangesbetweenthe Israeligovern-
ment and Abdullah in August and Septemberdo not indicate an un-
equivocalintentionto choose Transjordanover Egypt as a negotiating
partner, or to accept Abdullah'srule in the territoriesthen under his
control.However,the contactswiththe Egyptiansin this periodheld out
only the slimmestof opportunitiesfor a settlement, owing primarilyto
Cairo's demand that Israel surrenderthe Negev to Egypt as a pre-
conditionto a peace settlement.This conditionwas utterlyunacceptable
to Israel, thus makingthe militaryoption againstEgypt almost inevi-
table.52Hence, the decisionmadein earlyOctoberby the Israeligovern-
ment to launch an offensive against the Egyptiansand reject Cairo's
demands did not reflect Israel's preferenceof Abdullah as a political
partner,53but was above all a preventivemeasureaimedat securingthe
Negev'sinclusionin the JewishState. The dialoguewithAbdullahwas an
importantchannelfor clarifyingthe king'smilitaryandpoliticalplansand
for assessinghis standingin the Arab war coalition. Indeed, the conclu-
sions drawn from that dialogue evidently underlayBen-Gurion'sap-
praisalthat the Arab Legion would not intervenewhen Israel attacked
the Egyptianforces.
Starting on 15 October, Operation Yoav was implemented under

extreme constraintsof an insufficientorderof battle and pressureof the

'politicalclock'.None the less, the go-aheadwas givenfor broadeningthe
southerncorridorto Jerusalemand takingcontrolof the rail line to the
city (operations'El-Hahar'and 'Yekev'). On 22 October, after having
deferred to UN pressuresto accept a ceasefire, Ben-Gurion decided
againsta proposalfor anotheroperation,to captureBeit Jala and seize
the Bethlehem-Hebron road. Ben-Gurion'sconsiderationswere pri-
marilypolitical:breachingthe ceasefirewould aggravateIsrael'sinter-
nationalpositionandjeopardizeits territorialgainshitherto;fearof how
the greatpowersandChristendomwouldreact;andthe desireto prevent
a confrontationwith the Legion (whichhad renewedits presencein the
Betlehem-Hebron area in the wake of OperationYoav), and possibly
with the Iraqisas well, thus keeping Egypt isolated.154
The Arab Legion took no counteractionduring the execution of
Operation Yoav.'5sOnce the Egyptianfront collapsed, Abdullah was
quick to deploy his own force in the MountHebronarea and ensurehis
own control there. On 21 October an Arab Legion force of reduced-
battalionsize returnedvia an indirectroutefromEizariyahto Bethlehem
andMountHebron,andfive dayslaterthese unitsclashedwithan Israeli
armoredpatrol that was advancingfrom Beit Jibrin.156 Henceforththe
Legion assumed responsibility for the region, consolidatingHashemite
rule, while the Egyptianforce, cut off from its rearsupport,wasforcedto
retreatfollowingthe signingof the Israeli-Egyptianarmisticeagreement.
The Egyptiandefeatin the Negev wasa seriousblowfor the All-Palestine
Government,whichwas compelledto move its headquartersfrom Gaza
to Cairo. The Egyptians' loss of direct contact and influence in the
'Triangle'and aroundMountHebronaffordedAbdullahan opportunity
to entrenchhis authorityin the areasunderhis control. The Legion set
out systematicallyto disarmor enlistthe Mufti'ssupportersin Jordanian-
controlledterritories.Even if at the time the Israeli General Staff was
unawarethat Legion forces had moved into the Mount Hebron sector,
the Israeliside was monitoringthe generalprocessby whichthe Legion
was consolidatingits control over that area. However, Israel took no
steps, either militaryor diplomatic,to halt the process.'57
Israel'smilitarysuperiorityover the EgyptianArmy demonstratedto
the Arabgovernmentsin general,andto Abdullahin particular,the scale
of the militarythreat they now faced from the Jewish state. The king's
awarenessof his militaryinferiority, and consequentlyhis fear of an
Israeliattackthat would eliminatehis territorialgainsin Palestine,were
crucialfactorsin his decision to renew his strategicunderstandingwith
the Israelis.'58
On the Israeliside, Ben-Gurion'sdiaryrevealsa continueddisposition

to take the offensiveagainstthe Hashemitearmiesin orderto force them

to withdraw from Palestine. Ben-Gurion's assumption was that the
conquest of the 'Triangle'would obligate the Arab Legion to retreatin
order to prevent its encirclementand total defeat on the hands of the
IDF. This option was repeatedlyexaminedfollowingthe end of 'Opera-
tion Hiram'(28-29 October),duringwhichthe Armyof Deliverancewas
driven out of Upper Galilee.'59However, political considerationscon-
tinuedto ruleout new militaryinitiativesfor fearthe greatpowerswould
react with force against Israel. On 4 November, the SecurityCouncil,
under heavy British pressure and with American support, passed a
resolutionvirtuallycallingon Israelto withdrawto the lines it hadheld in
the Negev before the start of OperationYoav. The harshnessof this
resolutionwas mitigatedby anotherCouncilresolution, on 16 Novem-
ber, callingon Israeland Egyptto open talkson an armisticeagreement.
However, the laterresolutionstill insistedon Israel'swithdrawalto its 14
Octoberpositionsin the Negev, underscoringthe undeterminedstatusof
this area and its standing as a key issue in the diplomaticstruggle.
Accordingto Ben-Gurion'sown testimony,the SecurityCouncilresolu-
tion of 4 November and US backing for the British Foreign Office
position made him doubt the practicabilityof a large-scaleoperationon
the centralfront.160
Washington'sstand heightenedthe concern of the Israeli leadership
that an offensive against the Hashemite armies, and especially the
conquestof additionalpartsof Jerusalem,wouldbe viewedas intolerable
by the worldChristiancommunity,andin particularby the United States
and Britain,in additionto inflatingthe refugee problemto catastrophic
dimensions. The great powers were likely to react by bringingheavy
pressureto bear on Israel, forcingit to forgo its conquestsin both the
West Bank and the Negev, and intensifyingthe calls for the inter-
nationalizationof Jerusalem.1'6Furthermore,despite the brilliantmili-
tary achievementsof OperationYoav, the IDF needed a final push in
December('OperationHorev')in orderto forceEgyptto end the fighting
and begin armisticenegotiations;and anothereffort in March('Opera-
tion Uvdah'), to ensure that the southernNegev, includingEilat, was
firmlyunder Israelicontrol.
Along with the diminishingoption of a large-scaleoperation against
the Hashemiteforces, therewasgrowingrecognitionof Abdullah'svalue
as a partnerin a political settlementthat would terminatethe war and
ensure Israel'sgains in Jerusalemand on the centralfront.'62Although
Ben-Guriondid not entirelydiscardthe possibilityof usingforce in order
to resolve local problems in the Jerusalemarea, in practice his goal
became increasinglylimited to expandingIsrael's 'narrowwaist'.

The resumptionof the political dialogue between Israel and Trans-

jordan in Novemberpaved the way for directtalks, withoutUN media-
tion, between their militarycommandersin Jerusalem, resultingin a
'sincereand absoluteceasefire'in the city and its environson 30 Novem-
ber. The agreementmarkedthe terminationof the militaryconfrontation
between Israel and Transjordan; the division of Jerusalem spelled out in
the accordwas subsequentlyendorsedin the armisticeagreement.But
the Dayan-Talceasefireagreementfor Jerusalemhad broaderramifica-
tions:it appliedto the entirefrontwiththe Legion, includingLatrun,and
heralded the end of the war with Transjordan.'63 Its significanceas an
additionalstep towardthe acceptanceof the militarystatusquo by both
sides was apparent at once: on the day following the signing, King
Abdullahconvened a conferencein Jerichoto confer legitimacyon his
claim to the country'sArab areas.
The JerichoConference,as it came to be known,whichwas held with
the encouragementand supportof the Arab Legion, and attended by
local Palestinians,recognizedAbdullahas 'Kingof Palestine'and effec-
tively grantedhim power-of-attorneyto resolve the 'Palestineproblem'
as he saw fit.'6 The Jericho Conferencefurther aggravatedthe king's
positionin the Arabworld,whichviewedthis as yet anotherstep towards
annexation. Indeed, the king was now eager to actualize the Jericho
resolutionsfor immediateand formalannexationof the Arab territory
held by his army. Abdullah was convinced that through immediate
annexationof Palestine, he could end the war with Israel and ease his
resulting economic difficulties. However, he was able to overcome
neither the opposition of his own governmentnor that of the British
Minister in Amman to a hasty annexation.'65 The combinationof his
militaryweaknessandhis isolationin the Arabworld,andwithinhis own
government,led to an increasedwillingnessto reacha settlementwiththe
Jews.
In the political talks that now resumed in Jerusalem, the king's
representativeproposedan armisticeto EliahuSasson,to be followedby
peace negotiations.Ben-Gurionobjected, assertingthat sincepeace was
the purportedgoal of the talks, peace was whatmustbe negotiatedwith
Abdullah. Ben-Gurionviewed the talkswith the king as startingfrom a
tabularasa:since no agreementwithAbdullahexisted, Israelshouldnot
agree in advance to Transjordan'sannexationof parts of the Land of
Israel.'66The Israeli decision to launch Operation Horev was closely
bound up with the need to commencepeace negotiationswith Abdullah
alongsidethe growingconcernover Britishmilitaryinterventionin the
event of an attack on the Legion.167 In the midst of OperationHorev,
Israelpresentedthe king with whatwas, effectively, an ultimatum:if he

did not agreeto peace negotiations,Israelreservedthe rightto utilizeits

military superiority. Abdullah's appeal to the British Foreign Office
producedan Americanprotestto Shertokthat clearlydefinedthe limits
of an Israelipowerplay vis-d-visTransjordan.Simultaneously,however,
the king decided on a favorableresponseto the Israelimessage, and in
January1949 he appointedAbdullahal-Tal and his physicianand con-
fidant, Shawkat al-Sati, as his official representativesin talks with
Israel.68
Althoughthese negotiationsdid not producea peace agreement,they
were instrumentalin preparingthe ground for the armistice accord
between the two countries,whichwas signedon 4 April 1949. Under its
terms,Abdullahceded a seriesof ridgeswest of Samaria,enablingIsrael
to broaden its narrowcenter. The king's concession came after diplo-
matic and militarypressure by Israel which threatenedto exploit the
expectedwithdrawalof the Iraqiforcesfromthe TriangleandAbdullah's
political isolation by using its militarysuperiority.Israel'sdictationof
terms demonstratedJordan'smilitaryweakness, Britain'sinability to
afford Amman militaryand diplomaticsupport, and Washington'sun-
willingnessto intervene in the negotiationsbetween the two sides on
demarcatinga border.169 Indeed, despiteIsrael'swillingnessto acquiesce
in Hashemiterule west of the Jordanriver, no effort was made to ease
Abdullah'spositionin his own kingdomandthroughoutthe Arabworld.
Israel demanded further territorialcompromise and later refused to
trade territoryfor a settlement. Given the overall balance of forces
between the two countries at the time, Israel probably could have
extractedeven more concessions. However, the Israelileadershippre-
ferredto make do with no more than what was consideredessentialfor
security, facilitatingJordan'sacceptanceof the requiredconcession.
Despite the extremelyunfavorableconditionsunder which the king
negotiatedthe armisticewithIsrael,the resultingagreementcame under
heavy attackfrom Arab governmentsand the Palestinians,accusingthe
king of treasonto the Arab cause and of collusionwith the Jews at the
urgingof the British. These accusationswere directedagainstthe king
mainlyfor his holding secret negotiationswith the Jews other than the
officialtalksat Rhodes;andfor his surrenderof territoryin the Triangle,
a purelyArab area with a populationof over 50,000, and whichhad not
been designatedas partof the Jewishstate. Above all, the king'sclose ties
with Britainrenderedhim suspectin the eyes of the Arabs. As Nuri al-
Saidreportedlycommenteduponlearningof the armisticeagreement,'If
Syria or the Lebanon had been concerned, it would not have
mattered'; however, Abdullah's already questionable credibilitywas
shattered.7°Abdullah'sloss of credibilityrenderedhiman easy scapegoat

for a humiliatedArab world, which blamedhim for servingas a British

tool in the foundingof the state of Israeland the defeat of Arab national
aspirations.
CONCLUSION
War is one of the most complex and intricateof phenomenain human

history;it is obviouslyof greatmomentfor the sidesinvolved.Rarelyhas
this been moreevidentthanin the warfoughtbetweenJewsandArabsin
1948, in which a diverse arrayof actorsparticipated:fledglingstates -
institutionallyweak andinexperiencedin the artof warandinternational
relations- informalorganizations,local andforeignalike, andthe Great
Powers, seekingto securetheiroverseasinterests.It was a warof highly
charged and intense polarities:fear and despair, hope and disappoint-
ment, intentionsandcapabilities,publicrhetoricand secrettalks, uncer-
tainty, perceptionand reality- and at the same time it compelled the
participantsto makedecisionsdictatedby a desirefor permanentsecurity
and a relentless drive for prestige and honor. Nor was this all. The
supreme efforts, individualand collective, on both sides, were com-
poundedby powerstrugglesfor leadershipandhegemony,actionswhich,
once set into motion,tendedto slipout of control,andan infiniterangeof
chance events and developments.Hence, to explain the results 01 the
Israeli-JordanianWar as the deliberate outcome of an earlier under-
standingis untenable.
It is a formidableundertakingto accountfor decisionsandactions,and
to trace their interconnections,consequences, and their place in the
historicalsequenceof events. And as if this were not enough, the myths
thatwere engenderedin the historicalconsciousnessof the sidesinvolved
need to be unravelled. One can surely understandthe dispositionto
propound a deterministicapproachwhich provides an all-embracing
conspiratorialexplanationfor the war'soutcome- particularlyif this is
meantto servea politicalor ideologicalpurpose.However,as a guideline
for the historiansuch a tendency is fraughtwith danger, even if the
argumentrests on historicalfacts and testimonies. In particular,this
appliesto the simplisticpostulateof a 'collusion'put forthto explainthe
complexandintricatefabricof relationsbetweenIsraelandTransjordan
in the 1948war. The 'collusion'concepthas an alternatingeffect on the
harshnessof the dilemmaswith whichdecisionmakerson both sides had
to contendwhile underconditionsof uncertaintyand existentialdistress.
This approachignores the conflictingaims and interests of the actors
operatingin the political and militaryarena; decisions stemmingfrom
failures, communication breakdowns, and tensions between politicians

and the military, and between senior command personnel and field
levels. Furthermore,this approachdisregardsthe lingeringbitterness
towardsAbdullahwhichthe confrontationwithhis armyleft in the Israeli
politico-securityhierarchy.171 It was more than a matter of disappoint-
mentthatthe relationsof cooperationandunderstandingwhichhadbeen
forgedwithhimover the yearsdid not standup to the test of the war.The
battles with the Arab Legion in the Etzion Bloc, in Jerusalemand at
Latrun,whichwere amongthe fiercestand most arduousfought by the
Haganahand the IDF, ended in abjectfailure,despitetheirhigh human
toll, and the decisions relating to those operations generated bitter
controversybetween Ben-Gurionand the General Staff.172
Circumstantialevidence can be produced seemingly to show the
validityof the strategicunderstandingunderlyingthe relationsbetween
KingAbdullahandthe JewishAgency, despitethe unforeseeablecourse
of the war. Such evidence is found in the unmitigatedhostilityby both
sides towardthe leadershipof the Palestiniannationalmovement.Also,
with the exception of a brief period, the king remainedisolated and an
object of vilificationin the Arab world, leadinghim to rely furtherupon
Britainand to seek cooperationwith the Jews. Abdullahadheredto his
originalplan to seize controlof the country'shilly centerwithouttaking
an offensive initiativeof any kind againstthe Jewish state. Above all,
Israel did not conquer the eastern section of the country's center,
although the balance of forces might have enabled it to do so, and
subsequentlyIsrael acquiescedto Hashemiterule in this region.
The problem is that this circumstantial evidence does not constitute
proofthateven duringthe fightingthe two sidesuphelda tacitagreement
or 'collusion',that they maintainedrelationswell suited for 'the best of
enemies,' or even that they demonstratedsymmetryin conductinga
limitedwar. Certainlythe evidence does not supportthe thesis that the
country's territorialmap was ultimately determined by the pre-war
strategicunderstanding.Such argumentshave the effect of reducingto
the point of absurditythe tremendousefforts invested by the IDF in
repeatedlytryingto captureLatrun, and the heavy price paid in these
attempts. And more: they ignore the possibilitythat Israel might have
succeeded in its offensives against Jenin and Latrun. The capture of
Latrun would have produced far reaching consequences, beginning with
the opening of the road to Ramallah and the way to Jerusalem and
encirclementof the Legion forces in the area between. This would have
led to the inevitablefall of the Old City of Jerusalem,and a possible
conquestof the Jenin-Hebronarea. The assessmentthat after the Ten
Day battles political considerations prevailed in Israel's strategy towards
Transjordan is well taken. However, the evidence does not fully support

the notion of a 'defacto partnership'between the two partiesduringthis

period.
The fact is that the tensionbetweenthe all-embracingexplanationand
the historicalfacts is reflectedin internalcontradictionsthat crop up in
some of the new studies. A salient example of these contradictionsis
representedin the attemptto portrayIsraeli-Jordanianrelationsas a tacit
understandingor a mutuallylimited war.173 What may appear to be a
strategyof limited war intentionallyadoptedwas, untilthe end of the Ten
Day battles, cycle actionsdictatedby strategicnecessities, political
a of
constraints,limitationsof strengthand militarysetbacks,ratherthan by
deliberate and voluntaryself-restraint.A conclusionthat seems to be
valid- especiallyfor the Israeliside - is that in this periodof the warthe
two sides behaved according to the old adage, 'a la guerre comme a la
guerre'.174When the countrywas finallydivideddefacto between Trans-
jordanandIsrael,it wasnot becausethe sideshadupheldthe elementsof
their prior accord;it derivedfrom a militaryand politicalrealitywhich
Israel was compelled to accept despite the collapse of the unwritten
understandingwith Abdullah, and Israel'smarkedmilitaryadvantage.
The Legion'soriginalplan was the fruitof harshmilitaryand political
constraintsthat were furtheraggravatedduringthe war. It is out of these
constraintsthat the king and Glubbdemonstratedunswervingfidelityto
that plan, and the strictlydefensive posture adopted by the Transjor-
danian forces in every stage of the fighting(with the exception of the
thrustagainstJerusalem,which had the limitedobjective of preventing
the fall of the Old City). The Legion, its superiorityin armor and
firepowernotwithstanding,was forced by overalllimitationsof strength
and a shortage of ammunitionto cut back its missions and range of
deployment, and to adopt, as far as possible, a defensive orientation.
Nowherewas this more obviousthan in the Legion'sbeing contentwith
the assuranceof Arab controlin the Old Citywithoutmakinga renewed
assault on the Jewish enclave on Mount Scopus. The Legion's force
limitationsin the mission to seize the Jenin-Hebron sector were well
demonstratedby the Iraqi Army's entry into the Triangle and the
Legion'sinabilityto defendRamleand Lydda.For the same reason,and
all the moreso owingto Britishpressure,the Legionneitherlaunchedan
offensivenor involveditself in the fightingin territoriesallocatedfor the
Jewishstate. The main battles fought by the Legion were in the Etzion
Bloc and at Latrun,both of whichlay withinthe boundariesof the Arab
state, while Jerusalemremaineda grey area.
Fromthe preparatorystage of the invasion,the kingsaw to it that the
Arab warplanwas tilted towardhis needs and that his militarypotential
wasfullyutilizedin the operationto capturethe Jenin-Hebronarea.Any

other courseof actionwouldhave compelledAbdullahto cooperatewith

the Arab armieson the basisof the originalplanwhichsoughtto cleavein
two the Jewish state in the area of the northernvalleys and force its
surrender.75That approachwould have generatedserious tension with
Britainandput at riskAbdullah'splanto annexthe country'sArabareas.
After 8 May, the question of Jerusalemwas not on the agenda in the
planning of the Arab invasion, and therefore could not have been
incorporatedinto the plan drawnup in Damascus.The contentionthat
Abdullahplannedfromthe outset to captureJerusalemandthat this was
the Legion'sprincipalobjectiveis manifestlyincorrectin the light of the
Legion's four days of inactionbefore enteringthe city.
It is doubtful whether we shall ever fully know what Abdullah's
intentionswere in those firstdays of the invasion,but it is beyonddoubt
that he recognizedhis politicaland militarylimitationsand adaptedhis
militarymoves accordingly.Even if Glubband Kirkbridebear the main
responsibilityfor the Legion'srestraintduringthe four days of inaction
that preceded its entry into Jerusalem,their success in postponingthe
attackwas dependenton the king'sacceptanceof their reasoning.Arab
officersof the Legion may have manifestedgreat enthusiasmto engage
the Jews in battles independently, against the policy of the Legion's
Britishcommand.Nevertheless,this does not necessarilysupporttheir
allegationsas to the treacherousrole playedby thatcommandor confirm
their accusationsconcerningthe detrimentaleffect of its policy. This is
particularlyso since the mainsourcesfor the role and the perceptionsof
Arabofficersof the Legionregardingpolicyof the highcommandare the
memoirsof such officerswhose versionscannot be consideredentirely
reliable. 76
If the Legion's militarymoves were primarilydictatedby consistent
politicalandmilitaryconstraints,Israel'smoveson the centralfrontwere
markedby alterationsin its strategicobjectives, caused by the proven
stayingpowerof JewishJerusalem,the strengtheningof the IDF against
the Arab armies, and the changingpoliticalsituationconcerningPales-
tine. Until the invasionof the Arab armies, Zionist strategyregarding
Jerusalem was built around acceptance of the internationalization
scheme. The objective of the militaryoperationswas to maintainthe
Jewishholdin Jerusalemandthe surroundingsettlements,althoughfrom
the end of Apriltherewas a growingneed to maintainan open corridorto
the city. 77The fall of the EtzionBloc andthe Arab Legion'sintervention
in Jerusalemgeneratedseriousconcernfor the city'sfate, as wasapparent
in the supremeeffort undertakento ensure a defensible land corridor
from the lowlands.This strategywas reinforcedduringthe firsttruce in
view of Bernadotte'srecommendations,and was fully obtained during

the Ten Day battles. Once the dangerto JewishJerusalemhad passed,

and a viable land corridorto the city was assured,the Israelileadership
couldexamineoptionsversusnecessitiesanddetermineprioritiesregard-
ing its strategic goals in the war. With the passing of the immediate
existentialthreat, the Israelidecision-makingprocesswas more suscep-
tible to politicalconsiderations,whoseweightgrewsteadilyfollowingthe
interventionby the greatpowersandthe United Nationsin the effortsto
resolve the conflict.
Israel refrainedfrom conductinga comprehensivemilitaryoperation
to captureeitherArabJerusalemor the Triangle,whentheoreticallythis
was withinits militarycapability,particularlyfollowingthe defeat of the
Egyptian army, and the diminishedthreat from other fronts. Israel's
reticence did not stem from a desire to preserve the partnershipwith
Abdullah. Rather, Israel'sbehaviorderivedfrom a numberof political
and militaryconstraintswhich emerged duringthe second truce, fore-
most amongthem the need to concentrateeffortsin the Negev. After all,
this territorywas liable to be lost because it was not yet securedunder
Israelicontrol, even thoughit was includedin the Jewishstate underthe
partitionplan. Yet even irrespectiveof the need to secure the Negev,
Israel'spoliticalmaneuverabilityhad alreadybeen reducedregardinga
militarysweep whichwouldconquerArab Jerusalemor the West Bank.
Among otherreasons,thiswas due to Britishsupportfor the kingandhis
plans, and the growingconvictionthat an identity of interests existed
between them; the role earmarkedfor Abdullahin Bernadotte'splan,
whichhad the full backingof Britainand the United States;and the fact
thatthe Legioncontrolledthe Old City,meaningthatanyactionagainstit
would be construedas a provocationagainstChristendomand the great
powers, jeopardizingearlierIsraelimilitarysuccesses.
The resumptionof the dialogue between the Israeli governmentand
King Abdullah, about two monthsbefore the start of OperationYoav,
was perceivedby Britainand the United States as a positive move with
the potential to form the foundation for an agreement and thus
strengthen acceptance of the division of Jerusalem and the king's
sovereigntyin the country'sArab areas.The dialoguewith the king, and
the militarysituation that had emerged on the front with the Legion,
aidedIsrael'seffortsto completethe expulsionof the EgyptianArmyand
to ensureIsraelisovereigntyin Jerusalemand in the land corridorto the
city. From this moment on, the Israeli government was increasingly
inclinedto acceptthe city's divisionas a wedge againstinternationaliza-
tion, which in any case had little prospect of being implemented.The
contentionthat the two sides acted to achievelimitedgoals in Jersualem
and deliberatelytriedto averta militarydecisionfor fear that this would

bring about internationalizationis groundless.For the Legion this was

not a practical matter at any stage of the war, while for Israel this
suppositionmightbe relevantonly afterOperationYoav. Thereis ample
evidence of the concern expressed by Ben-Gurion and other Israeli
leadersaboutthe reactionof ChristendomshouldChristianholy placesin
the Old City be damagedor fall into Israelihands. However, this was a
secondaryline of thoughtuntil the end of the Ten-Day battles and the
buildingof the Burma Road.
The mainconcernof the Israelileadershipin this periodwas the need
to ensurethe securityof the Jewishcity, whichwas isolatedand had few
forces at its disposal. Although the Jewish force in Jerusalem was
superior,it was insufficientto throwback the irregularsin the firstdays
after the expiry of the Mandate, and the Legion's interventionmade
Israel's weakness blatant. Ostensibly, the fear of internationalization
accountedfor the differencebetween the limited characterof the war
carriedout by Israelin Jerusalem,and the drivefor victoryat Latrun.In
fact, the concertedIsraeli effort to achieve a militaryvictory at Latrun
representeda strategywhose goal was the creationof a broadcorridorto
the city thatwouldensureits incorporationinto the Stateof Israel,rather
than dedicatingresourcesto extendJewishcontrolover the Arab partof
the city. The argumentof the fear of internationalization is renderedyet
moreuntenableby the possibilityof an IDF victoryat Latrunwhichmight
have developedinto a campaignfor the Ramallahridgeandthe conquest
of GreaterJerusalem.
It is difficultto disputethe contentionthat politicalreasonsdissuaded
Israelfrom attemptingto conquerthe West Bank or the Old City in the
wake of OperationYoav. Not only was there no strategicnecessity to
carryout suchan operation,butIsraelwasstrivingto ensureinternational
acceptanceof its sovereigntyin JewishJerusalemandover the Jerusalem
corridor. The attempt to play down the importance of the military
element in the decision makingis less convincing,and is based on the
highly questionable assumptionthat the IDF was clearly capable of
defeatingthe Hashemitearmiesandconqueringthe entireWestBank. A
similarclaim of the IDF capabilitywas indeed voiced by Ben-Gurion
himself in the Knesset on the day followingthe signingof the armistice
agreementwith Transjordan.On that occasion,Ben-Gurionreferredto
the political and demographiccalculationswhich had dissuaded the
government from authorizinga militarysweep to conquer those ter-
ritories.178 However, Ben-Gurion's argumentsshould be seen in the
context of his effortto justifythe armisticeagreementwithJordanin the
face of strongoppositionto the cedingof partsof Eretz-Israelto an alien
rule. It shouldalso be bornein mindthatthe favorableassessmentof IDF

capabilityin a clash with the Legion and the Iraqi Army (which had
tripledits order-of-battlein Samariasince firstdeployingthere) is merely
theoreticaland overlooksthe politicalandmilitarytoll takenby the war.
At all events, it disregardsthe exhaustionof the Israeli forces and the
founderingIsraelieconomy causedby the war effort and the prolonged
general mobilization.'79
It is difficult to avoid the impression that the myth of collusion holds an
attractionfor those who might identify with the ideological thrustim-
plied: the identificationof Zionismwith Europeanimperialism,and the
facile attributionof the loss by the PalestinianArabs of their political
rightsto the collaborationof these forces.'80
Evidently,the veryuse of the
term 'collusion' is misleading. It implies that the clandestine accord
between the Zionist leadershipand King Abdullahbefore the war was
made behindthe backof and at the expenseof the Palestinianpeople, as
if there had been a real possibilityfor a Zionist-Palestinianunderstand-
ing. The collusionmythimplicitlyassumesthe possibilityfor both Zionist
and Palestinianacceptance of the partitionplan and its peaceful im-
plementation.'18 Yet this notion ignores the depth of the enmity that
existed between the leadershipof the PalestinianArab nationalmove-
ment, headed by the Mufti, and the Zionist movementand the yishuv,
compounded by the former's decision to use force to prevent the
country'spartition.On the contrary,the 'collusion'presentedthe only
chanceto avertwar, and had it been implementedthe regionmighthave
been sparedthe bloodshedthat ensued and the uprootingof over half of
the PalestinianArab population.
NOTES
I amindebtedto GabrielCohen,whodevotedtimeandeffortto sharingwithme hisinsights

on the subject.I am also gratefulto YehoshuaPorath,Uri BialerandJoel Petersfor their
illuminatingcomments.Needless to say, I bear full responsibilityfor the article.
1. Fora rightistapproach,see: I. Eldad,Ma'aserRishon(Tel Aviv, 1950),pp. 333-4. M.
Begin, HashkafatHayim VehashkafaLeumit(Tel Aviv, 1952), pp. 38-9; Matzor,
MeitzarUmotza(Tel Aviv, 1954)pp. 16-17. M. Ra'anan,'KnuniyaBiyrushalayim',
Dvar Hashavu'a(Tel Aviv), 23 Feb. 1977. A. Golan and S. Nakdimon, Begin
(Jerusalem,1978), p. 194. For MAPAM's approach,see: M. Bentov, 'Hareka'
Hamedini Shel Milhemet Ha'atzmaut',in Z. Ra'anan, (ed.), Tzava Umilhama
BeyisraelUva'amim(TelAviv, 1955),pp. 832-48,880. I. Baer,BitahonIsrael,Etmol,
Hayom,Mahar(TelAviv, 1966),pp.125-35.S. Flapan,TheBirthof Israel,Mythsand
Realities(New York, 1987), pp. 8, 42-4, 49, 142-4, 167-8. For the Communists'
approach,see reporton a leafletof the Communistpartybranchesin the MiddleEast,
October,1948,the ResearchDivisionto Shim'oni,29 Nov. 1948,IsraelStateArchive,
(ISA), 130.15/2569/15.E. Tuma, YawmiyatSha'b, Thalathuna'Amman'Ala al-
Ittihad(Haifa, 1974), pp. 59-60, 63-4.
2. A. al-Tal, KarithatFilastin, MudhakiratAbdullahal-Tal, Qa'id Ma'rakatal-Quds

(Acre, 1968).W. al-Dali,Asraral-Jami'aal-'Arabiyawa'Abdal-RahmanAzzam, pp.

259-88. A. Sayegh,Al-Hashemiyounwa QadiyatFilastin(Sidon,1966),pp.261-5. M.
A. 'Aluba, Filastin wal-Damir al Insani (Cairo, 1964), pp. 144-53.
3. Y. Slutzki(ed.), SeferToldotHahagana,vol. 3, pt. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1972),p. 1638.The
official historyof Israel Defense Forces has utterly ignoredthis issue, see Toldot
MilhemetHakomemiyout,(Tel Aviv, 1972).Y. Yadin,the actingchiefof staffduring
the war, dismissed, in a symposiumheld in 1982 in Ef'al, any influence of the
understandingwith Abdullahon the war decisions,see He'arkhutHahaganaLikrat
MilhemetHa'atzmaut(Yad Tabenkin,Tel Aviv, 1988),no. 76, p. 90-91. See also his
interview,A. Shlaim,CollusionAcrosstheJordan(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),
p. 236.
4. In additionto Shlaim, see also: U. Bar-Joseph,The Best of Enemies, Israel and
Transjordanin the War of 1948 (London, 1987); I. Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict,1948-1951 (Macmillan,1988). D. Shueftan, Optzya Yardenit(Tel Aviv,
1986). See also; Y. Gelber, 'Maga'imDiplomatiyimTerem HitnagshutTzvait -
Hamasa-UmatanBein HasochnutHayehuditLemitzrayimVeyarden(1946-1948)'
Cathedra, (April 1985) no. 35, p. 125-62. A. Sela, Mimaga'im Lemasa Umatan -
Yahasei Hasochnut Hayehudit Umedinat Israel 'Im Hamelekh Abdullah, 1946-1950
(Dayan Center, Tel Aviv, 1985). A debate on this issue was conductedin the IDF
journalMa'arakhot,No. 311, pp.312-3, 314 (March1988-Jan./Feb.1989),with the
participationof E. Oren, D. Shueftanand M. Gazit. S. Musa,AyyamLa Tunsa,al-
UrdunFi Harb1948 (Amman, 1982).
5. Shlaim,pp. 218-20. Flapan,pp. 8, 142-4.
6. Shueftan,pp. 61-3. Shlaim,pp. 202-4, 225-4.
7. Pappe,pp. 24, 31-2, 34. Forthe sameargument,see J. andD. Kimche,BothSidesof
the Hill (London, 1960), p. 130.
8. Shueftan,pp. 61-3. Pappe,p. 21, 32, maintainsthatthe Legion'sbattleforJerusalem
startedbefore 15 May.
9. Shueftan,pp. 75-6, 83-6, 126-7, 338-9. Bar-Joseph,pp. 114-25.Shlaim,pp. 328-32,
341-4.
10. Bar-Joseph,pp. 68-9. Shlaim,pp. 210-8.
11. Originally,this argumentwasput forthby Baer, p. 145.It is acceptedby Bar-Joseph,
p. 74; Shueftan,pp. 135-6, 149-50; and, ratherimplicitly,by Shlaim,pp. 233-5.
12. Bar-Joseph,p. 241.
13. Pappe, p. 19.
14. Shueftan,pp. 75, 86-88, 238-9.
15. Shlaim,pp. 122-59, 220, 233-8, 620. Shlaimclaimsdisagreementwith Baer'sargu-
ment that therewas a 'collusion'(a termBaer does not actuallyuse in this context),
however,the nameand contentof Shlaim'sbook leave no roomfor doubtsas to his
acceptanceof this myth.
16. Report on a Meetingwith Representativesof the Arab Legion, 3 May 1948, ISA,
130.02/2513/2.Verbalreportof G. Meyerson(Meir)to the ProvisionalStateCouncil
on 12 May 1948on her meetingwith KingAbdullah,ISA, MinheletHa'am, Proto-
kolim, 18 April - 13 May 1948 (Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 40-4.
17. This has been discussed in details in my She'elat Eretz-Israel Bama'arekhet Habein -
'Arvit,1945-1948(UnpublishedPh.D. thesis, Jerusalem,1986), Ch. 7.
18. A. Shapira, Mipiturei Harama 'Ad Peruk Hapalmah (Tel Aviv, 1985), p. 110-3,
127-131,168-69.Y. Ratner,HayaiVaani(Tel Aviv, 1978),pp. 367-8. L. Collinsand
D. Lapierre,O, Jerusalem!(London,1972),pp. 465-6. D. Kurzman,Genesis1948,
theFirstArab-IsraeliWar(New York,1972),pp. 457-8. Forless criticaldescriptionof
Ben-Gurion'sapproach,see M. Bar-Zohar,Ben-Gurion(Tel Aviv, 1978),pp. 761-6.
19. ISA, Protocols,pp. 67-9.
20. See, for example,my 'Maga'imMediniyimBein HasochnutHayehuditLeveinMem-
shalot 'Ever-HayardenUmitzraimBidvarHeskem 'Al HalukatEretz-Israel,1946',
Hatziyonut,Vol. 10, 1985, pp. 276-7.
21. Ibid., pp. 266-7, 276. Gelber, pp. 134-6.

22. Conversationwith King Abdullah, 17 Nov. 1947, CentralZionist Archive (CZA),
S/25/4004. See the somewhatdifferentversionon the conversation,A. S. Kirkbride,
From the Wings,AmmanMemoirs,1947-1951(London 1976), pp. 4-5. No report
from Kirkbrideto London on this meeting has been found. For a hint about the
meeting and its content, see Musa, p. 77.
23. Khaldun.S. al-Husri(ed.) MudhakiratTahaal-Hashimi,Vol. 2, 1942-45 (Beirut,
1978) pp. 156-166. Iraq, TaqrirLajnatal-Tahqiqal-NiyabiyaFi QadiyatFilastin
(Baghdad,1949), pp. 66-7, 123-33. Memorandumby Cable, 15 Oct. 1947, Public
Record Office (PRO), London, F0371/61886/E10349.Evans to FO, 10 Oct. 1948,
PRO, F0371/61530/E9472. Al-Ahram,10 and 19 Oct. 1947.
24. Lajna IraqiyaNiyabiya,pp. 67-8. Kirkbrideto FO; 14 Oct. 1947, PRO, F0371/
61882/E9639;15 Oct. 1947, ibid, E9640. See also his dispachto Burrows,13 Nov.
1947, F0371/61836/E10611
25. Memorandumby Burrows,28 Nov. 1947, PRO, F0371/62194/E10806.
26. For a detailedanalysisof the Britishdecision-makingprocessconcerningthe relin-
quishingof the Mandateandthe consolidationof the withdrawalplanfromPalestine,
see G. Cohen, 'HamediniyutHabritit'Erev MilhemetHa'atzmaut',in Y. Wallach
(ed.), HayinuKeholmim(Massada,Giv'atayim,1985), pp. 155-66.
27. Kirkbrideto Bevin, 28 Oct. 1947,PRO, F0816/112. Kirkbrideto Burrows,29 Oct.
1947, PRO, F0371/62208/E10378.
28. Kirkbrideto FO; 29 Oct. and 17 Nov. 1947,PRO, F0371/61584/E11734.On Kirk-
bride'spositionin Transjordan,see Pappe, p. xiv.
29. Ibid., p. 2. See n.31, below.
30. On the Britishofficersin the Legionand theirlegal status,see Kirkbride,pp. 34-6.
Glubb, pp. 133-4.
31. Bevin to Kirkbride,22 Dec. 1947, PRO, F0371/61589/E11734.Memorandumby
Pyman, 7 Jan. 1948, PRO, F0371/68827/E449.Bevin to Abdullah, 10 Jan. 1948,
PRO, F0371/68367/E1980,and his instrucionsto Kirkbride,10 Jan. 1948, PRO,
F0816/112.
32. Bevin to Kirkbride,9 Feb. 1948,PRO, F0371/68366/E1916.J. B. Glubb,A Soldier
withtheArabs(London,1957),pp.63-6. FO to Kirkbride,2 Feb. 1948,PRO, F0816/
112. Memorandumby Wright,2 Feb. 1948, PRO, F0371/68817/E1728.
33. Salih Sayibal-Jubouri,MihnatFilastin(Beirut, 1970), p. 117. Tuck to Secretaryof
State, 20 Dec. 1947, 890B.00/12-2047,NationalArchives,Washington.Jenkinsto
Bailey, 30 Dec. 1947,PRO, F0371/68365/E758.Memorandumby Clayton,in Trout-
beck to Burrows,23 Dec. 1947, PRO, F0371/68364/E31.
34. E. Sassonto M. Shertok(Sharett);13 and 19 Jan. 1948,CZA, S/25/1701.Sassonto
Meyerson,26 Jan. 1948,ibid., 9038.From'Hayatom'('The Orphan'- codenameof
Abdullah'srepresentative),18Feb. 1948,ibid., 3569.Heydtto Shertok,4 Jan. 1948,
IsraelState Archive, Te'udotMediniyotVediplomatiyot, December1947-May1948
(Jerusalem,1980)(IsraelDocuments),p. 125. Musa,p. 77, approvesof the contacts
with the Jews at this stage, and arguesthat the latterinsistedon havingall that had
been allocatedto them by the UN partitionplan.
35. Bevin to Attlee, 12 Feb. 1948, PRO, F0371/68546/E2228.
36. Memorandumby E. SassonandH. Berman,13March1948,CZA, S/25/1701.Report
by R. Zaslani(Shiloah),7 March1948, ibid., 7706, allegingBritishwithdrawalof
suppportfor Abdullah.
37. Kirkbrideto FO, 19 Apr. 1948,PRO, F0371/68649/E5085.Azzamto Abdullah,15
Apr. 1948,PRO, FO816/117.Hashimi,p. 214. Sela, She'elatEretz-Israel,pp. 546-8.
38. Arab News Agency Bulletin,26 Apr. 1948,ISA, 65/5/5675.'Yedi'ot'ArviyeEretz-
Israel', 14-15 May 1948, CZA, S/25/9045.'A. al-'Arif, al-Nakba(Sidon, Beirut,
1956), p. 197. Musa, pp. 111-3.
39. As arguedby Gelber, pp. 155-6, and Bar-Joseph,p. 47.
40. Hashimi,pp. 214-15. Kirkbrideto Bevin; 16 Apr. 1948,PRO, F0816/117;21 Apr.
1948, PRO, F0371/68852/E5013.
41. Sassonto Abdullah,11Jan. 1948,CZA, S/25/9038.Sassonto Shertok,13and19Jan.
1948,ibid, 1701. Heydt to Shertok,4 Jan. 1948, IsraelDocuments,p. 125.

42. Shertokto Zaslani,25 Apr., 1948, ibid., p. 674.
43. D. Ben-Gurion,YomanHamilhama,MilhemetHa'atzma'nt,1947-1949,3 vols., eds.
G. RivlinandE. Oren(Tel Aviv, 1982),1 Jan. 1948,p. 103,(hereafter,Ben-Gurion's
Diary).
44. Conversationwith'Hayogev'(codenameof Abd al-Ghanial-Karmi-fromAbdullah's
Royal Court),24 Oct. 1947,CZA, S/25/7023.The BritishMiddleEast Officeto FO,
10 Oct. 1947,PRO, F0371/61580/E11775.GeneralPacardto Heyter,5 March1948,
PRO, F0371/ 68369/ E3371. Musa, p. 74.
45. Memorandumby Glubb, 12 Aug. 1948, PRO, F0141/1246.
46. See above, n. 31.
47. MeetingBevin-Douglas,29 Apr. 1948, PRO, F0371/ 68546/E5497.
48. Shertokto Zaslani,1 May 1948,IsraelDocuments,pp. 712-3. H. Herzogto Meyer-
son, 7 May1948,ibid,pp. 755-7. ConversationbetweenN. GoldmanandH. McNeil,
11 May 1948, ibid, pp. 780-1. Bevin to Kirkbride,5 May 1948, PRO, F0816/119.
Meetingwith Representativesof the ArabLegion,3 May 1948,ISA, 130.02/2513/2.
49. Shlaim,p. 218.
50. Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 27 Apr. 1948, p. 373.
51. Glubb, p. 107.
52. Ibid.,p. 98. MeetingwithRepresentativesof the ArabLegion,3 May1948,ibid., n. 48
above.
53. Memorandumby Burrows,24 Apr. 1948, PRO, F0371/68851/E5068.The Arab
governmentswere also awareof it; see Azzam'swarningshouldBritaintake punitive
measuresagainstTransjordan,Broadmeadto FO, 12 May 1948, ibid., E6184.
54. Meetingwith Representativesof the Arab Legion, 3 May 1948,ISA, 130.02/2513/2.
Kirkbrideto FO, 8 May1948,PRO,F0371/68852/E6008.Glubb,p. 107.Musa,p. 87.
Kurzman,p. 244, maintainsthat the meetingwas held in accordancewith the king's
instructions.Accordingto Colonel Goldie, the meetingwas held withoutthe king's
knowledge,Shlaim,pp. 182-5. Pappe,pp. 17-18, interpretsthe resultsof the meeting
as an understandingthat the fate of Jerusalemwouldbe decidedon the battlefield.
55. M. Russan,Ma'arikBab al-Wad( n.p., 1950), pp. 48-53.
56. Doubts aboutAbdullah'sintentionsbecameseriousmuchearlier;Memorandumby
SassonandBerman,13March1948,ibid,n. 36above.Meetingof the ArabDivisionof
the JewishAgency (held beforehavingbeen informedof Abdullah-Meyerson meet-
ing), 13 May 1948, CZA, S/25/9038.
57. Verbalreportof Meyersonon hermeetingwithKingAbdullah,12May1948,ibid., n.
16 above. Kirkbride'sreportto Londonon the meetingwas made only on 14 June
1948, in response to a cabled question to him from Bevin on 13 June; PRO,
F0816/123.
58. Bar-Joseph,pp. 49-50; Shlaim,pp. 143-5, andFlapan,pp. 140-2, go farin interpret-
ing Meyerson'spositionas an ultimatumto Abdullah.Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 17 Jan.
1949, p. 956.
59. Kirkbrideto FO; 1 May 1948, PRO, F0371/68546/E5529;4 May 1948, F0371/
68548/E5765;Kirkbrideto Bevin, 1 May, 1948, F0816/118.
60. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 28 Apr. 1948, Israel Documents, p. 693. Ben-Gurion's
response,30 Apr. 1948,ibid., p. 705. Meyersonto Cunningham,7 May 1948,ibid.,
pp. 745-6. Flapan, pp. 170-1, relates to Ben-Gurion'sreservedattitude to, and
delayedapprovalof, the agreement.
61. Report on a Meeting in Jericho, 7 May 1948, CunninghamPapers St. Antony's
College,Oxford,4/5/16. AhmadFrajTayi',SafahatMatwiya'AnFilastin(n.p., n.d.),
p. 101.
62. Z. Sharef, ThreeDays (London, 1962), pp. 114-5. H. Berman'smeetingwith the
TruceCommiteein Jerusalem,9 May 1948,IsraelDocuments,pp. 771-2. See Ben-
Gurion'spositionin a meetingof the 13-memberPeople'sAdministration,12 May
1948,MinheletHa'am,p. 61. Shlaim,pp. 193-5, holdsthe JewishAgencyresponsible
for failureof the Government'seffortsin thisrespect,but he ignoresthe existenceof
an unofficialtruce in Jerusalemuntil the morningof May 14.

63. Marshall,to Embassyin London,4 May1948,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,
vol. V, Part2 (Washington,1970), pp. 891-2 (FRUS).
64. MinheletHa-'am,pp. 75-6. The AmericanConsulin Jerusalemconsideredthat the
Jewsweretryingto exploitthe truceproposalsin orderto improvetheirpositionand
declaretheir state, Wassonto Sec. of State, 11 May 1948, FRUS, pp. 971-2.
65. Kirkbrideto FO, 4 and 8 May 1948, PRO; FO371/68852/E6008;F0371/68549/
E6002, respectively.Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 11 May 1948, p. 410. Wassonto Sec. of
State, 9 May 1948, FRUS, pp. 945-6.
66. Tal, pp. 31-5, argues that the attack was initiatedby him. His version has been
unquestioninglyadoptedby Shlaim,pp. 215-6; BarJoseph,p. 62; andby Collinsand
Lapierre,pp.348-50,357-8. Fora differentversion,see Glubb,p. 78;Musa,pp. 93-6;
Kurzman,p. 264-7.
67. Thiswaspartof the agreementon the MilitaryAnnexto the revisedAnglo-Jordanian
Treatyof March1946,of whichthe startof implementationwas reportedby British
MiddleEast LandForcesCommand,20 March1948, PRO, WO/261/18.
68. Kirkbrideto FO, 14 May 1948, PRO, F0816/120. Musa, pp. 97-8, refersto Kirk-
bride'sexplanationas a cover story.
69. MinheletHa'am,pp. 63, 77. Pappe,pp. 19, 21, 32, perceivesthe attackon the Etzion
Block as part of a pre-plannedbattle for Jerusalem.
70. 'NarrativeHistoryfor the PeriodFebruary1947-June1948',3 July1948,by General
G. MacMillan,G.O.C. Palestine,ImperialWarMuseum,London.
71. Kirkbrideto FO, 14 May 1948,F0371/68372/E6268.Musa,pp. 83-5, 101, maintains
that the Legion'scompanieswere deliberatelyleft behind, assumingthat the Jews
would not object. See FO's explanationto the US State Department;Wrightto
Douglas, 22 May 1948, PRO, FO371/68830/E7224.
72. Kirkbrideto FO, 14 May 1948, PRO, FO371/68372/E6268.
73. Shlaim,pp. 223-44, acceptsTal'sclaim,pp. 35-9, thatGlubbabandonedJerusalemto
the mercyof the Jews. Pappe, pp. 32-9. Both Shlaimand Pappeignorethe British
undertakingto evacuatethe Legion before the expiryof the Mandate.
74. Y. Shapira(ed.), David Shaltiel,Yerushalayim 1948 (Tel Aviv, 1981), pp. 145-51,
163-9. I. Levi (levitze), Tish'aKabin,Yerushalayim BikravotMilhemetHa'atzmaut
(Tel Aviv, 1986), pp. 225-35.
75. The Britishstood up to theircommitmentduringOperation'Yevusi',to handSheikh
Jarrahto the Jews on their withdrawalfrom the City; Kurzman,p. 241.
76. Muhammadal-Siba'i,Al-lkhwanal-MuslimunFi HarbFilastin(Dar al Nadhir,n.p.,
1985), pp. 30-1. Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 13 May 1948, p. 414.
77. Shlaim,p. 194-5, attributessuch an approachonly to the Jews.
78. Musa, p. 127.
79. The Israeliproposalwas officiallyhandedto the TruceCommissionon 15 May, after
havingbeen approvedby Ben-Gurion;Reportby H. V. Herzog,21 May1948,Israel
State Archive, Te'udotLemediniyutHahutzShel MedinatIsrael,Vol. I, 14 May-30
September1948(Jerusalem,1985),pp. 42-52. Shaltiel,pp. 165-6. Beaumontto FO,
14 May 1948, PRO, F0371/E68552/6248,reported acceptanceof eight-daysof
ceasefireby the JewishAgency and the Arab HigherCommittee,with approvalof
King Abdullah,Glubb,p. 108.
80. L. Kohnto Nieuwenhuys,19May1948,IsraelDocumentsI, p. 35. On the attemptsat
breakinginto the Old City, see Shaltiel,pp. 171-8.
81. Musa,p. 145. Kirkbrideto FO, 15 May 1948,PRO, F0371/68372/E6304.Kurzman,
p. 404. Levitze, pp. 42, 234.
82. Jubouri,pp. 167-168.A. al-Nafouri,'Al-Jaishal-SouriFi Filastin,'Am 1948',Al-Fikr
al-'Askari(Damascus),no. 2-3 (July 1979), p. 12. LajnaIraqiyaNiyabiya,p. 194.
83. Ibid., p. 195. 'Arif,p. 289. Musa,p. 56. Nafouri,p. 12. Jubouri,pp. 171-2. Kirkbride
to FO, 14 May, 1948, PRO, F0371/68372/E6268.
84. Jubouri,pp. 169-70, holds Glubbresponsiblefor changingthe plan. Glubb, p. 93,
maintainsthat there was no joint plan. Nafouri,ibid.
85. Kirkbrideto FO, 15 May, 1948, PRO, F0371/68372/E6304.

86. The opportunitywas lost despitethe pleas of the 'Har'el'Brigade'scommander(Y.
Rabin);Y. Alon, Ma'arakhotPalmah,MegamotUma'as(TelAviv, 1966).Collinsand
Lapierre,p. 415. Shapira,p. 110.
87. F. al-Qawaqji,'Memoirs,1948',part2, Journalof PalestineStudies,vol. 2(1973)1, pp.
9, 12-13. See Musa'scriticismon the recklessnessmanifestedby Qawaqjiin this
matter,p. 130.
88. For the role of the Syrianleadershipin organizingand directingthe irregularforces,
see Hashimi,p. 151 and on; Kh. Qasimiya(ed.), FilastinFi MudhakiratFawzi al-
Qawaqji,1936-1948(Beirut,1975),p. 124andon; Nafouri,p. 11. H. al-Hindi,'Jaish
al-Inqadh,1947-1949',Shu'unFilastiniya,pt. I, no. 23 (1973), p. 47.
89. For Qawaqji'sexplanationof the lack of coordinationwith the Legion'sCommand,
see, Qasimiya,p. 196-7. Qawaqji,p. 28.
90. Musa, pp. 129-130. Russan,pp. 71-5.
91. Kirkbrideto FO, 15 May 1948, PRO, FO371/68553/E6328.
92. Musa, pp. 133-5. levitze, pp. 57, 240-1. Their versionabout the numberof Arab
irregulararmedmen at the end of the Mandateare similar.
93. Musa, p. 136. For a photographof the document,see p. 188. Glubb, p. 117.
94. Kirkbrideto FO, 19 May 1948, PRO, F0816/120. Glubb, pp. 111-3.
95. Musa, pp. 137-8.
96. Kirkbrideto FO, 17 May1948,PRO,F0816/120.A letterin Arabicfromthe Kingto
Bevin, 16 May 1948, ibid.
97. Tal, pp. 101-102. Musa, pp. 144-5.
98. Ibid. Qawaqji,pp. 26, 30-3.
99. For the text of order, Musa, p. 138. Glubb, p. 110.
100. L. Kohnto Ben-Gurion,19 May 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 34. Reportby H. V.
Herzog, 21 May 1948, ibid., pp. 48-9. 'Arif, p. 442.
101. Memorandumby Glubb, 12 Aug. 1948, PRO, F0141/1246.
102. Shaltiel,pp. 173-4. Forthe controversyamongJewishcommandersin Jerusalem,see
ibid., pp. 175-7. Shapira,pp. 99-100, 189-90.Levitze,pp. 55-6. See also Musa,pp.
147-9. Kurzman,pp. 424-5.
103. For the text of order, see Musa, pp. 157-9.
104. As it was arguedby Tal in Akhir Sa'a, 1 Feb. 1950, 'Arif, p. 540. For a detailed
descriptionof the Legion'sattackon 19 and 22 May, see Musa, pp. 160-185, 293.
Kurzman,408-12. For interpretationsof the Legion'sattack,see Baer, p. 145, anda
similarargument;Bar-Joseph,pp. 72-4; Shlaim,pp. 234-5. Shueftan,p. 135-6.
105. For the positionof LondonandAmmanon internationalization; Kirkbrideto FO, 29
May 1948,PRO, F0816/121. Dow to FO, 20 May 1948,PRO, F0371/68566/E8495.
106. Kirkbride,pp. 36-7, 53, 98-9.
107. Kirkbrideto FO, 8 May 1948,PRO, F0371/68852/E6008.See also the letterhe sent
to FO by the usualmail and not in a cable, 8 May 1948,PRO, F0371/68854/E7202,
and the reassuringanswerfrom FO to him, 28 May 1948, ibid.
108. Kirkbrideto FO, 19 May 1948, PRO, F0816/120.
109. Kirkbride,pp. 34-6. See Musa'sversion,pp. 242-6.
110. Levitze, p. 361.
111. Ibid., pp. 42, 234.
112. Kirkbrideto FO, 21 May 1948, PRO, F0371/68373/E6694.Hashimi,pp. 223-5.
113. Levitze, p. 361.
114. Russan,p. 121.Musa,pp. 239-41.Levitze,pp. 286-92. Bar-Joseph'sexplanation,pp.
78-9. Kurzman,pp. 485-6.
115. Burdettto Sec. of State,30 June, 1948,FRUS,p. 1158.Memorandumby Hillenkoet-
ter, to Truman,8 May, 1948,ibid., p. 1200.Macdonald(the newconsulin Jerusalem)
to Sec. of State, 8 July 1948, ibid., p. 1201, and Editor'snote, ibid.
116. Kirkbrideto FO, 25, 26 May 1948,PRO, FO816/121.Editor'snote, FRUS,p. 1086.
Burdettto Sec. of State, 8 June 1948, ibid., pp. 1105-6.
117. Bevin to Pirie-Gordon,22 Aug. 1948, PRO, PREM/1022.
118. Kirkbrideto FO, 9 June 1948, PRO, FO371/68413/E7854, and Bevin's answer, 11

June 1948,ibid. On the positionof the LegionandTransjordan,see memorandumby

Glubb, 12 Aug. 1948, PRO, F0141/1246. Kirkbrideto FO; 12 July 1948, PRO,
F0371/68572/E9449;9 July 1948,PRO, F0371/68570/E9295,reportsa stateof panic
among the Jordanianleaders.Bevin's answerto him, 9 July 1948, ibid. Pappe, pp.
35-6.
119. Kirkbrideto FO, 9 June 1948,PRO, F0371/68413/E7854.Campbellto Bevin, 1 July
1948, PRO, F0371/68857/E9054.
120. MonthlySummaryon Transjordan,July1948;Kirkbrideto Bevin,6 Aug. 1948,PRO,
FO 371/68845/E10720. Dow to FO, 29 June 1948,PRO, F0371/68567/E8807.Patter-
son to Sec. of State, 30 June 1948, FRUS, p. 1159.
121. Ben-Gurion'sDiary;24 May 1948,p. 454; 18 June 1948,pp. 533-4. D. Ben-Gurion,
BehilahemIsrael(Tel Aviv, 1951), 24 June, 1948, p. 179.
122. E. Oren, BaderekhEl Ha'ir, Mivtza''Dani' (Tel Aviv, 1976), p. 15. Russan, pp.
135-6. In the absenceof intentionto keep the two towns,no militarygovernorswere
appointedby the Legion, Kurtzman,p. 508.
123. On the water problemsin Jerusalem,see D. Yossef, KiryaNe'emana(Jerusalem,
1960), pp. 233-5.
124. Levitze, p. 253. Shertokto Eban, 3 July 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 267.
125. Tal, pp. 270-6. Levitze, pp. 310-311.
126. Ibid., p. 319.
127. Baer, p. 203. Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 17 July 1948, pp. 596-7. For the local natureof
planningand implementationof the Operation,see Levitze,pp. 313-19; Kurtzman,
pp. 511-4, 601-3.
128. Memorandumby Glubb, 12 Aug. 1948, PRO, F0141/1246. Musa, pp. 240-241.
Kirkbrideto FO, 9 June 1948,PRO, F0371/68413/E7854,andFO's answer,11 June
1948, ibid. Alexanderto Bevin, 4 Aug. 1984, PRO, F0371/68415/E10895.
129. MeetingShertok-CountBernadotte,17-18 June 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 183.
130. Marshall to consul in Jerusalem, 28 July 1948, FRUS, p. 1251. Macdonald to Sec. of
State, 1 Aug. 1948, ibid., pp. 1264-5.
131. Knox to Sec. of State, 3 Aug. 1948, ibid., pp. 1273-4. Yossef, pp. 304-5.
132. Ben-Gurion'sDiary; 19 July 1948,p. 602; 3 Aug. 1948, p. 631. Behilahem,22 July
1948,pp. 186-7. Meetingof the IsraeliDelegationto the UnitedNations,3 Oct. 1948,
Israel States Archive, Te'udotdemediniyutHahutz shel MedinetIsrael, Vol. II,
October 1948-April1949, Jerusalem,1984, pp.6-7.
133. Intelligence reports by the FO Research Division, 19 and 22 July 1948, ISA,
130.15/2569/13. Kurtzman, pp. 556, 598.
134. For the situation and reinforcementsin the Negev and the 'Triangle',see Ben-
Gurion'sDiary, pp. 613, 622-5, 628-9, 631, 663, 672, 700, 720. For the timingof
offensive in the Negev, ibid., pp. 624, 629, 673.
135. Marshall to consul in Jerusalem; 28 July 1948, FRUS, p. 1251; 3 Aug. 1948, ibid.,
p. 1275-6. On the consolidation of British American understading, Douglas to Sec. of
State, 27 Aug. 1948, ibid., pp. 1352-9; 10 Sep. 1948, ibid., pp. 1388-90. Marshall to
the Embassy in London, 11 Sep. 1948, ibid., p. 1392.
136. Eban to Shertok,5 Aug. 1948,IsraelDocumentsI, p. 460. Shertokto Eban, 8 Aug.
1948, ibid., pp. 493-4. Eban to Shertok,11 Aug. 1948, ibid., p. 511.
137. For early expression of this approach; Ben-Gurion, Behilahem, 22 July 1948, p. 187;
Eytan to Shertok, 28 July 1948, Israel Documents I, pp. 423-4; Editor's note, ibid., p.
453.
138. Sasson to Shim'oni, 3 Aug. 1948, ibid., p. 453, Memorandum by Lovett, 26 Aug. 1948,
and Editor'snote, FRUS, p. 1347.
139. Weizmannto Truman,25 May1948,IsraelDocumentsI, p. 77. Lovettto Truman,11
Aug. 1948, FRUS, pp. 1300-1301.Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 3 Nov. 1948, p. 796.
140. Meeting Shertok-McDonald, 7 Sep. 1948, FRUS I, pp. 1375-8.
141. Macdonald to Sec. of State, 6 Sep. 1948, FRUS, p. 1375. Kurtzman, pp. 618-20.
142. Shertok to the members of government, 10 Sep. 1948, Israel Documents I, p. 585. Two
weeks later, the Government moderated its position towards compromise, 26 Sep.

1948, Ben-Gurion'sDiary, p. 722. M. Shertok,Besha'arHa'umot,1946-1949(Tel
Aviv, 1958),pp. 304-5.
143. Shertokto Sasson, 5 Aug. 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 490.
144. Bar-Joseph,pp. 115-9. Shueftan,pp. 79-81. Shlaim, pp. 308-11. Bar-Zohar,pp.
Bishe'elatYerushalayimBemil-
822-6. M. Pa'il,'HaistrategyaHatziyonit-Hayisraelit
hemet Ha'atzmaut'in E. Shaltiel (ed.), Prakim Betoldot YerushalayimBazman
Hehadash(Jerusalem,1985), p. 371.
145. P. Bernadotte,ToJerusalem(London,1951),pp. 238-44. Ben-Gurion'sDiary,7 Oct.
1948, p. 736. Eban to Shertok,22 Sep. 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 624.
146. Ben-Gurion'sDiary, 6-7 Oct. 1948. pp. 736-7.
147. Sharettto Elath, 10 Oct. 1948, IsraelDocumentsII, p. 45.
148. Kirkbrideto FO, 5 Aug. 1948, PRO, F0371/68830/E10466.
149. KamilIhsan al-Sharif,Al-Ikhwanal-MuslimunFi Harb Filastin(Cairo, 1951), pp.
106-7. Shim'onito Eban, 9 July 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 310.
150. Campbellto FO, 12 July 1948, PRO, F0371/68641/E9552;31 July 1948, ibid.,
E10241/Dowto FO, 3 Aug. 1948, ibid., E10393. SamihShabib,Hukumat'Umum
Filastin,MuqaddimatWahaqa'iq(Nicosia, 1988), 35-50. Al-Haj Amin al-Husseini,
Haqa'iq'An QadiyyatFilastin(Cairo, 1956), pp. 84-6. al-'Arif,pp. 703-6.
151. MeetingShertok-CountBernadotte,10 Aug. 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, pp. 504-5.
Shrtokto B. Shitrit,8 Aug. 1948, ibid., p. 498.
152. Shim'onito Sasson,17 Aug. 1948,ibid., p. 533. Sharettto Eytan,5 Oct. 1948,Israel
DocumentsII, pp. 21-2. Ben-Gurionto Sharett,8 Oct. 1948, ibid., p. 44.
153. As contendedby Shlaim,pp. 316-20.
154. Ben-Gurion'sDiary,22 Oct. 1948,p. 761. Alon, p. 236, arguesthatthe advanceof his
forces towardsHebronwas stoppedby politicalorder. Musa, pp. 467-9, views the
Legion as the factorfor stoppingthe IsraeliForceson the Beit Jibrin-Hebronroad.
155. Tal, p. 407, contendsthatGlubbwasinvolvedin a collusionwiththe Jewsagainstthe
Egyptians.Shlaim,pp. 328-9, refutesTal's argument.Flapan,p. 142, acceptsTal's
version.
156. Musa,pp. 468-9. Tal, pp. 411-2. On disarmingthe Mufti'sadherents,see Musa,pp.
459-60.
157. Pa'il, p. 374.
158. Sassonto Abu al-Huda,28 Oct. 1948, IsraelDocumentsII, pp. 109-110. Sharettto
Eytan, 9 Nov. 1948, ibid., p. 155.
159. Ben-Gurion'sDiary;31 Oct. 1948,p. 790;5 Nov. 1948,p. 799;14Nov. 1948,p. 824;18
Dec. 1948,p. 885.
160. Ibid., 5 Nov. 1948, p. 799. Head of the US Delegationto the UN to Acting Sec. of
State, 3 Nov. 1948, FRUS, pp. 1543-4. For the text of SC resolution,see ibid., pp.
1546-7.
161. Sharett'sremarksto a surveyof the researchdivision,31 Oct. 1948, ISA, 130.02/
2448/1.Ben-Gurion'sDiary,28 Dec. 1948,pp. 906 907. Ha'aretz,23 Nov. 1948.See
Ben-Gurion'sillustrativespeech to the Knesset,4 Apr. 1949, ISA, ibid.
162. Shiloahto Sharett,20 Nov. 1948, IsraelDocumentsII, pp. 209-10.
163. Pa'il, pp. 375-376. Shiloahto Sharett,30 Nov. 1948, IsraelDocumentsII, p. 250; 5
Dec. 1948, ibid., p. 266. Burdettto Sec. of State, 29 Nov. 1948, FRUS, p. 1634.
164. Akhbaral-Yawm,5 Dec. 1948.Tal, pp. 376-9. Reporton the Congress,6 Dec. 1948,
PRO, F0816/142.
165. Kirkbrideto FO, 9 Dec. 1948, PRO, F0371/68643/E15690.Abdullahto Abu al-
Huda, 6 Jan. 1949, PRO, F0816/151. Kirkbrideto FO, 17 Jan. 1949, PRO, FO371/
75335/E815.
166. Sassonto Sharett,19Dec. 1948,IsraelDocumentsII, p. 306. Ben-Gurion'sDiary;18
Dec. 1948, pp. 884-5; 19 Dec. 1948, p. 886; 21 Dec. 1948, p. 893.
167. Ibid., 28 Dec. 1948, pp. 906-7.
168. Stablerto Sec. of State,29 Dec. 1948,FRUS,pp. 1699-1700. Lovettto McDonald,30
Dec. 1948,ibid,p. 1704.Kirkbrideto FO;2 Jan. 1949,PRO, FO371/75330/E6;10Jan.
1949, PRO, F0371/75376/E464.

169. Abdullahto Bevin, 11March1949,andBevin'sresponse,to Amman,18March1949,
PRO, F0371/75383/E3637.Kirkbrideto FO, 11 March1949, PRO, F0371/75381/
E3305.Pirie-Gordonto FO, 26 March1949,PRO, F0371/75387/E3941.Sec. of State
to the legationin Amman,25 March1949,ForeignRelationsof TheUnitedStates,1949
(Washington,1977),andeditorialnote, p. 871. Trumanto KingAbdullah,28 March
1949, ibid., pp. 878-9.
170. Mackto FO, 29 March1949, PRO, F0371/75387/E4092.Tal, pp. 569-82, 587-97.
171. Sharettto Sasson, 5 Aug. 1948, IsraelDocumentsI, p. 490. Tal, pp. 460-1.
172. See note 18 above.
173. Shlaim,pp. 223-4, 235, 316-20, maintains,despitethe title andcontentof his book,
that there was no collusion but at most a tacit understanding.See Bar-Joseph's
interpretations of the battlesin Jerusalem,pp. 68-9, 73-4; andLatrun,pp. 75-86;and
lack of interventionby the Legionin the battleduringOperationYoav, pp. 132-3.
174. As contendedby Shueftan,p. 63.
175. From a purely militaryviewpoint,the Legion was expected to concentrateall its
effortson bisectingthe Jewishstate, thusits entranceinto Jerusalemseems a serious
mistake;Alon, pp. 232-3. Baer, p. 133.
176. These aremainlythe memoirsof Tal andRussanof whichan extensiveuse wasmade
particularlyby Bar-Josephand Shlaim.
177. Pa'il, p. 360.
178. Ben-Gurionto the Knesset,4 Apr. 1949, ISA, 130.02/2448/1.
179. E. Oren, 'IskaDe-Facto?',Ma'arakhot,311 (March1988),pp.39-44, disagreeswith
Shueftanand emphasizesthe militaryand politicalconstraintswhich preventeda
conquestof the WestBank.See Shueftan'sresponse,'AkhenIska,HavanaVeheskem
- OptziaYardenit',ibid., 312-3 (Sept.-Oct. 1988), pp. 39-44.
180. Shlaim,p. 2.
181. Baer, pp. 121-3. Flapan,p. 58.


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Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality

Author(s): Avraham Sela

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

tendedthatan historicopportunityhadbeen missedto gaincontrolof the

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

by Britain in the Zionist-Hashemiteagreementwas meant to expand

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role played by this understandingin shapingIsraeli-Jordanianrelations

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question of the historiographicalperiodizationof the relationsbetween

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This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

strengthenits positionwithinthat arena.Thiswas particularlydue to the

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.21 on Sat, 21 Jun 2014 05:29:26 AM

of Deliveranceoperatedundertheirown commandsand rarelyachieved

FROM STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING TO WAR

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extensive autonomy.In the meeting at Naharayimhe even spoke about

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The meetingat Naharayim,andAbdullah'spositionagainstoperations

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Legion'snot attackingany partof the territoryof the Jewishstate.31The

The king'ssuccessesin the diplomaticarena- coordinationof his plans

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Under these circumstances,it was essentialfor the king to demonstrate

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save Palestine.Withthis step, Abdullahrestoredhis prestigein the inter-

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Mandateloomed on the horizon. Britainand Francewere requestedto

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The Holy Citywasnot a goal for the ArabLegionin the planningstagesof

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advantagesecured by Haganah forces towards the end of April. The

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declarationof the state and make do with autonomyunder Transjor-

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Throughthe mediationof the UN TrusteeshipCouncil,an agreement

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Agency andthe ArabHigherCommittee,an agreementthatwouldentail

Ben-Gurion's apprehensionsregardingan Arab offensive outside of

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BritishArmy HQ in Palestineissuedan officialcommuniquestatingthat

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SuleimanMusa calls 'the lost days'.78During this four-dayperiod, the

The withdrawalof the British from Jerusalem created a vacuum of

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the Jewishcommand'smotivationswasthe urgentneed to preventthe fall

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not mesh with Abdullah'sintentions,and he insistedthat it be alteredto

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retake the Latrunpositions, they found them abandonedby the main

Accordingto SuleimanMusa,fromthe veryfirstdayof the Legion'sentry

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of the Legion'sfailureto act as the radioreportedthe triumphantadvance

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